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A  TREATISE 


ON   THE 


LAW  OF  EVIDENCE 


WITH   A 


DISCUSSION  OF  THE  PRINCIPLES  AND  RULES 

WHICH  GOVERN  ITS  PRESENTATION, 

RECEPTION  AND  EXCLUSION, 


AND   THE 


EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES  IN  COURT. 


BY 


H.  C.  UNDERHILL,  LL.  B. 

Ml  ' 


CHICAGO: 

T.  II.  FLOOD  AND   COMPANY, 
Law  Book  Publishers. 

1894. 


T 
1094 


Entered  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1894,  by 

H.  C.  UNDERBILL, 
in  the  office  of  the  Librarian  of  Congress,  at  Washington. 


STATE  JOURNAL  PRINTING  COMPANY, 

Printers  and  Stereotypkrs, 

MADISON,  wis. 


TO 
MY    FRIEND    AND    FORMER    INSTRUCTOR, 

C.  G.  TIEDEMAN,  Esq., 

PROFESSOR  OF   LAW  IN  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  THE  CITY  OF  NEW  YORK, 
THIS  VOLUME  IS  RESPECTFULLY  DEDICATED, 
AS    A 
TRIBUTE    OF    THE    AUTHORS    APPRECIATION    OF    HIS    LEARNING 
AND    ABILITY    AS    A    SCHOLAR.  AND    HIS    INTEG- 
RITY   AND    KINDLINESS    AS    A    MAN. 


6*70919 


PREFACE. 


The  primary  purpose  of  the  author  in  the  preparation  of 
this  work  is  to  present  in  a  concise  and  clear  narrative  a  rea- 
sonably comprehensive  statement  of  the  rules  and  principles 
of  the  existing  law  of  evidence,  for  the  use  of  students  of  law 
pursuing  their  studies  in  law  schools  or  elsewhere.  Though 
this  is  the  main  object  of  the  work,  the  author  is  not  wholly 
without  hopes  that  it  may  also  be  of  some  service  to  the  pro- 
fession ;  and  with  this  end  in  view  a  full  citation  of  the  most 
recent  and  most  important  cases  has  been  made,  which,  with 
a  carefully  prepared  topical  and  analytical  index,  will,  it  is 
believed,  facilitate  the  convenient  use  of  the  book  in  many,  if 
not  in  all,  the  exigencies  of  practice. 

In  order  to  secure  conciseness  it  was  found  necessary  to 
omit  the  detailed  discussion  of  many  things  which,  though 
interesting  to  the  historical  investigator  or  antiquarian,  are 
obsolete  and  useless  to  the  student.  The  author  has  not 
hesitated,  however,  when  the  occasion  seemed  to  demand  it, 
to  discuss  dead  or  obsolete  law  if  the  discussion  is  essential 
to  a  proper  elucidation  or  understanding  of  the  law  of  the 
present. 

The  evolution  of  the  law  of  evidence  from  a  mass  of  arbi- 
trary and  inadequate  rules,  based  upon  the  conservatism  and 
prejudice  which  could  see  nothing  but  good  in  the  past,  into 
a  well-reasoned  and  flexible  system  of  jurisprudence  adapted 
to  the  demands  of  the  spirit  of  a  progressive  age,  may  be 
attributed  to  a  variety  of  causes.  The  application  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  logic  to  the  law  of  evidence,  resulting  from  the  labors 


VI  PREFACE. 

of  Bentham  and  his  followers,  doubtless  had  much  to  do  in 
exploding  the  theory  propounded  by  some  of  the  earliest  writ- 
ers, that  it  was  not  only  useless  but  absolutely  harmful  to  seek 
to  find  a  reason  for  any  of  the  rules  of  evidence.  So,  too,  coin- 
cident with  the  process  of  rehabilitation  and  evolution  which 
has  been  going  on  in  the  law  itself  as  the  result  of  its  develop- 
ment along  logical  lines  and  the  operation  of  public  opinion 
acting  through  a  progressive  and  enlightened  judiciary,  may 
be  considered  the  express  statutory  changes  which  have  been 
made  and  some  of  which  are  embodied  in  the  codes  of  pro- 
cedure which  exist  in  many  of  the  states. 

Other  influences  as  well  have  been  at  work.  The  spread 
of  popular  education,  the  vast  increase  in  and  the  new  uses 
wrhich  have  been  found  for  wealth,  the  progress  of  scientific 
investigation,  the  application  of  newly-discovered  scientific 
principles  to  every  day-affairs,  and  the  extensive  use  of  ma- 
chinery for  purposes  of  transportation  and  manufacture, 
have  all  combined  to  bring  about  great  changes  in  the  law 
and  particularly  in  the  law  of  evidence. 

The  result  of  all  this  is,  that  while  the  law  of  evidence  has 
been  rendered  more  logical  and  better  adapted  to  the  de- 
mands of  a  progressive  social  state,  many  questions  have  been 
cast  into  the  back-ground  which  fifty  years  ago  were  of  the 
utmost  importance.  On  the  other  hand,  other  subjects  and 
questions  have  been  brought  forward  for  the  consideration 
of  the  student  or  attorney,  and  for  discussion  in  the  forum. 

Accordingly  it  will  be  found  that,  while  some  matters 
which  are  treated  by  the  older  authorities  at  some  length 
receive  only  cursory  attention  in  this  volume,  leaving  the 
reader  to  pursue  his  investigations  of  the  details  regarding 
them  in  the  authorities  cited,  other  departments  of  the  law  of 
evidence  —  as,  for  example,  expert  and  opinion  evidence,  res 
gestae,  relevancy,  the  statutory  incompetency  of  interested 
witnesses  to  testify  to  personal  transactions  with  a  decedent, 


PREFACE.  VI 1 

privileged  communications  to  doctors,  attorneys  and  clergy- 
men, the  inspection  of  persons  and  things  by  the  jury,  com- 
parison of  handwriting,  the  use  of  pleadings  as  evidence,  stip- 
ulations, objections  to  evidence,  etc., —  have  received  the  full 
consideration  their  modern  importance  demands. 

In  citing  the  most  recent  cases  the  author  has  endeavored 
to  give  the  citation  from  the  state  report  as  well  as  that  from 
the  National  Reporter  s}Tstem.  In  many  cases  where  it  was 
not  practicable  to  give  the  state  report  citation  in  the  notes, 
it  will  be  found  appended  to  the  case  in  its  proper  place  in 
the  table  of  cases.  Where  it  is  not  given  in  the  table  of 
cases,  the  reader  may  feel  assured  that  the  case  has  not 
been  reported  by  the  state  Reporter  up  to  the  time  that  this 
work  goes  to  press. 

Trusting  that  his  work  may  prove  of  value  in  lightening 
the  labors  of  practitioner  and  student,  and  that  though  either 
may  not  find  in  these  pages  a  solution  for  every  possible  or 
conceivable  problem  with  which  he  may  be  confronted,  yet, 
believing  that  what  is  found  will  neither  mislead  nor  con- 
fuse, the  author  presents  his  work  to  the  indulgence  of  the 

public. 

H.  C.  Underbill. 
59  Reid  Ave.,  Brooklyn,  N.  Y., 

September  10,  1894. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER. 


Early  development  of  law         .... 

Evidence  defined       ...... 

The  basis  of  belief     ...... 

Direct  and  circumstantial  evidence  distinguished 
Nature  and  eifect  of  circumstantial  evidence    . 
Reasonable  doubt  and  the  weight  of  evidence  . 


§1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 


CHAPTER  L 


RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY. 


Relevancy  of  evidence       ....... 

Collateral  facts,  how  far  admissible  ..... 

Evidence  of  intention,  motive,  good  faith,  etc.,  when  relevant 
Collateral  facts  bearing  on  character        .... 

Province  of  judge  and  jury       ...... 

Blended  questions  of  law  and  fact    ..... 

Preliminary  facts  bearing  on  admissibility 


8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 


CHAPTER  II. 

SUBSTANCE  OF  THE  ISSUE. 

Matter  of  substance  and  of  essential  description 
Formal  allegations    ...... 

Allegations  of  value,  quantity,  time,  place,  etc. 
Proof  of  contracts    ...... 

Variance  in  the  proof  of  sealed  instruments     . 
Substance  of  the  issue  in  criminal  trials   . 
Variance — Amendments  .         . 


18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 


CHAPTER  IIL 

PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY  EVIDENCE. 

Primary  and  secondaiy  evidence  distinguished 
Instruments  required  by  law  to  be  in  writing   . 
Disputed  writings      ........ 

Contracts  and  other  transactions  actually  reduced  to  writing 
Collateral  writings     ........ 


30 
31 
32 
33 
34 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


Exceptions  in  the  case  of  records  and  appointments  to  office 
Exceptions  in  the  case  of  evidence  of  general  results 
Admissions  as  primary  evidence        ..... 
Photographs  as  primary  evidence      ..... 
Exhibition  of  articles  in  court  ...... 


35 
36 
37 
38 
39 


CHAPTER  IV. 


HEARSAY. 


Definition  —  Grounds  for  its  rejection       .         . 
Statements  to  be  proved  as  facts 
Expressions  of  bodily  or  mental  feeling    . 
Pedigree  —  Oral  and  written  declarations 
Declarations  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gestae 
Requisites  ....... 

Must  be  illustrative  and  connected  with  main  transaction 
Declarations  must  be  contemporaneous  or  nearly  so 
Entries  as  part  of  the  res  gestce  and  made  by  third  persons 
Entries  against  interest  and  entries  which  are  part  of  the  res 
distinguished      ...... 

A  party's  own  books  as  evidence 
Indorsements  as  part  of  the  res  gestce 


50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 

59 
60 
61 


CHAPTER  V. 

ADMISSIONS. 

Definition  and  character  .         . §  65 

Privity  as  affecting  admissions          .......  66 

Parties  whose  admission  is  received  —  Joint  interest,  when  required  67 

Admissions  of  partners  —  Their  effect  when  made  after  dissolution  68 

Declarations  of  conspirators      ........  69 

Assignor  and  assignee       .........  70 

AVife's  admission  —  When  binding  on  husband          ....  71 

Admissions  of  inhabitants  of  towns           ......  72 

Admissions  of  strangers  to  the  record  —  Principal  and  surety  —  Ad- 
missions of  real  parties 73 

The  declarations  of  agents         ........  73a 

Admissions  by  attorneys  of  record   .......  74 

Offers  of  compromise  —  Admissions  under  duress  against  interest    .  75 

Admissions  in  pleadings   .........  76 

Admissions  by  reference   .........  77 

Admissions  from  conduct  and  assumed  character     ....  78 

Self-serving  declarations            ........  79 

Mode  of  proof  —  Nature  of  the  admissions         .....  80 

Weight  and  sufficiency  of  admissions        ......  81 

Admissions,  when  conclusive  —  Mistake  ......  83 

Estoppel  defined 83 

Intention  of  party  estopped       ........  84 

Admissions  and  communications  sent  and  received  by  telephone      .  85 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS.  XI 


CHAPTER  VI. 


CONFESSIONS. 

Definition  and  classification §  88 

To  be  regarded  with  caution     .         . 88a 

Voluntary  character  of  confessions 89 

Confessions,  when  voluntary  —  Inducements  offered        ...  90 

Confessions  need  not  be  spontaneous 91 

Preliminary  examination 92 

Extra-judicial  confessions  must  be  corroborated       ....  93 

Conclusive  character  of  judicial  confessions 94 

Persons  offering  inducements 95 

Confessions  of  persons  other  than  defendant 96 

Confessions  of  conspirators 97 

Confessions  of  treason 98 

CHAPTER  VIL 

DYING  DECLARATIONS. 

Definition §  100 

Sense  of  approaching  death 101 

In  what  cases  admissible 102 

Form  of  the  declaration 103 

CHAPTER  VIII. 

ANCIENT  DOCUMENTS. 

Definition §  105 

Documents  must  come  from  proper  custody 106 

Execution  need  not  be  proved 107 

Extent  of  corroboration  required 108 

CHAPTER  IX. 

GENERAL  REPUTATION. 

Public  and  general  reputation  distinguished  —  Adequate  knowledge 

of  declarant §  110 

Identity  of  declarant Ill 

Death  of  declarant 112 

Date  of  the  declaration  ante  litem  motam        .        .        .         .         •  113 

Evidence  of  reputation  in  the  case  of  private  rights          .         .         .  114 

Traditionary  evidence  regarding  private  boundaries          .         .         .  115 

Documents  showing  general  reputation 116 

CHAPTER  X. 

STRANGERS'   DECLARATIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST. 

Declarations  of  third  persons  and  other  declarations  distinguished  .  §  117 

Declarations  must  be  against  interest 118 

The  interest  of  the  declarant 119 

B 


Xll 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


The  death  of  the  declarant §  119« 

The  knowledge  of  the  declarant 1196 

Statements  of  predecessor  against  interest,  when  evidence  in  behalf 

of  successor 119e 


CHAPTER  XL 

WITNESSES  ABSENT   OR    DISQUALIFIED. 


Testimony  of  missing  witnesses 

Witness  need  not  be  deceased  ....... 

Witnesses  who  have  become  sick,  decrepit  or  insane 
Cross-examination  at  former  trial  requisite  —  Identity  of  parties 
Precise  language  of  witness,  how  far  requisite  .         . 


§  120 
121 
122 
123 
124 


CHAPTER  XII. 

PRIVATE  WRITINGS. 

Definition  and  classification §  125 

Production  of  writing  —  Proof  of  contents  by  secondary  evidence  .  126 
Writings  obtained  by  fraud  or  deceit  —  Decoy  letters       .         .         .  127 
Spoliation  and  alteration  distinguished  —  Effect  of  material  altera- 
tions    128 

Alterations  — Presumptions  and  burden  of  proof  to  explain     .         .  129 

Private  writings  lost  or  destroyed     .......  130 

Handwriting  defined  —  Signature  by  mark       .....  131 

Production  of  writings,  when  necessary   ......  132 

Proof  by  admissions  of  party  ........  133 

When  proof  of  handwriting  may  be  dispensed  with  —  Acknowledg- 
ments           134 

Who  may  take  acknowledgments     .......  135 

The  certificate 136 

Impeaching  the  certificate 137 

Proof  by  subscribing  witnesses          .......  138 

Proof  by  witnesses  acquainted  with  party's  handwriting          .         .  139 

Mode  of  examining  witnesses  as  to  handwriting       ....  139a 

Comparison  of  handwriting 140 

To  what  expert  may  give  evidence 141 

Proof  of  exhibits  in  equity •        •  142 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

JUDICIAL  AND  OTHER  PUBLIC  RECORDS. 

Inspection  of  public  records 

Proof  of  executive  and  legislative  acts  and  writings 

Proof  of  public  non-judicial  records 

Proof  of  foreign  laws        ...... 

Proof  of  municipal  ordinances  .... 

Effect  of  public  documents  as  evidence     .        .        . 


§  142a 
142& 
142c 

143 
143a 

144 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


Nlll 


Historical  and  scientific  publications  —  Almanacs  and  newspapers  .  §  145 

Proof  of  judicial  records — General  rule   ......  L46 

Proof  of  records  of  courts  of  equity  and  of  inferior  courts        .         .  147 

Proof  of  records  of  courts  of  other  states 14tt 

Proof  of  foreign  judgments 149 

Records  of  surrogate  courts 150 

Proof  of  returns  on  writs  .........  150« 

The  effect  of  judicial  records  as  evidence 1506 

The  effect  of  judgments  on  those  in  privity  with  the  parties     .         .  151 

Judgment  must  have  been  final  and  on  the  merits    ....  152 

Judgments  conclusive  only  as  to  material  facts  in  issue    .         .         .  153 

Identity  of  cause  of  action  required           ......  154 

Persons  affected  by  judgments  in  rem  and  actions  fixing  personal 

status 155 

Criminal  judgments 156 

Proof  of  judgments  as  facts  and  their  use  as  proving  ulterior  facts 

distinguished 157 

Validity  and  effect  of  foreign  judgments 158 

Judgments  of  sister  states 159 

Judgments  in  bar  need  not  be  pleaded 160 

CHAPTER  XIV. 


PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS. 

Foundation  of  the  doctrine 

Husband  and  wife,  when  competent  witnesses 
Statutory  legislation  —  Confidential  communications 
Confidential  communications  between  husband  and  wife 
Communications  to  attorneys  .... 
Character  and  time  of  the  communications 
Attorney  employed  by  both  parties  . 
Permanent  character  of  the  privilege  —  Its  waiver 
Privileges  as  to  documents        .... 
What  communications  are  within  the  privilege 
Privilege  of  police,  judicial  and  executive  officials 
Privilege  as  relating  to  jurors  .... 
Confidential  communications  to  clergymen 
Communications  to  physicians 


§  165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 


CHAPTER  XV. 


EXPERT  AND  OPINION  EVIDENCE. 

Definition  ........... 

Matter  of  common  knowledge  —  Opinions  of  non-experts,  when  ad 
missible      ......... 

Expert  evidence,  when  admissible    ..... 

Competency  and  examination  of  experts 
Cross-examination  of  experts  —  Use  of  scientific  books     . 
The  weight  and  credibility  of  expert  and  opinion  evidence 


§  185 


186 

187 
188 
189 
190 


XIV 


TABLE    OF   CONTENTS. 


Compensation  of  experts 

Physicians  as  experts  —  Cause  of  death 

Evidence  of  medical  experts  to  show  character  of  disease  and  blood 

stains  —  Expert  evidence  as  to  autopsies  and  malpractice  . 
Non-expert  evidence  upon  a  person's  physical  condition  . 
Chemists  as  experts  —  Poisons  ...... 

Expert  evidence  where  sexual  crimes  have  been  committed  —  Abor 

tion 

Expert  and  non-expert  evidence  upon  insanity 

Mechanical  experts  ......... 

Expert  evidence  as  to  value 

Underwriters  as  experts  ........ 

Experiments  in  and  out  of  court 

Physical  examination  of  the  party  by  experts  .... 


191 
192 

193 
194 
195 

196 
197 

198 
199 
200 
201 
202 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

PAROL  OR  EXTRINSIC  EVIDENCE   AS   RELATED  TO  WRITINGS. 

Parol  evidence,  when  inadmissible    .......§  205 

Interpretation  and  construction  of  writings 206 

Rule  applies  between  parties  only     .......  207 

Invalidity  of  writings  —  Evidence  to  vary  or  explain  or  show  real 

consideration      ..........  208 

Incomplete  and  collateral  writings 209 

Parol  evidence  to  connect  and  explain  contemporaneous  writings    .  210 

Receipts 211 

Independent  parol  contracts  and  conditions  precedent     .         .         .  212 

To  establish  implied,  resulting  or  constructive  trusts         .         .         .  213 

Discharge,  modification  or  extension  of  contract  may  be  shown       .  214 

To  rebut  presumptions      .........  215 

To  show  usage  ..........  216 

To  explain  technical  terms 217 

Abbreviations 218 

The  relations  of  the  parties 219 

To  ascertain  or  explain  subject-matter 220 

Ambiguities  defined  and  distinguished  —  Parol  evidence  to  explain  221 

Parol  evidence  as  applicable  to  wills         ......  222 

Parol  evidence  to  show  absolute  deed  a  mortgage  and  in  suits  for 

specific  performance  and  reformation  or  cancellation        .         .  223 


CHAPTER  XVIL 

PRESUMPTIONS. 

Definition  and  classification 

Presumptions  of  law  and  fact  distinguished 
Presumptions  of  fact  —  Accomplices 
Presumptions  from  adverse  possession  and  prescription 
Presumptions  from  lapse  of  time      .... 
Presumptions  from  possession  .... 


224 
225 
226 
227 
228 
229 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 


XV 


Presumptions  from  the  usual  course  of  trade   . 
Lawfulness  —  Continuity  —  Sanity  —  Insanity 
Presumptions  as  to  jurisdiction 
Presumptions  of  life,  death  and  survivorship    . 
Legitimacy  —  Innocence  —  Malice   .        .        . 


§  230 
231 
232 
233 
234 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 

JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 

Judicial  notice §  236 

Matter  of  common  knowledge 237 

Historical  facts          . 238 

Geographical  facts 239 

Political  facts  —  Elections 240 

Scientific  facts 241 

Common  and  statutory  law  —  Municipal  ordinances  and  local  and 

foreign  laws       . 242 

Foreign  nations,  seals  and  acts 243 

Terms  of  court,  records,  rules  of  practice  and  judicial  proceedings  .  244 


CHAPTER  XIX 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF  AND  RIGHT  TO  OPEN  AND  CLOSE. 


Burden  of  proof  defined 

Burden  of  proof  in  special  proceedings     . 

Burden  of  proof  in  criminal  trials    .... 

Proof  of  negative  —  Facts  best  known  to  party  alleging 

When  plaintiff  may  open  and  close  .... 

When  defendant  may  open  and  close 

Right  to  open  and  close  in  special  proceedings 

Right  to  open  and  close,  when  discretionary     . 


247 
248 
249 
250 
251 
252 
253 
254 


CHAPTER  XX 


STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS. 

Origin  and  nature  of  the  statute §261 

Agreements  relating  to  interests  in  land 262 

Partition  of  real  property 263 

Trusts  in  real  and  personal  estate 264 

Surrender  or  assignment  of  leases 265 

Contracts  required  to  be  in  writing 266 

Articles  of  partnership      . 267 

Form  and  character  of  the  writing 268 

Wills  required  to  be  evidenced  in  writing         .....  269 
Agreements  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds  which  must  be  evi- 
denced by  writings .         .  270 


XVI 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  XXL 


ATTENDANCE   OF   WITNESSES. 

The  attendance  of  witnesses  at  private  arbitrations 
The  subpoena  —  Fees  of  witnesses 
Fees  in  criminal  cases        ..... 
Subpoena  duces  tecum        ..... 
Time  and  mode  of  serving  the  subpoena    . 
Recognizance  to  secure  presence  of  a  witness  . 
Obstructing  attendance  of  witnesses  .         . 

Changing  venue  for  convenience  of  witnesses  . 
Failure  of  witnesses  to  attend  —  Continuance,  when 
Continuance  in  criminal  trials  .... 
Non-attendance  of  witness  —  When  a  contempt 
Privilege  of  witnesses  from  service  of  civil  process 
Privilege  of  witnesses  from  civil  arrest 
Duration  of  the  privilege  from  arrest        .         . 
Attendance  of  witnesses  in  custody  .         , 
Attendance  of  witnesses  before  legislative  bodies 


granted 


§  273 
2TG 
277 
278 
279 
280 
281 
281a 
282 
283 
284 
285 
286 
287 
288 
289 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


COMPETENCY  OF   WITNESSES. 


Classes  of  persons  incompetent 

Parties  incompetent  as  witnesses  at  common  law      .         . 
Testimony  of  party  admissible  when  his  connection  with  action  no 

longer  exists       ......... 

What  constitutes  interest  in  the  event       ..... 

Exceptions  to  the  common-law  rule  —  The  answer  as  evidence  for 

the  defendant  in  equity       ....... 

Competency  of  parties  as  witnesses  in  equity —  The  employment  and 

effect  of  a  bill  of  discovery  ...... 

Defendant  in  criminal  trial  — His  competency  as  a  witness 
Statutory  competency  of  parties  as  witnesses   .... 

Statutory  incompetency  of  interested  persons  to  testify  as  to  trans 

actions  with  deceased  or  insane  persons     .... 

What  are  transaction  with  decedents        ..... 

Persons  interested  —  Their  statutory  incompetency  . 
Incompetency  of  parties  to  negotiable  instruments  to  impeach  them 
Competency  of  counsel  as  witnesses  ..... 

Competency  of  judges  as  witnesses  .         .         .         . 

Incompetency  of  arbitrators  as  witnesses  in  an  action  on  the  award 
Definition  and  form  of  oath  and  affirmation     .... 

Incompetency  because  of  a  lack  of  religious  belief    .         .         . 
Incompetency  of  insane  persons  as  witnesses    .... 

Deaf  mutes  as  witnesses  ........ 

Children  as  witnesses 


§  300 
301 

302 
303 

304 

305 
300 
307 

308 
309 
310 
311 
312 
313 
314 
315 
316 
317 
318 
319 


TABLE    OF    CONTENTS.  XVI I 

Witnesses  rendered  incompetent  by  conviction  of  infamous  crimes  — 

The  effect  of  pardon §320 

Statutory  regulation  of  the  competency  of  witnesses  convicted  of 

crime 321 

Statutes  construed 322 

Accomplices 323 

Corroboration  of  accomplices  .        .        .        .    •     .        .        .        .  324 

CHAPTER  XXIIL 

EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES. 

Order  for  witnesses  to  withdraw  from  court-room  .         ...  §  330 

Direct  examination  and  cross-examination  distinguished          .         .  331 

Refusal  to  testify,  when  a  contempt  — Employment  of  interpreter    .  332 

Mode  of  conducting  direct  examination 333 

Questions  put  by  the  judge  or  by  members  of  the  jury     .         .         .  334 

Leading  questions  —  When  allowable  on  direct  examination     .         .  335 

Responsiveness  of  answers        ........  336 

Witness  may  refresh  his  memory  by  referring  to  a  memorandum  or 

writing       ...........  337 

Character  of  the  writing  used  to  refresh  memory  of  the  witness       .  338 

Cross-examination  —  Its  purpose  and  value 339 

Power  of  cross-examination  —  Its  extent 340 

Redirect  examination 341 

Recalling  witnesses  .                  342 

Receiving  evidence  out  of  court 343 

Taking  the  view  by  the  jury 344 

*' Real  evidence  "  —  Physical  examination  by  the  jury  in  court  — 

Identification      ..........  345 

Right  of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  trial  to  confront  the  witnesses 

against  him 346 

The  accused  as  a  witness  in  a  criminal  prosecution  ....  346a 

CHAPTER  XXIV. 

IMPEACHMENT   OF  WITNESSES. 

Party  cannot  impeach  his  own  witness §  347 

Exceptions  to  the  rule  that  a  party  vouches  for  his  own  witnesses  .  348 
How  the  adverse  witness  may  be  impeached  —  General  reputation 

for  veracity,  etc. 349 

Impeachment  by  proving  contrary  statements  or  silence  of  witness 

on  a  former  occasion .........  350 

Falsus  in  uno  falsus  in  omnibus       .......  351 

Evidence  of  general  reputation  of  an  impeached  witness  .         .         .  352 

Privileges  of  witnesses  —  Questions  disclosing  pecuniary  liability     .  353 

Questions  tending  to  disgrace  the  witness 354 

Questions  calculated  to  expose  the  witness  to  a  criminal  charge       .  354a 

Bias  and  prejudice  of  the  witness 3546 


XV111  TABLE   OF   CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  XXV. 

AFFIDAVITS  AND  DEPOSITIONS. 

Affidavits  and  depositions  defined  and  distinguished        .        .        .    §  355 

Parties  to  affidavits .        .  356 

Formal  requisites  of  affidavits 357 

Language  of  the  affidavit 358 

Definition  and  character  of  depositions 359 

Mode  of  procuring  depositions ........  360 

Statutes  construed — The  certificate.         .        .        .        .        .        .  361 

Objections  to  depositions 362 

Use  of  depositions  as  evidence. 363 

Equitable  bills  to  perpetuate  testimony 364 

CHAPTER  XXVL 

RECEPTION  OF  EVIDENCE  —  NUMBER  OF  WITNESSES. 

Mode  of  offering  and  objecting  to  evidence      .        .         .         .       '.     §  366 
"Waiver  of  objections  to  evidence  —  Necessity  for  repeating  objec- 
tions    367 

Motions  to  strike  out  evidence 368 

The  improper  admission  of  evidence,  when  immaterial    .        .        .  369 

The  improper  exclusion  of  evidence,  when  immaterial     .         .        .  370 

Nature  and  use  of  stipulations  as  regards  evidence  ....  371 

Demurrer  to  evidence 372 

Surprise 373 

Rebutting  evidence  —  Nature  and  use  of 374 

Order  of  proof  —  Evidence  offered  by  the  party  after  he  rests  .  375 

Materiality  and  sufficiency  of  newly -discovered  evidence         .        .  376 

Diligence  of  party  offering  new  evidence  must  be  shown         .        .  377 
Newly-discovered  evidence  must  not  be  cumulative  or  impeaching 

merely        ...........  378 

"Writ  of  error  —  When  employed  at  common  law     ....  379 

The  powers  of  appellate  tribunals  in  relation  to  the  evidence  re- 
ceived in  the  trial  court      . 380 

Limitations  on  the  number  of  witnesses 381 

Number  of  witnesses  necessary  in  trials  for  perjury         .         .        .  382 

Number  of  witnesses  in  trials  for  treason 383 

Compelling  the  calling  of  the  witnesses 384 

Positive  and  negative  testimony  —  Number  of  witnesses  as  affecting 

the  weight  of  evidence       ........  385 

The  discretionary  power  of  the  court  —  Judicial  discretion  defined 

and  considered 386 


TABLE  OF  CASES  CITED. 


Keferences  are  to  sections. 


Aaron  v.  State  (31  Ga.  167),  9. 
Abbot  v.  Coleman  (22  Kan.  250),  132, 

140. 
Abbot  v.  Heath  (Wis.,  1893,  54  N.  W. 

Rep.  574),  52. 
Abbot  v.  Plumbe  (1  Doug.  216),  138. 
Abbott  v.  Abbott  (51  Me.  581),  220. 
Abbott     v.     Petersburgh      Granite 

Quarry  Co.  (62  Hun,  622),  373. 
Abbott  v.  Ross  (62  Me.  194),  311. 
Abele  v.  Brewster  (58  Hun,  605),  31. 
Abell  v.  Pa.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (18  W.  Va. 

400),  233,  237. 
Abell  v.  Radcliffe  (13  Johns.  297),  246. 
Abercrombie   v.    Littman  (77    Tex. 

589),  148. 
Aberl  v.  Van  Gelder  (33  N.  Y.  513), 

115. 
Abrams  v.  Seale  (44  Ala.  297),  83. 
Accola  v.  Railroad  Co.  (70  Iowa,  185), 

233,  237. 
Achilles  v.  Achilles  (137  111.  589;  28 

N.  E.  Rep.  45),  308. 
Adae  v.  Zangs  (41  Iowa,  586),  339. 
Adam  v.  Bald  (1  Green,  188),  157. 
Adams  v.  Barnes  (17  Mass.  365),  151. 
Adams  v.  Betts  (1  Watts,  425),  146. 
Adams  v.  Brown  (16  Ohio  St.  419),  84. 
Adams  v.  Davidson  (10  N.  Y.  309),  69. 
Adams  v.  Eames  (107  Mass.  275),  80. 
Adams  v.  Edwards  (115  Pa.  St.  211), 

309. 
Adams  v.  Eichenberger  (Ark.,  1893, 

18  S.  W.  Rep.  853),  80. 
Adams  v.  Frye  (5  Mete.  109),  215. 
Adams  v.  Harrington  (114  Ind.  16), 

239. 


Adams  v.  Humphreys  (54  Ga.  396), 

73a. 
Adams  v.   Jones  (39  Ga.  508),  232, 

233. 
Adams  v.  Main  (3  Ind.  App.  232), 

186,  226,  232,  234. 
Adams  v.  Medsker  (25  W.  Va.  128), 

135. 
Adams  v.   Morgan  (150  Mass.   148), 

208. 
Adams  v.  Morrison  (113  N.  Y.  152), 

309. 
Adams  v.   Norris  (23  How.,  U.  S., 

353),  242. 
Adams  v.   Pearson  (7  Pick.,  Mass., 

341),  153. 
Adams  v.  People  (63  N.  Y.  621),  188. 
Adams  v.  Power  (52  Miss.  828),  267. 
Adams  v.  State  (28  Fla.  511),  249,  341. 
Adams  v.  State  (25  Ohio  St.  584),  114. 
Adams  v.  Swansea  (116  Mass.  591), 

115. 
Adams  v.  Way  (33  Conn.  419),  148. 
Adams  v.  Wheeler  (97  Mass.  67),  348. 
Addis  v.  Van  Buskirk  (4  Zabr.  218), 

22. 
Adler  v.  Friedman  (16  Cal.  138),  214. 
Aedford  v.  McCormac  (90  N.  C.  151), 

357. 
JEtna  Ins.  Co.  v.  Deming  (123  Ind. 

415 ;  24  N.  E.  Rep.  86,  375),  178. 
Agnew  v.   Brooklyn  City  R.  R.  Co. 

(5  N.  Y.  S.  756),  317. 
Ahern  v.  Telephone  Co.  (Oreg.,  1893, 

33  Pac.  Rep.  403),  18. 
Aikin  v.  Weckerly  (19  Mich.  482), 

231,  269. 


XX 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Ake  v.  State  (31  Tex.  476),  97. 
Akers  v.  Kirk  (Ga.,  1894,   18  S.  E. 

Rep.  366),  76. 
Alabama  Coal  Co.   v.   Pitts    (Ala., 

1893,  13  S.  Rep.  35),  187. 
Alabama,    etc.    R.    Co.    v.     Arnold 

(Ala.,  2S.  Rep.  837),  50. 
Alabama  G.  S.  R.    Co.   v.   Hill   (93 

Ala.  514),  190,  202,  282,  332. 
/    Alabama   Land   Co.  v.    Kyle  (Ala., 

1893.  13  S.  Rep.  43),  231. 
Alaska,  Tbe  (33  Fed.  Rep.  107),  198. 
Albertsen  v.  Robeson  (1  Dall.,  U.  S. , 

9),  53. 
Albertsen  v.  Terry  (109  N.  C.  8 ;  13 

S.  E.  Rep.  713),  11. 
Alberti  v.  N.  Y.,  L.  E.   &  N.   R.  R. 

Co.  (118  N.  Y.  77),  192. 
Albia  v.  O'Hara  (64  Iowa,  297),  143a. 
Albin  v.  State  (63  Ind.  598),  6. 
Albright  v.  Lapp  (26  Pa.  St.    101), 

332. 
Albritten  v.  Huntsville  (60  Ala.  486), 

242. 
Alcock,  In  re  (12  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  354, 

355),  166. 
Alcorn  v.  Morgan  (77  Ind.  184),  211. 
Alcorn  v.  Railroad  Co.  (108  Mo.  81), 

366,  369. 
Alcott  v.  Strong (9  Cush.,  Mass.,  323), 

68. 
Alderman  v.  Bell  (9  Cal.  315),  244. 
Alderman  v.  People  (4  Mich.   411), 

323. 
Aiderton  v.  Wright  (81  Mich.   244), 

340. 
Aldrich  v.   Aldrich  (135  Mass.  153), 

220. 
Aldrich  v.  Jessiman  (8  N.   H.  516), 

77. 
Aklridge   v.    Midland,   etc.    Co.    (78 

Mo.  559),  73a. 
Alexander  v.  Burnham  (18  Wis.  199), 

244. 
Alexander  v.  Caldwell  (55  Ala.  517), 

66,  70. 
Alexander  v.  Com.   (105  Pa.   St.  1), 

10. 


Alexander  v.   Handley  (11  S.   Rep. 

390),  79. 
Alexander  v.  Harris  (4  Cranch,  299), 

21. 
Alexander  v.  Jonquil  (71   111.   366), 

188. 
Alexander  v.  McNear  (28  Fed.  Rep. 

403),  77,  314. 
Alexander  v.    Mt.    Sterling  (71  111. 

366),  188. 
Alexander  v.  Penn.  etc.  Co.  (48  Ohio 

St.  623),  143. 
Alexander  v.  Thompson  (42  Minn. 

498;  44  N.  W.  Rep.  534),  7. 
Alford  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.   Rep. 

299),  323. 
Alfred  v.  State  (37  Miss.  296),  89. 
Alger  v.  Andrews  (47  Vt.  238),  70. 
Alkire  v.  Kahla  (123  111.  496),  128. 
Allegheny  v.  Nelson  (25  Pa.  St.  332), 

218,  242. 
Allan  v.  Allan  (15  Ves.  134),  364. 
Allen  v.  Bond  (112  Ind.  523),  385. 
Allen  v.  Carpenter  (66  Tex.  138),  199. 
Allen  v.   Chouteau    (102    Mo.  309), 

308. 
Allen  v.  Clark  (66  Hun,  N.  Y.,  628), 

68. 
Allen  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1888,  9    S.  W. 

Rep.  703),  330. 
Allen  v.  Furbish  (4  Gray,  Mass.,  504), 

212 
Allen  v.   Gray  (11  Cow.,  N.  Y.,  95), 

150a. 
Allen  v.  Hawks  (13  Pick.  70),  309. 
Allen  v.  Hodge  (31  Vt.  436),  83. 
Allen  v.  Hunter  (6   McLean,    U.  S., 

303),  208. 
Allen  v.  Kemp  (29  Iowa,  452),  223. 
Allen  v.    Killinger  (8  Wall.,   U.   S., 

480),  77. 
Allen  v.  Lenoir  (53  Miss.  321),  136. 
Allen  v.  Maddock  (11   Moore   P.  C. 

427,  454),  210. 
Allen  v.  Mass  (27  Mo.  354),  131. 
Allen  v.  O'Donnell  (28  Fed.  Rep.  17), 

306. 
Allen  v.  Root  (39  Tex.  589),  173. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


XXI 


References  are  to  sections. 


Allen  v.  Scharringhausen  (8  Mo.  App. 

229),  223,  247. 
Allen  v.    State   (3  Humph.,  Tenn., 

367),  139. 
Allen  v.  State  (10  Ohio  St.  287),  306, 

323. 
Allen  v.    Thaxter  (1    Blackf.,  Ind., 

399),  148. 
Allen  v.  Watson  (2  Hill,  S.  C,  319), 

143. 
Aller  v.  State  (55  Ala.  16),  241. 
Ailing  v.  Brazee  (27  111.  App.  595), 

60. 
Ailing  v.  Wenzel  (27  111.  App.  516 ; 

24  N.  E.  Rep.  551),  60. 
Allison  v.  State  (42  Inch  354),  230. 
All  port  v.  Meek  (4  C.  &  P.  267),  140. 
Alman  v.  Owens  (31  Ala.  167),  233, 

249. 
Almy   v.   Simonson   (52  Hun,  535), 

242. 
Alston,  In  re  (1892,  Prob.  142),  233. 
Alt  v.  California  Fig  Syrup  Co.  (19 

Nev.  18),  199. 
Altmeyer   v.  Caulfield  (37  W.    Va. 

847),  358. 
Altschul  v.  San  Francisco,  etc.   Co. 

(43  Cal.  171),  223. 
Ambler    v.   Whipple  (139  111.   311), 

159. 
Amer.  Bank  Note  Co.  v.   Man.   Ry. 

Co.  (66  Hun,  627;  20  N.   Y.   S. 

819),  371. 
Amer.  En.  Tile  Co.  v.   Reich  (12  N. 

Y.  S.  927),  1S7. 
Amer.    F.    Co.    v.    United   States  (2 

Pet.  358,  305),  69,  97. 
Amer.  L.  Ins.   Co.  v.  Rosenagle  (77 

Pa,  St.  507),  143. 
Amer.  Mortg.   Co.  v.  Boyd  (92  Ala. 

139;  9S.  Rep.  166),  151. 
Amer.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Canter  (1  Pet.  511), 

242. 
Amer.  Oak  L.  Co.  v.  Standard,  etc. 

Co.    (Utah,    1893,  33  Pac.   Rep. 

246),  231. 
Amer.    Steamship  Co.  v.  Landreth 
(102  Pa,  St.  131),  73a. 


Amer.  S.   Co.  v.  Thurber  (121  N.  Y. 

655;  24  N.  E.  Rep.  1129),  205. 
Amer.  Tr.  Co.   v.  Rosenagle  (77  Pa. 

St.  516),  53. 
Ames    v.    Merriam   (9  Wend.    498), 

355. 
Amey  v.  Long  (9  East,  473),  173. 
Ammonsv.  Dwyer  (78  Tex.  639;  15 

S.  W.  Rep.  1049),  108. 
Amory  v.  Fellows  (5  Mass.  225),  332. 
Amos  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893,  11  S.  Rep. 

424),  69. 
Anderson  v.  Anderson  (23  Tex.  639), 

242. 
Anderson  v.  Armstead  (69  111.  452- 

454),  84. 
Anderson  v.  Dunn  (6  Wheat.   204), 

288. 
Anderson  v.  Monroe  (55   Fed.    Rep. 

596),  249. 
Anderson  v.  O'Donnell  (29  S.  C.  355), 

242. 
Anderson  v.  Parker  (6  Cal.  197),  53. 
Anderson  v.  Roleson    (2    Bay,    495), 

130. 
Anderson  v.  State  (25  Neb.  550),  89. 
Anderson  v.  State  (104  Ind.  367 ;    6 

N.  E.  Rep.  63),  381. 
Andrews  v.  Brewster  (124  N.  Y.  433), 

212. 
Andrews  v.  Flack  (88  Ala.  294;  6  S. 

Rep.  907),  148. 
Andrews  v.  Hayclen  (88  Ky.  455 ;  1 1 

S.  W.  Rep.  428),  140. 
Andrews  v.  Mut.  R.  L.  F.  Ass'n  (34 

Fed.  Rep.  870),  178. 
Andrews  v.  Parker  (48  Tex.  94),  380. 
Andrews  v.   Solomon  (1  Pet.  C.  C. 

356),  169. 
Angell  v.  Angell  (1  S.  &  S.  83),  363. 
Angell  v.  Hester  (64  Mo.  142),  308. 
Angell  v.  Hill  (18  N.  Y.  S.  S24),  369. 
Angell   v.   Loomis    (Mich.,   1893,   55 

N.  W.  Rep.  1008),  334. 
Angell  v.  Rosenburg  (12  Mich.  241), 

114. 
Angle  v.   Bilby  (25  Neb.  595 ;  41  N. 

W.  Rep.  397),  74. 


xxn 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Anglo-Am.   P.  &  P.  Co.  v.  Cannon 

(31  Fed.  Rep.  313),  30,  32. 
Angus   v.   Foster  (42  111.   App.   19), 

380. 
Anheuser-Busch  v.  Hutmacher  (127 

111.  657 ;  21  N.  E.  Rep.  626),  33. 
Anix  v.  Miller  (54  Iowa,  541),  244. 
Ankersmit  v.  Bluxome  (48  Hun,  1), 

375. 
Ankerstein  v.  Clarke  (4  T.  R.  616), 

22. 
Anonymous  (Ala.,   1890,   7  S.   Rep. 

100),  202. 
Anshicks  v.  State  (6  Tex.  App.  527), 

343. 
Anspach  v.   Bast  (52  Pa.   St.  356), 

205. 
Anthony  v.  Beal  (111  Mo.  637;  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  326),  130. 
Anthony  v.   German  Am.  Ins.  Co. 

(48  Mo.  App.  65),  200. 
Anthony  v.  Smith  (4  Bosw.,  N.  Y., 

503),  193. 
Applegate  v.  Lexington,  etc.  Mining 

Co.  (117  U.  S.  263),  106,  108. 
Appollon,  The  (9  Wheat.  374),  239. 
Arbuckle  v.  Templeton  (65  Vt.  205; 

25  Atl.  Rep.  1095),  173. 
Archer  v.    Helm  (69  Miss.  730;  11 

S.  Rep.  3),  262. 
Archer  v.  Insurance  Co.  (31  Fed.  Rep. 

660),  276. 
Archer  v.  N.  Y.,  N.  H.  etc.  Co.  (106 

N.  Y.  603),  38. 
Archibald  v.  McLaurin  (21  Can.  S.  C. 

R.  588),  11. 
Archibald  v.  State  (122  Ind.  122),  101. 
Arcia  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  198),  23. 
Ardesco  Oil  Co.  v.  Gilson  (63  Pa.  St. 

146),  185. 
Arent  v.  Squire  (1  Daly,  347),  231. 
Arimond  v.  Green  Bay,  etc.  (35  Wis. 

41),  229. 
Arkansas  v.  Bower  (20  D.  C.  29),  149. 
Armour  v.  Spalding  (Colo.,  1890,  23 

Pac.  Rep.  789),  223. 
Armsted  v.  State  (22  Tex.  App,  51), 

69. 


Armstrong  v.  Ackley  (71    Iowa,  76 ' 

32  N.  W.  Rep.  180),  50,  192,  193. 
Armstrong  v.  Boylan  (4  N.  J.  L.  76), 

355. 
Armstrong  v.  Fargo  (8   Hun,  175), 

139. 
Armstrong  v.  St.  Louis  (69  Mo.  309), 

205. 
Armstrong  v.  State  (30  Fla.  170;  11 

S.  Rep.  618),  197,  231,  249. 
Armstrong  v.  Thurston  (11  Md.  148)r 

139a. 
Arndt  v.  Harshaw  (53  Wis.  269),  71. 
Arnfield  v.  Bate  (3  M.  &  S.  173),  19. 
Arnold  v.  Arnold  (20  Iowa,  273),  214. 
Arnold  v.  Arnold  (13  Vt.  43,  362),. 

316. 
Arnold  v.  Cheseborough  (46  Fed.  Rep. 

700),  35. 
Arnold  v.  Frazier  (5  Strobh.,  S.  C,  Z)r 

148. 
Arnold  v.  State  (81  Wis.  278),  334. 
Arnson  v.  Spawn  (S.  D.,  1892,  49  N» 

W.  Rep.  1066),  115. 
Arrison  v.  Harmstead  (2  Barr,  191),. 

128. 
Arthur  v.  Broadnax  (3  Ala.  375),  114. 
Arthur  v.  Gordon  (67  Ga.  220),  249. 
Arthur  v.  James  (28  Pa.  St.  236),  76. 
Arthur  v.  Roberts  (60  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

580),  217,  221. 
Artz  v.  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  (44  Iowa,. 

284),  347. 
Asbach  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (Iowa, 

1892,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  90),  70,  355. 
Ashing  v.  Miles  (16  Ind.  329),  254. 
Ashley  v.  Martin  (50  Ala.  537),  238. 
Ashlock  v.  Linder  (50  111.  159),  75. 
Ashman  v.  Flint,  etc.  Co.  (90  Mich. 

567 ;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  645),  18. 
Ashton  v.  Shepherd  (120  Ind.  69;  22 

N.  E.  Rep.  98),  20. 
Ashworth    v.    Kittredge    (12   Cush. 

193),  145. 
Assignees  of  Desbrow  v.  Farrow  (3 

Rich.,  S.  C,  382),  139. 
Association  v.  Cronin  (4  Allen,  141), 

188. 


TAIJLE    OF    CASES. 


XX1U 


References  are  to  sections. 


Aston    v.   Insurance    Co.    (7    Cow. 

202),  217. 
Atcheson  v.  Huebner  (90  Mich.  643 ; 

51  N.  W.  Rep.  634),  140. 
Atchison  v.  Bartholow  (4  Kan.  124), 

355. 
Atchison  v.  Everett  (Cowp.  389,  390), 

315. 
Atchison,  etc.  Co.  v.  Betts  (10  Colo. 

431),  230. 
Atchison,    etc.     Co.     v.    Brassfield 

(Kan.,  1893,  32  Pac.  Rep.  814),  192. 
Atchison,    etc.    Co.    v.    Howard  (C. 

C.  A.  229),  232. 
Atchison,   T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Thul 

(29  Kan.  466),  202. 
Atchison  R.   Co.    v.  Miller  (18  Pac. 

Rep.  486;  39  Kan.  419),  188. 
Atherton  v.  Atkins  (139  Mass.  61), 

366. 
Atherton  v.  Beard  (2  T.  R.  610),  140. 
Atkins  v.  State  (69  Ga.  595),  51. 
Atkins  v.  Tompkins  (155  Mass.  256), 

205. 
Atkins  v.  Tregold  (2  B.  &  C.  23),  67. 
Atkinson  v.  Cox  (54  Ark.  444;  16  S. 

W.  Rep.  124),  20,  24. 
Atkinson  v.  Roch  Printing  Co.  (43 

Hun,  167),  199. 
Atkinson  v.  Saltman  (Ind.,  1893,  29 

N.  E.  Rep.  435),  355. 
Atkinson  v.  Truesdell  (127  N.  Y.  230 ; 

27  N.  E.  Rep.  844),  216. 
Atlanta  v.  Schmelzer  (89  Ga.  609), 

217. 
Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Holcomb  (88  Ga. 

9),  226. 
Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Manning  (3  Col. 

224),  139. 
Attaway  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

475),  283. 
Attorney-General    v.     Abbott    (154 

Mass.  423;  28  N.   E.  Rep.  346), 

116. 
Attorney-General  v.  Briant  (15  L.  J. 

Exch.  265),  175. 
Attorney-General    v.    Hitchcock  (1 

Ex.  102),  354. 


Attorney-General   v.  Ray  (2  Hare, 

518),  363. 
Attorney-General   v.   Skinner's   Co. 

(8  Sim.  377),  287. 
Atwood  v.  Harrison  (5  J.  J.  Marsh. , 

Ky.,  329),  304. 
Atwood  v.  Scott  (99  Mass.  177),  276. 
Atwood  v.  Welton  (7  Conn.  66),  316. 
Auerbach   v.  Peetsch  (18  N.    Y.    S. 

453),  244,  249, 252. 
Augur  v.  Whittier  (117  Mass.  451), 

32. 
Augusta  v.  Hafers  (61  Ga.  48),  8. 
Augusta  v.  Windsor  (19  Me.  317),  58. 
Augustine  Kobbe,  The  (37  Fed.  Rep. 

696),  205. 
Aultman   v.  Ritter  (81  Wis.  395;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  569),  169,  379. 
Aurora  v.  Cobb  (21  Ind.  493),  249. 
Ausman  v.  Veal  (10  Ind.  355),  241. 
Austee .  v.  Nelmes  (1  H.  &  M.  225), 

220. 
Austin  v.  Andrews  (77  Cal.  98;  16 

Pac.  Rep.  546),  115. 
Austin    v.    Chittenden    (33  Vt.  53), 

73a. 
Austin  v.  Day  (17  Pick.,  Mass.,  208), 

150a. 
Austin   v.    Holland  (69  N.  Y.  571, 

576),  230. 
Austin  v.  State  (14  Ark.  555),  339. 
Austin  v.  Thompson  (45  N.  H.  113), 

127. 
Austine    v.   Treat  (39  N.    W.   Rep. 

749;  71  Mich.  561),  126. 
Austrian  v.  Springer  (94  Mich.  343), 

216. 
Auzeriaz  v.  Neglee  (74  Cal.  60),  217. 
Averell  v.  Barber  (63  Hun,  630),  288. 
Averell  v.  Sec.  Nat.  Bank  (19  D.   C. 

246),  151. 
Averell  v.  Smith  (17  Wall.  95),  158. 
Avery  v.   Bowman  (39  N.  H.  593), 

150a. 
Avery  v.  Fitzgerald  (7  S.  W.  Rep.  6 ; 

94  Mo.  207),  333. 
Avery  v.  Mattice  (9  N.  Y.  S.  166),  334. 
Avery  v.  Moore  (133  111.  74),  343. 


XXIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Avery  v.  Railroad  Co.  (121  N.  Y.  31 ; 

24  N.  E.  Rep.  20).  186. 
Avery  v.  Starbuck  (127  N.  Y.  675;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  1080),  32. 
Avilla  v.  Nash  (117  Mass.  318),  13. 
Aver  v.  Getty  (46  Hun,  287),  73. 
Ayers  v.  Harris  (77  Tex.  108),  38a. 
Ayers  v.  Metcalfe  (39  111.  307),  80. 
Ayers  v.  Watson  (137  U.  S.  581),  36, 

116. 
Ayres  v.   State  (21  Tex.  App.  399), 

226. 
Ayres  v.  Weed  (16  Conn.  291),  221. 
Ayrey  v.  Davenport  (2  N.    R.  474), 

146. 

B. 

Babb  v.  Aldrich  (45  Kan.  218),  360. 
Babcock  v.  People  (15  Hun,  N.  Y., 

347),  315. 
Babcock  v.  People  (13  Colo.  515),  350. 
Babcock  v.  Utter  (1  Abb.   App.  27), 

231. 
Baccio  v.  People  (41  N.  Y.  265),  52. 
Bachelder  v.  Nutting  (16  N.  H.  261), 

130. 
Backdahl  v.  Lodge  (46  Minn.  61),  53. 
Bacon  v.  Bacon  (33  Wis.  147),  360. 
Bacon  v.  Hanna  (63  Hun,  625),  50. 
Bacon  v.  Railroad  Co.  (131  U.  S.  258), 

134. 
Bacon  v.  State  (22  Fla.  51),  324. 
Bacon  v.  Williams    (13    Gray,    525, 

527),  139a,  140. 
Badcock  v.  Steadrnan  (1  Root,  Conn., 

87),  212. 
Badder  v.  Kiel'er  (91  Mich.  611;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  60),  10,  332. 
Baeder  v.  Jennings   (40   Fed.   Rep. 

199),  138. 
Badger  v.  Badger  (88  N.  Y.  336),  309. 
Badger  v.  Jones  (12  Pick.,  Mass.,  371), 

211. 
Bagley  v.  Francis  (14  Mass.  453),  143. 
Bagley  v.  McMickle  (9  Cal.  430),  226. 
Bagley  &  Sewall  Co.   v.  Saranac  R. 

P.  Co.  (135  N.  Y.  626),  212. 


Bailey  v.  Bailey  (36  Mich.  185),  233. 
Bailey  v.  Chicago  M.  etc.  Co.  (S.  D., 

1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  596),  366. 
Bailey  v.  Cornwell   (66  Mich.    107), 

208. 
Bailey  v.  Martin  (119  Ind.  103),  148. 
Bailey  v.  Taylor  (11  Conn.  531),  128, 

129. 
Bailey  v.  Trumbull  (31  Conn.  581),  8. 
Baillie  v.  Jackson  (17  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 

131),  142. 
Baily  v.  Baily  (35  Ala.  687),  269. 
Baily  v.  Kalamazoo  (40  Mich.  251), 

237. 
Baily  v.  O'Bannon  (28  Mo.  App.  39), 

76. 
Baily  v.  Pardridge  (134  111.  188),  79. 
Baily  v.  State  (Neb.,  1894,  55  N.  W. 

Rep.  241),  35. 
Baily  v.  State  (30  Neb.  855 ;  47  N.  W. 

Rep.  208),  143a. 
Baily  v.  Sundberg  (49  Fed.  Rep.  583), 

155. 
Bain  v.  State  (61  Ala.  75),  53. 
Bain  v.  Welsh  (85  Me.  108),  126. 
Baird,  In  re  (47  Hun,  77),  67. 
Baird  v.  Daily  (68  N.  Y.  547),  198. 
Baird  v.  Evans  (58  Ga.  350),  135. 
Baker  v.   Chapline  (12  Iowa,    204), 

232. 
Baker  v.  Charlton  (7  Cush.  581),  82. 
Baker  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892,  17  S.  W. 

Rep.  625),  9,  343. 
Baker  v.  Davis  (22  N.  H.  27),  150«. 
Baker  v.  Denning   (8  A.   &    E.    94), 

131. 
Baker  v.  Haines  (6  Whart.,  Pa.,  284), 

140. 
Baker  v.  Hall  (158  Mass.  361 ;  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  612),  220. 
Baker  v.  Haskell  (47  N.  H.  479),  226. 
Baker  v.  Magnon  (9  111.   App.   655), 

143a. 
Baker  v.  Malony  (Tex.,  4  S.  W.  Rep. 

469),  56. 
Baker  v.  Mygatt  (14  Iowa,  131),  140, 

244. 
Baker  v.  Scofield  (58  Ga.  1S2),  143a. 


TA15LE    OF    CASES. 


XXV 


References  are  to  sections. 


Baker  v.  State  (30  Fla.  41),  18S. 
Baker  v.  Stockpole  (9  Cow.,  N.  Y., 

420),  09. 
Baker  v.  Thompson  (89  Ga.  486),  313. 
Baker  v.  Witten  (Old.,  1892,  39  Pac. 

Rep.  491).  71. 
Baker's  Appeal  (107  Pa.  St.  381),  210. 
Balbo  v.  People  (19  Hun,  424),  91. 
Balch  v.  Smith  (4  Wash.  St.  497),  231. 
Baldridge  v.  Faust  (28  Neb.  259;  44 

N.  W.  Rep.  110),  146. 
Baldridge  v.  Penland  (68  Tex.  441 ; 

4  S.  W.  Rep.  565),  58,  60. 
Baldridge,   etc.    Co.    v.    Calrett    (75 

Tex.  628),  333. 
Baldwin  v.  Burrows  (95  Ind.  81),  208. 
Baldwin    v.    Chicago,    etc.    Co.    (50 

Iowa,  680),  198. 
Baldwin  v.  Hale  (17  Johns.  272),  146. 
Baldwin  v.  Parker  (99  Mass.  79),  168. 
Baldwin  v.  Shannon  (43  N.  J.  L.  96), 

220. 
Baldwin  v.  State  (12  Mo.  223),  231. 
Baldwin  v.  Walker  (94  Ala.  314;  10 

S.  Rep.  891),  334. 
Balfour  v.  Chew  (Martin,  517),  14S. 
Ball  v.  Fagg  (67  Mo.  481),  143a. 
Ballard  v.  Manuf.   Co.  (15  N.  Y.  S. 

403),  73a. 
Ballard  v.  N.  Y,  L.  E.  etc.  Co.  (126 

Pa.  St.  141),  198. 
Ballard  v.  State  (31  Fla.  266;  12  S. 

Rep.  865),  306. 
Ballentine  v.  White  (77  Pa.   St.  20), 

141. 
Ballinger  v.   Davis    (29   Iowa,  512), 

131. 
Ballinger  v.   Elliott  (73  N.  C.  596), 

286. 
Ballock  v.  Hooper  (146  U.  S.  363),  76. 
Ballon  v.  Ballon  (110  N.  Y.  402),  151. 
Balls  v.  Smith  (2  M.  &  G.  350),  358. 
Baltimore  v.  Lib.  Turnp.  Co.  (66  Md. 

419;  7  Atl.  Rep.  805),  186,  188. 
Baltimore,   etc.   R.    Co.  v.  Polly  (14 

Gratt,,  Va.,  447,  470),  344. 
Baltimore  &  Ohio  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Cas- 

sell  (66  Md.  419),  194. 


Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Rambo 

(59  Fed.  Rep.  75),  194. 
Bamford  v.  Iron  Co.  (33  Fed.  Rep. 

677),  368,  370. 
Banbury  v.  Sheerin  (S.  D.,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  723),  134. 
Banbury  Peerage    Case   (1   Sim.   & 

Stu.  153),  234. 
Banert  v.  Day  (3  Wash.  C.  C.  243),  53. 
Banfield  v.  Whipple  (10  Allen,  Mass., 

29),  9. 
Bank  v.  Anderson  (28  S.  C.  148),  74. 
Bank  v.  Bellis  (10  Cush.  378),  236. 
Bank  v.  Board  (Ky.,    18S5,  5  S.    W. 

Rep.  735,  739,  742),  233. 
Bank  v.  Bollong  (24  Neb.  825),  339. 
Bank  v.  Cooper  (137  U.  S.  473),  209. 
Bank  v.  Curran  (10  Ark.  142),  244. 
Bank  v.  Dandridge  (12  Wheat.  69), 

232. 
Bank  v.  Darragh  (1  Hun.  113),  73. 
Bank  v.  De  Bernales  (1  C.  &  P.  569), 

80. 
Bank  v.  Evans  (32  Iowa,  202),  147. 
Bank  v.  Fitzhugh  (1  Har.  &  G.,  Md., 

239),  242. 
Bank  v.  Gerry  (5  Pet.  99-112),  304. 
Bank  v.  Gidrot  (19  Ga.  421),  73a. 
Bank  v.  Gilmore  (N.  D.,  1893,  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  1032),  377. 
Bank  v.  Good  (44  Mo.  App.  129),  128. 
Bank  v.  Harding  (1   Wright,   Ohio, 

430).  147. 
Bank  v.  Holls  (11  Gray,  Mass.,  520), 

141. 
Bank  v.  Houghton  (41    Mich.   709), 

140. 
Bank  v.  Hull  (7  Mo.  273),  311. 
Bank  v.  Inman  (34   N.   E.   Rep.  21 ; 

133  Ind.  287),  367. 
Bank  v.  Jacobs   (1   P.    &  W.,    Pa., 

161,  170),  139a. 
Bank  v.  Kennedy  (17  Wall.  19),  56. 
Bank  v.  Kortright  (22  Wend.,  N.  Y, 

348),  128. 
Bank  v.  Lewis  (8  Pick.  113),  152. 
Bank  v.  Lierman  (5  Neb.  247),  139a, 

140. 


XXVI 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Bank  v.  Machir  (18  W.   Va.  271), 

239. 
Bank  v.  McManigle  (69  Pa.  St.  156), 

230. 
Bank  v.  Marsh  (46  Vt.  443),  139. 
Bank  v.  Meagher  (33  Ala.  622),  237. 
Bank  v.  Mersereau  (3  Barb.  Ch.  528), 

226. 
Bank  v.  Mitchell  (15  Conn.  206),  58. 
Bank  v.  Mudgett  (44  N.  Y.  514),  139a. 
Bank  v.  Natchez  (3  Rob.,  La.,  293), 

82. 
Bank  v.  Nias  (16  Q.  B.  717),  158. 
Bank  v.  Nickell  (34  Mo.   App.  295), 

128. 
Bank  v.  Radtke  (Iowa,  1893,  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  435),  135. 
Bank  v.  Rutland  (33  Vt.  414),  108. 
Bank  v.  Wenzel   (151   Pa.    St.   142), 

139. 
Bank  v.  Whitehill  (16  S.  &  R.,  Pa., 

89),  58. 
Bank  v.  Young  (36  Iowa,  44),  141. 
Bank  of  Middlebury  v.  Rutland   (33 

Vt.  414),  108. 
Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Gifford  (79  Iowa, 

309),  120. 
Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Gifford  (70  Iowa, 

580),  73. 
Bank  of  Utica  v.  Mersereau  (3  Barb. 

Ch.,  N.  Y,  528),  174. 
Banks  v.  Gruben  (87  Pa.   St.   468), 

242. 
Banks  v.  Kingsley  (84  Me.  Ill),  233. 
Bannon  v.  Aultman   (80  Wis.    307), 

214. 
Barbee  v.  Barbee  (109  N.  C.  299),  208. 
Barber,  In  re  (W.  N.,  1879,  p.   141), 

210. 
Barber  v.  Merriam  (11  Allen,  Mass., 

322),  192,  193. 
Barber  v.  Terrell  (54  Ga.  146),  138. 
Barbour  v.   Melendy  (88  Va.    595), 

282. 
Barbour  v.  Watts  (2  A.  K.  Marsh. 

290),  148. 
Barclay   v.    Hopkins  (59    Ga.   562), 

209. 


Barclay  v.  Pursley  (110  Pa.  St.  13), 

212. 
Barcus  v.  State  (49  Miss.  17),  234. 
Bardwell  v.  Dewitt  (42  Minn.  468), 

73. 
Bardwell  v.  Ziegler  (3  Wash.  St.  34), 

216. 
Bareda  v.    Silsby  (21  How.,   U.  S., 

146),  207. 
Barhyte  v.  Summers  (68  Mich.  341), 

384. 
Barhyte  v.  Vack  (12  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

145),  157. 
Barker  v.  Bushnell  (75  111.  220),  75, 

76. 
Barker  v.  Coit  (1  Root,  Conn.,  225), 

277. 
Barker  v.  Coleman  (35  Ala.  221),  194. 
Barker  v.  Haskell  (9   Cush.,  Mass., 

218),  60. 
Barker   v.  Hebbard  (81  Mich.  627), 

120. 
Barker  v.  Kuhn  (38  Iowa,  395),  174. 
Barker  v.  McFerran  (26  Pa.  St.  211), 

128,  150. 
Barker  v.  Prentiss  (6  Mass.  430),  213. 
Barker  v.  State  (12  Tex.  273),   233, 

237. 
Barker  v.  State  (48  Ind.  163),  234. 
Barley  v.  Barley  (7  Jones,  44),  210. 
Barley  v.  Woods  (17  N.  H.  365),  123. 
Barlow  v.    Buckingham  (68  Iowa, 

169),  214. 
Barlow  v.  State  (77  Ga.  448),  23.      . 
Barnard  v.  Gall  (43  La.   Ann.  959), 

240. 
Barnard  v.  Henry  (25  Vt.  289),  60. 
Barnard  v.  Heydrick  (49  Barb.  68), 

131. 
Barnard  v.  Macy  (1 1  Ind.  536),  77. 
Barnes  v.  Barnes  (66  Me.  286),  138. 
Barnes  v.  Bost.  etc.  Co.  (130  Mass. 

388),  262. 
Barnes  v.  City  (89  Ala.  602),  143a. 
Barnes  v.  Denslow  (9  N.  Y.  S.  53), 

373. 
Barnes  v.  Dow  (59  Vt.  530),  60,  309. 
Barnes  v.  Ingalls  (39  Ala.  193),  199. 


TABLE   OF   CASE8. 


XXVU 


References  are  to  sections. 


Barnes  v.  Mawson  (1  M.  &S.  77),  116. 
Barnes  v.  Reilly  (81  Mich.  374;  45  N. 

W.  Rep.  1016),  332. 
Barnes  v.  State  (Tex.,  1889,  11  S.  W. 

Rep.  679),  306. 
Barnett  v.  Barnett  (83  Va.  504),  205. 
Barnsdale  v.  Lowe  (2  Russ.  &  My. 

142),  363. 
Barnuin  v.  Barnuni(42  Md.  251),  362. 
Baron  de  Bodes  v.  Reginaim  (10  Jur. 

217),  143. 
Barr  v.  Anburn  (89  III.  361),  143a. 
Ban-  v.  Gratz  (4  Wheat.    213,   221), 

106,  107,  108,  157. 
Bar  re  v.  Reading  City  Pass.  Ry.  Co. 

(26  Atl.  Rep.  99:  155  Pa.  St.  170), 

186. 
Barrelle  v.  Penn.  Ry.  Co.  (4  N.  Y.  S. 

127),  194. 
Barrett  v.  Copeland  (18  Vt.  67),  150a. 
Barrett  v.  Dowris  (9  R.   I.  446),  143. 
Barrett  v.  Railroad    Co.   (45    N.   Y. 

628),  74. 
Barringer  v.  Bank  (14  S.  &  R.  405), 
•      129. 

Barron  v.  Barron  (24  Vt.  375),  246. 
Barrow  v.  Rhinelander(l  Johns.  Ch., 

N.  Y,  559),  142. 
Barry  v.  Coville  (7  N.  Y.  S.  36),  157, 

172. 
Barry  v.  Raison  (1  Kernan,   N.   Y., 

462),  207. 
Barry  v.  Stevens  (69  Me.  290),  168. 
Bartholomew  v.  People  (104  111.  601), 

322. 
Bartholomew  v.  Stephens  (8  C.  &  P. 

728),  126. 
Bartlett  v.  Cleavenger  (35    W.    Va. 

719),  250. 
Bartlett  v.  Delpratt  (4  Mass.  702),  73. 
Bartlett  v.  Gale  (4  Paige,  N.  Y,  503), 

304. 
Bartlett  v.  Lee  (33  Ga.  491),  205. 
Bartlett  v.  Marshall  (2  Bibb,    Ky., 

467),  70. 
Barton  v.  Anderson  (104  Ind.  578), 

218. 
Barton  v.  Govan  (116  N.  Y.  658),  188. 
C 


Barton  v.  Lynch  (69  Hun,  1),  223. 
Bassett  v.  Bassett  (55  Me.  125),  128. 
Bassett  v.  Cunningham  (9  Gratt.  684), 

79. 
Bassett  v.  Shares  (63  Conn.  39;   27 

Atl.  Rep.  431),  334. 
Bassett  v.  Shepardson  (52  Mich.  3), 

309. 
Bass  Fur.  Co.  v.  Glasscock  (82  Ala. 

452),  186. 
Batcheldor  v.  Emery  (20  N.  H.  165), 

73a. 
Bates  v.  Ableman  (13  Wis.  644),  70. 
Bates  v.  Barber  (4  Cush.  107),  346. 
Bates  v.  Farelet  (89  Mo.  121-249),  308. 
Bates  v.  Holladay  (31  Mo.  App.  162), 

346. 
Bates  v.  Hurd  (65  Me.  180),  246. 
Bates  v.  People  (8  111.  644),  139a. 
Bates  v.  Preble  (U.  S.,  1894,  12  S.  Ct. 

277),  60. 
Bates  v.  Sabin  (64  Vt.  511),  60. 
Bates  v.  United  States  (10  Fed.  Rep. 

92),  127. 
Batesen  v.  Hartsink  (4  Esp.  43),  173. 
Bathgate  v.  Haskin  (59  N.  Y  533),  74. 
Bathrick  v.  Detroit,  etc.  Co.  (50  Mich. 

279,  652),  194,  349. 
Baugher  v.  Merryman  (32  Md.  185), 

223. 
Baum  v.  Reay  (96  Cal.  462 ;  29  Pac. 

Rep.  117),  60. 
Baumbach  v.  Gessler  (82  Wis.  231), 

287. 
Baumgardner   v.    Mfg.  Co.    (Minn., 

1893,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  964),  338. 
Baur  v.  Beal  (14  Colo.  383;  23  Pac. 

Rep.  345),  147,  334. 
Bausch  v.  Ingersoll  (61  Hun,  627),  24. 
Baxter  v.  Doe  (142  Mass.  558),  8. 
Baxter  v.    Graham  (5  Watts,    418), 

203. 
Baylis  v.  Chubb  (16  Gratt.  284),  242. 
Bayly  v.  Bryant  (24 Pick.,  Mass.,  198), 

73. 
Bays  v.  Trulson  (Oreg.,  1894,  35  Pac. 

Rep.  26),  205. 
Beach  v.  Elmira  (58  Kan.  606),  154. 


XXV111 


TAliLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Beach  v.  Pennell  (50  Me.  3S7),  308. 
Beaks  v.  Da  Cunla  (12  N.  Y.  S.  551 ; 

58  Hun,    609;    27    N.    E.    Rep. 

251),  8. 
Beal  v.  Stevens  (72  Cal.  451),  270. 
Beale  v.  Brown  (6  Mackey,  574),  70, 

167. 
Beale  v.   Thompson  (6  Cranch,  70), 

360. 
Beall  v.  Beck  (3  Har.  &  McC.  242), 

73. 
Beall  v.  Poole  (27  Md.  245),  32. 
Beall  v.  Shattuck  (53  Miss.  253),  150a. 
Beaman  v.  Russell  (20  Vfc  205),  128, 

129. 
Beaman  v.   Whitney  (22   Me.    413), 

134,  135. 
Bean  v.  Loryea  (81  Cal.  51),  242. 
Beard  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (41  Minn. 

153),  366. 
Beard  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (39  Minn. 

547),  309. 
Bearden  v.  State  (44  Ark.  331),  315. 
Beards  v.  Frame  (85  Cal.  134),  147. 
Beardsley  v.  Am.  Miss.  Soc.  (45  Conn. 

327),  222. 
Beardsley  v.   Crane  (Minn.,  1893,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  740),  220. 
Beardsley  v.  Hall  (36  Conn.  270),  69. 
Beardsley   v.    Knight   (10  Vt.    185), 

223. 
Beardstown  v.  Virginia,  etc.  (76  111. 

34),  250. 
Beasley  v.  Bradley  (2  Swan,  Tenn., 

180),  306. 
Beatty  v.  Hatcher  (13  Ohio  St.  115), 

249. 
Beaty  v.  Knowler  (4  Pet.,  U.  S.,  152), 

242. 
Beaufort  v.  Smith  (4  Ex.  450),  116. 
Beaumont  v.  Perkins  (1  Phillim.  78), 

141. 
Beavan  v.  Carpenter  (11  Sim.  22),  363. 
Beaver  v.  Taylor  (1  Wall.,  U.  S.,  042), 

50. 
Beavers  v.  State  (58  Ind.  530),  344. 
Bechtel's  Appeal  (133  Pa.  St.  367;  19 

Atl.  Rep.  412),  128. 


Becker  v.  Baumgartner  (111.,  1893,  32t 

N.  E.  Rep.  786),  24. 
Beckhaus  v.  Ladner  (48  N.  J.   Eq. 

152),  308. 
Beckwith  v.  Windsor  Co.  (14  Conn. 

594),  131. 
Bedell  v.  L.  I.  Railroad  Co.  (44  N.  Y. 

367),  199. 
Bedford  v.  Sherman  (68  Hun,  317), 

GO. 
Bedgood  v.  McLain  (89  Ga.  793),  129. 
Bedlow's  Will,  In  re  (67  Hun,  408), 

309. 
Bee  v.  Bowman  (Tenn.,  1891,  14  S. 

W.  Rep.  481),  248. 
Beech's  Case  (1  Leach's  Cas.  158),  23. 
Beeks  v.  Odom  (70  Tex.  183),  343. 
Beers  v.  Payment  (Mich.,   1893,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  886),  341. 
Began  v.  Hamilton  (90  Ala.  454),  362. 
Begarly  v.  State  (8  Baxt.,  Tenn.,  520), 

95. 
Begg  v.  Beggs  (56  Wis.  534),  222. 
Begg  v.  Blake  (6  Q.  B.  126),  68. 
Beliam  v.  Hendrickson  (32  N.  J.  Eq. 

441),  220. 
Behrensmeyer  v.  Krietz  (135  111.  591), 

362. 
Behrman  v.  Lind  (47  Hun,  530),  217. 
Beitman  v.  Hopkins  (109  Ind.  178), 

107. 
Beitz  v.  Fuller  (1  McCord,  541),  07. 
Belcher  v.  Mulhall  (57  Tex.  17),  205. 
Belcher  v.  State  (125  Ind.  419),  97. 
Belcher  v.  Weaver  (46  Tex.  293),  136. 
Belden  v.  Allen  (61  Conn.  173),  374. 
Belfast  v.  Chichester  (2  J.  &  W.  451), 

363. 
Belford,  Clarke  &  Co.   v.  Scribner 

(144  U.  S.  488),  380. 
Bell  v.  Ansly  (16  East,  141),  73. 
Bell  v.   Brewster  (44  Ohio  St.  694, 

090,   097),  8,  100,   107,   129,  140, 

141. 
Bell  v.  Chaytar  (1  C.  &  K.  102),  138. 
Bell  v.   Goodnature  (Minn.,  1892,  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  908),  84. 
Bell  v.  Jamison  (102  Mo.  71),  302. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


XXIX 


References  are  to  sections. 


Bell  v.   Kendrick  (Flu.,  1890,  6  S. 

Rep.  868),  58. 
Bell  v.  Morrison  (1  Pet.  367),  69. 
Bell  v.  Prewitt  (62  111.  362),  339. 
Bell  v.  Shields  (4  Harr.,  19  N.  J.,  93), 

133. 
Bell  v.   State  (Tex.,  1893,   20  S.  W. 

Rep.  362),  350. 
Bell  v.  State  (1  Tex.  A  pp.  81),  237. 
Bell  v.  State  (78  Ga.  572),  342. 
Bell  v.  Utley  (17  Mich.  508),  69,  211. 
Bell  v.   Woodman  (60  Me.  465),  207. 
Bell  v.  Woodward  (46  N.  H.  315), 

221. 
Belles  v.  Anderson  (38  111.  App.  126), 

379. 
Bellinger,  In  re  (8  Wend.  595),  354. 
Bellows  v.  Stone  (14  N.  H.  175),  223. 
Belmont  v.  Warrell  (69  Me.  314),  242. 
Belote  v.  Wayne (7  Yerg.,  Tenn.,  534), 

69. 
Belzhover  v.    Blackstock  (3  Watts, 

20),  174. 
Bement  v.  Claybrook   (5  Ind.  App. 

193 ;  31  N.  E.  Rep.  556),  206. 
Bement  v.  May  (Ind.,  1893,  34  N.  E. 

Rep.  327),  79. 
Bemis  v.  Vermont  R.  R.  Co.  (58  Vt. 

636),  198. 
Benaway  v.  Conine  (3  Chand.,  Wis., 

214),  330. 
Benecia  Works  v.  Estes  (Cal.,  1892, 

32  Pac.  Rep.  938),  208. 
Benedict  v.  Driggs  (34  Hun,  94),  230. 
Benedict  v.  Hall  (76  N.  C.  113),  356. 
Benedict  v.  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co. 

(49  N.  W.  Rep.  408),  52. 
Benedict  v.  State  (14  Wis.  423),  7. 
Benedict  v.  State  (11  N.  E.  Rep.  125; 

44  Ohio,  679),  116. 
Benev.  Society  v.  Phillips  (36  Mich. 

22),  242. 
Benge  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892,  17  S.  W. 

Rep.  146),  283. 
Benjamin  v.  Hathaway  (3  Conn.  528), 

353. 
Benjamin   v.   N.  Y.   El.   R.   Co.  (63 

Hun,  629),  334. 


Benn  v.  Hatcher  (81  Va.  34),  206. 
Benner  v.  Dredging  Co.  (134  N.  Y. 

456),  367. 
Bennet  v.  Paine  (7  Watts,  334),  136. 
Bennett  v.  Dean  (41  Mich.  472),  83. 
Bennettv.  Insurance  Co.  (8 Daly,  471), 

241. 
Bennett  v.  Kroth  (37  Kan.  235),  277. 
Bennett  v.  Libhart  (27  Mich.  489), 

129. 
Bennett  v.  McCaffrey  (28  Mo.  App. 

220),  140. 
Bennett  v.   Runyon  (4  Dana,  422), 

105. 
Bennett  v.  Russell  (34  Mo.  524),  77. 
Bennett  v.  Shipley  (82  Mo.  448),  135. 
Bennett  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  341),  6. 
Bennett  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  359), 

347. 
Bennett  v.  State  (22  S.  W.  Rep.  684), 

124. 
Bennett  v.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  73), 

322. 
Bennett  v.  State  (57  Wis.  69),  188. 
Bennett  v.   Syndicate  Ins.   Co.    (43 

Minn.  48),  350. 
Benninghof   v.    Cubbison   (45   Kan. 

621),  370. 
Bennison  v.  Walbank  (38  Minn.  313), 

193. 
Bensberg  v.  Harris  (46  Mo.  App.  404), 

347. 
Bensimer  v.  Fell  (W.  Va.,  1891,  12  S. 

E.  Rep.  1078),  157. 
Bensley  v.   Brockway  (27   111.    App. 

410),  67,  68,  73a. 
Benson,  In  re  (16  N.  Y.  S.  Ill),  178. 
Benson  v.  Christian  (129  Ind.   535), 

244. 
Benson  v.  Dean  (40  Minn.  455),  21. 
Benson  v.  Lundy  (52  Iowa,  256),  70. 
Benson  v.  McMahon  (127  U.  S.  467), 

125. 
Benson  v.  United  States  (146  U.  S. 

245),  306. 
Bent  v.  Baker  (3  T.  R.  27),  303. 
Bentell  v.  Oliver  (89  Ga.  246),  150a. 
Bentley  v.  Brown  (37  Kan.  14),  199. 


XXX 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Bentley  v.  Cooke   (3    Doug.,    Eng., 

422),  166. 
Bentley  v.  O'Brien  (111  111.  53),  66. 
Benton  v.  Baxley  (Ga.,   1893,  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  820),  138. 
Benton  v.  Martin  (52  N.  Y.  570),  212. 
Benton  v.  State  (30  Avk.  328),  344. 
Berbesick   v.  Fritz  (39  Iowa,    700), 

223. 
Berg  v.  McLafferty  (12  Atl.  Rep.  460), 

120. 
Berg  v.  Peterson  (52  N.  W,  Rep.  37 ; 

49  Minn.  420),  139. 
Berg  v.  Warner  (47  Minn.  250),  71. 
Bergen  v.  People  (17  111.  426),  93. 
Bergquist  v.  Iron  Co.  (49  Minn.  511; 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  136),  186. 
Berkely  Peerage  Case  (4  Campb.  401- 

417),  53,  113. 
Berliner  v.  Waterloo  (14  Wis.  378), 

242. 
Berney  v.  Dinsmore  (141  Mass.  42), 

199. 
Bernhart  v.  State  (82  Wis.  23),  343. 
Berry    v.   Berry  (24  Atl.   Rep.   957; 

84  Me.  541),  380. 
Berry  v.  Com.  (10  Bush,  Ky.,  15),  93. 
Berry  v.  Haines  (4  Wheat.    17),  128. 
Berry  v.  Hall  (N.   M.,  1893,  35  Pac. 

Rep.  36),  144. 
Berry  v.   Kowatsky  (Cal.,    1893,    30 

Pac.  Rep.  202),  8. 
Berry  v.  Lathrop  (24  Ark.  12),  68. 
Berry  v.  Sawyer  (19  Fed.  Rep.  286), 

304. 
Berry  v.  Stevens  (71  Me.  503),  302. 
Berry  v.  Stevens  (69  Me.  290),  309. 
Berry  v.  United  States  (2  Colo.  Terr. 

186),  90. 
Berry  v.  Whitney  (40  Mich.  65),  223. 
Bertody  v.  Ison  (69  Ga.  317),  254. 
Bertrand  v.  Taylor  (32  Ark.  470),  249. 
Berwies  v.  So.  Pac.  R.   Co.  (80  Cal. 

415),  145. 
Besch  v.  Besch  (27  Tex.  390),  56. 
Bestor  v.  Roberts  (58  Ala.  331),  133, 

140. 
Bethune  v.  Hale  (45  Ala.  522),  244. 


Betts  v.  Gloversville  (8  N.  Y.  S.  795), 

138. 
Betts  v.  Starr  (5  Corn.  550,  553),  160. 
Bevan  v.  Bank  (31  N.  E.   Rep.  679 ; 

39  111.  App.  577),  139,  140. 
Bevans  v.  Barnett  (Ark.,  1893.  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  160),  18. 
Beveridge  v.   Parmlee  (43  111.  App. 

459),  380. 
Bibb  v.  Allen  (149  U.  S.  481),  7,  360. 
Bickford  v.  Menier  (9  N.  Y.  S.  775), 

250. 
Bierce  v.  Stocking  (11  Gray,  174),  195. 
Bierhaus  v.  W.  U.  T.  Co.  (Ind.,  1893, 

34  N.  E.  Rep.  581),  231. 
Bigelow  v.   Copen  (145  Mass.    273), 

214. 
Bigelow  v.  Legg  (102  N.  Y.  654),  216. 
Bigelow  v.   Metro.   Ry.  Co.  (48  Mo. 

App.  367),  231. 
Bigelow  v.   Summers  (28  Fla.  759), 

130. 
Bigelow   v.   Winsor  (1  Gray,  Mass., 

299,  303),  151. 
Bigelow  v.  Sickles  (75  Wis.  528),  168. 
Bigham  v.  Coleman  (71  Ga.  176),  132. 
Bigler  v.  Reyher  (48  Ind.  112),  174. 
Bigoonette  v.  Paulet  (134  Mass.  123), 

52. 
Billings  v.   Billings  (10  Cush.   178), 

212. 
Billings  v.  Stark  (15  Fla.  297).  226. 
Billingsley  v.  Dean  (11  Ind.  331),  242. 
Binfield  v.  State  (Neb.,  1884,  19  N.  W. 

Rep.  607),  330. 
Binford  v.  Young  (115  Ind.  174),  370. 
Bingham  v.  Cabot  (3  Dall.  19),  144. 
Bingham  v.  Hyland  (6  N.  Y.  S.  75), 

130. 
Bingham  v.  Walk  (12S  Ind.  164;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  483),  173,  174,  370. 
Binkert  v.  Jensen  (94  111.  283),  242. 
Binns  v.  State  (16  Ind.  31),  6. 
Birbeck  v.  Burrows  (2  Hall,  51),  314. 
Bird  v.  Com.    (21  Gratt.,  Va.,  800), 

185,  242. 
Bird  v.  Hudson  (N.  C,  1893,  18  S.  E. 

Rep.  209),  349. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXXI 


References  are  to  sections. 


Bird  v.  Hueston  (10  Ohio  St.   418), 

166,  168. 
Bird  v.  State  (107  Ind.  154),  345. 
Bird  v.  Styles  (18  N.  J.  Eq.  297),  304. 
Birdsey  v.  Butterfield  (34  Wis.   52), 

83. 
Birmingham  v.  Anderson  (48  Pa.  St. 

253),  210. 
Birmingham  F.  Ins.   Co.   v.   Culver 

(126  111.  329;  18  N.  E.  Rep.  804), 

200,  341. 
Birmingham  F.  &  N.  Co.  v.  Gross 

(Ark.,  1893,  12  S.  Rep.  36),  208. 
Bischoff  v.  Schmetz  (5  N.  Y.  S.  757), 

199. 
Biscoe  v.  State  (67  Md.  6),  89. 
Bishop  v.  Dillard  (49  Ark.  285),  205. 
Bishop  v.   Minton   (112   N.    C.    524; 

17  S.  E.  Rep.  436),  84. 
Bishop  v.  Tucker  (4  Rich.,  S.  C,  78), 

123. 
Bishop    of    Meath   v.    Marquess    of 

Winchester  (3  Bing.   N.  C.  183), 

106. 
Bissell  v.  Adams  (55  Conn.   399),  69. 
Bissell  v.  Briggs  (9  Mass.  462),  232. 
Bissell  v.  West  (35  Ind,  54),  6. 
Bixby  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.  (8  Pick. 

86),  144. 
Bixby  v,  Montpelier,  etc.  Co.  (49  Vt. 

125),  19S. 
Bixler  v.  Barker  (3  Bush,  Ky.,  166), 

242. 
Black  v.  Epperson  (40  Tex.  178),  232. 
Black  v.  Hill  (32  Ohio  St.  313),  220. 
Black  v.  Lord  Braybrook  (2  Stark.  7), 

149. 
Black  v.  Shreeve  (13  N.  J.  Eq.  455), 

212. 
Black  v.  State  (1  Tex.  App.  368),  249. 
Black  v.  State  (59  Wis.  471),  324. 
Black  v.  Woodson  (39  Md.  194),  124. 
Blackburn  v.  Com.  (12  Bush,  181), 

348. 
Blackburn  v.    Crawfords    (3    Wall. 

175),  171. 
Blackburn  v.  Hargreave  (2  Lew.  C.  C. 

259),  277. 


Blackburn  v.  State  (23  Ohio  St.  146), 

10,  231. 
Blackington   v.    Rockland    (66    Me. 

352),  38. 
Blackledge   v.    Simpson   (2  Hayw., 

S.  C,  30),  77. 
Blackman  v.  Riley  (63  Hun,  521 ;  28 

Abb.  N.  C.  126),  134. 
Blackman  v.  State  (80  Ga.  785),  376. 
Blackshire  v.  Pettit  (35  W.  Va.  547), 

250. 
Blackwell  v.  State  (67  Ga.  76),  344. 
Blackwell  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  416; 

17  S.  W.  Rep.  1061),  38. 
Blade  v.  Noland  (12  Wend.  173),  226. 
Blagen  v.  Thompson  (Oreg.,  1893,  31 

Pac.  Rep.  647),  199. 
Blair  v.  Bnttolph  (72  Iowa,  31),  212. 
Blair  v.  Madison  (81  Iowa,  3),  52. 
Blair  v.  Pelham  (118  Miss.  420,  421), 

38a,  139. 
Blair  v.  Railroad  Co.  (89  Mo.  334), 

178. 
Blair  v.  Wallace  (21  Cal.  317),  232. 
Blake  v.  Graves  (18  Iowa,  312,  317), 

166. 
Blake  v.  Ladd  (ION.  H.  190),  302. 
Blake  v.  People  (73  N.  Y.  586),  375. 
Blake  v.  Russ  (33  Me.  360),  126. 
Blake  v.  Rourke  (74  Iowa,   519;   38 

N.  W.  Rep.  392),  197. 
Blakeley,  In  re  (48  Wis.  294),  222. 
Blaker  v.  State  (29  N.  E.  Rep.  1077 ; 

130  Ind.  206),  11. 
Blakeslee  v.  Dye  (1   Colo.  App.  128; 

27  Pac.  Rep.  881),  359. 
Blalock  v.  Miland  (87  Ga.  573),  30, 

130. 
Blanc  Jour  v.  Tutt  (32  Mo.  576),  70. 
Blanchard  v.  Evans  (55  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  543),  79. 
Blanchard  v.  Tyler  (12  Mich.  89),  226. 
Blanchard  v.  Young  (11   Cush.  341, 

345),  120,  247. 
Blane  v.  Rogers  (49  Cal.  15),  320. 
Blewett  v.  Gaynor  (77  Wis.  378),  375. 
Blewett  v.  Tregonning  (3  Ad.  &  EI. 

554,  565,  581,  584),  341. 


XXX11 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 

Bliss  v.  Brainard  (41  N.  H.  256),  250, 

276. 
Bliss  v.  Mclntire  (18  Vt.  466),  128. 
Bliss  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 

Co.  (Mass.,  1894,  36  N.  E  Rep.  65), 

192. 
Bliss  v.  Shuman  (47  Me.  252),  277. 
Block  v.  Jacksonville    (36  111.    301), 

143a. 
Block  v.  Woodron  (39  Md.  194),  124. 
Blocker  v.  Burness  (2  Ala.  355),  316. 
Blodgett  v.  Jordan  (6  Vt.  580),  148. 
Blood   v.    Fairbanks    (50   Cal.    420), 

308. 
Bloodgood  v.  James  (12  Johns.  285), 

288. 

Osterlee    (139    111. 


Schrock    (110    111. 


Bloomington    v 

120),  52,  363 
Bloomington    v, 

221),  189. 
Bloomington  v.  Smith  (23  N.  E.  Rep. 

972),  130. 
Blossom   v.  Griffin  (13   N.  Y.    569), 

371. 
Blount  v.  Kempton  (155  Mass.  378), 

168. 
Blower  v.  Hol'lis  (1  Cromp.  &  M.  396), 

147. 
Bloxam  v.  Elsie  (1  C.  &  P.  558),  38. 
Blum  v.  Davis  (56  Tex.  426),  358. 
Blum  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (1  Misc. 

Rep.  119;  20  N.  Y.  S.  722),  199. 
Blumhart  v.  Rohr  (70  Md.  839),  60. 
Blythe  v.  Gibbons  (Ind.,    1894,    35 

N.  E.  Rep.  557),  208. 
Blythe  v.  State  (4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep. 

435),  344. 
Boalmayer  v.  State  (20  S.  W.  Rep. 

1102;  31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  473),  330. 
Board  v.  First  Nat.  Bank   (24  N.  Y. 

S.  392),  82. 
Board  v.  Misenheimer  (78  111.   22), 

139. 
Boardman  v.  Reed  (6  Pet.  328),  115. 
Boardman  v.  Woodman   (47  N.  ■  H. 

120),  188. 
Board  of  Commissioners  v.  Diebold 

S.  &  L.  Co.  (133   U.  S.  473),  76. 


Board  of  Com'rs  of  Franklin  County 

v.  Bunting  (111  Ind.  143),  73a. 
Bock   v.  Wygant  (5  III.   App.  643), 

350. 
Bode  v.  Trimmer  (82  Cal.  513),  31. 
Boe   v.    Minn.    Milk   Co.  (44   Minn. 

460),  154. 
Boehm  v.  Lies  (18  N.  Y.  S.  577),  252. 
Borran  v.   Hamilton   (90  Ala.  354), 

148. 
Bogardus   v.    Clark   (4  Paige,   623), 

150. 
Boggan  v.  Horn  (97  N.  C.  268),  60. 
Boggus  v.  State  (34  Ga.  375),  140. 
Bohannanv.  Chapman  (13  Ala.  641), 

73a. 
Bohart  v.  Chamberlain  (99  Mo.  622), 

130. 
Bohrer  v.  Lange  (44  Minn.  281),  3(5, 

310. 
Bohrer  v.  Stumpf  (31  111.  App.  139), 

7,8. 
Bolgiano  v.  Lock  Co.  (73  Md.  132), 

285. 
Boiling  v.   Fannin  (Ala.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  59),  57,  58. 
Boiling  v.  Teel  (76  Va.  487),  262. 
Boiling  v.  State  (Ark.,  1891,  18  S.  W. 

Rep.  658),  249. 
Bollinger  Co.  v.   McDowell  (99  Mo. 

632),  217. 
Bolwar  v.  Nepensett  (16  Pick.  241), 

229. 
Bompart  v.   Roderman  (24  Mo.  385), 

262. 
Bond  v.  Ward  (1  Nott  &  McCord, 

201),  73. 
Bonds  v.  Smith  (106  N.  C.  553),  12C>. 
Bondur  v.  Le  Bourne  (79  Me.  21),  24. 
Bone  v.  State  (86  Ga.  108),  334. 
Bonnard  v.  State  (25  Tex.  App.  173), 

340. 
Bonnelli  v.  Bowen  (74  Miss.  142 ;  11 

S.  Rep.  791),  350. 
Bonner  v.   Mayfield   (82  Tex.    234), 

198. 
Bonner  v.  McPhail  (31  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

106),  315. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XXXlll 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Bonner   v.   People  (40  111.  App.  028), 

270. 
Bonnett  v.  Glatfeldt  (120  111.    106), 

60,  342. 
Bonstead  v.  Cuyler  (Pa.,  1887,  8  Atl. 

Rep.  818),  309. 
Boogher  v.  Howe  (99  Mo.  183),  11. 
Bookman  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co.  (137 

N.  Y.  302),  241. 
Bookman  v.  N.  Y.  EI.  R.  R.  Co.  (137 

N.  Y.  595),  199. 
Boon  v.  State  (37  Minn.  126),  230. 
Boone  v.  Miller  (73  Tex.  564),  53. 
Boorman  v.  Johnston  (12  Wend.  573), 

206. 
Booth  v.  Pendola  (88  Cal.  36 ;  23  Pac. 

Rep.  200),  309. 
Booth  v.  Palte  (L.  R.  15  App.  Cas. 

188),  220. 
Boothby  v.  Stanley  (34  Me.  515),  129. 
Boree  v.  McLean  (24  Wis.  225),  31. 
Bork  v.  People  (91  N.  Y.  13),  23. 
Born  v.  Rosenow  (84  Wis.  62 ;  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  1089),  334. 
Borough  v.  Brown  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 

272),  239. 
Borst  v.  Nalle  (28  Gratt.,  Va.,  423), 

213. 
Borum  v.  Fouts  (15  Ind.  50),  168. 
Boscowitz,  Ex  parte  (84  Ala.  463 ,  4 

S.  Rep.  279),  354. 
Bose  v.  Solliers  (6  Dow.  &  Ry.  514), 

358. 
Bostie  v.  State  (94  Ala.  45),  333. 
Bostock  v.  State  (61  Ga.  635,  639),  344. 
Boston  v.  Benson  (12  Cush.,  Mass., 

61),  128. 
Boston  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoit  (14  Vt.  92), 

158. 
Boston,  etc.   Co.    v.    Dana  (1  Gray, 

Mass.,  83),  37,  176. 
Bostwick  v.  Leech  (3  Day,  Conn., 

476),  262. 
Boswell  v.  Com.  (20  Gratt.,  Va.,  860), 

231. 
Boteler  v.  Dexter  (20  D.  C.  26),  128, 

130. 
Bott  v.  Burnell  (9  Mass.  96),  150a. 


Bottomley  v.  United  States  (1  Story, 

143),  8. 
Boughton  v.  Seamans  (9  Hun,  392), 

314. 
Boulden  v.  Mclntire  (119  Ind.  574), 

234.' 
Bouldin  v.   Massie   (7  Wheat.  122), 

130. 
Bouldin  v.  Phelps  (30  Fed.  Rep.  547), 

242. 
Boulter  v.  Behrend  (20  D.  C.  567), 

358. 
Bouman  v.  Norton  (5  C.  &  P.  177), 

171. 
Bounds  v.  Little  (79  Tex.  128),  31. 
Bourck  v.  Miller  (Oreg.,  26  Pac.  Rep. 

861),  35. 
Bourden  v.  Bailes  (101  N.  C.  612), 

334. 
Bourne  v.  Boston  (2  Gray,  494),  126. 
Bouton  v.   Linsley  (84  Wis.  644;  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  1017),  154. 
Bovee  v.  Hurd  (134  N.  Y.  450),  222. 
Bow  v.  Allentown  (34  N.   H.   365), 

225. 
Bowditch  v.  Mawley  (1  Campb.  195), 

22. 
Bowen  v.  Bank  (18  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

226),  35. 
Bowen  v.    Huntington  (35  W.  Va. 

682),  188,  192. 
Bowen  v.  Missouri  P.  etc.  Co.  (Mo., 

1893,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  436),  242. 
Bower  v.  O'Brien  (2  Ind.  423),  140. 
Bower  v.  State  (5  Miss.  364),  93. 
Bowers  v.  Hogau  (93  Mich.  420),  199. 
Bowers  v.  Overfield  (10  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  273),  60. 
Bowers  v.  Schuler  (Minn.,   1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  817),  309. 
Bowers  v.  Smith  (8  N.  Y.  S.  226),  82. 
Bowers  v.  State  (19  N.  Y.  State  Rep. 

926),  308. 
Bowersox  v.  Gitt  (12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

81),  159. 
Bowie  v.  Maddox  (29  Ga.  285),  6. 
Bowker  v.  Delong  (141  Mass.   351), 

73a. 


XX  XIV 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Bovvlin  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  543),  283. 
Bowling  Green  v.  Com.  (79  Ky.  604), 

324. 
Bowman  v.  Griffith  (35   Neb.   361), 

226. 
Bowman  v.  Norton  (5  C.  &  P.  177), 

169. 
Bowman  v.  Patrick  (32  Fed.    Rep. 

368),  166. 
Bowman  v.  Sanborn  (25  N.  H.  87), 

133. 
Bowman  v.  Smith  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S. 

W.  Rep.  48),  31,  146. 
Bowyer  v.  Martin  (6  Rand.,  Va.,  525), 

221. 
Boyce  v.  Auditor  (52  N.  W.  Rep.  754 ; 

90  Mich.  314),  31,  146. 
Boyd  v.  Jones  (60  Mo.  454),  70. 
Boyd    v.    McConnell    (10    Humph., 

Tenn.,  68),  128. 
Boyd  v.  Nebraska  (143  U.  S.  135 ;  12 

S.  Ct.  375),  81. 
Boyd  v.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.  (3  La.   Ann. 

848),  233. 
Boyd  v.  State  (2  Humph.,  Tenn.,  37), 

89. 
Boyd  v.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  570),  5. 
Boyd  v.  State  (14  Lea,   Tenn.,    161), 

201. 
Boyd  v.  Thompson  (153  Pa.  St.  78), 

68. 
Boyd  v.  United  States  (142  U.  S.  87), 

320. 
Boyden  v.  Moore  (5  Mass.  365),  82. 
Boyle  v.  Chambers  (32  Mo.  46),  107. 
Boyle  v.  Coleman  (13  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

42),  139a. 
Boyle  v.  State  (105  Ind.  469),  102. 
Boyle  v.  State  (57  Wis.  472),  189. 
Boylston  v.  Giltner  (3  Oreg.  118),  193. 
Brace  v.  Doble  (S.  D.,  1893,  53  N.  W. 

Rep.  859),  24. 
Brackettv.  Norton  (4  Conn.  117),  143. 
Bradford  v.  Dawson  (2  Ala.  203),  136. 
Bradford  v.  Floyd  (80  Mo.  207),  237. 
Bradford    v.    Williams  (2  Md.  Ch. 

1-3),  71-73a. 


Bradish  v.  Yocum  (30  111.  386),  217. 
Bradley  v.  Bradley  (4  Wheat.  173), 

233. 
Bradley   v.  Merrick  (91  N.  Y.  293), 

123. 
Bradley  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  (8 

id.  289),  188. 
Bradley    Fert.    Co.    v.    Taylor    (112 

N.  C.  141 ;  17  S.  E.  Rep.  69),  283, 

332. 
Bradly  v.  Bradly  (2  Fairf.  267),  156. 
Bradly  v.  Caswell  (Vt.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  956),  219. 
Bradly  v.  Elsby  (33  Mich.  328),  142. 
Bradly  v.  West  (60  Mo.  33),  229. 
Bradly,  Adm'r,  v.    Long  (2  Strobh., 

S.  C,  160),  132. 
Bradshaw  v.  Bennett  (1  M.  &  Rob. 

148),  138. 
Bradshaw  v.  Combs  (102  111.  428),  334. 
Bradshaw  v.  Mansfield  (18  Tex.  App. 

21),  242. 
Bradshaw  v.  State  (17  Neb.  147),  6. 
Bradstreet   v.    Neptune  Ins.    Co.   (3- 

Sumn.  600),  158. 
Brady  v.  Cassidy  (13  N.  Y.  S.  824),  24. 
Brady  v.  Valentine  (21  N.  Y  S.  776; 

3  Misc.  Rep.  19),  370. 
Bragg  v.  Bletz  (7  D.  C.  105),  11. 
Bragg  v.  Danielson  (141  Mass.  195), 

379. 
Bragg  v.  Massie  (38  Ala.  89),  223. 
Bragg  v.  Paulk  (42  Me.  502).  246. 
Bragg  v.  Stanford  (82  Ind.  324),  208. 
Brainard  v.  Buck  (25  Vt.  573),  79. 
Brainerd  v.  Brainerd  (15  Conn.  575), 

223. 
Braly  v.  Henry  (77  Cal.  324),  339. 
Bramble  v.  Hunt  (68  Hun,  204),  199, 

369. 
Bramble  v.  Kingsbury  (39  Ark.  131), 

83. 
Bramlette  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  611 ; 

2  S.  W.  Rep.  765,  875),  6,  166. 
Branch  v.  Wilson  (12  Fla.  543),  215. 
Brand  v.  Servass  (11  Mont.  86),  367. 
Brandas  v.  Barnett  (3  M.   G.   &  S» 

519),  242. 


TAKLE    OF   CASES. 


XXXV 


References  are  to  sections. 


Brandt  v.  Klein  (17  Johns.  335),  173. 
Branfoot  v.  Hamilton  (52  Fed.  Rep. 

390),  191. 
Bransen  v.  Kitchenman  (148  Pa.  St. 

541),  8. 
Brantley  v.  Swift  (24  Ala.  390),  198. 
Bransdale   v.    Lowe  (2  Rus.   &  My. 

142),  363. 
Branstetter  v.  Morgan  (N.  D.,  1893, 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  758),  374. 
Brassell   v.    State  (91   Ala.  45;  S  S. 

Rep.  679),  333. 
Brauns  v.  Stearns  (1  Oreg.  367),  221. 
Brawley  v.   United  States  (96  U.  S. 

168),  217. 
Bray  v.  Kremp  (113  Mo.  552;  21  S. 

W.  Rep.   220),  366. 
Brazel  v.  Fair  (26  S.  C.  370),  173. 
Breckenridge  v.    Duncan  (2   A.   K. 

Marsh.  50),  221. 
Breen  v.  Moran  (51  Minn.  525;  53  N. 

W.  Rep.  755),  216. 
Breher  v.   Reese  (17  111.   App.    545), 

265. 
Breiseumeister  v.  Lodge   (81    Mich. 

525),  178. 
Brelscher  v.  Treitske  (33  Neb.  699), 

385. 
Brennan  v.  Hall  (14  N.  Y.  S.  864),  157. 
Brennan  v.  Security  L.   Ins.  Co.  (4 

Daly,  N.  Y.,  296),  253. 
Brennan  v.  Voght  (Ala.,   1893,  11  S. 

Rep.  893),  237. 
Brennan  v.  Winkler  (37  S.  C.  457 ;  16 

S.  E.  Rep.  250),  200. 
Bressler  v.  People  (117  111.  422),  384. 
Bretts  v.  Levine  (Minn.,  1892,  52  N. 

W.  Rep.  525),  209. 
Brewer  v.  Knapp  (1  Pick.  332,  337), 

230. 
Brewster  v.  Doane  (2  Hill,  537),  58. 
Brewster  v.  McCall  (15  Conn.  274), 

222. 
Brice  v.  Miller  (15  S.  E.  Rep.  272;  35 

S.  C.  537),  333,  367. 
Briceland  v.   Com.  (74  Pa.  St.  469), 

249. 
Bridge  v.  Eggleston  (14  Mass.  245),  9. 


Bridge  v.  Gray  (14  N.  Y.  61),  69. 
Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller  (111.,  1893,  28  N. 

E.  Rep.  1091),  202. 
Bridges  v.   North  London  Ry.   Co. 

(L.  R.  7  H.  L.  213),  13. 
Bridgham's  Appeal  (82  Me.  323),  371. 
Bridgman  v.  Scott  (13  N.  Y.  S.  338; 

59  Hun,  624),  126. 
Briel  v.  Buffalo  (68  Hun,  219),  377. 
Brierly  v.    Davol    Mills   (128  Mass. 

291),  198. 
Briggs  v.  Briggs  (R.  I.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  198),  167. 
Briggs  v.  Com.  (82  Va.  554),  349. 
Briggs  v.  Georgia  (15  Vt.  61),  60. 
Briggs  v.  Hervey  (130  Mass.  187),  230. 
Briggs  v.  Jones  (46  Minn.  277),  366. 
Briggs  v.  Minn.   S.  R.  Co.  (52  Minn. 

36;  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1019),  188. 
Briggs  v.  Morgan  (3  Phil.  325),  202. 
Briggs  v.  Partridge  (64  N.  Y.   357), 

73a. 
Briggs  v.  Rush  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  19), 

377. 
Briggs  v.  Whipple  (7  Vt.  15),  242. 
Brigham  v.  Carr  (21  Tex.   142),  73a. 
Brigham  v.  Gott   (3  N.    Y.   S.    518), 

178,  309. 
Brigham  v.  Palmer  (3  Allen,  Mass., 

450),  138. 
Brigham  v.  Peters  (1  Gray,  139),  139. 
Bright  v.   Smithers  (10  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  647),  159. 
Brightman  v.  Hix  (108  Mass.  246),  84. 
Brinckle  v.   Brinckle  (34  Leg.   Int. 

428),  114. 
Brinckley  v.  State  (89  Ala.  34),  186. 
Bringer,  In  re  (7  Blatch.  268),  234. 
Brinkman  v.    Jones  (44  Wis.    49S), 

223. 
Brison  v.  Brison  (75  Cal.  525),  213. 
Bristol  v.  Ontario  Orphan  Asylum  (60 

Conn.  472),  222. 
Bristol  Sav.   Bank  v.   Stiger  (Iowa, 

1893,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  265),  208. 
Bristow  v.  Sequeville  (L.  R.  5  Exch. 

275),  143. 
Britt  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  215),  352. 


XX  XVI 


TADLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Britton  v.  Stanley  (4   Whart.,  Pa., 

114),  128. 
Britton  v.  State  (115  Ind.  55),  339. 
Broad  v.  Pitt  (3  C.  &  B.  518),  177. 
Broad  Street   Hotel  Co.  v.  Weaver 

(57  Ala.  26),  242. 
Broat  v.  Moore'(44  Minn.  468),  377. 
Brobston  v.  Cahill  (64  111.  356),  140. 
Brock  v.  Brock  (116  Pa.  St.  113),  168. 
Brock  v.  Coram.  (92  Ky.  183 ;  17  S. 

W.  Rep.  337),  102. 
Brock  v.  Milligan  (10  Ohio,  123, 125), 

316. 
Brock  way  v.  Petted  (Mich.,  1890,  45 

N.  W.  Rep.  64),  24. 
Brodeck  v.  Hirschfield  (57  Vt.  12),  24. 
Broder  v.   Conklin  (98  Cal.  360;  33 

Pac.  Rep.  211),  231,  232,  234. 
Brogy  v.  Com.  (10  Gratt.,  Va.,  722), 

121. 
Brokman   v.    Myers  (59  Hun,  623), 

126. 
Bromley  v.  Goff  (75  Me.  213),  21. 
Bronson,  In  re  (67  Hun,  237),  79. 
Bronson   v.   Leach   (42  N.  W.  Rep. 

174;  74  Mich.  713),  368. 
Brook  v.   Chaplin  (3  Vt.   281),   135, 

136. 
Brook  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (81  Iowa, 

504;  47  N.  W.  Rep.  74),  201. 
Brook  v.  Clay  (3  A.  K.  Marsh.   545), 

53. 
Brook  v.  Duggan  (149  Mass.  396),  56. 
Brook  v.   New  Durham   (55   N.   H. 

550),  74. 
Brook  v.  Silver  (5  Del.  Ch.  7),  304. 
Brooke  v.  Filer  (35  Ind.  402),  238. 
Brooke  v.  Townsend  (7  Gill,  10),  197. 
Brooke   v.    Tradesmen's     Bank    (68 

Hun,  129),  366. 
Brooke  v.  Washington  (8  Gratt.,  Va., 

24S),  267. 
Brooken  v.  State  (26  Tex.  App.  121 ; 

9  S.  W.  Rep.  735),  332. 
Brookline  v.  Mackintosh  (133  Mass. 

266),  229. 
Brookmire  v.  Rosa  (34  Neb.   227;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  810),  357. 


Brooks  v.  Byam  (1  Story,  296),  305. 
Brooks  v.  Weeks  (121  Mass.  433),  347. 
Brookser  v.  State  (26  Tex.  App.  593), 

80. 
Broquet  v.  Tripp  (36  Kan.  700;  14 

Pac.  Rep.  227),  186,  188. 
Brotherton  v.  People  (75  N.  Y.  159), 

6,  102,  249. 
Brotton  v.   Langert  (1  Wash.  267), 

337. 
Brough  v.  Perkins  (6  Mod.  81),  145. 
Browder  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  614 ; 

18  S.  W.  Rep.  197),  350. 
Brower  v.  East  Rome  Town  Co.  (84 

Ga.  219),  60. 
Brown  v.  Baldwin  Co.  (13  N.  Y.  S. 

893),  216. 
Brown  v.  Bellows  (4  Pick.  179),  348. 
Brown  v.  Bocquin  (57  Ark.   97;  20 

N.  W.  Rep.  813),  153. 
Brown  v.  Bowen  (90  Mo.  184),  209. 
Brown  v.  Bowen  (30  N.  Y.  519),  84. 
Brown    v.     Brightman     (11    Allen, 

Mass.,  226),  308. 
Brown  v.  Brown  (43  N.  H.  25),  221. 
Brown  v.  Brown  (1  Hagg.  523),  202. 
Brown  v.  Brown  (39  Mich.  792),  252. 
Brown  v.  Cabalin  (3  Oreg.  45),  211. 
Brown  v.  Case  (23  S.  C.  251),  246. 
Brown  v.  Clark  (77  N.  Y.  360),  210. 
Brown  v.  Clock  (5  N.  Y.  Supp.  245), 

309. 
Brown  v.  Com.  (S6  Va.  935),  80. 
Brown  v.   Doubleday  (61   Vt.   523;  7 

Atl.  Rep.  135),  187. 
Brown  v.  Ed  son  (23  Vt.  435),  147. 
Brown  v.  Farrar  (3  Ohio,   140),  136. 
Brown  v.  Foster  (112  Mo.  237),  248. 
Brown  v.  Getchell  (11  Mass.  11),  286. 
Brown  v.  Griffith  (70  Cal.  14),  130. 
Brown  v.   Insurance    Co.    (70  Iowa, 

390),  188. 
Brown  v.  Isbell  (11  Ala.   1009),  213. 
Brown  v.  Jewett  (18  N.  H.  230),  233. 
Brown  v.  Kenyon  (108  Ind.  284),  115. 
Brown  v.    Lehigh,    etc.   Co.    (40   111. 

App.  602),  232. 
Brown  v.  Lincoln  (47  N.  H.  368),  139. 


TAIJLK    OF    CASES. 


XXXVU 


References  are  to  sections. 


Brown   v.    Marshal   (120   Ind.    323), 

375. 
Brown  v.  Metz  (33  111.  339),  129. 
Brown  v.  Minger  (16  Vt.  12),  73. 
Brown  v.  Mooers  (6  Gray,  451),  352. 
Brown  v.  Moore  (38  Tex.  645),  135. 
Brown  v.  Orr  (86  Va.  935),  320. 
Brown  v.  Peckard  (4  Utah,  292),  76. 
Brown   v.   Phelan   (2   Swan,  Tenn., 

629),  128. 
Brown  v.  Piper  (91  U.   S.   37),  236, 

237. 
Brown  v.  Prude  (Ala.,   1893,    11  S. 

Rep.  838),  199. 
Brown  v.  Purkhani  (18  Pick.    172), 

128. 
Brown  v.  Rome,  etc.   R.   R.    Co.  (45 

Hun,  439),  178. 
Brown  v.  Rouse  (93  Cal.  257),  18. 
Brown  v.  Scofield  (8  Barb.  279),  239. 
Brown  v.  Selby  (2  Biss.  457),  231. 
Brown  v.  Stark  (83  Cal.  636),  116. 
Brown  v.  State  (1  Pickle,  Tenn.,  439). 

286. 
Brown  v.  State  (72  Md.  468),  342. 
Brown  v.   State  (32  Tex.  Cr.   App. 
.   119;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  596),  80,  283. 
Brown  v.  State  (76  Ga.  623),  350. 
Brown  v.  State  (32  Miss.  433),  93. 
Brown  v.  State  (26  Ohio  St.  176),  9. 
Brown  v.  Sullivan  (3  Ind.  App.  211), 

379. 
Brown  v.  Sullivan  (71  Tex.   470),  20, 

24. 
Brown  v.  Taurick  (20  N.  Y.  S.  369), 

247,  252. 
Brown  v.  Wood  (17  Mass.  68),  232. 
Brown  v.  Wood  (121  Mass.  137),  168. 
Brown  v.  Wood  (6  Rich.,  S.  C,  Eq. 

155),  108. 
Brown  v.    Wright  (Ark.,    1893,    22 

S.  W.  Rep.  1022),  230. 
Brown's  Case  (9  Leigh,  Va.,  633),  80. 
Browne  v.  Piper  (91  U.  S.  37),  257. 
Brownell  v.  Pacific  R.  R.  Co.  (47  Mo. 

250),  57. 
Brownfield's  Ex'r  v.  Brownfield  (151 
Pa.  St.  565),  214. 


Browning   v.  Berry  (107   N.  C.  231), 

21. 
Brubaker  v.  Taylor  (76  Pa.  St.  83), 

346. 
Bruce  v.  Crews  (39  Ga.  544),  132. 
Bruce  v.  Lumber  Co.  (87  Va.   3S1), 

207. 
Bruce  v.  Osgood  (113  Ind.  360),  262. 
Bruce  v.  Priest  (5  Allen,  Mass.,  100), 

10. 
Bruce  v.  Slemp  (82  Va.  352),  208. 
Bruce  v.  State  (21  S.  W.  Rep.  602), 

350. 
Brucker  v.  State  (19  Wis.  539),  244. 
Brugnier  v.  United  States  (1  Dak.  9), 

20. 
Brumhall  v.  Van  Campen  (8  Minn. 

13),  230. 
Brundred  v.  Del  Hoyo  (20  N.  J.  L. 

328),  144. 
Brune  v.  Rawlings  (7  East,  279,  2S2), 

130. 
Bruner  v.  Nesbitt  (31  111.  App.  317), 

68. 
Bruner  v.  Wade  (84   Iowa,   698 ;   51 

N.  W.  Rep.  251),  8,  374. 
Brunger  v.  Smith  (49  Fed.  Rep.  124), 

168,  332. 
Brunker  v.  Cummins  (Ind.,  1893,  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  732),  186,  334. 
Bruns  v.  Close  (9  Colo.  225),  130. 
Brusch  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry.  Co.  (52 

Minn.   512;  55  N.  W.   Rep.   57), 

525. 
Bruyn  v.  R-ussell  (52  Hun,  217),  139. 
Brush  v.  Scribner  (11  Conn.  407),  143. 
Brush  v.  Witkins  (4  Johns.  Ch.  520), 

143. 
Bryan  v.  Harrison  (76  N.  C.  360),  217. 
Bryan  v.  Kales  (Ariz.,  1893,  31  Pac. 

Rep.  517),  129. 
Bryan  v.  State  (19  Fla.  364),  23. 
Bryan  v.  Walton  (20  Ga.  480),  114. 
Bryan  v.  Wear  (4  Mo.  106),  142. 
Bryant  v.  Booze  (55  Ga.  438),  67. 
Bryant  v.  Hunter  (6  Bush,  Ky.,  75), 

267. 
Bryce  v.  Buttler  (70  N.  C.  585),  69. 


XXXVlll 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Bubster  v.  State  (33  Neb.  663 ;  50  N. 

W.  Rep.  953),  89. 
Buchanan  v.  Wise  (34  Neb.  695 ;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  162),  30. 
Buchman  v.  State  (59  Ind.  1),  191. 
Buck  v.  Ashbrook  (51  Mo.  539),  168. 
Buck  v.  Gage  (43  N.   W.   Rep.  110), 

31,  142. 
Buck  v.  Patterson  (75  Mich.  397),  309. 
Buck  v.  Pickwell  (27  Vt.  104),  262. 
Buckinghouse  v.  Gregg  (19  Ind.  401), 

239. 
Buckley  v.  Bentley  (48  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

283),  205. 
Buckrnan  v.  Alwood  (71  111.  155),  223. 
Buckman  v.  Barnum  (15  Conn.  68),  68. 
Buckman's  Will  (64  Vt.  313),  168. 
Buckner  v.  Ries  (34  N.  Y.  344),  267. 
Buehler  v.   Reich  (18  N.  Y.  S.  115), 

188. 
Buel  v.  Irvin  (24  Mich.  145),  136. 
Buell  v.  Miller  (4  N.  H.  196),  214. 
Buell  v.  State  (72  Ind.  523),  244. 
Buffalo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Association  (126 

N.  Y.  450),  178. 
Buffalo  Ins.   Co.    v.    Steamship   Co. 

(29  Fed.  Rep.  237),  296. 
Buffalo  L.  T.  &  S.   D.  Co.  v.  Asso- 
ciation (N.    Y,    1891,  27  N.    E. 

Rep.  942),  144. 
Buffum  v.  Buff  urn  (49  Me.  108),  267. 
Buffuui  v.  Harris  (5  R.   I.  250),  185. 
Buford  v.  Shannon  (Ala.,  1893,  10  S. 

Rep.  263),  368. 
Buie  v.  Carver  (73  N.  C.  264),  124. 
Bulen  v.  Granger  (63  Mich.  311;  29 

N.  W.  Rep.  718),  139a. 
Bulger  v.  Ross  (Ala.,  1893,  12  S.  Rep. 

803),  222. 
Bulkin  v.  Ehret  (29  Abb.  N.  C.  62), 

378. 
Bulkley     v.    Van   Wyck    (5    Paige, 

N.  Y.,  536),  300. 
Bull  v.  Wagner  (33  Neb.  246 ;  49  N. 

W.  Rep.  1130),  379. 
Bullock  v.  Consumers'  Lumber  Co. 

(Cal.,  1893,    31   Pac.    Rep.   367), 

73a,  220. 


Bullock  v.  Knox  (96  Ala.  195;  10  S. 

Rep.  339),  234. 
Bump  v.  Cooper  (Oreg.,  1891,  26  Pac. 

Rep.  848),  7. 
Bunn  v.  Todd  (107  N.  C.  226),  209. 
Bunnell  v.  Taintor  (4  Conn.  568),  267. 
Bunson  v.  Brooks  (68  Ala.  248),  71. 
Burdell  v.  Blain  (66  Ga.  170),  229. 
Burdick  v.  Hunt  (43  Ind.  381),  176. 
Burdin  v.  Trenton  (Mo.,  1893,  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  728),  367. 
Burditt  v.  Hunt  (25  Me.  419),  214. 
Burford  v.  McCue  (53  Pa.   St.  427), 

129. 
Burg  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co. 

(Iowa,  1894,  57  N.  W.  Rep.  680), 

189,  201. 
Burge  v.  State  (62  Ga.  170),  23. 
Burger  v.  State  (83  Ala.  36),  341. 
Burghart  v.  Angastain  (6   C.   &  P. 

290),  144. 
Burgin  v.  Chenault  (9  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

285),  108. 
Burgo  v.  State  (26  Neb.  639;  42  N. 

W.  Rep.  701),  231. 
Burhans  v.  Norwood  Park   (138  111. 

147;  27  N.  E.  Rep.  1088),  346. 
Burke  v.  Cutler   (78  Iowa,  299;  43 

N.  W.  Rep.  204),  36. 
Burke  v.  Miller  (7  Cush.,  Mass.,  547- 

550),  341. 
Burke  v.  Miltenberger  (19  Wall.  519), 

240. 
Burkhalter  v.  Coward  (16  S.  C.  435), 

249. 
Burkhalter  v.  State  (58  Pa.  St.  376), 

379. 
Burlington  v.  Calais  (1  Vt.  385),  72. 
Burlington,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wallace  (28 

Neb.   179;    44  N.  W.  Rep.  225), 

337. 
Burnell  v.  Wild  (76  N.  Y.  103),  148. 
Burnett  v.  Burkhead  (21  Ark.  77),  71. 
Burnett  v.  State  (87  Ga.  622),  9,  89. 
Burney  v.  State  (87  Ala.  80),  324. 
Burnham  v.  Adams  (5  Vt.  313),  60. 
Burnham   v.    Cleary  (34  Wis.    117), 

309. 


TABLK    OF    CASES. 


XXXIX 


References  are  to  sections. 


Burnham  v.  Davis  (144   Mass.  104). 

247. 
Burnham  v.   Ellis  (39  Me.  319),  73a. 
Burnliam  v.    Gosuell  (47  Mo.  App. 

037),  128. 
Burnliam  v.  Hatfield  (5  Blackf.,  IncL, 

21),  170. 
Burnham   v.    Morrissey    (14    Gray, 

226),  288. 
Burnham  v  Sherwood  (14  Atl.  Rep. 

714;  50  Conn.  229),  385. 
Burnham  v.  Stevens  (33  N.  H.  247), 

2S4. 
Burnham  v.  Sweatt  (10  N.  H.  418), 

00. 
Burns  v.  Barenfeld  (84  Ind.  43),  192. 
Burns  v.  Fay  (14  Peck.  8),  60. 
Burns  v.   Hendrix  (54  Ala.  78),  232. 
Burns  v.  Scott  (117  U.  S.  582),  205. 
Burns  v.    Thompson  (91    Ind.    140), 

207. 
Burns  v.  Welch  (8  Yerg.,  Tenn.,  117), 

198. 
Burpenning  v.  Railroad  Co.  (48  N. 

W.  Rep.  444),  242. 
Burr  v.  Sim  (4  Whart.  150),  233. 
Burr  v.  Wilson  (22  Minn.  200),  0. 
Burrows  v.  Klunk  (70  Md.  451),  128. 
Burr's  Trial  (pp.  180,  187),  175. 
Burt  v.    McKinstry  (4  Minn.    140), 

70. 
Burt   v.    Wigglesworth   (117    Mass. 

302),  253. 
Burton  v.  Driggs  (20  Wall.,  U.  S., 

136),  37. 
Burton  v.    Schenck   (40   Minn.   52), 

150a. 
Burton  v.  Tuite  (80  Mich.  218),  150a. 
Burwell  v.  Sneed  (104  N.  C.  118;  10 

S.  E.  Rep.  152),  145,  188. 
Bush  v.  Barnett  (90  Cal.  202),  52. 
Bush  v.  Barrow  (78  Tex.  5),  154. 
Bush  v.  Bush  (87  Mo.  480),  51. 
Bush  v.  Com.  (80   Ky.    248,    250;  17 

S.  W.  Rep.  330),  89,  310. 
Bush  v.  Jones  (94  Md.  223),  154. 
Bush  v.  Smith  (1  C.  M.  &  R.  94),  339. 
Bush  v.  Stowell  (71  Pa.  St.  208),  09. 


Bushel  v.  Barrett  (Ry.    &  M.    434), 

320. 
Bushnellv.  Glessner  (40  Minn.  531), 

250. 
Buswell  v.  Luicks  (8  Daly,   N.   Y., 

518),  51. 
Buswell  v.  Pioneer   (37   N.  Y.    312), 

211. 
Buswell  v.  Trimmer  (144  Mass.  350), 

10. 
Butcher  v.  Brownsville  (2  Kan.  70), 

242. 
Bute  v.  Potts  (18  Pac.  Rep.  329;  76 

Cal.  304),  193. 
Butler  v.  Benson  (1  Barb.  520),  337. 
Butler  v.    Catling  (1    Root,    Conn., 

310),  305. 
Butler  v.  Chicago,   etc.    Co.    (Iowa, 

1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  208),  12,  186. 
Butler  v.  Collins  (12  Cal.  457),  9. 
Butler  v.  Cornell  (111.,  1893,  35  N.  E. 

Rep.  707),  188. 
Butler  v.  Insurance  Co.  (45  Iowa,  93), 

197. 
Butler  v.  Man.  Ry.  Co.  (24  N.  Y.  S. 

142),  52. 
Butler  v.    Moore   (cited  in  McNally, 

Evid.,  253,  254),  177. 
Butler  v.  Mountgarret  (7  H.  L.  Cas. 

633),  52. 
Butler  v.  Price  (115  Mass.  578),  71. 
Butler  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,  16   S.  E. 

Rep.  894),  334. 
Butler  v.  Wentworth   (84  Me.    25), 

320. 
Butrick  v.  Allen  (8  Mass.  273),  149. 
Butrick  v.  Tilton  (155  Mass.  461 ;  29 

N.  E.  Rep.  1088).  53. 
Butterfield   v.    Gilchrist    (03   Mich. 

155),  340,  374. 
Button  v.   Am.   Tract  Soc.   (23  Vt. 

338),  222. 
Butz  v.  Schwartz  (32  111.  App.  156), 

308. 
Buxton  v.  Edwards  (134  Mass.  367), 

69. 
Buzard  v.  McNulty  (77  Tex.  438 ;  14 

S.  W.  Rep.  38a),  76. 


xl 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Buzzell  v.  Willard(44  Vt.  44),  212. 
Byers  v.  Van  Deusen  (5  Wend.  268), 

232. 
Byrnes  v.  Pac.  Exp.  Co.  (Tex.,  1891, 

15  S.  W.  Rep.  46),  337,  339. 

c. 

Cable  v.  Cable  (146  Pa.  St.  451),  134. 
Cable  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  220),  93,  97. 
Cadwallader  v.  Zeb  (14  S.  Ct.  288, 

U.  S.,  1894),  8. 
Cady  v.  Shepard  (11  Pick.  400),  69. 
Cady  v.  Walker  (62  Mich.  157),  171, 

314. 
Caffer  v.  Scheming  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S. 

Rep.  123),  142. 
Caffey  v.  State  (94  Ala.  76),  6. 
Cahill  v.  Colgan  (Cal.,  1893,  31  Pac. 

Rep.  614),  18. 
Cahill  v.  Murphy  (30  Pac.  Rep.  195 ; 

94  Cal.  129),  369. 
Cahn,  In  re  (3  Redf.  Sur.  31),  222. 
Cahn  v.  Monroe  (29  Fed.  Rep.  675), 

276. 
Cain  v.  Cain  (140  Pa.  St.  144),  79. 
Cain  v.    Cody   (Cal,    1892,    29  Pac. 

Rep.  778),  24. 
Cain  v.  Heard  (1  Coldw.,  Tenn.,  163), 

268. 
Cairns  v.  Mooney  (62  Vt.  172),  309. 
Cake  v.  Bank  (116  Pa.  St.  264),  208, 

212. 
Calderon  v.  0'Donahue(47  Fed.  Rep. 

39),  56. 
Caldwell   v.  Bowen  (80  Mich.  382), 

339. 
Caldwell  v.  Center  (30  Cal.  543),  210. 
Caldwell  v.  Davis   (10  Colo.  481;  15 

Pac.  Rep.  696),  157,  172. 
Caldwell  v.  Depew   (40   Minn.  528), 

223. 
Caldwell  v.  Fulton  (31  Pa.  St.  849), 

217. 
Caldwell  v.  Garner  (31  Mo.  131),  73a. 
Caldwell  v.  Murphy  (11  N.  Y.  416), 

152. 


Caldwell  v.  Richmond,  etc.   Co.   (89 

Ga.  550),  241. 
Calhoun   v.    Richardson    (30  Conn. 

210),  211. 
.Callahan  v.  N.  Y.,  Lake  Erie  &  W. 

R.  R.  (102  N.  Y.  194),  186. 
Callahan  v.  State  (41  Tex.  439),  23. 
Callan  v.  Lukens  (89  Pa.  St.  136),  24. 
Callan  v.  McDaniel  (72  Ala.  96),  76. 
Callender  v.    Olcott    (4  Mich.    344), 

150a. 
Calvert   v.  Flower  (7   C.  &  P.  386), 

126. 
Cambreling  v.  Purton  (56  Hun,  610; 

125  N.  Y.  610),  233. 
Cameron  v.  Fay  (55  Tex.  38),  86. 
Cameron  v.  Lightfoot  (2  W.  Bl.  1193). 

281. 
Camoys  Peerage  Case  (6  CI.  &  Fin. 

789),  53. 
Campau  v.  Dubois  (39  Mich.  274),  75. 
Campau  v.  North  (39  Mich.  606),  178. 
Campbell    v.    Campbell    (54    N.   Y. 

Super.  Ct.  Rep.  381),  300. 
Campbell  v.  Campbell  (30  N.  J.  Eq. 

415),  268. 
Campbell  v.  Chase  (12  R.  I.  333),  168. 
Campbell  v.  Com.  (84  Pa.   St.  187), 

323. 
Campbell  v.  Dalhousie  (L.  R.  1  H.  L. 

App.  462),  364. 
Campbell   v.    Dearborn    (109    Mass. 

130),  223. 
Campbell  v.  Johnson   (44    Mo.    247), 

207. 
Campbell  v.  Juimies  (3  Misc.  R.  316), 

11. 
Campbell  v.  McArthur  (2  Hawks,  N. 

C,  33),  128. 
Campbell  v.  Morgan  (68  Hun,  490), 

210. 
Campbell  v.  Russell  (139  Mass.  278), 

198. 
Campbell  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  369), 

334. 
Campbell  v.  State  (8  Tex.  App.  84), 

50. 
Campbell  v.  State  (38  Ark.  498),  10. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


xli 


References  are  to  sections. 


Campbell  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  18  S. 

\V.  Rep.  409),  11. 
Campbell  v.  State  (23  Ala.    41),  186. 
Campbell  v.  State  (55  Ala.  80),  80. 
Campbell    v.    Upshur  (3    Humph., 

Tenn.,  185),  205. 
Campbell  v.  West  (44  Cal.  64G),  229. 
Campbell  v.  West  (86  Cal.  197),  239, 

240. 
Campbell  v.  Weston  (3  Paige,    124), 

314. 
Campbell  v.  Wood  (116  Mo.  196;   22 

S.  W.  Rep.  796),  220. 
Campbell  v.  Woodstock  Iron  Co.  (83 

Ala.  351),  102. 
Campbell  Banking  Co.  v.  Cole  (Iowa, 

1893,  56  N.  W.  Rep.  441),  308. 
Canaday  v.  Johnson  (40  Iowa,  587), 

308. 
Candelaria  v.  Railroad  Co.  (N.  M., 

1892,  27  Pac.  Rep.  497),  11. 
Canfield  v.  Asheville,  etc.  Co.  (Ill  N. 

C.  597),  385. 
Cannon  v.  People  (141  111.  270 ;  30  N. 

E.  Rep.  1077),  333,  334. 
Canto,  Ex  parte  (21  Tex.  App.  61), 

32. 
Cantrell  v.  State  (27  Ind.  505),  357. 
Cape  Girardeau   v.    Burrough    (112 

Mo.  559),  234. 
Capehart  v.  Mills  (Ala.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  44),  129. 
Capling  v.  Herman  (17  Mich.  524), 

149. 
Caralier  v.  Insurance  Co.  (63  Hun, 

82),  226. 
Carberry  v.  Warrell  (68  Miss.   573), 

282. 
Card  v.   Foot  (57   Conn.    431),    322, 

337. 
Card  v.  State  (109  Ind.  420),  9,  69. 
Carden  v.  State  (84  Ala.   417;  4  S. 

Rep.  823),  80. 
Carey  v.  Carey  (104  N.  C.  171),  309. 
Carey  v.  Carey  (108  N.  C.  267),  171. 
Cargain  v.  Everett  (62  Hun,  620),  24. 
Cargill  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  782),  343. 


Carico  v.  Com.  (7  Busb,  Ky.,    124), 

102. 
Carleton  v.  Carleton  (85  N.  Y.  818), 

358. 
Carley  v.  Railroad  Co.  (48  Hun,  619), 

366. 
Carlile  v.  Burley  (3  Greenl.  250),  309. 
Carlisle  v.  Carlisle  (78  Ala.  542),  135, 

136. 
Carlisle  v.  Cooper  (19  N.  J.  Eq.  256), 

229. 
Carllo  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  147),  282. 
Carlton  v.  Baldwin  (27  Tex.  572),  70. 
Carlton  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892,  18  S.  W. 

Rep.  535),  330. 
Carlyle  v.  Carlyle  Power  Co.  (36  111. 

App.  28),  151. 
Carmell  v.  Phenix  Ins.   Co.  (59  Me. 

582),  200. 
Carnegie  v.  Morrison  (2  Met.,  Mass., 

404),  143. 
Carnright  v.  Gray  (11  N.  Y.  S.  278: 

27  N.  E.  Rep.  835).  230. 
Carpenter  v.   Bailey  (29  Pac.    Rep. 

101 ;  94  Cal.  406),  188,  197. 
Carpenter  v.  Bank  (119  111.  352),  254. 
Carpenter  v.  Dexter  (8  Wall.,  U.  S., 

513),  135,  136,  242. 
Carpenter  v.  Eastern  Trans.  Co.  (71 

N.  Y.  374 ;  67  Barb.  570),  198. 
Carpenter  v.  Hatch  (64  N.  H.  573;  15 

Atl.  Rep.  219),  197. 
Carpenter  v.   Huffsteller  (87   N.  C. 

273),  24. 
Carpenter  v.  Jamison  (75  Mo.  285), 

211. 
Carpenter  v.  Knapp  (66  Mun,  632), 

373,  381. 
Carpenter  v.  Strange  (141  U.  S.  87), 

159. 
Carpenter  v.  Tucker  (98  N.  C.  316), 

124. 
Carpenter  v.  Willey  (65  Vt.  169;  26 

Atl.  Rep.  488),  13,  226,  366. 
Carr  v.  Gravitt  (54  Mich.   540),  267. 
Can-  v.  State  (10  S.  E.  Rep.  626;  84 

Ga.  250),  89. 


xlii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Carr  v.  State  (Ind.,   1893,  34  N.   E. 

Rep.  593),  10. 
Carrier  v.  Hampton  (11  Ired.  L.,  N. 

G,  307),  181,  139a. 
Carrington  v.  Potter  (37  Fed.   Rep. 

767),  144. 
Carrington  v.  St.  Louis  (89  Mo.  208), 

178. 
Carrington  v.  Stimson  (1  Curtis  C.  C. 

437),  360. 
Carroll  v.  Com.  (84  Pa.  St.  107),  324. 
Carroll  v.  O'Conner  (Ind.,   1894,  35 

N.  E.  Rep.  1006),  205. 
Carroll  v.  O'Shea  (21   N.   Y.  S.  956), 

366. 
Carroll  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ill  Mass.  1), 

84. 
Carroll  v.  State  (5  Neb.  31),  306,  323, 

344. 
Carroll  v.  State  (23  Ala.  28),  188. 
Carroll  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  100),  354. 
Carroll  v.  Water  Co.    (5   Wash.    St. 

613),  18. 
Carroll  v.  Welch  (26  Tex.  147),  199. 
Carruthers   v.  Town  (Iowa,  1892,  53 

N.  W.  Rep.  240),  199. 
Carskadon   v.  Williams   (7   W.  Va. 

784),  69. 
Carson  v.  Gillitt  (2  N.  D.  255 ;  50  N. 

W.  Rep.  710),  73a. 
Carson  v.  Smith  (5  Minn.  78),  246. 
Carson  v.  State  (80  Ga.  170),  330. 
Carter  v.  Bennett  (4  Fla.  352),  151. 
Carter  v.  Burnham  (31  Ark.  212),  69, 

73a. 
Carter  v.  Carter  (37  111.  App.  219;  28 

N.  E.  Rep.  948),  186. 
Carter  v.  Chandron  (21  Ala.  72),  106. 
Carter  v.  Jackson  (58  N.  H.  156),  140. 
Carter  v.  State  (Neb.,  1893,  54  N.  W. 

Rep.  853),  350. 
Carter  v.  State  (22  Fla.  553),  234. 
Carter  v.  Tinicum    Co.    (77    Pa.    St. 

310),  229. 
Carter  v.  West  (Ky.,  1892,  19  S.  W. 

Rep.  592),  168,  250. 
Carthaus  v.  State  (78  Wis.  540),  283. 


Cartier  v.  Lumber   Co.  (35   111.  App. 

449),  226. 
Cartlege  v.  Cutliff  (29  Ga.  758),  304. 
Cartwright  v.  Cartwright  (26  W.  R. 

684),  143. 
Cartwright  v.  Cartwright    (1    Phill. 

100),  231. 
Cartwright  v.  Clopton   (25    Ga.    85), 

214. 
Carver,  In  re  (23   N.  Y.  S.  753),  129. 
Carver  v.  Jackson  (4  Peters,  85),  151. 
Carwin  v.  Morehead  (51  Iowa,  99),  30. 
Cary  v.  White  (59  N.  Y.  336),  309. 
Case  v.  Blood  (71  Iowa,  632),  124. 
Case  v.  Case  (17  Cal.  598),  234. 
Case  v.  Heely  (26  Kan.  353),  147. 
Case  v.  Mobile  (30  Ala.  538),  24. 
Case  v.  Perew  (46  Hun,  57),  241. 
Case  v.  Reeve  (14  John.  81),  151. 
Case  v.  Seger  (4  Wash.  St.  492),  262. 
Casebolt   v.  Ackerman   (46   N.  J.  L. 

169),  69. 
Caset  v.  State  (40  Ark.  511),  231. 
Casey  v.  O'Shaughnessy  (7  Jur.  1140), 

53. 
Casey  v.  People  (31  Hun,  528),  249. 
Casey  v.  Reeves  (46  Kan.  571),  239. 
Casey  v.  State  (20  Neb.  138),  7. 
Cash  v.  Auditor  (7  Ind.  227),  239. 
Cashman  v.  Harrison  (90  Cal.  297),  7. 
Casseh  v.  Cooke  (8  Serg.  &  R.   368), 

136. 
Cassells  v.  Usry  (51  Ga.  621),  74. 
Cassiano  v.  Straus  (23  N.  Y.  S.  1036), 

370. 
Cassin  v.  La  Salle  County  (21  S.  W. 

Rep.  122;  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  127), 

369. 
Castell  v.   Millison  (41  111.  App.  61), 

126,  375. 
Castillo  v.    State  (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

145;  19  S.  W.  Rop.  892),  52. 
Castner  v.  Richardson  (Colo.,  1893, 

33  Pac.  Rep.  163),  380. 
Castor  v.  Davis  (Ind.,  1890,  20  N.  E. 

Rep.  110),  231. 
Castor  v.  Fry  (33  W.  Va.  449;  10  S. 

E.  Rep.  799),  66,  208. 


TABLE    OF   CASKS. 


xliii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Cates  v.  Kellogg  (9  Ind.  50G),  7G. 
Cates  v.  Loftus  (3  A.  K.  Marsh.  202), 

129. 
Cathcart  v.  Com.  (37  Pa.  St.  108),  10. 
Cat  heart  v.   Robinson  (5  Pet.   263), 

223. 
Catlett  v.  Insurance  Co.   (1   Paine, 

U.  S.  C.  C.  594),  149. 
Callin    v.    Harris   (Wash.,    1894,    35 

Pac.  Rep.  385),  205. 
Catoe  v.  Catoe  (32  S.  C.  595;  10  S.  E. 

Rep.  1078),  211,  213. 
Caton  v.  Lenox  (5  Rand.,  Va.,  31), 

124. 
Cavanaugh  v.  Buehler  (120  Pa.  St. 

441),  343. 
Cavanaugh  v.  Jackson  (91  Cal.  580), 

262. 
Cavazos  v.  Trevino  (6  Wall.,  U.  S., 

773),  206. 
Ca vender  v.  Guild  (4  Cal.  250),   242. 
Cavendish  v.  Troy  (41  Vt.  99),  188. 
Caughran  v.  Gilman  (81  Iowa,  442), 

159,  242. 
Caujolle  v.  Ferrie  (23  N.  Y.  91 ;  26 

Barb.  177),  53,  234. 
Cecil  v.  Beaver  (28  Iowa,  240),  226. 
Cecil  v.  Cecil  (20  Md.  153),  215. 
Central  Bank  v.  Baltimore  (20  Atl. 

Rep.  283,  Md.,  1890),  242. 
Central  Bank  v.  Veasey  (14  Ark.  671), 

148. 
Central  Branch  U.  P.  R.  Co.  v.  But- 

man  (22  Kan.  446),  76. 
Central  B.   Corp.  v.  Butler  (2  Gray, 

Mass.,  132),  244. 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Attaway  (1893,  16 

S.  E.  Rep.  956),  3. 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  'Curtis  (87  Ga.  416), 

282. 
Central  R.  Co.  v.   Hubbard  (86  Ga. 

623),  24. 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Kent  (84  Ga.  351), 

50. 
Central  R.   Co.  v.  Stolmer  (51  Fed. 

Rep.  518),  76. 
Central   R.,   etc.  Co.  v.    Ingram  (9p 

Ala.  152 ;  10  S.  Rep.  516),  11.         | 
D 


Central  R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Cons.  &  In  v. 

Co.  (32   S.   C.   319;   33  id.  599), 

249. 
Central  R.  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Ingram 

(Ala.,  1893,  12  S.  Rep.  801),  370. 
Central  W.  H.  Co.  v.  Sargent  (40  III. 

App.  438),  350,  351. 
Chabbock's  Case  (1  Mass.  144),  89. 
Chace  v.  Chace  (130  Mass.  128),  246. 
Chaddock  v.  Clifton  (22  Wis.   115), 

80. 
Cbadsey  v.   Greene  (24  Conn.  562), 

77. 
Chad  wick  v.    Perkins  (3  Me.    399), 

246. 
Chaffee    v.    Baptist  Miss.    Con.    (10 

Paige,  25),  138. 
Chaffee  v.  Jones  (19  Pick.,   Mass., 

260),  287. 
Chaffee  v.  Taylor  (3  Allen,    Mass., 

598),  139. 
Chalk  v.  Raine  (7  Hare,  393),  142. 
Chamberlain  v.  Boone  (74  Tex.  659), 

130. 
Chamberlain  v.  Brasley  (110  Mass. 

88),  142. 
Chamberlain  v.   Carlisle  (26  N.  H. 

540),  160. 
Chamberlain  v.  Davis  (33  N.  H.  12), 

71. 
Chamberlain  v.  Pybas  (81  Tex.  511), 

135. 
Chambers  v.  People  (105   111.   4S9), 

381. 
Chambers  v.  Ringsiaff  (69  Ala.  140), 

221 
Chambers  v.  Watson  (60  Iowa,  339), 

220. 
Chamble  v.  Martin  (27  Tex.  139),  129. 
Chambless  v.  State  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S. 

W.  Rep.  899),  354. 
Chandler  v.  Avery  (47  Hun,  9),  324. 
Chandler  v.    Barron   (45    Me.    534), 

139a. 
Chandler  v.  Beal  (137  Ind.  596),  276, 

339,  366,  367. 
Chandler  v.  Jost  (96  Ala.  596;  11  S. 

Rep.  636),  248. 


xliv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Chandler  v.  Knott  (53  N.  W.  Rep. 

88),  11. 
Chandler  v.  Thompson  (30  Fed.  Rep. 

38),  198. 
Chapel  v.  Washburn  (11  Ind.   393), 

73. 
Chapin  v.  Cambria  Iron  Co.  (145  Pa. 

St.  478),  209. 
Chapin  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (79  Iowa, 

582;  44  N.  W.  Rep.  820),  211. 
Chapin  v.  Curtis  (23  Conn.  3S8),  151. 
Chapin  v.  Dobson  (78  N.  Y.  74),  209. 
Chapman  v.  Chapman  (48  Kan.  636 ; 

29  Pac.  Rep.  1074),  159. 
Chapman  v.  Chapman  (2  Conn.  347), 

53. 
Chapman  v.  Chicago,    etc.    Co.    (26 

Wis.  295),  80. 
Chapman  v.  Davis  (3  M.  &  G.  609), 

284. 
Chapman  v.  Ewing  (78  Ala.  403),  77, 

314. 
Chapman  v.  Kimball  (84  Me.   389), 

233. 
Chapman  v.  Peebles  (84  Ala.  283 ;  4 

S.  Rep.  273),  157. 
Chapman  v.  Pingry  (67  Me.  198),  83. 
Chapman  v.  Pollack  (70  Cal.   487), 

210. 
Chapman  v.  Sutton  (68    Wis.    657), 

211. 
Chapman  v.  Twitched  (37  Me.  59),  77. 
Chapped  v.  Missionary  Soc.  (3  Ind. 

App.  356),  222. 
Charles  v.  Marrow  (99  Mo.  638),  229. 
Charles  v.  Patch  (87  Mo.  450),  217. 
Charles  v.  State  (49  Ala.  332),  50. 
Charlesworth  v.  Tinker  (18  Wis.  633), 

123. 
Charlotte  v.  Chouteau  (33  Mo.  194), 

143. 
Charter  Oak  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rodel  (95 

U.  S.  232),  197. 
Chase  v.  Debolt  (7  111.  571),  124. 
Chase  v.  Evoy  (51  Cal.  618),  308. 
Chase  v.  Fish  (16  Me.  132),  287. 
Chase  v.  Garretson  (54  N.  J.  L.  42), 

3C2. 


Chase  v.   Hathaway  (14  Mass.  222, 

227),  150. 
Chase  v.  Jones  (84  Me.  107),  380. 
Chase  v.  People  (40  111.  352),  249. 
Chase  v.  Perley  (148  Mass.  289),  343. 
Chase  v.  State  (46  Miss.  683),  10. 
Chase  v.  Stockett  (Md.,  1890,  19  Atl. 

Rep.  761),  246. 
Chase  v.  Street  (10  Iowa,  593),  357. 
Chateaugay,  etc.  Co.   v.   Blake  (144 

U.  S.  476),  188,  216,  374. 
Chatfield  v.  Simonson  (92  N.  Y.  209), 

83. 
Chattanooga   Co.    v.    Clowdis    (Ga., 

1893,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  88),  56. 
Chattanooga,  etc.  Co.  v.  Owen  (Ga., 

1893,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  853),  339,  347. 
Chattues  v.  Raitt  (20  Ohio,  132),  126. 
Cheague  v.  Tuite  (44  111.  App.  535), 

141. 
Cheatham  v.  State  (7  S.  Rep.  204;  67 

Miss.  335),  229,  324. 
Cheek  v.  Herndon  (82  Tex.  146),  366. 
Cheever  v.  Congdon  (34  Mich.  296), 

53. 
Cheever  v.  Sweet  (151  Mass.  186;  23 

N.  E.  Rep.  831),  12. 
Cheever  v.  Wilson  (9  Wall.  108),  242. 
Cheltenham  Co.  v.  Cook  (44  Mo.  29), 

73. 
Chemsford  Co.  v.  Demarest  (7  Gray, 

Mass.,  1),  73. 
Chenango  Bank  v.  Lewis  (63  Barb. 

Ill),  58,  144. 
Chenery  v.  Dole  (39  Me.  164),  262. 
Cheney  v.  Dunlap  (20  Neb.  265),  141. 
Cherry  v.  Baker  (17  Md.  75),  244. 
Cherry  v.   Buttler  (17   S.    W.    Rep. 

1090),  79. 
Cherry  v.  State  (6  Fla.  679),  176. 
Cherry  v.  State  (68  Ala.  29),  53. 
Chesley  v.  Chesley  (10  N.  H.  327),  79. 
Chester  v.  Armstrong  (66  Md.   113), 

139a. 
Chester  v.  Bakersfield  (64   Cal.   42), 

368. 
Chester  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  577), 

140. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


xlv 


References  are  to  sections. 


Chester  v.  Wilhelm  (111  N.  C.  314), 

347. 
Cheshire  v.  Wagon  Co.  (89  Ga.  249), 

150. 
Chewacla  Works  v.    Dismukes   (87 

Ala.  344),  24. 
Chicago  v.  Powers  (42  111.  169),  8. 
Chicago  v.  Edson  (43  111.  App.  417), 

3G7. 
Chicago  Attachment  Co.    v.    Davis 

(142  111.  171 ;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  859), 

265. 
Chicago  &  A.  B.  Co.  v.  Anglo-Amer- 
ican Packing  Co.  (46  Fed.  Rep. 

584),  159. 
Chicago  E.  &  B.   P.   Co.  v.  Johnson 

(44  111.  App.  224),  377. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Behmey  (48  Kan. 

47),  366. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Bivans  (142  111. 

401 ;  32  N.  E.  Rep.  456),  369. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brown  (44  Kan. 

384),  130. 
Chicago,  etc.   Co.  v.   Bryan  (90  111. 

126),  252. 
Chicago,  etc.   Co.   v.   Champion   (33 

N.  W.  Rep.  874),  237. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Debanm  (2  Ind. 

App.  281),  366. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.   v.    Duffin  (126  111. 

100;  18  N.  E.  Rep.  279),  282. 
Chicago,   etc.  Co.  v.  Emery  (Kan., 

1893,  32  Pac.  Rep.  631),  8. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Fisher  (111.,  1892. 

31  N.  E.  Rep.  406),  385. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  George  (19  111. 

510).  186. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hazels  (26  Neb. 

364;  42  N.  W.  Rep.  93),  342. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.   Keegan  (31  N. 

E.  Rep.  550),  134. 
Chicago,   etc.   Co.   v.    Leah,    41   111. 

App.  584,  592),  344. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Lewis  (111.,  1893, 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  230),  227. 
Chicago,  etc.   Co.  v.  Rolvink  (31  111. 

App.  596),  19. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.   Shenk  (131   III. 
283 ;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  436,  332. 


Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Ind.,  1893, 

33  N.  E.  Rep.  241).  18. 
Chicago,  etc.    Co.  v.   Spelker  (Ind., 

1893,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  280),  8,  52. 
Chicago,    etc.    Co.    v.    Tuite  (44  111. 

App.  535),  143. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.   v.  Wedel  (144  111. 

9;  33  N.  E.  Rep.  547),  373. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Woodward  (47 

Kan.  191),  336. 
Chicago,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher  (141 

111.  614;  31  N.   E.   Rep.  406),  11. 
Chicago,  etc.  Road  v.  Fietsam  (19111. 

App.  55),  31. 
Chicago,  K.  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart 

(47  Kan.  704),  340. 
Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R.  Co.  v.  Stewart 

(31   Pac.  Rep.   668;  50  Kan.  33), 

199. 
Chicago'R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dillon  (123  111. 

570),  366. 
Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Fox  (41  111.  App. 

106),  70. 
Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Lambert  (119  111. 

255),  192. 
Chicago  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mouriquand  (45 

1     Kan.  170),  199. 
Child  v.  Ellsworth  (2  D.,  M.  &  G.  683), 

150. 
Child  v.  Kingsbury  (46  Vt.  47),  115. 
Childress  v.  Cutler  (16  Mo.  24),  144. 
Childrey  v.  Huntington  (34  W.  Va. 

457),  31. 
Childs  v.  Dobbins  (61  Iowa,  109),  208. 
Childs  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  1039),  283,  346. 
Chiniquy  v.  Catholic  Bishop  (41  111. 

148),  135. 
Chipman  v.  Kellogg  (60  Mich.  438), 

60. 
Chirac  v.  Reinecker  (11  Wheat.  280, 

295),  157,  168. 
Chism   v.    State   (Miss.,   1893,   12  S. 

Rep.  852),  347. 
Chittendon  v.  Com.   (Ky.,  1888,  9  S. 

W.  Rep.  386),  102. 
Choate  v.  Huff  (Tex.,  1892,  18  S.  W. 

Rep.  87),  363. 
Chouteau  v.  Allen  (70  Mo.  290),  136. 


xlvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Chouteau  v.  Soulard  (9  Mo.  581),  242. 
Christensen   v.    Union  Trunk  Line 

(Wash.,     1893,     32    Pac.     Rep. 

1018),  8. 
Christian  v.  Williams  (35  Mo.  App. 

297),  285. 
Christian  Co.  Bank  v.  Good  (44  Mo. 

App.  129),  128. 
Christian  v.  Phillips  (58  Hun,  282), 

31. 
Christmas   v.  Whingates   (32   L.    J. 

Prob.  73),  129. 
Christy  v.  Spring  (97  Cal.  21 ;  31  Pac. 

Rep.  110),  153. 
Chubb  v.  Salomons  (3  C.   &  K.   75), 

175. 
Chumasero  v.  Gilbert  (24  111.   293), 

242. 
Church  v.  Chicago,    etc.    Co.    (Mo., 

1893,  23  S.  W.  Rep.  1056),  351. 
Church  v.  Crossman  (49  Iowa,  444), 

232. 
Church  v.  Howard  (79  N.  Y.  415),  67. 
Church  v.  Hubbard  (2  Cranch,  187, 

238),  143,  243. 
Church  v.  Milwaukee  (31  Wis.  519), 

82. 
Church  v.  Mott  (7  Paige,  N.  Y.,  77), 

218. 

.    Mut.  Fire   Ins.   Co.  (158 
475;  33  N.    E.   Rep.   572), 


Ruland  (64  Pa.  St.  432), 


323. 
54; 


Church   v 

Mass. 

198. 
Church  v 

222. 
Churchill  v.  Suter  (4  Mass.  162), 
Churchman  v.  Bowman  (95  Cal 

30  Pac.  Rep.  770),  82. 
Churchman  v.  Kansas  City  (49  Mo. 

App.  366),  366. 
Churchman  v.  Smith  (6Whart.  106), 

60. 
Chute  v.  State  (19  Minn.  271),  344. 
Cicotte  v.   Cruciaux  (52  Mich.  227), 

237. 
Cihak  v.  Klenke  (117  111.  643),  8. 
Ciley  v.  Van  Patten  (35  N.  W.  Rep. 

831;  69  Mich.  400),  36. 
Cilley  v.  Huse  (40  N.  H.  358),  268. 


Cincinnati,  etc.   Co.  v.  Jones  (21  S. 

W.  Rep.  192),  240. 
Cincinnati,  etc.   Co.   v.  Roesch  (126 

Ind.  445),  366. 
Cincinnati,   etc.    Co.    v.    Smith    (22 

Ohio  St.  227),  198. 
Ciocci  v.  Ciocci  (29  L.  T.  Pr.  &  M. 

20),  9. 
Cist  v.  Ziegler  (16  S.  &  R.  282),  160. 
Citizens'  Gaslight  Co.  v.  Granger  (19 

111.  App.  201),  67a. 
Citizens*  G.  L.  Co.   v.  O'Brien  (118 

111.  174),  208. 
City  v.  Devine  (1  W.  N.  C,  Pa.,  358), 

356. 
City  v.  Drexel  (141  111.  89;  30  N.  E. 

Rep.  774),  371. 
City  v.  Dunn  (1  McCord,  S.  C.,333), 

143a. 
City  v.  Edson  (43  111.  App.  417),  376. 
City  v.   Shawhan   (9   Am.    &   Eng. 

Corp.  Cas.  556),  131. 
City  Council  v.  King  (4  McCord,  487), 

288. 
City  of  Sandwich  v.  Dolan  (31  N.  E. 

Rep.  416;  42  111.  App.  53),  350. 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Missouri  Pac. 

R.  Co.  (114  Mo.  13;  21  S.  W.  Rep. 

202),  370. 
Claflin  v.  Baer  (28  Hun,  N.  Y.,  204). 

252. 
Clafy  v.  Farrow  (18  N.  Y.  S.  160), 

247. 
Clancy  v.  Cranie  (2  Dev.  Eq.,  N.  C, 

363),  267. 
Clanton  v.  Scruggs  (Ala.,  1892,  10  S. 

Rep.  757),  262. 
Clapp  v.  Bullard  (23  111.   App.  609*. 

350,  351. 
Clapp  v.  Collins  (7  N.  Y.  S.  98),  128. 
Clapp  v.  Engledow  (82  Tex.  290),  71. 
Clapp  v.  Hartford  (35  Conn.  GO),  212. 
Clapp  v.  Herrick  (129  Mass.  202',  151. 
Clapp  v.  Wilson   (5   Denio,    N.    Y., 

285),  354. 
Clapsaddle,  In  re  (24  N.  Y.  S.  313), 

CO,  61. 
Clark  v.  Anderson  (14  Daly,  464),  73a. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


xlvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Clark  v.  Bradstreet  (80  Me.  456),  345. 
Clark  v.  Bruce  (12  Hun,  271),   141, 

195,  197. 
Clark  v.  Carrington  (7  Cranch,  308), 

73. 
Clark  v.  Coffin  Co.  (125  Ind.  277),  217, 

220. 
Clark  v.  Com.  (123  Pa.  St.  555),  5. 
Clark  v.  Culidge  (8  Kan.  189),  84. 
Clark  v.  Donnavant  (10  Leigh,  Va., 

22),  138. 
Clark  v.  Eckstein  (22  Pa.   St.  507), 

129. 
Clark  v.  Fairly  (30  Mo.  App.   335), 

142. 
Clark  v.  Fletcher  (1  Allen,  53),  126. 
Clark  v.  Freeman  (25  Pa.  St.  133), 

139,  139a. 
Clark  v.  Grant  (2  Wend.,  N.  Y.,  129), 

275. 
Clark  v.  Hart  (49  Ala.  86),  205. 
Clark  v.  Hoffaker  (26  Mo.  264),  68. 
Clark  v.  Lancaster  (36  Md.  196),  221. 
Clark  v.  McNeal  (114  N.  Y.  289;  21 

N.  E.  Rep.  405),  309. 
Clark  v.  Miller  (4  Wend.  628),  226. 
Clark  v.  Owens  (18  N.  Y.  434),  53, 

107. 
Clark  v.  Rhoades  (2  Heisk.,  Tenn., 

206),  140. 
Clark  v.  Ryan  (Ala.,  1893,  11  S.  Rep. 

22),  366. 
Clark  v.  Sherman  (5  Wash.  St.  681), 

20. 
Clark  v.  Stansbury  (49  Md.  346),  222. 
Clark  v.  State  (12  Ohio  St.  483),  197. 
Clark  v.  State  (16  S.  E.  Rep.  96 ;  90 

Ga.  448),  23. 
Clark  v.  State  (87  Ala.  71),  346. 
Clark  v.  Thompson  (47  111.  25),  232. 
Clark  v.  Trinity  Church  (5  Watts  & 

S.  266),  144. 
Clark  v.  Vance  (15  Wend.  193),  121. 
Clark  v.  Waite  (12  Mass.  439),  73. 
Clark  v.  Woodruff  (83  N.  Y.    218), 

221. 
Clark  v.   Zeigler  (85  Ala.  154;   4  S. 

Rep.  669),  353. 


Clark's  Ex'rs  v.   Cochran  (3  Mart., 

La.,  353,  360),  133. 
Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Riemsdyk  (9  Cranch, 

153),  76. 
Clarke  v.  Bank  (10  Ark.  516),  242. 
Clarke  v.  Canfield  (2  McCart.,  N.  J., 

119),  233. 
Clarke  v.  MeAuliffe  (81  Wis.  244;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  83),  262. 
Clarke  v.  Rice  (15  R.  I.  132;  23  Atl. 

Rep.  301),  14S. 
Clarke  v.  Van  Court  (51  Neb.  756),  8. 
Clarke,  Ex  parte  (2  Dea.  &  Ch.  99), 

287. 
Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse  (5  T.  R.  412), 

116. 
Clary  v.  Clary  (2  Ired.,   N.   C,   78), 

197. 
Clavey  v.  Lord  (87  Cal.  413),  376. 
Clay  v.  Alderson  (10  N.  Y.  49),  140. 
Clay  v.  Robinson  (7  W.  Va.  350),  249. 
Clay  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.   W. 

Rep.  973),  282. 
Clay  v.  Williams  (2  Munf.  105,  122), 

173. 
Clayton  v.  Nugent  (13  M.  &  W.  206), 

218. 
Clayton  v.  State  (24  Atk.  16),  150a. 
Clayton  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.  App. 

489;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  404),  89,  95, 

350. 
Cleaves  v.  Foss  (4  Greenl.,   Me.,  1), 

268. 
Cleaves  v.  Lord  (3  Gray,  Mass.,  66, 

71),  21. 
Clem  v.  State  (33  Ind.  418),  352. 
Clemens  v.   Bullen  (Mass.,  1893,   34 

N.  E.  Rep.  173),  35. 
Clemens  v.  Meyer  (44  La.  Ann.  390; 

10  S.  Rep.  797),  141. 
Clements  v.  Hunt  (1  Jones,    N.  C, 

400),  53. 
Clements  v.  McGinn  (Cal.,   1893,  33 

Pac.  Rep.  920),  317. 
Clements  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  258), 

23. 
Clendenning  v.  Clymer  (17  Ind.  155), 

215. 


xlviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Cleveland  v.  Newson  (45  Mich.  62), 

233. 
Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Clos- 

ser  (126  Ind.  348),  73a. 
Cleveland,    C,    C.    &    I.   R.   R.    v. 

Newell  (104  Ind.  269),  52. 
Cleveland,  etc.  Co.  v.  Aherns  (42  111. 

App.  434),  367. 
Cleveland,  etc.    Co.  v.  Perkins  (17 

Mich.  296),  30. 
Cleveland,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wynant(Ind., 

1893,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  569),  366,  367. 
Clever  v.  Hilberry  (116  Pa.  St.  431), 

56. 
Cleverly  v.  Cleverly  (124  Mass.  314), 

220. 
Click  v.  Hamilton  (7  Rich.,  S.  C,  65), 

73a. 
Clifford  v.  Mayer  (Ind.,  1893,  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  127),  23. 
Clift  v.  Moses  (112  N.   Y.   426;  21 

N.  Y.  State  Rep.  777),  309. 
Clifton  v.   Granger  (Iowa,   1893,   53 

N.  W.  Rep.  316),  10. 
Clingman  v.  Irvine  (40  111.  App.  606), 

333. 
Clink  v.    Gunn   (90   Mich.    135;    51 

N.  W.  Rep.  193),  349. 
Clinton  v.  Estes  (20  Ark.  216),  208. 
Clinton  v.  Howard  (42  Conn.   294), 

188. 
Close  v.  Olney  (1  Denio,  319),  354. 
Close  v.  Samm  (27  Iowa,  507),  344. 
Close  v.  Stuyvesant  (132  111.  607;  24 

N.  E.  Rep.  868),  144. 
Cloud   v.   Calhoun  (10  Rich.,  S.   C. 

Eq.,  358),  304. 
!  Clouston  v.  Gray  (48  Kan.   31),  282. 
Cluff  v.  Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Co.  (13  Allen, 

Mass.,  308),  230. 
Cluggage  v.  Swan  (4  Binn.  150),  58. 
Cluverius  v.  Com.  (81  Va.  787),  102. 
Coal  R.  C.  Co.  v.  Jones  (127  111.  379 ; 

20  N.  E.  Rep.  89),  234. 
Coals  v.  Sulan  (46  Kan.  341),  222. 
Cobb  v.  Covenant  Mut.  Ben.  Assoc. 

(153  Mass.   176;   26  N.   E.    Rep. 

230),  11. 


Cobb  v.  Dortch  (52  Ga.  584),  77,  314. 
Cobb  v.  Johnson  (2  Sneed,   Tenn,, 

73),  73a. 
Cobb  v.  Malone  (86  Ala.  571 ;  8  S.  Rep. 

693),  37. 
Cobb  v.  O'Neal (2  Sneed,  Tenn.,  438), 

214. 
Coble  v.  State  (31  Ohio  St.  100),  322. 
Coburn  v.  Ellenwood  (4  N.   H.  99), 

262. 
Cochran  v.  Amnion  (16  Hi.  316),  306. 
Cochran  v.  Bartell  (91  Mo.  655:  3  S. 

W.  Rep.  854),  315. 
Cochran  v.  Jones  (85  Ga.  678;  11  S. 

E.  Rep.  811),  11. 
Cochran  v.  Ward  (Ind.,  1892,  29  N. 

E.  Rep.  795),  141. 
Cockerill  v.  Stafford  (102  Mo.   57), 

152. 
Cockrill  v.  Hall  (76  Cal.  192;  18  Pac. 

Rep.  318),  313,  354. 
Codman    v.     Verm.     etc.     Co.     (17 

Blatchf.,  U.  S.,  3),  376. 
Codmon  v.  Caldwell  (31  Me.  560),  60. 
Coe  v.  Turner  (57  Conn.  937),  71. 
Cofa  v.  Schening  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S. 

Rep.  123),  147. 
Coghlan  v.  Railroad  (12  S.   Ct.  150 ; 

142  U.  S.  101),  242. 
Coffee  v.  State  (25  Fla.  501 ;  6  S.  Rep. 

493),  90. 
Coffey  v.  Procter  Coal  Co.  (Ky.,  1892, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  286),  377. 
Coffin  v.  Hydraulic  Co.  (136  N.  Y. 

655;  32  N.  E.  Rep.  1076),  250. 
Coffin  v.  Jones  (13  Pick.  441),  168. 
Cogshall  v.  Roller  Miller  Co.  (48  Kan. 

480),  186. 
Cogswell  v.  West  St.  &  N.  E.  Elev. 

Ry.  Co.  (3  Pac.  Rep.  411),  374. 
Cohen  v.  Cont.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (69  N.  Y. 

308],  178. 
Cohen  v.  State   (11   Tex.  App.   622), 

324. 
Cohen  v.  State  (50  Ala.  108),  6. 
Cohen  v.  Teller  (93  Pa.  St.  123),  133. 
Coit  v.  Starkweather  (8  Conn.  289), 

128. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


xlix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Coit  v.  Tracy  (8  Conn.  268),  G8. 
Colburn   v.   Groton  (N.  H.,  1894,  28 

Atl.  Rep.  95),  75. 
Colclough  v.   Nilaud  (68  Wis.  309; 

32  N.  W.  Rep.  119),  336. 
Colclough  v.  Smith  (15  Ir.  Ch.  347), 

53. 
Cole  v.  Blunt  (2  Bosw.,  N.  Y.,  116), 

314. 
Cole  v.  Clark  (3  Wis.  323),  198. 
Cole  v.  Cole  (41  Md.  301),  262. 
Cole  v.  Cole  (33  Me.  542),  76. 
Cole  v.  Jessup  (10  N.  Y.  96 ;  9  Barb. 

395),  337. 
Cole  v.  Lake  (54  N.  H.  278),  217. 
Cole  v.  Luke  Shore,  etc.  Co.  (Mich., 

1893,   54   N.  W.  Rep.  638),  193, 

351. 
Cole  v.  National  Sch.   Furn.  Co.  (45 

111.  App.  273),  380. 
Coleman   v.   Com.    (25   Gratt.,  Va., 

865),  142,  317. 
Coleman  v.  Ross  (46  Pa.  St.  180),  304. 
Coleman  v.  State  (111  Ind.    563;   13 

N.  E.  Rep.  100),  168. 
Coleman  v.  State  (63  N.  Y.  93),  240. 
Coleman  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  520; 

2  S.  W.  Rep.  859),  23. 
Coleman  v.  State  (44  Tex.  109),  324. 
Coleman  v.  White  (43  Ind.  429),  113. 
Coleman,  In  re  (11  N.  Y.  220),  52. 
Coler  v.  County  (N.  M.,  1892,  27  Pac. 

Rep.  619),  225. 
Coles  v.  Brown  (10  Paige,  526),  223. 
Coles  v.  State  (75  Ind.  511),  197. 
Coles  v.Yorks  (36  Minn.  388),  115. 
Colgan  v.  Philips (7  Rich.,  S.  C,  359), 

71. 
Collar  v.  Collar  (86  Mich.  507 ;  49  N. 

W.  Rep.  551),  246. 
Collar  v.  Potter  (88   Mich.  549),  340. 
Collender  v.  Dinsmore  (55  N.  Y.  202), 

218. 
Collett  v.  Keith  (4  Esp.  212),  75. 
Collett  v.  Smith  (143  Mass.  473),  67, 

68. 
Collier  v.  Mokes  (2  C.  &  K.  1012),  75. 
Collier  v.  Society  (8  B.  Mon.  68),  242. 


Collier  v.  State  (20  Ark.  36),  343. 
Collier  v.  White  (Ala.,    1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  385),  83. 
Collins  v.  Ball  (82  Tex.  259),  13,  140. 
Collins  v.    Burlington,    etc.  Co.    (83 

Iowa,  346 ;  49   N.  W.  Rep.  848), 

11. 
Collins  v.  Collins  (51  Miss.  511),  128. 
Collins  v.  Com.  (12  Bush,  271),  121. 
Collins  v.  Driscoll  (34  Conn.  43),  220. 
Collins  v.  Elliot  (1  Harr.  &  J.  2),  138. 
Collins  v.  Gilbert  (94  U.  S.  753),  230. 
Collins  v.  Glass  (46  Mo.  App.  278),  8, 

374. 
Collius  v.  Mack  (31  Ark.  684),  167. 
Collins  v.  People  (98  111.  584),  324. 
Collins  v.    Richart    (14    Bush,   Ky., 

621),  361. 
Collins  v.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  141), 

89. 
Collins  v.  Valleau  (79  Iowa,  626;  43 

N.  W.  Rep.  284 ;  44  id.  904),  142. 
Collins  v.  Waters  (54  111.  485),  52. 
Collison  v.  Curling  (9  CI.  &  Fin.  88), 

221. 
Colloway  v.  Cassart  (45  Ark.  41),  238. 
Colnen  v.  Orr  (71  Cal.  43),  142. 
Colorado  Coal  &  Iron  Co.  v.  United 

States  (123  U.  S.  317),  250. 
Colorado  Mid.    Ry.    v.    O'Brien  (16 

Colo.  219),  198. 
Colquitt  v.  Thomas  (8  Ga.  268),  73a. 
Colson  v.  Bouzey   (6  Greenl.,   Me., 

474),  144. 
Colt  v.  Eves  (12  Conn.  243),  69. 
Colt  v.  McConnell  (116  Ind.  256;  19 

N.  E.  Rep.  106),  171. 
Coltrane  v.  Lamb  (109  N.  C.  209 ;  13 

S.  E.  Rep.  784),  135. 
Columbus  v.    Billingmeier  (7  Ohio 

Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  136),  344. 
Columbus,  etc.  Co.    v.  Semmes  (27 

Ga.  283),  7. 
Columbus,  etc.    v.    Tillman  (79   Ga. 

607;  5  S.  E.  Rep.  135),  130. 
Colvin  v.  Peabody   (155  Mass.   104; 

29  N.  E.  Rep.  59),  11. 
Colwell  v.  Brower  (75  111.  516),  254. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Combs  v.  Winchester  (39  N.  H.   1), 

341. 
Comfort  v.    Kittle  (81   Iowa,    179), 

230. 
Com.  Bank  v.  Bank  (4  Hill,  N.  Y., 

516),  142. 
Com.  Life  Ins.  Co.   v.  Union  Trust 

Co.  (112  U.  S.  254),  178. 
Commissioners    v.    Glass   (17   Ohio, 

342),  136. 
Commissioners  v.  Trustees   (107  111. 

489),  253. 
Com.  v.  Abbott  (13  Mete.   123,  124), 

11. 
Com.  v.  Ackert  (133  Mass.  402),  90. 
Com.    v.    Andrews   (143    Mass.    23), 

139a. 
Com.  v.  Baker  (29  N.   E.   Rep.  512; 

155  Mass.  287),  323. 
Com.  v.  Balken  (32  Pick.  281),  147. 
Com.  v.  Barry  (8  Pa.   Co.   Ct.  Rep. 

216),  346. 
Com.   v.   Beckley  (3  Mete,   Mass., 

330),  23. 
Com.  v.  Black  (108  Mass.  296),  101. 
Com.  v.  Bloss  (116  Mass.  56),  241. 
Com.  v.  Bosworth  (22  Pick.  397,  399), 

324. 
Com.  v.  Briant  (142  Mass.  463),  225. 
Com.  v.  Brigbam  (147  Mass.  414),  80. 
Com.  v.  Brown  (14  Gray,  Mass.,  419), 

39. 
Com.  v.  Brown  (121  Mass.  69,  70),  39, 

188,  189. 
Com.  v.  Brown  (149  Mass.  35),  93. 
Com.  v.  Brown  (150  Mass.  330),  93, 

95. 
Com.  v.  Brown  (130  Mass.  279),  323. 
Com.  v.  Buccieri  (153  Pa.  St.  535;  26 

Atl.  Rep.  228),  197. 
Com.  v.  Bush  (2  Duv.,  Ky.,  264),  320. 
Com.  v.  Buzzell  (16  Pick.  157),  350. 
Com.  v.  Byron  (14  Gray,  31),  341. 
Com.  v.  Call  (21  Pick.  515),  79. 
Com.  v.  Campbell    (155    Mass.    127, 

537;  30  N.  E.  Rep.  72),  8,  93. 
Com.  v.  Caponi   (155  Mass.   534;   30 
N.  E.  Rep.  82),  23,  166. 


Com.  v.  Cary  (12  Gush.,  Mass.,  246), 

102. 
Com.  v.  Casey  (11  Cush.,  Mass.,  417), 

103. 
Com.  v.  Castles  (9  Gray,  121),  138. 
Com.  v.  Chaney  (148  Mass.  8),  333. 
Com.  v.  Chase  (147  Mass.  597),  324. 
Com.  v.  Clancy  (154  Mass.    128;   27 

N.  E.  Rep.  1001),  337. 
Com.  v.  Clark  (130  Pa.  St.  650;  18 

Atl.  Rep.  988),  93. 
Com.  v.  Cleary  (23  Atl.  Rep.  1110; 

30  W.  N.  C.  1 ;  148  Pa.  St.  26), 

346. 
Com.  v.  Cleary  (152  Mass.  491),  168. 
Com.  v.  Coe  (115  Mass.  481),  13,  139, 

140. 
Com.  v.  Cohen  (127  Mass.  282),  127. 
Com.  v.  Coy  (157  Mass.  200;  32  N.  E. 

Rep.  4),  23,  93. 
Com.  v.  Crowninshield  (10  Pick.  497), 

69. 
Com.  v.  Cullen  (111  Mass.  435),  90. 
Com.  v.  Cunningham  (104  Mass.  545), 

186. 
Com.  v.  Curran  (119  Mass.  206),  250. 
Com.  v.  Curtis  (97  Mass.  574),  9. 
Com.  v.  Dam  (107  Mass.  210),  7. 
Com.  v.  Damon  (136  Mass.  441),  354«. 
Com.  v.  Dana  (2  Met.  327,  329),  127. 
Com.  v.  Dance  (8  Cush.  384),  322. 
Com.  v.  Daniel  (4  Pa.  L.  J.  R.  49), 

286. 
Com.  v.  Densmore  (12  Mass.  535),  79. 
Com.  v.  Desmond  (103   Mass.    445), 

239. 
Com.  v.  Dill  (156  Mass.  226),  35. 
Com.  v.  Dill  (156  Mass.  266;  30  N.  E. 

Rep.  1016),  340. 
Com.  v.  Donlican(114  Mass.  257),  188. 
Com.  v.   Downing  (4  Gray,  29,  30), 

146,  323. 
Com.  v.  Drake  (15  Mass.  161),  177. 
Com.  v.  Drake  (124  Mass.  21),  324. 
Com.  v.  Dudley  (10  Mass.  403),  265. 
Com.  v.  Dunlop  (89  Va.  431 ;  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  273),  240. 
Com.  v.  Emmons  (98  Mass.  6),  345. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


li 


References  are  to  sections. 


Com.  v.  Evans  (101  Mass.  25),  156. 
Com.  v.  Fairchell    (1   Brewst.,    Pa., 

566),  201. 
Com.  v.  Feely  (2  Va.  Cas.  1),  281. 
Com.  v.  Felch  (132  Mass.  22),  51,  53. 
Com.  v.  Ford  (111  Mass.  394),  323. 
Com.  v.  Ford  (14  Gray,  399),  147. 
Com.  v.  Ford  (146  Mass.   131;  15  N. 

E.  Rep.  153),  322. 
Com.  v.  Fox  (1S.W.  Rep.  396),  349. 
Com.  v.  Gerade   (145   Pa.    St.    289), 

231. 
Com.   v.  Goodnow  (154  Mass.  487), 

346. 
Com.  v.  Gorey  (1  Gray,  Mass.,  463), 

95. 
Com.  v.  Gorham  (99  Mass.  420),  322. 
Com.  v.  Gould  (158  Mass.  499;  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  656),  23,  354a. 
Com.  v.   Griffin  (110  Mass.  181),  80, 

168. 
Com.  v.  Hackett  (2  Allen,  Mass.,  136), 

57. 
Com.  v.  Hall  (65  Mass.  137),  176. 
Com.  v.  Halley  (13  Allen,  587),  337. 
Com.  v.  Haney  (127  Mass.  455),  101, 

103. 
Com.  v.  Hanley  (140  Mass.  457),  346. 
Com.  v.  Hanson  (1   Nott  &  McC, 

S.  C,  554),  128. 
Com.  v.  Harmon  (4  Barr,  Pa.,  269), 

4,  89,  90. 
Com.    v.    Haskell    (140    Mass.    128), 

384. 
Com.  v.  Hawkins  (3  Gray,  463),  234. 
Com.  v.  Hayes  (145  Mass.  289;  14  N. 

E.  Rep.  151),  168. 
Com.  v.  Heffron  (102  Mass.  161),  108. 
Com.  v.  Hersey  (84  Mass.  173),  330. 
Com.  v.  Hill  (14  Mass.  207),  316. 
Com.  v.  Hill  (65  Mass.  137),  176. 
Com.  v.  Hills  (10  Cush.  532),  316. 
Com.  v.  Holmes  (127  Mass.  424),  324. 
Com.  v.  Holt  (146  Mass.  38),  195. 
Com.  v.  Horten  (9  Pick.  206),  156. 
Com.  v.  Hoarigan  (89  Ky.  305;  12  S. 

W.  Rep.  550),  340. 
Com.  v.  Howe  (9  Gray,  110),  91. 


Com.  v.  Howe  (2  Allen,  Mass.,  153).. 

95. 
Com.  v.  Hudson  (97  Mass.  565),  9. 
Com.  v.  Ingraham  (7  Gray,  46),  352. 
Com.  v.  Jeffries  (89  Mass.  548),  230. 
Com.  v.  Jones  (155  Mass.  170;  29  N. 

E.  Rep.  467),  349. 
Com.  v.  Kane  (108  Mass.  423),  36. 
Com.  v.  Keefe  (140  Mass.  301 ;  4  N. 

E.  Rep.  576),  23. 
Com.  v.  Kendall  (113  Mass.  210),  10. 
Com.  v.  Kenney  (12  Mete.   235),  79. 
Com.  v.  King  (150  Mass.  233;  22  N. 

E.  Rep.  905),   145,  239. 
Com.    v.    Knapp  (10    Pick.,    Mass., 

477),  323. 
Cora.  v.  Knapp  (9  Pick.  496),  91,  344. 
Com.  v.  Kneeland  (20  Pick.  239),  237. 
Com.  v.  Lamon  (29  N.  E.  Rep.  467 ; 

155  Mass.  168),  346. 
Com.  v.  Laughlin  (11  Cush.  598),  23. 
Com.  v.  Leonard  (140  Mass.  470,  479; 

4  N.  E.  Rep.  96),  10. 
Com.  v.   Lesher   (17   S.    &  R.,   Pa., 

164),  386. 
Com.  v.  Lester  (129  Mass.  101),  23. 
Com.  v.  Locke  (114  Mass.  288),  250. 
Com.  v.  Lyden  (113  Mass.  452),  341. 
Com.  v.  Lynch  (3  Pittsb.,  Pa.,  412), 

231. 
Com.  v.  Lynes  (142  Mass.   577),   188, 

319. 
Com.  v.  Mahon  (142  Pa.  St.  417),  7. 
Com.  v.  Malone  (114  Mass.  295),  188. 
Com.  v.  Marsh  (10  Pick.  57),  306. 
Com.  v.  Maxwell    (2    Pick.,    Mass., 

250. 
Com.  v.  Marzynski   (149    Mass.    68), 

241. 
Com.  v.  McCarthy  (119  Mass.  354),  9. 
Com.  v.  McDermott  (123  Mass.  441), 

97. 
Com.  v.  McDonald   (110  Mass.   545), 

354. 
Com.  v.  McGrath  (140  Mass.  296;  6 

N.  E.  Rep.  515),  234. 
Com.  v.  McGuire  (84  Ky.  57),  321. 
Com.  v.  McKee  (1  Gray,  62),  249. 


lii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Com.  v.  McLaughton  (105  Mass.  4G0), 

23. 
Com.  v.  McMahon  (145  Pa.  St.  413), 

6,  9. 
Com.  v.  McManus  (143  Pa.  St.  64;  21 

Atl.  Rep.  1018),  11. 
Com.  v.  Mead  (12  Gray,  Mass.,  167), 

176. 
Com.  v.  Minor  (89  Ky.  555 ;  13  S.  W. 

Rep.  5),  321. 
Com.  v.  Moinehan  (140  Mass.  463 ;  1 

N.  E.  Rep.  59),  195. 
Com.  v.  Morey  (1  Gray,  Mass.,  461), 

89. 
Com.  v.  Morgan  (107  Mass.  205),  354, 

354a. 
Com.  v.  Morgan  (Mass.,  1893,  34  N. 

E.  Rep.  458),  39. 
Com.  v.  Morningstar  (12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

R.  34),  23. 
Com.  v.  Morrill  (62  Mass.  571),  23. 
Com.  v.  Mosier  (135  Pa.   St.  221 ;  19 

Atl.  Rep.  943),  350. 
Com.  v.  Mosier  (4  Barr,  Pa.,  264),  95. 
Com.  v.  Mullen  (150   Mass.    394;   23 

N.  E.  Rep.  51),  346. 
Com.  v.  Mullern  (97  Mass.  545),  345a. 
Com.  v.  Nagle  (157  Mass.  554;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  861),  10. 
Com.  v.  Ntfus  (135  Mass.   533),    133, 

139. 
Com.  v.  Nichols  (114  Mass.  2S5),  354a. 
Com.  v.  Peckham    (2    Gray,    Mass., 

514),  241. 
Com.  v.  Penn  (1  Pet.  C.  C.  496),  115. 
Com.  v.  Phillips  (11  Pick.  28),  146. 
Com.  v.  Piper  (120  Mass.  185,  188), 

89,  192,  201. 
Com.  v.   Pomeroy   (117   Mass.    143), 

249. 
Com.  v.  Pratt  (126  Mass.  462),  354. 
Com.  v.  Price  (10  Gray,  Mass.,  472), 

323. 
Com.  v.  Purdy  (146   Mass.    138;    15 

N.  E.  Rep.  364),  23. 
Com  v.  Regan  (105  Mass.  593),  354. 
Com.  v.  Reynolds  (14  Gray,  Mass., 

87),  281. 


Com.  v.  Richards  (18  Pick.  404),  124. 
Com.  v.  Riggs  (14  Gray,  376),  23. 
Com.  v.  Robinson  (146  Mass.  371),  5, 7. 
Com.  v.  Rogers  (7  Met.,  Mass.,  500), 

188,  231. 
Com.  v.  Rowell  (146  Mass.  130;   15 

N.  E.  Rep.  151),  23. 
Com.  v.  Russell  (156  Mass.  196;  30 

N.  E.  Rep.  763),  9,  95. 
Com.  v.  Samuel  (2  Pick.,  Mass.,  103), 

250. 
Com.  v.  Saulsbury  (152  Pa.  St.  554; 

26  Atl.  Rep.  610),  9. 
Com.  v.  Sego  (105  Mass.  210),  95. 
Com.  v.  Shaw  (4  Cush.  593),  350,  354, 

354a. 
Com.  v.  Shepherd  (2  Pa.  Dist.  Rep. 

345),  10. 
Com.  v.  Smith  (2  Gray,  Mass.,  516), 

316. 
Com.  v.  Smith  (9  Mass.  109),  174. 
Com.  v.  Smith  (119  Mass.  305),  89. 
Com.  v.  Smith  (6  S.  &  R.,  Pa.,  567), 

139. 
Com.    v.    Snowden    (Ky.,    1892,    17 

S.  W.  Rep.  205),  176. 
Com.  v.  Stevenson  (142  Mass.  146; 

8  N.  E.  Rep.  361),  225. 
Com.  v.  Strasser  (153  Pa.  St.  431),  10. 
Com.  v.  Sturtivant  (117  Mass.   122), 

188,  193,  194. 
Com.  v.  Sullivan  (150  Mass.  315;  23 

N.  E.  Rep.  47),  322. 
Com.  v.  Switzer  (134  Pa.  St.  383;  26 

W.  N.  C.  46),  38a,  145. 
Com.  v.  Talbot  (2  Allen,  Mass.,  161), 

226. 
Com.  v.  Taylor  (5  Cush.,  Mass.,  606), 

89,  95. 
Com.  v.  Taylor  (132  Mass.  261),  193. 
Com.  v.  Thompson  (99  Mass.  444),  87. 
Com.  v.  Thompson  (11  Allen,  Mass., 

25),  233. 
Com.  v.  Thompson  (Mass.,  1893,   23 

N.  E.  Rep.  910),  39. 
Com.  v.  Thyng  (134   Mass.  191),  348. 
Com.  v.  Tibbetts  (157  Mass.  519;  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  910),  39. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


liii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Com.  v.  Trefethen  (157  Mass.  180 ;  31 

N.  E.  Rep.  961),  84. 
Com.  v.  Vass  (3  Leigh,  78G),  103. 
Com.  v.  Vose(157  Mass.  393;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  305),  50. 
Com.  v.  Ward  (157  Mass.  482;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  G63),  334. 
Com.  v.  Webster  (5  Cush.  321),  5,  6, 

23,  131,  139,  344. 
Com.  v.  Whitaker  (131    Mass.  224), 

234. 
Com.  v.  White  (145  Mass.  392),  9. 
Com.  v.  White  (147  Mass.  76),  176. 
Com.  v.  Whitman  (121   Mass.    361), 

345. 
Com.  v.  Williams    (105    Mass.    62), 

140. 
Com.  v.  Wilson  (1  Gray,  337),  145. 
Com.  v.  Wright  (1  Cush.  65),  22. 
Com.  v.  Wright  (107  Mass.  403),  381. 
Com.  v.  Zelt  (138  Pa.  St.  615 ;  21  Atl. 

Rep.  7),  250. 
Commercial  Ice  Co.  v.  Kiefer  (26  111. 

App.  466),  308. 
Commercial  Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ever- 

hart  (88  Va.  952 ;  14  S.  E.  Rep. 

836),  150a. 
Comp.  v.  Brown  (48  Ind.  575),  252. 
Compton  v.    Blexham  (2  Coll.  201), 

150. 
Comstock  v.  Carnley  (4  Blatch.  C.  C. 

58),  32. 
Comstock  v.  Hadlyme  (8  Conn.  254), 

254. 
Comstock  v.   Smith   (26  Mich.  306), 

83,  129. 
Comstock  v.  Smith  (20  Mich.  338),  7. 
Conde  v.  Wiltsie  (131  N.  Y.  647;  30 

N.  E.  Rep.  866),  11. 
Cone  v.  Cone  (107  Mass.  285),  209. 
Conger  v.  Weaver  (6  Cal.  548),  238. 
Congress,  etc.  Co.  v.  Edgar  (99  U.  S. 

657),  198. 
Conklin  v.  Boyd  (46  Mich.  56),  229. 
Conkling  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  Co.   (54 

Mo.  385),  199. 
Conley  v.  Jennings  (22  111.  App.  547), 

67. 


Conley  v.  Stato  (85  N.  Y.  618),  389. 
Connell  v.   O'Neil  (154  Pa.  St.  582), 

366. 
Connelly  v.  O'Connor  (17  N.  Y.  State 

Rep.  261),  309. 
Conner  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  378), 

33. 
Connington  v.  Ludlow  (1  Met.,  Ky., 

295),  143a. 
Connors  v.    People   (50   N.  Y.  240), 

354a. 
Conn.  River  Bank  v.  Albee  (64  Vt. 

571),  246. 
Conolly  v.  Pardon  (1  Paige,  291),  222. 
Conrad  v.  Bank  (10  Mart.  700),  140. 
Conrad  v.  Ithaca  (16  N.  Y.  158),  198. 
Conrad   v.     Mass.    S.    Co.    (4  Allen, 

Mass.,  20),  77. 
Consequa  v.  Willings(l  Pet.  225),  242. 
Consual  v.  Sheldon  (35  Neb.   247 ;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  1104),  7,  128,  142. 
Consumers'  Coal  Co.  v.  Schaefer  (31 

111.  App.  364),  79. 
Consumers'  Gas  Co.  v.   Harless  (131 

Ind.  446;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  1062),  82. 
Continental  Bank  v.  Bank  of  Com- 
monwealth (50  N.  Y.  573),  83. 
Continental  Bank  v.  Wells  (73  Wis. 

352),  242. 
Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co. 

(51  Fed.  Rep.  884),  9,  58. 
Converse  v.  Blumrich  (14  Mich.  109), 

73a. 
Converse  v.  Hobbs  (64  N.  H.  42),  337. 
Converse  v.    Lamghshow   (81  Tex. 

275),  220. 
Converse  v.  Wead  (142  111.  132 ;  31  N. 

E.  Rep.  314),  218. 
Conway  v.  Vizzard  (122  Ind.  266),  51. 
Conway,  In  re  (58  Hun,  16),  269. 
Cook  v.  Barr  (44  N.  Y.  156),  76. 
Cook  v.  Decker  (63  Mo.  328),  237. 
Cook  v.  Grange  (18   Ohio,  526),  168. 
Cook  v.  Hawkins  (16  S.  W.  Rep.  8; 

54  Ark.  423),  216. 
Cook  v.  Knott  (28  Tex.  85),  135. 
Cook  v.  Larson  (47  Kan.  70 ;  27  Pac. 

Rep.  113),  282. 


liv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Cook   v.    Remington    (6  Mod.    237), 

304. 
Cook  v.  Rice  (91  Cal.  664),  151. 
Cook  v.  Shorthill  (82  Iowa,  277),  362. 
Cook  v.  Smith  (1  Vroom,  30  N.  J., 

387),  139. 
Cook  v.  State  (18  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  407), 

357. 
Cook  v.  State  (18  S.  W.  Rep.  412;  30 

Tex.  App.  607),  330. 
Cook  v.  State   (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  23),  89. 
Cook  v.  Stearns  (11  Mass.  533),  262. 
Cook  v.  Stout  (47  III.  530),  121. 
Cook  v.  Tavener  (41   Mo.  App.  642), 

234. 
Cook  v.  United  States  (11  S.  Ct.  268; 

138  U.  S.  157),  312. 
Cooke  v.  Maxwell  (2  Stark.  183),  175, 

320. 
Cooley  v.  Foltz  (85   Mich.  47;  48  N. 

W.  Rep.  176),  178. 
Coon  v.  State  (13  Sm.  &  M.  246),  93. 
Coon  v.  Swan  (30  Vt.  6),  169. 
Coonrod  v.  Madden  (126  Ind.  197;  25 

N.  E.  Rep.  1102),  35,  126. 
Cooper  v.  Andrews  (44  Mich.  94),  77. 
Cooper  v.  Dedrick  (22  Barb.  516),  231. 
Cooper  v.  Finke  (38  Minn.  2),  208. 
Cooper  t.  James  (79  Ga.  379 ;  4  S.  E. 

Rep.  916),  76. 
Cooper  v.   Morrell    (4   Yeates,    Pa., 

341),  60. 
Cooper  v.  Perry  (7  Pac.  Rep.  946 ;  16 

Colo.  436),  379. 
Cooper  v.  Reaney  (4  Minn.  528),  230. 
Cooper  v.  Reynolds  (10  Wall.,  U.  S., 

317),  155. 
Cooper  v.  State  (23  Tex.   336),    192, 

193. 
Copeland  v.   Koontz  (125  Ind.  126), 

308. 
Coppv.  Hollins  (56  Hun,  640;  9  N. 

Y.  S.  57),  354. 
Copperman    v.    People    (56    N.    Y. 

591),  9. 
Corbet  t  v.  Gibson  (16  Blatchf.  C.  C. 

334),  284. 


Corbett  v.   Norcross  (35  N.  Y.  99), 

262. 
Corbett  v.  State  (5  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  155), 

97. 
Corbin  v.  Sistrunk  (19  Ala.  203),  208. 
Cord  as  v.  Morrison  (23  N.  Y.  S.  1076), 

282. 
Corinth  v.  Lincoln  (34  Me.  310),  57. 
Cormack  v.  Walcott  (17  Am.  &  Eng. 

Corp.  Cases,  309),  140. 
Cormack  v.  Western  White  Bronze 

Co.  (77  Iowa,  32),  60. 
Corn  v.  Rosenthal  (20  N.  Y.  S.  632 ; 

1  Misc.  Rep.  168),  212. 
Corn  Exch.  Bank  v.  Nassau  Bank  (91 

N.  Y.  74),  216. 
Cornelius  v.  Smith  (55  Mo.  528),  246. 
Cornett  v.  Williams  (20  Wall.,  U.  S., 

226),  32. 
Corning   v.    Gould  (16  Wend.   531), 

229. 
Corning  v.  Walker  (100  N.  Y.  550), 

308. 
Corrigan  v.  Peroni  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  607), 

250. 
Cosmer's  Adm'r  v.  Smith  (36  W.  Va. 

788 ;  15  S.  E.  Rep.  977),  358. 
Cosper  v.  Nesbit  (45  Kan.  457),  206. 
Costello  v.  Crowell  (139  Mass.  588), 

139,  337. 
Costen  v.  McDowell  (107  N.  C.  546), 

120. 
Costigan  v.    Lunt   (127  Mass.    355), 

120. 
Costigan    v.    Mohawk,    etc.    Co.    (3 

Denio,  N.  Y.,  609),  247. 
Cothran  v.  Forsyth  (68  Ga.  560),  254. 
Cotton  v.  State  (87  Ala.  75 ;  6  S.  Rep. 

372),  5,  6,  91,  346. 
Cotton  v.  Ulmer  (45  Ala.  378),  231. 
Coubrough  v.  Adams  (70  Cal.  374 ;  11 

Pac.  Rep.  634),  371. 
Coulson  v.  Walton  (9  Pet.  62),  107, 

129. 
Coulter  v.  Amer.  Exp.  Co.  (56  N.  Y. 

585),  347. 
Counselman  v.  Hitchcock  (142  U.  S. 

547),  381. 


TA1JLK    OK    CASKS. 


\v 


References  are  to  sections. 


Countryman's  Estate,  In  re  (151  Pa. 

St.  577;  25  Atl.  Rep.  146;  31  W. 

N.  C.  148),  369. 
Course  v.  Head  (4  Dall.  22;  12  S.  Ct. 

195),  242. 
Courtney  v.  State  (5  Ind.  App.  356 ; 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  335),  9. 
Cousins  v.  Jackson  (52  Ala.  265),  308. 
Cousins  v.  Partridge  (79  Cal.   224), 

370. 
Couts  v.  Neer  (70  Tex.  468 ;  9  S.  W. 

Rep.  46),  381. 
Coveney  v.  Tannahill  (1   Hill,    33), 

173. 
Cover  v.  Manavvay  (115  Pa.  St.  345), 

136. 
Cover  v.  Myers  (75  Md.  406 ;  23  Atl. 

Rep.  856),  247. 
Covert  v.  Sebern  (73  Iowa,  564),  222. 
Covey  v.  Campbell  (52  Ind.  158),  18S. 
Covington,    etc.  Road  v.  Ingles  (15 

B.  Mon.,  Ky.,  637),  73a. 
Covington  Draw.   Co.   v.   Shepherd 

(20  How.,  U.  S.,  227),  242. 
Cowan  v.  Kinney  (33  Ohio  St.  423), 

1,8. 
Cowan  v.  Prowse  (19  S.  W.  Rep.  407, 

Ky.,  1892),  31. 
Cowan  v.  Third  Ave.  Ry.  Co.  (9  N. 

Y.  S.  610),  350. 
Coward  v.  Clanton  (79  Cal.  29),  76. 
Coward  v.  Dillinger  (56  Ind.  59),  357. 
Cowden  v.  Reynolds  (12  S.  &  R.  281), 

347. 
Co  wen  v.  Eartherly  (95  Ala.  324;  11 

S.  Rep.  195),  362. 
Cowing  v.  Altmau  (71   N.  Y.   433), 

214. 
Cowles  v.  Hayes  (71  N.  C.  231),  343. 
Cowley  v.  People  (83  N.  Y.  464),  38a, 

188. 
Cowman  v.  Rogers  (73  Md.  403),  233. 
Cox  v.  Com.  (125  Pa.  St.  103),  324. 
Cox  v.  Cox  (91  N.  C.  256),  220. 
Cox  v.  Dill  (85  Ind.  334),  141. 
Cox  v.  Ellsworth  (26  N.  W.  Rep.  460; 

18  Neb.  664),  233. 
Cox  v.  Hart  (145  U.  S.  376),  282. 


Cox  v.  Hill  (3  Ohio  St.  411),  353. 

Cox  v.  Jones  (52  Ga.  438),  142. 

Cox  v.  Jones  (110  N.  C.  309;  14  S.  E. 

Rep.  782),  380. 
Cox  v.  Mountford  (60  Ga.  62),  150a. 
Cox  v.  People  (19  Hun,  340),  89. 
Cox  v.Woods  (67  Cal.   317;  7  Pac. 

Rep.  722),  223. 
Cove  v.  Leach  (8  Mete,  Mass.,  371), 

233. 
Coyle  v.   Baltimore,  etc.   R.   Co.  (11 

W.  Va.  94),  73a. 
Coyne  v.    Manhattan    Ry.    Co.    (62 

Hun,  620),  188,  192. 
Cozard  v.  Hinman  (6  Bosw.  8),  20S. 
Cozine  v.  Walter  (55  N.  Y.  304),  150a. 
Cozzens  v.  Higgins(33  How.  Pr.  439), 

38a,  441. 
Craig  v.  Alvarson  (6  J.  J.  Marsh., 

Ky.,  609),  69. 
Craig  v.  Brown  (1  Pet.  352),  148. 
Craig  v.  Gilbreth  (47  Me.  416),  73a. 
Craig  v.  State  (18  S.   W.  Rep.   297, 

Tex.,  1892),  89. 
Craig  v.  Taylor  (6  B.  Mon.,  Ky.,  459), 

262. 
Crain  v.  Huntington  (81  Tex.  614), 

107,  130. 
Cram  v.  Cram  (33  Vt.   15,  40),  166, 

197. 
Cramer  v.  Burlington  (4  Iowa,  213), 

226. 
Cramer  v.  Shriner  (18  Md.  89),  35. 
Cranan  v.  New  Orleans  (16  La.  Ann. 

374),  225. 
Craudall  v.  Gallup  (12  Conn.  565),  76. 
Crandall  v.  Sterling  (1  Colo.  106),  242. 
Crane  v.  Dexter  (5  Wash.   St.   479), 

132. 
Crane  v.  Library  Ass'n  (29  N.  J.  L. 

302),  209. 
Crane  v.  Northfield  (33  Vt.  126),  198. 
Crane  v.  Ring  (48  Kan.  61),  24. 
Crane  Lumber  Co.   v.   Otter  Creek 

Lumber  Co.  (79  Mich.  307;  44  N. 

W.  Rep.  7S8),  60. 
Crappell  v.  State  (71  Ala.  324),  316. 
Crary  v.  Sprague  (12  Wend.  41),  121. 


lvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Crawford  v.  Abraham  (3  Oreg.  163), 

276. 
Crawford  v.   Elliot  (1  Houst.,    Del., 

467),  232. 
Crawford  v.   Neal  (144    U.  S.    585; 

12  S.  Ct.  759),  136. 
Crawford  v.  Williams  (48  Iowa,  249), 

189. 
Creamer  v.   Stevenson  (15  Md.  Ill), 

214. 
Crease  v.  Barrett  (1  C,  M.  &  R.  928), 

116. 
Cressena  v.  Sowers  (26  W.  N.  C.  133), 

136. 
Creston  v.  Walker  (26   Iowa,    205), 

254. 
Creswell  v.  State  (14  Tex.  App.  1),  9. 
Crew  v.  Saunders  (2  Str.  1005),  140. 
Crew  v.   State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  973),  282. 
Cribben  v.    Deall  (21  Oreg.  211 ;  27 

Pac.  Rep.  1046),  128. 
Crimmins  v.  Crimmins  (43  N.  J.  Eq. 

87),  308. 
Crist  v.  State  (21  Ala.  137),  141. 
Crocker  v.  Agenbrod  (122  Ind.  585), 

347. 
Crocker  v.  Duncan  (6  Blackf.,  Ind., 

278),  286. 
Crockett  v.  Crockett  (73  Ga.  647),  223. 
Crodson  v.  Leonard  (12Cranch,  433), 

158. 
Crohen  v.   Ewers  (39  111.  App.  34), 

199. 
Cromer  v.    Bornest  (27    S.  C.   436; 

3  S.  E.  Rep.  849),  36. 
Crommett  v.   Pearson  (18  Me.  344), 

205. 
Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.  (94  U.  S.  351), 

145. 
Crookham  v.   State  (5  W.  Va.  510), 

102. 
Crooks  v.  Whitford  (47  Mich.   283), 

222. 
Crosby  v.  Mason  (32  Conn.  482),  210. 
Crosby  v.  People  (27  N.  E.  Rep.  49 ; 

137  111.  325),  97. 
Crose  v.  Rutledge  (81  111.  266),  168. 


Cross  v.  Bell  (34  N.  H.  85),  226. 
Cross  v.  Cross  (108  N.  Y.  629;  15  N. 

E.  Rep.  333),  347. 
Cross  v.  Cross  (55  Mich.  280),  168. 
Cross  v.  Kansas  City  (90  Mo.  13),  83. 
Cross  v.  Martin  (46  Vt.  14),  129. 
Cross  v.  Railroad  Co.  (69  Mich.  363), 

186,  226. 
Cross  v.  Thompson  (50  Kan.  627;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  357),  217. 
Cross  v.  Williams  (43  N.  H.  332),  8. 
Grossman  v.  Crossman  (95  N.  Y.  145), 

30. 
Croswell  v.  Labree  (81  Me.  44),  128. 
Cr others  v.  Acock  (43  Mo.  App.  318), 

22. 
Crotty  v.  Eagle's  Adm'r  (35  W.   Va. 

143 ;  13  S.  E.  Rep.  859),  74. 
Crow  v.  Gleason  (20  N.   Y.   S.   590 ; 

65  Hun,  625),  371. 
Crow  v.  Searcy  (103  Mo.  975),  226. 
Crow  v.  Watkins  (48  Ark.  169),  70. 
Crowell  v.    Harvey    (30  Neb.    570), 

370. 
Crowell  v.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  204), 

324. 
Crumlish  v,  Wilmington  (5  Del.  Ch. 

270),  77. 
Crump  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,   20  S.  W. 

Rep.  390),  101. 
Crump  v.  Gerick  (40  Miss.  765),  76. 
Cuddy  v.  Brown  (78  111.  415),  53. 
Cullen   v.   Benim  (37  Ohio  St.  326), 

210. 
Cully  v.  Shirk  (131  Ind.  70),  150a. 
Culp  v.  Steare  (47  Kan.  746),  24. 
Culver  v.  Dwight  (6  Gray,  444),  188. 
Culver  v.  Marks  (122  Ind.  554),  37,  60, 

144. 
Culver  v.  Scott,  etc.   Co.  (55  N.  W. 

Rep.  552),  334. 
Culverhouse  v.  Wertz  (33  Mo.  App. 

24),  241. 
Cumberland  Mut.   Fire  Ins.  Co.   v. 

Giltman  (48  N.  J.  L.  495 ;  7  Atl. 

Rep.  424),  38. 
Cumming  v.  Barber  (99  N.  C.  332), 

212. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


lvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Oummings  v.  Arnold  (3  Mete.    486), 

214. 
Cunimings  v.  Powell  (116  Mo.    473; 

21  S.  W.  Rep.  1079),  208. 
Cummings  v.  Putnam  (19  N.  H.  5C9), 

214. 
Cunard  v.  Manhattan  (I  Misc.  Rep. 

151;  21  N.  Y.  S.  1131),  16. 
Cundell  v.  Pratt  (1  M.  &  Malk.  108), 

354. 
Cuneo  v.  Bessoni  (63  Ind.  524),  190. 
Cunningham  v.  Dwyer  (23  Md.  219), 

208. 
Cunningham  v.  Gallegher  (61   Wis. 

170),  249. 
Cunningham  v.  Minor  (66  Ala.  522), 

207. 
Cunningham  v.  Railroad  Co.  (49  Fed. 

Rep.  39),  192. 
Cunningham  v.  Union  Pac.  R.   Co. 

(4  Utah,  206;  7  Pac.  Rep.  795), 

360. 
Curd  v.  Williams  (Ky.,   1892,  18  S. 

W.  Rep.  634),  246. 
Curnen  v.  Mayer  (79  X.  Y.  511,  514), 

84. 
Curren  v.  Ampersee  (Mich.,  1893,  56 

N.  W.  Rep.  87),  34. 
Currier  v.  Richardson  (63  Vt.   617), 

146. 
Curry  v.  Kurtz  (33  Miss.  24),  69. 
Curry  v.  White  (51  Cal.  530),  69. 
Curtis  v.  Aaronson  (7  Atl.  Rep.  8S6 ; 

49  N.  J.  L.  68),  115. 
Curtis   v.    Belknap    (6    Wash.    433), 

138. 
Curtis  v.  Chicago,  etc.   Co.  (18  Wis. 

312),  188. 
Curtis  v.  Curtis  (131  Ind.  489),  361. 
Curtis  v.  Gano  (26  N.  Y.  426),  198. 
Curtis  v.  Richards  (1    Scott,  N.  R., 

155),  218. 
Curtis  v.  Wilson  (2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

646 ;  21  S.  W.  Rep.  787),  308. 
Cushing  v.  Babcock  (38  Me.  452),  77. 
Cushing  v.  Billings  (2  Cush.,  Mass., 

158),  375. 
Cushing  v.  Rice  (46  Me.  303),  205. 


Cushman  v.  Bonfield  (36   111.   App. 

436),  304. 
Cuthrell  v.  Cuthrell  (101  Ind.  375), 

212. 
Cutler  v.  Rathbone  (1  Hill,  205),  357. 
Cutler  v.  Wright  (22  N.  Y.  472),  2  12. 
Cutler  v.  Wright  (W.  N.  1890,  p.   . 

281. 
Cutter  v.  Waddingham  (22  Mo.  281), 

216. 
Cutting  v.  Carter  (29  Art.  72),  77. 
Cutts  v.  United  States  (1   Gall.  69), 

128. 
Cuyler  v.  Ferrill  (1  Abb.,  U.  S.,  169), 

240. 
Cuyler  v.  McCartney  (33   Barb.,   N. 

Y,  165),  70. 

D. 

Daggett  v.  Shaw  (5  Met.,  Mass.,  223), 

115. 
Dab!  man  v.  Hammel  (45  Wis.  460), 

249. 
Dail  v.  Moore  (51  Mo.  5S9),  135,  136. 
Daily  v.  Coons  (64  Ind.  545),  75. 
Daily  v.  Kinsler  (31  Neb.  340 ;  47  N. 

W.   Rep.  1045),  246. 
Daily  v.    N.  Y.  etc.    Co.    (32  Conn. 

356),  139a. 
Daily  v.  Sharkey  (29  Mo.  App.  518), 

151. 
Dainese  v.  Hall  (91  U.  S.  13),  242. 
Dairs  v.  Furman  (21  Kan.  131),  225. 
Dais'  Appeal  (128  Pa.  St.  572),  226. 
Dale  v.  Livingstone  (4  Wend.  558), 

173. 
Dale  v.  State  (88  Ga.  552),  282. 
Daley  v.    Hellman    (62   Hun,   620), 

282. 
Dallas  v.  Chenault  (Tex.,  1891,  16  S. 

W.  Rep.  173),  253. 
Dallmeyer  v.  Dallmeyer  (Pa.,  1888, 

16  Atl.  Rep.  72),  367. 
Dalrymple  v.  Dalryrnple   (2   Hagg. 

115,  144),  143. 
Dalton,  Ex  parte  (44  Ohio  St.  150), 

388. 


Iviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sectiona. 


Daly  v.  Bernstein  (28  Pac.  Eep.  764, 

N.  M.,  1892),  30. 
Daly  v.    Maguire  (6    Blatchf.    137), 

38a. 
Daly  v.  Melende  (32  Neb.  852),  333. 
Daly  v.  Multnomah  Co.  (14  Oreg.  20), 

277. 
Daly  v.  Wise  (132  N.  Y.  306),  232. 
Damm  v.  Gow  (88  Mich.  99),  218. 
Damon  v.  Granby   (2   Pick.,    Mass., 

345),  268. 
Dan  v.  Brown  (4  Cow.,  N.  Y.,  433, 

438),  67,  138. 
Dana  v.  Fiedler  (12  N.  Y.  40),    217, 

218. 
Dana  v.  Hancock  (30  Vt.  616),  214. 
Dana  v.  Newhall  (13  Mass.  498),  128. 
Dana  v.  Sessions   (Vt.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  585),  208. 
Dane  v.  Tucker   (4  Johns.  487),  176. 
Danforth   v.  Mclntire  (11  111.  App. 

447),  198. 
Daniel   v.    Daniel   (39   Pa.  St.    191), 

174. 
Daniels  v.  Foster  (26  Wis.  286),  309. 
Daniels  v.  Woonsocket  (11    R.  I.  4), 

75,  76. 
Danielson  v.  Fuel   Co.  (55   Tex.  49), 

142. 
Danville,  etc.  Co.   v.  State  (16   Ind. 

456),  242. 
Darby  v.  Ouseley  (1  H.  &  N.  1),  80. 
Darby  v.  Roberts  (3  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

427 ;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  529),  75. 
Darby  v.  State   (23  Tex.    App.  407), 

101,  102. 
Darby  v.  State  (92  Ala.  9),  103. 
Darcy  v.  McCarty  (35  Kan.  722),  144. 
Darling  v.  Westmoreland  (52  N.  H. 

401),  8. 
Darrah    v.   Watson   (36  Iowa,   116), 

148. 
Darry  v.  People   (10  N.  Y.  138),  234. 
Darst  v.  Bates  (51  111.  439),  222. 
Darst  v.  Murphy  (119  111.  343),  223. 
Dart  v.  Walker  (3  Daly,  N.  Y.,  138), 

69. 
Dass  Case  (1  Gratt.,  Va.,  557),  249. 


Daub  v.  Engelback  (109  111.  267),  76. 
Davenport  v.  Gas  Co.  (43  Iowa,  301), 

83. 
Davenport  v.  Hannibal  (108  Mo.  471 ; 

18  S.  W.  Rep.  1122),  11. 
Davenport  v.   Mahon  (6  Kulp,  Pa., 

350),  146. 
Davenport  v.  McKee  (98  N.  C.  500), 

350. 
Davey  v.  Lohrman  (20  N.  Y.  S.  675), 

349. 
Daveyac  v.   Seiler  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  375),  380. 
Davidson  v.  Arledge  (97  N.  C.  172), 

115. 
Davidson  v.  Cornell  (132  N.  Y.  22S), 

52. 
Davidson  v.  Felder  (2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

273 ;  21  S.  W.  Rep.  714),  371. 
Davidson  v.  Murphy  (13  Conn.  317), 

146. 
Davidson  v.  Peticolas   (34  Tex.  37), 

244. 
Davidson  v.  Wheeler  (17  R.   I.   28), 

370. 
Davie  v.  Briggs  (7  Otto,  628),  233. 
Davie  v.  Davis  (108  N.  C.  501 ;  13  S. 

E.  Rep.  240),  152. 
Davies  v.  Lowndes  (7   Scott,    N.   R. 

214),  113. 
Davis  v.  Agnew  (67  Tex.   210),  136. 
Davis  v.  Beazley  (75  Va.  491),  135. 
Davis  v.  California  Pow.  Works  (84 

Cal.  617),  341. 
Davis  v.    Colburn   (128    Mass.    377), 

265. 
Davis  v.  Dale  (1  M.  &  M.  514),  339. 
Davis  v.  Davis  (22  N.  Y.   S.  191 ;  2 

Misc.  Rep.  549),  158. 
Davis  v.  Evans  (102  Mo.  164),  70. 
Davis  v.  Fuller  (12  Vt.  178),  58. 
Davis  v.  Getchell  (32  Neb.  792),  8. 
Davis  v.  Goodrich  (45  Vt.  36),  214. 
Davis  v.  Graham  (2  Colo.  App.  210; 

29  Pac.  Rep.  1007),  350. 
Davis  v.  Harnbell  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S. 

W.  Rep.  972),  218. 
Davis  v.  Hays  (89  Ala.  563),  11. 


TABLE    OF   CASKS. 


lix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Davis  v.  Hopkins  (18  Colo.  153;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  70),  369. 
Davis  v.  Hudson  (29  Minn.  35),  232. 
Davis  v.  Jenkins  (Ky.,   1893,  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  283),  137. 
Davis  v.  Kline   (9  S.   W.   Rep.   724  ; 

9G  Mo.  401),  124. 
Davis  v.    Mann    (43   111.   App.    401), 

377. 
Davis  v.  McEnany   (150   Mass.  451), 

240. 
Davis  v.  Moody  (15  Ga.  175),  205. 
Davis  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  &  W.  R. 

R.  Co.  (69  Hun,  174),  198. 
Davis  v.  Rich  (2  How.,  N.   Y.,  86), 

357. 
Davis  v.  Rochester  (66  Hun,  629),  72, 

73a. 
Davis  v.  Sanford  (9  Allen,  216),  60. 
Davis  v.  Shafer  (50    Fed.    Rep.    74), 

123,  128. 
Davis  v.  Simmons  (25  Pac.  Rep.  535), 

75. 
Davis  v.  State  (35  Ind.  496),  188. 
Davis  v.  State  (31  Neb.  247 ;  47  N.  W. 

Rep.  854),  317. 
Davis  v.  State  (78  Ind.  15),  188. 
Davis  v.  State  (74  Ga.  869),  5,  7. 
Davis  v.  State  (38  Md.  15),  192. 
Davis  v.  Stern  (15  La.  Ann.  177),  208. 
Davis  v.  Stout  (126  Ind.  12;  25  N.  E. 

Rep.  862),  205. 
Davis  v.  Whitesides  (1    Dana,  Ky., 

177),  73a. 
Davis  v.  Willis  (67  Hun,  650),  333. 
Davis,  etc.  Co.   v.   Riverside  Co.  (84 

Wis.   262;  54  N.   W.  Rep.  506), 

282. 
Davy  v.  Faw  (7  Cranch,  U.  S.,  171), 

77. 
Dawes  v.  Shedd  (15  Mass.  69),  73. 
Dawley  v.  Ayers  (23  Cal.  108),  167. 
Daws  v.  Glasgow  (1  Pin.,  Wis.,  171), 

356. 
Dawson  v.  Coston  (18  Colo.  493;  33 

Pac.  Rep.  189),  354a. 
Dawson  v.  Landreaux  (29  La.  Ann. 

363),  739. 


Dawson  v.  Mayal  (45  Minn.  408),  53. 
Dawson  v.  Parham  (55  Ark.  286),  142. 
Dawson  v.  Schloss  (93   Cal.  134),  79, 

369. 
Day  v.  Cooley  (118  Mass.   524),  348. 
Day  v.  Gidjum  (131  Mass.  31),  168. 
Day  v.  Sharp  (4  Whart.  339),  8. 
Day  v.  State  (63  Ga.  667),  202. 
Day  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  213),  249. 
Day  v.  State  (27  Tex.  App.  143),  306. 
Dayger,  In  re  (47  Hun,  127),  269. 
Dayton  v.  Warne  (43  N.  J.  L.  659), 

73a. 
Dayton  v.  Wells   (1   Nott    &    McC, 

S.  C,  409),  121.       • 
Deade  v.  Hancock   (13    Price,    236), 

114. 
Deady  v.  Harrison  (1  Stark.   60),  73. 
Deakers  v.  Temple  (41  Pa.   St.  234), 

69. 
Dean  v.  Aveling  (1  Rob.  279),  202. 
Dean  v.  Com.   (32  Gratt.,  Va.,  912), 

57. 
Dean  v.  Dean  (1  Will.,  Vt.,  746),  138. 
Dean  v.  Erskine  (18  N.  H.  83).  220. 
Dean  v.  Fuller  (40  Pa.  St.  474),  138. 
Dean  v.  State  (29  Ind.  483),  229,  234. 
Dearing  v.  Sawtelle  (4  Greenl.,  Me., 

191),  311. 
De  Arnold  v.  Neasmith   (32  Mich. 

231),  58. 
Deartt  v.  Barley  (9  N.  Y.  371),  197. 
Deasy  v.  Thurman  (1  Idaho,  775),  70. 
Debaun,  In  re  (4  N.  Y  S.  342),  309. 
De  Casse  Brissac  v.  Rathbone  (6  H. 

&  Nor.  361),  158. 
De  Celis  v.  United  States  (13  Ct.  CI. 

117),  238. 
De   Cemea  v.  Cornell  (20   N.  Y  S. 

895),  216. 
Deck  v.  Johnson  (1  Abb.  App.  Dec, 

N.  Y,  497),  71. 
Decker,  Ex  parte  (6  Cowen,  N.  Y., 

59),  128. 
Dee  v.  Sharon  Hill  Acad.  (2  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  Rep.  228),  366. 
Deere  v.  Dagley  (80  Iowa,  197 ;  45  N. 

W.  Rep.  557),  33. 


lx 


TALiLK    OK    GASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Deery  v.  Cray  (10  Wall.,  U.  S.,  263), 

210. 
De  France  v.  Howard  (4  Iowa,  524), 

200. 
Deigv.  Morehead  (110  Ind.  451;  11 

N.  E.  Rep.  458),  188. 
Dejarnotto  v.  Com.  (75  Va.  857),  197. 
Delacroix  v.  Bulky   (13  Wend.  71), 

214. 
Delafield  v.  Hand  (3  Johns.  310),  149. 
Delafield  v.  Parish  (25  N.  Y.  9),  231. 
Delamater  v.  Prudential  L.  Ins.  Co. 

(5  N.  Y.  S.  586),  367. 
De  La  Motte's  Case  (21  How.  St.  Tr. 

810),  132. 
Delaney  v.  Root  (99  Mass.  548),  262. 
Delano  v.  Jacoby  (31  Pac.  Rep.  290; 

96  Cal.  275),  380. 
Delano   v.    Joysling   (1   Litt.,    Ky., 

117),  242. 
De  La  Riva  v.  Berreysea  (2  Cal.  195), 

79. 
Delaware,  etc.  Co.  v.  Starrs  (69  Pa. 

St.  36),  198. 
Delcouuyn  v.  Chamberlain  (48  How. 

Pr.,  N.  Y.,  409),  276. 
Delphi  v.  Lowery  (74  Ind.  520),  8. 
De  Meli  v.  De  Meli  (120  N.  Y.  492), 

168,  347. 
Dement,  Ex  parte  (53  Ala.  389),  191. 
Demeritt  v.  Meserve  (39  N.  H.  531), 

73a. 
Deming  v.  Merch.  etc.  Co.  (90  Tenn. 

306;  17  S.  W.  Rep.  89),  11. 
Demonheun    v.    Walker    (4  Baxt., 

Tenn.,  199),  139. 
Den  v.  Johnson  (18  N.  J.  L.  87),  166. 
Den  v.  Longstreet  (18  N.  J.  L.  414), 

262. 
Denair  v.  Brooklyn  (5  N.  Y.  S.  585), 

239. 
Denham  v.  Bryant  (139  Mass.    110), 

24. 
Denison  v.  Denison  (35  Md.  361),  309. 
Denmead  v.  Maack  (2  MacArthur, 

475),  243. 
Dennie  v.  Williams  (135  Mass.   28), 

76. 


Dennis   v.    Spencer  (45  Minn.   250), 

24. 
Denson  v.  Hyde  (6  Conn.   508),  143. 
Dent  v.  Dent  (3  Gill,  Md.,  482),  76. 
Denver,  etc.  Co.  v.  Neis  (56  Cal.  56), 

80. 
Denver,  etc.  Co.  v.   Ryan  (17  Colo. 

98 ;  28  Pac.  Rep.  79),  250. 
Denver  &  R.  G.  Co.  v.  Morrison  (3- 

Colo.    App.    194;    32   Pac.    Rep. 

859),  367. 
Denver  Tramway  Co.  v.  Reid  (Colo., 

1894,  35  Pac.  Rep.  269),  192. 
Depue  v.  Place  (7  Pa.  St.  428),  140. 
Depue  v.  Sargeant  (21  W.  Va.   326)» 

208. 
Deshon  v.  Insurance  Co.    (11  Met., 

Mass.,  199),  209. 
Des  Moines  Bank  v.  Hotel  Co.  (Iowa, 

1893,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  67),  376. 
De  Soby  v.  De  Laister  (2  Har.  &  J., 

Md.,  19),  146. 
Despatch  Line  v.  Bellamy  M.  Co.  (12 

N.  H.  205),  268. 
Destrehan  v.  Louisiana  Cypress  Co. 

(La.,  1893,  13  S.   Rep.  230),  216. 
Detroit   City   Ry.    Co.   v.    Mills  (85 

Mich.   634 ;  48  N.  W.  Rep.  1007), 

346. 
Detweiler  v.  Shultheis  (122  Ind.  155), 

229. 
Deuser  v.  Walkup  (43  Mo.  App.  625), 

171. 
Deutman  v.  Kilpatrick  (46  Mo.  App. 

624),  206. 
Devenbaugh  v.  Devenbaugh  (5  Paige, 

N.  Y,  554),  202. 
Devere  v.  State  (5  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep. 

509),  37. 
Devereux  v.   McMahon  (102   N.   C. 

284;  9S.  E.  Rep.  635),  131. 
Devinney  v.  Carey  (23  N.  Y.   State 

Rep.  208),  309. 
Devlin  v.  Boyd  (69  Hun,  328),  20. 
Devlin  v.  New  York   (4  Misc.   Rep. 

106;  23  N.  Y.  S.  888),  199. 
Devries  v.    Phillips  (63  N.    C.    53), 

354a. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


lxi 


References  are  to  sections. 


Devylyn  v.  Kill  crease  (2  McMull., 

S.  C,  425),  80. 
Dew  v.  Downam  (1  Green,  135),  339. 
Dewey  v.  Dewey  (35.  Vt.  505),  268. 
Dewey  v.  Goodenough  (56  Barb.  54), 

303. 
Dewey  v.  Warriner  (71  111.  19S),  311. 
Dewey  v.  Dewey  (1  Met.,  Mass.,  349), 

138. 
Dewey  v.  St.  Albans   Co.  (60  Vt.  1 ; 

12  Atl.  Rep.  221),  244. 
De  Witt  v.  Berry  (134  U.  S.  314),  216. 
Dewitt  v.  Brisbane  (16  N.  Y.  508), 

242. 
Dewitt  v.  Yates  (10  Johns.  156),  215. 
De  Wolf  v.  Strader  (26  111.  225),  16S. 
Dexter  v.  Booth  (2  Allen,  Mass.,  559), 

168. 
Dexter  v.  Clemans  (17  Pick.  175),  73. 
Dexter  v.  Cranston  (41   Mich.    448), 

239. 
Dexter  v.  Hall  (15  Wall.,  U.  S.,  9), 

188,  197. 
Dexter  v.  Harrison  (34   N.   E.   Rep. 

46;  146111.  169),  373. 
Dexter  v.  lvins  (133  N.  Y.  986),  24. 
Dexter  v.  Ohlander  (93  Ala.  441),  205. 
Diamond  M.  Co.  v.  Powers  (51  Mich. 

145),  140. 
Dicas  v.  Lawson  (1  Cr.,  M.  &  R.  934), 

284. 
Dickens  v.  Mahana  (21  How.,  U.  S., 

283),  225. 
Dickenson   v.    Fitchberg   (13    Gray, 

546),  185. 
Dickerman  v.  Aston  (21   Minn.  53S), 

268. 
Dickerson   v.    Mathewson  (50    Fed. 

Rep.  73),  371. 
Dickinson  v.  Clark  (5  W.  Va.  280), 

73. 
Dickinson  v.  Colegrove    (100    U.    S. 

580),  82. 
Dickson  v.  Evans  (6  T.  R.  57),  250. 
Dickson  v.  McGraw  (151  Pa.  St.  98 ; 

24  Atl.  Rep.  1043),  309. 
Dickson  v.  Peppers  (7  Ired.,  N.  C, 

429),  150a. 


Dickson  v.  Waldron   (Ind.,   1893,  35 

N.  E.  Rep.  1),  317. 
Didier  v.  Penn.  Co.  (146  Pa.  St.  582; 

23  Atl.  Rep.  801),  11. 
Diefendorf  v.  Diefcudorf  (8  N.  Y.  S. 

617),  226. 
Diel  v.  Railway   Co.    (37    Mo.    App. 

454),  226. 
Dietrich  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R.  Co.  (58 

Md.  347),  73a. 
Dietz  v.  Fourth  Nat.  Bank  (69  Mich. 

287 ;  37  N.  W.  Rep.  220),  140. 
Diffenbach  v.  Vogeler  (61   Md.  370), 

83. 
DifTenderfer  v.  Scott  (Ind.,  1S93,  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  87),  351,  352. 
Digby  v.  People  (113  111.  125),  101. 
Digby  v.  Steel  (3  Campb.  115),  38. 
Dillard  v.  State  (58  Miss.  368),  193, 

342. 
Dilleber   v.    Home   L.    Ins.    Co.    (87 

N.  Y.  79),  188. 
Dilleber  v.   Mut.    Life  Ins.  Co.    (69 

N.  Y.  256),  178. 
Dilley  v.  Love  (61  Md.  607),  309. 
Dillingham  v.  Flack   (63   Hun,  629), 

370. 
Dillon's  Case  (4  Dall.  116),  89. 
Dills  v.  State  (59  Ind.  15),  191. 
Dilworth  v.  Curts  (29  N.  E.  Rep.  861 ; 

139  111.  508),  371. 
Dimick  v.  Downs  (82  111.  570),  349. 
Dines  v.  People   (39  111.    App.    565), 

244. 
Dishazer  v.  Mariland  (12  Leigh,  Va., 

524),  108. 
Di  Sora  v.  Phillips  (33  Law  J.  Ch., 

H.  L.  Cas.  129),  149. 
Disque  v.  State  (49  N.  J.  L.  249 ;  8 

Atl.  Rep.  281),  346. 
District  v.  Armes  (107  U.  S.  519),  8, 

317. 
District  v.  Wash.  Gas  Co.  (20  D.  C. 

39),  124. 
Diven   v.    Johnson    (117    Ind.    512), 

208. 
Divine  v.  Mitchum  (4  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

4S3),  268. 


lxii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Dix  v.  Atkins  (128  Mass.  43),  126. 
Dixon  v.  Ely  (4  Edw.,  N.  Y.,  557), 

286. 
Dixon  v.  Niccolls  (39  111.  373),  237. 
Dixon  v.  Sinclair  (4  Va.  354),  152. 
Dixon  v.  State  (86  Ga.  754;  13  S.  E. 

Rep.  87),  347. 
Dixon  v.  State  (13  Fla.  636),  9,  52,  101, 

234,  249. 
Dobbin  v.  Bryan  (5  Tex.  267),  238. 
Dobson  v.  Cathron  (34  S.  C.  518),  35. 
Dobson  v.  Kuhula  (66  Hun,  627),  67, 

216. 
Dockterman    v.   Elder  (27    Weekly 

Law  Bui.  195),  262. 
Dodd  v.  Scott  (46  N.  W.  Rep.  1057 ; 

81  Iowa,  319),  153. 
Dodge  v.  Freedman,  etc.  Co.  (93  U.  S. 

579),  69. 
Dodge  v.  Gallatin  (130  N.  Y.  117;  29 

N.  E.  Rep.  107),  146. 
Dodge  v.  Stanbope  (55  Md.  121),  309. 
Dodson  v.   State  (86   Ala.  60;   5  S. 

Rep.  485),  93. 
Doe  v.  Barnes  (1  M.  &  R.  386,  389), 

144. 
Doe  v.  Campbell  (10  Johns.,  N.  Y., 

475),  107. 
Doe   v.    Davies  (10   Q.   B.    314),    13, 

113. 
Doe  v.  Davis  (11  Jur.  607).  53. 
Doe  v.  Deakin  (3  Carr.   &  P.  402), 

105. 
Doe  v.  Griffin  (15  East,  293),  232. 
Doe  v.  Hilder  (2  B.  &  Aid.  793),  242. 
Doe  v.  Keeling    (11    Q.    B.    884;    36 

Leg.  Obs.  312),  106. 
Doe  v.  Lindsey  (24  Ga.  225),  232. 
Doe  v.  Miles  (1  Stark.  181),  38. 
Doe  v.  Ries  (7  Bing.  724),  126. 
Doe  v.  Riley  (28  Ala.  161),  240. 
Doe  v.  Roe  (31  Ga.  593),  106. 
Doe  v.  Sisson  (12  East,  62),  116. 
Doe  v.  State  (40  Ark.  454),  120. 
Doe  v.  Tarver  (Ry.    &  M.  141,  142), 

114. 
Doe  v.  Tbomas  (14  East,  323),  115. 
Dogge  v.  State  (27  Neb.  272),  307. 


Dolan  v.  Armstrong   (35   Neb.    339; 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  132),  249. 
Dole  v.  Johnson  (50  N.  H.  454),  185, 

188. 
Dole  v.  Wilson  (16  Minn.  472),  242. 
Dole  v.  Wooldridge  (142  Mass.  184; 

7  N.  E.  Rep.  83~    340. 
Doll  v.  Mundine  (84  Tex.  315),  282. 
Doll  v.  People  (111.,    1893,  34  N.  E. 

Rep.  413),  373. 
Donaldson  v.  Everhart  (50  Kan.  718; 

32  Pac.  Rep.  405),  71. 
Donaldson  v.  Jude  (2  Bibb,  60),  146. 
Donell  v.  Jones  (13  Ala.  490),  334. 
Donelly  v.  Smith  (7  R.  I.  12),  166. 
Donkt   v.    Tbelluson  (8   C.    B.  812), 

143. 
Donlin  v.  Daeglin  (80  111.  60S),  209. 
Donnell  v.  Clark  (12  Kan.  154),  73a. 
Donnell  v.  James  (13  Ala.  490),  333. 
Donahue  v.  Mills  (41  Ark.  421),  316. 
Donohue  v.    Brannuni  (1    Overton, 

328),  148. 
Donohue  v.  People  (6  Park.   C.  C, 

N.  Y,  120),  139. 
Donohue  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  R.  Co.  (91 

Mo.  360),  370. 
Donohue  v.  Whitney  (61  Hun,  620 ; 

15  N.  Y.  S.  632),  113,  115,  116. 
Doolittle  v.  State  (93  Ind.  272),  192. 
Dooly  Block  v.  S.  L.  Rap.  T.  Co. 

(Utah,  1S93,  33  Pac.   Rep.   229), 

3S0. 
Doon  v.  Donaher  (113  Mass.  151),  126. 
Doran  v.  Mullen  (78  111.  342),  334. 
Dorev.  Thornburgh  (90  Cal.  64;  27 

Pac.  Rep.  30),  149. 
Doren  v.  Jeliffe  (20  N.  Y.  S.  636),  367. 
Dorlarque  v.  Cress  (71  111.  3S0-382), 

84. 
Dorman  v.  State  (56  Ind,  454),  244. 
Dome  v.  Southwork  Manuf'g  Co.  (11 

Cush.,  Mass.,  205),  73a. 
Dorr  v.  Fenno  (12  Pick.  521),  23. 
Dorsey  v.  Hagard  (5  Mo.  420),  208. 
Doster  v.  Brown  (25  Ga.  24),  199. 
Doty  v.  Smith  (68  Hun,   199 ;  22  N. 

Y.  S.  840),  60. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


lxiii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Doud  v.  Guthrie  (in  Bradw.,  111.,  653), 

344. 
Douglas  v.  Carmean  (49  Kan.  674;  31 

Pac.  Rep.  371),  135. 
Douglas  v.  Saunderson  (2  Dall.  116), 

53. 
Douglass  v.  Anthony  (45  Kan.  439; 

25  Pac.  Rep.  853),  377. 
Douglass  v.  Fullerton  (7   111.    App, 

102),  307. 
Douglass  v.  Mitchell  (35  Pa.  St.  440),  5. 
Dove  v.  Royal  Ins.  Co.  (Mich.,  1894, 

57  N.  W.  Rep.  30),  188. 
Dow  v.  Jewell  (18  N.   H.  380),  129* 

262. 
Dow  v.  Smith  (7  Vt.  465),  286. 
Dow  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  278), 

283. 
Dowel  v.  Watson  (105  N.  C.  476),  233. 
Dowdell  v.  State  (58  Ind.  333),  240. 
Dowden  v.  Junker  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  584), 

284. 
Dowdy  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.  (88  Ga. 

726),  188. 
Dowell  v.  Guthrie  (99  Mo.  653),  8, 

250. 
Dower  v.  Church  (21  W.  Va.  57),  343, 

376. 
Dowling  v.  Hennings  (20  Md.  186), 

229. 
Downer  v.  Rowell  (24  Vt.  343),  337. 
Downey  v.  Hendrie  (46  Mich.  498), 

237. 
Downie,  In  re  (42  Wis.  66),  236. 
Downing  v.  Diaz  (80  Tex.  436;  16  S. 

W.  Rep.  49),  142. 
Downing  v.  Iron  Co.  (93  Ala.   — ), 

262. 
Downs  v.  Beldon  (46  Vt.  674),  69,  71. 
Dows  v.  McMichael  (1  Paige,  139), 

160. 
Dow's  Ex'rs  v.  Spinney's  Ex'rs  (29 

Mo.  386),  133. 
Doyle  v.  Beaupre  (63  Hun,  624),  341. 
Doyle  v.  Church  (118  N.  Y.  678;  23 

N.  E.  Rep.  928),  50. 
Doyle  v.  Eye  &  Ear  Infirmary  (80  N. 

Y.  601),  193. 


Doyle  v.  Kansas  City  Ry.   Co.  (113 

Mo.  280;  20  S.  W.  Rep.  970),  367. 
Doyle   v.    Manhattan    Ry.    Co.    (59 

Hun,  625),  194. 
Drake  v.  Seaman  (97  N!  Y.  230),  268. 
Drake  v.  State  (23  Tex.  293).  103. 
Drake  v.  State  (75  Ga.  413),  10.  39. 
Draper  v.  Hatfield  (124  Mass.  53),  76. 
Dravo  v.  Fable  (132  U.  S.  487;  10  S. 

Ct.  Rep.  170),  347. 
Drennon  v.  Smith  (3  Head,   Tenn., 

389),  70. 
Drew   v.    Drum  (44   Mo.   App.   25), 

366. 
Drew  v.  Prior  (5  M.  &  G.  264),  139. 
Drew  v.  Simmons  (58  Ala.  403),  309. 
Drew  v.  Swift  (46  N.  Y.  209),  220. 
Drexel  v.  Berney  (122  U.  S.  253),  83. 
Drinkhouse,  In  re  (24  Atl.  Rep.  1083; 

151  Pa.  St.  294),  35. 
Drown  v.  Forrest  (63  Vt.  557),  20. 
Drummond  v.  Magruder  (9  Cranch, 

122),  *48. 
Drumright  v.  State  (29  Ga.  430),  84. 
Drury  v.    Midland   R.  R.    Co.    (127 

Mass.  571),  115. 
Dryden   v.    Stephens    (19   Mass.    1), 

238. 
Dryer  v.  Brown  (52  Hun,  391),  141. 
Dublin  v.  Chadbourne(16  Mass.  433), 

150. 
Dubois  v.  Baker  (30  N.  Y.  355),  140, 

141. 
Dubois  v.  Mason  (127  Mass.  37),  231. 
Dubois  v.  Perkins  (21  Oreg.  189 ;  27 

Pac.  Rep.  1044),  50. 
Ducan  v.  Beard  (2  N.  &  McC,  S.  C, 

400),  137. 
Duchess  of  Kingston's  Case  (11  Harg. 

St.  Tr.  243),  178. 
Ducker  v.  Whitson  (112  N.  C.  44;  16 

S.  E.  Rep.  854),  309,  333. 
Dudley  v.  McCluer  (65  Mo.  241),  10. 
Dudley  v.  McCord  (65  Iowa,  671 ;  22 

N.  W.  Rep.  920),  353,  355. 
Dudley  v.  Maley  (43  Fed.  Rep.  407), 

153. 
Dudley  v.  Vose  (114  Mass.  34),  217. 


lxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


■Duff  v.  Duff  (71   Cal, 

Rep.  570),  75. 
Duffield  v.  Hue  (129  Pa.  St.  94),  206. 
Dugan  v.  Mahoney  (11  Allen,  Mass., 

572),  337. 
Dugger  v.  McKesson  (100  N.  C.  1 ;  6 

S.  E.  Rep.  746),  115. 
Dugger  v.  Taylor  (46  Ala.  320),  205. 
Duke  of  Buccleugh  v.  Board  (L.  R. 

5  H.  L.  Cas.  418;  8  Moak's  Eng. 

448),  314. 
Duke  of  New  Castle  v.  Braxtowe  (4 

B.  &  Ad.  273),  116. 
Dulaney  v.  St.   Louis  S.  R.   Co.  (42 

Mo.  App.  65),  9,  11. 
Dulaney  v.  Walshe  (3  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

174;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  131),  37. 
Dulin  v.  Prince  (29  111.   App.   209), 

154. 
Dumas  v.  State  (62  Ga.  58),  101. 
Dunagan  v.  Dunagan  (38  Ga.   554), 

211. 
Dunbar  v.   Marden  (13  N-.  H.  311), 

138. 
Dunbar  v.  McGill  (69  Mich.  297;  37 

N.  W.  Rep.  285),  354. 
Duncan  v.  Beard  (2  Nott  &  McCord, 

S.  C,  400),  106. 
Duncan  v.  Duncan  (2  Yeates,  Pa., 

302),  221. 
Duncan  v.  Hughes  (1  McCord,  239, 

240),  138. 
Duncan  v.  State  (88  Ala.  31),  232. 
Duncan  v.  State  (10  S.  Rep.  815 ;  29 

Fla.  439),  370. 
Dundas  v.  Hitchcock (12  How.,  U.  S., 

256),  136. 
Dunham  v.  Carson  (37  S.  C.  269 ;  15 

S.  E.  Rep.  960),  152. 
Dunham  v.  Gannett  (124  Mass.  151), 

220. 
Dunklec  v.  Goodenough  (65  Vt.  257), 

60. 
Dunlap  v.  Hearn  (37  Miss.  471,  474), 

106. 
Dunlap  v.  Walls  (6  N.  H.  450),  148. 
Dunlop  v.  Dunlop  (94  Mich.  11),  308. 
Dunn  v.  Amos  (14  Wis.  106),  208. 


References  are  to  sections. 
513;  12  Pac 


Dunn  v.  Lewis  (05  Hun,  020),  282. 
Dunn  v.  Packwood(ll  Jur.  242),  312. 
Dunn  v.  People  (109  III.  635),  230. 
Dunn  v.  People  (29  N.  Y.   529),  350, 

375. 
Dunn  v.  Pipes  (20  La.    Ann.    276), 

211. 
Dunn  v.  Whitney  (10  Me.  9),  60. 
Dunnenbaum  v.    Schram    (59  Tex. 

281),  358. 
Dunns  v.  Rogers  (43  111.  260),  150a. 
Dunraven  v.  Llewellyn  (15  Q.  B.  791 ; 

15  Ad.  &E1.  791),  115. 
Dunston  v.  Higgins  (63  Hun,  631), 

158. 
Dunton  v.   Keel  (Ala.,    1892,    10  S. 

Rep.  333),  234. 
Duntzy  v.  Van  Buren  (5  Hun,  648), 

194. 
Dupeyster  v.  Gagoni  (84  Ky.  403 ;  1 

S.  W.  Rep.  652),  150. 
Dupree  v.  Dupree  (45  Ga.  415-442), 

138. 
Dupree   v.   State  (33  Ala.  380),  10, 

123. 
Dupree  v.  Woodruff  (Tex.,  1S92,  19 

S.  W.  Rep.  469),  83. 
Durch  v.    Chippewa  (00  Wis.    227), 

242. 
Dure  v.  Eady  (6  Dowl.  P.  Cas.  615), 

358. 
Durfee  v.  Abbott  (61  Mich.  471),  144. 
Durfee  v.  Knowles  (50  Hun,  601 ;  2 

N.  Y.  S.  466),  353. 
Durham  v.  Shannon  (116  Ind.  403; 

19  N.  E.  Rep.  190),  57. 
Durkee  v.  Cent.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (69  Cal. 

533),  57. 
Durkee  v.  Leland  (4  Vt.  612),  174. 
Durkee  v.  Railroad  Co.  (29  Vt.  127), 

33. 
Durkin  v.  Cobleigh  (156  Mass.  108; 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  474),  212. 
Durnellv.  Sowden  (5  Utah  Rep.  516; 

14  Pac.  Rep.  335),  140. 
Durrett  v.  State  (62  Ala.  434),  334. 
Dursly  v.  Fitzhardiug  (6  Ver.  257), 

303. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


lxv 


References  are  to  sections. 


Durst  v.  Masters  (L.  R.  lOProb.  Div. 

373-378),  38a. 
Dury  v.  Hervey  (126  Mass.  517),  79. 
Duryea  v.  Granger  (G6  Mich.  593 ;  33 

N.  W.  Rep.  730)  309. 
Duryea  v.  Vosburgh  (121  N.  Y.  57; 

24  N.  E.  Rep.  308),  73a. 
Dusenbury  v.  Hoadly  (63  Hun,  629; 

SON.  Y.  S.  911),  60. 
Dutch,  etc.   Co.  v.  Mooney  12   Cal. 

585),  242. 
Duttenhofer  v.  State  (34  Ohio  St.  91), 

174. 
Dutton  v.  Wordman  (9  Cush.  225), 

153. 
Duval    v.    Covenhoven    (4    Wend., 

N.  Y,  561),  77. 
Dwelly,  In  re  (46  Me.  477,  480),  166. 
Dwiggins  v.  Cook  (71  Tnd.  579),  150a. 
Dwinell  v.  Pottle  (3  Me.  167),  60. 
Dwinelle  v.  Rowland    (1   Abb.  Pr., 

N.  Y,  87),  359.. 
Dwinnell  v.  Larrabee  (33  Me.  464), 

126. 
Dworak  v.  More  (41  N.  W.  Rep.  777 ; 

25  Neb.  735,  741),  148. 

Dwyer  v.  Bassett  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

513),  9,  57,  120. 
Dwyer  v.  Brenham(65  Tex.  526),  242. 
Dwyer  v.    Dunbar  (5  Wall.,  U.    S., 

318),  32.     * 
Dwyer  v.  Rippetoe  (72  Tex.  520),  124, 

366. 
Dye  v.  Young  (55  Iowa,  433),  67. 
Dyer  v.  Dyer  (87  Ind.  13),  222. 
Dyer  v.  Fredericks  (63  Me.  173),  30. 
Dyer  v.  Irving  (2  Dem.  160),  129. 
Dyer  v.  Last  (51  111.  179),  244. 
Dyer  v.  Smith  (12  Conn.  384),  143. 
Dyson  v.  Wood  (3  B.  &  C.  449,  451), 

147. 

E. 

Eager  v.  Crawford  (76  N.  Y.  97),  210. 
Eagle  v.  Emmett  (4  Bradf.,  N.  Y, 

117),  233. 
Eakins  v.  Eakins  (Ky.,  1S93,  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  285),  231. 


Eakle  v.  Clark  (30  Md.  322),  67. 
Eames  v.  Eames  (41  N.  II.  176),  231. 
Earl  v.  Camp  (16  Wend.,  N.  Y,  562), 

150a. 
Earl  v.  People  (73  111.  329)),  324. 
Earl  v.  Tupper  (45  Vt.  275),  52. 
Earl  Spencer  v.   Peek  (L.  R.  3  Eq. 

415),  363. 
Earl  of  Suffolk  v.  Green  (1  Atk.  450), 

363. 
Early  v.  Com.  (86  Va.  921;  11  S.  E. 

Rep.  795),  95. 
Early  v.    Lake  Shore,  etc.   Co.   (30 

Atn.  &  Eng.  R.  Cas.  163),  8. 
Early  v.  State  (9  Tex.  App.  476),  141. 
Easley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (113 

Mo.  236;  20  S.  W.  Rep.  107),  375. 
Eason  v.   Chapman  (21  111.  35),  349, 

350. 
Eastern  Lum.  Co.  v.  Gill  (9  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  R.  630),  347. 
Eastern  Trans.  Co.  v.  Hope  (95  U.  S. 

297),  198. 
Eastman  v.   Crosby  (90  Mass.  206), 

242. 
Eastman  v.  Martin  (19  N.  H.  152), 

53. 
East  Tenn.  etc.   Co.   v.  Davis  (8  S. 

Rep.  349;  91  Ala.  615),  36. 
East  Tenn.  etc.    Co.    v.    Fleetwood 

(Ga.,   1893,  15  S.   E.  Rep.   778), 

252. 
East  Tenn.  etc.   Co.  v.  Hesters  (90 

Ga.  11;  15  S.  E.  Rep.   828),  374. 
East  Tenn.   etc.   Co.  v.  Markins  (13 

S.  E.  Rep.  855;  S8  Ga.  60),  11. 
East  Tenn.   etc.    Co.    v.    Turvaville 

(Ala.,  1893,  12  S.   Rep.   63),  369, 

370. 
East  Tenn.  etc.   Co.    v.   Watson  (90 

Ala.  41 ;  7  S.  Rep.  813),  188. 
East  Tenn.  etc.   Co.   v.   Wright  (76 

Ga.  532),  198. 
East  Tenn.   Iron   Co.   v.   Gaskell  (3 

Lea,  742),  238.    . 
East  Tenn.,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Arnold 

(89  Tenn.    107;    14  S.    W.   Rep. 

439),  362. 


lxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


East  Term.,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Maloy 

(77  Ga.  237),  50,  73a. 
Eaton  v.  Alger  (47  N.  Y.  451),  247. 
Eaton  v.  Avery  (83  N.  Y.  31),  242. 
Eaton  v.  Badger  (33  N.  H.  228),  232. 
Eaton  v.  Cook  (25  N.  J.  Eq.  55),  265. 
Eaton  v.  Tallmadge    (24  Wis.    217), 

53. 
Eaton  v.  Telegraph  Co.  (68   Me.  63), 

76,  82,  83. 
Ebersole  v.  Rankin  (102  Mo.  488;  15 

S.  W.  Rep.  422),  130. 
Ebert  v.  Ebert  (5  Md.  353),  234. 
Eborn  v.  Zimpleman   (47  Tex.  519), 

38a. 
Ecker   v.  Bank  (64  Md.  292 ;  1  Atl. 

Rep.  849),  237. 
Eckert  v.  Rule  (51  Kan.  703;  32  Pac. 

Rep.  657),  380. 
Eckert  v.  Triplett  (48  Ind.  174),  66. 
Eckford  v.  Eckford  (Iowa,  1893,  53 

N.  W.  Rep.  345),  222. 
Eckles  v.  Bate3  (26  Ala.  655),  192. 
Eckstein,  In  re  (24  Atl.  Rep.  63;  3 

W.  N.  C.  59 ;  10   Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 

41),  354a. 
Eddy  v.  Lowry  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  1076),  336. 
Eddy  v.  McCall  (71  Mich.  497;  39  N. 

W.  Rep.  734),  50. 
Eddy  v.  Newton   (Tex.,    1893,  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  533),  376. 
Ede  v.  Johnson  (15  Cal.  53),  240. 
Edelin  v.  Sanders  (8  Md.  118),  141. 
Edgar  v.   Ricbardson   (33   Obio  St. 

581),  38. 
Edgerly  v.  Emerson  (23  N.  H.  555), 

211. 
Edie  v.  E.  I.  Co.  (2  Burr.  1226),  242. 
Edington  v.    Mut.    L.    Ins.   Co.    (67 

N.  Y.  186),  178. 
Edison   Elec.  Co.  v.    United   States 

Elec.  Co.  (44  Fed.  Rep.  294),  173. 
Edmansen  v.  Andrews  (35  111.  App. 

223),  8. 
Edmonston  v.   Henry  (45  Mo.  App. 

346),  140. 
Edso  v.  Munsell  (10  Allen,  557),  229. 


Edwards  v.  Crenshaw  (30  Mo.  App. 

510),  347. 
Edwards    v.  Ford  (2  Bailey,    S.  C, 

461),  80. 
Edwards  v.   Osmond  (84  Tex.  656; 

19  S.  W.  Rep.  868),  31. 
Edwards  v.  State  (21  Ark.  512),  234. 
Edwards  v.  Sullivan  (8  Ired.,  N.  C.f 

302),  354&. 
Edwards  v.  Tracy  (62  Pa.  St.  374), 

38,  69. 
Edwards  v.  Tyler  (141  111.  454;  31  N. 

E.  Rep.  312),  71. 
Edwards  v.  Wall  (79  Va.  321),  223. 
Edwards    v.    Watertown    (59   Hun, 

620 ;  13  N.  Y.  S.  309),  56. 
Egan  v.   Murray  (80  Iowa,  180;  45 

N.  W.  Rep.  563),  139. 
Egery  v.  Buchanan  (5  Cal.  56),  150a. 
Eggers  v.  Eggers  (57  Ind.  461),  190. 
Egler  v.  People  (56  N.  Y.  642),  192. 
Egleton  v.   Gutteridge  (11  M.  &  W. 

468),  128. 
Egleton  v.  Knickerbocker  (6  Barb., 

N.  Y,  458),  211. 
Eble's  Will,  In  re  (41  N.  W.  Rep.  627 ; 

73  Wis.  445),  233. 
Ehrisman  v.  Scott  (5  Ind.  App.  596; 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  867),  339. 
Eichelberger  v.  Sifford  (27  Md.  320), 

131,  134. 
Eichenlaub  v.   St.   Joseph  (21  S.  W. 

Rep.  8;- 113  Mo.  395),  143. 
Eidam  v.  Finnegan  (48  Minn.  53 ;  50 

N.  W.  Rep.  933),  371. 
Eidt  v.  Cutter  (127  Mass.  523),  201. 
Eiland  v.  State  (52  Ala.  322),  93,  102. 
Eisenlord  v.  Clum  (67  Hun,  518;  22 

N.  Y.  S.  574),  11. 
Eisenlord  v.  Clum  (126  N.  Y.  552;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  1024).  53. 
Eisenlord  v.  Eisenlord  (2  N.    Y.  S. 

123),  309. 
Eisfield  v.  Dill  (71  Iowa,  442),  141. 
Ekinton  v.  Brick  (44  N.  J.  Eq.  154), 

197. 
Elberfeldt   v.   Waite  (79  Wis.    284), 

124. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


lxvii 


Heferences  are  to  sections. 


Elberson  v.  Richards  (42  N.  J.  L.  70), 

23. 
Eld  v.  Gorham  (20  Conn.  8),  141. 
Elder  v.  Oliver  (30  Mo.   App.   575), 

354. 
Eldon  v.  Burlingame  (G2  Iowa,    32), 

143a. 
Elgin  v.  Hall  (82  Va.  680),  129. 
Elgin  v.   Welch   (23  111.   App.    185), 

124. 
Eliot  v.  Eliot  (10  Allen,  357),  138. 
Elizabethtown  v.  Lefler  (23  111.  90), 

143a. 
Elizando  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep, 

237),  323. 
Elkhart  v.  Whitman  (122  Ind.   538), 

341. 
Ellen  v.  Lewison  (88  Cal.    253;  26 

Pac.  Rep.  109),  7. 
Ellerman  v.  Stockyards  (49  N.  J.  Eq. 

217;  23  Atl.  Rep.  257),  250. 
Ellice  v.  Roupell  (32  Beav.  299),  363. 
Elling  v.  Thextcn   (7  Mont.   330;   16 

Pac.  Rep.  931),  239. 
Ellingwood  v.  Bragg  (52  N.  H.  488), 

141. 
Elliot  v.  McClelland   (71    Ala.    206), 

143. 
Elliott  v.  Pearl  (10  Pet.  412),  114. 
Elliott  v.   Pearsoll  (1  Pet.  328),    53, 

136. 
Elliott  v.  State  (34  Neb.  48 ;  51  N.  W. 

Rep.  315),  316. 
Elliott  v.  Van  Buren  (33  Mich.  49), 

188,  194. 
Elliott  v.    Wanamaker  (155  Pa.    St. 

67;  25  Atl.  Rep  826),  11. 
Ellis  v.   Bank  (7    How.  U.  S.,  294), 

214. 
Ellis  v.  Bristol  (1  Gray.   Mass.,  370), 

140. 
Ellis  v.  Burrel  (60  Me.  209),  6. 
Ellis  v.  Dempsey  (4  W.  Va.  126),  69. 
Ellis  v.  Eastman  (32  Cal.  447),  212. 
Ellis  v.  Ellis  (33  Mass.  469),  222. 
Ellis  v.  Houston  (L.  R.  10  Ch.    Div. 

236),  222. 
Ellis  v.  Park  (8  Tex.  205),  233,  239. 


Ellis  v.  Reddin  (12  Kan.  306),  210. 
Ellis  v.  Rompell  (32  Beav.  299),  363. 
Ellis  v.  State  (65  Miss.  44),  89. 
Ellis  v.  State  (25  Fla.  702 ;  6  S.  Rep. 

768),  337. 
Ellis  v.  State  (Tex.,   1893,  24  S.   W. 

Rep.  894),  114,  197. 
Ellis  v.  Stewart  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  585),  308. 
Ellis  v.  Ward  (137  111.  509),  380. 
Ellison  v.  Wilson  (36  Vt.  67),  134. 
Ellmaker  v.  Ellmaker  (4  Watts,  Pa., 

89,  221. 
Ellsworth    v.    Insurance    Co.     (105 

N.  Y.  624),  30. 
Ellsworth   v.  Nelson  (81  Iowa,  57), 

239. 
Elrnborg  v.  St.  Paul  C.  R.  Co.  (51 

Minn.  70;   52   N.  W.  Rep.   639), 

378. 
Elmendorf    v.    Taylor    (10    Wheat. 

152),  242. 
Elmer   v.  Marsh   (3  Ind.  App.  558), 

366. 
Elmer  v.  Mut.  Ben.  L.  Ass'n  (19  N. 

Y.  S:  289),  250. 
Elmore  v.   State  (Ala.,   1893;  13  S. 

Rep.  427),  80. 
Elrod  v.   Alexander  (4   Heisk.  342), 

237. 
Elsas  v.  Second  Av.  R.  R.  Co.  (9  N. 

Y.  S.  210;  56  Hun,  161),  192. 
Elting  v.    Dayton  (63  Hun,  629;  17 

N.  Y.  S.  849),  18. 
Elting  v.  Scott  (2  Johns.,  N.  Y.,  157), 

176. 
Elting  v.  United  States  (27  Ct.  CI. 

158),  288. 
Elwood  v.  Deifendorf  (5  Barb.  498), 

67,  76. 
Elyton  L.  Co.  v.  McElrath  (53  Fed. 

Rep.  763),  231. 
Emeri'c  v.  Alvaredo  (61  Cal.  529),  234. 
Emanual  v.  Gates  (53  Fed.  Rep.  772), 

142. 
Emerson  v.  Fisk  (6  Greenl.  200),  126. 
Emerson  v.    Lowell    G.    L.    Co.   (6 

Allen,  148),  208. 


fxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Emerson  v.  Mills  (83  Tex.  385),  226. 
Emery  v.  Bos.   Marine  Ins.  Co.  (138 

Mass.  398),  216. 
Emery  v.  Fowler  (39  Me.   326),  124, 

151. 
Emley  v.  Drum  (36  Pa.  St.  123),  150a. 
Emmons  v.  Oldham  (12  Tex.  18),  218. 
Empire   Manuf.    Co.    v.    Stuart  (46 

Mich.  482),  139,  139a. 
Empire  Pass.  Ry.  Co.,  Appeal  of  (19 

Atl.  Rep.  629 ;  26  W.  N.  C.  26), 

140. 
Enders  v.  McDonald  (5   Ind.    App. 

297;  31  N.  E.  Rep.  1056),  233. 
Engle  v.  Smith  (82  Mich.  1 ;  46  N.  W. 

Rep.  21),  8. 
Engles  v.  Bruington  (4  Yeates,  Pa. , 

345),  131. 
English  v.  Sprague  (33  Me.  440),  147. 
Engraving  Co.  v.  Hoke  (30  Fed.  Rep. 

444),  241. 
Ennis  v.  Smith  (14  How.,  U.  S.,  400). 

143,  242. 
Ennor  v.  Hodson  (28  111.  App.  445), 

139. 
Ennor  v.  Thompson  (46  111.  215),  136. 
Enos  v.  Garrett  (2  Pa.  Dis.  Co.  R.  86), 

332. 
Enos  v.  St.   Paul  Fire  &  Mar.   Ins. 

Co.  (S.  D.,  1894,  57  N.  W.   Rep. 

919),  192,  199,  226. 
Ensign  v.  McKinney  (30  Hun,  N.  Y., 

249),  108. 
Eppert  v.    Hall   (133   Ind.    417;    31 

N.  E.  Rep.  74),  350. 
Epping  v.  Mockler  (55  Ga.  376),  205. 
Epps  v.  State  (102  Ind.  539),  188,  190. 
Epps  v.  State  (19  Ga.  102),  343. 
Equator  M.  &  S.  Co.  v.  Gunella  (18 

Colo.  548 ;  33  Pac.  Rep.  613),  200, 

209. 
Equitable  M.   Co.    v.    Kempner  (84 

Tex.  102),  136. 
Equitable   Mut.  Life  Ace.  Ass'n  v. 

McCluskey  (1  Colo.  App.  473,  29 

Pac.  Rep.  383),  52. 
Ericksen  v.  Schuster  (44  Minn.  441), 

20. 


Erickson  v.  Brant  (Minn.,   1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  62),  208. 
Erickson  v.    Draskowski  (94  Mich. 

551),  199. 
Erie  &  Pac.  Des.  v.  Stanley  (123  111. 

158;  14  N.  E.  Rep.  212),  144. 
Ervin  v.  Bevil  (80  Tex.  332),  362. 
Ervin  v.  Ervin  (18  Civ.  Pro.  Rep.  11), 

309. 
Erwin  v.  English  (61  Conn.  502 ;  23 

Atl.  Rep.  753),  58. 
Eskridge  v.  Railroad  Co.  (89  Ky.  367 ; 

12  S.  W.  Rep.  580),  186. 
Eskridge  v.  State  (25  Ala.  30),  91. 
Espey  v.  Comer  (76  Ala.  501),  69. 
Estes  v.  Fry  (94  Mo.  266),  214. 
Estill  v.  Taul  (2  Yerger,  467,  470), 

152. 
Estman  v.  St.  Anthony,  etc.  Co.  (43 

Minn.   60;  44  N.  W.  Rep.   882), 

217. 
Ethredge  v.  Hobbs  (77  Ga.  251),  330. 
Etowah  G.   M.   Co.  v.    Exter    (Ga., 

1893,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  991),  377. 
Euless  v.  McAdams  (108  N.  C.  507), 

222. 
Eureka  Ins.  Co.  v.  Robinson  (56  Pa. 

St.  256),  50. 
Eureka  Vinegar  Co.  v.  Gazette  (35 

Fed.  Rep.  570),  237,  244. 
Evans  v.  Eaton  (7  Wheat.  356),  303. 
Evans  v.  Evans  (155  Pa.  St.  572;  20 

Atl.  Rep.  755),  71. 
Evans  v.  Getting  (6  C.  &  P.  586),  145. 
Evans  v.  Grissom  (40  N.  J.  L.  549), 

222. 
Evans  v.  Hettich  (7  Wheat.  453),  303, 

317. 
Evans  v.  Montgomery  (Mich.,  1893, 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  362),  79. 
Evans  v.  Phelps  (12  Mich.  27),  194. 
Evans  v.  Railroad  Co.  (5  Phila.  Rep. 

512),  242. 
Evans  v.   Rees  (12  Ad.  &  El.   55), 

280. 
Evans  v.  Roberts  (5  B.  &  C.  836),  262. 
Evans  v.  State  (Ark.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  1026),  57,  101. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


lxix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Evanston  v.   Gunn  (99  U.  S.   GCO), 

III. 
Evansville,    etc.    Co.  v.  Fettig   (130 

Intl.  61),  188. 
Evansville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Maddox  (Ind., 

1893,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  511),  232. 
Evansville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Weikle  (Ind., 

1893,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  639),  380. 
Evarts  v.  United  States  M.  Ace.  Ins. 

Co.  (61  Hun,  624),  24. 
Everett  v.  Lowdhaui  (5  C.  &  P.  91), 

330. 
Everett  v.    State  (62  Ga.  65),  52. 
Everett  v.  State   (18   Tex.  App.  682; 

18  S.  W.  Rep.  674),  174. 
Everett  v.  Tidball  (34  Neb.  803),  361. 
Eversole  v.  Rankin  (102  Mo.  488),  31. 
Everson   v.  Mayhew  (85   Cal.  1 ;  21 

Pac.  Rep.  431),  31. 
Ewing  v.  Bailey  (36  111.  App.    191), 

316. 
Ewing  v.  Gay  (12  Ind.  64),  70. 
Ewing  v.  Smith  (132  Ind.  205),  208. 
Ewing  v.  State  (16  S.  W.  Rep.  872), 

58. 
Ewing  v.  Wilson  (132   Ind.   223;  31 

N.  E.  Rep.  64),  132. 
Express  Co.  v.  Aldine  Press  (126  Pa. 

St.  347),  129. 
Eysamen,  In  re  (113  N.  Y.  62),  309, 

367. 
Eyster  v.  Hathaway  (50  111.  522),  137. 

F. 

Fabyan  v.  Russell  (38  N.  H.  84),  244. 
Fain  v.  Cornett  (25  Ga.  1S8),  374. 
Fairbanks  v.  Erwin  (15  Colo.  366), 

247. 
Fairbury  v.  Rodgers  (98  111.  554),  198. 
Falk  v.  Gast  Lith.  Co.  (54  Fed.  Rep. 

890),  62. 
Fairchild   v.  Basconib  (35  Vt.    308, 

415),  188,  197. 
Faircbild  v.  Dennison  (4  Watts,  278), 

60. 
Fairfax  F.  M.  Co.  v.  Cbambers  (Md., 

1893,  23  Atl.  Rep.  1024),  19. 


Fairly  v.  Fairly  (38  Miss.  280),  105. 
Faivre  v.  Daley  (93  Cal.  663),  8. 
Fall  v.  Glover  (34  Neb.  522 ;  52  N.  W. 

Rep.  168),  208. 
Fall  v.  Roper  (3   Head,    Tenn.,  285), 

130. 
Fallin  v.  State  (83  Ala.  5),  350. 
Falls  Land  Co.  v.  Chisolm   (71  Tex. 

523;  9S.  W.  Rep.  479),  141. 
Fallman   v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.  (45  Fed. 

Rep.  156),  150a. 
Falvey  v.  Richmond  (87  Ga.  99),  343. 
Falvey  v.  Jackson  (132  Ind.  176),  368. 
Fant  v.  Sprig  (50  Md.  551),  207. 
Farkas  v.  State  (60  Miss.  847),  123. 
Farley  v.  Deslonde  (69  Tex.  458),  217. 
Farmer  v.  Grove   (24  Cal.  169),  223. 
Farmers'  Ins.   Co.  v.   Insurance  Co. 

(40  Minn.  152),  311. 
Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bair 

(87  Pa.  St.  124),  334. 
Farncombv.  Stern  (18  Colo.  279;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  612),  13. 
Farnswith   v.  Brigg  (6  N.  H.  561), 

150. 
Farrar  v.  Bolles  (55  Tex.  193),  244. 
Farrar  v.  Farrar  (4  N.  H.  191),  265. 
Farrar  v.  Stackpole  (6   Greenl.  154), 

216. 
Fairell  v.  Bean  (10  Md.  217),  208. 
Farrell  v.  Ladweli  (21  Wis.  182),  106. 
Farrell  v.  Weitz  (Mass.,  1S94,  35  N. 

E.  Rep.  783),  79. 
Farrington  v.  Hayes  (65  Vt.  153;  25 

Atl.  Rep.  1091),  58. 
Farris  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1890,   1   S.  W. 

Rep.  729),  231. 
Fathere  v.  Lawrence  (33  Miss.  622), 

138. 
Faulkner  v.  Faulkner  (84  Ga.   73), 

190. 
Faulkner  v.  Territory  (N.  M.,  1S93, 

30  Pac.  Rep.  96),  6,  38,  249. 
Faulkner  v.  Williman  (Ky.,  1891,  16 

S.  W.  Rep.  352),  232. 
Faw  v.  Meals  (65  Ga.  711),  73a. 
Fawcett  v.  Linthecum   (7  Ohio  Cir. 

Ct.  Rep.  141),  280. 


Ixx 


TABLE  OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Faxon   v.    Folvey  (110    Mass.    392), 

246. 
Faxon  v.  Hollis  (13  Mass.  427),  60. 
Fay  v.  Harlan  (12S  Mass.  244),  52. 
Fay  v.  Swan  (44  Mich.  544),  192. 
Fearn  v.  West  Jersey  Ferry  (143  Pa. 

St.  122),  363. 
Feather  v.  Reading  (155  Pa.  St.  187), 

341. 
Fechheimer  v.  Trounstine  (13  Colo. 

386),  208. 
Fee  v.  Taylor  (83  Ky.  264),  9,  140. 
Feeley  v.  Steinmetz  (22  Pa.  St.  437), 

355. 
Feeney  v.  L.  I.  R.  R.  Co.  (116  N.  Y. 

380),  178. 
Felder  v.  State  (5  S.  W.  Rep.  145;  23 

Tex.  App.  477),  80,  102. 
Fell  v.  Young  (63  111.  106),  107. 
Fellows  v.   Menasha  (11  Wis.  558), 

242. 
Fellows  v.  Smith  (130  Mass.  78),  66, 

115. 
Fellows  v.  Williamson  (1  M.  &  M. 

306),  56,  69. 
Felsenthal   v.  State   (30  Tex.    App. 

075),  10. 
Felter  v.    Mulliner  (2  Johns.    181), 

146. 
Felts  v.  Clapper  (69  Hun,  373),  249. 
Fenlon  v.  Dempsey  (50  Hun,  131 ;  21 

Ahb.  N.  C.  291),  231,  288,  332. 
Fenner  v.  London  &  S.   E.  Ry.  Co. 

(L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  767),  168. 
Fennimore  v.  Childs  (1  Halst,  N.  J., 

386),  79. 
Fenton  v.  Miller  (94  Mich.  204),  134. 
Fenton  v.  State  (100  Ind.  90),  241. 
Fenwick   v.    Bell  (1    C.   &  K.  312), 

198. 
Fenwick  v.  Ratcliffe  (6  T.  B.  Mom, 

Ky.,  154),  208. 
Ferbrach  v.  Martin  (Idaho,  1893,  32 

Pac.  Rep.  252),  51. 
Ferdinand    v.    State   (39  Ala.    706), 

238. 
Ferguson    v.    Harwood   (7    Cranch, 

408),  18,  148. 


Ferguson  v.  Hubbell  (97  N.  Y.  507), 

199. 
Ferguson  v.    McBean   (91    Cal.    63), 

174. 
Ferguson  v.  Wright  (N.  C,  1894,  18 

S.  E.  Rep.  691),  114. 
Ferrari  v.  Murray  (152  Mass.  496),  7. 
Ferrers  v.  Shirley  (Fitzgibbon,  195), 

139. 
Ferris  v.  Hard  (135  N.   Y.  354),  76, 

208. 
Ferry  v.  Sampson  (112  N.  Y.   415), 

232. 
Fesenmyer  v.  Adcock  (16  M.  &  W„ 

449),  218. 
Fesler  v.  Simpson  (58  Ind.  83),  210. 
Fetrill  v.  Fetrill   (5   Jones'   Eq.   61), 

208. 
Fiedler   v.    Stone  (6    Cush.,    Mass., 

340),  21. 
Field  v.  Com.  (Va.,   1893,   16  S.   E. 

Rep.  835),  376. 
Field  v.  Holland  (6  Cranch,  8),  76. 
Field  v.  Munson  (47  N.  Y.  221),  371. 
Field  v.  United  States  (9  Pet.,  U.  S., 

183),  150a. 
Fields  v.  State  (32  N.  E.  Rep.  780), 

10. 
Fife  v.  Com.  (29  Pa.  St.  429),  3,  89. 
Fifield   v.    Richardson  (34  Vt.  410), 

57. 
File  v.  Springel  (132  Ind.  312),  33. 
Filer  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (49  N.  Y. 

42),  193. 
Filer,  etc.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (63  Wis. 

118),  358. 
Filley  v.  Angell  (102  Mass.  167),  50. 
Finch   v.   Galligher    (25  Abb.  N.  C. 

404),  285. 
Finch  v.  Gridley's  Ex'rs  (25  Wend., 

N.  Y.,469),  139. 
Finelite   v.    Finelite    (68    Hun,   82), 

376. 
Fink  v.  Hey  (42  Mo.  App.  295),  308. 
Finley  v.  Bogan  (20  La.  Ann.  443), 

207. 
Finley  v.  St.  Louis  Ref.  Co.  (99  Mo. 

559),  10. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


lxxi 


References  are  to  sections. 


Finn  v.  Frink  (84  Me.  201),  51. 
Finn's  Case  (5  Rand.,  Va.,  701),  121. 
Finnegan  v.  Dugan  (14  Allen,  197), 

345. 
Finnegan  v.  Fall  River  Gas  Works 

(Mass..  lt>93,  34  N.  E.  Rep.  523), 

193. 
Finney  v.  Callender  (8  Minn.  41),  145. 
Finney  v.  State  (15  S.  W.  Rep.  175; 

29  Tex.  App.  1S4),  23. 
Fire  Ass'n  v.  Fleming  (78  Ga.  733; 

3  S.  E.  Rep.  420),  157. 
Fire  Ass'n  v.  Wickham  (141  U.  S. 

564),  209. 
■First  Church  v.  Holyoke  M.  Ins.  Co. 

(33  N.    E.    Rep.  572;  158  Mass. 

475),  310. 
First  Nat.   Bank  v.  Burkhardt  (100 

U.  S.  692),  216. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Carson  (60  Mich. 

82),  128. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Clark  (134  N.  Y. 

368),  374. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cornell  (41  Ohio 

St.  401),  310. 
First  Nat.   Bank  v.  Cunningham  (48 

Fed.  Rep.  515),  159. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Doty  (12  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  R.  287),  285. 
First  Nat.  Bank   v.  Forest  (44  Fed. 

Rep.  246),  363. 
First   Nat.    Bank    v.    Lowrey  (Neh., 

1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  568),  247. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  McConnell  (17  N. 

Y.  S.  422),  241. 
First  Nat.   Bank  v.  North  (S.  D.,  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  96),  362. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  William  Ruehl 

Co.  (33  111.  App.  121),  378. 
Fischer  v.    Insurance  Co.  (35  Fed. 

Rep.  544),  322. 
Fischer  v.  King  (53  Pa.  St.  3),  128. 
Fish  v.  Farvvell  (33  111.    App.  242), 

276. 
Fisher  v.  Fisher  (131  Ind.  462),  124. 
Fisher  v.  Fisher  (129  N.  Y.  654),  178. 
Fisher  v.  Porch  (10  N.  J.   Eq.  243), 

304. 


Fisher  v.  Railroad  Co.  (22  Oreg.  533), 

186. 
Fisher  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  502), 

249. 
Fisher  v.  Tucker  (1  McCord,  175),  69. 
Fisher's  Appeal  (132   Pa.    St.    488), 

223. 
Fist  v.  Fist  (3  Colo.  App.  273;  32Pac. 

Rep.  719),  378. 
Fitch  v.  Bogue  (19  Conn.  285),  130. 
Fitch  v.  KennarJ  (19  N.  Y.  S.  468), 

350. 
Fitch  v.  Pinckard  (5  111.  78),  143a. 
Fite   v.   Black  (Ga.,    1893,   17  S.  E. 

Rep.  349),  76. 
Fitler  v.    Shotwell  (7  W.  &  S.  14), 

144. 
Fitzgerald  v.  Brandt  (36  Neb.   683; 

54  N.  W.  Rep.  992),  377. 
Fitzgerald  v.   Hart  (17  S.  W.  Rep. 

369),  11. 
Fitzgerald    v.   Williams  (148  Mass. 

462),  50. 
Fitzgibbons  v.  Brown  (43  Me.  169), 

10. 
Fitzsimons  v.  Johnson  (90  Tenn.  416), 

159. 
Fitzwater  Peerage  Case  (10  CI.   & 

Fin.  193),  139. 
Flack  v.  Andrews  (86  Ala.  395),  146. 
Flagg  v.  Mason  (141  Mass.  64),  220. 
Flagg  v.  People  (40  Mich.  706),  95. 
Flagler  v.  Wheeler  (40  Hun,  125),  70. 
Flanagan  v.   People  (52  N.  Y.  467). 

231. 
Flanagin  v.  Champion  (1  Green  Ch., 

N.  J.,  51),  68. 
Flanders  v.  Fay  (40  Vt.  316),  214. 
Flanigan  v.  Phelps  (42  Minn.   186), 

128. 
Flannigan  v.  Neal  (67  Tex.  629),  150a. 
Flato  v.  Mulhall  (72  Mo.  522),  230, 

231. 
Fleischner  v.  Kubli  (20  Oreg.  323),  79. 
Fleming  v.  Latham  (48  Kan.  773),  13, 

36. 
Fleming  v.   McClure  (1  Brev.  428), 

242. 


Ixxii 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Fleming  v.  Richardson  (13  La.  Ann. 

414),  136. 
Fleming  v.   Shepherd  (83  Ga.   338), 

368. 
Fleming  v.  Stearns  (Iowa,  1890,  44 

N.  W.  Rep.  376),  68. 
Fletcher  v.  Braddyle  (3  Stark.   64), 

230. 
Fletcher  v.  Fuller  (120  U.  S.  534,  551, 

552),  226. 
Fletcher  v.  Memsur  (5  Ind.  267),  128. 
Fletcher  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,  17  S.  E. 

Rep.  100),  6. 
Flinn  v.  McGonnigle  (9  W.  &  S.,  Pa., 

75),  130. 
Flint  v.  Clinton  (12  N.  H.  430),  131. 
Flint  v.  Kennedy  (33  Fed.  Rep.  820), 

337. 
Flint  v.  Sheldon  (13  Mass.  443),  223. 
Flint's  Estate,  In  re  (Cal.,  1893,  34 

Pac.  Rep.  863),  178. 
Flood  v.  Mitchell  (68  N.  Y.  507),  337. 
Flora  v.  Lee  (5  111.   App.  629),  143a. 
Flower  v.  State  (39  Ark.  209),  250. 
Floyd  v.  Hamilton  (33  Ala.  235),  74. 
Floyd  v.  Ricks   (14   Ark.    286),  142, 

237. 
Fluharty  v.  Beatty  (22  W.  Va.  698), 

77. 
Flynn  v.    Coffee  (12   Allen,    Mass., 

133),  232. 
Flynt  v.  Bodenhamer  (80  N.  C.  205), 

142. 
Fogal  v.  Page  (59  Hun,  625),  309. 
Fogal  v.  Perio  (10  Bosw.,  N.  Y.,  100), 

107. 
Fogg  v.  Child  (13  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  246), 

73a. 
Fogg  v.  Dennis (3  Humph.,  Tenn.,  47), 

131-139a. 
Folger  v.  Mitchell   (3   Pick.,  Mass., 

396).  262. 
Folk  v.  Vara  (9  Rich.  Eq.  303),  226. 
Follansbee  v.  Walker  (72  Pa.  St.  230), 

312. 
Follett  v.  Jeffereyes  (1  Price,  N.  S.,  3), 

174. 
Folsom  v.  Cressy  (73  Me.  270),  146. 


Folsom  v.    Freeborn  (13  R.  I.  205), 

229. 
Fonda  v.  Burton  (63  Vt.  353),  207. 
Fontaine  v.  Sav.  Inst.  (57  Mo.  552), 

226. 
Foot  v.  Beecher  (78  N.  Y.  155),  66. 
Foot  v.  Silliman  (77  Tex.  208),  130. 
Foote  v.  Bently  (44  N.  Y.  166),  30. 
Footman    v.    Prendergast   (2   Strob. 

Eq.,S.  C,  317),  166. 
Forbes  v.  Darling  (94  Mich.  621),  220. 
Forbes  v.  Howard  (4  R.  I.  364),  188, 

199. 
Forbes  v.    McHaffle  (32  Neb.    742), 

150. 
Forbes  v.  Wale  (1  W.  Bl.  532),  304. 
Forbes  v.  Willard  (37  How.  Pr.  193),. 

354a. 
Force  v.  Dutcher  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  453), 

308. 
Ford  v.  Cunningham  (87  Cal.    409), 

30,  130. 
Ford  v.  Finney  (35  Ga.  258),  262. 
Ford  v.  Ford  (7  Humph.  92),  349. 
Ford  v.  State   (Ga.,    1893,    17   S.    E. 

Rep.  687),  354. 
Fordyce  v.  McCants  (51  Ark.  509),  50. 
Fordyce  v.  Withers  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

540;  20  S.  W.  Rep.  766),  8. 
Forehand  v.  State  (51  Ark.  553;  11 

S.  W.  Rep.  766),  343. 
Forehand  v.   State  (13  S.    W.    Rep. 

728 ;  56  Ark.  46),  239. 
Foreman  v.  Weil  (Ala.,   1893,   12  S. 

Rep.  815),  83. 
Forrester   v.  Parker  (14  Daly,  208), 

134. 
Forsuith  v.  State  (21  N.  H.  424),  232. 
Forsyth  v.  Doolittle  (120  U.  S.  73), 

188. 
Fort  Smith  Oil  Co.  v.  Slover(Ark., 

1894,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  106),  57,  73a. 
Fort  Wayne  v.  Coombs  (107  Ind.  75), 

•  185. 
Forth  Worth,  etc.  Co.  v.  Greathouso 

(82  Tex.  104),  188,  198. 
Fort  Worth,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hurd  (Tex.. 

1894,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  995),  199. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


lxxiii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Fort  Worth,  etc.  Co.  v.  Thompson 

(Tex.,  1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  137], 

198. 
Fort  Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wil- 
son (24  S.   W.  Rep.  68G ;  3  Tex. 

Civ.  App.  583),  19S. 
Fort  Worth  R.   R.  Co.   v.   Bank  (84 

Tex.  369).  220. 
Foscue  v.  Lyon  (55  N.   Y.   621),  238. 
Foss  v.  Heinkel  (Cal.,  1890,  25  Pac. 

Rep.  762),  116. 
Fossack  v.  Moody  (39  111.   App.  17). 

211. 
Foster  v.  Beals  (21  N.  Y.  247),  214. 
Foster  v.  Dickinson  (64  Vt.   233 ;  24 

Atl.  Rep.  253),  98,  188,  222,  348, 

371. 
Foster  v.  Hall  (12  Pick.  89,  92),  168, 

174. 
Foster  v.  Neilson  (2  Pet.  314),  242. 
Foster  v.  Pierce  (11  Cush.  438,  439), 

354. 
Foster  v.  Shaw  (7  S.  &  R.  163),  124. 
Foster    v.   State   (Miss.,  1893,    12  S. 

Rep.  822),  344. 
Foster  v.  Thrasher  (45  Ga.  517),  69. 
Foster   v.   Worthington    (146   Mass. 

607),  350. 
Foster's  Will  (34  Mich.  237),  38a. 
Fountain  v.  Menard  (Minn.,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  601),  262. 
Fotheringham  v.  Adams  Ex.  Co.  (34 

Fed.  Rep.  646),  176. 
Foundry  v.    Hovey  (21   Pick.  453), 

288. 
Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v.  Francklyn  (120 

U.  S.  751),  242. 
Fowler  v.   Insurance  Co.   (6   Cow., 

N.  Y.,  673),  10. 
Fowler  v.  Merrill  (11  How.,  U.  S., 

375),  361. 
Fowler  v.  Parks  (48  Fed.  Rep.  789), 

241. 
Fowler  v.  Richardson  (32  111.  App. 

252),  211. 
Fowler  v.  Savage  (3  Conn.  90),  157. 
Fowler  v.   Schafer  (69  Wis.  23;  32 

N.  W.  Rep.  292),  58. 


Fowler  v.  Smith   (153  Pa.   St.  639), 

214,  309. 
Fowler  v.  Stimpson   (79   Tex.  611), 

115. 
Fowler  v.  Strawberry  Hill  (74  Iowa, 

ii  I  1  ;  38  N.  W.  Rep.  521),  342. 
Fox    v.   Baltimore   Co.    (34    W.  Ya. 

466),  35,  37. 
Fox   v.    Com.   (Ky.,    1891,    1    S.   W. 

Rep.  396),  349. 
Fox  v.  Jones  (7  B.  &  C.  732),  140. 
Fox  v.  McComb  (63  Hun,  63:3),  207. 
Fox  v.  Norton  (9  Mich.  207),  69. 
Fox  v.  Penin.  W.  L.  &  Color  Works 

(92   Mich.    243;  52   X.    W.    Rep. 

623).  194,  195,  198. 
Fox  v.  Railroad  Co.  (52  N.  W.  Rep. 

623;  92  Mich.  243),  341. 
Fox  v.  Reid  (3  Johns.  477),  138. 
Fox  v.  Spring  L.  Co.  (89  Mich.  387), 

11. 
Foxv.  Whitney  (16   Mass.  118),  311. 
Foxcroft  v.   Nevins  (4  Greenl.   72), 

73. 
Foy  v.  Blackstone  (31  111.  538),  205. 
Foye  v.  Patch  (132  Mass.  105),  139. 
Frace  v.  N.  Y.,  L.  E.  &  W.  R.  Co. 

(22  N.  Y.  S.  958),  200. 
Fraedrich   v.    Flieth  (64  Wis.   184), 

344. 
Fraley  v.  Bentley  (1  Dak.  25),  208. 
Franceston  v.  Deering  (41  N.  H.  443), 

246. 
Francis  v.  Kirkpatrick  Co.  (52  Fed. 

Rep.  824),  231. 
Francis  v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.  (6  Cowen, 

429),  143. 
Francis  v.  Roosa  (151  Mass.  532),  342. 
Francisco  v.  Benepe  (6  Mont.  243), 

373. 
Frank  v.  Reuter  (22  S.  W.  Rep.  812), 

31. 
Frank  v.  Riggs  (93  Ala.  252),  262. 
Frankfort    v.    Anderson    (3    A.    K. 

Marsh.  932),  131. 
Franklin  v.  Baker  (48  Ohio  St.  296), 

250. 
Franklin  v.  State  (69  Ga.  42),  38a. 


Ixxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Franklin  Sav.    Bank   v.   Taylor  (23 

N.  E.  Rep.  397),  151. 
Franz  Falk  Brew.  Co.  v.  Hirst  (78 

Tex.  192),  151. 
Frary  v.  Gusha  (59  Vt.  257),  222. 
Fraser  v.  Marsh  (2  Stark.  41),  73. 
Frayes  v.    Worms    (10   C.    B.    149), 

158. 
Frazer  v.  Phelps  (3  Sandf.,  N.  Y., 

741),  315. 
Frazer  v.  State  (19  S.  W.  Rep.  838; 

56  Ark.  242),  351. 
Frazier  v.  Railroad  (38  Pa.  St.  104), 

10. 
Frazier  v.  State  (56  Ark.  242),  351. 
Frear  v.  Evertsen  (20  Johns.  142),  70, 

288. 
Frederick  v.  Case  (28  111.  App.  215), 

199. 
Freel  v.  Market  St.   etc.   Co.   (Cal., 

1893,  31  Pac.  Rep.  730),  178. 
Freeland  v.  Herron  (7  Cranch,  147), 

79. 
Freeman  v.  Adderson  (119  U.  S.  187), 

157. 
Freeman  v.  Britton  (2  Harr.,  N.  J., 

191),  311. 
Freeman  v.  Fogg  (82  Mo.  408),  7. 
Freeman  v.  Grant  (132  N.  Y.  32),  24. 
Freeman  v.  Person  (106  N.   C.  251), 

135. 
Freeman  v.  Phillips  (4  M.  &  S.  486, 

497),  113,  114. 
Freeman  v.  Thayer  (33  Me.  76),  218. 
Freeman  v.  Travelers'   Ins.   Co.  (144 

Mass.   572;  12  N.   E.  Rep.  372), 

198. 
Freeport  v.  Penrod  (53  N.   W.  Rep. 

74 ;  35  Neb.  273),  355. 
Freer  v.  Williams  (7  Baxt.  550,  556), 

348. 
French  v.  McGinnis  (69  Tex.  19),  107, 

232. 
French  v.  Wade  (35  Kan.  391),  73a. 
French  v.  Ware  (Vt.,   1893,   26  Atl. 

Rep.  1096),  168. 
French  v.  Wilkinson  (93  Mich.  322 ; 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  530),  354. 


Frezinski  v.  Newborg   (43  111.  App. 

406),  186. 
Frick  v.  Mill  Co.  (Kan.,  1893,  32  Pac. 

Rep.  1103),  214. 
Frieberg  v.  Donovan  (23111.  App.  62), 

77. 
Frieden  v.  Lahens  (2  Abb.  App.  Dec. 

Ill),  362. 
Friedman  v.   Railway  Co.  (7  Phila. 

203),  102. 
Friess  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co. 

(67  Hun,  205),  354. 
Frisk  v.  Reigelman  (43  Minn.  137), 

150a. 
Fritch  v.  State  (Ga.,   1893,  16  S.   E. 

Rep.  102),  234. 
Fritz   v.    Hathaway    (19    Atl.    Rep. 

1011;  26  W.  N.  C.  273),  355. 
Fritzler  v.  Robinson  (70  Iowa,  300), 

223. 
Frizzell   v.   State  (Tex.,  1891,  16   S. 

W.  Rep.  751),  39. 
Frost  v.   Blanchard   (97  Mass.    155), 

212. 
Frost  v.  Cattle  Co.  (81  Tex.  505),  136, 

210. 
Frostburg,  etc.  v.  Brace  (51  Md.  508), 

136. 
Fruin  v.  Railroad  (89  Mo.  397),  217. 
Fruin  Bambrick  Co.  v.  Geist  (37  Mo. 

App.  509),  112. 
Fry  v.  Bennett  (28  N.  Y.  324),  254. 
Fry  v.  Com.  (82  Va.  334),  10. 
Fry  v.  Man.  Trust  Co.  (23  Civ.  Pro. 

Rep.  520),  359. 
Fryer  v.  Patrick  (42  Md.  51),  222, 
Fryer  v.  Rockefeller  (63  N.  Y.  268), 

136. 
Fuchs   v.  Fuchs  (48  Mo.  App.   18), 

309. 
Fuhrman  v.  London  (13  S.  &  R.  386), 

135. 
Fulcher  v.  State  (13  S.  W.  Rep.  750; 

28  Tex.  App.  465),  101,  346. 
Fulham  v.  Hours  (4  Atl.  Rep.  652 ; 

60  Vt.  351),  141. 
Fulkerson  v.  Holmes  (117  U.  S.  389, 

397),  53,  108. 


TABLE    OF    OASES. 


lxxv 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Fulkcrson  v.  Thornton  (68  Mo.  4G8), 

308. 
Fulka  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  (Ill  Mo. 

335;  19  S.  W.  Rep.  818),  250. 
Fullenwider  v.  Fullenwider  (53*Mo. 

439),  237. 
Fuller  v.  Carny  (29  Hun,  47),  345. 
Fuller  v.    Hampton  (5  Conn.  416), 

76. 
Fuller  v.  Jackson  (92  Mich.  197),  188. 
Fuller    v.  Jamestown,   etc.    Co.    (26 

N.  Y.  S.  1078),  340. 
Fuller  v.  Linzee  (135  Mass.  468),  232. 
Fuller  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  559 ;  17 

S.  W.  Rep.  1108),  350. 
Fulton   v.    Hood    (34   Pa.    St.    365), 

141. 
Furbush  v.  Godwin  (25  N.  H.  425), 

207,  340. 
Furnis  v.  Durgin  (119  Mass.  500),  9. 
Furst  v.  Second  Ave.  R.  Co.  (72  N.  Y. 

542),  73a. 
Furst  v.  State  (47  N.  W.  Rep.   1116; 

31  Neb.  403),  93. 
Furton  v.  N.  Y.  Recorder  (22  N.  Y. 

S.  766;  3  Misc.  Rep.  314),  186. 
Futch  v.  State  (90  Ga.  472;  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  102),  341. 

G. 

Gablick  v.   People  (40   Mich.   292), 

226. 
Gadbois  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R. 

R.  Co.  (75  Iowa,  530),  341. 
Gaddis  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  931),  376. 
Gadsden  v.  Whaley  (14  S.  C.  210), 

265. 
Gady  v.  State  (83  Ala.  51),  233. 
Gaffield  v.  Scott  (40  111.  App.  380), 

71. 
Gage  v.  Smith  (27  Conn.  7),  229. 
Gainard  v.  Rochester  City  R.  R.  Co. 

(2  N.  Y.  S.  470),  368. 
Gaines  v.  Catron  (1  Humph.,  Tenn., 

514),  136. 
Gaines  v.  Russ  (20  Fla.  157),  304. 
F 


Gairiesworth  v.  Caldwell  (81  Ga.  76), 

317. 
Gaiftsey  v.  Rhodes  (63  Hun,  632),  79. 
Galbraith  v.   Gallivan  (78  Mo.  452), 

135. 
Galbraith   v.    McLain  (84   III.   379), 

73a. 
Galbreath  v.  Cole  (61  Ala.  139),  73a. 
Galbreath  v.   Newton  (45  Mo.  App. 

312),  23. 
Galceran  v.  Noble  (66  Ga.  367),  73a. 
Gale  v.  People  (26  Mich.  157),  339. 
Galpin  v.  Page  (18  Wall.  350),  234. 
Gall,  In  re  (9  N.  Y.  S.  426),  35. 
Gall  v.  Gall  (114  N.  Y.  109),  368. 
Gallagher  v.  Kilkeary  (29   111.  App. 

415),  138. 
Galland  v.  Jackman  (26  Cal.  85),  129. 
Gallaher  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  247), 

234,  345. 
Galle  v.  Tode  (26  N.  Y.  S.  633),  174. 
Gallegher  v.  Association   (Pa.,  1892, 

24  Atl.  Rep.  115,  138. 
Galliams  v.  Kilfoy  (94  Cal.  86),  150a. 
Gallon  v.  Van  Wormer  (Tex.,  1893, 

21  S.  W.  Rep.  547),  11.    . 
Galveston  City  R.  Co.  v.  Hewitt  (67 

Tex.  478),  12. 
Galveston,  etc.  Co.  v.  Daniels  (1  Tex. 

Civ.  App.   695),  129. 
Galveston,   H.   &   S.   A.    R.    Co.    v. 

Smith  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S.  W.  Rep. 

668),  336. 
Galveston,   H.  &  S.    A.    R.    Co.    v. 

Wesch(Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W.  Rep. 

957),  199. 
Galvin  v.  Meridian    Nat.  Bank  (129 

Ind.  439),  247. 
Galvin  v.  State  (93  Ind.  650),  226. 
Gamble  v.  Ross  (44  111.  App.  291),  380. 
Gaudy  v.  State  (23  Neb.  436 ;  40   N. 

*    W.  Rep.  302),  281. 
Gannon   v.    Stevens  (13   Kan.   447), 

124. 
Gannon's  Wills,  Iu  re  (2  Misc.  Rep. 

329),  366,  369. 
Gantier  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S.  W. 

Rep.  255),  56. 


lxxvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Garber  v.  State  (4  Cold.,  Tenn.,  161, 

165),  9. 
Gardner  v.  Frieze  (16  R.  I.  640),  51. 
Gantt  v.  Gantt  (6  La.  Ann.  667),  267. 
Garden  v.  Cresvvell  (2  M.  &  W.  319), 

284. 
Gardiner  v.  Miller  (47  Cal.  570),  229. 
Gardiner  v.   State  (N.  J.    L.,   1892, 

26  Atl.  Rep.  30),  6,  254. 
Gardner  v.  Benedict  (27  N.  Y.  S.  3), 

226. 
Gardner  v.  Col.   Ins.   Co.  (7  Johns., 

N.  Y.,  511),  149. 
Gardner  v.  Eberhart  (82  111.  316),  30. 
Gardner  v.   Gardner  (L.   R.  2  App. 

Cases,  723,  724),  225. 
Gardner  v.  Minea  (47  Minn.  295),  176. 
Gardom     v.    Woodward    (44    Kan. 

758),  9. 
Gardt  v.  Brown  (13  111.  475),  217. 
Garfield  v.  Knight's  Ferry,  etc.  Co. 

(14  Cal.  35),  73a. 
Garland  v.  Denver  (11  Colo.  534),  242. 
Garling  v.  Van  Allen  (55  N.  Y.  31), 

240. 
Garmon  v.  State  (66  Miss.  196),  330. 
Garn  v.  Working  (Ind.,  1893,  31  N. 

E.  Rep.  821),  232. 
Garner  v.  Myrick  (30  Miss.  448),  76. 
Garner  v.  State  (28  Fla.  113),  9. 
Garrigan  v.  Dickey  (1  Ind.  App.  421, 

27  N.  E.  Rep.  713),  371. 
Garside  v.  Watch  Case  Co.  (17  R.  I. 

691),  343. 
Garth  v.  Caldwell  (72  Mo.  622),  237. 
Gartrell  v.  Stafford  (12  Neb.  545),  139. 
Gartside  v.  Outram  (26  L.  J.  Ch.  113), 

174. 
Garvey  v,  Wayson  (22  Md.  17S),  157. 
Garvin  v.  State  (52  Miss.  207),  345. 
Garvin  v.  Wells  (8  Iowa,  286),  242. 
Gas  Co.  v.  O'Brien  (118  111.  174),  192. 
Gastrell   v.   Phillips  (64   Miss.  473), 

120,  121. 
Gates  v.   Chicago,  etc.   Co.  (44   Mo. 

App.  488),  188. 
Gates  v.  Fleischer  (67  Wis.  504 ;  30 

N.  W.  Rep.  674),  193. 


Gates  v.  Johnson  (30  Tex.  144),  238. 
Gates  v.  Salmon  (46  Cal.  461),  262. 
Gunl  v.  Willis  (26  Pa.  St.  259),  311. 
Gaunt  v.  State  (50  N.  J.  L.  491),  345. 
Gauntlet  v.   Carter  (17  Beav.   590), 

150. 
Gay  v.  Bates  (99  Mass.  263),  75. 
Gay  v.  Lloyd  (1   Greene,  Iowa,  78), 

147. 
Gay  v.  Palmer  (1  Esp.  135),  68. 
Gayheart   v.   Patten   (Ky.,  1893,  20 

S.  W.  Rep.  912),  380. 
Gayle  v.  Perryman  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S. 

W.  Rep.  850),  31. 
Gaynor  v.    Old   Colony   R.   R.  (100 

Mass.  208),  12. 
Gazam  v.  Royce  (78  Ga.  512),  356. 
Gee  y.  Culver  (13  Oreg.  598),  10. 
Gee  v.  Gee  (32  Miss.  190),  246. 
Gee  v.  Seott  (48  Tex.  510),  160. 
Gehr  v.  Fisher  (143  Pa.   St.  311),  53. 
Gelston  v.  Hoyt  (3  Wheat.  246),  158. 
Genet  v.  Lawyer  (61  Barb.  21),  309. 
Gentry  v.  State  (5  S.  W.   Rep.   660; 

24  Tex.  App.  80),  89. 
George  v.  Joy  (19  N.  H.  544),  337. 
George  v.  Pilcher  (28   Gratt,  Va., 

299),  352. 
Georgia,    etc.    Co.    v.    Miller    (Ga., 

1893,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  939),  20. 
Georgia,  etc.  Co.   v.  Strickland   (80 

Ga.  776;  6  S.  E.  Rep.  27),  130. 
Gerard  v.  Cowperthwait  (21  N.  Y.  S. 

1092),  212. 
Gerbig  v.  Railroad  Co.  (22  N.  Y.  S 

21 ;  67  Hun,  649),  193. 
Gerding  v.  Walter  (29  Mo.  426),  220. 
Gerlach  v.  Turner  (89  Cal.  446),  84. 
German  Ins.  Co.  v.  Penrod  (35  Neb. 

273),  282. 
Gernan  v.  Navigation  Co.  (66  Hun, 

633;  21  N.  Y.  S.  371),  231. 
Geron  v.  Felder  (15  Ala.  304),  148. 
Gerry  v.  Post  (13  How.  Pr.,  N.  Y., 

118),  232. 
Gerry  v.  Stimpson  (60  Me.  186),  213. 
Gertz  v.  Fitchburg  (137   Mass.    77), 

322. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


lxxvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Gerz  v.  Weber  (151  Pa.  St.  396),  309. 
Getts  v.  Watson  (18  Mo.  274),  129. 
Getzlaff  v.  Seliger  (43  Wis.  297),  173. 
Gibbons  v.  Gentry  (20  Mo.  4G8),  135. 
Gibbons  v.  Pickett  (31  Fia.  147;  12 

S.  Rep.   17),  150a. 
Gibbs  v.  Phillipson  (1  R.  &  My.  19), 

287. 
Giboney  v.  German  Ins.  Co.  (48  Mo. 

App.  185),  366. 
Gibson  v.  Com.  (87  Pa.  St.  253),  166. 
Gibson  v.  Foote  (40  Miss.  788),  246. 
Gibson  v.  Gibson  (24  Mo.  227),  51. 
Gibson  v.  Manuf.  Co.  (144  Mass.  83), 

143. 
Gibson  v.  Mut.    Ins.    Co.    (37   N.  Y. 

584),  316. 
Gibson  v.   Peebles  (2  McCord,  418), 

60. 
Gibson  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  414), 

10,  52. 
Gibson  v.  Stevens   (9   How.,  U.  S., 

384),  242. 
Gibson  v.  Trowbridge  (96  Ala.  357 ; 

11  S.  Rep.  365),  139,  140. 
Giddings  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  (90  Mo. 

272),  205. 
Gidney  v.  Logan  (79  N.  C.  214),  70. 
Gifford  v.  Corrigan  (117  N.  Y.  257), 

226. 
Gifford  v.  Thomas  (62  Vt.  34;  19  Atl. 

Rep.  1088),  309. 
Gilbert  v.  Anthony  (1  Yerg.  69),  128. 
Gilbert  v.  Duncan  (29  N.  J.  L.  133, 

521).  210. 
Gilbert  v.  McGinnis  (114  111.  48)  216. 
Gilbert  v.  Simpson  (6  Daly,  34),  139a. 
Gilbert  v.  Thompson  (9  Cush.  358), 

350. 
Gilbert  v.  West  End  St.  Ry.  Co.  (36 

N.  E.  Rep.  60),  39. 
Gilbraith  v.  Gallivan  (78  Mo.  452), 

136. 
Gilchrist  v.  Bate  (8  Watts,  355),  52. 
Gildersleeve    v.    Atkinson   (27   Pac. 

Rep.  477,  N.  M.,  1891),  11. 
Gildersleeve    v.  Caraway    (10    Ala. 
.      260),  124. 


Cildorsleeve  v.  Mahoney(5Duer,  383), 

80. 
Giles  v.  Hunter  (103  N.  C.  194),  223. 
Giles  v.  Vandiver  (17  S.  E.  Rep.  115, 

Ga.,  1893),  79,  366. 
Gill  v.  Ward  (23  Ark.  16),  357. 
Gilleland  v.  Martin  (3  McLean,  490), 

166. 
Gillespie  v.  Moon  (2  Johns.  Ch.  585), 

223. 
Gilliam  v.  Parkinson  (4  Rand.,  Va., 

325),  131. 
Gilliam  v.  State  (1  Head,  38),  350. 
Gillim  v.  Daviws  Co.  (Ky.,   1890,  14 

S.  W.  Rep.  838),  153. 
Gillis  v.  Wilmington  R.  Co.  (13  S.  E. 

Rep.  11),  130. 
Gilman  v.  Sheets  (43  N.  W.  Rep.  299), 

231. 
Gilman  v.  Stafford  (50  Vfc.  723),  188. 
Gilmanton  v.  Ham   (38   N.  H.  108), 

345. 
Gilmer  v.  Marks  (46  Fed.  Rep.  333), 

152. 
Gilmer  v.  Stone  (120  U.  S.  586),  222. 
Gilmore  v.  Bangs  (55  Ga.  403),  205. 
Gilmore,  In  re  (154  Pa.  St.  523),  220. 
Gilmore,  In  re  (81  Cal.  240),  222. 
Gilpin  v.  Daly  (58  Hun,  610),  359. 
Gilson  v.  Powell  (13  Miss.  712),  77. 
Gilston  v.  Hoyt  (3  Wheat.  246),  158. 
Gilyard   v.   State   (Ala.,  1893,  13  S. 

Rep.  891),  350. 
Gindrat   v.  People  (138   111.   103;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  1085),  i  9. 
Ginterman  v.  People   (111.,  1892,  28 

N.  W.  Rep.  1067),  249. 
Girard  v.  Kalamazoo -(92  Mich.  610: 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  1021),  186. 
Gitchell  v.  Ryan  (24  111.  App.  372), 

140. 
Givens  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S.  W. 

Rep.  44),  283. 
Glande  v.  Post  (43  La.   Ann.  865), 

158. 
Glass  v.  Blackwell  (48  Ark.  55),  151. 
Glass  v.  Hulburt  (102  Mass.  42),  222. 
Glassell  v.  Mason  (32  Ala.  719),  130. 


lxxviii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Gleason  v.  Hamilton  (138  N.  Y.  353), 

158. 
Glenn  v.  Ligett  (4?  Fed.   Rep.  472), 

50. 
Glenn  v.  Rogers  (3  Md.  312),  127. 
Glines  v.  Iron  Hall  (22  Civil  Pro.  R. 

437;  20  N.  Y.  S.  275),  150a. 
Globe  Printing  Co.  v.  Stahle  (23  Mo. 

App.  451),  233. 
Glover  v.  Holliday  (109  Mo.  108),  38. 
Glover  v.  Thomas  (75  Tex.  500),  32. 
Goble  v.  Grant  (2  Green   Ch.    629), 

231. 
Goddard  v.  Gardner  (28  Conn.  172), 

168. 
Goddard  v.  Gloninger  (5  Watts,  Pa., 

209),  139. 
Goddard  v.  Hill  (33  Me.  582),  205. 
Goddard  v.  Ingram  (3  Q.  B.  839),  69. 
Godding  v.  Orcutt  (44  Vt.  54),  60. 
Godfrey  v.  Godfrey  (17  Ind.  6),  242. 
Godfrey  v.  Knodle  (44  111.  App.  638), 

366. 
Godfrey    v.    Templeton    (2    Pickle, 

Tenn.,   161;   6  S.   W.  Rep.   47), 

308. 
Godwin  v.  Francis   (1   L.   R.   C.    P. 

293),  33. 
Goetz  v.  Kansas  City  Bank  (119  U. 

S.  318;  7  S.  Ct.  318),  73a. 
Goff  v.  Bank  (47  N.  W.  Rep.  190 ;  78 

Wis.  106),  57. 
Goff  v.  State  Bank  (84  Wis.  369;  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  732),  60. 
Goldberg  v.  Wolff  (10  N.  Y.  S.  544), 

50. 
Golden  v.  State  (25  Ga.  527),  80. 
Golden  Gate  Min.   Co.  v.  Yuba  Co. 

(65  Cal.  187),  234. 
Colder  v.  Mueller  (22  111.  App.  527), 

77. 
Goldman  v.  State  (75  Md.  621;  23 

Atl.  Rep.  1097),  11. 
Gold  mark  v.  Metro.  Opera  H.  Co. 

(67  Hun,  652),  362. 
Goldsmith  v.  Bane  (8  N.  J.  L.  87), 

139. 
Goldsmith  v.  Picard  (27  Ala.  142),  10. 


Goldsmith  v.  Sawyer  (46  Cal.    209), 

242. 
Goldsmith  v.   State  (Tex.,   1893,  23 

S.  W.  Rep.  405),  283,  315. 
Goldstein  v.  Black  (50  Cal.  462,  465), 

140. 
Goldstone  v.  Davidson  (19  Cal.  41), 

147. 
Goldstrohm  v.  Steiner  (15  Pa.  St.  28), 

386. 
Gommersol  v.  Cren  (10  N.  Y.  S.  231), 

75. 
Goneding  v.  Hammond  (49  Fed.  Rep. 

443),  206. 
Gonring  v.  Railroad  Co.  (47  N.  W. 

Rep.  18;  78  Wis.  16),  282. 
Gonzales  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  203), 

283. 
Gonzalia  v.  Bartelsman  (143  111.  634; 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  532),  139. 
Gooch  v.  Bryant  (13  Me.  386),  73a. 
Good  v.  Knox  (23  Atl.  Rep.  520;  64 

Vt.  97),  347. 
Goodbutv.  Scheeler(3Ind.  App.  318), 

22. 
Goode  v.  State  (32  Tex.  Crim.  Rep. 

505;  24  S.  W.  Rep.  102),  347. 
Goodheart  v.   Ransley  (28  Wkly.  L. 

Bui.  227),  231. 
Goodhue  v.  Bartlett  (5  McLean,  186), 

139a,  360. 
Goodhue   v.    Clark  (37  N.   H.  525), 

222. 
Gooding    v.    Underwood  (89    Mich. 

187),  82. 
Goodman  v.  Kennedy  (10  Neb.  270), 

340. 
Goodrich  v.  Tracy  (43  Vt.  314),  71. 
Goodrich  v.  Weston  (102  Mass.  362), 

30. 
Goodright  v.    Mass   (2  Cowp.   591), 

113. 
Goodsell  v.  Taylor  (41  Minn.  207).  187. 
Goodtitle  v.  Clayton  (4  Burr.  3224), 

328. 
Goodwin  v.  Appleton  (22   Me.  453), 

239. 
Goodwin  v.  Fox  (129  U.  S.  601),  202. 


TAI1I.K    OF    CASES. 


1  xxi  x 


References  are  to  sections. 


Goodwin  v.  Goodwin  (59  N.  TI.  548), 

211. 
Goodwin  v.  Jack  (62  Me.  416),  106. 
Goodwin    v.  Monds  (100   N.  C.  448), 

150a. 
Goodwin  v.  O'Brien  (6  N.  Y.  S.  239; 

53  Hun,  637),  60. 
Goodwin  v.  Smith  (67  Ind.  101),  276. 
Goodwin   v.  State  (12  Miss.  520),  23. 
Goodwin  v.  State  (96  Ind.  550),  9. 
Goodwin  v.  State  (60  Ga.  509),  166. 
Goodwin  Company's  Appeal  (117  Pa. 

St.  537),  171. 
Goodyear  v.Vosburgh  (63  Barb.  154), 

141,195. 
Goodykoontz  v.  Olsen  (54  Iowa,  174), 

135. 
Gordon,  In    re  (N.  J.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  268),  141. 
Gordon  v.  Bank  (144  U.  S.  97),  128. 
Gordon  v.  Hobart  (2  Sumn.  401),  242. 
Gordon  v.  Leech   (81  Ky.  229),  135, 

136. 
Gordon  v.  Parmlee  (15  Gray,  Mass., 

413),  37. 
Gordon  v.    Preston  (1   Watts,    Pa., 

385),  131. 
Gordon  v.  Price  (10  Ired.   L.,  N.  C., 

385),  139. 
Gordon  v.  Ritnour  (87  Mo.  54),  70. 
Gordon  v.  Tweedy  (74  Ala.  232),  237. 
Gorev.  Lewis  (109  N.  C.    539;    15 

S.  E.  Rep.  909),  216. 
Gore  v.  State  (52  Ark.  285),  346. 
Gorgas  v.  Hertz  (150  Pa.  St.  538),  127, 

130. 
Gorham  v.  Canton  (5  Me.  266),  56. 
Gorham  v.  Carroll (3  Litt.,  Ky.,  121), 

311. 
Gorman  v.  Stanton  (5  Mo.  App.  585), 

136. 
Gormly  v.  Bringam  (138  N.  Y.  623), 

24,  242. 
Gorsuch  v.    Rutledge  (70   Md.    272), 

366. 
Goshen  v.  England  (119  Ind.  368),  80, 

194. 
Goss  v.  Turner  (21  Vt.  437),  248. 


Gough  v.  St.  John  (16  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

646),  10. 
Gould  v.  Combs  (1  C.  B.  543),  218. 
Gould  v.  Conway  (59  Barb.,  N.   Y., 

355),  58. 
Gould  v.  Jones  (1  W.  Bl.  384).  139. 
Gould  v.  West  (32  Tex.  338),  82. 
Gould ing  v.    Hoyt  (34  N.  H.  148), 

158. 
Gove  v.  Downer  (59  Vt.  139),  233. 
Gove  v.  State  (58  Ala.  391),  97. 
Gower  v.  Emery  (6  Shepl.,  Me.,  79), 

157. 
Gower  v.   Stearnes  (2  Whart,  Pa., 

75),  223. 
Grace  v.  Lynch  (80  Wis.  166),  214. 
Grace  v.  Nesbitt  (109  Mo.  3),  67. 
Gracie  v.  Morris  (22  Ark.  415),  30. 
Grady  v.  Gosline  (48  Ohio  St.  665), 

150a. 
Grafton  v.  Reed  (34  W.  Va.  172),  142. 
Graham  v.  Anderson    (42  111.   514), 

244. 
Graham  v.  Gautier  (21  Tex.  112),  249. 
Graham  v.  Graham  (23  W.  Va.  36), 

222. 
Graham  v.  Graham  (10  Ired.   219), 

269. 
Graham  v.  Larimer  (83  Cal.  173;   23 

Pac.  Rep.  286),  341. 
Graham    v.    McReynolds   (90   Tenn. 

673),  333,  341,  366. 
Graham  v.  Selover  (59  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

313),  69. 
Graham  v.  Thompson  (55  Ark.  296), 

83. 
Graham  v.  Whiteley  (2  Dutch.,  N.  J., 

254),  158. 
Gramm  v.  Boener  (56  Ind.  497),  193. 
Grand  R.    etc.    Co.   v.   Huntley  (38 

Mich.  537),  52,  198. 
Grand  Trunk,  etc.  Co.  v.  Richardson 

(91  U.  S.  470),  229. 
Granger  v.  Batcheldor  (54  Vt.  348), 

74. 
Grant  v.  Hughes  (96  N.  C.  177 ;  2  S. 

E.  Rep.  339),  157. 
Grant  v.  Levan  (4  Pa.  St.  393),  142. 


lxxx 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Grant  v.  McLachlin   (4    Johns.    34), 

158. 
Grant  v.  Oliver  (91  Cal.  158),  30,  136. 
Grant  v.  State  (15  S.  E.  Rep.  488 ;  89 

Ga.  393),  330. 
Grant   v.  Thompson  (4    Conn.  203), 

197. 
Grantier  v.  Austin  (06  Hun,  157),  6. 
Grass  v.  Hurlbert  (102  Mass.  24,  41), 

223. 
Grattan  v.  Metropolitan  L.  Ins.  Co. 

(80  N.  Y.  281,  297),  478. 
Gratz  v.  Gratz  (4  Rawle,  Pa.,  411), 

262. 
Grau  v.  Spangenberg  (Minn.,  1893, 

54  N.  W.  Rep.  933),  254. 
Graves  v.  Battle  Creek  (95  Mich.  266; 

54  N.  W.  Rep.  757),  202,  211. 
Graves  v.  Blondell  (70  Me.  90),  84. 
Graves  v.  Davenport  (50   Fed.   Rep. 

881),  347. 
Graves  v.  Dudley  (20  N.  H.  76),  211. 
Graves  v.  Griffith  (3  Wash.  St.  742), 

378. 
Graves  v.' Merchants',  etc.  Bank  (82 

Iowa,   637;  49  N.  W.  Rep.   65), 

234. 
Graves  v.  People  (18  Colo.   170;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  63),  6,  54,  101,  102. 
Graves  v.  Safford  (41  111.  App.  659), 

309. 
Graves  v.  Santway  (6  N.  Y.  S.  892; 

52  Hun,  613),  342. 
Gray  v.  Daus  (27  Conn.  447),  146. 
Gray  v.  Kauffman  (82  Tex.  65),  136. 
Gray  v.  McLoughlin  (26  Iowa,  279), 

52. 
;  Gray   v.   Pentland  (2   S.   &  R.   23), 

175. 
Gray  v.  Pingrey  (17  Vt.  419),  160. 
Graybeal  v.  Gardner  (146  111.  337;  34 

N.  E.  Rep.  528),  248. 
Grayson   v.   Brooks   (64   Miss.    410), 

208. 
Grayson  v.  Buchanan  (88  Va.  251 ; 

13  S.  E.  Rep.  457),  376. 
Greathouse  Case  (2  Abb.,  U.  S.,  382), 

240. 


Great  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bacon  (30  111. 

347),  250. 
Great  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Haworth  (39 

111.  349),  198. 
Greasons  v.  Davis  (9  Iowa,  219),  142. 
Greaves  v.  Hunter  (2  C.  &  P.  477), 

139. 
Green   v.   Abraham   (43  Ark.    420), 

135. 
Green   v.  Armstrong  (1  Denio,  550), 

262. 
Green  v.  Batson  (71  Wis.  57),  208. 
Green  v.  Beckney   (3   Ind.  App.  39), 

128,  378. 
Green  v.  Casilk  (16  Md.  556),  337. 
Green  v.  Cawthorne  (4   Dev.  L.,  N. 

C,  409),  80,  334. 
Green  v.  Edick  (56  N.  Y.  696),  308. 
Green  v.  Godfrey  (44  Me.  25),  136. 
Green  v.  Gould  (3  Allen,  Mass.,  465), 

374. 
Green  v.  Green  (145  111.  264 ;  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  941),  269. 
Green  v.  Mill  (60  Vt.  442),  60. 
Green  v.  Mumper  (138  111.  434;  28  N. 

E.  Rep.  1075),  115. 
Green  v.  North   Buffalo  (56  Pa.  St. 

110),  73a. 
Green  v.  Pratt  (11  Conn.  205),  60. 
Green  v.  Sherrod    (105    N.    C.    197), 

223. 
Green  v.  State  (88  Ga.  516),  89. 
Green  v.  Vardiman  (2  Blackf.,  Ind., 

324),  304. 
Greene  v.  Phenix  Ins.   Co.  (134  111. 

310),  346. 
Greene  v.  State  (Tex.,  1891,  12  S.  W. 

Rep.  872),  352. 
Greenfield   v.  People  (85   N.  Y.  75), 

10. 
Greening  v.  Keel  (84  Tex.  326),  361. 
Greenleaf  v.  Dubuque  R.  R.  Co.  (30 

Iowa,  301),  53. 
Greenleaf  v.  Quincy  (12  Me.  11),  69. 
Greenpugh  v.   Cass  (64  N.  H.  326), 

222. 
Greenough  v.  Greenough  (11  Pa.  St. 

489),  138. 


TABLE    OF    OASES. 


lx.xxi 


References  are  to  sections. 


Greenough  v.  Guskell  (1  My.  &  K. 

98),  174. 
Greenwich  Ins.  Co.  v.  Waterman  (54 

Fed.  Rep.  S39),  216. 
Greer  v.  Covington  (Ky.,  1887,  2  S. 

W.  Rep.  323),  24. 
Greer  v.  Greer  (58   Hun,  251),   168, 

171. 
Greer  v.  Higgins  (20  Kan.  420),  350. 
Greer  v.  Louisville,  etc.    Co.    (Ky., 

1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  649),  145. 
Gregg  v.   Mallett  (111   N.  C.  74;  15 

S.  E.  Rep.  936),  226,  376. 
Gregory   v.    Coleman   (3  Tex.    Civ. 

A  pp.  166;  22  S.  W.  Rep.   181), 

370. 
Gregory  v.  Walker  (38  Ala.  26),  266. 
Grey  v.  McDaniel  (6  Bush,  Ky.,  480), 

232. 
Grider  v.  Mortgage  Co.  (Ala.,  1893, 

12  S.  Rep.  775),  139. 
Gridley  v.  College  (137  N.  Y.  527), 

232. 
Griel  v.  Lomax  (94  Ala.  641),  11. 
Griesheiuier  v.  Tanenbaum  (8  N.  Y. 

S.  582:  55  Hun,  604),  60. 
Griffen  v.  Griffen  (125  111.  430;  17  N. 

E.  Rep.  782),  226,  309. 
Griffin  v.  O'Neill  (47  Kan.  116),  373. 
Griffin  v.  Rice  (1  Hilt.,  N.  Y,  184), 

216. 
Griffin  v.  Salmon  (6  Daly,  531),  218. 
Griffin  v.  Smith  (45  Ind.  366),  168. 
Griffin  v.  State  (26  Tex.   App.    157; 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  552),  283,  349. 
Griffin,  etc.  Co.  v.  Joannes  (80  Wis. 

601),  11. 
Griffing  v.  Harris (9  Port.,  Ala.,  225), 

311. 
Griffith  v.   Avery  (11   A.  &  E.  322), 

139a. 
Griffith  v.  Furry  (30  111.  251),  221. 
Griffith  v.    Happersberger    (86  Cal. 

605),  151. 
Griffith  v.  Sauls  (77  Tex.  630;  14  S. 

W.  Rep.  230),  80. 
Griffith  v.  State  (26  Tex.  App.  157), 

352. 
Griffith  v.  Williams  (1  T.  R.  710),  74. 


Griffith  v.  Williams  (1  M.  &  R.  133), 

140. 
Grignon's  Lessee  v.  Astor  (2  How., 

U.  S„  319),  232. 
Grimmel   v.    Chicago,   etc.    Co.   (73 

Iowa,  93),  198. 
Grimmer  v.  Carlton  (93  Cal.  189),  76. 
Grimnan  v.  Dean  (62  Tex.  218),  83. 
Grim  wood  v.  Barrit  (6  T.  R.  460),  20. 
Grinnell  v.  Deuison  (12  Wis.    402), 

276. 
Griswold  v.  Gebbie  (126  Pa.  St.  353), 

93. 
Griswold  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co. 

(14  Daly,  484),  33. 
Griswold  v.   N.  Y.  Cent.   R.    R.  Co. 

(115  N.  Y.  61),  192. 
Griswold  v.    Pitcairn   (2  Cow.   85), 

149. 
Griswold  v.  State  (24  Wis.  144),  199. 
Groom  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  82),  23. 
Gross  v.  Drager  (66  Wis.  150),  208. 
Gross  v.  Reddy  (45  Pa.  St.  406),  166. 
Grover,    etc.    Co.    v.    Polhemus    (34 

Mich.  247),  73a. 
Groves  v.  State  (76  Ga.  808),  23. 
Grub  v.  Simpsou   (6  Heisk.,  Tenn., 

92),  267. 
Grunn  v.  Howeth  (35  Ala.  144),  146. 
Grunn  v.  Peakes  (36  Minn.  177),  148. 
Grusenmeyer  v.  Logansport  (76  Ind. 

549),  239. 
Guardians  v.  Greene  (5   Binn.  558), 

220. 
Guedel  v.  People  (43  111.  226),  23. 
Guertin  v.  Momblen  (144  111.  32;  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  49),  129. 
Guetig  v.  State  (66  Ind.  91),  249. 
Guidery  v.  Green  (95  Cal.  650),  208, 

212. 
Guion  v.  Williams  (7   N.  Y.  S.  786 ; 

55  Hun,  605),  246. 
Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.   Patter- 
son (Tex.,   1894,   24  S.  W.  Rep. 

349),  199. 
Gulf,  C.  &   S.  F.  Ry.  Co.   v.  Wright 

(1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  102),  199. 
Gulf.  etc.  Co.  v.  Ellis  (54  Fed.  Rep. 

481),  226. 


lxxxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Gulf,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hepner  (83  Tex.  70  ; 

18  S.  W.  Rep.  441),  7. 
Gulf,  etc.  Co.   v.   Johnson   (83   Tex. 

628;  19  S.  W.  Rep.  151),  18. 
Gulf,  etc.  Co.  v.   Norfleet    (78  Tex. 

321 ;  14  S.  W.  Rep.  703),  202. 
Gulf,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ross  (Tex.,  1891,  16 

S.  W.  Rep.  536),  253. 
Gulf,  etc.  Co.  v.  York  (74  Tex.  364 ; 

12  S.  W._  Rep.  151),  18. 
Gulick  v.  Gulick  (39  N.  J.  L.  516),  171. 
Gunn  v.  Ohio,  etc.  Co.  (37   W.  Va. 

421),  344. 
Gunn  v.  Peakes  (36  Minn.  177),  142. 
Gunn  v.  Wade  (65  Ga.  537),  121. 
Gunn,  In  re  (50  Kan.  125),  288. 
Gunn,  In  re  (50  Kan.  155),  284. 
Gunnison  v.  Gunnison  (41  N.  H.  121), 

276. 
Gunter  v.  State  (83  Ala.  96),  350. 
Gunter  v.  Watson  (4  Jones'  N.  C.  L. 

455),  340. 
Gunther  v.  Bennett  (72  Ind.  384 ;  19 

Atl.  Rep.  1048),  309. 
Gutchess  v.  Gutchess  (66 Barb.,  N.  Y., 

483),  73a. 
Guthrie  v.  Anderson  (48  Kan.  381), 

262. 
Gutsch  v.  Mcllhargey  (69  Mich.  377; 

37  N.  W.  Rep.  303),  341. 
Gutzell  v.  Pennie  (95  Cal.  598),  231. 
Guy  v.  Hull  (3  Murph.,  N.  C,  150), 

311. 
Guy  v.  Manuel  (89  N.  C.  83),  76. 
Guy  v.  Mead  (22  N.  C.  462),  60. 
Guy  v.  Metcalf  (83  Tex.  37),  282. 
Guyette  v.  Bolton  (46  Vt.  228),  139a. 
Guyot  v.  Butts  (4  Wend.  582),  2. 
Gvvyn  v.  Butler  (17  Colo.  114),  380. 
Gwyn  v.  State  (64  Miss.  324),  2S0. 
G v.  G (L.  R.  2  P.  &  D.  287), 

202. 

H. 

Habout  v.  Jones  (5  Wash.  St.  385), 

359. 
Hackett  v.  Collender  (32  Vt.  97),  79. 
Hackett  v.  Martin  (8  Greenl.,   Me., 

77),  70. 


Hackley  v.  Patrick  (3  Johns.  536),  69. 
Haddock  v.  Wilmarth  (5  N.  H.  187), 

311. 
Hadgo  v.  Gooden  (13  Ala.  718),  352. 
Hadley  v.  Howe  (46  Vt.  112),  115. 
Hadrick  v.  Heslop  (12  Jur.  600),  302. 
Haff  v.  Spicer  (3  Paige,  N.  Y.,  190), 

357. 
Hagan  v.  Insurance  Co.  (81   Iowa, 

321),  250. 
Haggin  v.  Haggin  (35  Neb.  575),  231. 
Hagnes  v.  Porter  (45  111.  318),  142. 
Hahn  v.  Guardian  Assur.  Co.  (Oreg., 

1893,  32  Pac.  Rep.  683),  200. 
Hahn  v.  Schmidt  (64  Cal.  284),  51. 
Hahn  v.   State  (13  Tex.   App.    383), 

132. 
Haight  v.  Proprietors  (4  Wash.  C.  C. 

601,  606),  356. 
Haights  v.  Arnold  (48  Md.  512),  358. 
Haile  v.  Palmer  (5  Mo.  403),  144. 
Haines  v.  Dennett   (11    N.    H.    180), 

311. 
Haines  v.  Hanrahau  (105  Mass.  480), 

242. 
Haines  v.  Sairers  (93  Mich.  440),  13, 

336. 
Haines  v.    Territory  (3  Wyo.    166), 

330. 
Haines   v.    Thompson  (21  N.   Y.  S. 

991 ;  2  Misc.  Rep.  385),  366,  370. 
Haines  v.  Watts  (N.  J.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  572),  308. 
Haish  v.  Payson  (107  111.  365),  188. 
Halbeck  v.  Boyleston  (117  Mass.  469), 

144. 
Halbert   v.  Skyler  (1  A.  K.  Marsh. 

368),  242. 
Halcomb    v.    Stubblefield  (76  Tex. 

310),  150a. 
Hale  v.  Everett  (53  N.  H.  55),  316. 
Hale  v.  Huse  (10  Gray,  Mass.,  99),  77, 

314. 
Hale  v.  Merrill  (27  Vt.  738),  276. 
Hale  v.  Smith  (6  Greenl.,  Me.,  416), 

303. 
Hale's  Ex'rs  v.  Ard  (48  Pa.  St.  22),  60. 
Half  v.  Curtis  (68  Tex.  640;  5  S.  W. 

Rep.  541),  188. 


TATiI.E   OF    OASES. 


lxxxiii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Halfin  v.  Winkleman  (18  S.  W.  Rep. 

433 ;  83  Tex.  385),  20,  226. 
Hall  v.  Aitkin  (25  Neb.  360),  142. 
Hall  v.  Brackctt  (62  N.  H.  509),  73. 
Hall  v.  Brennan  (19  N.  Y.  S.  623 ;  64 

Hun,  394),  76. 
Hall  v.  Chicago   R.    Co.    (52  N.   W. 

Rep.  247),  340. 
Hallv.  Com.  (89  Va.   171;  15  S.  E. 

Rep.  517),  13,  101. 
Hall  v.  Costello  (48  N.  H.  176),  143. 
Hall  v.  Davis  (36  N.  H.  569),  217,  220. 
Hall  v.  Eaton  (139  Mass.  217),  220. 
Hall  v.  Glidden  (39  Me.  445),  60. 
Hallv.  Houghton  (37  Me.  411),  347. 
Hall  v.  Kintz  (13  Pa.  Co.   Ct.   Rep. 

24),  358. 
Hall  v.  Leonard  (1  Pick.  31),  222. 
Hall  v.  McKay  (78  Tex.  248),  148. 
Hall  v.  Railroad  Co.  (51  N.  W.  Rep. 

150;  84  Iowa,  311),  348. 
Hall  v.  Rankin  (Iowa,  1893,  5  N.  W. 

Rep.  217),  188. 
Hall  v.  Roberts  (63  Hun,  473),  24. 
Hall  v.  Solomon  (61  Conn.  476),  208. 
Hall  v.  State  (31  Fla.  176;  12  S.  Rep. 

449),  97. 
Hall  v.  State  (132  Ind.  317),  10. 
Hall  v.  State  (31    Tex.    Crim.    Rep. 

565),  9,  52. 
Hall  v.  Vanier  (6  Neb.  85),  314. 
Hall  v.  Van  Vranken  (64  How.  Pr. 

407),  140. 
Hall  v.  Williams (6 Pick.,  Mass.,  237), 

146. 
Hall  v.  Young  (37  N.  H.  134),  246. 
Hall,  Inre(l  Wall.  Jr.,  U.  S.,  85),  232. 
Halladay  v.  Hart  (30  N.  Y.  474),  205. 
Hallam  v.  Corlett  (71  Iowa,  446),  223. 
Hallam  v.  Post  (55  Fed.   Rep.  456), 

10. 
Halley  v.   Gregg  (82  Iowa,   622;  48 

N.  W.  Rep.  974),  10. 
Halley  v.  Webster  (21  Me.  461),  231. 
Halliday  v.    Martinett    (20  Johns., 

N.  Y.,  168),  58. 
Hallock  v.  Kinney  (91  Mich.  57;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  706),  10. 


Ilallowell  v.  Hallowell  (88  Ind.  251), 

269. 
Hallum  v.  Dickenson  (49  Ark.  126), 

146. 
Halpin  v.  Stone  (78  Wis.  183;  47  N. 

W.  Rep.  177),  208. 
Halsey  v.  Sinsebaugh  (15  N.  Y.  485), 

337. 
Halstead   v.  Seamon  (52  How.  Pr., 

N.  Y,  415),  77. 
Haltenhof  v.  Haltenhof  (44  111.  App. 

135),  231. 
Hamberger  v.  Root  (6  W.  &  S.,  Pa., 

431),  67. 
Hamburg  v.  Wood  (18  S.   W.  Rep. 

623,  Tex.,  1892),  208. 
Hamilton,  In  re  (12  N.  Y.  S.  708),  35. 
Hamilton  v.  Buchanan   (112   N.    C. 

463;  17  S.  E.  Rep.  159).  246. 
Hamilton  v.  Coal  Co.  (61  Hun,  624), 

247. 
Hamilton  v.  Hulett  (51  Minn.  208; 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  364),  341. 
Hamilton  v.  Iowa  Co.  (Iowa,   1S93, 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  496),  73a. 
Hamilton  v.   Manhattan  Ry.  Co.  (9 

N.  Y.  313),  344. 
Hamilton  v.  Marsden  (6  Binn.   45), 

138. 
Hamilton   v.  Northwood  (86   Mich. 

315 ;  49  N.  W.  Rep.  37),  38.       • 
Hamilton  v.  Patrick  (62  Hun,  74),  76. 
Hamilton  v.  People  (29  Mich.   173), 

323,  349. 
Hamilton  v.   Pitcher   (53   Mo.   354), 

135. 
Hamilton  v.  Rich  Hill  Coal  Mining 

Co.  (108  Mo.  364;  18  S.  W.  Rep. 

977),  370. 
Hamilton  v.  Ross  (23  Neb.  630),  366. 
Hamilton  v.   Smith  (30  Mich.   229), 

234. 
Hamilton  Buggy  Co.  v.  Iowa  Buggy 

Co.  (Iowa,   1893,  55  N.  W.  Rep. 

496),  375. 
Hamlin  v.  Seers  (82  N.  Y.  327),  83. 
Hammatt  v.  Emerson  (27  Me.  308). 

73a. 


lxxxiv 


TABLE    OF   CASKS. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hamrnel  v.  State  (90  Ala.  577),  101. 
Hammerquist    v.    Swenson   (44    111. 

App.  627),  206. 
Hammers  v.  Dole  (61  111.  307),  135. 
Hammill  v.  Sup.  Council  (152  Pa.  St. 

537),  309. 
Hammond  v.  Beeson  (112  Mo.  190), 

79. 
Hammond  v.  Dike  (42  Minn.   273), 

350. 
Hammond  v.  Freeman  (9  Ark.  62), 

356. 
Hammond  v.  Hammond  (90  Ga.  527; 

16  S.  E.  Rep.  265),  158. 
Hammond  v.  Varian  (54  N.  Y.  398), 

133,  139. 
Hammond  v.   Wolf  (78  Iowa,   227; 

42  N.  W.  Rep.  778),  140. 
Hammond's  Case  (2  Greenl.  33;  11 

Am.  Dec.  39),  132. 
Hamon  v.  Huntley  (4  Cowen,  N.  Y., 

493),  67. 
Hanawalt  v.  State  (64  Wis.  84),  345. 
Hanby,  In  re  (25  W.  R.  427),  232. 
Hance  v.  Hair  (28  Ohio  St.  349),  69. 
Hancock  v.  Am.   L.   I.   Co.  (62  Mo. 

26),  232,  233. 
Hancock  v.  Flynn  (8  N.  Y.  S.  133; 

54  Hun,  638),  60,  144. 
Hancock  v.  Kelly  (81   Ala.   36S),  60. 
Hancock  v.   Leggett  (115  Ind.  546), 

52. 
Hancock  v.  Moody  (39  111.  App.  17), 

211. 
Hancock   v.   O'Rourke  (6   N.  Y.  S. 

549),  141. 
Hancock  v.  Worcester  (62  Vt.   106; 

18  Atl.  Rep.  1041),  244. 
Hancock    v.    Yunker    (83   111.    208), 

73a. 
Hancock's  Appeal  (112  Pa.  St.  532), 

222. 
Hand  v.  Swann  (1  Tex.   Civ.   App. 

241),  75. 
Hand  v.  Weidner  (115  Pa.  St.  302), 

136. 
Handlin's  Estate  v.  Law  (34  111.  App. 

84),  354. 


Hanking  v.  Grimes  (13  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

257),  141. 
Hankins  v.  State  (29  Fla.  554;  10  S. 

Rep.  822),  334. 
Hankinson  v.  Page  (3  Fed.  Rep.  186), 

125. 
Hanley  v.  Donoghue  (116  U.  S.  4), 

242. 
Hanlon  v.  Doherty  (109  Ind.  37),  171. 
Hanlon  v.  Wilson  (10  Neb.  138),  254. 
Hann  v.  State  (13  Tex.  App.  383), 

139a. 
Hanna  v.  Barrett  (39  Kan.  446;   18 

Pac.  Rep.  497),  346. 
Hanna  v.  Davis  (112  Mo.  599),  138. 
Hanna  v.  Hanna  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S.  W. 

Rep.  720),  52. 
Hanners    v.    McClelland   (74  Iowa, 

318),  322,  354. 
Hanoff  v.    State  (37  Ohio  St.    178), 

346. 
Hanover  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Lewis  (23  Fla. 

193;  IS.  Rep.  863),  127. 
Hanscom  v.  Burmood  (35  Neb.  504), 

350. 
Hansen  v.  Hale  (44  111.  App.  174),  21. 
Hanson  v.  Hoit  (14  N.  H.  56).  74. 
Hanson  v.  Weber  (40  Me.  194),  77. 
Harbison  v.  Lemon  (3  Blatchf.   51), 

208. 
Hard  v.  Ashley  (117  N.  Y.  606;    23 

N.  E.  Rep.  600),  50,  171,  308. 
Hard  v.  Brown  (18  Vt.  87),  114. 
Hardee  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Criui.  Rep. 

289),  52. 
Hardenbrook's   Case    (8    Abb.    Pr., 

N  Y.,  416),  286. 
Hardesty  v.  Com.  (88  Ky.   587),  283. 
Harding  v.  Bank  (81  Iowa,  499),  129. 
Harding  v.  Butler  (156  Mass.  34),  69. 
Hardy  v.  Cheny  (42  Vt.  417),  73a. 
Hardy  v.  Chesapeake  Bank  (51  Md. 

590),  308. 
Hardy  v.  Merrill  (56  N.  H.  227),  194, 

197. 
Hardy  v.    Summers  (10   Gill   &  J., 

Md.,  310),  304. 
Hare  v.  Mahoney  (00  Hun,  576),  341. 


TABLE    OF   CASKS. 


lxxxv 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hargrave  v.  Hargravo  (2  C.   &  K. 

701),  53. 
Hargrove  v.  Adcock  (111  N.  C.  16C), 

21. 
Harlan  v.  Howard  (79  Ky.  373),  108. 
Sarland  v.  Lilienthal  (53  N.  Y.  438), 

189. 
Harnickell  v.  Copper  Mining  Co.  (5 

N.  Y.  S.  112;  52  Hun,  610),  334. 
Harpendiug  v.  Church  (16  Pet.  455), 

242. 
Harper  v.  Burrow  (6  Ired.  30),  123. 
Harper  v.  Lexington  R.  Co.  (2  Dana, 

Ky.,  227),  344. 
Harper  v.   Morse  (114  Mo.   317;    21 

S.  W.  Rep.  517),  11. 
Harper  v.  Perry  (28  Iowa.  63),  208. 
Harrell  v.  Culpepper  (47  Ga.  635),  70. 
Harrell  v.  Zinipleman  (66  Tex.  292), 

216. 
Harriman  v.  Sampson  (23  111.  App. 

161),  168. 
Harriman  v..Stowe  (57  Mo.  93),  57. 
Harrington  v.  Chambers  (3  Utah,  94), 

69. 
Harrington  v.   Fish  (10  Mich.  415), 

136. 
Harrington  v.  Hamburg  (Iowa,  1892, 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  201),  307. 
Harrington  v.  Harrington  (154  Mass. 

517),  369. 
Harrington   v.   Samples    (36    Minn. 

200),  215. 
Harrington  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Grim. 

Rep.  577),  283. 
Harrington  v.   State  (36  Ala.   236), 

323. 
Harrington  v.   Worcester,  etc.   Co. 

(157  Mass.   579;    32   N.   E.  Rep. 

955),  176,  343. 
Harris  v.  Barnhart  (97  Cal.  546 ;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  589),  152. 
Harris  v.  Burton  (4  Harr.,  Del.,  66), 

135. 
Harris  v.  Clinton  (31  N.  W.  Rep.  425 ; 

64  Mich.  447),  198. 
Harris  v.  Dinkins  (4  Desaus.,  S.  C, 

60),  221. 


Harris  v.   Dougherty  (74  Tex.  1 ;  1 1 

S.  W.  Rep.  921),  157. 
Harris  v.  Harris  (23  Gratt.  737),  20b. 
Harris  v.  Herman  (78  Mo.  623),  238. 
Harris  v.  Holmes  (30  Vt.  352),  7. 
Harris  v.  Hoskins  (2  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

486;  32  S.  W.  Rep.  251),  106. 
Harris  v.  Lester  (80  111.  311),  355. 
Harris  v.  McArthur  (90  Ga.  216;  15 

S.  E.  Rep.  758),  371. 
Harris  v.  Nation  (79  Tex.  409),  362. 
Harris  v.  Oakey  (130  N.  Y.  1),  115. 
Harris   v.    Railroad  Co.    (36   N.   Y. 

Sup.  Ct.  373),  199. 
Harris  v.  Railroad  (78  Ga.  525),  50. 
Harris  v.  Schuttler  (Tex.,  1894,  24 

S.  W.  Rep.  989),  199. 
Harris  v.  So.  Mfg.  Co.  (8  R.  I.  133), 

77. 
Harris  v.  State  (6  Tex.  App.  97),  93. 
Harris  v.  Story  (2  E.  D.  Smith),  234. 
Harris  v.  Wilson  (7  Wend.  57),  350. 
Harris,  Ex  parte  (4  Utah,  5),  332. 
Harrisburg  Car.   Mfg.   Co.  v.  Sloan 

(120  Ind.    156;    21  N.    E.    Rep. 

1088),  173. 
Harrison  v.  Bank  (17  Wis.  310),  211. 
Harrison  v.  Bishop    (131    Ind.    161), 

248,  253. 
Harrison  v.  Blades  (3   Campb.  458), 

123. 
Harrison  v.  Charlton  (42  Iowa,  573), 

120. 
Harrison  v.  Com.  (79  Va.  374),  10. 
Harrison  v.  Harrison  (4  Moore  P.  C. 

96),  202. 
Harrison  v.  Kiser   (79  Ga.  588 ;  4  S. 

E.  Rep.  320),  226. 
Harrison  v.  Rowan  (3  Wash.  C.  C. 

580),  150. 
Harrison  v.  Simmons  (55   Ala.  510), 

136. 
Harrison  v.  State  (79  Ala.  29),  52. 
Harrison's  Appeal  (100  Pa.  St.  458), 

222. 
Harrow  v.  Brown  (76  Iowa,  179),  309. 
Hart   v.    Bait.    etc.    Co.  (6  W.    Va. 

336),  1. 


lxxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hart  v.  Hudson  R.  B.  Co.  (84  N.  Y. 

56),  188. 
Hart  v.  Kendall  (82  Ala.  144),  58. 
Hart  v.  State  (17   8.    W.    Rep.   421, 

Tex.,  1891),  232. 
Hart  v.  State  (55  Ind.  599),  238. 
Hart  v.  Teneyck  (12  Johns.  Ch.  62, 

108),  226. 
Hartford    Bank     v.    Hart    (3    Day, 

Conn.,  495),  67. 
Harter    v.    Hopkins    (83  Wis.    309), 

13. 
Hartley  v.  Brooks  (6  Whart.  189),  CO. 
Hartley  v.  Carloy   (150  Pa.   St.  23), 

129,  250. 
Hartley  v.  Cataract,  etc.  Co.  (19   N. 

Y.  S.  121 ;  64  Hun,  634),  337. 
Hartley  v.  Fresh  (6  Tex.  208),  137. 
Hartley  v.  Mathews  (96  Ala.  224;  11 

S.  Rep.  542),  76. 
Hartman  v.  Camman  (10  N.  J.  Eq. 

128),  217. 
Hartman   v.  Cin.  etc.    Co.    (4    Ind. 

App.    370;  30   N.   E.   Rep.  930), 

373. 
Hartman  v.  Evans  (W.  Ya.,  1894,  18 

S.  E.  Rep.  810),  9. 
Hartman  v.  Keystone    Ins.    Co.    (21 

Pa.  St.  466),  200. 
Hartman  v.  Rogers  (69  Cal.  643),  341. 
Hartshorn  v.  Dawson    (79  111.    108), 

136. 
Hartsock  v.  Mort   (76   Md.    281),  18, 

362. 
Hartze  v.  FihreCo.  (44  Md.  648),  151. 
Harvard  v.  Gare  (15  Pick.  372),  56. 
Harvey  v.    Chouteau  (14   Mo.    587), 

210. 
Harvey  v.  Lumber  Co.  (39  Mo.  App. 

214),  209. 
Harvey  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  178), 

283. 
Harvey  v.  Tebutt  (1  J.   &  W.   197), 

276. 
Harvey  v.  Thornton  (14111.  217),  232, 

233. 
Harvey  v.  Tyler  (2  Wall.,  U.  S.,  328), 

232. 


Harvey  v.  Walden  (23  La.  Ann.  163), 

238. 
Harvey  v.  West  (87  Ga.  553),  84. 
Ilawbrouck  v.  Baker  (10  Johns.  248), 

38. 
Haskeli  v.  Henry  (74  Me.    197),  308. 
Haskins  v.  Warren  (115  Mass.  514), 

250. 
Hass  v.  Marshall  (Pa.,  1888,   14  Atl. 

Rep.  421),  185,  195. 
Hastings  v.  L.  I.  Co.  (138  N.  Y.  473), 

220. 
Hastings  v.  Rider  (99  Mass.  625),  197. 
Hatch  v.  Blisset  (2  Stra.  986),  287. 
Hatch  v.  Douglas  (48  Conn.  116),  217. 
Hatch  v.  Elkins  (64  N.  Y.  489).  73. 
Hatch  v.  Fuller  (131   Mass.  574),  52. 
Hatch  v.  Hatch  (9  Mass.  307),  128. 
Hatch  v.  Perignet  (64  Barb.  189),  309. 
Hatch  v.  Potter  (2  Gilm.,  111.,  725), 

'  80. 
Hatcher  v.  Rochelaw  (18  N.  Y.  87), 

129,  244. 
Hatchett  v.  Conner   (30  Tex.    104), 

142. 
Hathaway  v.  Haskill  (9  Pick.,  Mass., 

42),  67. 
Hathaway  v.    Tinkham   (148   Mass. 

85),  366. 
Hatt  v.  Nay  (144  Mass.  186),  8. 
Hatton  v.  Robinson  (14  Pick.  422), 

166. 
Haugen  v.  C,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co. 

(S.  D.,  1893,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  769), 

11. 
Haughton  v.  Maurer  (55  Mich.  323), 

73a. 
Haven  v.  Brown  (7  Me.  421),  73a. 
Haven  v.  Foster  (9  Pick.  130),  143. 
Havens  v.  Sea  Shore   Railroad  (47 

N.  J.  Eq.  365 ;  20  Atl.  Rep.  497), 

107. 
Haver  v.   Schuyhart  (48  Mo.   App. 

20),  375. 
Haverstick  v.  State   (Ind.,  1893,  32 

N.  E  Rep.  785),  283. 
Haviland  v.  Man.  R.  Co.   (61  Hun, 

626;  131  N.  Y.  630),  366. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Lwxvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hawes  v.  Humphrey  (9  Pick.  357), 

138. 
Hawes  v.  Merchant  (1   Curt.    C.    C. 

144),  82. 
Hawes  v.   N.   E.    Ins.   Co.   (2  Curt, 

C.  C.  229),  200. 
Hawes  v.    State  (88  Ala.    68),    169, 

339. 
Hawey  v.  Donelly  (8  Paige,   N.  Y., 

415),  359. 
Hawey  v.  Foster  (64  Cal.  296),  150a. 
Hawk  v.  Applegarth  (37  Mo.   App. 

32),  73a. 
Hawkins  v.  Church  (23  Minn.  256), 

83. 
Hawkins  v.  Gardiner  (2  Sin.  &  Gif. 

441),  265. 
Hawkins  v.  Garland  (76   Va.    149), 

222. 
Hawkins  v.  Grimes  (13  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

257,  264),  140. 
Hawkins  v.   Harding  (37   111.   App. 

564),  226. 
Hawkins  v.  Lee  (8  Lea,  Tenn.,  42), 

209. 
Hawkins  v.  Sanby  (48  Minn.  69),  4. 
Hawkins  v.  State  (27  Tex.  App.  273), 

319. 
Hawkins  v.  Thomas   (3  Ind.    App. 

399),  239. 
Hawks  v.  Baker  (6  Greenl.,  Me.,  72), 

315. 
Hawksworth  v.   Brammel  (5  M.  & 

Cr.  281),  77. 
Hawley  v.  Dawson  (16  Oreg.   344), 

373. 
Hawley  v.  Donnelly  (8  Paige,  N.  Y., 

415),  357. 
Haworth  v.  Norris  (28  Fla.  763),  212. 
Hawthorne  v.  State  (61  Miss.  749), 

102. 
Hayden  v.  Ewing  (1  B.  Mon.  113), 

222. 
Hayden  v.  Grillo  (42  Mo.   App.  1), 

*308. 
Hayden  v.  Westcott  (11  Conn.  129), 

136. 
Hayes  v.  Burkam  (67  Ind.  359),  67. 


Hayes  v.  Case  (10  How.  St.  Tr.  312), 

141. 
Hayes  v.  Fine  (91  Cal.  391),  254. 
Hayes  v.  Foskoll  (31  Me.  112),  232. 
Hayes  v.  Jackson  (37  Cent.  L.  J.  298), 

268. 
Hayes  v.  Seaver  (7  Greenl.  237).  73. 
Hayes  v.  White  (66  Me.  305),  140. 
Haynes   v.  Ledyard  (33  Mich.  319), 

339. 
Haynes  v.  McRae  (Ala.,  1893,  11  S. 

Rep.  270),  226. 
Haynes  v.  Mosher(15  How.  Pr.  216), 

191. 
Haynes  v.  Rowe  (40  Me.  181),  362. 
Haynes  v.  Thomas  (7  Ind.  38),  139. 
Hays  v.  Com.  (Ky.,   1890,  14  S.  W. 

Rep.  833),  103. 
Hays  v.  Miller  (70  N.  Y.  112),  200. 
Hays  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  361),  333. 
Haywood  v.  Collins  (60  111.  328),  232. 
Haywood  v.    Thacher  (19  N.  Y.   S. 

882),  151. 
Hazard  v.  Spencer  (17  R.   I.  561;  23 

Atl.  Rep.  729),  247. 
Hazzard  v.  Vickory  (78  Ind.  64),  140. 
Head   v.  Head  (1    Sim.  &  Stu.  150), 

234. 
Head  v.    Thompson  (77   Iowa,  263), 

168. 
Headen  v.  Womack  (88  N.  C.  468),  71. 
Headly  v.  Renner  (130  Pa.  St.   542), 

222. 
Heady   v.  Vevay   Turnpike  Co.   (52 

Ind.  117),  344. 
Heald  v.  Thwing  (45  Me.  396),  185, 

197. 
Healey,  In  re  (53  Vt.  694),  285. 
Healey  v.  Simpson  (Mo.,  1893,  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  881),  373. 
Healey  v.  Terry  (9  N.  Y.  S.  519),  349. 
Healey  v.    Bauer  (65   Hun,  621 ;  19 

N.  Y.  S.  989),  58. 
Heane  v.  Rogers  (9  B.  &  C.  597),  82. 
Heath   v.    Missouri   R.  Co.  (83  Mo. 

624),  150a. 
Heath  v.  State  (7  Tex.  App.  464),  3o0. 


lxxxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Heath  v.  Voge  (60  Pa.  St.   108),  146. 
Hecker  v.  Hopkins  (16  Abb.  Pr.,  N. 

Y.,  301),  249. 
Heckman  v.  Green  (Mo.,  1893,  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  455),  174. 
Heddles  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R.  Co. 

(46  N.  W.  Rep.  115;  71  Wis.  288), 

194,  350. 
Hedger  v.  Ward  (15  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

106),  106,  135. 
Heermance  v.  Vernoy  (6  Johns.  5), 

303. 
Hegard  v.  Insurance  Co.  (Colo.,  1890, 

11  Pac.  Rep.  594),  239. 
Hefron  v.  State  (8  Fla.  73),  249,  254. 
Heffron  v.  Gallupe  (55  Me.  563),  176, 

343. 
Heidekoper  v.  Cotton  (3  Watts,  Pa. , 

56),  176. 
Heilman  v.  Lazarus  (90  N.  Y.  672), 

250. 
Heldt  v.  State  (20  Neb.  492;  30  N. 

W.  Rep.  626),  2. 
Helfenstein's  Estate  (135  Pa.  St.  293), 

145. 
Heller  v.  Petterson  (3  N.  Y.  S.  257; 

18  N.  Y.  State  Rep.  928),  371. 
Helm  v.   State  (7  S.    Rep.   487;    67 

Miss.  562),  322. 
Helmsley  v.  Loader  (2  Canipb.  450), 

133. 
Helton  v.  Alabama  M.  Ry.  Co.  (Ala., 

1893,  12  S.  Rep.  276),  9. 
Helwig  v.  Laschowitz  (82  Mich.  619), 

354. 
Hemenway   v.    Kundsen    (67    Hun, 

648).  359. 
Hemenway  v.   Smith  (28  Vt,    701), 

174. 
Hemingway  v.  Garth   (51   Ala.  530), 

348. 
Hemminger  v.  West.  Ass'n(95  Mich. 

355;  54  N.  W.  Rep.  949),  21,  339. 
Hempstead  v.  Read  (6  Conn.  480),  143. 
Henderson  v.  Anderson  (3  How.,  U. 

S.,  73),  311. 
Henderson    v.   Bank    (1    Ala.   855), 

139a. 


Henderson  v.    Bonar  (Ky.,   1890.  11 

S.  W.  Rep.  809),  232. 
Henderson  v.  Evans (14  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

15),  150a. 
Henderson   v.    Miller   (36   111.    App. 

262),  11. 
Hendrickson  v.  People  (10  N.  Y.  13), 

93. 
Hendrickson,  Ex  parte  (6  Utah,  3;  21 

Pac.  Rep.  396),  166. 
Heneke  v.  Floring  (114  111.  554),  246. 
Henessy  v.  Murdock  (137  N.  Y.  317), 

249. 
Henley  v.  Com.  (1  Bush,  Ky.,  11), 

23. 
Henly  v.  State  (29  Ark.  17),  343. 
Hennell  v.  Lyon  (I  B.  &  A.  182),  147. 
Henry  v.  Allen  (82  Tex.  35),  159. 
Henry  v.  Bishop  (2  Wend.  575),  138. 
Henry  v.  Bradshaw  (20  Iowa,   355), 

226. 
Henry  v.  Deetrich  (7  N.  Y.  S.  505), 

24. 
Henry  v.  Diviney  (101  Mo.  378),  130. 
Henry  v.  Leigh  (3  Camp.  499,  502), 

127. 
Henry  v.  Sanson  (2  Tex.   Civ.  App. 

150;  21  S.  W.  Rep.  69),  153. 
Henry  v.  Tilton  (19  Vt.  447),  150a. 
Henry  v.  Wead  (4  Law  Bull.,  N.  Y., 

10),  359. 
Henry  v.  Whitaker  (82  Tex.  5),  30. 
Henry  v.  Willard  (73  N.  C.  35),  68. 
Henry  Buggy  Co.  v.  Pratt  (73  Iowa, 

485;  35  N.  W.  Rep.  587),  348. 
Hensel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (37  Minn. 

87).  230. 
Henshaw  v.  Foster  (9  Pick.  318),  125. 
Henthorn  v.  Doe  (1  Blatch.  157),  242. 
Herbert  v.  Berrier  (81  Ind.  1),  231. 
Herbert  v.  Duffur  (Oreg.,    1893,   32 

Pac.  Rep.  502),  366. 
Herbert  v.  Keck  (35  Neb.  508),  380. 
Herbst  v.  Vacuum  Oil  Co.  (68  Hun, 

222),  371. 
Herd  v.  Herd  (71  Iowa,  497),  282. 
Hermes  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (80  Wis. 

590),  56. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


lxxxix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hernandez  v.  State  (22  S.  Rep.  972), 

18. 
Herndon  v.  Reed  (82  Tex.  647),  135. 
Herrick  v.  Malin  (22  Wend.  38S),  129. 
Herrick  v.   Svvomley  (56   Md.    139), 

124,  139. 
Herring  v.  Goodson  (43  Miss.  392), 

234. 
Herrington  v.    Winn   (14   N.   Y.   S. 

612;  60  Hun,  235),  178,  308. 
Herster  v.  Herster  (122  Pa.  St.  239), 

51. 
Hess'  Appeal  (26  W.  N.  C.  121),  129. 
Hess  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  Co.  (7  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  565),  202. 
Hess  v.   Lowry  (122  Ind.  233),  189, 

340. 
Hess  v.  Morgan  (3  Johns.,  N.  Y.,  84), 

284. 
Hester  v.  Com.  (85  Pa.  St.  139),  320. 
Hestres  v.    Brennan   (50   Cal.    217), 

379. 
Heught  v.  Proper  (4  Wash.  C.  C.  661), 

306. 
Heuston  v.   Simpson  (17  N.  E.  Rep. 

261:  115  Ind.  162),  178. 
Hewelette  v.  George  (68  Miss.  703), 

363. 
Hevvett  v.  Eisenbart  (36  Neb.  794 ;  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  252),  52,  56. 
Hewitt  v.  Carey  (150  Mass.  445),  350. 
Hewitt   v.    Morgan  (Iowa,    1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  478),  136. 
Hewlett  v.  Cock  (7  Wend.  371,  374), 

105,  106. 
Hewthorn  v.  Doe  (1  Blackf.,   Ind., 

159),  239. 
Hey  ward   v.    Knapp   (22    Minn.    5), 

344. 
Hey  wood  v.    Reed   (4  Gray,  Mass., 

574),  70. 
Hickman  v.  Jones  (9  Wall.,  U.  S., 

201-2),  11. 
Hickman  v.  Quinn  (6  Yerg.,  Tenn., 

96),  223. 
Hickman  v.  State  (38  Tex.  191),  197. 
Hicks  v.  Lovell  (64  Cal.  14),  124. 
Hicks  v.  Sharp  (89  Ga.  311),  51,  333. 


Hicks  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S.  Rep. 

375),  346. 
Hier  v.  Grant  (47  N.  Y.  278),  309. 
Higbee  v.   Dresser  (103  Mass.   523), 

174. 
Higbie   v.    Guardian    L.   I.    Co.   (52 

N.  Y.  603),  188,  194. 
Higginbotham  v.  Campbell  (85  Ga. 

638),  11. 
Higgins  v.  Dellinger  (22  Mo.  397),  19. 
Higgins  v.   Dewey  (107  Mass.  494). 

200. 
Higham  v.  Ridgeway  (10  East,  109), 

58. 
Higham  v.  Vanosdol  (101  Ind.  160), 

70. 
Highton  v.  Dessau  (19  N.  Y.  S.  395), 

217. 
Higman  v.  Hood  (3  Ind.  App.  456), 

18. 
Hilburn  v.  Harris  (Tex.,  1893,   21  S. 

W.  Rep.  572),  376. 
Hildebrand  v.  Fogle  (20  Ohio,  147), 

221. 
Hildreth   v.    Aldrich  (15   R.   I.   63), 

348. 
Hildreth  v.   Martin  (3  Allen,  Mass., 

371),  79. 
Hiles  v.  La  Flesh  (59  Wis.  465),  136. 
Hill  v.  Blake  (97  N.  Y.  216),  214. 
Hill  v.  Bub  (35  Neb.  524),  130. 
Hill  v.  Com.   (88  Va.  633 ;  14  S.  E. 

Rep.  330),  385. 
Hill  v.  Crary  (7  Ark.  536),  305. 
Hill  v.  Durand  (58  Wis.  160),  211. 
Hill  v.  Froehlick  (14  N.   Y.   S.   610; 

60  Hun,  580),  347. 
Hill  v.  Hilert  (19  W.  R.  250),  53. 
Hill  v.  Lafayette  (2  Md.  476),  200. 
Hill  v.  Miller  (76  N.  Y.  32),  200. 
Hill  v.  Packard  (5  Wend.  387),  146. 
Hill  v.  Perry  (82  Ind.  128),  249. 
Hill  v.  Portland,    etc.    Co.    (55    Me. 

438),  198. 
Hill  v.  Roderick  (4W.&S,,  Pa.,  221), 

67. 
Hill  v.  State  (91  Tenn.  521;  19  S.  W. 

Rep.  674),  350. 


-XC 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hill  v.  State  (43  111.  177),  237. 
Hillv.  State   (9  Yerg.,  Tenn.,  357), 

218. 
Hill  v.  State  (64  Miss.  431),  93. 
Hill  v.  Wand  (47  Kan.  240),  82,  83. 
Hill  v.  Whidden  (158  Mass.    267;  33 

N.  E.  Rep.  526),  208. 
Hillesum  v.  City  of  New  York  (4  N. 

Y.  S.  506),  336. 
Hillman  v.  Schwenk  (68  Mich.  293), 

350. 
Hills  v.  Barnes  (11  N.  H.  395),  129. 
Hills  v.  Case  (2  Gratt.  594),  102,  234. 
Hills  v.  Ludwig  (24  N.  E.  Rep.  596; 

46  Ohio  St.  513),  66. 
Hilton  v.  Bender  (69  N.  Y.  75),  218. 
Hilton  v.  Railroad    Co.    (Ala.,   1893, 

12  S.  Rep.  276),  7,  12. 
Hilts  v.  Colvin  (14  Johns.  182),  322. 
Himes  v.  Krehl  (154  Pa.  St.  190),  343. 
Tfimrod  v.  Bolton  (44  111.  App.  516), 

140. 
Hine  v.  Corn.  (Ky.,   13  S.   W.   Rep. 

445),  102. 
Iline  v.  Hine  (39  Barb.  507),  215. 
Hinzie  v.  Moody  (1   Tex.   Civ.  App. 

26),  358. 
Hirschfeld  v.    Williamson  (18   Nev. 

66),  71. 
Hirth  v.  Graham  (Ohio,  1893,   33  N. 

E.  Rep.  90),  254. 
Hitchcock  v.  Davis  (87   Mich.    629), 

250. 
Hitchcock  v.  Moore  (70  Mich.  112), 

168,  354&. 
Hitchcock  v.  Thayer   (32  Neb.   477; 

49  N.  W.  Rep.  374\  11. 
Hitchings  v.    St.  Louis  Transp.  Co. 

(68  Hun,  33),  73a. 
Hitchins  v.  Eardley  (L.  R.  2  P.  &  M. 

248),  53. 
Hitchins  v.  Frostburg  (68  Md.  100), 

343. 
Hitt  v.  Jenks  (123  U.  S.  301),  136. 
Hix  v.  Hix  (25  W.  Va.  481),  238. 
Hix  v.  Whittemore  (4  Met.  545),  231. 
Hoare  v.  Silverlock  (12  Jur.  695),  237. 
Hobart  v.  Hobart  (62  N.  Y.  80),  309. 


Hobart  v.  Jones  (5  Wash.  St.  385). 

358. 
Hobbrook  v.  Turrell  (9   Pick.    105), 

265. 
Hobbs  v.  State  (133  Ind.  404 ;  32  N.  E. 

Rep.  1019).  350. 
Hobby  v.  Dana  (17  Barb.  Ill),  200. 
Hodge  v.  State  (26  Fla.  11 ;  7  S.  Rep. 

593),  319,  334. 
Hodge  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893,  10  S.  Rep. 

164),  6. 
Hodge  v.  Thompson  (9  Ala.  131),  70. 
Hodges  v.  Carvill  (44  N.  J.  L.  456), 

308. 
Hodges  v.  Hodges  (9  Mass.  320),  232. 
Hodges  v.  Hodges  (106   N.  C.  374), 

53,  113. 
Hodges  v.  Nash  (43  III.  App.  638), 

282. 
Hodges  v.  Percival   (152   111.   53;  23 

N.  E.  Rep.  423),  8. 
Hodges  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  (71  Mo. 

50),  12. 
Hoefiing  v.  Hambleton  (84  Tex.  617; 

19  S.  W.  Rep.  689).  38. 
Hoff  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,  16  S.  E.  Rep. 

99),  11. 
Hoffman   v.    Fitchburg   R.    Co.    (67 

Hun,  581),  386. 
Hoffman  v.  Newell  (20  N.  Y.  S.  432). 

159. 
Hoffman  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  174). 

346. 
Hofman  v.  Smith  (1  Caines,  157),  16*. 
Hogaboom  v.  Herrick  (4  Vt.  131),  77. 
Hogan  v.  Corinth  (19  Fla.  84),  107. 
Hogan  v.  Shuart  (11  Mont.  498),  R66. 
Hogan  v.  State  (36  Wis.  296),  249. 
Hogansv.  Caruth  (18  Fla.  587),  135. 
Hoge  v.  Fisher  (1  Pet.   C.   C.   163), 

250. 
Hoge  v.  Hoge  (1  Watts,   163,  213), 

222. 
Hogel  v.  Lindell  (10  Mo.  483),  223. 
Hogg  v.  Orgill  (34  Pa.  St.  344),  69. 
Hoghten  v.  Hoghten  (15  Beav.  321?. 

75. 
Hogle  v.  Lowe  (12  Nev.  286),  268. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XU 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hogue  v.  Williamson  (Tex.,  1893,  22 

S.  W.  Rep.  7G2),  247. 
Hoitt  v.    Moulton    (21   N.    H.    586), 

139. 
Holbrook  v.  Burt  (22  Pick.,  Mass., 

546),  208. 
Holbrook  v.  Gay  (6  Cush.  215),  60. 
Holbrook  v.  Jackson  (7  Cush.   136), 

37. 
Holbrook  v.  New    Jersey  Zinc  Co. 

(57  N.  Y.  624),  134. 
Holbrook  v.  Nichol  (36  111.  161),  136. 
Holcomb  v.   Cornish  (8  Conn.  375), 

147. 
Holcomb  v.  Holcomb  (28  Conn.  177), 

317. 
Holcomb  v.  Holcomb  (95  N.  Y.  325), 

309. 
Holcomb  v.   Mooney  (13  Orcg.  513), 

217. 
Holcomb  v.  State  (28  Ga.  66),  33. 
Holdane  v.  Colespring  (21  N.  Y.  474), 

84. 
Holdridge  v.  Lee  (S.  D.,  1893,  52  N. 

W.  Rep.  265),  341. 
Holdridge  v.    Marsh   (30   Mo.   App. 

352),  148. 
Holker  v.  Parker  (7  Cranch,  436),  74. 
Holland  v.  Farthing  (Tex.,    1893,  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  67),  246. 
Holland  v.  State  (31  Tex.   Cr.    Rep. 

345),  283. 
Hollander  v.4Hiill  (58  Hun,  604),  2S5. 
Hollen  v.  Davis  (59  Iowa,  444),  221. 
Hollenback  v.  Fleming  (6  Hill,  304;, 

138. 
Holley  v.  Holley  (12  Am.   Dec.  342), 

242. 
Holliday  v.   Jackson  (30  Mo.    App. 

263),  69. 
Holliday  v.  McKinnie  (22  Fla.  153), 

309. 
Hollingsworth    v.   Holbrook   (45  N. 

W.  Rep.  561 ;  SO  Iowa,  151),  128. 
Hollingsworth  v.  State  (53  Ark.  387), 

350. 
Hollingsworth  v.  State  (4  S.  E.  Rep. 

560;  79  Ga.  605),  342. 
G 


Hollingsworth  v.  Walker  (13  S.  Rep, 

6),  220. 
Hollis  v.  Harris  (Ala.,    1893,    10  S. 

Rep.  377),  128. 
Hollister   v.   Cordero  (76  Cal.    649), 

232. 
Hollister  v.  Young  (41  Vt.   556),  308. 
Holloway  v.  Frick  (Pa.,  1893,  24Atl. 

Rep.  201).  214. 
Holloway  v    Railroad  Co.   (23   Tex. 

465),  242. 
Holman  v.  Kimball  (22  Vt.  555),  169v 
Holmes  v.  Anderson  (59  Tex.   481), 

209. 
Holmes  v.  Broughton  (10  Wend.,  N. 

Y.,  75),  230. 
Holmes  v.  Budd  (11  Iowa,  186),  68. 
Holmes  v.   Crowe!  1  (73  N.   C.  613), 

84. 
Holmes  v.  Goldsmith  (147  U.  S.  150), 

56,  139a,  140,  219. 
Holmes  v.  Gratz  (50  Fed.  Rep.  869). 

159. 
Hoist  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  1).  310. 
Holt  v.  Miers  (9  C.  &  P.  191),  127. 
Holt  v.  Moore  (37  Ark.  148).  128. 
Holt  v.  Pie  (120  Pa.  St.  425),  84. 
Holt  v.  Spokane  R.  Co.  (Idaho,  1894, 

35  Pac.  Rep.  39).  73a. 
Holton  v.  Carter  (90  Ga.  299;  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  819).  71. 
Holyoke,   etc.    Co.    v.    Ambden  (55 

Fed.  Rep.  593),  285. 
Homan  v.  State  (23  Tex.  212),  277. 
Home  v.  Bentinck  (2  Brod.  &  Bing. 

130),  175. 
Home  v.  McKenzie  (6  C.   &  F.  628), 

339. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bethel  (42  111.  App, 

475),  24. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  B.  W.  Co.  (93  U.  S 

548),  75. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Maple  (Ind.,  1890, 

27  N.  E.  Rep.  633),  220. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Myers  (93  111.  271), 

304. 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide  (11   Wall., 

U.  S.,  438;,  199. 


XCll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Homo  Lumbnr  Co.  v.  Hartman  (45 

Mo.  A  pp.  6L7),  10. 
Homer  v.  Cilley  (14  N.  H.  85),  108. 
Horner  v.  Wallia  (11  Mass.  309),  138. 
Homeyer  v.  N.  J.  S.  &   W.   Co.  (06 

Hun,  626),  127. 
Hommedieu  v.  Railroad  Co.  (120  Ind. 

435).  366. 
Hon  v.  Hon  (70  Ind.  135),  265. 
Hong  Kong  &   Shanghai   Banking 

Co.  v.    Cooper  (114   N.  Y.  388). 

371. 
Hood  v.   Pioneer  M.  &  M.    Co.  (95 

Ala.  461;   11  S.  Rep.  10),  21. 
Hood  v.  Tyner  (3  Ind.  App.    51).  76. 
Hook  v.  Kenyon  (55  Hun,  598),  199. 
Hook  v.  vStovell  (26  Ga.  704),  192. 
Hooker    v.   Axford    (33   Mich.    453), 

222. 
Hoope  v.  State  (81  Ala.  51),  89. 
Hooper  v.  Taylor  (39  Me.  224),  79. 
Hooper  v.  W.  W.  Co.  (37  Hun,  568), 

107. 
Hoover  v.  Hoover  (129  Pa.  St.  201), 

213,  248. 
Hope  v.  Sawyer  (14  111.  254),  135. 
Hopkins  v.  Albertson  (2   Bay,   484), 

138. 
Hopkins  v.  Banks  (7  Cow.  650),  69. 
Hopkins  v.  Bovvers  (108  N.   C.  298), 

308,  374. 
Hopkins  v.  Bowers  (111  N.   C.   175), 

373. 
Hopkins  v.  Coburn  (1  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

292),  286. 
Hopkins  v.  Com.  (50  Pa.  St.  9),  9. 
Hopkins  v.  De  Graffenreid  (2  Bay, 

187),  138. 
Hopkins  v.  McCrillis  (158  Mass.   97; 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  1026),  84. 
Hopkins  v.    Megguire    (35    Me.   78), 

139. 
Hopper  v.  Ashley  (15   Ala.  457),  139. 
Hopps  v.  People  (31  III.  385),  10. 
Hopt   v.    People  (7  S.  Ct.   614;  120 

U.  S.  431),  6. 
Horbach  v.  State  (43  Tex.  242),  102. 
Horn  v.  Cole  (51  N.  H.  287),  83,  84. 


Horn  v.   Haverhill  (113  Mass.  344), 

360. 
Horn  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S.  Rep. 

329),  332. 
Horn  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  13  S.  Rep. 

329),  11,  249. 
Horn  v.  State  (1  Kan.  42),  6. 
Home  v.  Bank  (108  N.  C.  100),  84. 
Home  v.  Williams  (23  Ind.  37),  124. 
Horner  v.  Stillwell  (35  N.  J.  L.  307), 

205. 
Hornish   v.    People  (142  111.  620;  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  677),  231. 
Hornsby  v.  State  (10  S.  Rep.  522;  94 

Ala.  50),  39,  89,  234. 
Hosmer  v.  McDonald  (Ark.,  1892,  19 

S.  W.  Rep.  963),  206. 
Hotchkiss  v.   Gen.   Ins.  Co.  (5  Hun, 

N.  Y,  101),  350. 
Hotchkiss    v.    Hunt    (56   Me.    252), 

150a. 
Hotchkiss  v.    Lyon  (2  Blackf.  222), 

73. 
Hough  v.  Barton  (20  Vt.  455),  73. 
Houghton  v.  Jones  (1   Wall.,  U.  S., 

702),  134. 
Houlton  v.  Manteuffel  (51  Minn.  185; 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  541),  53. 
Housch  v.  People  (66  111.  178),  232. 
House  v.  Beak  (43  111.  App.  615;  14.1 

111.  290),  79. 
House  v.  Greensburg  (93  Ind.  533), 

242. 
House  v.  Metcalf  (27  Conn.   632),  8, 

24. 
House  v.   Montgomery  (19  Mo.  App. 

170),  226. 
Houston    v.    Jordan  (82   Tex.    352), 

129. 
Hovey  v.   Elliot  (21  N.  Y.  S.  1083), 

159. 
Howard  v.  American,  etc.,   Soc.   (49 

Me.  288),  221. 
Howard  v.  Brewer  (37  Ohio  St.  402), 

168. 
Howard    v.    Lock  (Ky.,  1893,   22  S. 

W.  Rep.  332),  129. 
Howard  v.  Moot  (61  N.  Y.  2G2),  238. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


XClil 


References  are  to  sections. 


Howard  v.  Patrick  (38  Mich.  795), 

121. 
Howard  v.   Patrick  (42  Mich.   121), 

139a. 
Howard  v.  Skillwell  (139  U.  S.  199), 

362. 
Howard  v.  State  (23  Tex.  A  pp.  255), 

102. 
Howard  v.  State  (50  Ind.  192),  249. 
Howard  v.   Thompson  (12  Ohio  St 

201),  205. 
Howard  v.  Walker  (90  Tenn.  452 ;  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  897),  216. 
Howard  v.  Zimpelman  (Tex.,   1890, 

14  S.  W.  Rep.  59),  309. 
Howe  v.  Howard  (158  Mass.  278;  33 

N.  E.  Rep.  528),  8. 
Howe  v.  Sch  wernberg  (4  Misc.  Rep. 

73),  341. 
Howell    v.   Bowman  (Ala.,   1892,  10 

S.  Rep.  640),  339. 
Howell  v.  Dilts  (Ind.,  1892,  30  N.  E. 

Rep.  313),  386. 
Howell  v.  Howell  (47  Ga.  492),  70. 
Howell  v.  Moores  (127  111.  86),  208. 
Howell   Lumber   Co.    v.    Campbell 

(Neb.,  1894,  57  N.  W.  Rep.  383), 

351. 
Howes  v.  Rucker  (94  Ala.  166),  151. 
Howes  v.  State  (88  Ala.  37),  141. 
Howie  v.  Edward  (Ala.,  1893,  11  S. 

Rep.  748), 
Howser  v.   Com.   (51   Pa.    St.   338), 

346. 
Hoxey  v.  Green  (37  How.   Pr.   97), 

252. 
Hoxsie   v.  Empire  Lumber  Co.  (41 

Minn.  548),  199. 
Hoy  v.  Morris  (13  Gray,  519),  168. 
Hoyt   v.  Hannekin  (14  How.    346), 

361. 
Hoyt  v.   Hoyt  (112  N.  Y.  513),  171, 

178. 
Hoyt  v.  Newbold  (45  N.  J.  L.  319), 

233. 
Hoyt  v.  People  (140  111.  588),  346. 
Hroneck  v.  People  (134   111.  139;  24 

N.  E.  Rep.  861),  316. 


Hubbard  v.  Alexander  (3  Ch.  D.  738). 

222. 
Hubbard  v.  Greeley  (84  Me.  340),  212. 
Hubbard   v.  Hubbard   (7   Oreg.  42), 

330. 
Hubbard   v.  Johnson  (77   Me.   139), 

309. 
Hubbard  v.   Marshall  (50  Wis.  322),   ' 

205. 
Hubbell  v.  Hubbell  (22  Ohio  St.  208), 

308. 
Huber  v.  Beck  (Ind.,  1893,  33  N.  E. 

Rep.  985),  199. 
Huckabee  v.  Abbott  (87  Ala.  409), 

309. 
Huckabee  v.  Shepherd  (75  Ala.  342), 

212. 
Hudson  v.  Applegate  (Iowa,  1893,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  462),  123. 
Hudson  y.  Chicago  Ry.  Co.  (59  Iowa, 

581),  8. 
Hudson  v.  Daily  (13  Ala.  722),  148. 
Hudson  v.  Hudson  (90  Ga.  581 ;  16 

S.  E.  Rep.  349),  20,  334. 
Hudson  v.  Puett  (86  Ga.  341),  138. 
Hudson   v.  Roos  (76  Mich.  180),  121, 

344. 
Hudson  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  323), 

350. 
Hudson  v.  White  (17  R.  I.  519),  213, 

246. 
Hudson  v.  Yost  (13  S.  E.  Rep.  836), 

153. 
Hudspeth  v.  Mears  (Ga.,  1893,  17  S. 

E.  Rep.  837),  343. 
Hudspeth  v.  State  (55  Ark.  323),  378. 
Hueston  v.  Hueston  (2  Ohio  St.  488), 

67. 
Huet  v.  Lemesurier  (1  Cox,  Eq.  275), 

144. 
Huetteman  v.  Viesselmann  (48  Mo. 

App.  582),  75. 
Huff  v.  Bennett  (4  Sandf.,  N.  Y., 

120),  124,  139. 
Huff  v.  Latimer  (33  S.  C.  255;  11  S. 

E.  Rep.  758),  342. 
Huff  v.  Nims  (11  Neb.  363),  139a. 
Hughbanks,  In  re  (44  Kan.  105),  279. 


xciv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hughes  v.  Boone  (102  N.  C.  43),  173. 
Hughes  v.  Budd  (8  Dovvl.  315),  127. 
Hughes  v.  Detroit  (81    N.   W.    Rep. 

603;  63  Mich.  10),  317. 
Hughes  v.  Ward  (38  Kan.  452),  341, 

367. 
Hughes  v.  Wilkinson  (37  Miss.  482). 

135. 
Hughes  v.  Wilkinson  (35   Ala.  453). 

220. 
Hughey  v.  Eichelberger(ll  S.  C.  36), 

300. 
Hulbert  v.  Carver  (37  Barb.  62),  237. 
Hull  v.  Blake  (13  Mass.  155),  152. 
Humason  v.  Lobe  (76  Tex.  512),  151. 
Huuibard  v.  State (21  Tex.  App.  200), 

23. 
Humes  v.  O'Brien  (74  Ala.  64),  68. 
Humphrey  v.  Cande  (2  Cow.,  N.  Y., 

509),  357. 
Humphrey  v.  Cumming    (5   Wend., 

N.  YM  90),  287. 
Humphreys   v.    Burnside    (4    Bush, 

215),  238. 
Humphreys   v.    Guillow  (13  N.    H. 

385),  129. 
Humphreys  v.  Railroad  Co.  (13  S.  E. 

Rep.  985),  212. 
Humphreys  v.  Railroad  Co.  (88  Va. 

431),  212. 
Humphreys  v.  State  (78    Wis.    569; 

47  N.  W.  Rep.  836),  342,  376. 
Humphries  v.  Johnson  (20  Iud.  190), 

190. 
Hunnicut  v.  Peyton  (102  U.  S.  363), 

66. 
Hunnicutt  v.  Railroad  Co.  (11    S.  E. 

Rep.  580;  85  Ga.  195),  370. 
Hunscom  v.  Hunscom(15  Mass.  184). 

316. 
Hunsinger  v.  Hofner  (110  Ind.  390), 

339. 
Hunt  v.  Adams  (6  Mass.  519),  128. 
Hunt  v.  Adams  (7  Mass.  518),  188. 
Hunt  v.  Blackburn  (9  S.  Ct.  125;  128 

U.  S.  461),  171. 
Hunt  v.  Cassidy  (7    U.  S.  App.  124), 

249. 


Hunt  v.  Lowell   Gas   Co.    (8    Allen, 

Mass.,  170),  188. 
Hunt  v.  Lyle  (8  Yerg.  142),  148. 
Hunt  v.  Order  of  Chosen  Friends  (61 

Mich.  671),  58,  144. 
Hunt  v.  Strew  (33  Mich.  85).  71. 
Hunt's  Case  (4  Dall.  387).  286. 
Hunt,  In   re   (L.  R.  3   P.  &   D.  250), 

222. 
Hunter  v.  Bilyeu  (30  111.  228),  223. 
Hunter  v.  Burlington,    etc.    Co.   (76 

Iowa,  490),  123. 
Hunter  v.  Lanius  (82  Tex.  677),  208. 
Hunter  v.  New  York,  O.  &  W.  R.  R. 

Co.  (HON.  Y.  622),  237,  241. 
Hunter  v.  Riley  (36  Pa.  St.  509),  355. 
Hunter  v.  State  (29  Fla.  486),  6. 
Hunter  v.  Whitehead   (42   Mo.  524), 

267. 
Hunting  v.  Finch  (3  Ohio,  445),  129. 
Huntington  v.  Attrill(118  N.  Y.  365), 

7,  8. 
Huntington   v.    Atwell    (146    U.  S. 

657),  159. 
Huntington  v.  Charlotte  (15  Vt.  46), 

232. 
Huntington  v.  Conkey  (33  Barb.,  N. 

Y.,  218),  249,  252. 
Huntington  v.  Schultz  (Harp.,  S.  C, 

452),  286. 
Huntley  v.  Huet  (22  Atl.  Rep.  34  ;  59 

Conn.  102),  151. 
Huntley  v.  Huntley  (114  U.  S.  394), 

267. 
Huntsville   v.  L.  S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co. 
(Ala.,  1893,  12  S.  Rep.  295),  186, 
341. 
Hurd  v.  Bovee  (134  N.  Y.  596;  31  N. 

E.  Rep.  624),  217. 
Hurlbut  v.  Hurlbut  (128  N.  Y.  420), 

11.  170. 
Hurlbut  v.  Hurlbut  (63  Vt.  667),  366. 
Hurley  v.  Lockett  (72  Tex.  262),  66, 

7!. 
Hurley  v.  Sullivan    (137    Mass.    86), 

249. 
Hurst  v.  Beaver  (50  Mich.  612),  223. 
Hurst  v.  Jones  (1  Wall.   Jr.  373),  53. 


TABLE    OF    CA8E8. 


XCV 


References  are  to  sections. 


Hurst,  Ex  parte  (1  Wash.  C.  C.  18G), 

2*7. 
Hurt  v.  Evans  (49  Tex.  311),  300. 
Hurt    v.    McCartney    (18    111.    129), 

136. 
Hussey  v.  Kirkwood  (95  N.  C.  63), 

139a. 
Hussey  v.  State  (87  Ala.  121),  166. 
Hussman  v.    Wilkie  (50  Cal.   250), 

207. 
Hust  v.  Mellinger  (73  Tex.  189),  150. 
Huston  v.  Ticknor  (99  Pa.  St.  238), 

138. 
Hutchings  v.  Castle  (48  Cal.  152),  70. 
Hutchings  v.  Corgan  (59  111.  70).  124. 
Hutchins  v.  Adams  (3  Greenl.  174), 

20. 
Hutchins  v.  Corn'i'S    (16    Minn.    13), 

150a. 
Hutchins  v.  Hutchins  (98  N.  Y.  56), 

11. 
Hutchinson    v.    Ainsworth  (63   Cal. 

286),  136. 
Hutchinson    v.    Boltz    (35    W.    Va. 

754),  5. 
Hutchison  v.  Cleary  (N.  D.,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  729),  309. 
Hutchison   v.   State  (19   Neb.    263), 

345. 
Hutton  v.  Weber  (17   N.  Y.  S.  463), 

136. 
Hutzler  v.  Hubbard  (26  Tex.    537), 

68. 
Huxley  v.  Harrold  (62  Mo.  616),  136. 
Hyatt  v.  Pugsley  (23   Barb.,   N.  Y., 

285),  221. 
Hyburn  v.  State  (26  Tex.  App.  668), 

283. 
Hyde  v.  Shank  (93   Mich.  535),  247. 
Hyde  v.  Woolfolk  (1  Iowa,  159),  140, 

166,  185. 
Hyden  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep. 

401),  283,  350. 
Hydrick  v.  Burke  (30  Ark.  124),  220. 
Hynes  v.  McDermott  (82   N.  Y.  41), 

139. 
H v.    P (L.    R    3  P.  &  D. 

126),  202. 


I. 


Iasigi  v.  Rosenstein  (65  Hun,  591),  216. 
Idaho,  etc.  Co.  v.  Bradbury  (132  U. 

S.  509),  7. 
Idaho  Ford  Co.  v.  Firemen's  Ins.  Co. 

(Utah,   1893,  29  Pac.   Rep.  826), 

73a. 
111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.   v.   People  (111., 

1893,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  173).  186. 
111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Ruffin  (Miss., 

1888,  3  S.  Rep.  578),  50. 
111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.    Sutton    (42 

Mich.  438),  52,  192. 
Imrie  v.  Castrigue  (8  C.  B.,  N.   S., 

406),  158. 
Ince  v.  Beekman  (16  La,   Ann.  352), 

233. 
Independence  v.  Trovvville  (15  Kan. 

70),  143a. 
Indiana,  etc.  Co.  v.   Cook  (102  Ind. 

113),  253. 
Indianapolis  v.  Scott  (72  Ind.  196), 

343. 
Indianapolis   Cabinet   Co.    v.    Herr- 

man  (Ind.,   18lJ3,  34  N.  E.  Rep. 

579),  330. 
Indianapolis,  etc.    Co.   v.   Stout   (53 

Ind.  543),  123. 
Indianapolis    Ry.    v.    Boetcher  (131 

Ind.  82;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  551),  8. 
Ingalls  v.  State  (48  Wis.  647),  324. 
Ingersoll  v.  Stiger  (46  N.  J.  Eq.  511), 

304. 
Ingle  v.  Jones  (43  Iowa,  286),  246. 
Ingraham   v.   Hutchison    (2    Conn. 

584),  229. 
Ingram  v.  State  (27  Ala.  17),  244. 
Insurance   Co.    v.   Forchheimer   (86 

Ala.  541),  242. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Hazen  (110  Pa.  St. 

537),  10. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Lane  (46  N.  J.  Eq. 

316),  50. 
Insurance  Co.    v.  Morey  (96  U.   S. 

544),  83. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Mosley  (8  Wall.,  U. 

S.,  397),  52,  57. 


XCV1 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Insurance  Co.   v.  Sheppard  (85  Ga. 

751),  57. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Slowitch  (55  N.  Y. 

Super.  Ct.  452),  334. 
Insurance  Co.  v.  Throop  (22  Mich. 

146),  217. 
Insurance  Co.   v.  "Weide  (11   Wall., 

U.  S.,  441),  225. 
International  Co.    v.    Ragsdale    (67 

Tex.  27),  76. 
International,    etc.    Co.    v.    Kuehn 

(Tex.,  1893,  21  S.   W.   Rep.  58), 

50,  52. 
International,  etc.  Co.  v.  Underwood 

(64  Tex.  464),  202. 
International  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Dyer  (76 

Tex.  156),  341. 
Investment    Co.    v.   Elridge  (2   Pa. 

Dis.  Ct.  Rep.  394),  140. 
Irby  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  103),  101. 
Irish  v.  Smith  (8  S.  &  R.  573),  180. 
Irvin  v.  Bail  (80  Tex.  352),  362. 
Irvin  v.  Howard  (37  Ga.  23),  358. 
Irving  v.  Campbell  (56  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  224),  130. 
Irving   v.   Edrington   (41    La.    Ann. 

671),  356. 
Irwin  v.  Phillips  (5  Cal.  140),  238. 
Irwin  v.  West  (81  Pa.  St.  157),  67. 
Isaacson  v.   N.  Y.   Cent.   R.  R.  Co. 

(94  N.  Y.  278),  242. 
Isenhour  v.  Isenhour  (64  N.  C.  640), 

309. 
Isley  v.  Boon  (109  N.  C.  555),  30. 
Ives  v.  Kimball  (1  Mich.  308),  136. 
Ives  v.  Quinn  (27  N.  Y.  S.  251),  199. 
Ives  v.  Williams  (50  Mich.  100),  205. 
Ivory  v.  Town  of  Deer  Park  (116  N. 

Y.  476),  186. 

J. 

Jaccard   v.    Anderson  (37   Mo.    91), 

123. 
Jackson  v.  Allen  (120  Mass.  64),  83. 
Jackson  v.  Beneham  (15  Johns.,  N. 

Y.,  226),  53. 
Jackson  v.  Birton  (11  Johns.  64),  83. 


Jackson  v.  Boncham  (15  Johns.  226), 

142,  222. 
Jackson  v.  Cairns  (20  Johns.,  N.  Y., 

300),  130. 
Jackson  v.  Cbristman  (4  Wend.,  N. 

Y.,  277),  107. 
Jackson  v.  Clopton  (66  Ala.  29).  75. 
Jackson  v.  Com.  (19  Gratt.  656),  101. 
Jackson  v.  Cooly  (8  Johns.  128,  131), 

52,  53. 
Jackson  v.  Crilly  (16  Colo.  103),  123. 
Jackson  v.  Crissey  (3  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

251),  123. 
Jackson  v.  Fairbanks  (2  H.  Bl.  340), 

69. 
Jackson  v.    French  (3  Wend.   337), 

1G8. 
Jackson  v.   Gager  (5  Cow.,  N.  Y., 

383),  314. 
Jackson  v.  Gardner  (8  Johns.   404), 

265. 
Jackson  v.  Jackson  (47  Ga.  99),  32. 
Jackson  v.  Jones  (74  Tex.  104),  308. 
Jackson  v.  LaGrange(19  Johns.  336), 

138. 
Jackson  v.  Lamb    (7  Cow.,    N.    Y., 

431),  108. 
Jackson  v.  Laroway  (3  Johns.  Cas. 

283),  106,  108. 
Jackson  v.  Lawson  (15  Johns.  544), 

123. 
Jackson  v.  Litch    (62  Pa.    St.    451), 

341. 
Jackson  v.  Lodge  (36  Cal.  28),  223. 
Jackson  v.  Luquere    (5    Cow.    221), 

105,  108,  138. 
Jackson  v.  Marford  (7  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

62),  225. 
Jackson  v.  McVey  (18  Johns.    330), 

173. 
Jackson  v.  Nelson  (6  Cow.  248),  303. 
Jackson  v.  Osborn    (2    Wend.    555), 

129. 
Jackson  v.  Parker    (13    Conn.    352), 

311. 
Jackson  v.  Plumb    (8    Johns.    295), 

242. 
Jackson  v.  Russell  (4  Wend.  543),  53. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


XCV1) 


References  are  to  sections. 


Jackson  v.  Seager  (2  D.  &  L  13),  284. 
Jackson  v.  State  (54  Ark.  243),  283. 
Jackson  v.  State  (1  Ind.  185),  315. 
Jackson  v.  State  (88  Ga.  787),  23. 
Jackson  v.  Swope  (Ind.,  1893,  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  909),  350. 
Jackson  v.  Tatebo  (3  Wash.  St.  456), 

250. 
Jackson  v.  Times  (152  Pa.  St.  40G), 

11. 
Jackson  v.  Winchester  (4  Dall.  206), 

123. 
Jackson  v.  Wood  (3  Wend.  27).  157. 
Jackson  v.  Wood  worth  (3  Paige,  136), 

356. 
Jacksonville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Pen.  Trans. 

Co.  (27  Fia.  157;  9  S.  Rep.  661), 

73a,  373. 
Jacksonville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Southworth 

(32  111.  A  pp.  307),  363. 
Jacobi  v.  Order   of  Germania  (26  N. 

Y.  S.  318),  58. 
Jacobs  v.  Duke  (1  E.  D.  Smith,  N.  Y., 

271),  10. 
Jacobs   v.    Hester  (113    Mass.    157), 

168. 
Jacobs  v.  Shorey  (48  N.  H.  100),  69. 
Jacobs'   Case  (5  Jones,  N.   C,  259). 

345. 
Jacoway  v.  Gault  (20  Ark.  190),  136. 
Jacqua  v.  Witham   (106   Ind.  515), 

218. 
James  v.  Bligh  (11  Allen,  Mass.,  4), 

211. 
James  v.  Farnell  (1  Turn.  &  R.  417), 

138. 
James  v.  Ford  (9  N.  Y.  S.  127),  8. 
James  v.  James  (81  Tex.  373),  158. 
James  v.  Mickey  (26  S.  C.  270),  351. 
James  v.  Walrath  (8  Johns.  410).  23. 
James  v.  Weigbtnian  (Fla.,  1893,  12 

S.  Rep.  526),  159. 
James  v.  Work  (24  N.  Y.  S.  147),  9, 

20. 
Jameson  v.  Drinkard  (12  Moore,  148), 

198. 
Jameson  v.   Emerson  (82  Me.   309), 

223. 


Jameson  v.  Snyder  (79  Wis.  2S6;  48 

N.  W.  Rep.  261),  130. 
Jamieson  v.  Ind.  etc.  Co.  (46  N.  Y. 

421),  241. 
Jamison  v.  Ludlow  (3  La.  Ann.  492), 

214. 
Jamison  v.  People  (145  111.   357;    34 

N.  E.  Rep.  46S),  6,  84.  232. 
Janeway  v.  Skerritt  (30  N.  J.  L.  97). 

74. 
Janney  v.  Brown  (36  La.  Ann.  118), 

214. 
Jardine  v.  Sheridan  (2  C.  &  K.  24), 

168. 
Jarrell  v.  Jarrell  (27  W.  Va.   743), 

223. 
Jarrett  v.  Jarrett  (11  W.   Va.   562). 

250. 
Jasper  v.  Porter  (2  McLean,  579),  242. 
Jassv.  Mohn   (R.    I.,    1893,    26   Atl. 

Rep.  787),  308. 
Jauncy  v.  Thorne  (2  Barb.   Ch.   40), 

138. 
Jeans  v.  Wheedqn  (2  M.  &  Rob.  484). 

93. 
Jefferds  v.  Alvord  (151  Mass.  95),  9. 
Jefferds  v.  People  (5  Park.  C.  R.  547). 

91. 
Jefferson  v.  New  York  EI.   R.   Co. 

(132  N.  Y.  483),  366. 
Jefferson  v.  State  (80  Ga.  16),  334. 
Jefferson ville,  etc   R.  Co.  v.  Bowen 

(40  Ind.  545),  344. 
Jeffersonville,   etc.   Co.    v.  Lanham 

(27  Ind.   171).  198. 
Jeffries  v.  Jeffries  (39  Ala.  655),  238. 
Jenkins  v.  Collard  (145  U.  S.   546). 

240. 
Jenkins  v.  Lykes  (19  Fla.    148),  217. 
Jenkins  v.  Meagher  (46  Miss.  84),  77. 
Jenkins  v.  Railroad    Co.   (110  N.  C. 

438),  344. 
Jenkins  v.  State   (Fla.,    1893,   12   S. 

Rep.  677),  229,  337. 
Jenkyns  v.  Gaisford  (32  L.  J.  Prob. 

122),  269. 
Jenner  v.  Joliffee  (6  Johns.  9),  38,  80. 
Jennings  v.  Bank  (8  Mich.  181),  114. 


XCV111 


TABLE  OF  CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Jennings  v.  Moore  (83  Mich.  231;  47 

N.  W.  Rep.  127),  205. 
Jennings  v.  Railroad  Co.  (97  N.  Y. 

438),  220. 
Jennison    v.   Citizens'  Sav.  Bank  (83 

N.  Y.  540),  359. 
Jennison  v.  Hapgood  (10  Pick.  77),  50. 
Jennison  v.  Mosely  (Miss.,    1S92,    10 

S.  Rep.  582),  249. 
Jenson  v.  McCorkle  (154  Pa.  St.  353), 

220. 
Jerman  v.  Tenneas  (44  La.  Ann.  020), 

370. 
Jesse  v.  Davis  (34  Mo.  App.  341),  00. 
Jesse  v.  Parker  (0  Gratt.  57),  131. 
Jewel  v.  Jewel  (1  How.,  U.  S.,  219), 

57. 
Jewell  v.  Centre  (25  Ala.  498),  242. 
Jewell  v.  Jewell  (17  Pet.  213),  53. 
Jilmer  v.  Schell  (35   N.   Y.  Sup.   Ct. 

67),  60. 
Jim  v.  State  (4  Humph.,  Tenn.,  289), 

343. 
Jinks  v.  Lewis  (89  Ga.  787),  373. 
Jobbins  v.  Gray  (34  111.   App.  208), 

376. 
John  Morris  Co.  v.  Burgess  (44  111. 

App.  27),  341. 
Johnson  v.  Armstrong  (Ala.,   1893, 

12  S.  Rep.  12),  222,  231. 
Johnson  v.  Bradstreet  (81  Ga.  425), 

COG* 

Johnson  v.    Broadway  R.  R.  Co.  (0 

N.  Y.  S.  112),  192. 
Johnson  v.  Brown  (130  Ind.  61),  360. 
Johnson    v.    Buckle  (05   Hun,   001), 

358. 
Johnson   v.    Clarkson  (3  Rich.   Eq. 

305),  210. 
Johnson  v.   Clements  (25  Kan.  370), 

121. 
Johnson  v.   Com.  (Ky.,    1894,  23  S. 

W.  Rep.  507),  283. 
Johnson  v.   Crippen  (02  Miss.  597), 

304. 
Johnson  v.  dotty  (22  N.  Y.  S.  753), 

180. 
Johnson  v.  Culver  (116  Ind.  278),  60. 


Johnson  v.   Daverne  (19  Johns.  Ch. 

134),  139. 
Jobnson  v.  Day  (2  N.  D.  295),  129. 
Johnson   v.    Day   (17   Pick.,    Mass., 

108),  150a. 
Johnson  v.  Delaney  (35  Tex.  42),  246. 
Johnson  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (90  Ga.   810;  17  S.   E.   Rep. 

121),  109. 
Johnson  v.  Hart  (82  Ga.  767),  311. 
Johnson  v.   Heald  (33  Md.  352),  300. 
Johnson   v.   Howes  (2   Stew.,   Ala., 

27).  148. 
Johnson  v.  Johnson  (65  Tex.  87),  254. 
Johnson   v.   Johnson  (114   111.    Gil), 

Johnson    v.    Josephs    (75   Me.   544), 

249. 
Johnson  v.  Kelleher  (115  Mass.  125; 

29  N.  E.  Rep.  200),  12. 
Johnson  v.  Kettler  (84  111.  315),  232. 
Johnson  v.  Mar.  B.  R.  (28  Neb.  492), 

129. 
Johnson  v.  Marsh  (2  La.  Ann.  772), 

09. 
Johnson  v.   Maxwell  (87  N.   C.  18), 

249. 
Johnson  v.    Merithew  (80  Me.  115), 

232. 
Johnson  v.  Merry,  etc.  Co.  (53  Fed. 

Rep.  569),  366. 
Johnson  v.  Miller  (82  Iowa,  693),  151. 
Johnson  v.  Mills  (31  Neb.  524),  282. 
Johnson  v.  N.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (47  Minn. 

430),  192. 
Johnson  v.  Parrotte  (34  Neb.  26;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  290),  176. 
Johnson  v.   People  (140  111.   350;  29 

N.  E.  Rep.  895),  11. 
Johnson  v.  Phifer  (6  Neb.  401),  208. 
Johnson  v.  Powers  (40  Vt.  611),  124. 
Johnson  v.    Railroad  Co.    (51  Iowa, 

25),  362. 
Johnson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (90  Ala.  505), 

130. 
Johnson  v.  Ridir  (Iowa,  1892,  50  N. 

W.  Rep.  36),  11. 
Johnson  v.  Roberts  (31  Md.  476),  233. 


TABLE    OE   CASES. 


XC1X 


References  are  to  sections. 


Johnson  v.  Russell  (144  Mass.  409), 

76. 
Johnson  v.   Sherwin  (3  Gray,  Mass., 

374),  71. 
Johnson  v.  State  (59  Ala.  37),  93. 
Johnson  v.  State  (86  Ga.  90),  93. 
Johnson  v.  State  (61  Ga.  305),  95. 
Johnson  v.  State  (85  Ga.   561),  282. 
Johnson  v.  State  (27  Fia.  245),  343. 
Johnson  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  36S), 

52. 
Johnson  v.  State  (27  Tex.  App.  135), 

166. 
Johnson  v.  State  (29  Tex.  App,  150), 

8,  234. 
Johnson  v.  State  (47  Ala.  9),  102. 
Johnson  v.  State  (18  Tex.  App.  385),  7. 
Johnson  v.  State  (30  La.  Ann.   881), 

89. 
Johnson  v.  State  (17  Ala.  618).  102. 
Johnson  v.  Taylor  (60  Tex.  360),  136. 
Johnson  v.  Timmons  (50  Tex.  521), 

107. 
Johnson  v.  Waknilla  (9  S.  Rep.  690; 

28  Fla.  720),  146. 
Johnson  v.   Wallace  (53  Miss.   331), 

139a. 
Johnston  v.  Allen  (100  N.  C.  131),  366. 
Johnston  v.    Markle  Paper  Co.   (153 

Pa.  St.  189),  380. 
Johnston  v.  Oregon  S.  L  &  U.  N.  Co. 

(1893,  31  Pac.  Rep.  283),  186. 
Johnston  v.  State  (94  Ala.  35),  334. 
Johnston  v.  Todd  (5  Beav.  600,  602), 

350. 
Johnston  Hard.    Co.    v.    Muller   (72 

Mich.  265),  354. 
Joliet  R.  Co.  v.  Caul  (42  111.  App.  41), 

202. 
Jones  v.  Arterborn  (11  Humph.  97), 

138. 
Jones  v.  Brooklyn  (3  N.  Y.    S.   353), 

178,  319. 
Jones  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  (S.  C,  1893, 

17  S.  E.  Rep.  698),  13. 
Jones  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (43  Minn. 

279),  188. 
Jones  v.  Crow  (32  Pa.  St.  398),  229. 


Jones  v.  Duchow  (87    Cal.   109),    10. 
Jones  v.  Foxall  (15  Beav.  338),  75. 
Jones  v.  Gale's  Adm'r  (4  Martin, 635), 

240. 
Jones  v.  Harris    (1    Strobh.,    S.    C, 

160),  320. 
Jones  v.  Hays  (4  McLean,  521),  242. 
Jones  v.  Hough  (77  Ala.  437),  131. 
Jones  v.  Hoyt  (10  Abb.  N.   C,  324), 

359. 
Jones  v.  Hnggins  (1  Dev.  L.,  N.  C, 

223),  139. 
Jones  v.  Jones  (63  Hun,  630),  248. 
Jones  v.  Jones  (120  N.  Y.  389),  73a. 
Jones  v.  Jones  (45  Md.  148),  345. 
Jones  v.  Jones  (36  Md.  447),  53. 
Jones  v.  Kennedy  (11  Pick.  125),  247. 
Jones  v.  Knauss  (31   N.  J.  Eq.  609), 

226,  286. 
Jones  v.  Laney  (3  Tex.  342),  242. 
Jones  v.  Lanier  (2   Dev.,    S.    C,   L. 

480),  353. 
Jones  v.  Ludlow  (6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep. 

57),  151. 
Jones  v.  Lumber  Co.  (Ark.,  1893,  23 

S.  W.  Rep.  679),  350. 
Jones  v.  Marks  (47  Cal.  242),  268. 
Jones  v.  Mason  (2  Stra.  833),  138. 
Jones  v.  Mason  (5  Rand.,  Va.,  577), 

215. 
Jones  v.  Moore  (7  Binn.  573),  69. 
Jones  v.  Neale  (1  Hughes  C.  C.  268), 

361. 
Jones  v.  O'Farrell  (1  New  354),  68. 
Jones  v.  Perkins  (54  Me.  393),  205. 
Jones  v.  Pitcher  (3  S.  &  R,  135),  144. 
Jones  v.  Porter  (59  Miss.  628),  135. 
Jones  v.  Portland  (88  Mich.  598),  52. 
Jones  v.  President,  etc.  Portland  (88 

Mich.  598),  188. 
Jones  v.  Reardon  (3  Md.  Ch.  57),  135. 
Jones  v.  Reeves  (6  Rich.,  S.  C,  132), 

254. 
Jones  v.  Roberts  (37  Mo.  App.  163), 

51. 
Jones  v.  Rose  (11  Jur.  379),  287. 
Jones  v.  Slate  Co.  (16  How.,  N.  Y., 

129),  357. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Jones  v.  Smith  (31  S.  C.  527),  268. 
Jones  v.  Snyder  (117  Inch-  229),  199. 
Jones  v.  St.    Louis,    etc.    Co.   (Ark., 

1890,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  416),  7. 
Jones  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893,  12  S.  Rep. 

411),  102. 
Jones  v.  State  (57  Miss.  684),  5. 
Jones  v.  State  (65  Miss.  179;  3  S.  Rep. 

379),  174,  350. 
Jones  v.  State  (71  Ind.  66),  57. 
Jones  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Or.  Rep.  177), 

283. 
Jones  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  404),  322. 
Jones  v.  State  (52  Ark.  345),  102, 
Jones  v.  Stevens  (3(5  Neb.  849 ;  55  N. 

W.  Rep.  251),  341. 
Jones  v.  Swank  (Minn.,  1893,  53  N. 

W.  Rep.  634),  249. 
Jones  v.  Tucker  (41  N.  H.  546),  13, 

193. 
Jones  v.  Turpin  (6  Heisk.,    Tenn., 

181),  176. 
Jones  v.  United   States  (137  U.   S. 

202).  240. 
Jones  v.  White  (11  Humph.,  Tenn., 

268),  192,  193. 
Jordan   v.   Circuit  Court  (69  Iowa, 

177),  244. 
Jordan  v.  Corey  (2  Ind.  3S5),  136. 
Jordan  v.  Hubbard  (26  Ala.  433),  71. 
Jordan  v.  Loftin  (13  Ala.  547),  212. 
Jordan  v.  Miller  (75  Va.  442),  267. 
Jordan  v.  Osgood  (109  Mass.  457),  9. 
Jordan  v.  State  (81  Ala.  20),  101. 
Jordan  v.  State  (16S.-W.  Rep.  543; 

29  Tex.  A  pp.  449),  346. 
Jordan  v.  Stewart   (23   Pa.  St.  244). 

129. 
Jcsephi  v.  Mady  Clothing  Co.  (Mont., 

1893,  33  Pac.  Rep.  10),  160. 
Josey  v.  Davis  (55  Ark.  318),  82. 
Joy    v.    Diefendorf    (130   N.    Y.    6), 

247. 
Judd  v.  Gibbs  (3  Gray,  Mass.,  530), 

76. 
Judge  v.  Jordan  (81  Iowa,  519),  351. 
Judson  v.  Lake  (3  Day,  318),  150. 


Juillard  v.  Chaffee   (92  N.   Y.  535), 

212. 
Jurner  v.  Cate  (Ga.f  1893,  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  971),  151. 

K. 

Kabok  v.  L.  I.  Ins.  Co.  (51  Hun,  639; 

4  N.  Y.  S.  718),  58. 
Kahn  v.  Insurance  Co.  (Wyo.,  1894, 

34  Pac.  Rep.  1059),  75. 
Kain  v.  Bare  (Ind.,  1892,  31    N.  E. 

Rep.  205),  247. 
Kain  v.  Larkin  (131  N.  Y.  300),  33. 
Kaiser  v.  State  (35  Neb.  704),  5. 
Kalbrier  v.  Leonard  (34  Ind.  497),  239. 
Kane  v.  Tarbitt  (23  111.  App.  311).  70. 
Kane  v.  Troy  (48  Hun,  619),  56. 
Kankakee,  etc.  Co.  v.  Horan  (131  111. 

288;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  621),  76. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald (51  Fed.  Rep.  278 ;  2  C.  C. 

A.  153),  374. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v.  Philips  (Ala., 

1893,  13  S.  Rep.  65),  237,  368,  377. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v.  Stouer  (51 

Fed.    Rep.   649;  2  C.  C.  A.  437), 

192. 
Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v.  Webb  (Ala., 

1893,  11  S.  Rep.  888),  216. 
Kansas,   etc.   Co.  v.   Miller  (2  Colo. 

Ter.  442),  232. 
Kansas,  etc.   Co.  v.  Richardson  (25 

Kan.  391),  12. 
Kansas,   etc.    Co.  v.  Ryan  (49  Kan. 

1),  11. 
Kansas,   etc.   Co.  v.  Smith   (90  Ala. 

25 ;  8  S.  Rep.  43),  38a,  58. 
Kant  v.  Kessler  (114  Pa.  St.  003).  171. 
Karney  v.  Paisley  (13  Iowa,  89),  166. 
Karney  v.  State  (68  Miss.  233;  8  S. 

Rep.  292),  231. 
Kaufman  v.  Schneider  (35  III.  A]  p. 

256),  152. 
Kaufman  v.  Springer  (38  Kan.  730), 

50. 
Kay  v.  Thomson  (10  Am.   L.   Reg., 

N.  S.,  594),  193. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CI 


References  are  to  sections. 


Kaywood  v.  Barnett  (3  Dev.   &  B. 

91),  53. 
Kean  v.  Rice  (12  S.  &  R.  203,  208),  143. 
Keaton  v.  Mayer  (71  Ga.  649),  75. 
Keaton  v.  McGirier  (24  Ga.  217),  136. 
Keator  v.  Colorado,   etc.   Co.  (Colo., 

1893,  32  Pac.  Rep.  857),  371. 
Keegan  v.  Carpenter  (47  Ind.   597), 

73. 
Keeler  v.  Shears  (6  Wend.  540),  24. 
Keely  v.  Oliver  (N.  C,  1893,  18  S.  E. 

Rep.  698),  212. 
Keen  v.  South  St,  Louis  Co.  (40  Mo. 

19),  200. 
Keener  v.  State  (18  Ga.  194),  102. 
Keesey  v.  Gage  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S.  W. 

Rep.  397),  380. 
Keeveny    v.    Ottman   (26   Wkly.  L. 

Bui.  65),  370. 
Kegg  v.  State  (7  Ohio  St.  79),  210. 
Keidan  v.  Winnegar  (95  Mich.  430; 

54  N.  W.  Rep.  901),  219. 
Keifer  v.  Carnsi  (7  D.  C.  156),  73. 
Keisling  v.  Readle  (1  Ind.  App.  240), 

377. 
Keith  v.  Knoche  (43  111.  App.  161), 

355,  378. 
Keith  v.   Lathrop  (10  Cush.,  Mass., 

553),  139. 
Keith  v.  New  Haven  &  N.    R.   Co. 

(140  Mass.  175),  345. 
Keith  v.  Wells  (23  Pac.  Rep.  991 ;  14 

Colo.  321),  333. 
Keithe  v.  Kibbe  (10  Cush.,  Mass.,  35), 

60. 
Kellar  v.  Moore  (51  Ala.  340),  240. 
Keller  v.  Nutz  (5  S.  &  R.  251),  53. 
Keller  v.  Railway  Co.  (27  Minn.  178), 

71. 
Keller  v.  State  (123  Ind.  110;  23  N. 

E.  Rep.  138),  385. 
Kelley  v.  People  (55  N.  Y.  565),  69. 
Kelley  v.  Saltmarsh  (146  Mass.  585), 

205. 
Kelley  v.  State "(55  N.  Y.  565),  80. 
Kellogg  v.  Thompson  (142  Mass.  76), 

207. 
Kelly  v.  Carter  (55  Ark.  112),  212. 


Kelly  v.  Harrison  (69  Miss.  456),  150a. 
Kelly  v.  People  (17  Colo.  130),  6. 
Kelly  v.  People  (55  N.  Y.  505),  68. 
Kelly   v.   McGuire  (15  Ark.  555).  53. 
Kelly  v.  Insurance  Co.  (82  Iowa,  137), 

370. 
Kelly  v.  Kelley  (80  Wis.  490),  232. 
Kelly  v.  Owens  (Cal.,  1893,  30  Pac. 

Rep.  59G),  9,  250. 
Kelly  v.  People  (17  Colo.  130;  29  Pac. 

Rep.  805),  324. 
Kelly  v.  Railroad  Co.   (58  Ala.  4S9), 

242. 
Kelly  v.  Rosenstock  (45    Md.    389), 

136. 
Kelly  v.  Rowane  (33  Mo.  App.  440), 

199. 
Kelly  v.  Story  (6  Heisk.  202),  238. 
Kelm  v.  Briggs  (46  Me.  467),  150a. 
Kelsey  v.  Busch  (2  Hill,  N.  Y.,  440), 

80. 
Kelsey   v.   Hanmer  (18  Conn.    311), 

130,  138. 
Kelsey   v.   Murphy  (20  Pa.  St.  78), 

69. 
Kelsoe  v.  State  (47  Ala.  573),  9. 
Kemble  v.  Lull  (3  McLean,  272),  217. 
Kemp  v.  Donhan  (5  Har.,  Del.,  417), 

166. 
Kendall  v.  Field  (14  Me.  30),  60. 
Kendall  v.  Powers  (4  Neb.  533),  147. 
Kendrick  v.   Central  R.   R.  Co.  (89 

Ga.  782),   186. 
Kendrick  v.  Latham  (6  S.  Rep.  871 ; 

28  Fla.  819).  33. 
Kendrick  v.  State  (10  Humph.  479), 

120. 
Kendrick  v.  Turbell  (26  Vt.  416),  77. 
Kenerson  v.  Henry  (101  Mass.  152;, 

108. 
Kenezleber  v.  Wahl   (92  Cal.  202), 

373. 
Kennard  v.  Kennard  (63  N.  H.  308), 

143. 
Kennedy  v.  Currie  (3  Wash.  St.  442), 

7,  360. 
Kennedy  v.  Doyle  (10  Allen,  161), 

20. 


en 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Kennedy  v.  Holladay  (16  S.  W.  Rep. 

688;  105  Mo.  34),  176. 
Kennedy  v.   People  (39  N.  Y.  245), 

187,  192. 
Kennedy  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  85S),  5. 
Kennedy  v.  State  (39  N.  Y.  50),  23. 
Kennedy  v.  Upshaw   (66   Tex.   442), 

248,  253,  334.  349,  352. 
Kennegar  v.  State  (120  Ind.  176),  23. 
Kenosha   Co.   v.   Shedd   (48  N.   W. 

Rep.  933;  82  Iowa,  540;,  81,  244. 
Kent  v.  Garvin  (1  Gray,  Mass.,  148), 

60. 
Kent  v.  Insurance  Co.  (N.  D.,   1892, 

50  N.  W.  Rep.  85),  232. 
Kent  v.  Lincoln  (32  Vt.  591),  8. 
Kent  v.  State  (42  Ohio,  429),  359. 
Kent  v.  White  (27  Ind.  390),  247. 
Kenton   v.   First    Nat.    Bank    (Ky., 

1892,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  841),  82,  371. 
Kentucky  v.  I.  Cent.  Co.  (Ind.,  1892, 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  802),  76. 
Kentucky  Cent.    Ry.   Co.  v.    Smith 

(Ky.,  1892,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  392),  344. 
Kentzler  v.  Kentzler  (3  Wash.   St. 

166),  36,  148. 
Kenyon  v.  Luther  (4  N.  Y.  S.  498),  9. 
Kenyon  v.  Pierce  (17  R.  I.  794),  308. 
Keppel  v.  Petersburg  R.  Co.  (Chase's 

Dec.  167),  238. 
Kermot  v.  Ayer  (11  Mich.  181),  237. 
Kern  v.  Van  Phul  (7  Minn.  426),  205 
Kernam  v.  Bah  ana  (13  S.  Rep.  155, 

La.,  1893),  220. 
Kernan  v.  State  (65  Md.  253),  9. 
■Kernin  v.  Hill  (37  111.  209),  140. 
Kernitz  v.  L.  I.  City  (50  Hun,  428), 

239. 
Kerper  v.  Wood  (29  N.  E.  Rep.  501 ; 

48  Ohio  St.  613),  69. 
Kerr  v.  Hill  (27  W.  Va.  576),  223. 
Kerr  v.  Hodge  (39  111.  App.  546),  351. 
Kerr  v.  Love  (1  Wash.  St.  172),  60. 
Kessel  v.  Albetis  (56  Barb.  362),  242. 
Ketchum,  In  re  (5  N.  Y.  S.  566),  232. 
Kettering  v.  Jacksonville  (50  111.  39), 
143a. 


Key  v.  Dent  (14  Md.  86),  151. 
Keyes  v.  State  (122  Ind.  527),  346. 
Key  ton  v.   Brawford  (5  Gratt.   39), 

223. 
Kibbe  v.  Bancroft  (17  111.  18),  60. 
Kidder  v.  Blaisdell  (45  Me.  461),  244. 
Kidder  v.  Horrobbin  (72  N.  Y.  169), 

220. 
Kidder  v.  Vandersloot  (114  111.  130), 

18,  208. 
Kidd's  Adra'r  v.  Alexander  (1  Rand., 

Va.,  456),  134. 
Kid n ell  v.   Larson  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  534),  11. 
Kil bourn   v.  Latta  (7   Mackey,  80), 

250. 
Kilbourn   v.   Thompson  (105   U.   S. 

168,  181,205),  288. 
Kilburn  v.  Bennett  (3  Met.,  Mass., 

199),  231. 
Kilgore  v.  Stanley  (90  Ala.  523),  130. 
Kilgour  v.  Gockley  (83  111.  109),  232. 
Kilgour  v.  Miles  (6  J.  &  J.,  Md.,  274), 

145. 
Killebrew  v.  Murphy  (3  Heisk.  546), 

238. 
Kilmer  v.  St.  Louis,  Ft.  S.  &  W.  R. 

Co.  (37  Kan.   84;  14   Pac.  Rep. 

465),  282. 
Kilpatrick  v.  Com.  (31  Pa.  St.  198), 

244. 
Kilpatrick  v.  Dean  (4  N.  Y.  S.  708), 

367. 
Kilrow  v.  Com.  (89  Pa.  St.  480),  323. 
Kimball  v.  Chappell  (27  Abb.  N.  C. 

437),  222. 
Kimball  v.   Saguin  (Iowa,  1892,   53 

N.  W.  Rep.  116),  376,  380. 
Kimball  v.  Walker  (30  111.  511),  208. 
Kimberly  v.  Arms  (129  U.  S.   512), 

258. 
Kimtsen  v.  Davis  (51   Minn.  363;  53 

N.  W.  Rep.  646),  150a. 
Kindall  v.  White  (3  Me.  245),  150a. 
King,  In  re  (29  W.  N.  C.  426),  84. 
King  v.  Chase  (15  N.  H.  8),  160. 
King  v.    Donahue  (110  Mass.    155), 

139a. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cm 


References  are  to  sections. 


King  v.  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.  (45  Ind. 

43),  883. 
King  v.   Iowa  Midland   R.    Co.   (34 

Iowa,  458),  844. 
King    v.   J&cobson    (58   Hun,   CIO), 

250. 
King  v.  King  (42  Mo.  App.  454),  56, 

168. 
King  v.  Little  (4  Cash.  438),  218. 
King  v.  Luff  (8  East,  193),  241. 
King  v.  Merritt  (34  N.  W.  Rep.  689; 

67  Midi.  194),  106. 
King  v.  Peakman  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  316), 

349. 
King  v.  Railroad   Co.  (27  N.   Y.   S. 

973).  334. 
Kingv.  Rea  (21   Pac.  Rep.    1084;  13 

Colo.  69),  128. 
King  v.  Sears  (Ga.,    1893,    18  S.    E. 

Rep.  830),  107. 
King  v.  Second   Ave.   R.  R.   Co.  (26 

N.  Y.  S.  973),  192. 
King  v.  State  (44  Ind.  285),  23. 
King  v.  State  (91    Tenn.    617),    103, 

878. 
King  v.  State  (9  Fla.  617),  231. 
King  v.  State  (77  Ga.  734),  350. 
King  v.  Woodruff  (23  Conn.  56),  208. 
King  v.  Worthington  (73  111.  161),  30. 
Kingen  v.  State  (50  Ind.  537),  71. 
King-freed  v.   Pullen  (54   Me.    398), 

276. 
Kingman  v.  Cowles  (103  Mass.  283), 

148. 
Kingman  v.  Paulsen  (126  Ind.  507), 

159. 
Kingman  v.  Sparrow  (12  Barb.  201), 

229. 
Kingory  v.  United   States  (44   Fed. 

Rep.  669),  337. 
Kingsbury  v.  Moses  (45  N.  H.  222), 

35. 
Kingston  v.  Kincaid  (1  Wash. ,  TJ.  S., 

448),  77. 
Kinnear  v.  Mackey  (85  111.  96),  82. 
Kinney  v.  Berra'n  (6  Cush.  304),  5. 
Kinney  v.  Farnsworth(l7Conn.  355), 

82. 


Kinney  v.  Springfield  (35  Mo.  App. 

297),  202. 
Kinney  v.   United  States    (54    Fed. 

Rep.  312),  GO. 
Kinsey  v.  Bennett  (37   S.  C.  319;  15 

S.  E.  Rep.  905),  246. 
Kip  v.  Brigham   (6  Johns.  158),  15!). 
Kirby  v.  State  (5  S.  W.  Rep.  165;  23 

Tex.  App.  13),  90,  93. 
Kirk   v.    Hamilton   (102   U.    S.    68), 

83. 
Kirk  v.  Kirk  (33  N.  E.  Rep.  552;  137 

N.  Y.  510),  151. 
Kirkland  v.  Smith  (2  Martin,  N.  S., 

497),  148. 
Kirksey   v.    Kirksey   (41    Ala.  626), 

139a. 
Kiser  v.  Dannenburg   (88  Ga.    541), 

67. 
Kiser  v.  Randleman  (5  Jones'  L.  42S), 

241. 
Kissam  v.  Forrest   (25    Wend.  651), 

324. 
Kitchen  v.  State   (29   Tex.  App.  45), 

382. 
Kitner  v.  Whitlock  (88  111.  513).  247. 
Kittridge  v.  Russell   (114   Mass.  67), 

80. 
Kleiman  v.  Geiselman  (45  Mo.  App. 

497),  33. 
Klein  v.  Landman  (29  Mo.  259),  234. 
Klein  v.    McNamara  (54   Miss.   90), 

223. 
Klein  v.  People  (113  III.  596),  6. 
Klepsch  v.  Donald  (4  Wash.  St.  436), 

344. 
Kley  v.  Healy  (127  N.  Y.  555;  2  N.  Y. 

231),  232,  276. 
Kline  v.  Baker  (99  Mass.  254),  143. 
Kline  v.  Baker  (106  Mass.  161),  23. 
Kling  v.  Kansas  Cit}r  (27  Mo.  App. 

231),  178. 
Klink  v.  People  (16  Colo.  467),  232. 
Knapp  Case  (9  Pick.  496),  95. 
Knapp  v.  Baily  (9  Me.  195),  223. 
Knapp  v.    Maltby   (13    Wend.    587), 

128. 
Knapp  v.  Marlboro  (29  Vt.  282),  205. 


CIV 


TAHLK    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Knnpp  v.  Runals  (37  Wis.  135),  253. 
Knapp  v.  Warner  (57  N.  Y.  668),  221. 
Kneeland  v.  Luce  (141  U.  S.  437), 

371. 
Knick  v.  Knick  (75  Va.  12),  220. 
Knight  v.  Clements  (8  A.  &  El.  215), 

129. 
Knight  v.  Dyer  (57  Me.  176),  210. 
Knight  v.  Packard  (3  McCord,   71), 

811. 
Knighton  v.  Smith  (1  Oreg.  276),  136. 
Knode  v.   Williams  (17  Wall.  588), 

349. 
Knoll  v.  State  (55  Wis.  249),  193. 
Knott  v.  Knott  (6  Oreg.  142),  267. 
Knower  v.  Haines (31  Fed.  Rep.  513), 

242. 
Knox,  In  re  (31  Pa.  St.  220),  269. 
Knox  v.  Barbee  (3  Bibb,   Ky.,  526), 

211. 
Knox  v.  Bowersox  (6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

275),  232. 
Knox  v.  Clark  (123  Mass.   216),  198. 
Knox  v.  Jenks  (7  Mass.  488),  226. 
Knox  v.  Knox  (95  Ala.   495;  11   S. 

Rep.  204),  248. 
Koetler  v.   Man.   Ry.  Co.  (59  Hun, 

623),  56. 
Kollenberger  v.  People  (9  Colo.  233), 

90. 
Kolsky  v.  Loveman  (Ala.,  1892.  12  S. 

Rep.  720).  249. 
Koontz  v.  Owens  (109  Mo.  1;  18  S. 

W.  Rep.  928),  168,  375. 
Koppert  v.  Nagg(37  111.  App.  23),  149. 
Korwitz  v.  Wright  (37  Tex.  82),  60. 
Kouhn  v.  Schroth  (44  111.  App.  513), 

380. 
Kramer  v.  Com.  (87  Pa.  St.  299),  9. 
Kranich  v.  Sherwood  (92  Mich.  397), 

208. 
Krebs  v.  State  (8  Tex.  App.  1),  103. 
Krekeler  v.  Ruther  (62  N.  Y.  372), 

160. 
Kreps  v.  Carlisle  (Pa.,  1893,  27  Atl. 

Rep.  741),  309. 
Kreuzberger   v.  Wingfield  (96  Cal. 

251),  209. 


Krey  v.  Schlusner  (62  Hun,  620),  336. 
Kriel  v.  Com.  (5  Bush,  Ky.,  362),  231. 
Krummer   v.   Christopher  &  Tenth 

St.    R.    Co.    (2   Misc.   Rep.   298), 

380. 
Kruse  v.  Chester  (06  Cal.   353),  141. 
Kruse  v.  Wilson  (79  111.  233),  357. 
Kuehler  v.  Adler  (78  N.  Y.  287),  220. 
Kuh   v.    Michigan   Bank   (93   Mich. 

511),  60. 
Kuhl  v.  Mayer  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  84,  85), 

84. 
Kuhns  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (65  Iowa, 

528;  22  N.  W.  Rep.  661),  189. 
Kunde  v.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  65),  69. 
Kurz  v.  Fish  (58  Hun,  602),  281. 
Kux   v.   Central  M.   Sav.   Bank  (93 

Mich.  511;,  60. 
Kyburg  v.  Perkins  (6  Cal.  674),  142. 
Kyle  v.  Frost  (29  Ind.  398),  166. 

L. 

Labaree  v.   Klesterman  (49   N.  W. 

Rep.  1102;  33  Neb.  150),  73,  337. 
Labor  v.  Crane  (56  Mich.  585),  124. 
Lacas  v.  Railroad  Co.  (92  Mich.  412), 

52. 
Lachance  v.   Loblein  (15  Mo.  App. 

460),  140. 
Lacon  v.  Higgins  (3  Stark.  178),  143. 
Lacon  v.  Lacon  (W.  N.    1891,  p.  25), 

215. 
Ladd  v.  Blunt  (4  Mass.  402),  146. 
Ladow   v.  Groom  (1  Denio,  N.  Y., 

429),  357. 
Lafayette  Bank  v.  Metcalf  (29  Mo. 

App.  384),  252. 
Lafayette,  etc.  Co.  v.  Elman  (30  Ind. 

83),  73a. 
Lafferty  v.  Moore  (33  N.  Y.  658),  84. 
Lagan  v.  Glover  (77  Tex.  448),  142. 
Lahn  v.  Gustafson  (73  Iowa,  633 ;  35 

N.  W.  Rep.  660),  366. 
Laidley  v.  Cummings  (83  Ky.  606, 

607),  141,  242. 
Laidley  v.  Rogers  (67  Hun,  653),  359. 
Laing  v.  Rush  (66  Hun,  635),  376. 


TATU.K    OF    CASE? 


cv 


References  are  to  sections. 


Laing  v.  United  States  N.  J.  R.  Co. 

(54  N.  J.  L.  57(5),  8,  190. 
Like  v.  Gray  (35  Iowa,  462),  208. 
Lake  v.  Ranney  (33  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  50, 

68),  234. 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hatch  (6  Oiiio 

Cir.  Ct.  230),  241. 
Lake  Erie,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mora  in  (29  N. 

E.    Rep.   809;  36  111.   App.  862), 

341,  3.10. 
Lake  Ont.  etc.  Co.  v.  Judson  (122  N. 

Y.  278),  247. 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brown  (123 

111.  162),  381. 
Lake  Shore,   etc.  Co.  v.  Herrick  (29 

N.  E.  Rep.  1032;  49  Ohio  St.  25), 

56. 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hundt  (140 

111.  525),  18,  20. 
Lakens  v.  Hazlett(37  Minn.  441).  339. 
Lally  v.  Rossman  (82  Wis.    147;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  1132),  871. 
Lalor  v.  McDonald  (44  Mo.  App.  439), 

380. 
Lamance  v.  Byrnes  (17  Nev.  197),  7, 

375. 
Lamar  v.  Pearce  (90  Ga.  377;  17  S. 

E.  Rep.  92),  50,  76,  80,  142. 
Lamb  v.  Davenport  (1  Sawy.,  U.  S., 

609),  238. 
Lamb  v.  State  (66  Md.  285),  217. 
Lambert  v.   People  (6   Abb.    N.    C. 

181),  77. 
Lambert  v.  Smith  (1  Cranch,  U.  S., 

361),  67. 
Lambert's  Estate,  In  re  (10  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  R.  10),  210. 
Lamberty  v.  Roberts  (9  N.  Y.  S.  607 ; 

56  Hun,  649),  82. 
Lamoure  v.  Caryl  (4  Den.  170),  199. 
Lamphire  v.  Cowan  (39  Vt.  420),  232. 
Lamphire  v.  Slaughter  (61  How.  Pr., 

N.  Y.,  36),  212. 
Lampton  v.  Haggard  (3  Mon.  146), 

237. 
Lanahan  v.  Lawton  (50   N.  J.  Eq. 

276;  23  Atl.  Rep.  476),  363. 
Lanbach  v.  Mires  (141  Pa.  St.  447),  130. 


Lancaster  v.  Collins  (1 15  U.  S.   222), 

254. 
Lancaster  v.  Lane  (14  111.  242),  147. 
Lancaster  v.  State  (9  Tex.  App.  400), 

23. 
Lancaster  v.  Washington  I.   Co.  (62 

Mo.  121),  232. 
Landa  v.  Obert  (79  Tex.  33),  156. 
Landaff's  Petition  (34  N.  H.  164),  72. 
Land  Co.  v.  Calhoun  (16  W.  Va.  362), 

244. 
Lander  v.  Lander  (5  Ir.   C.   L.    Rep. 

27),  333. 
Landlord  v.    Jones  (18  Oreg.   307), 

347. 
Landin   v.  Anderson   (76  Ala.    403), 

244. 
Lindis  v.  State  (70  Ga.  651),  6. 
Landsberger  v.  Gorham  (5  Cal.  450), 

168. 
Landt  v.  Mayor  (Colo.,  1893,  31  Pac. 

Rep.  524),  250. 
Lane  v.  Farmer  (13  Ark.  63),  226. 
Lane  v.  Harris  (16  Ga.  217),  242. 
Lane  v.  Innes  (43  Minn.    157).    150a. 
Lane  v.  Johnson  (.59  Vt.  237),  211. 
Lane  v.  Lane  (21  S.  W.  Rep.  99;  113 

Mo.  504),  369. 
Lane  v.  L.  E.  R.   Co.  (23  N.  Y.   29), 

242. 
Lane  v.  Marshall  (65  Vt.  85).  304. 
Lane  v.  Morse  (6  How.,  N.  Y.,  394), 

357. 
Lane  v.  Union  Bank  (29  N.  E.  Rep. 

613),  216. 
Lane  v.  Wilcox  (55    Barb.,    N.    Y., 

615),  195. 
Lang  v.  Sanger  (76  Wis.  71 ;  44  N.  W. 

Rep.  1085),  8. 
Langan  v.  Langan  (89   Cal.    186;  26 

Pac.  Rep.  794),  208. 
Langdon  v.  Astor  (16  N.  Y.  34),  215. 
Langdon  v.  Keith  (9  Vt.  299),  223. 
Langdon  v.  People  (133  III.   382;  24 

N.  E.  Rep.  874).  5,  378. 
Langer  v.  Merritt  (120  N.Y.I  14),  142. 
Langer  v.  Meservey  (80   Iowa,    158; 

45  N.  W.  Rep.  732),  223. 


CVl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Langford  v.  Jones  (18  Oreg.  307),  190. 
Langworthy  v.  Green  (88  Mich.  207), 

18G. 
Lanier    v.  Foust   (81   Tex.    186;     10 

S.  W.  Rep.  904),  208. 
Lapham  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.  (24  Pick., 

Mass.,  1),  198. 
Laras  v.  Com.  (84  Pa.  St.   208),    188. 
Large  v.  Passmore  (5  S.  &  R.,  Pa., 

51),  815. 
Larimore   v.    Bobb    (Mo.,    1893,     21 

S.  W.  Rep.  922),  279. 
Larkin  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Iowa,   1892, 

52  N.  W,  Rep.  480),  141,  143a. 
Larkins  v.  Riddle  (21  Ala.   252),  223. 
Larkins  v.  Rhodes     (5    Port.,    Ala., 

195),  267. 
Larman  v.  Knight  (140  111.  132),  213, 

246. 
Larrowe  v.  Lewis  (58  Hun,  601),  216. 
Larson  v.  Johnson  (42  111.  App.  198), 

216. 
Larson  v.  Lombard     Inv.     Co.     (51 

Minn.  141 ;  53  N.   W.   Rep.    179). 

186,  379. 
Larten  v.  Gilliam  (2  111.  577),  141. 
La  Rue  v.   St.    Anthony   &   D.    Ele- 
vator Co.  (S.  D.,  1893,  54  N.  W. 

Rep.  806),  73. 
Lasater  v.  Van  Hook  (77  Tex.   650), 

20. 
Las   Caygas   v.    Larionda  (4  Mart., 

La.,  283),  149. 
Lash  v.  Rendall  (72  Ind.  475),  83. 
Lassiter  v.  State  (67  Ga.  739),  330. 
Lassone  v.  Boston  &  L.  R.  Co.  (N.  H, 

1890,  24  Atl.  Rep.  902),  58. 
Latham  v.  Brown  (48  Kan.  190),  199. 
Latham  v.  Shipley   (Iowa,    1892,    53 

N.  W.  Rep.  342),  198. 
Lathrop  v.  Adkinson  (87  Ga.   389), 

124. 
Lathrop  v.  Foster  (51  Me.  367),  212. 
Latimer  v.  Elgin  (4  Desaus.  26,  32), 

143. 
Latley  v.  Emery  (59  Hun,  237),  11. 
Lauderdale  v.   State  (Tex.,  1892,  19 

S.  W.  Rep.  670),  89. 


Lauer  v.  Kuder  (111.,  1893,  34  N.  E. 

Rep.  484),  247,  250. 
Laughlin    v.    Street  R.    R.    Co.    (03 

Mich.  220),  198. 
Lauter  v.  Simpson  (2  Ind.  App.  293), 

362,.  366. 
Lavette  v.  Sage  (29  Conn.  577),  208. 
Lavin  v.  Mutual   Aid  Soc.    (74  111. 

349),  58,  144. 
Law  v.  Merrill  (6  Wend.   268,    277),  , 

81. 
Law  v.  Scott  (5  Har.   &  J.  438),  175. 
La  whom  v.  Carter  (11  Bush,  Ky.,  7), 

60. 
Lawless  v.  Quele  (8  Ir.  L.  3S2),  38. 
Lawlor  v.  Fritcher  (54  Hun,  586),  9. 
Lawrence  v.  Barker  (5  Wend.    305), 

347. 
Lawrence  v.  Guaranty  Co.  (51  Kan. 

222;  32  Pac.  Rep.  816),  83. 
Lawrence  v.  Hunt  (10  Wend.  83,  84), 

160. 
Lawrence  v.    Minturn     (17     How., 

U.   S.,  100),  226. 
Lawrence  v.  Myrieman   Marble  Co. 

(1  Misc.  Rep.  105),  187. 
Lawrence  v.  Tennant  (64  N.  H.  532), 

108,  115. 
Lawrence   v.    Wilson    (Mass.,    1891, 

35  N.  E.  Rep.  858),  66. 
Lawson  v.  Conaway  (37  W.  Va.  159), 

194. 
Lawson  v.  Kelly  (83  Tex.   497),   151. 
Lawson  v.  Lawson  (117  111.  98),  213. 
Lay  v.  Neville  (25  Cal.  545).  175. 
Lay   Grae  v.    Peterson    (2    Sandf. , 

N.  Y..  338),  71. 
Layman's  Wills  (40  Minn.  372),  171. 
Lazard   v.   Mer.    &   Min.    Co.    (Md., 

1S93,  26  Atl.  Rep.  897),  336. 
Lazare  v.  Jacques  (15  La.  Ann.  599), 

208. 
Lazarus  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co. 

(69  Hun.  190),  199. 
Lazear  v.  Union   Bank  (52  Md.  78), 

£05. 
Lazier  v.  Westcott    (26  N.  Y.  146), 

243. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CVll 


References  are  to  sections. 


Leach  v.  Linde  (24  N.  Y.  S.  170),  141. 
Leach  v.  Shelby  (5S  Miss.  681),  208. 
Leache  v.  State  (22  Tex.   App.  279), 

231. 
Leagel  v.  Railroad  Co.  (83  Iowa,  320), 

145. 
Leahey  v.  Marsh  (155   Pa.   St.  458), 

12,  50. 
Leakey  v.  Gunter  (25  Tex.  400),  213. 
Lear  v.  Durgin  (64  N.  H.  618),  205. 
Learmouth,  Ex  parte  (6  Madd.  113), 

124. 
Learned  v.  Hall  (133  Mass.  417),  7. 
Lears  v.  Rice  (65  Mich.  97),  70. 
Leary  v.  Leary  (18  Ga.  690),  9. 
Leath  v.  Baker  (82  Me.  28),  362. 
Leathers  v.  Wrecking  Co.  (2  Woods, 

682),  38. 
Leatherwood    v.    Sullivan   (81    Ala. 

45S),  242. 
Leavitt  v.  Baker  (82  Me.  28).  362. 
Leavitt  v.  Dodge  (61  Hun,  627),  11. 
Leavitt  v.  Windsor  Land  &  Invest- 
ment Co.  (54  Fed.  Rep.  459),  206. 
Le  Ban  v.  Vanderbilt  (3  Redf.,  N.  Y., 

384),  67. 
Le  Baron  v.  United  States  (4  Wall. 

642),  21. 
Le  Bean  v.  People  (35  N.  Y.  223),  52. 
Le  Carpentierv.  Delery  (4  Mart.,  La., 

451),  140. 
Leckraan  v.  Harding  (65  111.  505),  136. 
Ledbetter  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  247), 

101. 
Leddy  v.  Barney  (139  Mass.  394),  205. 
Lee  v.  Baldwin  (10  Ga.  208),  304. 
Lee  v.  Brown  (21  Kan.  458),  73. 
Lee  v.  Church  (52  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  110), 

215. 
Lee  v.  Shivers  (70  Ala.  288),  222. 
Lee  v.  State  (21  Ohio  St.  151),  322. 
Lee  v.  State  (56  Ark.    4;    19  S.  W. 

Rep.  6),  346. 
Lee,  Adni'r,  v.  Hill  (87  Va.  497),  121, 

123. 
Leeds  v.  Amherst  (14  Sim.  357),  276. 
Leeds  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.  (2  Wheat., 

U.  S.,  380),  67,  76. 


Lees  v.  Lamprey  (43  N.  H.  13),  69. 
Leese  v.  Clarke  (29  Cal.  661),  32. 
Lee  Silver  Co.  v.  Engelbach  (IS  Colo. 

106;  31  Pac.  Rep.  771),  7. 
Lefavour  v.  Yandes  (2  Blackf.  240), 

69. 
Lefevre  v.    Lefevre  (59  N.  Y.  434), 

222. 
Legatt   v.    Tollervey  (14  East,  202), 

127. 
Legendre  v.   N.    O.   Brew.  Co.  (La., 

1893,  12  S.  Rep.  837).  140. 
Legg  v.   Bloomington   (40  111.  App. 

185),  8. 
Leggat  v.   Leggat  (Mont.,  1893,    33 

Pac.  Rep.  5).  66. 
Legge  v.  Edmonds  (25  L.  J.  Ch.  125), 

73. 
Lego  v.  Medley  (79  Wis.  211),  222, 
Lehigh  v.  Railroad  Co.  (41  N.  J.  Eq. 

187),  309. 
Leibe  v.  Hebersmith  (3  S.  Rep.  283), 

138. 
Leiber  v.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  R.  Co. 

(84  Iowa,  97 ;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  547), 

11,  350. 
Leideman  v.    Schultz  (24  Eng.  L.  & 

Eq.  305),  217. 
Leidlein  v.  Mayer  (95  Mich.  586;  55' 

N.  W.  Rep.  367),  38a. 
Leigh,  In  re  (1892,  Prob.  82),  128. 
Leigh  v.   Everheart  (4  T.  B.  Mon., 

Ky.,  379),  305. 
Leigh  v.  Hind  (17  E.  C.  L.  774),  277. 
Leighton  v.  Sargent  (11  Fost.,  N.  H., 

120),  193. 
Leiter  v.  Day  (35  111.  App.  248),  21. 
Leland  v.  Wilkinson  (6  Pet.  317),  242. 
Lcmert  v.  Shafer  (Ind.,  1893,  31  N. 

E.  Rep.  112S),  232. 
Lenahan  v.   People  (5  T.  &  C.  265), 

239. 
Lenhart  v.  Allen  (32  Pa.  St.  312),  67. 
Lennig's  Estate,  In  re  (154  Pa.  St. 

209;  25  Atl.  Rep.  1009),  222. 
Leonard  v.  Allen  (11  Cush.  241),  10. 
Leonard  v.  German  F.   Ins.   Co.  (23 

N.  Y.  S.  684),  373. 


CV1U 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 
Railway  Co.  (21   Oreg 


Leonard  v. 

655),  39. 
Leonard  v.  So.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (21   Oreg. 

555),  8,  201. 
Leonard  v.  Territory  (2  Wash.  Ter. 

381),  5,  7. 
Leonard  v.  Tillotson  (97  N.  Y.  8),  80. 
Lepla  v.  Minn.  Tribune  Co.  (35  Minn. 

311),  168. 
Leport   v.  Todd   (32   N.  J.   L.  124), 

234. 
Leslie  v.  Leslie  (110  Mo.  31),  362. 
Lester  v.  State  (32  Ark.  727,  93. 
Levi  v.  Black  well  (35  S.  C.  511),  380. 
Levi  v.  Welsh  (45  N.  J.  Eq.  867),  208. 
Levison  v.  State  (54  Ala.  520),  93. 
Levy  v.  Cadet  (17  S.  &  R.  127),  69. 
Levy  v.  Mitchell  (6  Ark.    138).  73a. 
Levy  v.    State   (28  Tex.    App.   203), 

350. 
Lewars  v.  Weaver  (121  Pa.  St.  268), 

367. 
Lewin  v.  Russell  (42  N.  Y.  251),  309. 
Lewis  v.  Adams  (61  Ga.  549),  66. 
Lewis  v.  Alkire  (32   W.    Va.   504), 

376. 
Lewis  v.  Bacon  (3  H.  &  M.  89),  355. 
Lewis  v.  Bruton  (74  Ala.  317),  240. 
Lewis  v.  Fish  (40  Mo.  App.  372),  362. 
Lewis  v.  Hadrnon  (56  Ala.  1S6),  33. 
Lewis  v.  Hitchcock  (10  Fed.  Rep.  7), 

19. 
Lewis  v.  Kramer  (3  Md.  265),  58. 
Lewis  v.  Lewis  (5  La.  Ann.  388),  150. 
Lewis  v.  Lewis  (26  Tex.   App.  115), 

150r/. 
Lewis  v.  McClure  (8  Oreg.  273).  242. 
Lewis  v.  Meginnia  (30  Fla.  419),  58, 

60,  67,  309. 
Lewis  v.  Merritt  (113  N.  Y.  388),  308. 
Lewis  v.   Pallin  (48  Mo.   App.   657), 

380. 
Lewis  v.  Roberts  (103  E.  C.  L.  29),  30. 
Lewis  v.  Roulo  (93  Mich.  475),   120. 
Lewis  v.  Sapio  (1  M.  &  W.  39),  139. 
Lewis  v.  Smith  (107  Mass.  334),  8. 
Lewis  v.  State  (15  S.  E.  Rep.  697 ;  90 

Ga.  95),  23,  234,  334. 


Lewis  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,   16  S.  E. 

Rep.  986),  350. 
Lewis  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  903),  239. 
Lewis  v.  United  States  (92  U.  S.  621), 

206. 
Lewis  v.  Wintrebe  (76  Ind.  13).  244. 
Lewke  v.  D.   D.  E.   B.   etc.  Co.  (46 

Hun,  283),  57. 
Lexington  v.  Headley  (5  Bush,  Ky., 

508),  143a. 
Liddell  v.  Fisher  (48  Mo.  App.  449), 

24. 
Liddon  v.  Hodnett  (22  Fla.  442),  142c. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Norris  (31  N.  J.  Eq. 

583-585),  84. 
Lift  v.  Lingane  (17  R.  I.  420;  22  Atl. 

Rep.  942),  176. 
Liggett  v.  Glenn  (51  Fed.  Rep.  381), 

173. 
Lighthouse   v.  Railroad   Co.  (S.  D. , 

1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  320),  386. 
Lilienthal's  Tobacco  v.  United  States 

(97  U.  S.  237,  266),  249. 
Lillis  v.  Erin  Ditch  Co.  (95  Cal.  553), 

76. 
Lilly  v.  Wagoner  (27  111.  395),  231. 
Limb^rger  v.  Tidwell  (104  N.  C.  506), 

136. 
Lime  Rock  Bank  v.  Hewitt  (52  Me. 

531),  73a,  121. 
Linck  v.  Litchfield   (141   111.  469;  31 

N.  E.  Rep.  123),  239,  356. 
Lincoln,  In  re  (19  Fed.  Rep.  460),  24. 
Lincoln  v.  Bartells   (6    Wend.    475). 

143,  243. 
Lincoln  v.   Taunton    Co.    (9    Allen, 

Mass.,  122).  195. 
Lind  v.  Lind  (Minn.,  1893,  54  N.  W. 

Rep.  934),  231. 
Lindley  v.  Sullivan  (133  Ind.  588;  33 

N.  E.  Rep.  361),  250. 
Lindsay  v.  Chicago     (115     111.     120), 

143a. 
Lindsay  v.  Garvin  (31  S.  C.  259),  205. 
Lindsay  v.  Miller  (2  Pet,  660),  229. 
Lindsay  v.  People  (63  N.  Y.  143),  7, 

193,  323. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


C1X 


References  are  to  sections. 


Lindsay  v.  Reilly  (50  N.  J.  L.  636;  15 

Atl.  Rep.  679),  150.. 
Linecum  v.  State  (29  Tex.  App.  328), 

10. 
Linfield  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.  (10 

Cash.  570),  360. 
Link    v.  Sheldon  (64    Hun,   633;  18 

N.  Y.   S.  815),  188,  193,  336,  307. 
Linn,  Boyd,    etc.   Co.   v.   Terrill   (13 

Bush,  Ky.,  463),  268. 
Linsley  v.  Brown  (13  Conn.  192),  208. 
Linton  v.  Allen  (154  Mass.  432),  32, 

366. 
Linton  v.  Com.  (46  Pa.  St.  294),  312. 
Linton  v.  Hurley   (14  Gray,    Mass., 

191),  193. 
Lipe  v.  McClery  (41  111.  App.  29),  220. 
Lippitt   v.  Kelly   (46  Vt.    523),    210, 

217. 
Lipscombe  v.  Holmes  (2Campb.  441), 

82. 
List  v.  Kortpeter  (26  Ind.  27),  250. 
Lister  v.  Smith  (33  L.  J.   Prob.  29), 

222. 
Listman  v.  Hickey  (65  Hun,  8;  19 

N.  Y.  S.  880),  24. 
Little  v.  Com.  (25  Gratt,  Va.,  921), 

176. 
Little  v.  Downing  (37   N.    H.    355), 

229. 
Little  v.  Herndon  (10  Wall.  31),  129. 
Little  v.  Keon  (1  N.  Y.  Code  R.  4), 

312. 
Little  v.  Lischkoff  (Ala.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  429),  199,  339. 
Little  v.  Thompson  (2  Greenl. ,  Me., 

228),  250. 
Little  Pittsburg  Con.  Mining  Co.  v. 
Little  Chief  Cons.  Mining  Co.  (11 

Colo.  223),  226. 
Little  Rock  v.  Railroad  Co.  (56  Ark. 

495),  366. 
Little  Rock  Trust  Co.  v.  Martin  (21 
S.  W.  Rep.  468;  57   Ark.    277), 
128. 
Littlehale  v.  Dix  (11  Cush.  265),  361. 
Littler  v.   Thompson  (2  Beav.    129), 
281. 


Litton  v.  Wright  (1  Ind.  App.  92;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  329),  187. 
Liverpool,  etc.  G.   W.  Co.  v.  Phenix 

Ins.  Co.  (129  U.  S.  464),  242. 
Livingston,  Appeal  of  (63  Conn.  68; 

26  Atl.  Rep.  58),  67,  248. 
Livingston  Case  (14  Gratt.,  Va.,  592), 

52. 
Livingston  v.  Metro.    R.   R.   Co.   (1? 

N.  Y.  S.  203),  186. 
Livingston  v.   Tompkins   (4  Johns., 

N.  Y.,  Ch.  415),  305. 
Llewellyn's  Case  (13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 

126),  332. 
Lloyd   v.    Davis  (2   Ind.    App.  170), 

174. 
Lloyd  v.  Farrell  (48  Pa.  St.  73),  205. 
Lloyd  v.  Hollenback   (98  Mich.  203 ; 

57  N.  W.  Rep.  110),  308. 
Lloyd  v.  Thompson  (5  111.  App.  90), 

339. 
Lobdell   v.  Lobdell  (36  N.  Y.  327), 

309. 
Locke  v.  Moulton  (96  Cal.  21),  223. 
Locke  v.  Railroad  Co.  (46  Iowa,  112), 

38a. 
Locke  v.  Rowell  (47  N.  H.  461),  217. 
Lockwood    v.  Lockwood    (51    Hun, 

337),  150. 
Lockwood  v.    Rose  (125  Ind.  588), 

373. 
Loder  v.  Whelpley   (111   N.  Y.  245), 

169,  178,  309. 
Loeb   v.    Richardson   (74   Ala.   311), 

237. 
Loeffner  v.  State  (10  Ohio  St.  599), 

231. 
Loftus  v.  Maloney  (89  Va.  576;  16  S. 

E.  Rep.  749),  208. 
Logan   v.  United   States   (144  U.  S. 

263;  12  S.  Ct.  617),  307,  320. 
Logansport    v.    McMillen    (49    Ind. 

495),  199. 
Lohman  v.  State  (81   Ind.  151),  237. 
Lohman  v.  Stocke  (94  Mo.  672),  120. 
Lohmer  v.  Insurance  Co.  (121  Mass. 

439),  73o. 
Lohr  v.  People  (132  111.  504),  351. 


ex 


TABLE   OF   OASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Lonergan   v.  Whitehead  (10  Watts, 

Pa.,  249),  GO. 
Long  v.  Aroisby  Co.   (43   Mo.  App. 

253),  216. 
Long  v.  Campbell  (37  W.  Va.  6G5), 

24,  129. 
Long  v.  Drew  (114  Mass.  77),  12G. 
Long  v.  Georgia,   etc.    Co.    (82    Ga. 

628).  107. 
Longv.  Hartwell   (34  N.  J.  L.  116), 

268. 
Long  v.  Johnson  (24  N.  H.  302),  205. 
Long  v.  Kee  (44  La.  Ann.  309 ;  10  S. 

Rep.  854).  83. 
Long  v.  Langsclale  (56  Ark.  239),  380. 
Longv.  Little  (119  III.  600),  139. 
Long  v.  Long  (44  Mo.  App.  141).  220. 
Longv.  Mast  (11  Pa.  St.  189),  231. 
Long  v.  Milford  (137  Pa.  St.  122).  11. 
Long  v.  People  (34   111.  App.    481), 

283. 
Long  v.  People  (135  111.  535),  283. 
Long  v.  State  (86  Ala.  36),  93,  323. 
Long  v.  Straus  (124  Ind.  84;  24  N.  E. 

Rep.  664),  8,  220. 
Longenecker  v.  Hyde  (6  Binn.,  Pa., 

1),  74. 
Longes   v.  Kennedy   (2   Bibb,    Ky., 

607),  237. 
Longnecker  v.  Shields  (1  Colo.  261 ; 

28  Pac.  Rep.  659),  282. 
Loomis  v.   Insurance  Co.   (81  Wis. 

386;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  561),  200. 
Loomis  v.  Loomis  (26  Vt.  198),  69. 
Loomis  v.  Mowry  (8  Hun.  311),  199. 
Loomis  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (159 

Mass.  39 ;  34  N.  E.  Rep.  30),  73a, 

350. 
Loomis  v.  Pingree  (43  Me.  299),  220. 
Loomis  v.  Wadham  (8  Gray,  Mass., 

557),  38. 
Looney  v.  Rankin  (15  Ores:.  617),  209. 
Lord  v.  Bigelovv  (124  Mass.  185),  74. 
Lord  v.  Col  Yin  (3  De  G.,  M.  &  G.), 

142. 
Lord  v.  Lord  (58  N.  H.  7),  131. 
Lord   Melville's  Case  (29    How.  St. 

Trials,  683),  353. 


Lord  Stafford's  Case  (7  How.  St.  Tr. 

1527),  383. 
Loring  v.  Palmer  (118  U.  S.  321),  246. 
Loring  v.  Steineman  (1  Mete,  Mass., 

204),  232. 
Lorrillard  v.  Clyde  (55  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  308),  154. 
Lott  v.  King  (79  Tex.  292),  33,  359. 
Lotto  v.  Davenport  (50  Minn.  99 ;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  130),  249,  250. 
Lotz  v.  Scott  (103  Ind.  155),  198. 
Loud  v.  Merrill  (45  Me.  516),  220. 
Loughry  v.  Wait  (34  111.  App.  523), 

124. 
Louis  v.  Easton  (50  Ala.  470),  308. 
Louisville  v.  Board  (83  Ky.  219),  232. 
Louisville  C.  Jour.  v.  Weaver  (Ky., 

1892,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1018),  249. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Atkins  (2  Lea, 

Tenn.,  248),  133. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Barker  (Ala., 

1893,  10  S.  Rep.  453),  342. 
Louisville,   etc.    Co.   v.   Berry  (Ind  , 

1891,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  565),  82. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Chaffin  (84  Ga. 

519),  186. 
Louisville,  etc.   Co.   v.    Crayton  (69 

Miss.  152),  374,  378. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Donegan(lll 

Ind.  179),  198. 
Louisville,  etc.   Co.   v.  Dulavey  (43 

111.  App.  297),  32. 
Louisville,   etc.    Co.    v.  Falvey  (104 

Ind.  409,  416),  52,  192. 
Louisville,  etc.   Co.   v.   Foley  (Ky., 

1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  866),  73a. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hays  (11  Tenn. 

£82),  229. 
Louisville,   etc.    Co.    v.   Hurt  (Ala.. 

1893,  13  S.  Rep.  830),  18,  348. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kenley  (Tenn., 

1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  326),  380. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Neafus  (Ky., 

1892,  18  S.  W.  Rep.   1030),  208. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Orr(10S.  Rep. 

107;  94  Ala.  602),  232. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Parish  (Ind.. 

1893,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  122),  148. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXI 


References  are  to  sections. 


Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Shires  (108  111. 

017),  143a. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Stommel  (120 

Ind.  35),  11. 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wood  (113  Ind. 

548),  345. 
Louisville,  etc.   Co.    v.    Wright  (115 

Ind.  378),  70. 
Louisville,  N.  A.  etc.   Co.  v.  Fraw- 

ley  (110  Ind.  20),  352. 
Louman  v.  Aubrey  (72  111.  019),  308. 
Love  v.  Dickinson  (85  N.  C.  5),  252. 
Love  v.  McAlister  (42  Ark.  183),  350. 
Lovejoy  v.  Hart  (Minn.,  1894,  57  N. 

W.  Rep.  57),  186. 
Lovejoy  v.  Lovett    (124    Mass.   2"0), 

220,  222. 
Lovelock  v.  Gregg  (14  Colo.  53).  60. 
Lovett  v.  State  (30  Fla.  142),  6.  234. 
Lovett  v.  State  (00  Ga.  257),  93. 
Loving  v.  Warren  Co.  (14  Bush,  Ky., 

310),  142. 
Low  v.  Burrows  (12  Cal.  181),  148. 
Low  v.  Conn.  etc.  R.  Co.  (45  N.  H. 

370),  73a. 
Low  v.  Greenwood  (30  111.  App.  184), 

11. 
Low  v.  Hanson  (72  Me.  104),  240. 
Low  v.  Perkins  (10  Vt.  532),  72. 
Low's  C:ise  (4  Me.  439),  170. 
Low's  Estate  (Myrick's  Prob.,  Cal., 

143),  168. 
Lowder  v.  Schluter  (78  Tex.  103),  53. 
Lowdermilk  v.  Bostick(98N.  C.  299), 

205. 
Lowe  v.  Bliss  (24  111.  108),  237. 
Lowe  v.  Thompson  (S6  Ind.  503),  21 1. 
Lowell  v.  Payne  (30  La.   Ann.  511), 

250. 
Lowenstein,  In  re  (2  Misc.  Rep.  323), 

178. 
Lower  v.  Conyers  (7   Cow.,  N.  Y., 

263),  20. 
Lowery  v.   Caldwell  (139  Mass.   88), 

150a. 
Lowman  v.  State  (SI  Ind.  151),  237. 
Lowry  v.  Harris  (12  Minn.  255),  32, 

73a. 


Lowther  v.  State  (4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  R. 

522),  107. 
Lucas  v.   Brooks   (18  Wall.,  U.  S., 

436),  166. 
Lucas  v.   De  Cour  (1  M.  &  S.  249), 

68. 
Lucas  v.  Hunt  (91  Ky.  279;  15  S.  W. 

Rep.  781),  250. 
Lucas  v.  State  (27  Tex.   App.   322), 

343. 
Luce  v.  Dorcb.  M.  F.  I.  Co.  (105  Mass. 

497),  200. 
Lucker  v.  Cora.  (4  Bush,  Ky.,  440), 

242. 
Luco  v.  United  States  (23  How.  541), 

38a. 
Lucre  v.  State  (7  Baxter,  Tenn.,  14S), 

323. 
Ludlow  v.  Van  Rensselaer  (1  Johns. 

95),  242. 
Ludlow  v.  Warshing  (108  N.  Y.  520), 

141. 
Luke  v.  Calhoun  Co.  (52  Ala.   115), 

38a,  241. 
Luker  v.  Com.  (Ky.,   1887,  5  S.   W. 

Rep.  354),  101,  103. 
Lum  v.  Scarborough  (Tex.,  1893,  24 

S.  W.  Rep.  846),  107. 
Lumo  v.  Scott  (44  Minn.  110),  154. 
Lumpkin  v.  State  (68  Ala.   56),  324. 
Lunay  v.  Vantyne  (40  Vt.  501),  71. 
Lundas  v.  Lansing  (75  Mich.   502), 

52. 
Lunday  v.  Thomas  (26  Ga.  538),  208. 
Lurren  v.  Crawford  (4  S.  &  R.  3,  5), 

60. 
Lursher  v.  Com.  (26  Gratt.  963),  101. 
Lusk  v.  Parsons  (39  111.  App.   380), 

366. 
Lutes  v.  Reed  (13S  Pa.  St.  191),  226. 
Lycoming  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ward  (90  111. 

5),  73a. 
Lyddy's  Will,  In  re  (3  N.  Y.  S.  636), 

188. 
Lyerly  v.  Wheeler  (12  Ired.,  N.  C, 

290),  226,  304. 
Lyles  v.  Com.  (88  Va.  390;  13  S.  E. 

Rep.  802),  351. 


cxu 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Lyman  v.  Philadelphia  (56  Pa.  St. 

488),  349. 
Lyman   v.    State   (14   Allen,   Mass., 

329),  200. 
Lynch  v.  Doran  (95  Mich.  395 ;  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  882),  24S. 
Lynch  v.  Grayson  (N.  M...  1893,  32 

Pac.  Rep.  149),  380. 
Lynch  v.  Livingston  (6  N.  Y.  433), 

135. 
Lynch  v.  Peabody  (137  Mass.  93),  7. 
Lynde  v.  Judd  (3  Day,  Conn.,  499), 

146. 
Lynn  v.  Lyerle  (113  111.  134),  171. 
Lynn  v.  Morse  (76  Iowa,  665),  130. 
Lyon  v.  Batz  (42  Mo.  App.  606),  366. 
Lyon  v.   Lyman  (9  Conn.   55),  131, 

139a,  140. 
Lyon  v.  Marine  (55  Fed.  Rep.  964), 

241. 
Lyon  v.  Miller  (24  Pa.  St.  392),  2U5. 
Lyon  v.  Prouty  (154  Mass.  488),  168. 
Lyons  v.  Holmes  (11   S.  C.  429),  131. 
Lyons  v.  People  (137  111.  602),  6. 
Lyons  v.  Pyatt  (N.   J.   L  ,   1893,  26 

Atl.  Rep.  334),  67. 
Lytle  v.  Bond  (40  Vt.  618),  309. 
Lyts  v.  Keevy  (5  Wash.  St.  606),  11, 

186. 

M. 

Mach.   Co.   v.   Barry  (2   Misc.   Rep. 

264),  128. 
Mack  v.  Bensley  (83  Wis.  80),  217. 
Mackey  v.  Armstrong  (84  Tex.  159; 

19  S.  W.  Rep.  463),  371. 
Mackey  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Co.  (19  D. 

C.  282),  142. 
Mackin  v.  O'Brien  (33  111.  474),  79. 
MacCready  v.  Schenck  (41  La.  Ann. 

456),  73. 
MacDonough  v.  Knight  (25  Q.  B.  D. 

1),  145. 
Macy  v.  Williams  (55  Hun,  489),  246. 
Maddox  v.  Maddox  (114  Mo.  35;  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  499),  248. 
Magee  v.  People  (139  111.  138;  2S  N. 

E.  Rep.  1077),  352. 


Magee  v.  Scott  (9  Cush.,  Mass.,  150), 

229. 
Magee  v.  Scott  (32  Pa.  St.  539),  147. 
Magee  v.    Troy   (1   N.  Y.  S.  24;  48 

Hun,  383),  8. 
Magers  v.  Dunlap  (39  111.  App.  618), 

128. 
Magie  v.  Chadoine  (30  Tex.  644),  238. 
Magie  v.  Herman  (50  Minn.  424 ;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  909),  33. 
Magnay  v.  Burt  (5  Q.  B.  394),  281. 
Magness  v.  Arnold  (31  Ark.  103),  136. 
Magoun   v\  N.  E.   Ins.   Co.  (1  Story, 

157),  158. 
Mahan  v.  McMahan  (13  Pa.  St.  376), 

262. 
Mahaney  v.  McLean  (26  Minn.  415), 

73a. 
Mahaney  v.   Railway  (108  Mo.  191; 

18  S.  W.  Rep.  895),  8. 
Maher  v.  People  (10  Mich.  212),  384. 
Mahon  v.  Mahon  (2  Irish  Eq.  440), 

287. 
Mahony  v.  Aurecocha  (51  Cal.  429), 

237. 
Mahurin   v.    Bickford  (5   N.   H.  9), 

150a. 
Maier  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S.  W. 

Rep.  974),  241. 
Mainard  v.  Beider  (2  Ind.  App.  115; 

28  N.  E.  Rep.  196),  168. 
Maine  v.  People  (9  Hun,  113),  102. 
Maine  v.  Ryder  (84  Pa.  St.  217),  131. 
Mair  v.   Beck  (2  Atl.  Rep.  218,  Pa. 

St.,  1886),  69. 
Maitland  v.  Bank  (40  Md.  540),  350. 
Maley  v.  Shattuck  (3  Cranch,  488), 

158. 
Malachi  v.  State  (89  Ala.  134),  227. 
Mallory  v.  Ohio  Farm.  Ins.  Co.  (90 

Mich.  112),  140. 
Malloy  v.    Bruden  (88  N.    C.    251), 

226. 
Malone  v.  Gates  (66  Tex.  22),  117. 
Maloney  v.  Duff  (72  Md.  283),  350. 
Maltby  v."  Kirkland   (48  Fed.   Rep. 

760),  73a. 
Mam  lock  v.  White  (20  Cal.  598),  68. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CX111 


References  are  to  sections. 


Manchester  v.   Brodner  (107  N.   Y. 

849),  209. 
Manchester   v.    Manchester   (24  Vt. 

649).  166. 
Manchester  v.  Moore  (19  N.  H.  564), 

302. 
Mandeville  v.  Parker  (31  N.  J.  Eq. 

242),  269. 
Maness  v.  Henry  (96  Ala.  454;  11  S. 

Rep.  470),  123. 
Manguni  v.  Webster  (7  Gill,  78),  244. 
Manistee  Bank  v.  Sprague  (64  Mich. 

59),  76. 
Mankin  v.  Emmons  (47  Mo.  306),  134. 
Manley   v.    Staples   (65   Vt.   370;  26 

Atl.  Rep.  630),  231. 
Mann  v.  Godbold  (3  Bing.  292),  30. 
Mann   v.   Mann  (1  Johns.   Ch.  231), 

221. 
Mann'v.  Mann  (14  Johns.  1),  214. 
Mann  v.  State  (46  Ind.  383),  134. 
Manning  v.  Hancock  Mut.  Life  Ins. 

Co.  (100  U.  S.  698),  226. 
Manning   v.   Purcell   (24   L.   J.   Ch. 

523),  150. 
Mansfield  v.  Rab  (21  N.  Y.  S.  65;  66 

Hun,  631),  380. 
Mansfield  v.  Sherwin  (181  Me.  365), 

223. 
Manson  v.  Lanley  (84  Me.  389),  61. 
Mantonya  v.  Hierter  (35  111.  App.  27), 

282. 

Manufg.  Ace.  Indemnity  Co.  v.  Dor- 

gan  (58  Fed.  Rep.  945),  186,  192, 

193. 

Many   v.  Titcomb  (19  Ind.  136),  242. 

Mapes  v.   Seales  (27   Tex.   345),  105, 

139a. 
Maples  v.  State  (3  Heisk.  408),  90. 
Mapp  v.  Phillips  (32  Ga.  72),  73a. 
Marabitti  v.  Bagolan  (21  Oreg.  299), 

380. 
Marable  v.  Meyer  (78  Ga.  60).  138. 
Marcey   v.    Shultz  (29   N.    Y.    548), 

337. 
March  v.  State  (44  Tex.  64),  343. 
Marcum  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1890,  1  S.  W. 
Rep.  727),  102. 


Marcy  v.    Amnzeen  (61   N.  H.  133), 

309. 
Marcy  v.  Barnes  (16  Gray,  163),  38a. 
Mariner  v.  Saunders  (5  Gilm.,  111., 

113),   130. 
Mark  v.  Hastings  (Ala.,  1893,    13  S. 

Rep.  297),  51. 
Markel  v.  Evans  (47  Ind.  326),  232. 
Markley  v.  Hull  (49  N.  W.  Rep.  1050 ; 

51  Iowa,  109),  380. 
Marks  v.  Beifus  (25  Q.  B.  Div.  494), 

175. 
Marks  v.  Lahee  (3  Bing.  N.  C,  408), 

117. 
Marks  v.  Societie  (22  Civ.  Pro.  Rep. 

201),  285. 
Marlatt  v.  Warwick  (18  N.  J.   Eq. 

108),  308. 
Marler  v.  State  (67  Ala.  55),  121. 
Marmaduke,  Ex  parte  (91  Mo.  228, 

251),  288. 
Marmet  v.    Archibald  (37  W.    Va. 

778).  282. 
Mars  v.  Virginia  Home  Ins.  Co.   (17 

S.  C.  514),  73a. 
Marse  v.  Rice  (Neb.,  1893,  54  N.  W. 

Rep.  308),  211. 
Marsh  v.  Bellew  (45  Wis.  39),  214. 
Marsh  v.  Colnett  (2  Esp.  665),  107. 
Marsh  v.  Cramer  (Colo.,  1891,  27Pac. 

Rep.  169),  250. 
Marsh  v.  Davis  (24  Vt.  363),  56. 
Marsh  v.  Hand  (35  Md.  123),  30. 
Marsh  v.  Jones  (21  Vt.  378),  124 
Marsh  v.  Mitchell  (26  N.  J.  Eq.  497), 

136,  137. 
Marsh  v.   Pier  (4  Rawle,  288,  289), 

160. 
Marsh  v.   Potter  (30  Barb.,    N.  Y  , 

506),  166. 
Marshal  v.  Thompson  (39  Minn.  137), 

223. 
Marshal  v.  Yougler  (10  S.  &  R.  161), 

128. 
Marshall  v.  Adams  (11  111.  37),  76. 
Marshall  v.    Brown   (50   Mich.    148), 

188. 
Marshall  v.  Cliff  (4  Camp.  133),  74. 


CX1V 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Keferences  are  to  sections. 


Marshall  v.   Green    (33  L.   T.    Rep., 

N.  S.,  404),  262. 
Marshall  v.  Hancock  (80  Cal.  82),  120. 

123. 
Marshall  v.    Harkenson    (84    Iowa, 

117;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  559),  3G8. 
Marshall  v.  Peck  (91  111.    187),   202, 

308. 
Marshall  v.  State  (31  Tex.  471),  23. 
Marshall  v.  State  (5  Tex.  App.  273), 

89. 
Martin  v.  Ashland  Mill  Co.  (49  Mo. 

27),  21G. 
Martin  v.  Aultman  (80  Wis.  150),  240. 
Martin  v.  Bowie  (37  S.  C.  102;  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  736),  33,  138. 
Martin  v.  Clarke  (8  R.  I.  389),  208. 
Martin  v.  Cope  (3   Abb.    Dec.    182). 

124. 
Martin  v.  Insurance  Co.  (Iowa,  1893, 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  534),  73a,  79. 
Martin  v.  Morris  (62  Wis.  418),  268. 
Martin  v.  Martin  (1   Misc.  Rep.  1S1), 

80. 
Martin  v.  Martin  (118  Itid.  227),  308. 
Martin  v.  Mott  (12  Wheat.   19),  232. 
Martin  v.  Root  (17  Mass.  222),  69. 
Martin  v.  Rutt  (127  Pa.  St.  380),  71. 
Martin  v.  State  (28  Ala.  71),  281. 
Martin  v.  State  (90  Ala.    602;   8  S. 

Rep.  858),  93. 
Martin  v.  State  (28  Tex.   App.   364), 

23. 
Martin  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  1),  226. 
Martin  v.    Stubbings  (126   111.    387), 

208. 
Martin  v.  Thayer  (37  W.  Va.  38),  222. 
Martin  v.  Victor,  etc.  Co.  (19  Nev. 

180),  8. 
Martindale  v.  Follett  (1  N.  H.   95), 

128. 
Marts  v.  State  (26  Ohio  St.  162),  10. 
Marx  v.  McGlynn  (88  N.  Y.  357),  51. 
Marx  v.  Strauss  (90  Ala.  453),  350. 
Marzetti  v.  Da    Jouffroy   (1    Dowl. 

41),  358. 
Mask  v.  Buffalo  (N.  Y.,  1893,  13  N. 
E,  Rep.  251),  191. 


Mask  v.  State  (32  Miss.  405),  69. 
Mason  v.    Atl.    Ave.    R.    R.  Co.    (4 

Misc.  Rep.  291),  12. 
Mason  v.  Eldred  (6  Wall.  235),  154. 
Mason  v.  Fuller  (45  Vt.  29),  53. 
Mason  v.  Lawrason  (1  Cranch,  190), 

148. 
Mason  v.  Ryus  (26  Kan.  464),  221. 
Mason  v.  Seitz  (36  Ind.  516),  262. 
Mason  v.  State  (20  S.  W.  Rep.  564 : 

31  Tex.  Crim.  App.  306),  9. 
Massey  v.  Colville  (45  N.  J.  L.  119), 

285. 
Massy  v.    Farmers'  Bank    (104    II!. 

327),  139a. 
Masters  v.  Marsh  (19  Neb.  458),  362. 
Masters  v.  Troy  (50  Hun,  485),  8. 
Masterson  v.  Boyce  (6  N.  Y.  S.  65 ;  58 

Hun,  630),  171. 
Masterson  v.    Little   (73  Tex.   6S2), 

151. 
Masterson  v.  Mathews  (60  Ala.  260), 

244. 
Masterson  v.  Todd  (Tex.,  1893,  24  S. 

W.  Rep.  682),  106. 
Matherly  v.  Com.   (Ky.,   1892,  19  S. 

W.  Rep.  977),  102. 
Mathes  v.  Robinson  (8  Met.  269),  60. 
Mathews  v.  AlswoVth  (La.,   1893,  12 

S.  Rep.  578),  83. 
Mathews  v.  Coalter  (9  Mo.  705),  129. 
Mathews  v.  Colburn  (1  Strobh.  25S), 

123. 
Mathews  v.    Culbertson    (83   Iowa, 

434;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  201),  83. 
Mathews  v.  Hoagland  (48  N.  J.  Eq. 

455),  169,  173,  174. 
Mathews  v.  Mathews  (53  Hun,  244 ; 

6  N.  Y.  S.  589),  368. 
Mathews  v.  Morgan  (Iowa,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  478),  83. 
Mathews  v.  Tappan  (6  Mo.  276),  19. 
Mathews  v.  Ward  (10  Gill  &  J.  143), 

232. 
Mathews,  Adm'r,  v.  Furness  (91  Ala. 

157),  248. 
Mathews'  Estate  (4  Am.  Law  Jour. 

356),  169. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


CXV 


References  are  to  sections. 


Mathews'  Estate   (5  Pa.    L.  J.  Rep. 

149),  173. 
Matley  v.  Long  (71  Md.  585),  217. 
Matson  v.  Frazer  (48  Mo.  App.  302), 

13,  362. 
Mattes   v.    Frankel    (65   Hun,   203), 

84. 
Matteson   v.    N.  Y.  etc.   R.    Co.  (35 

N.  Y.  487;  62  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  364), 

52,  192,  193. 
Mattocks  v.  Lyman  (18  Vt.  98),  80. 
Mattocks  v.  Wheaton   (10  Vt.    493), 

276. 
Mattoon  v.  Young  (45   N.   Y.    696), 

308. 
Mattox  v.  United  States  (146   U.  S. 

140),  103. 
Mauer  v.  Ferguson  (17  N.  Y.  S.  349), 

1S6. 
Maughan  v.  Burns  (26  Atl.  Rep.  583), 

199. 
Maurice  v.  Warden  (57  Md.  510;  54 

Md.  233),  142,  262. 
Mauro  v.  Piatt  (62  111.  450),  81. 
Maury  v.  Van  Armin  (1  Hill,  N.  Y., 

370),  357. 
Maxey  v.  Strong  (53  Mo.  280),  69. 
Maxfield  v.  Patchen  (29  111.  39),  223. 
Maxwell  v.  Harrison  (8  Ga.  61),  368. 
May  v.  Boston  (158  Mass.  21 ;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  902),  8. 
May  v.  Little  (3  Ired.  L.,  N.  C,  27), 

71. 
May  v.  People  (8  Colo.  210),  10. 
May  v.  Prendergast  (12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

R.  220),  263. 
May  v.  Shumway  (16  Gray,  86),  277. 
May  v  State  (90  Ga.   793 ;    17  S.   E. 

Rep.  108),  9. 
Maye  v.  Bradlee  (127  Mass.  414),  51. 
Maye  v.  Friedman  (69   N.    Y.    608), 

262. 
Mayer  v.  Stone  (21  Neb.  717),  350. 
Mayes  v.  State  (64  Miss.  329),  57. 
Maynard  v.  Cedar  County  (51  Iowa, 

431),  277. 
Maynard  v.  Frederick  (7  Cush.  247), 

315. 


Maynard  v.  Maynard  (10  Mass.  456), 

229. 
Mayo  v.  Wright  (63  Mich.  40),  52. 
Mayor  v.  Brooklyn  F.  I.  Co.  (3  Abb. 

App.  Dec.  251),  205. 
Mayor  v.  Butler  (1  Barb.  325),  314. 
Mays  v.  Deaver  (1  Iowa,  260),  80. 
McAdam  v.  State  (5  S.  W.  Rep.  826, 

Tenn.,  1886),  283. 
McAdory  v.  State  (62  Ala.  154),  90, 

95. 
McAfee  v.  Arline  (83  Ga.  645),  210. 
McAleer  v.    McMurray  (58   Pa.    St. 

120),  5. 
McAnulty's  Appeal  (135  Pa.  St.  210), 

60. 
McBee  v.  Bowman  (89  Tenn.    132), 

249. 
McBride  v.  Railroad   Co.    (60  Hun, 

585),  380. 
McBride  v.  Wallace  (62  Mich.   451), 

335. 
McCabe  v.  Com.    (Pa.,   1887,   8   Atl. 

Rep.  45),  91. 
McCabe  v.  Raney  (32  Ind.  309),  81. 
McCafferty  v.   Heritage  (5    Houst., 

Del.,  220),  140. 
McCall  v.  Moscowitz  (14  Daly,  10), 

37. 
McCall  v.  United  States  (1  Dak.  321- 

328),  125. 
McCalla  v.  State  (60  Ga.  346),  324. 
McCandless  v.  Warner  (26  W.   Va. 

754),  246. 
McCarlin  v.  Traphagan  (45  N.  J.  Eq. 

265),  308. 
McCarney  v.  People  (83  N.  Y.  408),  2. 
McCarthey  v.  Gallegher  (4  Misc.  Rep. 

18S),  7. 
McCarthy,  In  re  (59  Hun,  626),  168, 

171,  174. 
McCarthy,  In  re  (65  Hun,  624),  309. 
McCarthy   v.    Com.    (Kj».,    1893,    20 

S.  W.  Rep.  229),  188. 
McCarty  v.  Leary  (118  Mass.  509),  10. 
McCarty  v.  People  (51  111.  231),  10. 
McCaskin  v.  Lake  Shore  R.  R.  Co. 

(93  Mich.  553),  20. 


CXV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


McCaskle  v.  Amarine  (12  Ala.  17), 

133. 
McCausland  v.  Fleming  (63  Pa.  St. 

36),  115. 
McClackey   v.    State    (5  Tex.    App. 

320),  197. 
McClafferty  v.  Phelps  (151  Pa.  St.  86), 

51. 
McClain  v.  Com.    (110  Pa.  St.  263, 

209),  11,  89,  91,  333.  ■ 
McClaine  v.  People  (I  Atl.  Rep.  45; 

110  Pa.  St.  263),  354o. 
MeCIaskey   v.    Barr  (47    Fed.    Rep. 

363),  7,  107,  337. 
McClaskey  v.  State    (Tex.,  1892,  13 

S.  W.  Rep.  999),  6. 
McClellan  v.  McClellan  (65  Me.  500), 

169. 
McClellan  v.  Osborne  (51  Me.  118),  24. 
McClelland   v.    McClelland  (42  Mo. 

App.  32),  229. 
McClelland  v.  Rush  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

R.  188),  265. 
McCleneghan  v.  Reid   (34   Neb.  472; 

51  N.  W.  Rep.  1037),  7. 
McClory  v.  Wright  (10  Ir.  Law,  514), 

321 
McCloskey  v.  McCormiek  (44  111.  336), 

223. 
McClure  v.  Campbell  (25  Neb.  57;  40 

N.  W.  Rep.  595  ),  130. 
McClure  v.  Com.  (81  Ky.  448), '334. 
McClusky  v.    Klosterman   (20  Oreg. 

108;  25  Pac.  Rep.  366),  216. 
McCollum  v.  State  (14  S.   W.  Rep. 

1020;  29  Tex.  App.  102),  93. 
McComb  v.  Insurance  Co.  (48  N.  W. 

Rep.  1038 ;  83  Iowa,  247),  376. 
McConnell  v.  Bondry  (4  T.   B.  Mon. 

394),  239. 
McConnell  v.  Carey  (48  Pa.  St.  430), 

262. 
McConnell  v.  Kitchens  (20  S.  C.  430), 

262. 
McConnell  v.  McConnell  (Neb.,  1893, 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  292).  249. 
McConnell   v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,   18 

S.  W.  Rep.  645),  324. 


McCorkle  v.  Doby  (1  Strobh.,  S.  C, 

396),  68. 
McCormiek  v.  Fitzmorris  (39  Mo.  34), 

128,  129. 
McCormiek  v.  Garrett  (5DeG.,M.  & 

G.  278),  143. 
McCormiek  II.    Co.    v.    Burandt  (20 

N.  E.  Rep.  588;  136  III.  170),  24. 
McCormiek  M.   Co.  v.    Burandt  (,37 

111.  App.  588),  188. 
McCormiek  M.   Co.  v.  Snell  (23  111. 

App.  79),  76. 
McCoy  v.    Galloway  (3    Ohio,    283), 

115. 
McCoy  v.  New  York  (46  Hun,  268), 

230. 
McCoy  v.  Tucker  (121  Ind.  292),  8. 
McCrae  v.  Robinson  (2  Murph.,  N.  C, 

127),  79. 
McCraven  v.  McGuire  (23  Miss.  100), 

135. 
McCrawejr  v.  Remsen  (19  Ala.   430), 

82. 
McCrea  v.  Purmort  (10  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

473;  30  Am.  Dec.  103),  208. 
McCreary  v.  Turk  (29  Ala.  244),  30. 
McCrillis  v.   Millard  (17  R.   I.  724), 

61. 
McCulloch  v.  Dobson  (30  N.  E.  Rep. 

641;  133  N.  Y.  114),  8. 
McCullough  v.   Ashbridge  (155  Pa. 

St.  100),  210. 
McCully    v.     Malcolm    (9  Humph., 

Tenn.,  187),  133. 
McCune  v.  McCune  (29  Mo.  117),  67. 
McDaniel  v.  Needham  (01  Tex.  209), 

130. 
McDaniel  v.  King  (90  N.  C.  597).  222. 
McDaniel  v.  State  (16  Mass.  401),  10. 
McDaniel  v.  State  (8  Sm.  &  M.  401), 

102. 
McDaniel  v.  State  (Ala.,  1S83,  12  S. 

Rep.  241),  346. 
McDaniel  v.  State  (0  Ala.  306),  249. 
McDaniell  v.  State  (76  Ala.   1),  234, 

241. 
MeDermaid  v.   Russell  (41  111.  490), 

357. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXV11 


References  are  to  sections. 


McDermot  v.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.  (3  S.  & 

R.,  Pa.,  604),  221. 
McDermot  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  Co.  (73 

Mo.  516),  73a. 
McDermott  v.  Barnum  (19  Mo.  204), 

147. 
McDermott    v.    Chicago,     etc.    Co. 

(Wis.,  1893,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  79), 

375. 
McDermott  v.  McCormack  (4  Harr., 

Del.,  543),  131. 
McDonald  v.   Carnes  (90  Ala.  147), 

57. 
McDonald  v.  Caryell  (Ind.,  1893,  34 

N.  E.  Rep.  7),  377. 
McDonald  v.  Dana  (154  Mass.  152), 

222. 
McDonald  v.  Eggleston  (26  Vt.  154), 

69. 
McDonald  v.  Illinois   Cent.   R.  Co. 

(Iowa,  1893,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  102), 

333. 
McDonald  v.  Mallory  (77  N.  Y.  547), 

230. 
McDonald  v.  State  (80  Wis.  407),  240. 
McDonough    v.   Loughlin  (20  Barb. 

238),  269. 
McDowell  v.  Thomas  (4  Neb.  542),  77. 
McDuffie  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893, 17  S.  E. 

.  Rep.  505),  6. 
McElreath   v.   Midclleton  (14  S.    E. 

Rep.  906 ;  89  Ga.  356),  74. 
McElroy  v.  Braden  (152  Pa.  St.  78), 

362. 
McElvoy  v.   Ludlum  (32  N.  J.  Eq. 

828),  67,  76. 
McElwee   v.   Trowbridge   (68    Hun, 

28),  73a,  75. 
McEwen  v.  Biglow  (40   Mich.   215), 

188. 
McEwen  v.  Portland  (1   Oreg.   300), 

234. 
McFadden  v.  Ellmaker  (52  Cal.  348), 

66,  70. 
McFadden  v.   Railway  Co.  (92  Mo. 

313),  210. 
McFadden    v.   Reynolds  (Pa.,    1887, 

11  Atl.  Rep.  638),  354a. 


McFadden   v.    State  (28  Tex.    App. 

241),  346. 
McFarland  v.  Ford  (32  III.  App.  173), 

347. 
McGarvey  v.   Ford  (N.   M.,  27  Pac. 

Rep.  415),  232. 
McGaun  v.  Hamilton  (58  Conn.  69), 

198. 
McGee  v.  State  (16  S.  W.  Rep.  422 ; 

29  Tex.  App.  596),  320. 
McGee  v.  Wells  (37  S.  C.  365;  16  S. 

E.  Rep.  89),  11. 
McGennis  v.  Allison  (10  Serg.  &  R., 

Pa.,  197),   138. 
McGeorge  v.  Hoifman  (19  Atl.  Rep. 

413;  133  Pa.  St.  381),  226. 
McGerr  v.  Sell  (60  Ind.  249),  83. 
McGill  v.  Hawks  (95  Mich.  153;  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  707),  3d0. 
McGinnis  v.  State  (24  Ind.  500),  244. 
McGinnis  v.  State    (Wyo.,    1893,    31 

Pac.  Rep.  978),  306. 
McGoon  v.   Irvin  (1   Pinney,  Wis., 

526),  53. 
McGooney  v.  State  (20  Ohio  St.  93), 

205. 
McGowen  v.  Amer.  Press.  Tan  Bark 

(121  U.  S.  575),  199. 
McGrath  v.    Mongels   (20   N.    Y.    S. 

869),  209. 
McGrath  v.  Seagrave  (4  Allen,  443), 

147. 
McGravy  v.    Durnell  (134  111.    367), 

159. 
McGraw  v.   Com.   (Ky.,   1893,   20  S. 

W.  Rep.  879),  9,  69. 
McGregor  v.  Brown  (10  N.   Y.  117). 

263. 
McGrewv.  M.   Pac.   R.   R.   Co.  (109 

Mo.  582 ;  9  S.  W.  Rep.  53),  7. 
McGuire  v.  Manuf.   Co.  (156  Mass. 

324),  339. 
McGuire  v.  People   (44  Mich.  286), 

319. 
McGuire  v.  Railroad     Co.     (43    Mo. 

App.  354),  11. 
McGuire  v.  Stevens  (42    Miss.    474), 

209. 


cxvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


McGuirk  v.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (6G  Hun, 

628),  58,  144. 
McHugh  v.   Railroad  Co.   (65  Hun, 

619),  380. 
Mclntire  v.  Costello  (6  N.  Y.  S.  397; 

53  Hun,  636),  71. 
Mclntire  v.  Mancius  (16  Johns.  592), 

354. 
Mclntire  v.   Oliver  (2  Hawks,   209), 

69. 
Mclntire  v.  Velte  (153  Pa.  St.  350), 

128. 
Mcintosh  v.  Lee  (57  Iowa,  356),  237. 
Mcintosh  v.  Mcintosh  (79  Mich.  198; 

44  N.  W.  Rep.  592),  330. 
Mclvor    v.  Humble  (19   East,   169), 

144. 
McKay  v.  Lasher  (42  Hun,  270),  140. 
McKay  v.  Russell  (3  Wash.  St.  378),  9. 
McKee  v.  Hamilton  (33  Ohio  St.  7), 

67,  68. 
McKee  v.  State  (82  Ala.  32),  6. 
McKeefrey  v.  ConnellsvilleCoke  Co. 

(56  Fed.  Rep.  470),  216. 
McKelvey  v.  Railway  Co.  (39  W.  Va. 

500),  198. 
McKenzie   v.    Oregon    Imp.    Co.    (5 

Wash.  St.  409).  370. 
McKenzie  v.  State  (24  Ark.  636),  306, 

323. 
McKeon  v.   Barnes  (108  Mass.   344), 

139. 
McKesson  v.  Sherman  (51  Wis.  303), 

208. 
McKiesick   v.    State   (26  Tex.    673), 

343. 
McKinney  v.  State  (3  Wyo.  719),  283. 
McKinney  v.  State  (Fia.,  1892,  11  S. 

Rep.  732),  2J4. 
McKinnie  v.  Harvey  (38  Minn.    18), 

211. 
McLain  v.  Com.  (99  Pa.  St.  86),  123, 

193. 
McLain  v.  State  (Neb.,  1885,  7  Crim. 

L.  Mag.  199),  229. 
McLane  v.  Piaggo  (3  S.  Rep.  823;  24 

Fla.  71),  279. 
McLane  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  482),  8. 


McLaughlin  v.  Gilmore  (1  111.  App. 

563),  108. 
McLaughlin  v.  McLaughlin  (91  Pa. 

St.  462),  71. 
McLellon  v.  Cox  (36  Me.  95),  67. 
McLellon  v.  Crofton  (6  Greenl.  307), 

60. 
McLeod  v.  Ginter  (80  Ky.  403),  56. 
McLeod  v.  Lee  (17  Nev.  103),  50. 
McLeod   v.  Railway   Co.    (71   Iowa, 

138),  343. 
McLeod  v.  Skiles  (81  Mo.  595),  212. 
McLeod  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep. 

331),  197,  249. 
McLeon  v.  State  (16  Ala.  672),  330. 
McManus  v.  Freeman  (2  Pa.  Dist.  R. 

144),  168. 
McManuss  v.  London  (Minn.,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  139).  216. 
McMasters'  Appeal  (55  N.  W.    Rep. 

149,  Wis.,  1893),  169. 
McMasters  v.  Blaik  (29  Pa.  St.  298), 

231. 
McMeen  v.  Com.  (114  Pa.  St.  300),  6. 
McMicken  v.  Com.  (58  Pa.  St.  213), 

205. 
McMillan  v.   McDill  (110  111.  47),  67. 
McMullen  v.  Egan  (21  W.  Va.  244), 

137. 
McMullin  v.  Carsen  (48  Kan.  263 ;  29 

Pac.  Rep.  317),  11. 
McMurrin  v.  Rigby  (80  Iowa,  322),  52. 
McNair  v.  Com.  (26  Pa.  St.  388),  139, 

1 39a. 
McNamara  v.  Corp.  of  New  Melle- 

ray  (Iowa,  1893,   55  N.  W.  Rep. 

322),  370. 
McNamara  v.  Logan  (Ala.,    1894,  14 

S.  Rep.  175),  198. 
McName  v.  Morland  (26  Iowa,   96), 

226. 
McNeale  v.   Kraun   (21    Oreg.    218), 

361. 
McNear  v.  McComber  (18  Iowa,  7), 

206. 
McNeely  v.  Duff  (50  Kan.  488),  337. 
McNemey  v.    Reading   '150   Pa.  St. 

611;  30  W.  N.  C.  534),  348. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


CX1X 


References  are  to  sections. 


MoNichols  v.  Pac.   Ex.  Co.  (12  Mo. 

App.  401),  237. 
MeNight  v.  Bell  (26  W.   N.   C.  28), 

154. 
McNutt  v.  McNutt  (1  If.  Ind.  545),  376. 
McPlierson  v.  Bridge  Co.   (20  Oreg. 

486:  26  Pac.  Rep.  560).  18. 
McPlierson  v.  Seguine  (3  Dev.,  N. 

C,  154),  262. 
McPlierson  v.  Weston  (85  Cal.   90), 

205. 
McQueen  v.  People's  Nat.  Bank  (111 

N.  C.  509).  282. 
McQueen  v.  State  (94  Ala.  50 ;  10  S. 

Rep.  433),  89,  101. 
McRae  v.  State  (71  Ga.  9C),  67,  70. 
McRea  v.  Insurance  Bank  (16   Ala. 

755),  74. 
McReynolds  v.  Railroad  Co.  (106  111. 

152),  199. 
McShane  v.  Bank  (73  Md.  135),  73. 
McShane  v.  Braender  (66  How.  Pr., 

N.  Y.,  294),  252. 
McSweeney   v.    McMillan    (96    Ind. 

298),  70. 
McTyler  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,  18  S.  E. 

Rep.  140),  350. 
McVey  v.  Durkin  (136  Pa.    St.  418), 

58. 
McWhirter  v.    Allen   (1   Tex.    Civ. 

App.  649),  105. 
Meacham  v.  Meachaui  (Tenn.,  1892, 

19  S.  W.  Rep.  757),  262. 
Mead  v.  Black  (22  Wis.  232),  76. 
Mead  v.  Husted  (52  Conn.  56),  6. 
Mead  v.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co.  (3  Selden,  7 

N.  Y.,  530),  198. 
Mead  v.  Parker  (111  N.  Y.  259),  215. 
Mead  v.  Parker  (115  Mass.  413),  220. 
Meade  v.  Carolina  Bank  (26    S.    C. 

608),  186. 
Meagley  v.    Hoyt  (125  N.  Y.   771), 

229. 
Mealer  v.  State  (32  Tex.   Crim.  Rep. 

102;  22  S.W.  Rep.  142),  311,  349. 
Means  v.  Kimball  (35  Neb.  693),  130. 
Means  v.  Means  (7  Rich.,  S.  C,  533), 

139. 


Mears  v.  Cornwell  (73  Mich.  78),  346. 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Gibson  (7  Wend. 

460),  237. 
Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Levy  (3  Paige, 

N.  Y..  606l,  305. 
Mechanics'  Bank   v.  Lynn  (1   Pet., 

U.  S.,  376),  305. 
Mech.  &  Trad.  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wynant 

(49  Hun,  607),  380. 
Meconce  v.   Mower  (7  Wend.  315), 

73a. 
Medlin  v.  Steele  (75  N.  C.  154),  262. 
Medlin  v.  Wilkins  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

465),  374. 
Medomack  v.  Curtis  (24  Me.  36).  215. 
Meegan  v.  Boyle  (19  How.,  U.   S., 

130),  146. 
Meeker  v.  Meeker  (74  Iowa,  352;  37 

N.  W.  Rep.  773),  197. 
Meekins  v.  Smith  (1  H.  Bl.  636),  286." 
Meely  Hee  v.  Hudson  (21  S.  VV.  Rep. 

175),  241. 
Meentz  v.  Reiken  (42  111.  App.  17), 

250,  380. 
Meeteer  v.  Man.  R.  R.  Co.  (63  Hun, 

533),  307. 
Mehan  v.  State  (7  Wis.  670),  250. 
Meier  v.  Morgan  (82  Wis.  289),  346. 
Meikel  v.  Savings  Institution  (36  Ind. 

355).  128. 
Meiss  v.  Gill  (44  Ohio  St.  258),  160. 
Meixell  v.  Feezor  (43  111.  App.  180), 

335. 
Melcher   v.    Derkum  (44  Mo.  App. 

650),  79. 
Melcher  v.  Flanders  (40  N.  H.  139), 

138. 
Melius  v.  Houston  (41  Miss.  59),  148. 
Mellen,    In  re   (63  Hun,    623),    172, 

174. 
Mellon  v.  Reed  (114  Pa.  St.  647),  262. 
Mellor  v.    Missouri   P.    R.   Co.  (105 

Mo.   455;  16  S.    W.    Rep.    849), 

178. 
Melvin  v.  Bullard  (35  Vt.  368),  8. 
Melvin  v.  Whiting  (7  Pick.  79),  123. 
Melvin  v.   Whiting  (13  Pick.    190), 

276. 


cxx 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Memphis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Benson  (1  Pick. 

027),  30,  33. 
Memphis,  etc.    R.    Co.  v.   Cock    (04 

Miss.  713),  73a. 
Mendenhall   v.  Parish  (8  Jones'   L 

108),  208. 
Mentze  v.  Tuteur   (77   Wis.  236;  46 

N.  W.  Rep.  123),  349. 
Mercer  v.  Vose  (40  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct. 

218),   188,  199. 
Mercer  v.  Whall  (5  Ad.  &  EL,  N.  S., 

447),  249. 
Merchant  v.  Howell  (Minn.,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  131),  216. 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  Harrison  (39  Mo. 

433),  136. 
Merchants'  Bank  v.  Spalding  (9  N.  Y. 

53),  242. 
Merchants'  Dis.  Co.  v.  Leysor  (89  111. 

48),  362. 
Merchon  v.  Duer  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  333). 

246. 
Meredith   v.  Footner  (11   M.  &  W. 

202),  71. 
Meriam  v.  Harsen  (2  Barb.  232),  216. 
Meriwether  v.  State  (81    Ala.  74;  1 

S.  Rep.  5C0).  167. 
Merscheim  v.  Mus.  M.  P.  Union  (24 

Abb.  N.  C.  252),  154. 
Merrill  v.  Eastern  R.  Co.  (139  Mass. 

252),  250. 
Merrill  v.  Floyd  (2  C.  C.  A.  58),  367. 
Merrill  v.  Mary  (10  Allen,  Mass.,  416), 

"  343. 
Merritt  v.  Day  (38  N.  J.  L.  32),  69. 
Merritt  v.  Pollys  (16   B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

355),  69. 
Merritt  v.  Straw  (33  N.  E.  Rep.  657), 

140. 
Merritt  v.  White  (31  Mass.  438),  150a. 
Mersman  v.  Werges  (112  U.    S.  141), 

229. 
Mertz  v.  Detweiler  (8  W.  &  S.,  Pa., 

376),  73,  193. 
Meskimen    v.    Day    (35     Kan.    46), 

.    136. 
M.  E.  Church  v.  Jaques  (1   Johns., 

N.  Y.,  Ch.  65),  305. 


Metropolitan   Nat.  Bank   v.  Rogers 

(3  C.   C.   A,   666;  53   Fed.   Rep. 

776),  380. 
Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Johnson 

(Ga.,  1893,  18  S.    E.    Rep.    816), 

334. 
Meyer  v.  Cadwalader  (40  Fed.  Rep. 

32),  343. 
Meyer  v.  Campbell  (20  N.  Y.  S.  705 ; 

1  Misc.  Rep.  283\  350. 
Meyer  v.  Gassett  (38  Ark.  377),  136. 
Meyer  v.  Gullinan  (105  111.  272),  304. 
Meyer  v.  Houck  (Iowa,  1892,   52  N. 

W.  Rep.  235),  11. 
Meyer  v.  Roth  (51  Cal.  582),  121. 
Meyer  v.  Sefton.(2  Stark.  274),  37. 
Meyers  v.  Standart  (11  Ohio  St.  39), 

69. 
Miami,  etc.  Co.  v.  Baily  (37  Ohio  St. 

104),  202. 
Michael  v.  Crescent  Pipe   Line  Co. 

(Pa.,  1893,  28  Atl.  Rep.  204),*  199. 
Michael  v.  Foil  (100  N.  C.  189),  171. 
Michael  v.  Mace  (137  111.  485),  150a. 
Michels  v.  Olmstead   (14  Fed.  Rep. 

219),  212. 
Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Carrow  (73 

111.  34S),  73a. 
Michigan   Cent.    R.  Co.   v.  Gowgar 

(55  111.  503),  73a. 
Michigan,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes  (44 

Mich.  222),  344. 
Michigan   Ins.  Bank  v.  Eldred  (143 

U.  S.  293),  7. 
Michigan   Sav.    Bank   v,  Butler  (98 

Mich.  381 ;   57  N.  W.  Rep.  253), 

308. 
Mickelson   v.  Reves   (94   N.  C.  559), 

205. 
Middleditch   v.  Williams  (45   N.  J. 

Eq.  726),  51. 
Middleton  v.  Melton  (10  B.  &  C.  317), 

117. 
Middleton   v.  State  (52  Ga.  527),  324. 
Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Island  Coal   Co. 

(126  Ind.  384),  371. 
Milbank  v.  Jones  (17  N.  Y.  S.  464),  74. 
Miles  v.  Miles  (32  N.  H.  147),  304. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXX1 


References  are  to  sections. 


Miles  v.  0'Hara(4  Binn.,  Pa.,  108), 

124. 
Milford  v.  Powner  (126  Ind.  328),  110. 
Milford  v.  Veazie  (Me.,  1888,  14  Atl. 

Rep.  730),  126. 
Milfree  v.  State  (13  Tex.  App.  340), 

233. 
Millay  v.  Butts  (35  Me.  139),  229. 
Miller's  Appeal  (31  Pa.  St.  337),  215. 
Miller  v.  Avery  (2   Barb.    Ch.    582), 

142. 
Miller  v.  Eldridge  (26  Ind.  461),  22. 
Miller  v.  Fechtborn  (31  Pa.  St.  252), 

208. 
Miller   v.   Fletcher  (27  Gratt.,   Va., 

403),  205. 
Miller  v.  Indianapolis  (123  Ind.  196), 

142. 
Miller  v.  Insurance  Co.  (1  Abb.  N. 

C.  470),  216. 
Miller  v.  Johnston  (27  Md.  6),  140. 
Miller  v.  Jones  (32  Ark.  337),  140. 
Miller  v.  Knapp   (26   W.   N.   C.   29). 

147. 
Miller  v.  Miller  (2  Bing.  N.  C.  76),  138. 
Miller  v.  Montgomery  (¥8  N.  Y.  285), 

309. 
Miller  v.  Motter  (35  Md.  428),  309. 
Miller  v.  Mutual  Ben.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (31 

Iowa,  216),  200. 
Miller  v.  Neimerick  (19  111.   172),  69. 
Miller  v.  Powell  (53  Mo.  252),  136. 
Miller  v.  Railway  Co.  (58  Wis.  310), 

356. 
Miller  v.  Russell  (7  Mart.,  N.  S.,  266), 

122. 
Miller  v.  Saunders  (17  Ga.  92),  303. 
Mdler  v.  Shackelford  (4  Dana,  Ky„ 

264),  150a. 
Miller  v.  Shay  (145  Mass.  162),  60. 
Miller  v.  State  (68  Miss.  221),  8,  93. 
Miller  v.  State  (IS  Tex.  232),  9. 
Miller  v.  Stevens  (100  Mass.  518),  217. 
Miller  v.  Union  Switch  &  Signal  Co. 

(59  Hun,  624),  153. 
Miller  v.  Williams  (5  Esp.  19,  21),  82. 
Miller  v.  Windsor  W.  Co.  (30  W.  N. 

C.  85;  148  Pa.  St.  429),  8,  368. 


Miller  v.  Wood  (44  Vt.  378).  80. 
Miller  Ins.  Co.   v.   Kinneard  (35  III. 

App.  105),  212. 
Millet  v.  Marston  (63  Me.  477),  209. 
Millott  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.   E.  R.  Co.  (19 

N.  Y.  S.  122;  64  Hun,  634),  11. 
Mills  v.  Davis  (113  N.  Y.  243).  309. 
Mills  v.  Husson  (63  Hun,  632),  377. 
Mills  v.  Lee  (4  Hill,  549),  302. 
Mills  v.  Oddy  (6  C.  &  P.  728),  173. 
Mills  v.  Railroad  Co.  (41  N.  J.  Eq.  1), 

83. 
Milw.  etc.  Co.  v.  Johnson  (35  Neb. 

554),  216. 
Milw.  etc.  Co.  v.  Kellogg  (94  IT.   S. 

469),  186,  200. 
Minims  v.  State  (16  Ohio  St.  221),  9. 
Minis  v.  Schwarz  (37  Tex.   13),  242. 
Minchin  v.  Minchin  (32  N.  E.   Rep. 

164;  157  Mass.  265).  212. 
Miner  v.  Atherton  (35  Pa.   St.   528), 

215. 
Miner  v.  Baron  (131  N.  Y.  677),  374. 
Mines  v.  Perry  (113  Mass.    274),  139. 
Minet  v.  Morgan  (L.   R.  8  Ch.  361), 

174. 
Ming  v.  Foote  (9  Mont.  201 ;  23  Pac. 

Rep.  515),  38,  45. 
Minn.  M.  Co.  v.  Minn.   etc.  Ry.  Co. 

(51  Minn.   304;   53   N.   W.    Rep. 

639),  121. 
Minnesota  S.  Ag.   Soc.  v.  Swanson 

(48  Minn.  231),  369. 
Minor  v.  Kirkland  (Tex.,    1893,    20 

S.  W.  Rep.  932),  220. 
Minor  v.   Powers   (Tex.    Civ.   App., 

1894,  24   S.   W.   Rep.    710),   217, 

220. 
Minor  v.  Stone  (1  La.  Ann.  283),  244. 
Minor  v.  Tillotson  (7  Pet.  100),  30. 
Minter  v.  People  (29  N.   E.   Rep.  45; 

39  111.  App.  438),  354a. 
Minzenheimer  v.    Heinze    (74  Tex. 

254),  357. 
Mishler  v.  Baumgardner  (1  Am.  L. 

J.  304),  312. 
Mississippi,  etc.  Co.  v.  More  (15  S.  W. 

Rep.  714,  Tex.,  1891),  58,  83a. 


CXX11 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Missouri,    etc.    Co.    v.    Baier  (Neb., 

1893,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  913),  56. 
Missouri,  etc.  Co.  v.  Bond  (Tex.,  1893, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  930), 56. 
Missouri,  etc.  Co.  v.  German  (84  Tex. 

41),  33. 
Missouri,  etc.  Co.   v.   Heidenheimer 

(82  Tex.  195),  151. 
Missouri  Glass  Co.  v.    Grigg  (Tex., 

1890,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  174),  148. 
Missouri  Pac.   R.  Co.   v.   Pierce  (39 

Kan.  391),  368. 
Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Sherwood  (84 

Tex.  125),  73a. 
Mitchell  v.  Bradstreet   Co.  (116  Mo. 

226 ;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  724),  369. 
Mitchell  v.  Cochran  (10  N.  Y.  S.  545; 

57  Hun,  589),  308. 
Mitchell   v.    Judge    (53    Mich.    541), 

285. 
Mitchell  v.  Mitchell  (15   S.  W.  Rep. 

705;  80  Tex.  101),  168. 
Mitchell  v.  Sheriff   (7   Abb.  Pr.  96). 

288. 
Mitchell  v.  State  (71  Ga.  123),  124. 
Mitchell  v.  State  (94   Ala.  68 ;  10   S. 

Rep.  518),  346,  349,  350. 
Mitchell  v.  State  (58  Ala.  418),  194. 
Mitchinson  v.  Cross  (58  111.  366,  369), 

166. 
Mitchmerv.  Holmes  (Mo.,  1893,   20 

S.  W.  Rep.  1070),  136. 
Mithoff  v.  Byrne  (20   La.' Ann.  363), 

221. 
Mittnacht  v.  Slevin   (67   Hun,  315), 

205,  220. 
Mix  v.  Osby  (62  111.  193),  73a. 
Mix  v.  Shattuck  (50  Vt.  421),  69. 
Mix  v.  Staples  (63  Hun,  631),  189. 
Mixter  Coal  Co.  v.  Smith  (152  Pa.  St. 

395),  8. 
Mizer  v.  Bristol  (30  Neb.  138),  249. 
Moale  v.  Buchanan  (11  Gill  &  J.  314), 

223. 
Mobile  Bank  v.  McDonnell  (89  Ala. 

434),  70,  311. 
Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.  Blakely  (59  Ala. 
471),  198. 


Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.   George  (94  Ala. 

199;  10  S.  Rep.  145),  24. 
Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein  (43  111.  App. 

63),  73a. 
Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ladd  (9  S.  Rep. 

169;  92  Ala.  287),  145. 
Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.  Whitney  (39  Ala. 

468),  242. 
Mobile,  etc.  Co.   v.  Worthington  (95 

Ala.  598;  10  S.  Rep.  839),  8. 
Mobile  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Walker  (58  Ala. 

290),  185. 
Mobile  Sav.  Bank  v.    McDonnell  (89 

Ala.  434;  8  S.  Rep.  137),  208. 
Mockabee  v.  Com.  (78  Ky.  380),  101. 
Modern  Woodmen  v.  Sutton  (38  111. 

App.  327),  250. 
Moett  v.  People  (85  N.  Y.  373).  351. 
Moffatt  v.  Terney  (30  Pac.  Rep.  348 ; 

IT  Colo.  189),  347. 
Moffett  v.  Witherspoon  (10  Ired.  L. 

185),  74. 
Moline  Wagon  Co.  v.  Preston  (35  111. 

App.  358),  353. 
Molyneux   v.    Collier  (13  Ga.    406), 

114. 
Monkton  v.   Attorney-General  (2  R. 

&M.  147,  160),  113. 
Monroe  v.  Snow  (131  111.  126),  60. 
Monroe's  Estate,   In  re  (23  Abb.  N. 
C.  83;  5N.  Y.   S.  552),  194,  201. 
Monroe's  Will,  In  re  (20  N.  Y.  S.  82; 

2  Con.  Sur.  395),  169. 
Monroe  Cattle  Co.  v.  Becker  (147  U. 

S.  47),  304. 
Monselle  v.  Bacon  (66  Hun,  628),  380. 
Montague  v.  Stoltz  (S.  C,  1893,  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  868),  380. 
Montezuma  v.  Wilson  (Ga.,  1889,  9 

S.  E.  Rep.  17),  21. 
Montgomery  v.  Bevans  (1  Sawy.  C. 

C.  653),  233. 
Montgomery  v.  Com.  (88  Ky.  509), 

231. 
Montgomery  v.  Con.  Bridge  Co.  (110 

Pa.  St.  54),  7. 
Montgomery  v.  Deeley  (3  Wis.  623), 
242. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXX111 


References  are  to  sections. 


Montgomery  v.  Maguire(25  111.  App. 

31),  57. 
Montgomery  v.  Perkins (2  Met.,  Ky., 

418),  269. 
Montgomery  v.  Pickering  (116  Mass. 

227),  174. 
Montgomery  v.  Scott  (34  Wis.  333), 

194,  198. 
Montgomery  v.  State  (11  Ohio,  421), 

124. 
Montgomery  v.  State  (80  Ind.  338), 

102. 
Montrose  v.  Wanamaker   (57   Hun, 

590),  154. 
Montross  v.  Eddy  (53  N.   W.    Rep. 

916;  94  Mich.  100),  369. 
Moody  v.    Rowell  (17  Pick.,  Mass., 

490),  139,  139a,  140,  141,  341. 
Moody  v.  Smith  (70  N.  Y.  598),  268. 
Mooers  v.  Bunker  (29  N.  H.  42),  53. 
Mooney  v.  Holconib  (15  Oreg.   639), 

229. 
Mooney  v.  Hough  (84  Ala.  80),  343. 
Mooney  v.  Olsen  (22  Kan.  69),  151. 
Moore  v.  Bunner  (31  111.   App.   400), 

146. 
Moore  v.  Butler  (48  N.  H.  161),  73. 
Moore  v.  Com.  (92  Ky.  630 ;  18  S.  W. 

Rep.  833),  249. 
Moore  v.  Dulsen  (79  Ga.  456),  309. 
Moore  v.  Green  (73  N.  C.  394),  286. 
Moore  v.  Jackson  (4  Wend.,  N.   Y., 

59),  218. 
Moore  v.  Knott  (14  Oreg.  35),  60. 
Moore  v.  McDonald    (68     Md.    321), 

368. 
Moore  v.  MoKee  (13  Miss.  238),  166. 
Moore  v.  Moore  (39  Iowa,  461),  124. 
Moore  v.  Pickett  (62  111.  138),  246. 
Moore  v.  Robertson    (62    Hun,    623), 

361. 
Moore  v.  Spier  (80  Ala.  130),  269. 
Moore  v.  State  (17  Ohio  St.  321),  193. 
Moore  v.  State  (79  Ga.  498),  319. 
Moore  v.  United  States  (91  U.  S.  270), 

140. 
Moore  v.  United  States  (17  Ct.  of  CI. 

17),  222. 


Moore  v.  Voss  (1  Cranch,  C.  C.  179), 

205. 
Moore  v.  Wilkins  (10  N.  H.  455),  56. 
Moore  v.  Worth  (2  Duv.,  Ky.,  308). 

240. 
Moore  v.  Wright  (90  111.  470),  80,  207. 
Moore  wood  v.  Wood  (14  East,  330), 

112. 
Moors  v.  Albro  (129  Mass.  9),  129. 
Moran  v.  Hayes  (1  Johns.  Ch.   339), 

246. 
More  v.  Wood  (14  East,  327),  140. 
Moreland  v.  Bernhardt  (44  Tex.  275), 

223. 
Morgan  v.  Atlanta  (77  Ga.  662),  242. 
Morgan  v.  Burrows    (45  Wis.    211), 

220. 
Morgan  v.  Cree  (46  Vt.  786) ;  242. 
Morgenthau  v.  Walker  (21   N.  Y.  S. 

936),  351. 
Morin  v.  Multnomah  Co.  (18  Oreg. 

163;  22Pac.  Rep.  490),  277. 
Morneno  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  21  S. 

W.  Rep.  924),  4. 
Morning  Journal  v.  Jones  (123  N.  Y. 

207),  10. 
Morrell  v.  Kelly  (157   Mass.  126;  31 

N.  E.  Rep.  755),  380. 
Morrill  v.  Foster  (33  N.  H.  379),  53. 
Morrill  v.  Tegarden  (19  Neb.  534),  188. 
Morris  v.  Atl.  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.  (116  N. 

Y.  556),  350. 
Morris  v.  Cain  (39   La.  Ann.   712;  1 

S.  Rep.  879),  172. 
Morris  v.  Callanan  (105   Mass.    129), 

115. 
Morris  v.  Columbian  Iron  Works  & 

D.  D.  Co.  (Md.,  1893,  25  Atl.  Rep. 

417),  336,  337. 
Morris  v.  Davidson  (49  Ga.  361),  242. 
Morris  v.  Davies  (3  C.  &  P.  215),  250. 
Morris  v.  Davis  (5  C.  &  Fin.  163),  234. 
Morris  v.  Harmes'  Heirs  (7  Pet.  558), 

14. 
Morris  v.  Morris  (119  Ind.  343),  172, 

178. 
Morris  v.  Morton  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  287),  60,  222. 


CXX1V 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Morris  v.  Morton's  Ex'rs  (Ky.,  1892, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  287),  7. 
Morris  v.  Nixon  (1  Ho\v.,U.  S.,  118), 

67,  70. 
Morris  v.  Peckham   (51   Conn.    128), 

267. 
Morris  v.  Patchin  (24  N.  Y.  394),  148. 
Morris  v.  State   (31   Tex.  App.   597), 

10. 
Morris  v.  State  (2    Tex.    App.    502), 

357. 
Morris  v.  Stokes  (24  Ga.  552),  80. 
Morris  v.  White  (36   N.  J.  Eq.  324), 

304. 
Morrison  v.  Chapin  (97  Mass.  76),  337. 
Morrison  v.  Leonard  (3  C.  &  P.  127), 

316. 
Morrison  v.  Porter    (35    Minn.   425), 

140. 
Morrison  v.  Railroad  (Iowa,  1892,  57 

N.  W.  Rep.  75),  344. 
Morrison  v.  White  (16  La.  Ann.  100), 

135. 
Morrow  v.  Ostrander  (13  Hun,  219), 

335. 
Morse  v.  Bellows  (7  N.  H.  549),  69. 
Morse  v.  Hewett  (28  Mich.  481),  242. 
Morse  v.  Stearns  (131  Mass.  3S9),  220. 
Morss  v.  Moras  (11  Barb.  310),  313. 
Mortimer  v.  Chambers   (17   N.  Y.  S. 

552),  140. 
Mortimer  v.  Met.  E.  R.  Co.  (129  N.  Y. 

84),  362. 
Morton  v.  Barrett  (19  Me.  109),  53. 
Morton  v.  Dean (13  Met.,  Mass.,  388), 

268. 
Morton  v.  Nelson  (111.,  1893,  32  N.  E. 

Rep.  916),  262. 
Morvant,  Succession  of  (45  La.  Ann. 

207),  139. 
Mosely  v.  Davis  (11  Price,  162),  112. 
Mosely  v.  Martin  (37  Ala.  216),  220, 

237. 
Moses  v.  Penquit  (82  Ala.  370),  60. 
Mosley  v.  Insurance  Co.  (55  Vt.  142), 

241. 
Mosley  v.  Martin  (37  Ala.  216),   237, 

242 


Moss  v.  Cent.  Park  R.   R.  Co.  (23  N. 

Y.  S.  23),  176. 
Mossman  v.    Forrest  (27  Ind.   233), 

239. 
Moulton  v.  Bowker  (59  N.  Y.   533), 

74. 
Moulton  v.  Harri3  (94  Cal.  420),  262. 
Moundsville  v.  Velton  (13  S.  E.  Rep. 

373),  242. 
Mounett  v.  Mounett  (46  Ohio  St.  30), 

220. 
Mount  joy  v.  State  (78  Ind.  172),  357. 
Mount  Vernon  v.  Brooks  (39  111.  App. 

426).  339,  340. 
Moursund  v.  Priess  (Tex.,    1892,    84 

Tex.  554;  19    S.  W.  Rep.   775), 

150. 
Moy  v.  Hoydun  (30  Miss.  110).  141. 
Muckle  v.  Rendle  (16  N.  Y.  S.   208), 

199. 
Muckleroy  v.  Bethany  (27  Tex.  551), 

128. 
Mudd  v.  Suckermore  (5  A.  &  E.  703; 

31  E.  C.  L),  139. 
Mueller  v.  Relhan   (94  111.   142),  66, 

69. 
Mugge  v.  Adams  (76  Tex.  448),  130. 
Muldowney  v.  111.   Cent.    R.    Co.  (36 

Iowa,  472),  186. 
Mulhado  v.   Brooklyn,   etc.    Co.   (30 

N.  Y.  370),  345. 
Mulhall  v.  Keen  (18  Wall.,  U.  S.,  342), 

144. 
Mulhearn  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.  (53  N.  J. 

L.  153),  285. 
Mullaly  v.  Walsh  (I.  R.  6  C.  L.  314), 

233. 
Mullaney  v.  Duffy  (145  111.   559 ;  33 

N.  E.  Rep.  250),  110,  115. 
Mullen  v.  Morris  (2  Pa.   St.  85),   143. 
Mullen  v.  Railroad  (21  N.  Y.  S.  101), 

11. 
Mullins  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  1035),  93. 
Mullis  v.  Cairns  (5  Blackf.,  Ind.,  77), 

134. 
Munde  v.  Lambre  (125   Mass.    367), 

343. 


TAIH/K    OF    CASES. 


CXXV 


References  are  to  sections. 


Mundhenk  v.    Central   Iowa   R.  Co. 

(57  Iowa,  718),  75. 
Munn  v.  Burch  (25  111.  21).  242. 
Munn  v.  Owens  (2  Dill.  477),  308. 
Munroe  v.  Napier  (52  Ga.  388),  308. 
Munroe  v.  Perkins  (9  Pick.  298),  214. 
Munshower  v.  State  (55  Md.  11),  1-15. 
Munson  v.  Atwood  (30  Conn.  102),  6. 
Munson  v.  Wickwire  (21  Conn.  513), 

68. 
Murchie  v.  Cook  (1  Ala.  41),  212. 
Murdock  v.  Summer  (22  Pick.    158), 

199. 
Murdock  v.  Union  Bank  (2  Rob.  112), 

230. 
Murieta  v.  Wolfhagen   (2  C.   &  K. 

744;  61  E.  C.  L.),  139. 
Murphy  v.  Collins  (121  Mass.  6),  230. 
Murphy  v.  Com.  (IS  N.  Y.  S.  353;  28 

Abb.  N.  C.  207),  350. 
Murphy  v.  Com.  (23  Gratt.,  Va.,  960), 

350. 
Murphy  v.  Hagerman  (Wright,  Ohio, 

293,  297),  140. 
Murphy  v.  Hendricks  (57  Ind.  593). 

242. 
Murphy  v.  Hiebert(16  Pa.  St.  50),  71. 
Murphy  v.  May  (19  Bush,  Ky.,  33), 

73a. 
Murphy  v.  People  (9  Colo.  435),  10. 
Murphy  v.  People  (37  111.  447),  234. 
Murphy   v.   Railroad   Co.   (62   Hun, 

587),  12, 
Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type  Foundry 

(29  Mo.  App.  541),  76. 
Murphy  v.  State  (Tex.,    1893,   21   S. 

W.  Rep.  45),  282, 
Murray  v.  Chase  (134  Mass.  92),  74. 
Murray  v.  Elston  (23  N.  J.  Eq.  212), 

288. 
Murray  v.  G.  W.  Ins.   Co.  (25  N.  Y. 

S.  414),  340. 
Murray  v.  Gregory  (5  Wels.   &  H. 

468),  38. 
Murray  v.  Milner  (L.  R.  12  Ch.  Div. 

845),  53. 
Murray  v.  Murray  (6  Oreg.  17),  232. 
Murray  v.  Sells  (53  Ga.  257),  82. 


Murray  v.  State  (6  S.  Rep.  498),  90. 
Murray  v.  State  (25  Fla.   528 ;   12  S. 

Rep.  453),  89,  249. 
Murray,  In  re  (41    La.    Ann.    1109), 

144. 
Murrell  v.  Mandlebaum  (Tex.,  19  S. 

W.  Rep.  880),  262. 
Murtaugh  v.  Murphy  (30  111.   App. 

59),  351. 
Mussey  v.  Beecher  (3  Cush.,  Mass., 

517),  73a. 
Musson  v.  Fales  (16  Mass.  335),  323. 
Mutual  Benefit  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Ruse  (8 

Ga.  530),  205. 
Mutual,  etc.  Co.  v.  Tillman  (84  Tex. 

31),  50,  52. 
Mutual  Ins.  Co.   v.  Carey  (54  Hun, 

493;  135  N.  Y.  326),  135,  157. 
Mutual  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Anthony  (50 

Hun,  101),  121. 
Mutual   Life  Ins.  Co.   v.  Thompson 

(Ky.,  1893,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  87),  375. 
Myers  v.  Kinzie  (26  111.  36),  70. 
Myers  v.  Munson  (65  Iowa,  423),  210. 
Myers  v.  State  (46  Ohio  St.  473;  22 

N.  E.  Rep.  43),  244. 
Myers  v.  State  (7  Tex.  App.  640),  424. 

N. 

Nadau   v.    White    Lumber  Co.    (76 

Wis.  120;  43  N.  W.  Rep.  1035),  79. 
Nagee  v.  Osborne  (32  N.  Y.  669),  139a. 
Nalle  v.  Gates  (20  Tex.  315),  69. 
Nash  v.  Gilkerson  (5  S.  &  R.  352),  10. 
Nash  v.  Hall  (4  Ind.  444),  250. 
Nash  v.  Town  (5  Wall.  698),  373. 
Nashau,  etc.  Co.  v.  Boston,  etc.  Corp. 

(31  N.    E.  Rep.   1060;  157  Mass. 

268),  215. 
Nashville  Life  Ins.   Co.  v.  Mathews 

(8  Lea,  Tenn.,  299),  221. 
National   Bank   v.  Dunn   (106    Ind. 

110),  198. 
National  Bank  v.  Richardson  (2  N.  Y. 

S.  804),  229. 
National  Bank  v.   Scriven  (63  Hun, 

375),  349. 


CXXV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


National   Bank  v.    Stephenson    (82 

Tex.  435),  20. 
National  Bank  v.  Wood  (19  N.  Y.  S. 

81),  247. 
National  Harrow  Co.   v.  Hanby  (54 

Fed.  Rep.  493),  231,  250. 
National  State  Bank  v.  Richardson 

(2  N.  Y.  S.  804),  230. 
National  S.   S.   Co.  v.  Tugman  (143 

U.  S.  23),  355. 
National  Syrup  Co.   v.  Carlson  (42 

111.  App.  178),  347. 
National  Ulster  Co.  Bank  v.  Madden 

(114  N.  Y.  280),  60. 
Nations  v.  Johnson  (24  How.,  U.  S., 

195),  232. 
Navarro  v.  State  (24  Tex.  378 ;  G  S. 

W.  Rep.  542),  194,  355. 
Nave  v.  Kilter  (41  Ind.  301),  357. 
Nay  v.  Curley  (113  N.   Y.  575),  230, 

308. 
Neaderheuser  v.  State  (28  Ind.  257), 

239. 
Neal  v.  Dealing  (21  S.  W.  Rep.  1066), 

368. 
Neal  v.  Reams  (88  Ga.  29S),  222. 
Neal  v.  Wilding  (2  Str.  1151),  53. 
Neally  v.  Greenough  (5  Foster,  N.  H., 

325),  126. 
Nearpass  v.  Gihnan  (104  N.  Y.  507), 

309. 
Neely  v.  State  (27  Tex.  App.  324),  89, 

95,  323. 
Neff  v.  Cincinnati  (32  Ohio  St.  215), 

253. 
Neil  v.  State  (79  Ga.  779),  368. 
Neill's  Estate  (7  N.  Y.  S.  197),  178. 
Neland    v.    Murphy    (73   Wis.    326), 

50. 
Nelins  v.  Buckell  (1  Hay  w.  19),  138. 
Nelson  v.  Graff  (44  Mich.  433),  136. 
Nelson  v.  Harrington  (72  Wis.  591 ; 

40  N.  W.  Rep.  228),  346. 
Nelson  v.  Ladd  (54  N.  W.  Rep.  309, 

S.  D.,  1893),  244. 
Nelson  v.  M.  Ins.  Co.  (71  N.  Y.  453), 

188. 
Nelson  v.  Nelson  (66  Hun,  633),  282. 


Nelson  v.  New  York  (131  N.  Y.  4), 

60. 
Nelson  v.  State  (2  Swan,  Tenn.,  237). 

330. 
Nelson  v.  State  (33  Fla.    244;  13  S. 

Rep.  861),  10,  349. 
Nelson  v.  State  (1  Tex.  App.  41),  23. 
Nelson  v.  Sun  Ins.  Co.  (71  N.  Y.  453), 

185. 
Nelson  v.  Wallace  (48  Mo.  App.  193), 

10,  249.. 
Nesbit  v.  Greenville  (69  Miss.  22;  10 

S.  Rep.  452),  12. 
Nesbitt  v.  Cavendar  (27  S.  C.  1),  223. 
Nesbitt  v.  Riverside  (144  U.  S.  610), 

145. 
Newberry  v.  Robinson  (36  Fed.  Rep. 

841),  242. 
Newberry  v.  Sheffly  (89  Va.  286;  15 

S.  E.  Rep.  548),  145. 
Newberry  v.  State  (26  Fla.  334 ;  8  S. 

Rep.  445),  11. 
Newcomb   v.  Wood  (7  Otto,   U.  S.. 

581),  315. 
Newcomb  v.  Jones  (37  Mo.  App.  475), 

80,  82. 
Newcomb  v.  Presbury  (8  Met.  406), 

84. 
Newell  v.   Homer    (120    Mass.  277), 

34S. 
Newell  v.  Newell  (9  Paige,  N.  Y.,  26), 

202. 
Newell  v.  Nichols  (12  Hun,  N.  Y., 

644;  75  N.  Y.  78),  233. 
New  England,  etc.  Co.  v.   Farming- 
ton,  etc.  Co.  (8  W.  &  S.  229),  142. 
New  England  Glass  Co.  v.  Lovell  (7 

Cush.  319),  19S. 
New  England  Mon.  Co.  v.  Johnson 

(144  Pa.  St.  61),  30. 
New  England  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Gay  (33 

Fed.  Rep.  636),  208. 
Newhall  v.  Appleton  (114  N.  Y.  143), 

216. 
Newhall  v.  Holt  (6  M.  &  W.  662), 

80. 
Newhall  v.  Jenkins  (2  Gray,  562),  76. 
Newhan  v.  Aurora  (14  111.  364),  143a. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXVll 


References  are  to  sections. 


New  Haven  Co.  Bank  v.  Mitchell  (15 

Conn.  206),  138,  230. 
New  Jersey  v.  Yard  (95  U.  S.   112), 

242. 
New  Jersej'  Mat.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Baker 

(94  U.  S.  G10),  208. 
Newland  v.   Douglas  (2  Johns.  62), 

314. 
Newman   v.    Greenville   (7  S.   Rep. 

403 ;  67  Miss.  770),  231. 
Newman  v.   McComas  (43  Md.  70), 

69. 
Newman  v.  Samuels  (17  Iowa,  528), 

136. 
New   Mexican   R.    R.   Co.    v.    Hen- 
dricks (N.   Mex.,    1893,  30  Pac. 

Rep.  901),  199. 
New  Milford  v.  Sherman  (21  Conn. 

101),  56. 
New  Portland  v.  King  (55  Me.   172), 

36. 
Newsom  v.    Bufferton  (1   Dev.   Eq. 

383),  223. 
Newson  v.  Dodson  (61  Tex.  91),  52. 
Newton  v.  Belcher  (12  Q.  B.  921),  82. 
Newton   v.    Harland   (9   Dowl.    16), 

276. 
Newton  v.  Mut.  Ben.   L.   Ins.  Co.  (2 

Dill.  C.  C.  154),  57. 
Newton  v.  Newton  (46  Minn.  33;  48 

N.  W.  Rep.  450),  250. 
Newton  v.   Seamen's  Fr.   Soc.  (130 

Mass.  91),  210. 
Newton  v.   State  (Miss.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  560),  11. 
Newton  v.  State  (42  La.  Ann.  33),  52. 
New  York  City  v.  Second  Av.  R.  R. 

Co.  (102  N.  Y.  579),  GO. 
New   York   L.    Ins.    Co.   v.   Aitkins 

(125  N.  Y.  560),  159. 
New  York  Phar.  Ass'n  v.  Tilden  (14 

Fed.  Rep.  740),  134. 
New  York  Smelting  Co.  v.  Lieb  (4 

N.  Y.  S.  545;  56  Super.  Ct.  Rep. 

308),  309. 
Ney  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  Co.  (20  Iowa. 

347),  205. 
Ney  v.  Mumme  (66  Tex.  268),  31. 


Ney  v.  Troy  (50  Hun,  604 ;  3  N.  Y.  S. 

679),  192. 
Nichols  v.  Brunswick  (3  Cliff.,  U.  S. 

C.  C,  88),  276. 
Nichols  v.   Burch  (128  Ind.  324;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  737),  208. 
Nichols  v.  Goldsmith  (7  Wend.  360), 

758. 
Nichols  v.  Howe  (43  Minn.  181),  130. 
Nichols  v.   Johnson  (10  Conn.  192), 

128. 
Nichols  v.   Jones  (32  Mo.  App.  657), 

74,  76. 
Nichols    v.    Parker    (14    East,    331), 

114. 
Nichols  v.  Webb  (8  Wheat.  326),  58, 

60. 
Nichols  v.    Wentworth   (100  N.   Y. 

455)    226. 
Nicholson  v.   State  (38  Md.  140),  89. 
Niederluck   v.    State  (21  Tex.  App. 

320),  90. 
Nies  v.    Broadhead  (27  N.  Y.  S.  52), 

38a. 
Nilan  v.  Kalish  (Neb.,  1893,  55  N.  W. 

Rep.  295),  167. 
Nipper  v.  Jones  (27  Mo.  App.  558), 

60. 
Nixon  v.  McKinney  (105  N.   C.  23), 

50,  308. 
Nixon  v.  Palmer  (10  Barb.  175,  178), 

231. 
Nixon  v.  Porter  (34  Miss.  697),  108, 

115. 
Nixon  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.  App. 

205),  9. 
Nobles  v.  Hogg  (36  S.  C.  322),  362. 
Noftsger  v.  Smith  (Ind.,  1893,  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  1024),  "62. 
Noftsinger  v.  State  (7  Tex.  App.  301), 

10. 
Nolan  v.  Bolton  (25  Ga.  352),  215. 
Nolan  v.   Pelham  (77  Ga.   262),   31, 

126. 
Norcross  v.  Weldon  (59  Vt.  50),    18. 
Nordans  v.  Hubbard  (48  Fed.   Rep. 

921),  216. 
Norelli  v.  Rossi  (2  Bradw.  757),  158. 


GXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Norfolk  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wood  (33  Neb. 

113),  71. 
Nork  v.  Beach  (129  N.  Y.  621),  139, 

208. 
Norman  v.  Morrell  (4  Ves.  769),  218. 
Norman,  In  re  (33  N.  W.  Rep.  374; 

72  Iowa,  84),  22. 
Norris  v.  Beach  (2  Johns.   294),  286. 
Norris  v.  Harris  (15  Cal.  226),  231. 
Norris  v.  Moody  (84  Cal.  143),  226. 
Norris  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  592),  283. 
Norris  v.  Stewart   (105    N.    C.    455), 

168. 
Norsler  v.  Chicago,    B.  &  Q.  R.  Co. 

(73  Iowa,  268),  304. 
North  v.  People  (28  N.  E.  Rep.  966 ; 

139  111.  81),  36,  101,  283. 
North    Brookfield    v.    "Warren    (16 

Gray,  174),  53. 
North  Carolina  University  v.  Harri- 
son (90  N.  C.  385),  233. 
North  Chicago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cotting- 

ham  (44  III.  App.  46),  348. 
North  Chicago,  etc.   Co.  v.  Hudson 

(44  111.  App.  60),  8. 
North    Mfg.    Co.    v.    Chambers    (58 

Mich.  381),  241. 
Northern  Bank  v.    Lewis   (78   Wis. 

475),  219. 
Northern  Mich.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Lyon 

(95  Mich.  584;  55   N.    W.    Rep. 

438),  84. 
Northern  Mich.  Lumber  Co.  v.  Mc- 

Alister  (40  Mich.  84),  210. 
Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Charless 

(51   Fed.    Rep.   562;  2  C.  C.   A. 

380),  333. 
Northern    P.    etc.    Co.    v.    O'Brien 

(Wash.,  1890,  21  Pac.  Rep.  32), 

24. 
Northrop  v.  Hale  (76  Me.  309),  53. 
Northrop  v.  Wright  (24  Wend.  221), 

105. 
Northrup  v.  Jackson  (13  Wend.  80), 

126. 
North  Stonington  v.  Stonington  (31 

Conn.  412),  51. 


Northwestern    Bank    v.    Nelson    (1 

Gratt.,  Va.,  108),  305. 
Norton    v.   Atchison   (30   Pac.  Rep. 

585 ;  97  Cal.  388),  208. 
Norton  v.  Bank  (50  Ark.  59),  250. 
Norton  v.    Conner  (14  S.  W.  Rep. 

193,  Tex.,  1892),  105. 
Norton  v.    Doherty  (3  Gray,  Mass., 

372),  151. 
Norton   v.    Moore  (3  Head,    Tenn., 

482),  98. 
Norton  v.  Norton  (17  N.  Y.  St.  Rep. 

487),  230. 
Norton  v.  Paxton  (110  Mo.   456;  19 

S.  W.  Rep.  807),  248. 
Norvell  v.  McHenry  (1  Mich.  227), 

244. 
Norwegian   Plow  Co.   v.   Hanthorn 

(71  Wis.  529;  37  N.  W.  Rep.  825), 

341. 
Nott  v.  Thomson  (35  S.  C.  461 ;  14  S. 

E.  Rep.  940),  343. 
Nowlen  v.  Lyon  (41  N.  W.  Rep.  496; 

73  Mich.  434),  150. 
Nowlin  v.  Burwell  (75  Va.  551),  108. 
Noyes  v.  Pugin  (2. Wash.  St.  258), 

380. 
Noyes  v.   State  (40   N.  J.   L.    429), 

323. 
Noyes  v.  White  (19  Conn.  250),  57, 

116. 
Nuckols'  Adm'r  v.  Jones  (8  Gratt., 

Va..  267),  132. 
Nudd  v.  Burrows  (91  U.  S.  439),  11. 
Numrich  v.  Supreme  Lodge  (3  N.  Y. 

S.  552),  178. 

o. 

Oakland  v.  Rye  (52  Cal.  270),  83. 
Oakley  v.  State  (40  Ala.  392),  211. 
Oaks  v.  Weller  (16  Vt.  71),  225. 
Oaksmith  v.  Johnson  (92  U.  S.  343), 

226. 
O'Bannon  v.  Vigus  (32  111.  App.  473), 

80. 
Oberman   Brew.   Co.   v.   Adams  (35 

111.  App.'  540).  80. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXX1X 


References  are  to  sections. 


Obernalte  v.  Edgar  (28  Neb.  70 ;   44 

N.  W.  Rep.  82),  333. 
O'Blenis  v.  State  (47  N.  J.  L.  279),  10. 
O'Brien  v.  Com.  (6  Bush,  Ky.,  503), 

123. 
O'Brien  v.   McCann  (58  N.  Y.  373), 

231. 
O'Brien  v.  Weiler  (G8  Hun,  64),  309, 

375. 
O'Bryan  v.  Allen  (95  Mo.  68;  8  S.  W. 

Rep.  225),  330. 
Ocean  Ins.  Co.  v.  Francis  (2  Wend. 

64),  242. 
Ochoa  v.  Wilier  (59  Tex.  461),  149. 
O'Connell  v.  Main  Hotel  Co.  (90  Cal. 

515),  362. 
O'Connell  v.  O'Brien  (87  N.  Y.  577), 

249. 
O'Connell  v.  People  (87  N.  Y.  377), 

374. 
O'Conner  v.  Ice  Co.  (56  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  410),  334. 
O'Connor  v.    Andrews  (81  Tex.  28), 

18,  373. 
O'Connor  v.  Curtis  (18  S.  W.   Rep. 

953,  Tex.,  1892),  363. 
O'Connor  v.  Delaney  (Minn.,   1893, 

51  N.  W.  Rep.  1108),  67. 
Odel  v.  Culbert  (9  W.  &  S.  66),  60. 
Odell  v.  Koppel  (5  Heisk.  88),  316. 
Odell  v.  Montrose  (68  N.  Y.  499),  223. 
Odell  v.  Solomon  (4  N.  Y.   S.  440), 

124. 
Odell,  In  re  (6  Dern.  Sur.  344),  332. 
Odiorne  v.  Wade  (8  Pick.  518),  288. 
Ogden  v.  Lund  (11  Tex.  688),  238. 
Ogden  v.  Parsons  (23  How.,  U.  S., 

167),  198. 
Oglesby  v.  Farman  (77  Tex.  647),  142. 
O'Hara  v.  Ring  (52  111.  303),  140. 
O'Hare  v.  Duckworth  (4  Wash.  St. 

470),  51. 
Ohio  v.  Sweeney  (43  La.  Ann.  1073), 

232. 
Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Cullison  (40  111.  App. 

67),  57. 
Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kleinsmith  (38  111. 
App.  45),  11. 


Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Levy  (Ind.,  1893,  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  815),  355. 
Ohio,   etc.  Co.  v.  Trapp  (Ind.,    1892, 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  812),  276. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Levy  (34  N.  E. 

Rep.  245),  73a. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stein  (133  Ind. 

243;  31  N.  E.  Rep.  180),  73a. 
Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Walker  (113 

Ind.  196),  362. 
Ohio  Val.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watson's  Adm'r 

(Ky.,  1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  244),  8. 
Ohlsen  v.  Terrero  (L.  R.  10  Ch.  App. 

127),  341. 
Ohm  v.  San  Francisco  (Cal.,  1890,  25 

Pac.  Rep.  155),  244. 
O'Hogan  v.   Dillon  (76  N.  Y.   170), 

335. 
O'Kane  v.  Miller  (3  Ind.  App.   136), 

250. 
Oldsv.  Marshall  (93  Ala.  138;  8  S. 

Rep.  284),  13. 
Olive  v.  State  (11  Neb.  1),  324. 
Olmstead  v.  Bad  (Md.,  1893,  25  Atl. 

Rep.  243),  145. 
Olmstead   v.  Thompson  (8    S.  Rep. 

755),  244. 
Olsen  v.  Peterson  (33  Neb.  358),  75. 
Olson  v.  Gyertsen  (42  Minn.  407),  190. 
Omaha  v.  Ayres  (32  Neb.  375),  250. 
Omaha  v.  Jansen  (35  Neb.  68;  52  N. 

W.  Rep.  833),  13. 
Omaha  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v.  Fay  (Neb., 

1S93,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  211),  362. 
Omaha,  etc.  Co.  v.  Beeson  (36  Neb. 

361 ;  54  N.  W.  Rep.  557),  38,  367. 
Omaha,  etc.  Co.  v.  Walker  (17  Neb. 

432),  253. 
O'Malia  v.  Glynn  (42  111.  App.  51), 

152. 
O'Mara  v.  Com.  (75  Pa.  St.  424),  193. 
Omichund   v.    Barker  (Willes,    545, 

547),  315. 
O'Neill   v.    Howe  (9   N.  Y.  S.   746), 

333. 
O'Neill  v.  Murray  (6  Dak.  107),  173. 
O'Neill   v.   Railway   Co.  (129  N.   Y. 

125),  198. 


cxxx 


TABLE   OF   CASE8. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Opdyke  v.  Marble  (18  Abb.    N.    C. 

375),  358. 
Opdyke  v.  Weed  (18  Abb.  Pr.  223), 

249. 
Oppenheim  v.  Henry  (9  Hare,  802), 

150. 
Oppenheimer  v.  Wright  (106  Pa.  St. 

569),  136. 
Ordway  v.  Conrow  (4  Miss.  45),  148. 
Oregon  Short,  etc.  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry. 

Co.  (51  Fed.  Rep.  465),  216. 
Oregon  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Otis  (100  N.  Y. 

45),  230. 
Orleans  v.  Chatham  (2  Pick.  29),  246. 
Orman  v.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  604), 

174. 
Ormsby  v.  People  (53  N.  Y.  472),  69. 
Orne  v.   Townsend  (4  Mason,  544), 

144. 
Orr  v.  Hadley  (36  N.  H.  575),  123. 
Orr  v.  Hance  (44  Mo.  App.  461),  262. 
Orr  v.  Lacey  (2  Doug.  230),  310. 
Orr  v.  Orr  (35  S.  C.  275),  50. 
Orr  v.  Rode  (101  Mo.  387),  309. 
Orr  Water  Ditch,  etc.    Co.  v.  Jones 

(19Nev.  60),  8. 
Orser  v.  Orser  (24  N.  Y.  51),  348. 
Ort  v.  Fowler  (31  Kan.  478),  140. 
Ortiz  v.  State  (30  Fla.  256),  38a. 
Osbiston  v.   Kaufman  (29  Pac.  Rep. 

748 ;  1  Colo.  App.  333),  340. 
Osborn  v.  Bell  (62  Mich.  218),  8. 
Osborn  v.  Bell  (5  Denio,  370),  123. 
Osborn  v.  Blackburn  (47  N.  W.  Rep. 

175),  230. 
Osborn  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  223),  91,  93. 
Osborn  v.  Robins  (37  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

481),  70. 
Osborn  v.  Stringham  (S.  D.,  1894,  57 

N.  W.  Rep.  776),  211. 
Osborn  v.  Sutton  (108  Ind.  443),  232. 
Osborn  v.    United    States    Bank   (9 

Wheat.  866),  386. 
Osborne  v.  Detroit  (32  Fed.  Rep.  36), 

201. 
Osgood  v.  Bauder  (82  Iowa,  171 ;  47 

N.  W.  Rep.  1001),  362. 


Osgood  v.  Bringolf  (32  Iowa,   265), 

73a. 
Osgood  v.  Davis  (18  Me.  146),  205. 
Osgood  v.  Pacey  (23  111.   App.  116), 

73a. 
Oskaloosa  College  v.  Western  U.  T. 

Co.   (Iowa,  1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep. 

152),  343. 
Oslin  v.  Jerome  (93  Mich.  186),  186. 
Ostrander  v.  Snyder  (26  N.  Y.  S.  263), 

209. 
Otis  v.  Conway  (114  N.  Y.  113),  371. 
Otis  v.  Yan  Storch  (15  R.  I.  41),  73, 

219. 
Ottumwa  v.  Schaub  (52  Iowa,  515), 

142a. 
Oughterson  v.  Clark  (65  Hun,  624), 

60,  61. 
Outram  v.  Morewood  (5  T.  R.  123), 

117. 
Over  v.  Schifling  (102  Ind.  191),  77, 

362. 
Overand  v.  Menczer  (83  Tex.   122), 

130,  210. 
Overby  v.  Chesa.  &  Ohio  Ry.  Co.  (37 

W.  Va.  524),  185,  187,  368. 
Overlook  v.  Young  (81  Me.  318),  345. 
Overly  v.  Thrasher  (47  Ga.  10),  77. 
Overton  v.  State  (60  Ala.  73),  239. 
Owen  v.  Boyle  (15  Me.  147),  242. 
Owen  v.  Miss.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (38  Fed. 

Rep.  571),  344. 
Owens  v.  Gentry  (30  S.  C.  490),  370. 
Owens  v.  Kansas  City  (95  Mo.  169), 

194. 
Owens  v.  State  (10  S.  Rep.  669;  94 

Ala.  97),  9. 
Owens  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  558),  23. 
Owens  v.  State  (74  Ala.  401),  51. 
Owens  v.   Williams  (114  Ind.   179), 

346. 
Owensby  v.  State  (82  Ala.  63;  2  S. 

Rep.  764),  96. 
Owings  v.  Hull  (9  Pet.,  U.  S.,  624), 

242. 
Owings  v.    Speed    (5  Wheat.   423), 

303. 


TABLK    OF    CASES. 


CXXXl 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


P. 


Pace   v.  Com.  (Tex.,  1893,   20  S.  W. 

Rep.  762),  93,  95,  97. 
Pace  v.  Lanier  (Fla.,  1893,  13  S.  W. 

Rep.  363),  362. 
Pacific  R.  R.  Co.,  In  re  (32  Fed.  Rep. 

251-253),  288. 
Pack   v.  Geofroy   (19  N.  Y.  S.  583), 

356. 
Packard  v.  Bergen   Neck  R.  Co.  (54 

N.  J.  L.  533),  8. 
Packard  v.  Hill  (2  Wend.  411),  143. 
Packard  v.  Hill  (7  Cow.  434),  149. 
Packard  v.  Putnam   (57  N.  H.    43), 

246. 
Packard    v.    Richardson    (17    Mass. 

122),  268. 
Packer   v.  Vandevender  (13  Pa.  St. 

31),  229. 
Packet    v.    State    (1    Sneed,  Term., 

355),  233. 
Paddock  v.  Con.  Ins.  Co.  (104  Mass. 

521),  198. 
Page  v.  Carter  (8  B.  Mon.  192),  252. 
Page  v.  Einstein  (7  Jones,   N.    C, 

147),  215. 
Page  v.  Kirby  (63  Hun,  629),  263. 
Page  v.  Page  (15  Pick.  368),  130,  304. 
Page  v.  State  (61  Ala.  16),  188. 
Page  v.  Svvanton  (39  Me.  400),  67. 
Paige  v.  Chedsey  (20   N.  Y.  S.  899), 

176,  343. 
Paige  v.  Kelly  (5  Hill,  603),  199. 
Paige  v.  Paige  (71  Iowa,  318),  268. 
Paige  v.  Sherman  (6  Gray,  511),  208. 
Paine  v.  Aid  rich  (30  N.  E.  Rep.  725), 

7,  51,  197. 
Paine  v.  Parsons  (14  Pick.  313),  215. 
Paine  v.  Schenectady  (11  R.  I.  411), 

242. 
Paine  v.  Tilden  (5  Wash.  C.  C.  554), 

355. 
Paine  v.  Trask   (56  Fed.   Rep.   233), 

367. 
Painer  v.  Hodge   (71  N.  Y.  598),  60. 
Pallitz  v.    Trust  Co.   (53  Ind.   210), 

151. 


Pallman  v.  Smith   (135   Pa.  St.  188; 

19  Atl.  Rep.  891),  760. 
Palmer  v.  Fogg  (35  Me.  368),  361. 
Palmer  v.  Hamilton   (Ky.,    1894,   24 

S.  W.  Rep.  613),  9. 
Palmer  v.  Poore   (121  Ind.  165),  128. 
Palmer  v.  Rowan  (21  Neb.  452),  285. 
Palmerston    v.    Territory    (3    Wyo. 

333),  6. 
Pal  more  v.  State  (29  Ark.  248),  102. 
Palson  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893,  35  N.  E. 

Rep.  907),  335. 
Panama,    etc.    Co.    v.    Johnson   (63 

Hun,  629),  247,  250. 
Pandjiris  v.  McQueen  (59  Hun,  625), 

178. 
Pangburn  v.  Insurance  Co.  (62  Mich. 

638),  126. 
Panton  v.  Holland  (17  Johns.  92),  20. 
Parcell  v.  McReynolds  (71  Iowa,  621; 

33  N.  W.  Rep.  139),  309. 
Parent  v.  Wamsley's  Adm'r(20  Ind. 

82),  242. 
Parhan  v.  Moran  (4  Hun,  717),  309. 
Paris  v.   Railroad  Co.  (28  Fla.  251), 

232. 
Paris,  etc.   Co.   v.   Greiner  (84  Tex. 

443),  18. 
Park  v.  Hopkins  (2  Bailey,  S.  C,  408), 

68. 
Park  v.  Wooton  (35  Ala.  242),  71. 
Parke  v.  Smith  (4  Watts  &  S.  287), 

310. 
Parker  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.  (34  Wis. 

363),  139. 
Parker  v.  Carter  (4  Munf.  273),  169. 
Parker  v.  Chancellor  (11  S.  W.  Rep. 

503;  73  Tex.  475),  105,  106,  107. 
Parker  v.  Crittenden  (37  Conn.  148), 

82. 
Parker  v.  Enslow  (i02  111.  272),  202. 
Parker  v.  Foote  (19  Wend.  309),  226. 
Parker  v.  Foy  (43  Miss.  260),  208. 
Parker  v.  Handy  (24  Pick.  246),  2. 
Parker  v.  Kane  (22  How.  1),  220. 
Parker  v.  State  (39  Ala.  365),  23. 
Parker  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893,  35  N.  E. 

Rep.  1105),  346. 


exxxn 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Parker  v.  Way  cross,  etc.  Co.  (81  Ga. 

387),  105. 
Parkhurst  v.  Berdell  (110  N.  Y.  386), 

167. 
Parkhurst  v.  Ketchaua  (6  Allen,  406), 

231. 
Parkhurst  v.  Van  Cortlandt  (1  Johns. 

Ch.  273),  246. 
Parkins    v.    Havvkshaw    (2    Stark. 

1239),  169. 
Parkinson  v.  Atkinson  (31   L.  J.,  N. 

S.,  C.  P.  199),  191. 
Parkinson    v.    Trousdale   (3  Scam., 

111.,  367),  305. 
Parks  v.    Boston   (12   Pick.,    Mass., 

209),  344. 
Parks  v.  Dunlap  (86  Cal.  189),  15& 
Parks  v.  Richardson    (35   Mo.    App. 

192),  154. 
Parlin  v.   Stone  (48  Fed.  Rep.  808), 

84. 
Par  melee  v.  Raymond  (43  IU.  App. 

609),  199. 
Parmer  v.  Parmer  (88  Ala.  545),  223. 
Parmetary  v.   State  (105  N.  Y.  154), 

154. 
Parris  v.  McNeal  (55  N.  W.  Rep.  222 ; 

36  Neb.  727),  308. 
Parroski  v.  Goldberg  (80  Wis.   399), 

134. 
Parrott  v.  Baker  (82  Ga.  364),  66. 
Parrott  v.  Swain  (29  111.   App.   266), 

186. 
Parsons  v.  Hughes  (62  Hun,  621),  18. 
Parsons  v.  Man.  etc.  Co.   (16  Gray, 

Mass.,  463),  198. 
Parsons  v.  New  York  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 

(112  N.  Y.  355),  362. 
Parsons  v.  Phipps  (4  Tex.   341),   310. 
Parsons  v.  State  (2  S.   Rep.   854;  81 

Ala.  577),  231. 
Parsons  v.  Stockbridge  (42  Ind.  121), 

358. 
Parsons  v.  Thornton  <82  Ala.   308), 

219. 
Partee  v.  State  (67  Ga.  570).  324. 
Partridge  v.  Russell  (2  N.  Y.  S.  529 ; 

50  Hun,  601),  113,  115. 


References  are  to  sections. 

Pasachane  Water  Co.    v.    Standarfc 

(Cal.,    1893,   32   Pac.   Rep.   532), 

198. 
Pasadena  v.  Stimson  (27  Pac.   Rep. 

604),  242. 
Paschal  v.  State  (89  Ga.  303;  15  S.  E. 

Rep.  322),  335. 
Pashall  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Hun,  633), 

39. 
Patapsco  Ins.    Co.   v.   Southgate  (5 

Pet,  U.  S.,  602),  361. 
Patch  v.  White   (1   Mackey,   D.    C, 

468),  221. 
Patchen  v.  Brooklyn  (2  Wend.,  N. 

Y.,  377),  344. 
Patrick  v.  Crowe  (15  Colo.,  543),  75. 
Patrick  v.  Skoman    (Colo.,   1892,  29 

Pac.  Rep.  21),  11. 
Patten  v.  Messenger  (25  Pa.  St.  393), 

73a. 
Patten  v.  Ryan  (4  Rawle,  408),  60. 
Patten  v.  Tallman(27  Me.  17,  29),  138, 

150. 
Patten  v.  U.  L.  &  Ace.  Ins.   Co.  (61 

Hun,  627),  178. 
Patterson  v.  Boston  (20  Pick.,  Mass., 

159),  199. 
Patterson  v.  Choate  (7  Wend.  441), 

69. 
Patterson  v.  Com.  (86  Ky.  313),  93. 
Patterson  v.  Gaines    (6   How.    550), 

304. 
Patterson  v.  Insurance  Co.  (3  Har.  & 

J.,  Md.,  71),  355. 
Patterson  v.  McCausland  (3    Bland, 

Md.,  69),  237,  241. 
Patterson  v.   Scott  (142  111.    138;  31 

N.  E.  Rep.  433),  304. 
Patterson  v.  State  (86  Ga.  70).  334. 
Patterson  v.  Tucker  (4   Halst.    322), 

339. 
Patterson  v.  Winn  (5  Pet.  240),  304. 
Patton  v.  Ash  (7  Serg.   &  R.   116), 

230. 
Patton  v.  Beecher  (62  Ala.  579),  246. 
Paugh  v.  Paugh  (40  111.  App.   143), 

220. 
Paul  v.  Paul  (37  N.  J.  Eq.  25),  350. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXXXlll 


References  are  to  sections. 


Pavy  v.  Pavy  (30  Ohio  St.  600),  140. 
Pavy  v.  Wintrode  (87  Ind.  379).  73a. 
Pawling  v.  United  States  (4  Cranch, 

221),  373. 
Pawnee  Ditch  Co.  v.  Adams  (1  Colo. 

App.  250;  28  Pac.  Rep.  602),  176. 
Pawtucket  v.  Brtllou  (15  R.   I.   58), 

138,  276. 
Paxton   v.    Marshall  (18   Fed.   Rep. 

361),  125. 
Paxton  v.  Paxton  (W.  Va.,  1894,  18 

S.  E.  Rep.  765),  308. 
Payne  v.  Billingharu  (10  Iowa,  360), 

150a. 
Payne  v.  Dicus  (Iowa,  1893,  55   N. 

W.  Rep.  483),  367. 
Payne  v.  Hathaway  (3  Vt.  319),  262. 
Payne  v.  Kerr  (66  Hun,  636),  309. 
Payne  v.  State  (21    Tex.  App.   184), 

229. 
Payne  v.  State  (61  Miss.  161),  102. 
Payne  v.  State  (60  Ala.  350),  350. 
Payne  v.  Taylor  (34  111.   App.  491), 

147. 
Payne  v.  Tread  well  (16  Cal.  221),  238, 

242. 
Payne  v.  Troy,    etc.    Co.    (83   N.  Y. 

572),  12. 
Payson  v.  Lampson  (134  Mass.  593), 

210. 
Peak  v.  State  (50  N.  J.  L.  222),  101. 
Pearce  v.  Hawkins   (61  Tex.    435), 

358. 
Pearsall  v.  McCartney  (28  Ala.   110). 

249. 
Pearse  v.  Pearse  (1  De  G.  &  Sm.  28), 

169. 
Pearsman  v.  Gould  (42  N.  J.  Eq.  4 ; 

8  Atl.  Rep.  285),  276. 
Pearson  v.  Uarrington  (32  Ala.  227), 

237. 
Pearson  v.  McDaniel  (62  Ga.    100), 

139. 
Pearson  v.  Pearson  (46  Cal.  609),  53. 
Pearson  v.  Sabin  (10  N.  H.  205),  80. 
Peart  v.  Price  (152  Pa.  St.  277),  220. 
Pease  v.  Cole  (53  Conn.  71),  247. 
Pease  v.  Peck  (18  How.  595),  141. 


Pease  v.  Phelps  (10  Conn.  62),  67. 
Pease  v.  State  (Ga.,    1893,   16  S.    E. 

Rep.  113),  282,  378. 
Peavey  v.  Tilton  (18  N.  II.  152),  229. 
Peck  v.  Callahan  (95  N.  Y.  73),  140. 
Peck  v.  Cary  (27  N.  Y.  9),  348. 
Peck  v.  Crouse  (46  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  151), 

70. 
Peck  v.  Hutchison  (Iowa,   1893,    55 

N.  W.  Rep.  511),  369. 
Peck  v.  Ritchie  (66  Mo.  114),  73a. 
Peck  v.  Parchen  (52  Iowa,  46),  32. 
Pecke  v.  Hunter  (86  Va.  768),  304. 
Pecks  v.  Simis  (22  N.  E.  Rep.  313), 

237. 
Peckham  Iron  Co.  v.  Harper  (41  Ohio 

St.  100),  76. 
Pecquet  v.  Pecquet  (17  La.  Ann.  201), 

242. 
Peden  v.  Mail  (18  Ind.  560),  68. 
Pedrosena  v.  Hotchkiss  (95  Cal.  636), 

362. 
Peek  v.  Boone  (Ga. ,  1893,  17  S.  W. 

Rep.  66),  169. 
Peek  v.  Detroit  Novelty  Works  (29 

Mich.  312),  73a. 
Peekard  v.  Baily  (6  Foster,   N.  H, 

152),  148. 
Peeler  v.  Lathrop  (48  Fed.  Rep.  780), 

304. 
Pejepscot  v.  Ransom  (14  Mass.  145), 

218. 
Pellum  v.  State  (89  Ala.  28),  176. 
Peltier  v.  State  (23  Tex.  App.  366), 

321. 
Pelzer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Sun  Fire  Office 

of  London  (36  S.  C.  213;  15  S.  E. 

Rep.  562),  200. 
Pemigewasset  Bank    v.   Rogers  (18 

N.  H.  255),  73a. 
Pence  v.  Waugh  (Ind.,  1893,  34 N.  E. 

Rep.  860),  340. 
Pendery  v.    Crescent  (21  La.    Ann. 

410),  33. 
Pendill  v.  Neuberger  (31  N.  W.  Rep. 

177;  64  Mich.  220),  309. 
Pendleton  v.  Smissaert  (1  Colo.  App. 

508;  29  Pac.  Rep.  521),  250. 


CXXX1V 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Penhryn  Slate  Co.  v.  Meyer  (8  Daly, 

N.  Y.,  61),  249. 
Pennell  v.  Delta  Co.  (94  Mich.   217), 

216. 
Pennell  v.  Meyer  (8  C.  &  P.  470),  80. 
Pennington  v.  Gibson  (16  How.  65), 

242. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Conlan  (101  111. 

93),   186,  198. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Dolan  (32  N.  E. 

Rep.  802),  18,  108. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton  (132  Ind. 

189),  862. 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Newmeyer  (129 

Ind.  401 ;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  860),  11)0, 

340. 
Pennsylvania  Co.    v.    Swan  (37  111. 

App.  83),  188. 
Pennsylvania  Coal    Co.    v.    Friend 

(Ind.,  1892,   30  N.  E.  Rep.  1116), 

186. 
Pennsylvania,   etc.   Co.  v.  Cook  (123 

Pa.  St.  170),  367. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Frana  (13  111. 

App.  91),  237. 
Pennsylvania  R.  Co.   v.    Lyons  (18 

Atl.   Rep.   759;  129  Pa.  St.  113). 

57. 
Penny  v.  Brink  (15  N.  C.  68),  276. 
Pennypacker  v.  Leary  (65  Iowa,  220), 

267. 
Penruddock  v.  Hammond  (11  Beav. 

59),  174. 
Penwick  v.    Kennedy  (153   Pa.  St. 

179),  145. 
People  v.  Abbott  (Mich.,  1893,  56  N. 

W.  Rep.  862),  349. 
People  v.  Ah  Fat  (48  Cal.  61),  355. 
People  v.  Ah  Yute(56  Cal.  119),  124. 
People  v.  Augsburg  (97  N.  Y.  501), 

188. 
People  v.  Baker  (96  N.  Y.  340),  9. 
People  v.  Baker  (3  Abb.   Pr.    42 ;    3 

Park.  Crim.  Rep.  181),  277. 
People  v.  Barber  (115  N.  Y.  475),  197, 

231. 
People  v.  Barker  (00  Mich.  277),  89. 
People  v.  Barrett  (56  Hun,  351),  284. 


People  v.  Barton  (19  Cal.  632),  89. 
People  v.  Beckwith  (108  N.  Y.  67),  &. 
People  v.  Bell  (10  Johns.  95),  306. 
People  v.  Bemmerly  (87  Cal.  117;  25 

Pac.  Rep.  266),  101,  103. 
People  v.   Bemmerly  (Cal.,  1893,  33 

Pac.  Rep.  263),*  249. 
People  v.  Bezy  (67  Cal.  223),  10. 
People  v.  Board  of  Columbia  Co.  (31 

N.  E.  Rep.  322;  134  N.  Y.  1),  191. 
People  v.  Boggs  (20  Cal.  432),  343. 
People  v.  Bollinger  (71  Cal.  17),  323. 
People  v.  Bonny  (19  Cal.  426),  344. 
People  v.  Brady  (72  Cal.  490),  103. 
People  v.  Brewer  (53  Hun,  217),  178. 
People  v.  Briggs  (60  How.    Pr.  17), 

17.6. 
People  v.  Brogle  (88  N.   Y.   585;  10 

Abb.  N.  C.  300).  346. 
People  v.  Brooklyn  (7  N.  Y.  S.  327), 

140. 
People  v.  Brooks  (131  N.  Y.  321 ;  30 

N.  E.  Rep.  189),  840. 
People  v.  Brotherton  (47    Cal.    388), 

195. 
People  v.  Brown  (46  Hun,  320),  284. 
People  v.  Brown  (67  111.  435),  83. 
People  v.  Brown  (53  Midi.  531),  188. 
People  v.  Brown  (72  N.  Y.  571),  346. 
People  v.  Buddenseeck    (103   N.    Y. 

500),  38a,  202. 
People  v.  Bush    (71    Cal.    602),    234, 

344. 
People  v.  Bushton  (80  Cal.  161),  348. 
People  v.  Callaghan(4Utah,  49),  101, 

103. 
People  v.  Canvasser  (20  N.  Y.  S.  829), 

357. 
People  v.  Carolan  (71  Cal.  195),  322, 

354. 
People  v.  Carpenter  (102  N.  Y.  238), 

192. 
People  v.  Carr  (64  Mich.  7G2;  31  N. 

W.  Rep.  509),  354. 
People  v.  Cassiday  (133  N.  Y.  612),  89, 

93. 
People  v.  Cassidy  (14  N.  Y.  S.  349\ 

89. 


TABLE    OF    CASKS. 


cxxxv 


References  are  to  sections. 


People  v.  Chadvrick  (25    Pac.    Rep. 

737),  327. 
People  v.  Chapleau  (121   N.  Y.  266; 

24  N.  E.  Rep.  469),  850. 
People  v.  Cheeker  (61  Cal.  404),  145. 
People  v.  Chegaray  (18  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

642),  166. 
People  v.  Chin  (51  Cal.  597),  100. 
People  v.  Clung    (78  Cal.    389),  335, 

350. 
People  v.  Chung  (57   Cal.    567),  124, 

346. 
People  v.  Cline  (44  Mich.  290),  140. 
People  v.  Clark  (33  Mich.  112),    196. 
People  v.  Clough   (73  Cal.     348;    15 

Pac.  Rep.  5),  324. 
People  v.  Cochran  (61  Cal.  548),  343. 
People  v.  Cole  (43  N.  Y.  508),  310. 
People  v.  Collins  (64  Cal.  293),  97. 
People  v.  Collins  (53  Cal.   185),   127. 
People  v.  Collins   (7  John.  549),  140. 
People  v.  Com.  (87  Ky.  487 ;  9  S.  W. 

Rep.  509),  101. 
People  v.  Cooper  (39  111.  461 ;  29  N. 

E.  Rep.  872),  371. 
People  v.  Copsey   (71    Cal.  548),  316. 
People  v.  Coughlin  (35   N.  W.    Rep. 

72;  67  Mich.  466),  93. 
People  v.  Courtney  (28    Hun,    589), 

324. 
People  v.  Cowgill  (93  Cal.  596),  11. 
People  v.  Cox  (21  Hun,  47),  50. 
People  v.  Cronin  (34  Cal.  191),  381. 
People  v.  Cronise  (51  Hun,  489),  362. 
People  v.  Crowley  (102  N.   Y.  234), 

381. 
People  v.  Crowley  (Cal.,  1893,  35  Pac. 

Rep.  84),  354. 
People  v.  Davis  (50  N.  Y.  96),  102. 
People  v.  Deacons  (109   N.  Y.    374), 

89,  193. 
People  v.  Devine  (46  Cal.  225),  121. 
People  v.  Dohring(59N.  Y.  374),  313. 
People  v.  Dowdigan  (67   Mich.    95), 

332. 
People  v.  Downs  (123  N.  Y.  558),  249. 
People  v.  Doyell  (48  Cal.  85),  350. 
People  v.  Doyle  (58  Hun,   535),  346. 


People  v.  Drake  (65  Hun,  331),  9. 
People  v.  Druse  (103  N.  Y.  665),  10 
People  v.  Durfee  (62  Mich.  487),  231 

232,  369. 
People  v.  Elliott  (106  N.  Y.  288),  324 
People  v.  Etter(Sl  Mich.   570;  45  N 

W.  Rep.  1109),  384. 
People  v.  Everhart  (104  N.  Y.   591 

11  N.  E.  Rep.   62),  315,  324. 
People  v.  Farmer  (77  Cal.  1 ;  18  Pac. 

Rep.  800),  102. 
People  v.  Fernandez  (35  N.   Y.   49, 

64),  39. 
People  v.  Fine  (77  Cal.  147),  88. 
People  v.  Finley  (38  Mich.  482),  231. 
People  v.  Fish  (125  N.  Y.   126),  346. 
People  v.  Fleming  (14  N.  Y.  S.  200). 

334. 
People  v.  Foley  (27  Weekly  Dig.,  N. 

Y.,  217),  345. 
People  v.  Fong  Ah  Sing  (70  Cal.  8), 

102.  333. 
People  v.  Foote  (93  Mich.  38),  346. 
People  v.  Formosa  (131  N.   Y.  478; 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  492),  10,  23,  343. 
People  v.  Fox  (24  N.  E.   Rep.  923 ;  3 

N.  Y.  S.  359),  89. 
People  v.  Foy  (34  N.   E.   Rep.   396; 

138  N.  Y.  664),  231. 
People  v.  Frindel  (58  Hun,  482),  319. 
People  v.  Gallagher  (75  Mich.  512), 

89,  172,  321. 
People  v.  Garbutt  (17  Mich.  9),  9. 
People  v.  Garcia  (25  Cal.  531),  74. 
People  v.  Gardner  (32  Pac.  Rep.  880 ; 

9.8  Cal.  127),  346. 
People  v.  Gastro  (75  Mich.  127),  89. 
People  v.  Geiger  (49  Cal.  643),  70. 
People  v.  Gibbons  (43  Cal.  557),  93. 
People  v.  Gibbs  (93  N.  Y.  473),  9. 
People  v.  Gilon  (18  Civ.  Pro.  R.  109), 

171. 
People  v.  Glenn  (10  Cal.  32),  103. 
People  v.  Goldenson   (76    Cal.   328), 

189,  340,  345. 
People  v.  Gonzalez  (35  N.  Y.  49),  39, 

193. 
People  v.  Graney  (91  Mich.  646),  234. 


CXXXV1 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


People  v.  Croon  (99  Cal.  564;  34  Pac. 

Rep.  231),  315. 
People  v.  Green  (1  Park.  Cr.  Cas.  11), 

80. 
People  v.  Green  (1  Denio,  N.  Y.,  614), 

166. 
Peopie  v.  Greenfield  (30  N.  Y.  Sup. 

Ct.  462 ;  85  N.  Y.  75,  83),  193. 
People  v.   Hanifan  (Mich.,  1893,  56 

N.  W.  Rep.  1048),  311. 
People  v.  Harris  (95  Mich.  87;  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  645),  10. 
People  v.  Harris  (136  N.  Y.  423),  178, 

188. 
People  v.  Harris  (4  Denio,  N.  Y.,  150), 

281. 
People  v.  Harrison  (53  N.  W.  Rep. 

725;  93  Mich.  594),  350,  354. 
People  v.  Hayes  (24  N.  Y.  S.  194), 

382. 
People  v.  Haynes  (11  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

565),  23. 
People  v.  Hennessy  (15  Wend.  147), 

93. 
People  v.  Hess  (85  Mich.  128 ;  48  N. 

W.  Rep.  181),  346. 
People  v.    Hibernia  Sav.   Bank  (84 

Cal.  634),  116. 
People  v.   Hilhouse  (80  Mich.  580), 

340. 
People  v.  Hinchman  (75  Mich.  587), 

93. 
People  v.  Hite  (Utah,  1893,  33  Pac. 

Rep.  254),  354. 
People  v.   Holbrook  (13  Johns.  90), 

35. 
People  v.  Holfelder  (5  N.  Y.  Crim. 

R.  179),  186. 
People  v.  Honey  man  (3  Den.,  N.  Y., 

121),  23. 
People  v.  Hong  (93  Cal.  41 ;  27  Pac. 

Rep.  1096),  378. 
People  v.  Hope  (62  Cal.  291),  202. 
People  v.  Howes  (81    Mich.   396;  45 

N.  W.  Rep.  961),  89. 
People  v.  Hughes  (41  Cal.  234),  23. 
People  v.  Hulbut  (4   Denio,   N.  Y., 

133),  176. 


People  v.  Hull  (86  Mich.  449),  334. 
People  v.  Irwin  (77  Cal.  494),  93. 
People  v.  Jaehne  (7  N.  E.  Rep.  290; 

108  N.  Y.  182),  324. 
People   v.    Johnson  (N.  Y,  1893,  35 

N.  E.  Rep.  604),  39. 
People  v.  Johnson  (41  Cal.  452),  90. 
People  v.  Judge  (41  Mich.  726),  275. 
People  v.  Kelley  (47  Cal.  125),  93. 
People  v.  Kelly  (24  N.  Y.  74),   332, 

354a. 
People  v.  Kemmler  (119  N.  Y.  585), 

178. 
People  v.    Kent    Circuit   Judge  (41 

Mich.  722),  150a. 
People  v.  Kenyon  (93  Mich.  19).  384. 
People  v.  Kern  (Utah,  1893,  30  Pac. 

Rep.  988),  6. 
People  v.  Kerr  (6  N.  Y.  S.  674),  69. 
People  v.  Kerr  (6  N.  Y.   Crim.   R. 

406),  6. 
People  v.  Kerrigan  (14  Pac.  Rep.  566; 

73  Cal.  222),  231. 
People  v.  Kline  (83  Cal.  374),  232. 
People  v.  Knapp  (26  Md.  112),  102. 
People  v.  Lake  (12  N.  Y.  358),  197. 
People  v.  Lange  (90  Mich.  454),  333. 
People  v.  Langtree  (64  Cal.  256),  323. 
People  v.  Lee  (49  Cal.  37),  280. 
People  v.  Lee  Chuck  (74  Cal.  30;  15 

Pac.  Rep.  322),  102. 
People  v.  Lem  You  (97  Cal.  224 ;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  11),  124. 
People  v.  Levire  (85  Cal.  39;  24  Pac. 

Rep.  631),  201. 
People  v.  Levy  (71  Cal.  618),  188, 197. 
People  v.  Loui  (27  Pac.  Rep.  295;  90 

Cal.  377),  378. 
People  v.  Lowrey  (70  Cal.  193),  344. 
People  v.  Mahoney  (77  Cal.  529),  343, 
People  v.  Man.  Co.  (9  Wend.   351), 

231. 
People  v.  Marseilles  (70  Cal.  98),  188, 

277. 
People  v.  Mather  (4  Wend.  257,  258), 

349,  354. 
People  v.  Matteson  (2  Cowen,  433, 

473),  316. 


TABLE    OK    CASKS. 


CXXXVJ1 


References  are  to  sections. 


People  v.  Matterson  (17  III.  167),  140. 
People  v.  McCann(l6  N.  Y.  66),  247. 
People  v.  McCarthy  (110  N.  Y.  309), 

249. 
People  v.  McCormack  (135  N.  Y.  663), 

846. 
People  v.  McCoy  (45  How.  Pr.,  N.  Y„ 

216),  202. 
People  v.  McCrea  (32  Cal.  93),  52. 
People  v.  McDonell  (17  Cal.  131),  231. 
People  v.  McGIoin  (91  N.  Y.  241),  93. 
People  v.  McGonegal  (136  N.  Y.  62). 

196,  323. 
People  v.   McGuire  (135   N.  Y.  639), 

323. 
People  v.  McKellar  (53  Cal.  65),  344. 
People  v.  McLean  (84  Cal.  480),  11. 
People  v.  McLean  (71  Mich.  309),  10. 
People  v.    McNair  (21    Wend.    608), 

319. 
People  v.    McNamara  (94  Cal.  509), 

341. 
People  v.  McQuade  (110  N.  Y.  284), 

769. 
People  v.  McQuaid  (S5  Mich.  123;  48 

N.  W.  Rep.  161),  187. 
People  v.   Mead   (50  Mich.    228),  8, 

202. 
People  v.  Millard   (53  Mich.  63),  7, 

194. 
People  v.  Millard  (5  Crim.   L.  Mag. 

588),  188. 
People  v.  Miller  (2  Park.  Cr.   Cas. 

25),  313. 
People  v.    Mills   (94  Mich.  630),  10, 

350. 
People  v.  Minaugh  (131  N.  Y.  563), 

11. 
People  v.  Mining  Co.    (66  Cal.  138), 

239. 
People  v.  Mitchell  (94  Cal.  550),  89. 
People  v.  Mitchell  (55  Cal.  236),  229. 
People  v.  Molaspina  (57  Cal.  628),  6. 
People  v.  Molins  (10   N.  Y.  S.  130), 

323. 
People  v.  Mondon  (103  N.  Y.  214),  93. 
People  v.  Monroe  (Cal.,  1893,  33  Pac. 

Rep.  776),  336. 


People  v.  Montgomery  (13  Abh.  Pr.. 

N.  S.,  207,  240),  191. 
People  v.  Monteith  (73  Cal.  7),  186. 
People  v.  Morrow  (60  Cal.  142),  5. 
People  v.  Murphy  (45  Cal.  137),   124, 

166. 
People  v.  Murphy  (135  N.  Y.  450;  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  138),  139a. 
People  v.  Murray  (123   N.   Y.   160), 

140. 
People   v.    Murray    (57   Mich.    396), 

143a. 
People  v.  Murray  (52  Mich.  388),  102, 

340. 
People  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.  (29  N. 

Y.  431),  386. 
People   v.    N.  Y.   Hospital  (3  Abb. 

N.  C.  229),  317. 
People    v.    Noelke    (94  N.    Y.    137), 

127. 
People  v.  Northey  (77  Cal.  618),  334. 
People  v.  Nyce  (34  Hun,  298),  250. 
People  v.  O'Brien  (Mich.,  1893,  56  N. 

W.  Rep.  72),  354. 
People  v.   O'Brien  (96  Cal.    171),  9, 

349. 
People  v.  O'Brien  (60  Mich.   8),  324. 
People  v.  Ogle  (104  N.  Y.  511),  88. 
People  v.  Oliver  (4  Utah,  460),  384. 
People  v.  Olmstead  (30    Mich.   435), 

100,  102. 
People  v.  O'Neil  (109  N.  Y.  251),  322, 

324,  351. 
People  v.   O'Neill  (48  Hun,  36),  324. 
People  v.  O'Sullivan  (104  N.  Y.  493), 

752. 
People  v.  Oyer  &  T.  (83  N.  Y.  436). 

335,  354a. 
People  v.  Packenham(115  N.  Y.  200), 

197. 
People  v.  Page  (1  Idaho,  194),  374. 
People  v.  Pallister  (138  N.  Y.  601),  6, 

234. 
People  v.  Parker  (67  Mich.  222;  34 

N.  W.  Rep.  720).  140. 
People  v.  Parton  (49  Cal.  632),  342. 
People  v.  Paton  (20  N.  Y.  195),  11. 
People  v.  Pearsall  (50  Mich.  233),  6. 


CXXXVlll 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


People  v.  Pease  (27  N.  Y.  45),   231, 

250. 
People  v.  Penhallow  (42  Hun,  103), 

346. 
People  v.  Perini  (94  Cal.  573),  249. 
People  v.  Perryman  (72    Mich.   184; 

40  N.  W.  Rep.  425),  190. 
People  v.  Petmecky  (99  N.  Y.  415), 

351. 
People  v.  Pine  (2  Barb.  566),  11. 
People  v.  Potter  (35  Cal.  110),  242. 
People  v.  Powell  (87  Cal.  348),  88. 
People  v.  Pyper  (6    Utah,     160;   21 

Pac.  Rep.  722),  277. 
People  v.  Ramirez  (73  Cal.  403),  101. 
People  v.  Reggel  (8     Utah,     21 ;   28 

Pac.  Rep.  955),  176. 
People  v.  Rice  (10  N.  Y.  S.  270),  332. 
People  v.  Robinson  (2  Park.  Cr.  Cas. 

236),  195. 
People  v.  Robinson  (26  How.  Pr.  90), 

356. 
People  v.  Rodrigo  (69  Cal.  601),  322, 

354. 
People  v.  Rogers  (21  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

518),  356. 
People  v.  Rogers  (18  N.  Y.  9),  89. 
People  v.  Rohl  (138  N.  Y.  616),  11. 
People  v.  Ryan  (28  Hun,  568),  324. 
People  v.  Ryan  (55  Hun,  214),  349. 
People  v.  Samario  (84  Cal.  484),  101. 
People  v.  Sam   Lung  (70   Cal.   516), 

330. 
People  v.  Sare  Bo  (72  Cal.  623),  101. 
People  v.  Sliney  (137  N.  Y.  570),  178. 
People  v.  Smalling  (94  Cal.  112),  88a. 
People  v.  Scoggins  (37  Cal.  683),  10. 
People  v.  Schuyler  (106   N.  Y  298, 

303),  178,  197. 
People  v.  Sessions    (58    Mich.     594), 

192. 
People  v.  Shattuck  (6  Abb.  N.  C.  33), 

176. 
People  v.  Shaw  (63  N.  Y.  40),  103. 
People  v.  Sheriff  (29  Barb.  622),  174. 
People  v.  Sherman  (61  Hun,  623;  133 

N.  Y.  349),  337. 
People  v.  Sligh  (48  Mich.  54),  124. 


People  v.  Smith  (104  N.  Y.  491),  101, 

102,  362. 
People  v.  Smith  (98  Cal.  218;  33  Pac. 

Rep.  58),  324. 
People  v.  Smith  (94  N.  Y.  649),  323. 
People  v.  Snyder  (41  N.  Y.  397),  229, 

238,  239. 
People  v.  Soto  (49  Cal.  69),  89. 
People  v.  Spies  (122  III.  1),  346. 
People  v.  Stanley  (17  Cal.    113),  68, 

69. 
People  v.  Stewart  (28  Cal.  395),  10. 
People  v.  Stewart  (75  Mich.   21),  91. 
People  v.  Stewart  (97  111.  123),  240. 
People  v.  Stewart  (97    Cal.    238 ;    32 

Pac.  Rep.  8),  52. 
People    v.    Suppiger  (103    111.    434), 

239. 
People  v.  Sweethand  (77   Mich.  53), 

89,  142. 
People  v.  Taylor  (59  Cal.  640),  101. 
People  v.  Taylor  (93  Mich.  638),  89. 
People  v.  Taylor  (138  N.  Y.  398),  202, 

249.  . 
People  v.  Teague  (11  S.  E.  Rep.  665; 

106  N.  C.  576),  354a. 
People  v.  Thomas  (92  Cal.  506),  340. 
People  v.  Thompson  (85  Cal.  598),  96, 

359. 
People  v.  Thornton  (74  Cal.  48),  343. 
People  v.  Tice  (131  N.  Y.  651),  346. 
People  v.  Tiley  (84  Cal.  651),  354. 
People  v.  Townsend     (5    How.    Pr., 

N.  Y,  315),  315. 
People  v.  Travers  (83  Cal.  238),  249. 
People  v.  Turcott  (65  Cal.  126),   334. 
People  v.  Tyler  (35  Cal.  553),  349. 
People   v.    Urquidas   (96    Cal.   239), 

378. 
People  v.  Vanderhoof  (39  N.  W.  Rep. 

28;  71  Mich.  158),  189. 
People  v.  Van  Houter  (38  Hun,  168), 

234. 
People  v.  Van  Tassell  (64  Hun,  444), 

284. 
People  v.  Vedder  (98  N.  Y.  630),  196. 
People  v.  Vellarde  (59  Cal.  457),  110. 
People  v.  Vernon  (35  Cal.  49),  57. 


TAT.I.K    OF    CASES. 


CXXXIX 


References  are  to  sections. 


People  v.  Warner  (51  Hun,  53),  832. 
People  v.  Warner  (5  Wend.  273),  22. 
People  v.  Webster  (N.  Y.,   1893,    34 

X.  E.  Rep.  730),  350,  354. 
People  v.  Weldon  (111    N.    Y.    569), 

229,  367. 
People  v.  Whipple  (9  Cowen,    707), 

323. 
People  v.  White  (62  Hun,  111),   227. 
People  v.  White  (14  Wend.,   N.  Y., 

Ill),  367. 
People  v.  Willard  (92  Cal.   4S2),  334. 
People  v.  Williams  (18  Cal.  187),  340. 
People  v.  Williams  (64  Cal.  87),   30, 

239. 
People  v.  Wilson  (62  Hun,  61S),  141. 
People  v.  Wilson  (109  N.  Y.  345),  192. 
People  v.  Wong  (10  Pac.   Rep.   275; 

69  Cal.  180),  6. 
People  v.  Wood  (126  N.   Y.   219;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  362),  167,  334. 
People    v.    Wood    (131  N.    Y.    617), 

239. 
People  v.  Wreden  (59  Cal.  392),  197. 
People  v.  Wright  (90  Mich.  362),  39, 

384. 
People  v.  Young  (31  Cal.  568),  176. 
People  v.  Yut  Ling  (74  Cal.  569),  344. 
People's  Nat.   Gas  Co.  v.   Braddock 

Wire  Co.  (155  Pa.  St.  22;  25  Atl. 

Rep.  749),  206. 
People's  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Fidelity  Tit. 

&  Trust  Co.  (150  Pa.   St.  8;  24 

Atl.  Rep.  339),  206. 
Peoria,  etc.  Co.  v.  Rice  (144  111.  227; 

33  N.  E.  Rep.  951),  202. 
Peoria,  etc.  Co.  v.  Scott  (116  III.  401), 

242. 
Pepper  v.   Barnett  (22   Gratt,  Va., 

405),  139. 
Perego  v.  Purdy  (1  Hilton,  269),  80. 
Perine  v.  Grand  Lodge  A.  O.  U.  W. 

(Minn.,  1893,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  367), 

250. 
Perishable  Freight  T.  Co.  v.  O'Neill 

(41  111.  App.  423),  350. 
Perkins  v.  Augusta  Ins.  Co.  (10  Gray, 

812),  198. 
J 


Perkins  v.  Burnett  (2  Root,  Conn., 

30),  70. 
Perkins  v.  Concord  Road  (44  N.  II. 

223),  71. 
Perkins  v.  Graham  (18  Ala.  822),  71. 
Perkins  v.  Perkins   (39   N.    II.    163), 

231.  250,  253. 
Perkins  v.    Plunkett   (74   Me.    328), 

24. 
Perkins  v.  Rogers  (35  Ind.  124),  238. 
Perkins  v.  State  (132  Mass.  217),  188. 
Perkins  v.  State  (4  Ind.  222),  170. 
Perkins  v.  Stickney  (132  Mass.  217), 

188. 
Perkins  v.  Woodfolk  (8  Baxt.  411), 

240,  241. 
Perrin   v.  Wells  (155   Pa.    St.  299), 

122. 
Perrine  v.  Cooley  (39  N.  J.  L.  449), 

209. 
Perritt  v.  Couch   (5  Bush,  201),  237. 
Perry  v.  Binney  (103  Mass.  153),  210. 
Perry  v.  Boomhauer   (17   N.   Y.    S. 

890),  282. 
Perry  v.  Gerbeau  (5  Mart,,  N.  S.,  18, 

19).  81. 
Perry  v.  Gibson  (1  Ad.   &  El.   48), 

339. 
Perry  v.  Jensen  (21  Atl.  Rep.  866;  28 

W.  N.  C.  126),  187. 
Perry  v.  Scott  (109  N.  C.  374),  220. 
Perry  v.  Simpson  Mfg.  Co.  (40  Conn. 

313),  74. 
Perry  v.  State  (87  Ala.  30),  6. 
Perry  v.  State  (94  Ala.  25),  10. 
Perse  v.   Perse  (5  H.  L.  Cas.  671), 

2S7. 
Person  v.  Grier  (66  N.  Y.  124),  286. 
Pete  v.  State  (44  La.  Ann.  14),  52. 
Peterman   v.    Laws  (6  Leigh,  Va., 

523),  149. 
Peters  v.  Bourneau  (22111.  App.  177), 

11. 
Peters  v.  Jones  (35   Iowa,   412),  82, 

83. 
Peters  v.  Lawson    (66  Tex.  336),  74. 
Peters  v.  Porter  (60  How.  Pr.}  N.  Y., 

422),  222. 


cxl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Peters  v.  Warren  Ins.  Co.  (3  Sumn. 

389).  158. 
Petersen  v.  Siglinger  (S.  D.,  1893,  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  10G0),  343. 
Peterson  v.  Grover  (20  Me.  463),  223. 
Petrie  v.  Fitzgerald  (1    Daly,  N.  Y., 

401),  287. 
Petrie  v.  Petrie  (6  N.  Y.  S.  831 ;  53 

Hun,  G38),  309. 
Petrie  v.  Railway  Co.   (29  S.  C.  303; 

7S.  E.  Rep.  815),  121. 
Petrie   v.    Williams  (68   Hun,  589), 

67. 
Pettit  v.  May  (34  Wis.  666),  242. 
Peugh  v.  Davis  (96  U.  S.  332),  223. 
Peyroud  v.  Howard  (7  Pet.  342),  239. 
Peyser  v.  Myers  (63  Hun,  634),  56. 
Pharo  v.    Beadleston   (21    N.  Y.  S. 

989),  370. 
Phelps  v.  Foot  (1  Conn.  387),  51. 
Phelps  v.  George's    Creek    (60    Md. 

536),  73a. 
Phelps   v.    James    (Iowa,    1893,     53 

N.  W.  Rep.  74),  73a. 
Phelps  v.  Railroad  Co.  (94  111.  548), 

83. 
Phelps,  In  re  (98  N.  Y.  267),  2C9. 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bowersox  (6  Ohio 

Cir.  Ct.  1),  199. 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Copeland  (86  Ala. 

551).  199. 
Phettiplace   v.   N.   Pac.    R.   Co.    (84 

Wis.  412;  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1092), 

20. 
Phifer  v.  Erwin  (100  N.  C.  59;  6  S. 

E.  Rep.  672),  350. 
Philadelphia  v.   Newcumet  (11  Pa. 

Co.  Ct.  Rep.  504),  150a. 
Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Henrice  (92 

Pa.  St.  431),  13. 
Philadelphia,   etc.   Co.  v.   Hickman 

(28  Pa.  St.  318),  133. 
Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Howard  (13 

How.,U.  S.,  307),  123. 
Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Stimpson  (4 

Peters,  461),  350. 
Philadelphia  R.   Co.  v.  Lehman  (56 

Md.  209),  237. 


Philips  v.  Elwell  (14  Ohio  St.  240), 

150a. 
Phillips  v.  Chappell  (16  Ga.  16),  215. 
Phillips  v.   Huntington  (35  W.  Va. 

406),  33. 
Phillips   v.    Kingfield   (1   Appleton, 

375),  349. 
Phillips   v.    Marblehead  (148   Mass. 

329),  340. 
Phillips  v.  McGrath  (62  Wis.  124), 

309. 
Phillips  v.   McNab  (9  N.  Y.  S.  526), 

199. 
Phillips  v.  Smith  (110  Mass.  61),  76. 
Phillips  v.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  229), 

384. 
Phillips  v.   Terry  (3   Abb.  Dec,  N. 

Y.,  607),  198. 
Phillips  v.   Trow.   Fur.   Co.  (86  Ga. 

699),  130. 
Philpot  v.  Taylor  (75  111.  309),  69. 
Phipard  v.   Phipard  (55  Hun,  433), 

246. 
Phoenix  Ins.  Co.  of  London  v.  Freed- 

man  (Tex.,  1893,  19  S.  W.  Rep. 

1010),  369. 
Piatt  v.  United  States  (22  Wall.  496), 

215. 
Pickard  v.  Baily  (6  Fost.,  N.  H.,  152), 

143. 
Pickard  v.  Bryant  (52  N.   W.   Rep. 

788;  92  Mich.  430),  337,  340,  348. 
Pickering  v.  Fisk  (6  Vt.  102),  242. 
Pickering  v.  Pickering  (50  N.  H.  349), 

221. 
Pickett  v.  Abney  (81  Tex.  645;  19  S. 

W.  Rep.  859),  35. 
Pickett  v.  Ferguson  (45  Ark.   177), 

205. 
Pickett  v.  Nelson  (79  Wis.  9),  220. 
Pidcock  v.   Potter  (68  Pa.  St.  342), 

192. 
Pierce  v.  Andrews  (6  Cush.  4),  84. 
Pierce  v.  Brewer  (43  Vt.  292),  208. 
Pierce  v.  Goldsberg  (35  Ind.  317),  79. 
Pierce  v.  Indseth  (106  U.  S.  555),  143, 

212. 
.  Pierce  v.  Jacobs  (7  Mackey,  498),  53. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


cxli 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Pierce  v.  Newton  (13  Gray,  528),  350. 
Pierce  v.  Northey  (14  Wis.  9),  139a. 
Pierce  v.  Pierce  (60  N.  H.  355),  77. 
Pierce  v.  Roberts  (57  Conn.  40),  68. 
Pierce  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  587),  6. 
Pierce  v.  Stevens  (30  Me.  184),  212. 
Pierce  v.  Ted  well  (81  Ala.  299),  212. 
Pierce  v.  Traver  (13  Nev.  526),  223. 
Pierce  v.  Wood  (23  N.  H.  579),  69. 
Pierson  v.  Conley  (Mich.,  1893,  55  N. 

W.  Rep.  387),  153. 
Pierson  v.  Hooker  (3  Johns.,  N.  Y., 

68),  69. 
Pierson  v.  People  (79  N.  Y.  424),  172, 

202. 
Pike  v.  Gage  (9  Fost.,  N.  H„  461), 

79. 
Pike  v.  State  (49  N.  H.  399),  186. 
Pillsbnry  v.  Locke  (33  N.  H.  96),  217. 
Pilcher  v.  Kerr  (7  La.  Ann.  244),  70. 
Pilcher  v.  Ligon  (91  Ky.  228),  154. 
Pinson  v.  Ivey  (1  Yerg.  296),  222. 
Piper  v.  True  (36  Cal.  60G),  222. 
Pinney  v.  Cahill  (48  Mich.  584),  189. 
Pinney  v.  Will  (27  Minn.  280),  197. 
Pittman  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,  17  S.  E. 

Rep.  856),  9,  332. 
Pitton  v.  Walter  (1  Stra.  162),  146. 
Pitts  v.  Brown  (49  Vt.  83),  126. 
Pitts  v.  Emmons  (92  Mich.  542),  126. 
Pitts  v.  Lewis  (81  Iowa,  51 ;  46  N.  W. 

Rep.  739),  124. 
Pitts,  In   re  (Wis.,  1893,  55  N.   W. 

Rep.  149),  169. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.  Co.  v.  McGrath  (115 

111.  172),  123. 
Pittsburgh,  etc.   Co.   v.    Reich   (101 

111.  157),  198. 
Pittsburgh  &  L.  S.  Iron  Co.  v.  Kirk- 

patrick  (92  Mich.  252),  73a. 
Plake  v.  State  (121  Ind.  433),  231. 
Planet,  etc.  Co.  v.   Railroad  Co.  (115 

Mo.  613;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  616).  83. 
Plank-road  Co.  v.  Wetsel  (21  Baib. 

56),  128. 
Piano  Co.  v.  Root  (N.   D.,  1893,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  924),  234. 


Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Frawley  (08  Wis. 

577;  32  N.  W.  Rep.  768),  170. 
Plant  v.  Condit  (22  Ark.  454),  208. 
Plant  v.  McEwen  (4  Conn.  544),  73. 
Platner  v.  Plainer  (78  N.  Y.  90),  66. 

70. 
Piatt  v.  Munroe   (34  Barb.,   N.  Y., 

293),  386. 
Platto  v.  Gettelman  (Wis.,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  167),  82. 
Plaxton  v.  Dare  (10  B.  &  C.  17),  116. 
Pleasant  v.  State  (15  Ark.  624),  330. 
Pledger  v.  State  (77  Ga.  242),  332. 
Plumer  v.  Currier  (53  N.  H.  287),  76. 
Plummer  v.  Gould  (92  Mich.  1),  210. 
Plunkett  v.  Cobbett  (29  How.  St.  Tr. 

71,  72),  175. 
Plyer  v.  German  Am.   Ins.  Co.  (121 

N.  Y.  689),  351. 
Poe  v.  State  (10  Lea,  Tenn.,  673),  5. 
Poignard  v.  Smith  (8  Pick.  278),  301. 
Pole  v.  Rogers  (3  Bing.    N.  C.  780), 

359. 
Polk  v.  Butterfield  (9  Colo.  325),  242. 
Polk  v.  State  (36  Ark.  117),  195. 
Pollard  v.  Seybourn  (1  Hagg.  75),  202. 
Polleys  v.    Ocean  Ins.  Co.  (14  Me. 

141),  73a. 
Pollock  v  Glassell  (2  Gratt.  439),  210. 
Pollock  v.  Warwick  (104  N.  C.  638), 

223. 
Poison  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893,  35  N.  E. 

Rep.  907),  168. 
Polston  v.  See  (46  Iowa,  30),  6. 
Pomeroy  v.    Bailey  (43  N.   H.   118), 

208. 
Pomeroy  v.  Com.  (2  Va.  Cas.  343), 

23. 
Pool  v.  Gramling  (88  Ga.  653),  232. 
Pool  v.  Morris  (29  Ga.  374),  67. 
Poole  v.    East  Tenn.  etc.   Co.  (Ga., 

1893,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  267),  56. 
Poole  v.   Richardson  (3  Mass.  330), 

197. 
Poor  v.  Oakman  (154  Mass.  316),  262. 
Poorman  v.  Miller  (44  Cal.  269),  31. 
Pope  v.  Allen  (90  N.  Y.  298),  309. 
Pope  v.  Allis  (115  U.  S.  363),  76. 


cxlii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Pope  v.  Harrison  (16  Lea,  Term.,  82), 

232. 
Pope  v.    Negus  (14   Civ.    Pro.  Eep. 

406),  285. 
Porter  v.  Christian  (88  Va.  730),  382. 
Porter  v.  Ferguson  (4  Fla.  103),  130. 
Porter  v.   Nelson  (121   Pa.   St.   640), 

309. 
Porter  v.  Sherman  Co.  Banking  Co. 

(36  Neb.  271 ;  55  N.  W.  Rep.  231), 

380. 
Porter  v.  Seiler  (23  Pa.  St.  424),  9. 
Porter  v.  State  (76  Ga.  658),  324. 
Porter  v.  State  (2  Ind.  435),  330. 
Porter  v.  State  (55  Ala.  93),  6,  90. 
Porter  v.  Still  (63  Miss.  357),  254. 
Porter  v.  Waring  (69  N.  Y.  250),  242. 
Porter  v.  Wilson  et  al.  (13  Pa.   St. 

641),  132. 
Posey  v.  Patton  (109  N.  C.  455),  343. 
Potter  v.  Baldwin  (133  Mass.  427),  51. 
Potter  v.  Deyo  (19  Wend.  361),  250. 
Potter  v.  Luther  (3  Johns.  431).  244. 
Potter  v.  Merchants'  Bank  (28  N.  Y. 

641),  199. 
Potter  v.  Ware  (1  Cush.    519,    524), 

312. 
Potter's  Appeal  (53  Mich.  106),  222. 
Potts  v.  House  (6  Ga.  324),  197. 
Potts  v.  Jones  (110  Pa.  St.  48),  11. 
Potts  v.  Mayer  (86  N.  Y.  302),  308. 
Potts  v.  State  (26  Tex.  App.  663;  14 

S.  W.  Rep.  446),  93. 
Potwin  v.  Johnson  (108  111.  70),  242. 
Poucher  v.  State  (98  N.  Y.  422),  230. 
Pound  v.  State  (43  Ga.  88),  10. 
Powell  v.  Brunner  (86  Ga.  531),  67. 
Powell  v.  Manson  (3  Mason,  347),  215. 
Powell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (77  Ga.  192), 

193. 
Powell  v.  State  (25  Ala.  28),  197. 
Powell  v.  Turner  (139  Mass.  97),  373. 
Powell  v.    Waters  (17  Johns.    176), 

237. 
Powers  v.  Braley  (41  Mo.  App.  556), 

229. 
Powers  v.  McKenzie  (80  Tenn.  167), 

346. 


Powers  v.  People  (42  111.  App.  427), 

56. 
Powers  v.  Presgroves  (38  Miss.  227), 

10. 
Powers  v.  Savin  (28  Abb.  N.  C.  463), 

60. 
Powers  v.  Sheperd  (21  N.  H.  60),  360. 
Powers  v.  State  (80  Ind.  77),  348. 
Powers  v.  State  (87  Ind.  144),  101. 
Powers  v.  State  (44  Ga.  209),  324. 
Prairie  Sch.  Tp.  v.  Haselen  (N.  D., 

1893,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  938),  211. 
Prather  v.  Johnson  (3  Har.  &  J.,  Md., 

487),  142. 
Prather  v.  Wilkins  (68  Tex.  187),  33. 
Pratt  v.  Andrews  (4  Comst.,  N.  Y., 

493),  10. 
Pratt  v.  California  M.  Co.  (24  Fed. 

Rep.  S69),  222. 
Pratt  v.  Elkins  (b0  N.  Y.  198),  309. 
Pratt  v.  King  (1  Oreg.  49),  148. 
Pratt  v.  White  (132  Mass.  477),  CO. 
Prell    v.    McDonald    (7    Kan.    446), 

143a,  242. 
Prendible  v.  Conn.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mass., 

1893,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  675),  198. 
Prentiss  v.  Bates  (88  Mich.  567),  188, 

222. 
Prentiss  v.  Bates  (93  Mich.  234),  248. 
Prentiss  v.  Parks  (65  Me.  559),  232. 
Prescot  v.  Ganser  (34  Iowa,  175),  140. 
Presley  v.  Grand  Trunk  R.  Co.  (22 

Atl.  Rep.  554),  8. 
Prest  v.  Mersereau  (10  N.  J.  L.  268), 

60. 
Preston  v.  Hall  (23  Gratt.,  Va.,  600), 

268. 
Preston  v.  Harvey  (2  H.  &  M.  55), 

160. 
Prewet  v.  Coopwood  (30  Miss.  369), 

67. 
Prewet  v.  Land  (36  Miss.  495),  67. 
Prewitt  v.  Lambert  (Colo.,  1893,  34 

Pac.  Rep.  684),  309. 
Price  v.  Archuleta  (17  Colo.  288;  29 

Pac.  Rep.  460),  249. 
Price  v.  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (48  Mo. 

App.  281),  237. 


TATiLE    OF   CASES. 


CX.lll 


References  are  to  sections. 


Price  v.  Grover  (40  Md.  202),  222. 
Price  v.  Hartson  (44  N.  Y.  94),  193. 
Price  v.  Kane  (112  Mo.  412),  246. 
Price  v.  Littlewood    (3  Camp.  288), 

114. 
Price  v.  Page  (24  Mo.  05),  239. 
Price  r.  People  (131  III.  223),  283. 
Price  v.  Perkins  (2  Dev.  Eq.,  N.  C, 

250),  315. 
Price  v.  Powell  (3  N.  Y.  322),  198. 
Price  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  (S.  C, 

1893,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  732),  198. 
Price  v.  State  (72  Ga.  441),  102. 
Pride  v.  Lunt  (19  Me.  115),  220.   k 
Priest  v.  State  (10  Neb.  393),  93,  97. 
Prigden  v.  Green  (80  Ga.  737 ;  7  S.  E. 

Rep.  97),  108. 
Prill  v.  Denhead  (8  Sim.  279),  158. 
Primm  v.  Stewart  (7  Tex.  178),  53. 
Prince  v.  Sanio  (7  Ad.  &  El.  G27), 

341. 
Prince  v.  Skellin  (71  Me.   361),  238, 

240. 
Prince  v.  Smith  (4  Mass.  455),  60. 
Prince  v.  State  (72  Ga.  441),  102. 
Printup  v.  Mitchell  (17  Ga.  558),  129. 
Printz  v.  People  (42  Mich.  144),  199. 
Prior  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S.  Rep. 

681),  346. 
Pritchard    v.    Norwood    (155    Mass. 

539),  35. 
Pritchard  v.  Pritchard  (69  Wis.  373), 

309. 
Pritchard  v.  Smith  (77  Ga.  463),  128. 
Probert  v.  McDonald  (S.  D.,  1892,  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  212),  250. 
Probert  v.  Phipps  (149  Mass.  258),  201. 
Procter  v.  Cole  (66  Ind.  576),  205. 
Proctor  v.    Old  Colony  R.   Co.  (154 

Mass.  251),  74. 
Proctor  v.  Snodgrass  (6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 

Rep.  547),  206. 
Propeller  Commerce,  In  re  (1  Black, 

580),  158. 
Proper  v.  State  (Wis.,  1893,  53  N.  W. 

Rep.  1035),  335. 
Propson  v.  Lathem  (80  Wis.  608),  8. 
Prouty  v.  Ruggles  (2  Story,  199),  360. 


Prov.    etc.    Co.    v.    Worcester  (155 

Mass.  35),  8. 
Prudential  Ins.  Co.  v.  Fredericks  (41 

111.  App.  19),  73. 
Pryor  v.  Roburn  (16  Ark.  671).  160. 
Publishers'  Ass'n  v.  Fisher  (95  Mich. 

274 ;  54  N.  W.  Rep.  759),  60. 
Pucci  v.  Barney  (21  N.  Y.  S.  1099), 

216. 
Puget  Sound  R.  Co.  v.  Ingersoll  (4 

Wash.  St.  675),  380. 
Pugh   v.    Ayres  (47  Mo.  App.  490), 

367. 
Pugh  v.  Good  (19  Oreg.  85;  23  Pac. 

Rep.  827),  276. 
Pugh  v.  Little  Rock  (35  Ark.  75), 

143a. 
Pugh  v.  State  (2  Head,  227),  244. 
Pullen  v.  Pullen  (43  N.  J.  Eq.  139), 

322,  341,  356. 
Pulley  v.  Hilton  (12  Price,  625),  142. 
Pulliam  v.  State  (6  S.  Rep.  839;  88 

Ala.  1).  101. 
Pullman  v.  Corning  (14  Barb.  174;  9 

N.  Y.  93),  199. 
Pullman  v.  Smith  (79  Tex.  468),  52. 
Pureed  v.  Miner  (4  Wall.  517),  262. 
Purdy  v.  Delavan  (1  Caines,  304),  77. 
Puryear  v.  Com.  (83  Va.  51),  320. 
Puryear  v.  State  (63  Ga.  692),  124. 
Putnam  v.  Bond  (100  Mass.  58),  217. 
Putnam  v.  Wadley  (40  111.  346),  139. 
Puyar  v.  Reese  (46  Tenn.  21),  197. 
Pyburn  v.  State  (84  Ga.  193),  283. 
Pye  v.  Bakke  (Minn.,  1893,  55  N.  W. 

Rep.  904),  339,  340. 

Q, 

Quackenbush    v.    Railroad    Co.    (73 

Iowa,  458),  145. 
Quaife  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.    Co.  (48 

Wis.  513),  52,  192. 
Queen  v.  Bell  (22  N.  Y.   S.  398),  377. 
Queener  v.  Morrow  (1  Coldw.,  Tenn., 

123),  71. 
Queen  Ins.    Co.  v.   Studebaker  (117 

Ind.  416),  334. 


cxliv 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Queen's  Case  (2  Brod.  &  Bing.  281), 

315. 
Querry  v.  White  (1  Bibb,  Ky.,  271), 

211. 
Quigley  v.  De  Hass  (93  Pa.  St.  292), 

217. 
Quigley   v.  Turner  (150  Mass.  108), 

322. 
Quimby  v.  Boyd  (8  Cat.  194),  135. 
Quin  v.  State  (46  Ind.  459),  234. 
Quinland  v.  State  (16  S.  W.  Rep.  258; 

29  Tex.  App.  401),  89. 
Quinland  v.  Utica  (74  N.  Y.  603),  8. 
Quinn  v.  Roath  (37  Conn.  16),  223. 
Quinn  v.  Halbert  (57  Vt.  178),  124. 
Quinn  v.  Higgins  (63  Wis.  664),  188, 

193. 
Quinn  v.  People  (15  N.  E.  Rep.  46; 

123  111.  333),  346. 

R. 

Rabsuhl  v.  Lack  (35  Mo.  316),  208. 
Rackleff  v.  Norton  (19  Me.  274),  136. 
Radcliff  v.  Insurance  Co.  (7  Johns. 

38),  144. 
Ragan  v.  Kansas   City  &  S.   E.  R. 

Co.  (Ill  Mo.  456),  199. 
Ragland  v.  Wynn  (37  Ala.  32),  240. 
Rabin  v.  Deig  (121  Ind.  283),  73a. 
Raiford  v.   French  (11  Rich.,  S.  C, 

367),  73a. 
Railing   v.    Com.    (113  Pa.    St.    37), 

101. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Chenoa  (43  III.  209), 

242. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Clowdis  (90  Ga.  258; 

17  S.  E.  Rep.  88),  56. 
Railroad  Co.   v.  Davis  (1  Gray,  88), 

350. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Farmer  (Ala.,  1893, 

12  S.  Rep.  86),  24. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Finlay  (38  Kan.  550 ; 

16  Pac.  Rep.  951),  185. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Hickman  (28  Pa.  St. 

318),  139. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson  (Ga.,  1893, 

16  S.  E  Rep.  49),  143a. 


Railroad  Co.  v.  Levy  (Ind.,  1893,  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  815),  73a. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Martin  (112  111.  16), 

193. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Owen  (90  Ga.  265;  15 

S.  E.  Rep.  853),  250. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Plumas  Co.  (37  Cal. 

354),  242. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Randall  (85  Ga.  297), 

341. 
Railway  Co.   v.   Rhea  (44  Ark.  258, 

264),  249. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Selby  (47  Ind.  471),  8. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Shornter  (12  La.  Ann. 

136),  148. 
Railroad  Co.  v.  Ward  (35  111.  App. 

423),  73a. 
Railsback  v.  Patton  (34  Neb.  490 ;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  277),  225. 
Rainey  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.   R.  Co.  (23 

N.  Y.  S.  80;  68  Hun,  495),  308. 
Rains  v.  State  (88  Ala.   91),  6,  354a. 
Ralfe  v.  Dart  (2  Taunt.  521),  146. 
Ralston  v.  Miller  (3  Rand.,  Va.,  44), 

115. 
Ralston  v.  Moore  (83  Ky.   571),  136. 
Rambler  v.  Tryson  (7  S.   &  R.  90), 

197. 
Ramsbottom    v.    Phelps    (18    Conn. 

278),  69. 
Ramsey    v.    Hurley    (72    Tex.  1194), 

50. 
Ramson  v.  Adams  (17  Johns.,  N.  Y., 

130),  229. 
Ranch  v.  N.  Y,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co. 

(2  N.  Y.  S.  108),  199. 
Rand  v.  Hanson  (154  Mass.  88;  28  N. 

E.  Rep.  6),  148. 
Randall  v.   Baird  (66  Mich.  312;  33 

N.  W.  Rep.  506),  24. 
Randall  v.  Gurney  (3  B.  &  A.  252), 

286. 
Randall  v.  Lynch  (2  Camp.  352,  357), 

82. 
Randall  v.  Packard  (20  N.  Y.  S.  716), 

199,  373. 
Randall  v.  State  (32  N.  E.  Rep.  305; 

132  Ind.  539),  340,  349. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlv 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Randegger  v.  Ehrhardt(51  III.  101), 

70. 
Randell  v.  Burtis  (57  Tex.  362),  148. 
Randell  v.  Hodges  (3  Bland,  47),  150. 
Randolph  v.  Adams  (2  W.  Va.  519), 

198. 
Raner   v.    Tiinerson  (51  Barb.  517), 

84. 
Rank  v.    Grote   (110  N.  Y.  12),  213, 

268,  309. 
Rankin  v.    Bell  (19  S.  W.  Rep.  874, 

Tex.,  1892),  229. 
Rankin  v.  Hannan  (38  Ohio  St.  438), 

308. 
Rankin  v.  Wallace  (Ky.,  1890,  14  S. 

W.  Rep.  79),  208. 
Ranson  v.  State  (40  Ark.  176).  321. 
Raper  v.  Birkbeck  (15  East,  17),  12S. 
Rapley  v.   Klugh  (S.  C,  1894,  18  S. 

E.  Rep.  680),  220. 
Rapple,  In  re  (66  Hun,  558),  222. 
Raridan  v.   Railroad  (69  Iowa,  527), 

237. 
Rash  v.  State  (61  Ala.  89).  192,  194. 
Rates  v.  Robinson  (8  Iowa,  318),  357. 
Rathburn   v.    Acker  (18  Barb.  375), 

279. 
Rattarre  v.    Chapman  (79  Ga.  574), 

349. 
Ravisies  v.   Alston  (5  Ala.  297),  12S. 
Rawls  v.   Am.  L.  Ins.  Co.  (36  Barb. 

357;  27  N.  Y.  282),  194,  200. 
Rawson  v.  Knight  (73  Me.  340),  309. 
Ray  v.  Ray  (98  N.  C.  566),  188. 
Ray  v.   Simmons  (11  R.  I.  266),  265. 
Ray  v.   State  (1  Greene,  Iowa,  316), 

323. 
Ray  v.  Stewart  (105  N.  C.  472),  142. 
Raymond  v.   Coffey   (5   Oreg.   132), 

220. 
Raymond  v.  Cottier    (3    Pick.    293, 

296),  143. 
Raymond  v.  Krauskopf  (Iowa,  1893, 

54  N.  W.  Rep.  432),  214. 
Raymond    v.    Raymond    (10   Cash., 

Mass.,  134),  214. 
Raynes  v.   Bennett  (114  Mass.  425), 

68. 


Raynham  v.   Canton  (3  Pick.  233), 
143. 

Ray  nor  v.  Norton  (3  Mich.  210),  337. 
Rea  v.  Scully  (76  Iowa,  343),  148. 
Read  v.  Hurd  (7  Wend.,  N.  Y.,  408), 

225. 
Read   v.   Woodruffe  (24  Beav.  421), 

305. 
Reavis  v.  Co  well  (56  Cal.  583),  356. 
Reber  v.  Herring  (115  Pa.  St.  599;   8 

Atl.  Rep.  800),  193. 
Record  v.  Village  (46  Hun,  418),  178. 
Redell  v.  Railroad  Co.  (44  N.  Y.  367), 

188. 
Redd  v.  Murray  (24  Pac.  Rep.  341 ;  93 

Cal.  48),  210. 
Redden  v.  Teft  (48  Kan.  302 ;  29  Pac. 

Rep.  157),  350. 
Reddick  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  267), 

322. 
Redding  v.   Wright  (49  Minn.  322), 

67,  199. 
Red f earn  v.   Douglas  (35  S.  C.  569), 

382. 
Red  field  v.  Redfield  (110  N.  Y.  674), 

309. 
Redford  v.  Peggy  (6  Rand.,  Va.,  316), 

139a. 
Redman  v.   Graham  (80  N.  C.  231), 

83. 
Redstrake  v.  Insurance  Co.  (44  N.  J. 

Eq.  294),  24. 
Reed  v.  Dick  (8  Watts,  Pa.,  479),  198. 
Reed  v.  Kemp  (16  111.  445),  128. 
Reed  v.  New  (39  Kan.  727),  369. 
Reed  v.  Newcomb  (19  Atl.  Rep.  367), 

82. 
Reed  v.  Penn.  Ry.  Co.  (56  Fed.  Rep. 

184),  192. 
Reed  v.   Stapp  (52  Fed.  Rep.  641  :  3 

C.  C.  A.  244;  9  U.  S.  App.   34), 

369. 
Reed  v.  State  (16  Ark.  499),  114. 
Reed  v.  State  (16  S.  W.  Rep.  819;  54 

Ark.  621),  229. 
Reed  v.  Wilson  (61   Hun,  623),  159. 
Reed  v.  Wilson  (41  N.  J.  L.  29),  145, 

242. 


cxlvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Reed  v.  Walters    (3  M.  &  W.  577), 

106. 
Reese  v.  Coffey  (Ind.,  1893,  32  N.  E. 

Rep.  720),  362. 
Reese  v.  Harris  (27  Ala.  301),  230. 
Reese  v.  Murnane  (31  Pac.  Rep.  1027 ; 

5  Wash.   St.  372),  117. 
Reese  v.  Reese  (90  Pa.  St.  89),  139a. 
Reeves  v.  Townsend  (2  Zab.,  N.   J., 

39),  232. 
Reg.  v.  Adderburg  (5  Q.  B.  187),  72. 
Reg.  v.  Arnold  (8  C.  &  P.  622),  90. 
Reg.  v.  Atwood  (5  Cox,  C.   C.    322), 

90. 
Reg.  v.  Baldy  (16  Jar.  599),  89. 
Reg.  v.  Bate  (11  Cox,  C.  C.  686),  90. 
Reg.  v.  Bedingfield  (14    Cox,  C.    C. 

341),  57. 
Reg.  v.  Bird  (17  Cox,  C.  C.   387),  24. 
Reg.  v.  Boulter  (16  Jur.  135),  382. 
Reg.    v.  Braithwaite  (8  Cox,    C.   C. 

254),  382. 
Reg.  v.  Burke  (8  Cox,  44),  354. 
Reg.  v.  Butler  (2   Car.  &  Kir.  221), 

93. 
Reg.  v.  Chappie  (9  C.  &  P.  355),  281. 
Reg.  v.  Child  (5  Cox,  C.  C.  197),  124. 
Reg.  v.  Farler  (8  C.  &  P.  106),  324. 
Reg.  v.  Garbott  (1  Demo,  C.  C.  236), 

354. 
Reg.  v.  Garner  (12  Jur.  944),  89. 
Reg.  v.  Garside  (2  Lew.   C.  C.   38), 

323. 
Reg.  v.  Hill  (15  Jur.  470),  317. 
Reg.  v.  Holmes  (1  C.  &  K.  248),  90. 
Reg.  v.  Jarvis  (L.  R.,  1  C.   C.  R,  C. 

B.  96),  89. 
Reg.  v.  Jones  (1  Den.  Cr.  Cas.  166), 

173. 
Reg.  v.  Kitson  (20   Eng.    L.    &  Eq. 

509),  126. 
Reg.  v.  Lay  ton  (4  Cox,  C.  C.  149, 155), 

231. 
Reg.  v.  Martin  (L.  R.  1  Cr.  Cas.  Res. 

378),  344. 
Reg.  v.  Moore  (61   Law  J.  Mag.  80; 

17  Cox,  C.  C.  458),  315. 
Reg.  v.  Perkins  (9  C.  &  P.  395),  102. 


Reg.  v.  Richardson  (3  F.   &  F.  693), 

175. 
Reg.  v.  Shaw  (10  Cox,  C.  C.  66),  382. 
Reg.  v.  Sloman  (1  Dowl.  618),  284. 
Reg.  v.  Sparks  (1  F.  &  F.  388),  323. 
Reg.  v.  Steele  (12  Cox,  C.  C.  168),  101. 
Reg.  v.  Still  (30  U.  C.  C.  P.  30),  196. 
Reg.  v.  Young  (19  Cox,  C.  C.  371), 

324. 
Reherd  v.  Clem  (86  Va.  374),  309. 
Reich  v.  Berdel  (120  111.  499;  11  N. 

E.  Rep.  913),  30. 
Reid  v.  Hodgson  (1  Cranch,  TJ.   S., 

491),  139. 
Reid  v.  Louisiana,   etc.  Co.  (29  La. 

Ann.  388),  69. 
Reid  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  (145  N. 

Y.  574),  52. 
Reid  v.  State  (50  Ga.  536),  249. 
Reifsnyder  v.  Meter  Co.  (Iowa,  1894, 

57  N.  W.  Rep.  692),  198. 
Reigard  v.  O'Neill  (38  111.  400),  222. 
Reiley  v.  Haynes  (38  Kan.  259),  367. 
Reily  v.  Com.  (Ky.,    1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  222),  9,  10. 
Reineman  v.   Blair  (96  Pa.  St.  155), 

74. 
Reinhart  v.  Lugo  (86  Cal.  395),  150a. 
Reinhold  v.  State  (130  Ind.  467),  334. 
Reis  v.  Grafman  (56  Mo.  434),  83. 
Reiter  v.   Miller  (86  N.  Y.  507),  231. 
Remer  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.  (1  N. 

Y.  S.  124;  48  Hun,  352),  340. 
Remington  v.   Dougherty  (81   N.  Y. 

474),  135. 
Remy  v.   Mun.  No.  2  (12  La.  Ann. 

500,  503),  344. 
Renaud  v.  Abbott  (116  U.  S.  277), 

242. 
Renier  v.   Hurlburt  (50  N.  W.  Rep. 

783;  81  Wis.  24),  159. 
Renihan  v.  Dennin  (103  N.  Y.  577), 

178. 
Renolds  v.  Rowley  (2  La.  Ann.  890), 

73a. 
Rent  v.  Church  (136  N.  Y.  10;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  704),  151. 
Renz  v.  Stoll  (94  Mich.  377),  246. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


cxlvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Repp  v.   Wiles  (3  Iml.  App.  1G7;  29 

N.  E.  Rep.  441),  74. 
Reppert  v.  Colvin  (48  Pa.  St.  248),  69 
Republic  Bank  v.  Darragh  (.30  Hun, 

N.  Y.,  29),  314. 
Respublica  v.  Cribbs  (3  Yeates,  429), 

354. 
Respublica  v.  Davis  (3  Yeates,  128), 

73. 
Respublica  v.  McCarthy  (2  Dall.  86, 

88),  93. 
Reuber  v.  Crawford   (Neb.,   1893,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  549),  380. 
Revett  v.  Braham  (4  T.  R.  497),  140. 
Rex  v.  Aickles  (1  Leach,  Cr.  Cas.  435), 

144. 
Rex  v.  Baker  (2  M.  &  Rob.  53),  102. 
Rex  v.  Baldry  (2  Den.  C.  C.  430),  90. 
Rex  v.  Benson  (Camp.  508),  147. 
Rex  v.  Brangan   (1    Leach,  Cr.  Cas. 

32),  140. 
Rex  v.  Castell  Careinion  (8  East),  320. 
Rex  v.  Clewes  (4  C.  &  P.  221),  90. 
Rex  v.  Cotton   (3  Campb.  444,  446), 

113. 
Rex  v.  Court  (7  C.  &  P.  486),  91. 
Rex  v.  Criswell  (3  T.  R.  721),  122. 
Rex  v.  Davis  (6  Mod.  74),  320. 
Rex  v.  Deeley    (1    Moody,    Cr.  Cas. 

303),  23. 
Rex  v.  Derrington   (2  C.  &   P.  418), 

91. 
Rex  v.  Dunn  (4  C.  &  P.  543),  96. 
Rex  v.  Fletcher  (1  Stra.  633),  323. 
Rex  v.  Fuller  (Russ.  &  Ry.  30>),  229. 
Rex  v.  Gillis  (11  Cox,  C.  C.  69),  323. 
Rex  v.  Green  (6  C.  &  R  655),  91. 
Rex  v.  Hard  wick  (11  East,  579),  72, 

96. 
Rex  v.  Hardy  (24  How.  St.  Tr.  451, 

753),  69,  175. 
Rex  v.  Harrington  (4  M.  &  S.  353), 

13S. 
Rex  v.  Harvey  (8  Cox,  C.  C.  103),  313. 
Rex  v.  Hayes  (2  Cox,  C.  C.  226),  53. 
Rex  v.  Hebdon  (2  Stra.  1109),  151. 
Rex  v.  Hind  (8  Cox,  C.  C.  300),  102. 
Rex  v.  Hunt  (3  B.  &  A.  566),  36. 


Rex  v.  Inhabitants  (3B.  &  Al  1.  586 

38. 
Rex  v.  Inhabitants  (1   B.  &  C.  573), 

107. 
Rex  v.  Jarvis  (2  M.  &  R.  40),  324. 
Rex  v.  Jenkins    (L.    R.    1    Cr.    Cas. 

187),  101. 
Rex  v.  Leefe  (2  Campb.  134,  140),  20. 
Rex  v.  Lewis  (4  Esp.  225),  354. 
Rex  v.  Lewis  (6  C.  &  P.  101),  93. 
Rex  v.  Lloyd  (6  C.  &  P.  893),  91. 
Rex  v.  London  (2  Lev.  231),  2S8. 
Rex  v.  Mayhew  (6  C.  &  P.  315),  382. 
Rex  v.  Mayor  (5  T.  R.  66),  151. 
Rex  v,  Mead  (2  B.  &  C.  605),  102. 
Rex  v.  Mellor  (Staff.    Sum.    Assize, 

1833;,  323. 
Rex  v.  More  (2  Den.  C.  C.  522),  96. 
Rex  v.  Morris  (2  Burr.  1189),  147. 
Rex  v.  Mosely  (1  Mood.  97),  101. 
Rex  v.  Noakes  (5  C.  &  P.  326),  324. 
Rex  v.  Onslow  (12  Cox,  356),  281. 
Rex  v.  Reason  (1  Str.  499,  500),   103. 
Rex  v.  Sadler  (4  C.  &  P.  218),  277. 
Rex  v.  Scaife  (1  Mood.   &   R.    551). 

102. 
Rex  v.  Simmons  (6  C.  &  P.  540),  91. 
Rex  v.  Slaney  (5  C.  &  P.  213;  24  E. 

C.  L.  1832),  139. 
Rex  v.  Slaughter  (8  C.  &  P.  784).  m. 
Rex  v.  Spencer  (7  C.  &  P.  776),  96. 
Rex  v.  Spilsbury  (7   C.  &  P.  188).  93. 
Rex  v.  Walter  (7  C.  &  P.  267),  93. 
Rex  v.  Walters  (7  C.  &  P.  250),  23. 
Rex  v.  Watson  (2  Stark.  136),  175. 
Rex  v.  Wedge  (5  C.  &  P.  298),  53. 
Rex  v.  Weller  (2  Car.  &  K.  223),  93. 
Rex  v.  Wild  (1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  452), 

91. 
Rex  v.  Woburn  (10  East,  395),  288. 
Rex  v.  Woodcock  (2  Leach,  Cr.  Cas. 

567),  100,  166. 
Rexford  v.  Comstock  (3  N.  Y.  S.  876), 

60. 
Rexford  v.  Miller  (49  Vt.  319),  231. 
Reynders  v.  Hindman  (88  Ga.  314), 

74. 
Reynolds  v.  Adams  (90  111.  134),  222. 


cxlviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Reynolds  v.  Franklin  (47  Minn.  145), 

362. 
Reynolds  v.  Greenbaum  (80  111.  416), 

851. 
Reynolds  v.  Jordan  (6  Cal.  109),  217. 
Reynolds  v.  Reynolds  (45  Mo.  App. 

622),  262. 
Reynolds  v.  Robinson  (64  N.  Y.  389), 

188,  199. 
Reynolds  v.  Robinson  (82  N.  Y.  103), 

215. 
Reynolds  v.  Rowley  (3  Rob.,  La.,  261), 

173. 
Reynolds  v.  United   States  (98  U.  S. 

155),  120,  121. 
Reynolds,   Ex  parte    (87   Ala.    138), 

240. 
Rhine  /.  Ellen  (36  Cal.  362),  208. 
Rhines    v.    Baird    (41   Pa.   St.    356), 

223. 
Rhode  v.  Louthain  (8   Blackf.,  Ind., 

413),  268. 
Rhodes  v.  Lovvry  (54  Ala.  4),  73a. 
Rhodes  v.  Metropolis  (36   111.  App. 

123),  153. 
Rhodes  v.  Pray  (36   Minn.  395),  309. 
Rice  v.  Daly  (66  Hun,  62S),  308. 
Rice  v.  Hassenpflug  (13   N.  E.  Rep. 

655;  45  Ohio  St.  477),  315. 
Rice  v.  Keith  (63  N.  C.  319),  166. 
Rice  v.  Mead  (22  How.  Pr.  440),  237. 
Rice  v.  Montgomery  (4  Biss.  75),  239. 
Rice  v.  Pennypacker  (5  Del.  Ch.  33), 

246. 
Ricev.  Rice  (47   N.  J.  Eq.    559;  19 

Atl.  Rep.  736),  202,  288,  235. 
Rice  v.  Shook  (27  Ark.  137),  238. 
Rich   v.  Flanders  (39  N.  H.  304),  67, 

68. 
Rich   v.  Jones  (9  Cush.,  Mass.,  326), 

186. 
Rich  v.  Minneapolis  (40  Minn.  84),  76. 
Richard  v.  Williams  (7  Wheat.  59), 

226. 
Richards'  Appeal  (122  Pa.  St.  547;  15 

Atl.  Rep.  903),  36. 
Richards  v.  Bassett  (10  B.  &  C.  657), 
113,  114. 


Richards  v.  Bostor  (90  Ala.  352),  24. 
Richards  v.  Crocker   (66   Hun,  629), 

205. 
Richards  v.  Day  (63  Hun,  635),  212. 
Richards  v.  Green    (Ariz.,    1893,    32 

Pac.  Rep.  266),  24. 
Richards  v.  Howard  (2  Nott  &  McC. 

474),  60. 
Richards   v.    Humphreys  (15   Pick.  . 

139),  215. 
Richards  v.   Knight  (Iowa,  1892,  42 

N.  W.  Rep.  584),  237. 
Richards  v.  State  (36  Neb.  17 ;  53  N. 

W.  Rep.  1027),  52. 
Richards  v.  State  (82  Wis.  172;  51  N. 

W.  Rep.  652),  103,  348. 
Richards  v.  Wedemeyer  (75  Md.  10), 

11. 
Richardson  v.   Beede  (43  Me.  161), 

211. 
Richardson  v.  Eureka  (96  Cal.  443), 

232. 
Richardson  v.  Hooper  (13  Pick.  446), 

214. 
Richardson  v.  Huggins(23N.  H.  106), 

232. 
Richardson  v.  Milburn  (17  Md.  67), 

30. 
Richardson  v.  Palmer  (38  N.  H.  218), 

220. 
Richardson    v.    Stringfellow    (Ala., 

1894,  14  S.  Rep.  283),  186. 
Richardson    v.    Williams    (2    Port., 

Ala.,  239),  239. 
Richardson,  etc.  Co.  v.  Jones  (92  Ala. 

218;  9S.  Rep.  276),  138. 
Richmond    v.    Sundborg   (77    Iowa, 

258),  354. 
Richmond  v.  Thomaston  (38  Me.  232), 

56. 
Richmond,  etc.  Co.    v.   Burnett  (88 

Va.  538),  380. 
Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  Farmer  (Ala., 

12  S.  Rep.  86),  18. 
Richmond,    etc.    Co.    v.   Farquar  (8 

Blackf.,  Ind.,  89),  221. 
Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  Garner  (Ga., 

1893,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  110),  7. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cxlix 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Richmond,    etc.    Co.    v.    Hammond 

(93  Ala.  181 ;  9  S.   Rep.  577),  56. 
Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hissong(Ala., 

1893,  13  S.  Rep.  209),  145. 
Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kerler  (88  Ga. 

39),  81. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Vance  (93 

Ala.  144),  342. 
Richmond   R.   &   E.   Co.  v.   Dick  (8 

U.  S.  App.  99  ;  52  Fed.  Rep.  379), 

282. 
Rick  v.  Neitzy  (1  Mackey,  D.  C,  21), 

304. 
Ricketts   v.   Gurney   (7   Price,   699), 

287. 
Riddis  v.  James  (0  Binn.  321).  143. 
Riddle  v.  Hill  (51  Ala.  224),  238. 
Rideout   v.   Newton   (17   N.   H.  71), 

139a. 
Riderhour  v.  Kansas  City  Cable  Ry. 

Co.  (102  Mo.  270),  20,  319. 
Rid-ely  v.  Howard  (3  Har.  &  McH., 

Md.,  321),  136. 
Ridgely  v.  Johnson  (11  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

527),  108. 
Ridgway  v.  Bowman  (7  Cush.  268), 

212. 
Rifener  v.  Bowman  (53  Pa.  St.  318), 

128. 
Rigdon  v.  Conley  (31  111.  App.  630), 

126,  339. 
Rigdon  v.  Jordan  (81  Ga.  668),  252. 
Riggs  v.  Myers  (20  Mo.  239),  220. 
Riggs  v.  Powell  (142  111.  453;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  482),  139,  140. 
Riggs  v.  State  (30  Miss.  635),  9,  52. 
Riggs  v.  Tayloe  (9  Wheat.  486),  130. 
Right  v.  Price  (Doug.  241),  276. 
Riley  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  32  S.  W. 

Rep.  222).  10. 
Riley  v.  Gerrish  (9  Cush.  104),  219. 
Riley  v.  Gregg  (16  Wis.  666),  219. 
Riley  v.   Martinelli  (97  Cal.  575;  32 

Pac.  Rep.  579),  79. 
Riley  v.  Minor  (29  Mo.  439),  268. 
Riley  v.  State  (88  Ala.  93),  330,  342. 
Riley  v.   Suydam  (4  Barb.,  N.  Y., 
222),  71. 


Ping  v.  Ashworth  (3  Iowa,  452),  223. 
Ringgenburg  v.  Hartman  (102  Ind. 

537),  282. 
Ringgold  v.  Tyson  (3  Har.  &  J.  172), 

310. 
Ringold    v.    Edwards    (7    Ark.    86), 

150a. 
Riordan  v.  Guggerty  (74  Iowa,  688 ; 

39  N.  W.  Rep.  107),  141.  337,  340. 
Ripley  v.  Paige  (12  Vt.  353),  205. 
Ripon  v.  Bittel  (30  Wis.  614),  189. 
Risk  v.  State  (19  Ind.  153),  345. 
Ritchie  v.  Pease  (114  III.  353),  205. 
Ritter  v.  First   Nat.    Bank   (30   Mo. 

App.  652),  8. 
Rivard  v.  Walker  (39  111.  413),  229. 
Rivers  v.  State  (10  Tex.  App.  177), 

320. 
Rizzolo  v.  Com.  (126  Pa.  St.  54>,  90. 
Roach  v.  Bannon  (57  Miss.  490),  83. 
Robb  v.  Hackley  (23  Wend.  50),  350. 
Robb  v.  Schmidt  (35  Mo.  290).  70. 
Robbins  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac  (82 

Wis.  340),  380. 
Robbins  v.  Diggins  (78  Iowa,  521 ;  43 

N.  W.  Rep.  306),  18,  24. 
Robbins  v.  Spencer  (121    Ind.   594), 

340. 
Robbins  v.  State  (8  Ohio  St.  131),  102. 
Robbins  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  20 S.  W. 

Rep.  358),  283. 
Robb's  Case  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  442), 

332. 
Roberts'  Appeal  (26  Pa.  St.  102),  67. 
Roberts'  Case  (1  Dev.  259,  264),  90,  96. 
Roberts  v.  Boston   (149   Mass.   346), 

199. 
Roberts  v.  Burgess  (85  Ala.  192).  368. 
Roberts  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  895),  330,  354. 
Roberts  v.  Conell   (71  Tex.  11),    36, 

150. 
Roberts  v.  Davis  (72  Ga.  819),  83. 
Roberts  v.  Dixon  (50  Kan.  436),  126. 
Roberts  v.   Donovan   (70   Cal.    113), 

309. 
Roberts  v.  Kendall  (3  Ind.  App.  339), 

67. 


cl 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Roberts  v.  Johnson  (58  N.  Y.  613), 

193. 
Roberts  v.  Johnstown  Bank  (14  N. 

Y.  S.  432;  CO  Hun,  576),  370. 
Roberts  v.  McGee  (15  Barb.  449),  80. 
Roberts  v.  Medbury  (132  Mass.  100), 

69,  70,  115. 
Roberts  v.  People  (9  Colo.  474),  225. 
Roberts  v.  Preston  (100  N.  C.  243), 

115. 
Roberts  v.    Railroad  Co.  (1   Brew., 

Pa.,  538),  356. 
Roberts   v.    Roberts   (Cab,    1893,   31 

Pac.  Rep.  941),  150a. 
Roberts  v.  Roberts  (55  N.  Y.  275),  220. 
Roberts  v.  Spencer  (123  Mass.  397), 

126. 
Roberts  v.  State  (5  Tex.   App.   141), 

102. 
Roberts  v.  Trawick  (13  Ala.  68),  67. 
Roberts  v.  Wills  (8  Paige,  446),  143. 
Robertson  v.  Barbourne  (6  B.  Mon. 

527),  150. 
Robertson  v.  Brost  (83  111.  116),  71. 
Robertson  v.  Coates(l  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

664),  362. 
Robertson  v.  Craver  (Iowa,  1892,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  492),  333. 
Robertson  v.  Jones  (8  Mass.  536),  158. 
Robertson  v.  Knapp  (35  N.  Y.  91 ;  33 

How.  Pr.,  N.  Y.,  309),  188. 
Robertson  v.  Reed  (38  Mo.  App.  32), 

60. 
Robertson  v.  Robertson  (Ky.,  1893, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  543),  249. 
Robertson  v.  State  (17  S.  W.   Rep. 

1068 ;  30  Tex.  App.  496),  88. 
Robertson  v.  Van  Cleave  (129  Ind. 

217;  26  N.  E.  Rep.  899),  151. 
Robin  v.  King  (2  Leigh,  142),  168. 
Robinson  v.  Adams  (62  Me.  369),  197, 

231. 
Robinson  v.  Arnet  (15  La.  262),  133. 
Robinson  v.   Brewster  (140  111.  649), 

222. 
Robinson  v.  Brown  (82  111.  279),  244. 
Robinson    v.    Chambers    (94    Mich. 

471),  280. 


Robinson  v.  Evans  (3  S.  C.  335),  211. 
Robinson  v.  Gallier  (2  Wood,  C.  C. 

178),  233. 
Robinson  v.  Gould  (26  Iowa,  93),  229. 
Robinson  v.  Kanawba,  etc.  Co.  (8  N. 

E.  Rep.  683),  74. 
Robinson  v.  Marino  (3  Wash.  434), 

192. 
Robinson  v.  Mulder  (81  Midi.  75),  00, 

209. 
Robinson  v.  Parks  (76  Md.  118),  145. 
Robinson  v.  Reed  (46  Iowa,  220),  127. 
Robinson  v.  Robinson  (22  Iowa,  247), 

70. 
Robinson  v.  Robinson  (20  S.  C.  567), 

139a. 
Robinson  v.  State  (82  Ga.  535).  334. 
Robinson  v.  State  (1  Lea,  Tenn.,  673), 

362. 
Robinson  v.  State  (124  111.  336),  350. 
Robinson  v.  State  (84  Ga.  674),  226. 
Robinson  v.  Trull  (4  Cush.  249),  277. 
Robinson  v.  Wheeler  (25  N.  Y.  252), 

229. 
Robinson  Con.  Coal  Co.  v.  Johnson 

(22  Pac.  Rep.  459;  13  Colo.  258), 

69. 
Robinson  Consolidated  Mining  Co.  v. 

Craig  (4  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  478),  139. 
Robsen  v.  State  (83  Ga.  166;  9  S.  E. 

Rep.  610),  284. 
Robson  v.  Kemp  (4  Esp.  235),  170. 
Roch  v.  George's  Adm'r  (Ky.,  1893, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  1039),  265. 
Roche  v.  Beldam  (119  111.  320),  205. 
Roche  v.  Ware  (71  Cal.  375),  60. 
Rochelle  v.  Harrison  (8  Port.,  Ala., 

351),  71. 
Rochester,  etc.   Co.  v.   Budlong  (10 

How.  Pr.,  N.  Y.,  289),  187. 
Rockey's  Estate,  In  re  (155  Pa.  St. 

453;  26  AtJ.  Rep.  656;  32  W.  N. 

C.  434),  140. 
Rockford  v.  Hollenbeck  (34  111.  App. 

40),  20. 
Rockland  v.  Morrill  (71  Me.  455),  233. 
Rockwell  v.  Brown  (54  N.  Y.    213), 

208. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cli 


References  are  to  sections 
Finnegan    (43  Md.   490), 


Roddy  v 

Eodee  v.  Detroit  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (26 

N.  Y.  S.  242),  199. 
Rodemacher   v.   Green.   Ins.  Co.  (27 

N.  Y.  S.  155),  199. 
Roderigues  v.  Bank  (63  N.  ;Y.  460), 

233. 
Rodes  v.  Elevator  Co.  (49  Minn.  370), 

73a. 
Rodman  v.  Hoops  (1  Dall.  85),  160. 
Rodriquez  v.  State  (22  S.   W.   Rep. 

998 ;  32  Tex.   Cr.   Rep.  259),  145. 
Roe  v.  Cutter  (4  Wash.  St.  611),  18. 
Roe  v.  Davis  (7  East,  362),  30. 
Roe  v.  Day  (7  C.  &  P.  705),  80. 
Roe  v.  Ferrais  (2  B.  &  P.  548),  80. 
Roe  v.  Roe  (40  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  1),  140. 
Roe  v.  Strong  (107  N.  Y.  356),  145. 
Roebke  v.  Andrews  (26  Wis.  311),  69. 
Roehl  v.  Hanmesser  (114  Ind.  311), 

130. 
Rogers  v.  Adams  (66  Ala.  600),  136. 
Rogers  v.  Bullock  (2  Pen.,  3N.  J.  L., 

517),  286. 
Rogers  v.  Burns  (27  Pa.  St.  525),  232. 
Rogers  v.  Clements  (92  N.  C.  81),  69. 
Rogers  v.  Coal  Co.  (Ala.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  81),  53. 
Rogers  v.  Grain  (30  Tex.  284),  52. 
Rogers  v.  French  (19  Ga.  316),  215. 
Rogers  v.  Kneeland  (10  Wend.  219), 

371. 
Rogers  v.  Ritter   (12    Wall.,    U.    S., 

317),  139. 
Rogers  v.  Rogers  (87  Mo.  257),  246. 
Rogers  v.  State  (50  Ala.  102),  23. 
Rogers  v.  State  (11  Tex.   App.  608), 

139. 
Rogers  v.  State  (90  Ga.  463 ;  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  205),  23. 
Rogers  v.  Tillman  (72  Ga.  479),  142. 
Rogers  v.  Tyley  (144  111.  642;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  693),  139,  140,  141. 
Rohrer  v.  Morningstar  (18  Ohio,  579), 

310. 
Rohrig  v.  Pearson  (12  Colo.  127),  337. 
Rollins  v.  Clement  (25  S.  C.  601),  8. 


Rollins  v.  Menager  (22  W.  Va.  461), 

136. 
Rollins  v.  United  States  (23  Ct.  CI. 

106),  57. 
Romanes  v.  Frazier  (16  Grant,  U.  C, 

97),  135. 
Roman  Catholic  Archbishop  v.  Ship- 
man  (69  Cal.  586),  151. 
Romans  v.  Hay  (12  Iowa,  270),  168. 
Romer  v.  Center  (Minn.,  1893,  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  1052),  374. 
Ronkendorf  v.  Taylor  (4 Peters,  349), 

142. 
Ronnebaum  v.  Mt.  Auburn  Ry.  Co. 

(29  Wkly.  Law  Bui.  338),  67. 
Rooker  v.  Perkins  (14  Wis.  557),  226. 
Roosa  v.  Boston  Loan  Co.  (132  Mass. 

439),  52. 
Roosevelt  v.    Marks  (16  Johns.  Ch. 

266).  69. 
Roosevelt  v.  Railroad  Co.  (66  Hun, 

633),  3S«. 
Root  v.  Borst  (65  Hun,  622),  350. 
Root  v.  King  (7  Cow.,   N.   Y.,  617), 

144. 
Rose  v.  Bank  (91  Mo.  399),  139a,  140. 
Rose  v.  Chapman  (44  Mich.  312).  73. 
Rose  v.   Otis  (31   Pac.   Rep.   493;  18 

Colo.  59),  350. 
Roseboom   v.  Billington  (17  Johns. 

182),  61. 
Rosebrough  v.  Ansley  (35  Ohio  St. 

107),  84. 
Rosenberg  v.  Claflin  (Ala.,  1893,  10 

S.  Rep.  521),  357. 
Rosenfeld  v.   Case    (87  Mich.   295), 

121. 
Rosen  field  v.  Fortier  (94  Mich.  34), 

83. 
Rosenthal  v.  Bilger  (Iowa,  1893,  53 

N.  W.  Rep.  255),  335. 
Rosenthal  v.  McMann  (29  Tac.  Rep. 

121;  93  Cal.  505),  362. 
Rosenthal  v.  Walker  (111  U.  S.  185), 

230. 
Roseville  v.  Gilbert  (24  111.  App.  334), 

231. 
Ross  v.  Bedell  (5  Duer,  462),  231. 


clii 


TARLK    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Ross  v.  Bos  well  (60  Ind.  233),  237. 
Ross  v.  Bruce  (1   Day,   Conn.,  100). 

35. 
Ross  v.  Brusie  (70  Cal.  465),  60. 
Ross  v.  Buhler  (2  Mart.,  N.   S.,  La., 

312),  313. 
Ross  v.  Faust  (54  Ind.  471),  239. 
Ross  v.  Goodwin  (88  Ala.  390),  130. 
Ross  v.  Malone  (Ala.,  1892, 12  S.  Rep. 

182),  20. 
Ross  v.  McQuiston    (45   Iowa,    145), 

222. 
Ross  v.  Sagbeer  (21  Wend.  106),  208. 
Ross  v.  State  (67  Md.  286),  89. 
Rosson  v.  Stehr  (23  Tex.  App.  287), 

320. 
Roswell  v.  State  (63  Ala.  307),  231. 
Roten  v.  State  (31    Fla.    514;  12  S. 

Rep.  910),  10,  102. 
Roth  v.  State  (10  Tex.  App.  7),  23. 
Eothrock  v.  Gallaher  (91  Pa.  St.  108), 

121,  309. 
Rottenburgh  v.  Fowl  (N.  J.,  1893,  26 

Atl.  Rep.  338),  208. 
Rottman   v.   Wasson   (5   Kan.   552), 

268. 
Roughton  v.  Rawlings  (88  Ga.  819), 

262. 
Rounds  v.  Rounds  (64  Vt.  432),  52. 
Rounds  v.  State  (57  Wis.  45),  124. 
Rountree  v.  Lane  (32  S.  C.  160),  262. 
Rountree  v.  State  (88  Ga.  457),  226, 

324. 
Rousey  v.  Wood  (47  Mo.  App.  465), 

239. 
Rousseau  v.  Blen  (31  N.  Y.  177),  169. 
Rowe  v.   Brenton  (8  B.  &  C.  737;  3 

Man.  &R.  267),  117,  362. 
Rowe  v.  Canney  (139  Mass.  41),  176. 
Rowe  v.   Hasland  (1   W.  B.  L.  404), 

233. 
Rowe  v.  Ware  (30  Ga.  278),  268. 
Roweil   v.    Fuller  (59  Vt.    688),  38, 

140. 
Roweil  v.  Klein  (44  Ind.  290),  73a. 
Rowland  v.  Ashby  (Ry.  &  M.   231), 

93. 
Rowland  v.  Boozer  (10  Ala.  690),  09. 


Rowland  v.  McCowan  (20  Orog.  53S; 

20  Pac.  Rep.  853),  58. 
Rowland  v.  Rowland  (40  N.  J.  Eq. 

281),  310. 
Rowley  v.  Ball  (3  Cowen,  303),  130. 
Rowley   v.    Howard  (23    Cal.   401), 

150a. 
Rowley   v.    Merlin  (6    Jur.,    N.    S., 

1165),  129. 
Royal  Ins.  Co.  v.  Schuring  (87  Ky. 

410:  9  S.  W.  Rep.  242),  254. 
Royce  v.  Burt  (42  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  339), 

205. 
Royce  v.  Cazan  (76  Ga.  79),  139. 
Rozet  v.   Harvey  (26  111.  App.  558), 

24. 
Ruan  v.  Perry  (3  Caines,  N.  Y.,  120), 

10. 
Ruberts  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  7  S.  W.  Rep. 

401),  89. 
Ruby  v.  Van  Valkenburg  (72  Tex. 

450),  167. 
Ruch  v.  Rock  Island  (97  U.  S.  693), 

120. 
Rucker  v.  Reid  (36  Kan.  470),  363. 
Rudd  v.   Robinson  (7  N.  Y.  S.  535; 

54  Hun,  339),  60. 
Rudd  v.  Rounds  (64  Vt.  432),  56. 
Rudolph   v.    Davis  (35  Neb.  157;  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  841),  380. 
Rudy  v.  Austin  (50  Ark.  73),  304. 
Rugg  v.  Ward  (23  Atl.  Rep.  726;  64 

Vt.  402),  220. 
Rule  v.  Maupin  (84  Mo.  587),  222. 
Rulken  v.  Reid  (36  Kan.  470),  363. 
Ruloff  v.  People  (45  N.  Y.  224),  38a, 

346. 
Ruloff  v.  People  (18  N.  Y.  179),  93. 
Rumph  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893,   16  S.  E. 

Rep.  104),  139,  139a. 
Rumsey  v.  Boutwell  (01  Hun,  165), 

11. 
Rumsey  v.  N.  Y.  &  N.   J.  Tel.  Co. 

(49  N.  J.  L.  323),  60. 
Rundle  v.  Foster  (3  Tenn.  Ch.   658), 

170. 
Ranger  v.  Holtzclaw  (112  Mo.  519), 

209. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


cliii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Rank  v.  Ten  Eyck  (24  N.  J.  L.  750), 

73r/. 
Runnels  v.  State  (2S  Ark.  121),   323. 
Rupert  v.  Penner  (35   Neb.   587 ;  id. 

803;  53   N.   W.    Rep.    892),    210, 

367. 
Rusling  v.  Rusling(36  N.  J.  Eq.  726), 

51. 
Rush  v.  French  (1  Ariz.  99),  130. 
Rusa  v.  Wabash  W.  Ry.  Co.  (112  Mo. 

45),  188. 
Russell  v.  Bradley  (47  Kan.  438),  20. 
Russell  v.  Coffin     (8     Pick..     Mass., 

143),  139. 
Russell  v.  Com.  (78  Va.  600\  5. 
Russell  v.  Crittenden  (53  Conn.  564), 

188. 
Russell  v.  De  Grand   (8   R.    I.    389). 

208. 
Russell  v.  Hallett  (22  Kan.  276),  233. 
Russell  v.  Irwin  (41  Ala.  292),  219. 
Russell  v.  Jackson    (15    Jur.     1117), 

172,  174. 
Russell  v.  Jackson  (22   Wend.   276), 

238. 
Russell  v.  Kearney  (27  Ga.   96),  148. 
Russell  v.  Longmore  (29    Neb.    209, 

286),  128,  129. 
Russell  v.  Martin  (15  Tex.   23S),  257. 
Russell  v.  Nail  (79  Tex.  644 ;  15  S.  W. 

Rep.  635),  378. 
Russell  v.  Place  (94  U.  S.  608),  154. 
Russell  v.  Rider  (6  C.  &  P.  416),  337. 
Russell  v.  Russell  (64  Ala.  500),  205. 
Russell  v.  Sargent  (7   111.    A  pp.  98), 

240. 
Russell  v.  Seminary  (75  111.  337),  136. 
Russell  v.  Stanbyn  (16  Moak's  Eng. 

818),  215. 
Russell  v.  State  (11  Tex.  App.  268), 

10. 
Russell  v.  Stockton   (8    Conn.    230), 

114. 
Russell  v.  Svvitzer  (63  Ga.  711),  246. 
Ruston's  Case  (I   Leach's   Cr.    Cas. 

408),  316. 
Rutherford  v.    Morris   (77   111.    397), 

197. 


Rutherford  v.  Scliattman  (119  N.  Y. 

604),  69. 
Rutledge  v.  Hudson  (80  Ga.  266),  38. 
Ryan  v.  People  (79  N.  Y.  594),  354. 
Ryan  v.  State  (84  Wis.  368),  9. 
Ryan  v.  State  (83  Wis.  486),   88,  97, 

229,  334. 
Ryder  v.  Roberts  (48  Mo.  App.  132), 

232.  v 

Ryno  v.  Darby  (20  N.  J.  Eq.  31),  223. 

s. 

Sabariego  v.    Maverick   (124  TJ.    S. 

295),  226. 
Sabler  v.   Sheffield  S.  Co.  (87  Ala. 

305),  310. 
Sabre  v.  Smith  (62  N.  H.  663),  309. 
Sackett  v.   Spencer  (29   Barb.    180), 

337. 
Sackville  v.  Ayleartt  (1  Vern.   103), 

363. 
Saders  v.  Giddings  (90  Mich.  50),  31. 
Saenger  v.  Nightingale  (48  Fed.  Rep. 

708),  79. 
Sage  v,  Jones  (47  Ind.  122),  205. 
Sage  v.  State  (27  Ind.   15;  26  N.  E. 

Rep.  067),  124. 
Sage  v.  Suite  (91  Ind.  141),  197. 
Sager  v.  Dorr  (4  N.  Y.  S.  568),  309. 
Sahlien  v.  Bank  (90  Tenn.  221),  216. 
Sahlinger  v.  People  (102  111.  241),  229. 
St.  George  v.  St.  Margaret  (1  Salk. 

123),  234. 
St.  Louis  v.  Arndt  (94  Mo.  275 ;  7  S. 

W.  Rep.  15),  50. 
St.  Louis  v.   Miss.   P.   R.   Co.  (Mo., 

1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  202),  210. 
St.  Louis  v.  San  Francisco  R.  R.  Co. 

(35  Kan.  426),  242. 
St.   Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller  (138 

111.  465),  202. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Am.  T.  I.   Co. 

(33  Mo.  App.  348),  241. 
St.    Louis,    etc.   Co.  v.    Bradley  (54 

Fed.  Rep.  630),  198. 
St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.   Insurance  Co. 

(33  Mo.  App.  348),  237. 


cliv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


St.   Louis,   etc.   Co.  v.  Olive  (40  .111. 

A  pp.  82),  232. 
St.    Louis,    etc.    Co.   v.   Weaver  (35 

Kan.  412),  230,  242. 
St.  Louis  Gas  Co.  v.  American  F.  I. 

Co.  (33  Mo.  App.  348),  190. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Lyman 
(57  Ark.  512 ;  22  S.  W.  Rep.  170), 
187. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Spanu 
(57  Ark.  127;  20  S.  W.  Rep.  914), 
380. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Sweet 
(57  Ark.  287 ;  21  S.  W.  Rep.  587), 
350. 
St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Taylor 
(Ark.,  1893,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1083), 
249. 
Sairs  v.  Sexton  (35  111.    App.    307), 

154. 
Salado    College   v.    Davis  (47   Tex. 

131),  73a. 
Salas  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.  R.  485), 

93. 
Salazar  v.  Taylor  (18   Col.    538;  33 

Pac.  Rep.  839),  139. 
Salem  Bank  v.  Gloucester  (17  Mass. 

27),  81. 
Salina  v.  Tuspar  (27  Kan.  544),  343. 
Salladay   v.  Doclgeville  (Wis.,  1893, 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  696),  8. 
Salmon  v.  Miles  (4  U.   S.  App.  101), 

357. 
Salmon  Bank  v.  Leyser  (116  Md.  51 ; 

22  S.  W.  Rep.  504),  24. 
Salomon,  etc.  Co.  v.  Jones  (34  Kan. 

443),  74. 
Salte  v.  Thomas  (3  B.  &  P.  188),  144. 
Sammons    v.    Havvver  (25   W.    Va. 

678),  252. 
Sample  v.  Frost  (10  Iowa,  266),  169. 
Samson  v.  Overton  (4  Bibb,  409),  148. 
Sanders  v.  Bagwell  (S.  C,  1893,   16 

S.  E.  Rep.  770),  128,  339. 
Sanders  v.  Palmer  (55  Fed.  Rep.  217), 

12. 
Sanders  v.  Reister  (1  Dak.  Ter.  151), 
52. 


Sanders  v.  State  (94  Ind.  147),  190. 
Sanders  v.  Stokes  (30  Ala.  43),  7. 
Sandford  v.  Chase  (3  Cow.,   N.   Y., 

381),  286. 
Sandford  v.  Newark  (37  N.  J.  L.  1), 

222 
Sandford  v.  Oberlin  College  (31  Pac. 

Rep.  1088;  50  Kan.  342),  152. 
Sandford  Tool  Co.   v.   Mullen  (Ind., 

l8rJ0,  27  N.  E.  Rep.  448),  24. 
Sandidge  v.   Hunt  (5  S.  Rep.  55;  40 

La.  Ann.  766),  230. 
Sandifer  v.  Howard  (59  111.  246),  70. 
Sands  v.   Robison  (12  Smed.  &  M., 

Miss.,  854),   170. 
Sanford  v.  Chase  (3  Cow.,  N.  Y.,  381), 

275. 
Sanford  v.  Ellithorpe  (95  N.  Y.  48), 

309. 
Sanford  v.  Gates  (38  Kan.  405),  282. 
Sanford   v.   Peck  (Conn.,    1894,    27 

Atl.  Rep.  1057),  8. 
Sanford  v.  Rawlings  (43  111.  92),  217. 
Sanford  v.  Rowley  (93  Mich.  119),  10. 
San  Gabriel  Wine  Co.  v.  Behlow  (94 

Cal.  10S),  380. 
Sanger  v.  Flow  (48  Fed.  Rep.  152 ;  4 

U.  S.  App.  32),  249. 
Sanger  v.  Merritt(131  N.Y.  614),  262. 
Saugster  v.    Daiton   (Ark.,   1890,   12 

S.  W.  Rep.  202),  50. 
San  Joaquin  v.  Beecher  (Cal.,  1894, 

35  Pac.  Rep.  349),  205. 
Sanscraint  v.  Torongo  (87  Mich.  69), 

79,  110. 
Santa  Clara  v.  Enright  (95  Cal.  105), 

188. 
Santissima  Trinidad,  In  re  (7  Wheat. 

273,  335),  243. 
Sapp  v.  King  (66  Tex.  570),  279. 
Sargeant  v.   Marshall  (38  III.  App. 

642),  124. 
Sargeant  v.  Sargeant  (18  Vt.  371),  73. 
Sargent  v.   Hampden  (38  Me.  581), 

169. 
Sarle  v.  Arnold  (7  R.  I.  582),  188. 
Sartor    v.    Bullinger   (59  Tex.  411), 

139a. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


civ 


References  are  to  sections. 


Sartorius  v.  State  (24  Miss.  602),  330. 
Saser  v.  Bank  (4  Md.  420),  145. 
Sasser  v.  Herring  (3  Dev.,  N.  C,  340), 

115. 
Sasser  v.  Sasser  (73  Ga.  275),  246. 
Satchel  1  v.  Doram  (4  Ohio  St.  542), 

231. 
Satter white  v.  Davenport  (10  Rich., 

S.  C,  Eq.  305),  306. 
Satterwhite   v.  Rosser  (61  Tex.  166), 

225. 
Satterwhite  v.  Shirley  (25  N.  E.  Rep. 

1100),  151. 
Sauber  v.  Collins  (40  111.  App.  426), 

11. 
Sauer  v.  Union  Oil  Co.  (9  S.  Rep. 

5G6 ;  43  La.  Ann.  699),  229. 
Sauls  v.  State  (30  Tex.   App.  496 ;  17 

S.  W.  Rep.  1066),  88. 
Saunders   v.    Bridges   (67   Tex.   93), 

252. 
Saunders  v.    Hendrix  (5  Ala.   224), 

168. 
Saunders  v.   People  (38  Mich.  222), 

127. 
Saussy  v.   So.   Flor.  R.  Co.  (22  Fla. 

327),  355. 
Sauter  v.  Carroll  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 

292),  60. 
Savage  v.  Balch  (8  Greenl.  27),  73. 
Savage  v.  O'Neill  (44  N.  Y.  298),  231. 
Savage's  Case  (84  Va.  582),  240. 
Savannah,  etc.  Co.  v.  Collins  (77  Ga. 

376),  217. 
Savannah,  etc.   Co.  v.   Flanagan  (82 

Ga.  579),  121. 
Saveland  v.  Green  (40  Wis.  431),  33. 
Savings,    etc.   Co.    v.    Philips  (Ga., 

1893,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  82),  12. 
Sawyer  v.   Baldwin  (11  Pick.  494), 

142. 
Sawyer  v.   Grandy  (N.   C,  1893,  18 

S.  E.  Rep.  79),  309. 
Sawyer  v.  Harmon  (136  Mass.  414), 

150a. 
Saxton  v.  Johnson  (14  Johns.  418), 

21. 
Saxton  v.  Nirnmis  (14  Mass.  320),  142. 


Say  and  Sele,  In  re  (1  H.  L.  Cas. 

507),  234. 
Sayles  v.  Baker  (5  R.  I.  457),  215. 
Sayre  v.  Burdick  (47  Minn.  367),  208. 
Scammon  v.  Scamnion  (33  N.  H.  52), 

279. 
Scanlan  v.    Hodges   (52    Fed.    Rep. 

354),  18. 
Scattergood  v.  Wood  (79  N.  Y.  263), 

198. 
Schaben  v.  Ott  (6  Ct.  CI.  230),  146. 
Schackleford  v.  State  (33  Ark.  539), 

121. 
Schafer  v.  Schafer  (93  Ind.  586),  124. 
Schaser  v.  State  (36  Wis.  429),  9,  341. 
Schenck  v.  Warner  (37  Barb.  258), 

117. 
Schermerhorn   v.    Schermerhorn  (1 

Wend.  119),  302. 
Scheutze  v.  Baily  (40  Mo.  69),  268. 
Schill  v.  Plumb  (55  N.  Y.  592),  145. 
Schilling  v.  Territory  (2  Wash.  Ter. 

283),  239. 
Schindler  v.  Rail  Co.  (87  Mich.  400), 

28,  123. 
Schlaf  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ala.,  1893,  14 

S.  Rep.  105),  198. 
Schlemmer  v.  State  (51  N.  J.  L.  29), 

56. 
Schlencker  v.  State  (9  Neb.  241),  197. 
Schmertzell    v.    Oshkosh    (55   Wis. 

490),  143a. 
Schmidt  v.  Durnham  (Minn.,    1S92, 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  277),  347. 
Schmidt  v.  Garfield  (64  Hun,    294), 

10. 
Schmidt  v.  Keen   (10   N.  Y.  S.  267), 

74. 
Schmidt  v.  Packard   (31  N.  E.  Rep. 

944;  132  Ind.  398),  79,  117. 
Schneider  v.    Haas  (14   Oreg.  174), 

330. 
Schneider  v.  Manning  (121  111.  376; 

12  N.  E.  Rep.  267),  222. 
Schneider  v.  Patterson  (Neb.,   1894, 

57  N.  W.  Rep.  398),  220. 
Schneider  v.  Tombling  (34  Neb.  661), 

362. 


clvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Schnier  v.  People  (23  111.  17),  332. 
Schoenberger  v.  Hackman   (37  Pa. 

St.  425),  135. 
Schoerkin  v.  Swift  (19  Blatch.,  U.  SM 

209),  243. 
Scholes   v.  Hilton   (10  M.  &  W.  1G), 

284. 
Scholl  v.  Bradstreet  (Iowa,  1892,  52 

N.  W.  Rep.  500),  70. 
Schoolcraft  v.  People  (117   111.  271), 

52. 
School   Dist.    No.    1    v.    Lyford   (27 

Wis.  506),  242. 
Schooner     Mersey     (Blatchf.    Prize 

Cas.  187),  238. 
Schott  v.  Blanchard  (8  Martin,  302), 

148. 
Schott  v.  Youree  (142  111.  233;  31  N. 

E.  Rep.  591),  374. 
Schram  v.  Gentry  (63  Tex.  283),  136. 
Schramm  v.  O'Connor  (98  111.  539), 

208. 
Schreiner  v.  Order  of  Foresters  (35 

111.  App.  576),  156. 
Schroeder  v.  Frey   (114  N.  Y.  266), 

371. 
Schroeder  v.  Railway  Co.  (47  Iowa, 

375),  202,  345. 
Schroepel   v.  Syracuse  Plank  Road 

(7  How.  Pr.,  N.  Y,  94),  73a. 
Schubkagel  v.  Dierstein  (131  Pa.  St. 

53),  169. 
Schuckman  v.  Winterbottom  (9  N. 

Y.  S.  733),  60. 
Schuchardt  v.  Aliens  (1  Wall.  359),  7. 
Schuble  v.  Cunningham  (14   Daly, 

404),  199. 
Schuler  v.  Eckert  (90  Mich.  165),  380. 
Schuler  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.  (1  Misc. 

R.  351),  52. 
Schull's  Appeal  (115  Pa.  St.  141),  68. 
Schultz  v.  Lindell  (30  Mo.  310),  198. 
Sebum  an  v.  Pilcher  (36  111.  App.  43), 

376. 
Schunior  v.  Russell  (83  Tex.  83 ;  18 

S.  W.  Rep.  484),  107,  361. 
Schurreger  v.  Raymond  (105  N.  Y. 

648),  198. 


Schurtz  v.  Kerkon  (85  Cal.  277),  35, 
Schusler  v.  State  (29  Ind.  391),  6,  7. 
Schuster  v.  State   (80  Wis.    107;   49 

N.  W.  Rep.  30),  333. 
Schwab  v.  Heindel(16  Daly,  164),  79. 
Schwartz  v.  Atkin  (12  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  373),  120. 
Schwartz  v.  Wood  (21  N.  Y.  S.  1053; 

67  Huu,  638),  194,  375. 
Schwersenski  v.  Vineberg  (19  Can. 

S.  C.  R.  243),  211. 
Scobey  v.  Walker  (Ind.,  1888,  15  N. 

W.  Rep.  674),  229. 
Scotland  Co.  v.  Hill  (112  TJ.  S.  183), 

362. 
Scott  v.  Blanchard  (8  Martin,   303), 

148. 
Scott  v.  Clare  (3  Campb.  236),  38,  80. 
Scott  v.   Donovan  (153   Mass.    378), 

345. 
Scott  v.  Gallagher  (11  S.  &  R.  347), 

136. 
Scott  v.  Harris  (127  Ind.  520),  309. 
Scott  v.  Hooper  (14  Vt.  535),  316. 
Scott  v.  Iron  Co.  (Ky.,  1892,  18  S.  W. 

Rep.  1012),  232. 
Scott  v.  Lilienthal  (9  Bosw.  224),  199. 
Scott  v.  Lloyd  (12  Pet.  149),  288. 
Scott  v.  Metro.  El.  R.  Co.  (21  N.  Y.  S. 

631),  367. 
Scott  v.  People  (63  111.  508),  101,  102. 
Scott  v.  People  (141  111.  195 ;  30  N.  E. 

Rep.  329),  375. 
Scott  v.  Pinkinton  (2  B.  &  S.  11),  38. 
Scott  v.  Ratcliffe  (5  Pet.  81),  233. 
Scott  v.  Scott  (95  Mo.  300),  229. 
Scott  v.  United  States  (7  Ct.  CI.  457), 

320. 
Scott  v.  Wood  (81  Cal.  398,  400),  231, 

247. 
Scovill  v.  Baldwin  (27  Conn.  316), 

229. 
Scraggs  v.  Hill  (W.  Va.,  1893,  17  S. 

E.  Rep.  185),  221. 
Scruggs  v.  Scruggs  (46  Mo.  271),  150a. 
Scruggs  v.  State  (15  S.  W.  Rep.  1074), 

10. 
Seaman  v.  Ward  (1  Hilt.  52,  55),  231. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Searcy  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  513), 

89. 
Searight  v.  Craighead  (1  Penn.  125), 

69. 
Searles  v.  State  (6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  331), 

89,  96,  97. 
Searles  v.  Thompson  (18  Minn.  316), 

80. 
Sears  v.  Dillingham  (12  Mass.   358), 

138. 
Sears  v.  Mason's  Adrn'r  (Va.,   1890, 

10  S.  E.  Rep.  529),  301. 
Sears  v.  Starbird  (78  Cal.  225),  362. 
Searsmont  v.    Lincolnville  (83  Me. 

75),  382. 
Seattle,  etc.  Co.  v.  Gilchrist  (4  Wash. 

St.  509),  8. 
Seaver  v.  Boston,  etc.  Co.  (14  Gray, 

Mass.,  466),  198. 
Seavy  v.   Dearborn  (19  N.   H.  351), 

347. 
Second   Nat.    Bank   v.  Wenzel  (151 

Pa.  St.  142),  350. 
1     Secor  v.  Bell  (18  Johns.,  N.  Y.,  52), 

287. 
Seebrock  v.  Fedawa  (46  N.  W.  Rep. 

650 ;  30  Neb.  424),  248. 
Seekell  v.  Norman  (73  Iowa,  254;  43 

N.  W.  Rep.  190),  346. 
Seers  v.    So.    R.    Co.    (Mo.,  1891,  18 

S.  W.  Rep.  1007),  80. 
Segar  v.  Babcock  (R.  I.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  257),  220. 
Seiler  v.  Mohn  (37  W.  Va.  507),  246. 
Seiple  v.  Seiple  (25  W.  N.  C.  488),  250. 
Seldner  v.  Bank  (66  Md.  88),  69. 
Seligraan  v.  Rogers  (113  Mo.  642;  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  94),  351.  . 
Selma  v.  Perkins  (68  Ala.  145),  242. 
Selph  v.  State  (22  Fla.  537),  384. 
Selvvyn's   Case  (3    Hagg.    748),  232, 

233. 
Seminary  v.  Calhoun  (25  N.  Y.  422), 

348. 
Semple  v.  Glenn  (91  Ala.  245),  159. 
Senger  v.  Senger  (81  Va.  687),  222. 
Senn  v.  Southern  Ry.  Co.  (18  S.  W. 

Rep.  1007;  108  Mo.  142),  188. 


Sessions  v.  Gilbert  (1  Vt.  75),  211. 
Setchers  v.  Keigwin  (57  Conn.  573), 

60. 
Settle  v.  Alison  (8  Ga.  201),  105. 
Seven  Bishops'  Case  (12  How.  St.  Tr. 

183,  306),  140. 
Severson  v.  Severson  (68  Iowa,  657), 

222. 
Sewell  v.  Mead   (Iowa,   1892,   52   N. 

W.  Rep.  227),  250. 
Sewell  v.  Price  (32  Ala.  97),  223. 
Sewell  v.  Robbins   (139    Mass.    164), 

363. 
Sexton  v.  Windell   (23   Gratt.    534), 

217. 
Seymour  v.  Baily  (76  Ga.   338),  249, 

252. 
Seymour  v.  Matteson  (42  How.  Pr., 

N.  Y.,  496),  73. 
Shaack  v.  Meily  (136  Pa.  St.  161 ;  26 

W.  N.  C.  569),  309. 
Shafer  v.   Stonebraker   (4  G.    &  J. 

345),  160. 
Shaffer  v.  Hahn  (111  N.  C.  1),  134. 
Shafter  v.  Evans  (53  Cal.  32),  12. 
Shahan  v.  Swan  (Ohio,    1892,  26  N. 

E.  Rep.  222),  376. 
Shailer  v.  Corbett  (61  Hun,  626),  384. 
Shall  v.  Miller  (5  Whart,  Pa.,  156), 

313. 
Shamburg  v.  Commagere  (5  Martin, 

La.,  9),  310. 
Sbaply  v.  Abbott  (42  N.  Y.  443),  84. 
Shapt  v.  Wyckoff  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  376), 

214. 
Sharey  v.  Hursey  (32  Me.  579),  348. 
Sharon  v.  Morrisr(39  Kan.  377),  199. 
Sharon  v.  Sharon  (79  Cal.  633),  170, 

376. 
Sharp  v.  Blankenship  (79  Cal.  411), 

115. 
Sharp  v.  Hamilton  (12  N.  J.  L.  109), 

136. 
Sharp  v.  Johnson  (22   Ark.  75),  231. 
Sharp  v.  Kansas,  etc.  Co.  (Mo.,  1892, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  93),  197. 
Sharp  v.  Knox  (48    Mo.    App.    109), 

231. 


clviii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Sharp  v.  Sharp  et  al.  (2  Leigh,  Va., 

249),  139. 
Sharp  v.  State  (51  Ark.  147),  354. 
Shaver  v.  Ehle  (16  Johns.,    N.   Y., 

201),  133. 
Shaw  v.  Barnhart  (17  Ind.  183),  249. 
Shaw  v.  County   Court  (30   W.  Va. 

488 ;  4  S.  E.  Rep.  430),  373. 
Shaw  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  588),  93. 
Shea  v.  Manky  Co.   (8  N.  Y.  S.  333), 

147. 
Sheahan   v.  National   S.   S.  Co.  (66 

Hun,  48),  374. 
Shear  v.  Van  Dyke  (10  Hun,    528), 

335. 
Shearer  v.  Middleton  (88  Mich.  621), 

24. 
Shedden   v.    Patrick  (2  Sw.   &  Tr. 

170),  52. 
Sheehan  v.   Bradford,    etc.    Co.    (15 

Civ.  Pro.  Rep.  429),  285. 
Sheehan  v.  Loler  (36  Mo.  App.  224), 

82. 
Sheehy   v.    Mandeville    (7    Cranch, 

208),  20. 
Sheetz  v.  Sweeney  (136  111.  336),  220. 
Sheffield  v.  Clark  (73  Ga.  92),  232. 
Sheldon  v.  Benham  (4  Hill,  N.  Y., 

129),  218. 
Sheldon  v.  Berry  (39  Tex.  App.  154), 

362. 
Sheldon  v.  Booth  (50  Iowa,  209),  198. 
Sheldon  v.  Ferris  (45  Barb.,  N.  Y, 

124),  233. 
Sheldon  v.  Rivett  (110  N.  C.  408),  357. 
Sheldon  v.  Sheldon  (58  Hun,  601), 

170. 
Sheldon  v.  Warner  (45  Mich.  638), 

141,  195. 
Sheldon,  In  re  (18  N.  Y.  S.  15),  189. 
Shelton  v.  Barbour  (2  Wash.  64),  122. 
Shelton  v.  Dearing  (10  B.  Mon.  405), 

128. 
Shenandoah  V.  R.  v.  Griffith  (76  Va. 

912),  24. 
Shepard  v.  Newhall  (54  Fed.  Rep. 
306),  24. 


Shepard  v.  Rinks  (78  111.  188),  262. 
Shepard  v.  Stockham  (45  Kan.  244), 

153. 
Shepard,  In  re  (18  Blatcli.  266),  288. 
Shephard   v.    Railway  Co.   (85   Mo. 

629),  202. 
Shepherd  v.  State  (31  Neb.  389),  334. 
Shepley  v.  Waterhouse  (22  Me.  497), 

69. 
Shepp  v.  State  (31  Tex.   Crim.  Rep. 

349),  80. 
Sheppard  v.  Yocum  (10  Oreg.  410), 

347. 
Sherer  v.  Ingerman  (110  Ind.  442), 

308. 
Sheridan's  Case  (31    How.    St.    Tr. 

672),  36. 
Sherman  v.  Atkins  (4  Pick.  283),  58. 
Sherman  v.  Buick  (93  U.  S.  209),  208. 
Sherman  v.  Crosby  (,11  Johns.  70),  58. 
Sherman  v.  Gundlach(37  Minn.  118,, 

2S5. 
Sherman    v.  Kortright    (52    Barb., 

N.  Y.,  267),  8. 
Sherman  v.  Lanier  (39  N.  J.  Eq.  253), 

309. 
Sherman,  In  re  (24  N.  Y.  S.  283),  380. 
Sherwood  v.  Baker  (105  Mo.  472;  16 

S.  W.  Rep.  938),  150. 
Sherwood  v.  Burr  (4  Day,  244),  226. 
Sherwood   v.    Chicago,  etc.    Co.  (88 

Mich.  108),  11. 
Sherwood  v.   Merritt  (83  Wis.  233), 

128. 
Sherwood  v.  Titman  (55  Pa.  St.  77), 

374. 
Shewalter  v.   Williamson  (125  Ind. 

373),  376. 
Shield  v.  Smith  (104  N.  C.  57;  10  S. 

E.  Rep.  76),  310. 
Shields  v.  Smith  (37  Ark.  47),  83. 
Shifflet  v.  Morell  (4  S.  W.  Rep.  483 ; 

68  Tex.  382),  186. 
Shiner  v.  Abbie  (77  Tex.  1),  79. 
Shinn  v.  Hicks  (68  Tex.  277),  106. 
Shipley  v.  Fox  (69  Md.  572),  11. 
Shirley  v.    Dewey    (17    Ohio,    156), 
130.      • 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Sholly  v.  Dillar  (3  Rawle,  Pa.,  147), 

343. 
Shoms  v.  Ziegler  (10  Phila.,  Pa.,  315), 

343. 
Short  v.  Kinzie  (80  Ind.  500),  140. 
Short  v.  Lee  (2  Jac.  &  W.  477),  117. 
Short  v.  N.   Pac.  EI.  Co.  (45  N.  W. 

Rep.  706;  1  N.  D.  150),  757. 
Short  v.  State  (63  Ind.  376),  345. 
Shotwell  v.  Harrison  (22  Mich.  410), 

134. 
Shotwell  v.  Humblen  (25  Miss.  156), 

150a. 
Shotwell  v.    McElhenny    (101    Mo. 

677),  373. 
Shotwell  v.  Struble  (21  N.  J.  Eq.  31), 

305. 
Shotwell,  In  re  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  444), 

269. 
Show  v.  Barr  (29  Iowa,  296),  148. 
Showalter  v.  Bergman  (23  N.  E.  Rep. 

686),  10. 
Showman  v.  Lee  (80  Mich.  556),  7. 
Shradski  v.  Albright  (93  Mo.  42),  223. 
Shrewsbury  Peerage  Case  (7  H.  L.  C. 

26),  53. 
Shrimpton  v.  Philbrick  (Minn.,  1893, 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  551),  367. 
Shroeder  v.  Webster  (Iowa,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  569),  129,  367. 
Shroyer  v.  Miller  (3  W.  Va.  158),  10. 
Shulse  v.  McWilliams  (104  Ind.  512), 

249. 
Shultz  v.    Andrews   (54   How.  Pr. , 

N.  Y.,  380),  287. 
Shultz  v.  Moore  (1   McLean,  U.  S., 

520),  136. 
Shultz  v.  State  (5  Tex.  App.  390), 

335. 
Shutesbury    v.    Hadley  (133    Mass. 

242),  142. 
Siberry  v.  State  (133  Ind.  677;  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  681),  39,  201. 
Sibley  v.  Waffle  (16  N.  Y.  180),  169. 
Sibley  v.  Young  (26  S.  C.  415),  69. 
Sicard  v.  Peters  (6  Pet.  136),  134. 
Sickles  v.  Look  (93  Cal.  600),  232. 
Sidwell  v.  Birney  (69  Mo.  144),  135. 


Siebert  v.  People  (143  111.  571 ;  32  N. 

E.  Rep.  431),  6,  39,  195,  381. 
Silberman  v.  Clark   (96   N.  Y.  522), 

218. 
Silberstein  v.  Houston,  W.,  St.  &  P. 

F.  R.   Co.  (4  N.  Y.   S.  843;   52 
Hun,  611),  368. 

Sill  v.  Reese  (47  Cal.  294),  139. 
Sillar  v.  Brown  (9  C.  &  P.  601),  188. 
Silver  Lake  v.  Harding  (5  Ohio,  545), 

148. 
Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Willis  (127  U.  S. 

480),  23. 
Silvers  v.  Potter  (48  N.  J.  Eq.  539),  208. 
Silvey  v.  Hodgdon  (52  Cal.  3G3),  265. 
Simcox,  Iii  re  (11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  445), 

253. 
Simfield  v.   Barlows  (33  Neb.  785), 

150a. 
Simis  v.   Davidson  (54  N.  Y.  Super. 

Ct.  235),  82. 
Simis  v.  Railway  Co.  (20  N.  Y.  S.  179), 

216. 
Simmons  v.  Haas  (56  Md.  153),  80. 
Simmons  v.  Havens  (101  N.  Y.  427), 

341. 
Simmons  v.  Johnson  (14  Wis.   526), 

210. 
Simmons  v.    Partridge    (154   Mass. 

500),  79. 
Simmons  v.  Spratt  (26  Fla.  449),  382. 
Simmons  v.  Spratt  (20  Fla.  495),  124, 

142. 
Simmons  v.   State  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S. 

Rep.  896),  354. 
Simmons  v.  Trumbo  (9  W.  Va.  358), 

238,  242. 
Simms  v.  State  (22  S.  W.  Rep.  876 ; 

32  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  277),  24. 
Simms  v.  Todd  (72  Mo.  288),  244. 
Simon  v.  Ash  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  202; 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  719),  126. 
Simons  v.  Cooks  (29  Iowa,  324),  14S. 
Simonsen  v.   Dolan  (Mo.,  1893,  21  S. 

W.  Rep.  510),  129. 
Simpson  v.  Dix  (131  Mass.  179),  221. 
Simpson  v.    Montgomery   (25  Ark. 

365),  136. 


clx 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Simpson  v.  Pearson  (31  Ind.  1),  82. 
Simpson  v.  Pegram  (112  N.  C.  541; 

17  S.  E.  Rep.  430),  11. 
Simpson  v.  State  (78  Ga.  91),  3546. 
Sims  v.  Kitchen  (5  Esp.  46),  279. 
Sims  v.  Sims  (75  N.  Y.  466),  321. 
Sinclair  v.  Stevenson  (1  C.  &  P.  582), 

126. 
Sing  Chung  Co.  v.  Young  Wing  (59 

Conn.  535),  360. 
Singer  Mfg.   Co.  v.  Rook  (84  Pa.  St. 

442),  157. 
Singleton  v.  O'Blenis  (125  Ind.  151), 

18. 
Singleton  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  (66 

Mo.  63),  217. 
Sinsheimer  v.  Skinner  (43  111.  App. 

608),  360. 
Sioux  City,  etc.  R.  Co.   v.  Stout  (17 

Wall.  663),  11. 
Sisk  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  432),  336. 
Sisson  v.  Baltimore  (51  Md.  83),  77. 
Sisson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (14  Mich.  497), 

175. 
Sisson  v.   Yost  (58  Hun,  609;  12  N. 

Y.  S.  373),  354. 
Sistare  v.  Hecksler  (63  Hun,  634),  56. 
Sistare  v.  Olcott  (15  N.  Y.  State  Rep. 

248),  199. 
Sivav.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.,  1893, 

21  S.  W.  Rep.  915),  270. 
Sivers  v.  Sivers  (97  Cal.  518;  32  Pac. 

Rep.  571),  152,  209. 
Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.  v.  Metropolitan  R. 

Co.  (34  N.  E.  Rep.  400 ;  138  N.  Y. 

548),  199. 
Sixth   Ave.    R.  Co.  v.  Railroad  Co. 

(138  N.  Y.  548),  381. 
Skaggs  v.  State  (108  Ind.  53),  316,  332. 
Skates  v.  State  (64  Miss.  644),  283. 
Skattowe  v.   Railway  Co.  (22  Oreg. 

430),  8. 
Skeen  v.  Springfield  Eng.  &  T.  Co. 

(42  Mo.  App.  158),  145. 
Skellie  v.  James  (81  Ga.  419),  170. 
Skinner  v.  Brigham  (126  Mass.  132), 

138. 
Skinner  v.  Fulton  (39  111.  484),  136. 


Skinner  v.   Harrison  (116  Ind.  139), 

222 
Slack  v.  Mass  (Dud.,  Ga.,  161),  310. 
Slade  v.  State  (29  Tex.  App.  381),  249. 
Slamper  v.  Gray  (Wyo.,  1890,  23  Pac. 

Rep.  09),  147. 
Slaney  v.  Wade  (1  M.  &  C.  338),  113. 
Slater  v.  Lawson  (B.  &  Ad.  369),  67. 
Slatterie  v.  Pooley  (6  M.  &  W.  664), 

38. 
Slaughter  v.  Barnes  (3  A.  K.  Marsh. 

412),  244. 
Slaymaker  v.  Gundacker  (10  S.  &R., 

Pa.,  75),  67. 
Slaymaker  v.  Wilson  (1  P.  &  W.,  Pa., 

216),  139. 
Sleeper    v.     Van    Middles  worth    (4 

Denio,  431),  349. 
Slessinger  v.   Buckingham  (17  Fed. 

Rep.  454),  304. 
Sleven  v.  Wallace  (64  Hun,  288),  262. 
Slingerland  v.  Slingerland  (46  Minn. 

100),  124. 
Slingman  v.  Fiedler  (3  Mo.  App.  577), 

237. 
Sloan  v.  Torry  (78  Mo.  623),  242. 
Slocum  v.  Prov.  St.  etc.  Co.  (10  R.  I. 

112),  232. 
Sluby  v.  Chaplin  (4  Johns.  461),  138. 
Slusser  v.  Burlington  (47  Iowa,  300), 

121. 
Small  v.  Williams  (87  Ga.  68),  56. 
Smalley  v.  Appleton  (70  Wis.  349; 

25  N.  W.  Rep.  729),  194. 
Smalley  v.  Fullerton  (Iowa,  1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  520),  370. 
Smathers  v.  State  (46  Ind.  447),  229. 
Smead  v.   Williamson  (16  B.  Mon., 

Ky.,  492),  66. 
Smethurst  v.  Propes  (148  Mass.  261), 

362. 
Smith  v.   Arnold  (5  Mason,    U.  S., 

414),  268. 
Smith  v.  Arthur  (110  N.  C.  400),  262. 
Smith  v.   Bennett  (1   Jones,  N.  C, 

372),  226. 
Smith  v.  Blakey  (36  L.  J.  Q.  B.  95),  58. 
Smith  v.  Bragg  (1  John.  Cas.  238),  148. 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


clxi 


References  are  to  sections. 


Smith  v.  Brien  (6  N.  Y.  S.  174),  168. 
Smith  v.  Brown  (151  Mass.  339),  30, 

126. 
Smith  v.  Burnham  (3  Sumn.  435, 438, 

439),  81,  267. 
Smith  v.  Castles  (1  Gray,  108),  354. 
Smith  v.  Caswell  (67  Tex.  567 ;  4  S. 

W.  Rep.  848),  139,  140. 
Smith  v.    Christopher  (16  Abb.  Pr., 

N.  Y.),  332. 
Smith  v.  Coleman  (77  Wis.  343),  209. 
Smith  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892,   17  S.  W. 

Rep.  68),  283. 
Smith  v.  Crego  (7  N.  Y.  S.  86),  171. 
Smith  v.  Crooker  (5  Mass.  538),  128. 
Smith  v.  Davidson  (41  Fed.  Rep.  172), 

76. 
Smith  v.  Dittman  (16  Daly,  427),  52. 
Smith  v.  Dunbar  (8  Pick.  246),  128. 
Smith  v.  Earl  Brownlow  (L.  R.  9  Eq. 

241),  116. 
Smith  v.  Elmer  (47  Wis.  479),  140. 
Smith  v.  Engle  (44  Iowa,  265),  232. 
Smith  v.  Gugerty  (4  Barb.  619),  198. 
Smith  v.  Holcomb    (99    Mass.    553), 

343. 
Smith  v.  Holland  (61  N.  Y.  635),  211. 
Smith  v.  Hutchinson  (61  Mo.  83),  84. 
Smith  v.  Ingraham  (7  Cow.  419),  277. 
Smith  v.  Insurance  Co.   (89  Pa.  St. 

287),  218. 
Smith   v.   Janesville   (52  Wis.   680), 

242. 
Smith  v.  Jones  (76  Me.  138),  286,  287. 
Smith  v.  Jones  (6  Rand.  32),  138. 
Smith  v.  Kipp  (49  Minn.  119),  380. 
Smith  v.  Lindsay  (89  Mo.  76),  130. 
Smith  v.  McGuire  (67  Ala.  34),  136, 

157. 
Smith  v.  Milliken  (2  Minn.  319),  74. 
Smith  v.  Mott  (65  Hun,  625),  370. 
Smith  v.  Natchez   S.    Co.   (1  How., 

Miss.,  479),  124. 
Smith  v.  Navasota  (72  Tex.  422),  145. 
Smith  v.  Pelott  (68  Hun,  632),  76. 
Smith  v.  Perry  (29  N.  J.  L.  74),  268. 
Smith  v.  Pierce  (65  Vt.  200;  25  Atl. 

Rep.  1092),  309. 


Smith  v.  Powers  (15  N.  H.  546),  115. 
Smith  v.  Prescott  (17  Me.  277),  133. 
Smith  v.  Putnam  (62  N.  H.  369),  226. 
Smith  v.  Railroad  Co.  (76  Tex.  63), 

198. 
Smith  v.   Railroad   Co.   (25  Am.   & 

Eng.  R.  R.  Cas.  546),  8. 
Smith  v.  Rankin  (20  111.  14),  107. 
Smith  v.  Rentz  (131  Pa.  St.  169),  60. 
Smith  v.  Rummels    (94  Mich.    617), 

357. 
Smith  v.  Sainsbury  (5  C.  &  B.  196 ; 

24  E.  C.  L.),  139. 
Smith  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co. 

(2  Tenn.  Ch.  599),  306. 
Smith  v.  Sanford  (12  Pick.  139),  60. 
Smith  v.  Shackelford  (9  Dana,  452), 

115. 
Smith  v.  Smith  (52  N.  J.  L.  207),  35. 
Smith  v.  Smith  (15  N.  H.  55),  230. 
Smith  v.  Smith  (4  Paige,  432),  231. 
Smith  v.  Speed  (50  Ala.  276),  238. 
Smith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  831),  10. 
Smith  v.  State  (53  Ala.  407),  69. 
Smith  v.  State    (11   Pac.    Rep.    908), 

379. 
Smith  v.   State  (29  Fla.   108;  10  S. 

Rep.  894),  8. 
Smith  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.  277), 

341. 
Smith  v.  State  (88  Ala.  73),  349. 
Smith  v.  State  (4  Lea,   Tenn.,  428), 

330. 
Smith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  554),  350. 
Smith  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  309), 

324. 
Smith  v.  State  (42  Tex.  444),  344. 
Smith  v.  State  (15  S.  E.  Rep.  675 ;  88 

Ga.  627),  89. 
Smith  v.  State  (2  Ohio-  St.  513),  201. 
Smith  v.  Stickney  (17  Barb.,  N.  Y, 

489),  350. 
Smith  v.  Surman  (9  B.  &  C.   561), 

253. 
Smith  v.  Swan  (22  S.  W.   Rep.   247, 

Tex.,  1893),  106. 


clxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Smith  v.  Tebbitt  (L.  R.    1  P.    &  M. 

354),  53. 
Smith  v.  The  Serapis  (49  Fed.  Rep. 

393),  362. 
Smith  v.  Traders'  Bank  (82  Tex.  368), 

33. 
Smith  v.  Turley  (32  W.  Ya.  14),  168. 
Smith  v.  Utisch  (Iowa,  1892,  52  N. 

W.  Rep.  343),  348. 
Smith  v.  Walton  (8   Gill,    Md.,   77), 

139,  139a. 
Smith  v.  Weed  (20  Wend.  184),  128. 
Smith  v.  Whittier  (95  Cal.    279),  75. 
Smith  v.  Williams  (15    S.  E.    Rep. 

130;  89  Ga.  9),  80. 
Smith  v.  Williams  (38  Miss.  48),  138. 
Smith  v.  Wilson  (1    Tex.  Civ.  App. 

86),  79. 
Smith  v.  Wood  (Ind.,  1893,  32  N.  E. 

Rep.  921),  209. 
Smith  v.  Young  (1   Campb.  439),  35. 
Smith  v.  Zeigler  (63  Hun,  624),  368. 
Smith,  In  re  (61  Hun,  101),  170,  171. 
Smith  &  Keating  Implement  Co.  v. 

Wheeler  (27  Mo.  App.  16),  373. 
Smythev.  Caswell  (67  Tex.  567),  139a. 
Snell  v.  State  (29  Tex.  App.  296;  15 

S.  W.  Rep.  722),  101,  103. 
Snelling,  In  re  (136  N.  Y.  515),  188, 

380. 
Snider  v.  Burke  (84  Ala.  53),  276. 
Snodgrass  v.   Com.  (89  Ya.   679;  17 

S.  E.  Rep.  238),  342,  347. 
Snohll  v.  Met.  R.  Co.  (19  D.  C.  399),  71. 
Snow  v.  Allen  (151  Mass.  51),  212. 
Snow  v.  Railroad  (6  Me.  230),  344. 
Snow  v.  Starr  (12  S.  W.  Rep.  673 ;  75 

Tex.  411),  66. 
Snowball  v.  Goodricke  (4  B.  &  Ad. 

541),  73. 
Snyder  v.  Berkes  (Ala.,  4  S.  W.  Rep. 

225),  140. 
Snyder  v.  Brown  (4  Watts,  132),  142. 
Snyder  v.  Free  (114  Mo.  360;  21  S. 

W.  Rep.  847),  51. 
Snyder  v.  Harper  (24  W.  Va.  206),  24. 
Snyder  v.  McKeever  (10  Bradw.,  111., 
188),  139. 


Snyder  v.  Nations  (6    Blackf.  295), 

316. 
Snyder  v.  State  (59  Ind.  109),  93. 
Snyder  v.  Wolford  (38  Minn.   175), 

267. 
Soaps  v.  Eichberg  (42  111.  App.  375), 

21,  76,  127. 
Society  v.  Young  (2  N.  H.  310),  218. 
Soher,  In  re  (78  Cal.  477),  210. 
Solomons  v.  Hughes  (24  Kan.  281), 

143a,  242. 
Solyer  v.  Romanet  (52  Tex.  562),  136. 
Somers  v.  Wright  (114  Mass.  171),  60. 
Somerville  v.  Winbush  (7  Gratt. ,  Va., 

205),  242. 
Sommer  v.  Smith  (90  Cal.  260;   27 

Pac.  Rep.  208),  18. 
Souder  v.  Schechterly  (90  Pa.  St.  83), 

70. 
South  v.  State  (86  Ala.  617),  306. 
Southard  v.  Rexford  (6  Cowen,  254), 

354. 
Southard  v.  Sutton  (68  Me.  575),  84. 
South   Baltimore   Co.   v.   Muhlback 

(69  Md.  395),  310. 
South  Bend  Iron  Works  v.  Cottrell 

(31  Fed.  Rep.  256),  217. 
Southerland  v.  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.  (106 

N.  C.  100),  57. 
South,  etc.   Co.  v.  Jeffries  (40  Mo. 

App.  360),  237. 
South,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wood  (74  Ala.  449), 

237. 
Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Thornton  (41 

Miss.  216),  139. 
Southern  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wolverton  Hd. 

Co.  (Tex.,  1892,  19  S.  W.  Rep. 

615),  159. 
Southern  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.   Rauh  (49 

Fed.  Rep.  696;  1   C.  C.  A.   416), 

7,  374. 
Southwick  v.  Southwick  (2  Sweeny, 

234),  168. 
Sowry  v.  Buffington  (6  W.  Va.  249), 

253. 
Spahn  v.  People  (117  111.  538),  281. 
Spalding  v.  Saltill   (Colo.,    1893,    31 

Pac.  Rep.  486),  343. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxiii 


^References  are  to  sections. 


Spalding  v.   Saxton  (G  Watts,  Pa., 

338),  320. 
Spangenberg  v.  Charles  (44  111.  App. 

526),  362. 
Spangler  v.  Jacoby  (14  111.  299),  144. 
Sparks  v.  Com.  (89  Ky.  644),  306. 
Sparks  v.  Sparks  (51   Kan.   195 ;   32 

Pac.  Rep.  892),  171,  250. 
Sparks  v.  Texas  Loan  Agency  (19  S. 

W.  Rep.  256),  83. 
Sparrenberger  v.  State  (53  Ala.  481), 

176. 
Spaulding  v.  Bliss   (83   Mich.    311), 

193. 
Spanlding  v.  Vincent  (24  Vt.   501), 

143. 
Speake  v.  United  States  (9  Cranch, 

28),  128. 
Spear  v.  Coate  (3  McCord,  S.  C,  227), 

115. 
Spear  v.  Richardson  (37  N.   H.   26), 

333. 
Spears  v.  Burton  (31  Miss.  547),  233, 

234. 
Spears  v.  Forrest  (15  Vt.  435),  349. 
Spears  v.  Ohio  (20  Ohio  St.  583),  89. 
Speiden  v.  State  (3  Tex.  App.    156), 

127. 
Speight  v.  State  (80  Ga.  512),  351. 
Spellier,  etc.   Co.  v.    Geiger  (23  Atl. 

Rep.  547 ;  147  Pa.  St.    399),   242. 
Spencely,  In  re  (1892,  Prob.  142),  233. 
Spencer  v.  Bill  (109  N.  C.  39),  356. 
Spencer  v.  Carr  (45  N.  Y.   410),   229. 
Spencer  v.  Dougherty  (23  III.   App. 

399),  351. 
Spencer  v.  Fortescue  (16  N.  E.  Rep. 

898),  76. 
Spencer  v.  Fuller  (68  Ga.   73),  150a. 
Spencer  v.  Langdon  (21  111.  192),  148. 
Spencer  v.  Newton  (6  Ad.  &  E.  623), 

287. 
Spencer  v.   Robbins  (106  Ind.   580), 

309. 
Spencer  v.  State  (31  Tex.  64),  97. 
Spencer,  In  re  (96  Cal.  448),  222. 
Sperb  v.  Railroad  Co.  (57  Hun,  588), 

371. 


Sperry  v.  Willard  (1  Wend.,  N.  Y., 

32),  287. 
Spicer  v.  State  (69  Ala.  159),  202. 
Spiegel  v.  Hays  (118  N.  Y.  660),  322. 
Spies  v.  People  (122  111.  1 ;  3  Am.  St. 

Rep.  320 ;  9  Cr.  L.  Mag.  829),  10, 

69,  70,  381. 
Spies  v.  Price  (91  Ala.  166),  246. 
Spiller  v.  Scribner  (36  Vt.  247),  210, 

220. 
Spitz's  Appeal  (56  Conn.  184 ;  14  Atl. 

Rep.  776),  167,  168. 
Spofford  v.  Spofford  (10  H.  H.  254), 

77. 
Spohn  v.  Mo.  R.  R.  Co.  (116  Mo.  617; 

22  S.  W.  Rep.  690),  350. 
Spragins  v.  White  (108  N.  C.  449),  206. 
Spraguev.  Bond  (113  N.  C.  551;  18 

S.  E.  Rep.  701),  79,  310. 
Sprague  v.  Luther  (8  R.  I.  252),  276. 
Sprigg  v.  Moale  (28  Md.  497),  233.    ' 
Springer  v.  Bien  (!0  N.  Y.  S.  530;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  1076).  153. 
Springer  v.  Chicago  (37  111.  App.  206; 

135  111.  532),  344. 
Springer  v.  Hall  (83  Mo.  93),  140. 
Springfield  v.  Dalboy  (139  111.  34;  29 

N.  E.  Rep.  860),  341,  344. 
Springfield  v.  Vivian  (03  Mich.  681), 

216. 
Springfield  R.  Co.  v.  Rhea  (44  Ark. 

258),  253. 
Springs  v.  Schenck  (106  N.  C.  153), 

60,  142. 
Springsteen  v.  Sampson   (32   N.  Y. 

703),  371. 
Spring  Valley,  etc.  Co.  v.  Drinkhouse 

(92  Cal.  528),  253. 
Spurrier  v.  Front  St.  Ry.  Co.  (3  Wash. 

St.  659),  250. 
Stackpole  v.   Arnold  (11  Mass.   31), 

205,  208. 
Stafford  v.  Morning  Journal  (68  Hun, 

467),  7. 
Stafford  v.  Rice  (5  Cowen,  23),  310. 
Stafford  v.  State  (55  Ga.  592),  89. 
Stallings  v.  Gottschalk  (Md.,  1893,  26 

Atl.  Rep.  524),  58,  214. 


clxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Stall ings  v.   Hallum  (79  Tex.   421), 

58. 
Stallinga  v.  Whitaker  (55  Ark.  494), 

129. 
Stamford  v.  Hornitz  (49  Ind.  525), 

309. 
Standard   Oil  Co.   v.   Tierney  (Ky., 

1892,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1025),  8. 
Stanfell  v.  Lesvellyn  (Ky.,  1893,  22 

S.  W.  Rep.  645),  380. 
Stanley   v.    Montgomery   (102    Ind. 

102),  11,  168. 
Stanley  v.   McElrath  (86  Cal.  449), 

244. 
Stanley  v.  Stanley  (112  Ind.  143;  13 

N.  E.  Rep.  261),  168. 
Stanton  v.  Ellis  (16  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  319). 

356. 
Stanton  v.  Hodges  (6  Vt.  64),  150a. 
Staples  v.  State  (14  S.  W.  Rep.  603; 

S9  Tenn.  231),  346. 
Stapleton  v.  Crofts  (18  Ad.  &  E.  367, 

369),  166. 
Stapleton  v.  King  (33  Iowa,  28),  211. 
Stapylton  v.  Clough  (2  El.  &  Bl.  933), 

58. 
Star  Brick  Co.  v.  Redsdale  (36  N.  J. 

L.  220),  242. 
Stark  v.  Canaday  (3  Litt.  399),  215. 
Starkey  v.  People  (17  111.  21),  102. 
Staser  v.  Hogan  (21  N.  E.  Rep.  911), 

309. 
State  v.  Abbott  (8  W.  Va.  741),  102. 
State  v.  Adams   (40  La.   Ann.   213), 

166. 
State  v.  Adams  (20  Kan.  311),  344. 
State  v.  Adamson    (43    Minn.    196), 

322,  354. 
State  v.  Ah  Clung  (14  Nev.  79),  39, 

345. 
State  v.  Ah   Lee  (8  Oreg.  214),  100, 

344. 
State  v.  Aldrich  (50  Kan.  666),  101. 
State  v.  Alexander  (30  S.  C.  74),  231. 
State  v.  Alexander  (66  Mo.  148),  234. 
State  v.  Alexis  (La.,  1893,  13  S.  Rep. 

394),  354. 
State  v.  Alien  (107  N.  C.  105),  354a. 


State  v.  Allen  (57  Iowa,  451),  324. 
State  v.  Aired   (115   Mo.   471;  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  363),  283. 
State  v.  Ames  (64  Me.  386),  281. 
State  v.  Anderson  (10  Oreg.  448),  5. 
State  v.  Anderson  (86  Mo.  309),  6. 
State  v.  Anderson  (8  S.  Rep.  1,  Fla., 

1890),  152. 
State  v.  Appleby  (25  S.  C.  500),  77. 
State  v.  Ariel  (S.  C,  1893,  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  779),  237. 
State  v.  Armstrong  (106  Mo.  395 ;  16 

S.  W.  Rep.  604),  11. 
State  v.  Armstrong    (4    Minn.    335), 

166. 
State  v.  Arnold  (13  Ired.,  N.  C,  184), 

345. 
State  v.  Avery  (113   Mo.  475;  21  S. 

W.  Rep.  193),  4,  340. 
State  v.  Baber  (74  Mo.  292),  197. 
State  v.  Babtiste  (26  La.  Ann.  134), 

320. 
State  v.  Bailey  (16  Ind.  46),  242. 
State  v.  Baker  (33  W.  Va.  379),  39. 
State  v.  Baker  (Oreg.,  1893,  32  Pac. 

Rep.  161),  343. 
State  v.  Baldwin  (36  Kan.  17,  18),  9, 

188,  337,  340,  350. 
State  v.  Baldwin    (45    N.    W.    Rep. 

297),  102. 
State  v.  Bailer   (26  W.  Va.  90),  281. 
State  v.  Bank  (10  Mo.  App.  482),  71. 
State  v.  Banks  (40  La.    Ann.    736), 

324. 
State  v.  Bannister  (35  S.  C.  290;  14 

S.  E.  Rep.  678),  101. 
State  v.  Barber  (36  U.  S.  313),  241. 
State  v.  Barrows  (76  Me.  401),  306, 

323. 
State  v.  Bartlett  (47  Ind.  396),  146. 
State  v.  Bartlett  (55  Me.  200),  354a. 
State  v.  Bassett  (34  La.  Ann.  1108), 

23. 
State  v.  Baxter  (82  N.  C.  602),  384. 
State  v.  Bayonne  (23  La.   Ann.  78), 

324. 
State  v.  Beasley  (84  Iowa,  83;  50  N. 

W.  Rep.  570),  249. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxv 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Beaucleigh  (92  Mo.  490),  351. 
State  v.  Belcher  (13  S.  C.  459),  166. 
State  v.  Bener  (64  Me.  267),  335. 
State  v.  Bennett  (31  Iowa,   24),  166. 
State  v.  Bergen  (34  N.  J.  L.  439),  242. 
State  v.  Berkley  (92  Mo.  41),  277, 
State  v.  Bernard  (45  Iowa,  234),  167. 
State  v.  Bertin  (24  La.  Ann.  46),  344. 
State  v.  Best  (12  S.  E.  Rep.  907;  111 

N.  C.  638),  23,  53,  110,  176. 
State  v.  Birdwell  (36  La.  Ann.  859),  9. 
State  v.  Bishop  (51  Vt.  287),  229. 
State  v.  Black  (42  La.  Ann.   861 ;  8 

S.  Rep.  594),  102,  334. 
State  v.  Blackburn  (80   N.   C.    474), 

101. 
State  v.  Blalock  (Phill.,  N.  C,  242), 

320. 
State  v.  Blemis  (24  Mo.  402),  123. 
State  v.  Block  (42  La.  Ann.  861),  101. 
State  v.  Blunt  (91  Mo.  503),  6. 
State  v.  Bohan  (15  Kan.  407),  102. 
State  v.  Boswell  (2  Dev.,  N.  C,  200, 

210),  350. 
State  v.  Bourne  (21   Oreg.  218),  276. 
State  v.  Bowman  (78  N.  C.  509),  195. 
State  v.  Boyd  (34   Neb.  435;    51  N. 

W.  Rep.  964),  240,  242. 
State  v.  Bradley  (64  Vt.  466),  52. 
State  v.  Branch  (112  Mo.  661),  210. 
State  v.  Brecht  (41  Minn.  50),  234. 
State  v.  Brewer  (98  N.  C.  607),  5. 
State  v.  Bronson  (49  Kan.  758),  9. 
State  v.  Brooks  (29  Mo.  App.  286),  5, 
State  v.  Brooks  (92  Mo.  542 ;  5  S.  W. 

Rep.  257).  91. 
State  v.  Brooks  (99  Mo.   137;  12   S. 

W.  Rep.  633),  11. 
State  v.  Brookshire  (2  Ala.  303),  330. 
State  v.  Broughton  (7  Ired.  L.,  N.  C, 

96),  176. 
State  v.  Brownlee  (84  Iowa,  473;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  25),  323. 
State  v.  Buck  (62  N.  H.  670),  281. 
State  v.  Buckles  (26  Kan.  237),  23. 
State  v.  Buell  (89  Mo.  595),  346. 
State  v.  Burpee   (65  Vt.    1;  25   Atl. 

Rep.  964),  11. 


State  v.  Byers  (100   N.  C.   512),  234, 

249,  3546. 
State  v.  Byrd  (94  N.  C.  624),  131. 
State  v.  Cain  (20  W.  Va.  177),  384. 
State  v.  Cain  (20  W.  Va.  679),  102. 
State  v.  Cain  (9  W.  Va.  559),  53. 
State  v.  Calligan  (41   La.  Ann.  574), 

350. 
State  v.  Campbell   (1    Rich. ,    S.   C. , 

224),  123. 
State  v.  Carden  (84  Ala.  217),  351. 
State  v.  Cardoza  (11  S.  C.  195),  341. 
State  v.  Carlisle  (57  Mo.  102),  89. 
State  v.  Carlos  (S.  C,  1893,  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  832),  376. 
State  v.  Carpenter  (20  Vt.  9),  281. 
State  v.  Carroll  (51  N.  W.  Rep.  1159, 

Iowa,  1892),  89. 
State  v.  Carroll  (30  S.   C.  85),  88,  89. 
State  v.  Carroll  (38  Conn.   449),  240. 
State  v.  Carson  (36  S.   C.  524;  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  588),  13,  89. 
State  v.  Carter  (35  Vt.  378),  168. 
State  v.  Carver   (22    Oreg.    602;    30 

Pac.  Rep.  315),  234. 
State  v.  Case  (24  N.  J.  L.  416),  142. 
State  v.  Cassidy  (Iowa,   1892,  52  N. 

W.  Rep.  1),  10. 
State  v.  Cecil  (54  Md.  426),  123. 
State  v.  Chamberlain  (89   Mo.    129), 

346,  354a. 
State  v.  Chambers  (39  Iowa,  179),  90. 
State  v.  Chambers  (45  La.  Ann.  36), 

89. 
State  v.  Chambers  (43  La.  Ann.  1108; 

10  S.  Rep.  247),  37A 
State  v.  Chisnell  (W.  Va.,  1892,  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  412),  346. 
State  v.  Choy  (84  Cal.  276),  11. 
State  v.  Christian  (44  La.  Ann.  950), 

349. 
State  v.  Chyo  Chiagk  (92  Mo.   395), 

315. 
State  v.  Claire  (41   La.    Ann.    1067), 

374. 
State  v.  Clark  (15  S.  C.  403),  192. 
State  v.  Clawson  (30  Mo.  App.  139), 

349. 


clxvi 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Clayton  (34  Mo.   App.  465), 

140. 
State  v.  Cleveland  (80  Mo.  108),  239. 
State  v.  Coella  (3  Wash.  St,  99),  89, 

354. 
State  v.  Coffey  (44   Mo.    App.    455), 

349,  350. 
State  v.  Colclough  (31  S.  C.  156),  23. 
State  v.  Cole  (63  Iowa,  695),  190. 
State  v.  Coleman  (20  S.  C.  444),  249. 
State  v.  Collins  (72  N.  C.  144),  23. 
State  v.  Collins  (20  Iowa,  85),  167. 
State  v.  Colwell  (8  R.  I.  132),  337. 
State  v.  Condry  (5  Jones'  L.,  N.  C, 

418),  323. 
State  v.  Cook  (23  La.  Ann.  347),  312. 
State  v.  Cook  (17  Kan.  394),  195. 
State  v.  Cooper  (101  N.  C.  684),  242. 
State  v.  Corcoran  (38  La.  Ann.  949), 

52. 
State  v.  County  (89  Mo.  237),  239. 
State  v.  Covington  (2  Bailey,  S.  C, 

569),  80. 
State  v.  Crabtree  (Mo.,    1892,  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  7),  101. 
State  v.  Crane  (110  N.  C.  530),  6. 
State  v.  Crawford  (S.  C,  1893,  17  S. 

E.  Rep.  199),  11. 
State  v.  Crawford  (33  Am.  L.  Reg. 

21),  249. 
State  v.  Crenshaw  (32  La.  Ann.  406), 

192. 
State  v.  Crow  (107  Mo.  341 ;  17  S.  W. 

Rep.  744),  39,  350. 
State  v.  Crowson  (98  N.  C.  595),  95. 
State  v.  Cummins  (76  Iowa,  133),  335. 
State  v.  Curren  (51  Iowa,  112),  10. 
State  v.Dana  (59  Vt.   614;    10  Atl. 

Rep.  727),  324. 
State  v.  Danforth  (48  Iowa,  43),  345. 
State  v.  Daniel  (31  La.  Ann  91),  101. 
State  v.  Darnell  (1  Houst.  C.  C,  Del., 

321),  91,  95. 
State  v.  Daugherty  (17  New  376),  57. 
State  v.  Davenport   (S.   C,  1893,  17 

S.  E.  Rep.  37),  5. 
State  v.  Davis  (48  Kan.  1),  330. 
State  v.  Davis  (29  Mo.  391),  350. 


State  v.  Dayton  (25  N.  J.  L.  54),  355. 
State  v.  De  Graff  (113  N.  C.  688;  18 

S.  E.  Rep.  507),  140. 
State  v.  Demareste(41La.  Ann.  617), 

93. 
State  v.   Depoister  (Nev.,    1891,    25 

Pac.  Rep.  1000),  178. 
State  v.  Dickinson  (41  Wis.  299),  102. 
State  v.  Didy  (72  N.  C.   325),  89,  95. 
State  v.  Dilley  (15  Ore?.  70),  342. 
State  v.  Dodson  (16  S.  C.  453),  320. 
State  v.  Dodson  (4  Oreg.  64),  102. 
State  v.  Donellon  (12  La.  Ann.  1292), 

140. 
State   v.   Donelon   (La.,  1893,   12  S. 

Rep.  922),  97. 
State  v.  Doris  (40  Conn.  145),  58. 
State  v.  Dorr  (82  Me.  212),  23. 
State  v.  Dorsey  (40  La.  Ann.    739), 

343. 
State  v.  Downs  (91  Mo.  19),  10,  102. 
State  v.  Duffy  (57  Conn.  525),  313, 

340. 
State  v.  Dufour  (31  La.   Ann.  804), 

93. 
State  v.  Dumphy  (4  Minn.  438),  10. 
State  v.   Duncan   (Wash.,    1893,    35 

Pac.  Rep.  117),  354. 
State  v.  Duncan  (116  Mo.  288;  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  690),  39,  88,  96,  339. 
State  v.  Duncan  (6  Ired.   L,  N.  C, 

236),  96. 
State  v.  Dunlop  (24  Me.  77),  23. 
State  v.  Dunnell  (3  R.  I.  127),  239. 
State  v.   Dusenberry  (112   Mo.   277), 

176,  283. 
State  v.  Dyer  (59  Me.  503).  166. 
State  v.  Eckler  (106  Mo.  585),  10. 
State  v.  Edwards  (109  Mo.  318),  6. 
State  v.  Effinger  (44  Mo.   App.   81), 

241. 
State  v.  Elkins  (101  Mo.  344;  14  S. 

W.  Rep.  116),  101. 
State  v.  Elliott  (45  Iowa,   386,  486), 

100,  102. 
State  v.  Elwood  (17  R.  I.  763),  10,  39, 

340. 
State  v.  Erb  (74  Mo.  199),  197. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Ervien  (N.  J.,  1888,  12  Atl. 

Rep.  136),  265. 
State    v.    Falconer    (70   Iowa,    418), 

283. 
State  v.  Farley  (Iowa,  1893,  53  N.  W. 

Rep.  1089),  336. 
State  v.  Farmer  (84    Me.  436),   316, 

354. 
State  v.   Farnhaiu  (10  S.  Rep.  531), 

357. 
State  v.   Farrington  (Iowa,  1894,  57 

N.  W.  Rep.  606),  339. 
State  v.  Fassett  (16  Conn.   468),  176. 
State  v.  Feites  (51  Iowa,  495),  91,  93, 

197. 
State  v.  Finch  (70  Iowa,  316),  199. 
State  v.  Fitzsimmons  (30   Mo.    236), 

330. 
State  v.  Flack  (48  Kan.  146),  23. 
State  v.  Flanagan  (25  Ark.  92),  88. 
State  v.  Fletcher    (Oreg.,    1893,     33 

Pac.  Rep.  575),  96,  101,  201. 
State  v.Flint   (60  Yt.    304;  14  Atl. 

Rep.  178),  350. 
State  v.  Foley  (15  Nev.  64),  320. 
State  v.  Foot  Yon  (Oreg.,    1S93,    33 

Pac.  Rep.  537),  102. 
State  v.  Fox  (25  N.  J.  L.  256),  23. 
State  v.  Frazier  (1  Houst.,  Del.,  176), 

57,  102,  103. 
State  v.  Freeman  (5  Conn.  34S),  176. 
State  v.  Fruge  (28  La.  Ann.  657),  343. 
State  v.  Gafberg  (12  La.  Ann.   265), 

23. 
State  v.  Garrett  (71  N.  C.  95),  38a. 
State  v.  Garvey  (25  La.   Ann.   191), 

93. 
State  v.  Gay  (94  N.  C.  814),  139. 
State  v.  Gayette  (11  R.  I.  592),  241. 
State  v.  Geddis  (42  Iowa,  268),  197. 
State  v.  Geclicke  (43  N.  J.  L.  86),  192. 
State  v.  Georgia,  etc.  Co.  (109  N.  C. 

310),  6. 
State  v.  Gibbs  (10  Mont.  213),  384. 
State  v.  Gibson  (10    S.   E.  Rep.  58; 

33  W.  Va.  97),  244. 
State  v.  Gilleck  (10  Iowa,  9S),  343. 
State  v.  Gilman  (51  Me.  306),  93. 


State  v.  Ginger  (80  Iowa,  574),    192, 

377. 
State  v.  Glahn  (97  Mo.  579),  89. 
State  v.  Glynn  (51  Vt.  577),  350. 
State  v.  Gordet  (7  Ired.,  N.  C,  210), 

23. 
State  v.  Gott  (44  Md.  341),  208. 
State  v.  Gould  (26  W.  Va.  258),  241. 
State  v.  Grace  (18  Minn.  398),  280. 
State  v.  Gracly  (84  Mo.  220),  176. 
State  v.  Graham   (41    N.    J.    L.    15), 

323. 
State  v.  Graham  (74  N.   C.  646),  39, 

202. 
State    v.    Gramelspacher    (126   Ind. 

398),  240. 
State  v.  Grant  (Iowa,    1893,    53    N. 

W.  Rep.  120).  6,  69,  97. 
State  v.  Grant  (22  Me.  171),  89. 
State  v.  Grate  (68  Mo.  23),  10. 
State  v.  Graves  (95  Mo.  510),  346. 
State  v.  Gray  (29  Minn.  144),  23. 
State  v.  Green  (15  N.  J.  L.  88),  357. 
State  v.  Green  (1  Houst.  C.  C,  Del., 

217),  9. 
State   v.  Gryder  (44  La.  Ann.  962), 

24. 
State  v.  Gurnee  (14  Kan.  Ill),  30. 
State  v.  Guyer  (6  Iowa,  263),  167. 
State  v.  Hack  (Mo.,  1893),  23  S.  W. 

Rep.  1089),  354. 
State  v.  Hall   (79   Iowa,    674 ;  44  N. 

W.  Rep.  914),  345. 
State   v.    Hambleton    (22   Mo.   452), 

237. 
State  v.  Hamilton  (42  La.  Ann.  1204), 

346. 
State  v.  Hamilton  (8  S.  Rep.  304;  55 

Mo.  520),  50,  249. 
State  v.  Hammet  (12  Ind.  448),  244. 
State  v.  Hanley  (34  Minn.  430),  188. 
State  v.  Harmon  (Del.,  3  Harr.,  567), 

89. 
State  v.  Harper  (35  Ohio  St.  78),  102. 
State  v.  Harris  (34   La.    Ann.    118), 

343. 
State  v.    Harrison  (5  Jones,  N.  C, 

115),  7. 


clxviii 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Harrison  (15  S.  E.  Rep.  982; 

36  W.  Va.  729),  231,  283. 
State  v.  Harrod  (102  Mo.  590),  52. 
State  v.  Hartman  (46  Wis.  478),  343. 
State  v.  Hastings  (53  N.  H.  452),  140. 
State  v.  Havelin  (6  La:  Ann.  107),  69. 
State  v.  Hawkins  (100  Mo.  666),  324. 
State  v.  Hawkins  (18  Oreg.  476;  23 

Pac.  Rep.  475),  11. 
State  v.  Hayden  (51  Vt.  296),  197. 
State  v.  Haynes  (71  N.  C.  79),  90. 
State  v.  Head  (S.  C,  1893,  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  892),  93. 
State  v.  Heed  (57  Mo.  252),  384. 
State  v.  Henderson  (Iowa,   1893,  50 

N.  W.  Rep.  758),  9,  227. 
State  v.  Henderson  (29  W.  Va.  147), 

140. 
State  v.   Hendrix  (La.,   1893,   12  S. 

Rep.  621),  378. 
State  v.  Hendrix  (98  Mo.  374),  142. 
State  v.  Hennessy  (55  Iowa,  299),  324. 
State  v.  Hennings  (54   N.   W.    Rep. 

537,  S.  D.,  1893),  355. 
State  v.  Higgins  (13  R.  I.  330),  250. 
State  v.  Hillstock  (La.,   1893,    12  S. 

Rep.  352),  284. 
State  v.  Hinchman  (27  Pa.  St.  479), 

242. 
State  v.  Hinkle  (6  Iowa,  380),  195. 
State  v.  Hirsch  (45  Mo.  429),  250. 
State  v.  Hoblitzelle  (85  Mo.  620),  140. 
State  v.  Hockett  (70   Iowa,  442;   30 

N.  W.  Rep.  742),  10,  231. 
State  v.  Hodge  (50  N.  H.  510),  11,  229. 
State  v.  Hogue  (6  Jones,  N.  C,  381), 

10. 
State  v.  Holden  (44  N.  W.  Rep.  123; 

42  Minn.  350),  89. 
State  v.  Holland  (83  N.  C.  624),  324. 
State  v.  Holt  (84  Me.  509),  281. 
State  v.  Hooper  (2  Bailey,  S.  C,  37), 

139. 
State  v.  Hopkins  (50  Vt.  316),  330. 
State  v.  Hopper  (7 1  Mo.  425),  343. 
State  v.  Home  (9  Kan.  119),  348. 
State  v.  Horner  (Del.,  1893,  26  Atl. 

Rep.  73),  281. 


State  v.  Hornsby  (8  Rob.,  La.,  554), 

277. 
State  v.  Horton  (100  N.  C.  443),  345. 
State  v.  Houx  (109  Mo.  654),  354. 
State  v.  Howard  (32  Vt.  380),  52. 
State  v.  Howard  (S.  C,  1892, 14  S.  E. 

Rep.  481),  89,  339. 
State  v.  Howard  (Mo.,  1893,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  81),  316. 
State  v.  Hoyt  (46  Conn.  330),  52,  231. 
State  v.  Hoyt  (47  Conn.  518),  9. 
State  v.  Huff  (76  Iowa,  200),  342. 
State  v.  Hulse  (106  Mo.  41),  8. 
State  v.  Humble  (34  Mo.  App.  343), 

23. 
State  v.  Hunsaker  (16  Oreg.  497),  375. 
State  v.  Hunter  (50  Kan.  302),  5. 
State  v.  Hurley  (1  Houst.  Cr.    Cas., 

Del.,  28),  231. 
State  v.  Hyer  (39  N.  J.  L.  598),  324. 
State  v.  Hymer  (15  Nev.  49),  9,  52. 
State  v.  Ice  (34  W.  Va.  244;  12  S.  E. 

Rep.  695),  346. 
State  v.  Ihrig  (106  Mo.  267),  381. 
State  v.  Isham  (1  Hawkes,  185),  140. 
State  v.  Jackson  (44  La.  Ann.    160; 

10  S.  E.  Rep.  600),  350. 
State  v.  Jackson  (106   Mo.  174),  226, 

306,  324. 
State  v.  Jackson  (30  Me.  29).  23. 
State  v.  Jackson  (9  Mont.  458),  93. 
State  v.  Jacobs  (106   N.  C.  695),  335. 
State  v.  James  (34  S.  C.  579),  172. 
State  v.  Jansen  (22  Kan.  98),  127. 
State  v.  Jennett  (88  N.  C.  605),  229. 
State  v.  Jerome  (82    Iowa,   749 ;    48 

N.  W.  Rep.  722),  52. 
State  v.  Jobnson  (29  La.  Ann.  717), 

333. 
State  v.  Johnson  (67  N.  C.  58),  202. 
State  v.  Johnson  (94  Ala.  35),  9. 
State  v.  Johnson  (34  N.  W.  Rep.  177; 

72  Iowa,  396),  101,  346. 
State  v.  Johnson  (30  La.  Ann.  884),  89. 
State  v.  Johnson  (41  La.  Ann.  574), 

277. 
State  v.  Johnson  (12  Nev.  124),  123. 
State  v.  Johnson (37  Minn.  493),  5,  6,  7. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxix 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.   Jolly  (3  Dev.  &  Bat.  110), 

168. 
State  v.  Jones  (50  N.  H.  370),  249. 
State  v.  Jones  (54  Mo.  478),  90. 
State  v.  Jones  (13  S.  E.  Rep.  325),  172. 
State  v.  Jones  (41  Kan.  309),  201. 
State  v.  Jones  (44  La.  Ann.  1120),  11. 
State  v.  Jones  (29    S.     C.    201),    352, 

354. 
State  v.  Jones  (50  N.  H.  3G9),  231. 
State  v.  Josey  (64  N.  C.  56),  6. 
State  v.  Justus  (11  Oreg.  170),  201. 
State  v.  Keeland  (90  Mo.  237),  22. 
State  v.  Keith  (63  N.  C.  140),  320. 
State  v.  Kellerinan   (13    Kan.    135), 

324. 
State  v.  Kelly  (73  Mo.  608),  229. 
State  v.  Kelsey  (44  N.   J.  Law,   34), 

125. 
State  v.  Keuion  (R.  I.,  1893,   26  Atl. 

Rep.  199),  10. 
State  v.  Kibling  (63  Vt.  636).  1 1. 
State  v.  Kilgore  (70  Mo.  546),  23. 
State  v.  Kinder  (96  Mo.  548),  89. 
State  v.  King  (37  Iowa,  462),  143a. 
State  v.  King  (86  N.  C.  603),  122,  123. 
State  v.  Klinger  (46  Mo.  229),  197. 
State  v.  Knapp  (45  N.   H.    148),  196, 

229. 
State  v.  Knight  (43  Me.  1),   193,  234. 
State  v.  Knowles  (48  Iowa,  593),  39. 
State  v.  Koontz  (5  S.    E.    Rep.  32S), 

139a. 
State  v.  Kriechbaum  (81  Iowa,  633; 

47  N.  W.  Rep.  S72),  250. 
State  w.Lantz  (23  Kan.  728),  343. 
State  v.  Laque  (41   La.   Ann.  1070), 

122. 
State  v.  Larkin  (49  N.  H.  39),  69. 
State  v.   Lautenschlager    (22  Minn. 

514),  23. 
State  v.  Lawhorne  (66  N.    C.    638), 

90. 
State  v.  Leabo  (89  Mo.  247),  188. 
State  v.  Lefaivre  (53  Mo.  470),  217. 
State  v.  Lehman  (S.  D„  1891,  49   N. 

W.  Rep.  31),  197. 
State  v.  Lentz  (45  Minn.  377),  8. 


State  v.  Leuth  (5  Ohio   Cir.    Ct.    R. 

94),  93. 
State  v.  Libby  (84  Me.  461),  23. 
State  v.  Liquor  (73  Me.  278),  242. 
State  v.  Litchfield  (58  Me.  267),  324. 
State  v.  Littlefield  (3  R.  I.  124),   76. 
State  v.  Lockwood  (58  Vt.  378),   330. 
State  v.  Long  (37  W.  Va.  266),  140. 
State  v.  Lopez  (15  Nev.  407),  344. 
State  v.  Loughlin  (20  Atl.  Rep.  981, 

N.  H.,  1890),  142. 
State  v.  Lowry  (74  N.  C.  121),  241. 
State  v.  Lucas  (Oreg.,  1893,  33  Pac. 

Rep.  5-18),  334. 
State  v.  Lund  (49  Kan.  580),  283. 
State  v.  Lurch  (12  Oreg.  99),  346. 
State  v,  Lyon  (81  N.  C.  600),  323. 
State  v.  Magoon  (50  Vt.  333),  374. 
State  v.  Maguire  (Md.,    1893,   21  S. 

W.  Rep.  212),  381. 
State  v.  Mali  an  (32  Vt.  241),  93. 
State  v.  Maher  (74  Iowa,  77),  375. 
State  v.  Maier  (36  W.  Va.  757),  188, 

197,  231. 
State  v.  Malloy  (31  Fed,  Rep.  19),  190. 
State  v.  Manceaux(42La.  Ann.  1164), 

283. 
State  v.  Marshall  (Mo.,   1893,  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  45),  9. 
State  v.  Martin  (15  S.  W.  Rep.  529; 

103  Mo.  50S),  757. 
State  v.  Martin  (N.  J.,  3  Cr.  L.  Mag. 

44),  231. 
State  v.  Martin  (74  Mo.  547),  9. 
State  v.  Mason  (112  Mo.  374),  57. 
State  v.  Massey  (104  N.  C.  877),  277. 
State  v.  Mathes(90Me.  571),  101,  102, 

103. 
State  v.  Mathews  (98  Mo.  125),  306, 

334,  346. 
State  v.  Mathews  (78  N.  C.  523),  10. 
State  v.  Maylook  (9  Oreg.  54),  143. 
State  v.  Mayor  (11  Humph.  217),  242. 
State  v.  McCafferty  (63  Me.  233),  241. 
State  v.  McCanon  (57  Mo.  160),  102. 
State  v.  McClain  (49  Kan.  730),  153. 
State  v.  McCarthy  (43  La.  Ann.  541), 

277. 


€1XX 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  McCord  (8  Kan.  161),  167. 
State  v.  McCoy  (111  Mo.  517),  102. 
State  v.  McDonald  (43  N.  J.  L.  591), 

168. 
State  v.  McDowell  (N.    C,  7   S.    E. 

Rep.  7S5),  211. 
State  v.  McFarlain  (41  La.  Ann.  686), 

340,  3546. 
State  v.  McGahey   (N.    D.,    1893,  55 

N.  W.  Rep.  753),  340,  341. 
State  v.  McGee  (46  N.  W.  Rep.  764 ; 

81  Iowa,  17),  97. 
State  v.  McGuff(88  Ala.  151),  319. 
State  v.  McGuire  (87  Mo.  642),  129. 
State  v.  McGuire  (15  R.   I.  23),  346, 

354. 
State  v.  Mcintosh  (S.  C.,  1893,  17  S. 

E.  Rep.  446),  11. 
State  v.  McKean  (36  Iowa,  343),  323. 
State  v.  McKenzie  (102  Mo.  620),  97. 
State  v.  McNeil  (33  La.  Ann.  1332), 

123. 
State  v.  Medlecott  (9  Kan.  257),  101. 
State  v.  Merriman  (S.  C,  1891,  12  S. 

E.  Rep.  619),  354. 
State  v.   Mewherter  (47  Iowa,    88), 

176. 
State  v.    Michael  (37  W.  Va.   565), 

319. 
State  v.  Middleham  (62  Iowa,  150), 

384. 
State  v.  Miller  (47  Wis.  530),  140. 
State  v.  Miller  (35  Kan.  328),  93. 
State  v.  Miller  (42  La.  Ann.  186),  89. 
State  v.  Miller  (100  Mo.  606),  3G7,  322, 

382. 
State  v.  Miller  (93  Mo.  263),  340,  350. 
State  v.  Milling  (35  S.  C.  16;  14  S.  E. 

Rep.  284),  5,  334. 
State  v.  Mills  (91  N.  C.  581),  101. 
State  v.  Milton  (18  Mo.  417),  150a. 
State  v.  Mims  (S.  C,    1893,    17  S.  E. 

Rep.  850),  97. 
State  v.  Minnick  (15  Iowa,  123),  240. 
State  v.  Minor  (Mo.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  1085),  226,  306,  346. 
State  v.  Minton  (22  S.  W.  Rep.  808 ; 

116  Mo.  605),  78. 


State  v.  Mitchell  (Phill.,  N.  C.,  L. 

447),  97. 
State  v.  Mitchell   (57   W.    Va.  565), 

113. 
State  v.  Moelschein   (53  Iowa,   310), 

10,  382. 
State  v.  Moncla(39La.  Ann.  368),  88. 
State  v.  Moore  (11  Ired.    L.,   N.  C., 

160),  232. 
State  v.  Moore  (101  Mo.  316),  229. 
State  v.  Moore    (Mo.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  1086),  57. 
State  v.  Moorman  (27  S.  C.  22),  89. 
State  v.  Moran  (34  Iowa,  453),  324. 
State  v.  Moran  (35  W.  Va.  260),  884. 
State  v.  Mordecai  (68  N.  C.  207),  39. 
State  v.  Morphy  (33  Iowa,  270),  250. 
State  v.  Morrill  (2  Dev.,   N.  C,  L. 

269),  710. 
State  v.  Morris  (109  N.  C.  820),  350. 
State  v.  Morrison  (3   Dev.   299),  250. 
State  v.  Mounts  (106  Mo.  226),  4. 
State  v.  Mowry  (37  Kan.  369;  15  Pac. 

Rep.  282),  231. 
State  v.  Moxley  (14   S.  W.  Rep.  969  ; 

15  id.  556 ;  102  Mo.  374),  39,  346. 
State  v.  Mulkern  (85  Me.  106),  4. 
State  v.  Muilins  (101  Mo.  514),  88,  93. 
State  v.  Murdy  (81  Iowa,  88),  102. 
State  v.  Murfreesboro   (11   Humph., 

Tenn.,  217),  242. 
State  v.  Murphy  (55  Vt.  449),  720. 
State  v.  Murphy    (La.,    1893,    13    S. 

Rep.  229),  346. 
State  v.  Myers  (82  Mo.  558 ;  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  382),  376. 
State  v.  Nance  (25  S.  C.  168),  101. 
State  v.  Neil  (6  Ala.  685),  106. 
State  v.  Nelson  (101  Mo.  464),  102. 
State  v.  Nett  (50  Wis.  524),  710. 
State  v.  Nettlebush  (20  Iowa,  257), 

102. 
State  v.  Newhouse  (38  La.  Ann.  862 ; 

2  S.  Rep.  799),  101. 
State  v.  New  York,  etc.   Co.  (N.  J. 

L.,  1890,  8  Atl.  Rep.  290),  33. 
State  v.  Norris  (9  N.  H.  101),  315. 
State  v.  Ober  (52  N.  H.  459),  354a. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


clxxi 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  O'Brien  (7  R.  I.  336),  189. 
State  v.  O'Brien  (40  N.  W.  Rep.  752 ; 

81  Iowa,  88),  102,  124,  354. 
State  v.  Owsley  (111  Mo.  450),  229. 
State  v.  Oxford  (30  Tex.  428),  176. 
State  v.  Packer  (80  N.  C.  439),  241. 
State  v.  Pagels  (92  Ma  300),  231,  277. 
State  v.  Parker  (96  Mo.  382),  350. 
State  v.  Parks  (109  N.  C.  813),  10. 
State  v.  Parrish  (Busb.  Law,  239),  93. 
State  v.  Parrott  (79  N.  C.  615),  166. 
State  v.  Patterson  (45  Vt.  30S),  103, 

249. 
State  v.  Patterson  (74  N.  C.  157),  354. 
State  v.  Pearce  (15  Nev.  188),  10. 
State  v.  Peelle  (124  Ind.  515;  24  N. 

E.  Rep.  440),  36. 
State  v.  Penn.   (13  Bank.  Reg.  464), 

51. 
State  v.  Perigo  (45  N.  W.  Rep.  399 ; 

80  Iowa,  37),  102. 
State  v.  Perkins  (06  N.  C.  126),  350. 
State  v.  Peters  (107  N.  C.  876),  384. 
State  v.  Pettaway  (3  Hawks,  S.  C, 

523),  234. 
State  v.  Pfefferlee  (36  Kan.  90),  322, 

354. 
State  v.  Phair  (48  Vt.  366),  144,  185. 
State  v.  Pike  (65  Me.  Ill),  193. 
State  v.  Place  (32  Pac.   Rep.  736 ;  5 

Wash.  St.  773),  9. 
State  v.  Plum  (49  Kan.  679),  11,  176. 
State  v.  Poll  (1  Hawks,  444),  102. 
State  v.  Porter  (La.,  1893,  12  S.  Rep. 

832),  9. 
State  v.  Porter  (10  Rich.,  S.  C,  145), 

23. 
State  v.  Pose  (33  La.  Ann.  932),  242. 
State  v.  Postlewait  (14  Iowa,    446), 

244. 
State  v.  Potter  (42  Vt.  495),  324. 
State  v.  Potter  (108  Mo.  424),  378. 
State  v.  Potts  (Iowa,  1892,  49  N.  W. 

Rep.  845),  378. 
State  v.  Powers  (51  N.  J.  L.  432;  17 

Atl.  Rep.  969),  316. 
State  v.  Prater  (26  S.  C.  198 ;  2  S.  E. 

Rep.  108),  324. 


State  v.  Pratt  (88  N.  C.  639),  80. 
State  v.  Pratt  (98  Mo.  482),  323,  376. 
State  v.  Price  (12  Gill  &  J.  260),  237. 
State  v.  Pritcher  (101  N.  C.  067),  346. 
State  v.  Rachoe  (37  Minn.  372),  140. 
State  v.  Rainsbarger   (71  Iowa,  746; 

31  N.  W.  Rep.  865),  166. 
State  v.  Ramsay  (82  Mo.  133),  102. 
State  v.  Ramsay  (Mont.,  1892,  28  Pac. 

Rep.  258),  276. 
State  v.   Rash  (12    Ired.,  N.  C,  L> 

382),  9. 
State  v.  Raven   (115   Mo.  419;  22  S. 

W.  Rep.  376),  350. 
State  v.  Raymond  (29  Pac.  Rep.  732; 

12  Mont.  226),  8. 
State  v.  Raymond  (53  N.  J.  L.  200, 

528),  334,  343. 
State  v.   Raymond  (46    Conn.  345), 

229. 
State  v.  Reader  (00  Iowa,  527),  239. 
State  v.  Reed  (62  Iowa,  40),  6. 
State  v.  Reed.  (62  Me.  129),   10,  88, 

350. 
State  v.  Reed  (89  Mo.  168),  341. 
State  v.  Reid  (45  La.  Aim.   162),  31. 
State  v.  Reidel  (Del.,  1888,   14  Atl. 

Rep.  550),  231. 
State  v.  Renfrew  (111  Mo.  589),  381. 
State  v.  Richardson  (34  Minn.  118), 

357. 
State  v.  Rights  (82  N.  C.  675),  356. 
State  v.  Riley  (42  La.   Ann.   995;   8 

S.  Rep.  469),  93. 
State  v.  Roberts  (03  Vt.  159),  39. 
State  v.  Robinson  ( —  La.  Ann.  340), 

102. 
State  v.  Rogers  (108  Mo.  202;  18  S. 

W.  Rep.  976),  349. 
State  v.  Rogers  (112  N.  C.  874;    17 

S.  E.  Rep.  297),  89. 
State  v.  Rose  (92  Mo.  201),  320. 
State  v.  Row  (Iowa,   1892,  46  N.  W. 

Rep.  872),  36. 
State  v.  Rowe  (98  N.  C.  629 ;  4  S.  E. 

Rep.  506),  350. 
State  v.  Ruff  (Ind.,  1893,   33  N.  •  E. 

Rep.  724),  151a. 


clxxii 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections 

State  v.  Runnels  (28  Ark.    121),  323. 
State  v.  Rush  (95  Mo.  199),  307. 
State  v.  Russell  (32  Pac.  Rep.   854), 

101. 
State  v.  Samuels  (28  Mo.  App.  649). 

7G. 
State  v.  Sandars    (106    Mo.    188),    6, 

249,  346. 
State  v.  Sanders  (68  Mo.  202),  343. 
State  v.  Sasse  (72  Wis.  3),  344. 
State  v.  Sauer  (42   Minn.    238),   351. 
State  v.  Saunders  (12  Pac.  Rep.  441 ; 

14  Oreg.  300),  102. 
State  v.  Schaefer  (Mo.,   1893,  22   S. 

W.  Rep.  447),  249. 
State  v.  Schleagel  (50  Kan.  235),  10. 
State  v.  Schmidt  (73  Iowa,  469;    35 

N.  W.  Rep.   5D0),  101,  103. 
State  v.  Scott  (109  Mo.  226;  19  S.  W. 

Rep.  89),  229. 
State  v.  Secrest  (80  N.  C.  450),  193. 
State  v.  Seiner  (17  Mo.  App.  39).  237. 
State  v.  Senn  (32  S.  C.  392;  11  S.  E. 

Rep.  292),  93. 
State  v.  Severson  (79  Iowa,  653),  319, 

332. 
State  v.  Shafer  (Oreg.,  1893,  32  Pac. 

Rep.  545),  101,  102. 
State  v.  Shelton  (2  Jones'  N.  C.   L. 

360;,  102. 
State  v.  Sherman  (42  Mo.   210),   242. 
State  v.  Shinbone  (46  N.  H.  497),  132. 
State  v.  Slagle  (83  N.  C.  630),  195. 
State  v.  Slingerland    (19    Nev.  135), 

8,  381. 
State  v.  Smith  (77  N.  C.  488),  234. 
State  v.  Smith  (73  Iowa,  32),  5. 
State  v.  Smith  (54  Iowa,  104),  345. 
State  v.  Smith  (32  Me.  369),  23. 
State  v.  Smith  (25  La.  Ann.  457),  88. 
State  v.  Smith  (6  R.  I.  33),  343. 
State  v.  Smith  (49  Conn.  376),  201. 
State  v.  Smith  (32  Mo.  370),  196. 
State  v.  Smith  (4  Phill.,  N.  C,  302), 

196. 
State  v.  Snowden(l  Brews.,  Pa.,  218), 

244. 
State  v.  Sopher  (70  Iowa,  494),  89. 


State  v.  Sorter  (Kan.,  1893,  34  Pac. 

Rep.  1036),  348. 
State  v.  Spalding  (34  Minn.  361),  102. 
State  v.  Spencer  (30  La.    Ann.   302), 

101. 
State  v.  Spenser  (21   N.   J.  L.   196), 

249. 
State  v.  Spillman  (43  La.  Ann.  1001), 

283. 
State  v.  Stair  (S7  Mo.  268),  139,  139a. 
-State  v.  Stark   (1   Strobh.,  S.  C,   L. 

479),  231. 
State  v.  Starling  (6  Jones,  N.  C.,  L. 

366),  231. 
State  v.  Steifel   (106   Mo.    129),   305, 

323. 
State  v.  Sterritte  (68  Iowa,  731),  10. 
State  v.  Stiee  (Iowa,  1893,  55  N.  W. 

Rep.  17),  9. 
State  v.  St.  Louis   S.    F.   R.   Co.  (29 

Mo.  App.  361),  38. 
State  v.  Stowe  (2  Wash.  St.  206),  378. 
State  v.  Stubbs   (13  S.    E.   Rep.  90; 

108  N.  C.  774),  8. 
State  v.  Sullivan  (28  N.  E.  Rep.  381; 

114  111.  24),  346. 
State  v.  Sullivan  (51  Iowa,  142),  102, 

103. 
State  v.  Swain  (68  Mo.  605),  348. 
State  v.  Swanze  (30  La.   Ann.  1323), 

234. 
State  v.  Swift  (69  Ind.  505),  240 
State  v.  Tall  (43  Minn.  273),  354. 
State  v.  Tanner  (38   La.    Ann.   307), 

343. 
State  v.  Tatro  (50  Vt.  483),  91. 
State  v.  Taylor  (20  S.  W.  Rep.  239; 

111  Mo.  538),  5. 
State  v.  Taylor  (1   Houst.  Cr.  Cas., 

Del.,  436),  249. 
State  v.  Taylor  (44  La.  Ann.  783;  11 

S.  Rep.  132),  9,  10. 
State  v.  Taylor  (Mo.,  1893,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  449),  354. 
State  v.  Taylor  (Mo.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  806),  88,  354. 
State  v.  Teipner  (36  Minn.  535),  191. 
Gtate  v.  Teissedre  (30  Kan.  484),  241. 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


clxxiii 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Tenison  (22  Pac.   Rep.  429; 

42  Kan.  302),  346. 
State  v.  Terrell  (12  Rich.,  S.  CL,  321), 

102,  195. 
State  v.  Thomas  (111  Ind.  516;  13  N. 

E.  Rep.  85),  330. 
State  v.  Thomason  (1  Jones,  N.   C. 

Law,  274),  102,  350. 
State  v.  Thorn pkins  (71  Mo.  63),  343. 
State  v.  Thompson  (83  Mo.  257),  343. 
State  v.  Tibeau  (30  Vt.  100),  97. 
State  v.  Tilghman  (Ired.,  N.  C,  Law, 

573),  101. 
State  v.  Tooney  (26  Minn.  262),  242. 
State  v.  Trounce  (Wash.,    1893,   32 

Pac.  Rep.  750),  232,  284. 
State  v.  Turlington  (102   Mo.    642), 

101,  283. 
State   v.   Turner   (110  Mo.    196),    6, 

346. 
State  v.  Turner  (15  S.  E.  Rep.  603; 

36  S.  C.  534),  334,  349,  350. 
State  v.  Uhrig  (106  Mo.  267),  354a. 
State  v.  Ulrich   (110  Mo.    350),    166, 

244. 
State  v.   Underwood   (44  La.    Ann. 

852),  281,  346. 
State  v.  Van  Winkle  (80  Iowa,  15), 

229,  356. 
State  v.  Vari  (35  S.  C.  175;  14  S.  E. 

Rep.  892),  330. 
State  v.  Vincent  (1  Houst.,  Del.,  1), 

93. 
State  v.  Vincent  (24  Iowa,  570),  234, 

249. 
State  v.  Von  Sachs  (30  La.  Ann.  942), 

89. 
State  v.  Vorback  (66  Mo.  168),  23. 
State  v.  Walker  (77  Me.  490),  56. 
State  v.  Walker  (Mo.,  1888,  9  S.  W. 

Rep.  646),  323,  324,  346. 
State  v.  Waller  (88  Mo.  402),  23. 
State  v.  Walsh  (44  La.   Ann.    1122), 

9,  346. 
State  v.  Walters   (7  Wash.  246;  34 

Pac.  Rep.  938,  1098),  350. 
State  v.  Ward  (39  Vt.  225),  140. 
State  v.  Ward  (61  Vt.  179),  330. 


State  v.  Watson  (7  S.  C.  63),  6. 
State  v.  Watson  (31  Mo.  361),  324. 
State  v.  Weasel  (30  La.  Ann.  919),  97. 
State  v.  Weaver  (101  N.  C.  758),  232. 
State  v.  Weddington  (103  N.  C.  364), 

346. 
State  v.  Welch  (79  Me.  99),  315. 
State  v.  Weldon  (S.  C,  1893,  17  S.  E. 

Rep.  688),  316. 
State  v.  Wells  (111  Mo.  533),  6,  346. 
State  v.  Wells  (48  Iowa,  671),  234. 
State  v.  Wentworth    (65    Me.    234), 

354a. 
State  v.  Wentworth  (37  N.  H.  196), 

52,  91. 
State  v.  West  (45  La.  Ann.  14;  13  S. 

Rep.  173),  96. 
State  v.  West  (1  Houst.,  Del.,  371), 

93,  249. 
State  v.  Westfall  (49  Iowa,  328),  102. 
State  v.  Whisenhurst  (2  Hawks,  458), 

315. 
State  v.  White  (19  Kan.  445),  174. 
State  v.  Whitfield   (109  N.    C.   876), 

89. 
State  v.  Whiton  (111  N.  C.  95),  6,  9. 
State  v.  Wieners  (66  Mo.  13),  345. 
State  v.  Williams  (67  N.  C.  12),  102. 
State  v.   Willingham   (33   La.   Ann. 

537),  339. 
State  v.  Willis  (Iowa,  1889,  44  N.  W. 

Rep.  699),  277. 
State  v.  Wilner  (40  Wis.  304),  231. 
State  v.  Wilson   (23   La.  Ann.   559), 

102. 
State  v.  Wilson  (40  La.  Ann.    757), 

343. 
State  v.  Wilson  (24  Kan.  189),  101. 
State  v.  Wilson  (39   Mo.  App.  114), 

250. 
State    v.   Wilson    (111    N.   C.   695), 

103. 
State  v.  Wingo  (66  Mo.  181).  249. 
State  v.  Wise  (33  S.  C.  382),  283. 
State  v.  Withan  (72  Me.  531),  354a. 
State  v.  Wolf  (8  Conn.  93),  316, 
State  v.  Wood  (53  N.  H.  484),  176, 

189,  196. 


clxxiv 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


State  v.  Woodruff  (67  N.  C.  89),  344, 

345. 
State  v.  Woods  (49  Kan.  237 ;  30  Pac. 

Rep.  520),  35. 
State  v.   Woodward  (Iowa,  1892,  5 

N.  W.  Rep.  885),  5. 
State  v.  Workman  (S.  C,   1893),  16 

S.  E.  Rep.  770),  378. 
State  v.  Workman  (15  S.  C.  540,  546), 

166. 
State  v.  Wright  (75  N.  C.   439),  350. 
State  v.  Wright  (41  La.   Ann.   600), 

166. 
State  v.  Wright  (70  Iowa,    152;    id. 

759),  233. 
State  v.  Young  (1  Winst.,  N.  C,  L., 

No.  1,  126),  93. 
State  v.  Young  (105  Mo.  634),  334. 
State  v.  Zellers  (7  N.  J.  L.   220),  93. 
State  v.  Zimmerman  (47  Kan.   242), 

140. 
State  v.  Zoun  (22  Oreg.  591 ;  30  Pac. 

Rep.  517),  231. 
Staunton   v.    Parker   (19   Hun,   55), 

178. 
Stavinow  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (43  Mo. 

App.  513),  337. 
Stayner  v.  Joyce  (Ind.,  1889,   22  N. 

E.  Rep.  89),  121. 
Stead  v.  Corse  (4  Cranch,  403),  218. 
Stead  v.  Worcester  (150  Mass.  241), 

198. 
Steageld  v.  State  (24  Tex.  287 ;  3  S. 

W.  Rep.  771),  178. 
Steagels  v.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  464), 

93. 
Stearns  v.  Hall  (9  Cush.,  Mass.,  31), 

214. 
Stearns  v.  Jones  (12  Allen,  582),  226. 
Steele  v.  Prickett  (2  Stark.  463,  466), 

110. 
Steele  v.  Shafer  (39  111.  App.  185),  79. 
Steele  v.  Stuart  (1  Phil.  Ch.  471),  169. 
Steele  v.  Ward  (30  Hun,  355),  309. 
Steen  v.  State  (20  Ohio  St.  333),  167. 
Stein  v.  Bowman  (13  Pet.  221),  166. 
Stein  v.  Swenson  (49  N.  W.  Rep.  55 ; 

46  Minn.  360),  121,  122,  124. 


Stoiner  v.  Ellis  (7  S.  Rep.  803,  Ala., 

1890),  230. 
Steirle  v.  Kaiser  (12  S.  Rep.  839,  La., 

1893),  219. 
Stephen  y.  State  (11  Ga.  225),  237. 
Stephens  v.  Allen  (11  Oreg.  18S),  223. 
Stephens  v.    McCormick    (5    Bush, 

181),  231. 
Stephens  v.  Vroman  (16  N.  Y.  301), 

80. 
Stephenson  v.   Arnold  (28  Ind.  278), 

345. 
Stephenson   v.    Richardson  (45  Mo. 

App.  544),  229. 
Stephenson  v.  State  (110  Ind.  358), 

101. 
Stepp  v.  Nat.  L.  &  Mut.  Ass'n  (37 

S.  C.  417;  16  S.  E.  Rep.  134),  186. 
Stepp  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim.   App. 

349),  197. 
Sterling  v.  Buckingham  (46  Conn. 

464),  05. 
Sterling  v.  Callahan  (94  Mich.  536), 

334. 
Stern  v.  Herren  (101  N.  C.  516),  276. 
Stern  v.  Isman  (51  Hun,  224),  309. 
Sterne  v.  State  (20  Ala.  43),  237. 
Stetson  v.   Freeman  (35  Kan.   523), 

115. 
Stevens  v.  Castel  (63  Mich.  118),  57. 
Stevens  v.  Dennett  (51  N.   H.    324), 

83,  84. 
Stevens  v.   Hampton  (46  Mo.  104), 

136. 
Stevens  v.  Ludlum  (46  Minn.  100), 

84. 
Stevens   v.    Minneapolis    (42    Minn. 

136;  43  N.  W.  Rep.  842),  199. 
Stevens  v.  Van  Cleve  (4  Wash.  C.  C. 

262),  131. 
Stevenson  v.  Gelsthorpe  (10  Mont. 

503),  193. 
Stevenson  v.  Gunning  (25  Atl.  Rep. 

697;  64  Vt.  601),  370. 
Stevenson  v.  Marony  (6  Ind.  330), 

247. 
Stevenson  v.  Reeves  (8  S.  Rep.  695), 

141. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxx* 


References  are  to  sections. 


Stevenson  v.   Smith  (28  N.  H.  12), 

286. 
Stevenson    v.   Wallace    (27    Gratt., 

Va.,  77),  226. 
Steward  v.  Clinton  (79  Mo.  604),  143a. 
Stewart  v.  Armstrong  (56  Fed.  Rep. 

167),  83. 
Stewart  v.  Chadvvick  (8  Iowa,  463), 

50. 
Stewart  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  Co.  (89 

Mich.  315),  344. 
Stewart  v.  De  Loach  (86  Ga.  729),  32. 
Stewart  v.  Kip  (5  Johns.  256),  303, 

309. 
Stewart  v.  Munford  (91  111.  158),  83. 
Stewart  v.  Preston  (1  Fla.  10),  128. 
Stewart  v.  Railroad    Co.    (86    Mich. 

315),  344. 
Stewart  v.  Register  (108  N.  C.  588), 

363. 
Stewart  v.  Smith  (23  111.  397),  217. 
Stewart  v.  State  (62  Md.  412),  23. 
Stewart's  Will  (1  Con.  Sur.  86),  232. 
Stice^  Ex  parte  (70  Cal.  51).  332. 
Sticker  v.   Groves  (5   Whart.    386), 

276. 
Stickney  v.  Stickney  (131  U.  S.  227, 

237),  167,  168. 
Stier  v.    Oscaloosa   (41   Iowa,    353), 

242. 
Stierle  v.  Kaiser  (La.,  1893,    12   S. 

Rep.  839),  355. 
Stiff  v.  Ashton  (155  Mass.  130;  29  N. 

E.  Rep.  303),  82. 
Stiles  v.  Giddens  (21  Tex.  783),  208. 
Stiles  v.  Probst  (69  111.  382),  128. 
Stiles  v.  Stewart  (12  Wend.  473),  244. 
Stiles  v.  Western   R.    Co.    (8   Met., 

Mass. ,  44),  73a. 
Still  v.  Tompkins  (154  Pa.   St.  43), 

212. 
Stillings  v.  Timmins  (152  Mass.  147; 

25  N.  E.  Rep.  50),  205,  208. 
Stillwater  Co.  v.  Coover  (26  Ohio  St. 

520),  198. 
Stillwell  v.  Archer  (18  N.  Y.  S.  888; 

64  Hun,  169),  11,  249. 
Stillwell  v.  Farwell  (61  Vt.  286),  346. 


Stillwell  v.   Patton  (18  S.  W.  Rep. 

1075;  108  Mo.  353),  129. 
Stillwell  &  B.  Mfg.   Co.   v.   Phelps" 

(130  U.  S.  520),  199. 
Stimpson  v.  Brooks  (3  Blatchf.  436), 

359. 
Stinch field  v.  Emerson  (52  Me.  465), 

233. 
Stinchfield  v.  Milliken  (71  Me.  567), 

223. 
Stinde  v.  Goodrich  (3  Redf.  Sur.  87), 

232. 
Stirnes  v.  Schofield  (Ind.,  1892,  31 

N.  E.  Rep.  411),  249. 
Stocking  v.  St.   Paul   Trust  Co.  (39 

Minn.  40),  37. 
Stockman  v.  Brooks  (27  Pac.  Rep, 

746),  142a. 
Stockton  v.  Johnson  (6  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

409),  69. 
Stockton  v.  Williams  (1  Doug.,  Mich., 

570),  50. 
Stockton  Sav.   Bank  v.  Staples  (98 

Cal.  189;  32  Pac.  Rep.  936),  84. 
Stoddard  v.  Buxton  (41  Iowa,  583), 

229. 
Stoddard  v.  Hill  (S.  C,  1893,  17  S.  E. 

Rep.  138),  139,  139a. 
Stoddard   v.  Sloan   (65  Iowa,   680), 

242. 
Stoddard  v.  Town  (32  N.    E.   Rep. 

948),  188. 
Stodolka  v.  Novotus  (111.,  1893,  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  534),  136. 
Stokeley  v.  Gordon  (8  Md.  496),  222. 
Stokoe  v.  St.  Paul,  M.  &  M.  R.  Co. 

(40  Minn.  546),  173. 
Stokes  v.  People  (53  N.  Y.  164),  234. 
Stokes  v.  State  (5  Baxt.,  Tenn.,  619), 

202. 
Stollenmalck  v.  Thacher  (115  Mass. 

224),  73a. 
Stondennie  v.  Harper  (81  Ala.  242), 

336. 
Stone  v.  Byron  (4  Dowl.  &  L.  393), 

312. 
Stone  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (66  Mich. 

76;  33  N.  W.  Rep.  24),  190. 


clxxvi 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Stone  v.  Geyser,  etc.  Co.  (52  Cal.  315), 

225. 
Stone  v.  Hubbard  (7  Cush.  595),  141. 
Stone  v.  Hunt  (114  Mo.  66;  21  S.  W. 

Rep.  454),  308. 
Stone  v.  Railroad  Co.  (S.  D.,  1893,  53 

N.  W.  Rep.  189),  282. 
Stone  v.  Thomas  (12  Pa.  St.  269),  139. 
Stone  Cattle  Co.  v.   Boon  (73  Tex. 

158),  142. 
Stoner  v.  Devilbiss  (70  Md.  160),  341. 
Stonesifer  v.  Kilburn  (94  Cal.   33), 

373. 
Stooksberry  v.  Swan  (Tex.,  1893,  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  694),  106. 
Stoops  v.  Smith  (100  Mass.  63),  232. 
Storer  v.  Gowen  (18  Me.  174),  80. 
Storey  v.  Flanigan  (57  Tex.  649),  107. 
Storm  v.  United  States  (94  U.  S.  84), 

208. 
Stout  v.  Slattery  (12  111.  162),  357. 
Stover  v.  People  (56  N.  Y.  316),  229, 

354a. 
Stowe  v.  Bishop  (58  Vt.  498),  186. 
Stratton  v.  Hawks  (43  Kan.  541),  126. 
Stratton  v.  Upton  (36  N.  H.  581),  276. 
Strauss   v.  Abraham  (32   Fed.  Rep. 

210),  351. 
Strauss  v.  Gross  (Tex.,  1893, 21  S.  W. 

Rep.  305),  214. 
Strawbridge    v.  Spain  (8  Ala.  820), 

73a. 
Stribling  v.  Atkinson  (79  Tex.  162), 

105. 
Strickland  v.  Hudson  (55  Miss.  235), 

123. 
Stringer  v.  Frost  (116  Ind.  477),  382. 
Stringham  v.  Insurance  Co.  (4  Abb. 

App.  Dec,  N.  Y.,  315),  73a. 
Strode  v.  Churchill  (2  Litt.,  Ky.,  75), 

148. 
Strode  v.  MacGowan  (2  Busb,  Ky., 

621),  234. 
Strohm   v.  Railroad   Co.  (96   N.    Y. 

305),  192. 
Strong  v.  Bradley  (13  Vt,  9),  147. 
Strong  v.  Case  (Kirby,  Conn.,  345), 
140. 


Strong  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  680),  9. 
Strong  v.  Stevens  (62  Wis.  255),  188. 
Strong  v.  Stewart  (9  Heisk.,  Tenn., 

137),  75,  76. 
Strong  v.  Strong  (126  111.  301),  223. 
Strong  v.   Wilson   (1    Morris,   Iowa, 

84),  310. 
Stroud  v.  Springfield  (28  Tex.  649), 

115. 
Stroud  v.  Tilton  (4  Abb.,  N.  Y.,  324), 

60. 
Stroudsburg  v.   Brown  (11  Pa.  Co. 

Ct.  R.  272),  239. 
Struthers  v.  Drexel  (122  U.  S.  487 ; 

7  S.  Ct.  1293),  18. 
Struthers  v.  Fuller  (45  Kan.  735),  282. 
Struyer  v.  Johnson  (110  Pa.  St.  21), 

151. 
Stuart  v.  New  Haven  (17  Neb.  211), 

202. 
Stuart  v.  People  (42  Mich.   255),   6, 

229. 
Stubbs  v.  State  (53  Miss.  437),  244. 
Stuckslager  v.  Neel  (123  Pa.  St.  60), 

60. 
Stump  v.   Napier  (2  Yerger,  Tenn., 

35),  310. 
Sturdivant  v.  Hull  (59  Me.  172).  73a. 
Sture  v.  Sture  (5  Johns.  Ch.  1),  215. 
Sturge  v.  Buchanan  (2  M.  &  R.  90), 

80. 
Sturm  v.  Jeffers  (2  C.  &  K.  442),  126. 
Suesenbach    v.  Wagner   (41    Minn. 

108),  148. 
Suiter  v.  Park  Nat.  Bank  (35  Neb. 

372),  247. 
Sullivan  v.  Davis  (29  Kan.  28),  83. 
Sullivan  v.   Kelly  (3  Allen,  Mass., 

148),  234. 
Sullivan  v.  Latimer  (S.  0.,  1893,  17 

S.  E.  Rep.  701),  309. 
Sullivan  v.  O'Leary  (146  Mass.  322), 

340. 
Sullivan  v.  People  (122  111.  385),  239. 
Sullivan  v.  People  (114  111.  24),  354a. 
Sullivan  v.  State  (93  Pa.  St.   285), 

201. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


clxxvii 


Keferences  are  to  sections. 


Sullivan  v.  State  (6  Tex.  App.  319), 

121. 
Summer  v.   Mitchell   (29  Fla.    179), 

135,  136. 
Summer  v.  State  (5  Tex.  App.  365), 

191. 
Summers  v.   Bergner    &  Eng.    Co. 

(143  Pa.  St.  114),  11. 
Summers  v.  Mosely  (2  C.  &  M.  477), 

339. 
Sumner  v.  Peeble  (5  Wash.  St.  471), 

231. 
Sumner  v.  Williams  (5  Mass.  144),  51. 
Sumpterv.    State  (11   Fla.  217),  324. 
Sunderland,  In  re(l  P.  &  D.  198).  210. 
Supples  v.  Lewis  (37  Conn.  56S),  35. 
Surles  v.  State  (89  Ga.  167),  351. 
Suter  v.  Bank  (35  Neb.  372),  252. 
Sutherland  v.  Ross  (140  Pa.  St.  379; 

21  Atl.    Rep.  354;  28  W.   N.  C. 

17).  309. 
Sutherland   v.    Stand.    L.    Ins.    Co. 

(Iowa,  1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  453), 

250. 
Sutor  v.  Woo'd  (76  Tex.  403),  340. 
Sutton  v.  Com.  (85  Va.  128),  346. 
Swain   v.  Comstock   (18   Wis.  463), 

242. 
Swain  v.  Grangers'  Union  (69  Cal. 

176),  217. 
Swain  v.  Humphreys  (42  111.  App. 

370),  169,  170. 
Swales  v.  Grubb  (126  Ind.  106),  237. 
Swan  v.  State  (26   Tex.  App.  115), 

332. 
Swazey  v.  Ames  (79  Me.  483),  309. 
Sweeny  v.  Easter  (1  Wall.   166),  310. 
Sweet  v.  Parker  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  455), 

308. 
Sweet  v.  Stevens  (7  R.  I.  375),  212. 
Swennerton  v.  Columbian  (37  N.  Y. 

174),  238. 
Swett  v.   Parker  (22  N.  J.  Eq.  453), 

223. 
Swett  v.  Shumway  (102  Mass.  365), 

217. 
Sweat  v.  State  (90  Ga.  315;  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  278),  378. 


Sweat  v.  State  (4  Tex.  App.  617),  23. 
Sweeney  v.  Easter  (1  Wall.  166),  312. 
Sweeney  v.  Girolo  (154  Pa.  St.  609;, 

150a. 
Sweigart   v.    Richard   (8   Barr,  Pa., 

436),  140. 
Swift  v.  Stevens  (8  Conn.  431),  130. 
Swift  Elec.  L.  Co.  v.  Grant  (90  Mich. 

469;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  539),  375. 
Swigart  v.  State  (109  111.  372),  5. 
Swigart  v.  Weare  (37  111.  App.  253), 

128. 
Swink  v.  French  (11  Lea,  SO),  53. 
Swisher  v.  Com.  (2oGtatt.,  Va.,  963), 

102. 
Switzer  v.  Claflin  (82  Tex.  513),  24. 
Sykes  v.  Bates  (26  Iowa,  522),  308. 
Sykes  v.  Lewis  (17  Ala.  261),  73. 
Sykes  v.  People  (132  111.  32;  23  N.  E. 

Rep.  391),  23. 
Sylvester  v.  Crapo  (15  Pick.,  Mass., 

92),  70. 
Sylvius  v.  Kosek  (117   Pa.    St.   67), 

223. 
Symmons  v.  Knox  (3  T.  R.  65),  19. 
Syracuse,   The   (36  Fed.   Rep.  830), 

276. 

T. 

Tabb  v.  Cabell  (17  Gratt.,  Va.,  160), 

76. 
Tabor  v.  Judd  (62  N.  H.  288),  350. 
Tabor  v.  N.  Y.  E.  R.  Co.  (58  N.  Y. 

Super.  Ct.  579),  8. 
Taft  v.  Com.  (158  Mass.  526;  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  1046),  188. 
Taft  v.  Fiske  (140  Mass.  250),  276. 
Talbott  v.  Hedges  (32  N.  E.  Rep.  788, 

Ind.,  1S93),  139a. 
Talbott  v.  Hines  (32  N.  E.  Rep.  788), 

139. 
Talbot  v.  Houser  (12  Bush,  Ky.,  408), 

135. 
Talbot  v.  McGee  (4   B.    Mon.,    Ky., 

377),  74. 
Talbot  v.  Seaman  (1  Cranch,   U.  S., 

12,  38),  143,  212. 


clxxviii 


TAP.LE    OF    CASKS. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Talcott  v.  Harris  (93  N.  Y.  567,  571), 

80. 
Taliaferro  v.  Goudelock  (82  Tex.  521), 

79. 
Taliaferro  v.  Lee  (Ala.,  1893,   13  S. 

Rep.  125),  367. 
Talkin  v.    Anderson  (Tex.,   1892,    19 

S.  W.  Rep.  350),  07. 
Tallmadge  v.  Press  (14  N.  Y.  S.  331; 

60  Hun,  579),  249. 
Tall  man  v.  Early  (13  N.  Y.  S.  805), 

24. 
Tallman  v.   Tallman  (3   Misc.    Rep. 

465),  222. 
Tarns  v.  Bullix  (35  Pa.  St.  30S),  7. 
Taney  v.  Kemp  (4  H.  &  J.  348),  353. 
Tangway  v.  O'Tonnell  (132  Ind.  62), 

151. 
Tankersley    v.    State    (31   Tex.    Cr. 

App.  595),  283. 
Tappan  v.  Kimball  (30  N.  H.  136), 

69. 
Tarbell  v.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.  (44  Minn. 

471),  205,  211. 
Tarbox  v.  Shuegrue  (36  Kan.  225), 

50. 
Tarsney  v.  Turner  (48  Fed.  Rep.  818), 

347. 
Tate  v.  Fashee  (117  Ind.  322),  262. 
Tate  v.  Penne  (Mart.,  La.,  548),  234. 
Tatham  v.  Ramey  (S2  Pa.  St.  120),  24. 
Tatum  v.  Colvin   (9  S.  Rep.  747;  43 

La.  Ann.  755),  3S0. 
Tavener  v.  Barrett  (21  W.  Va.  658), 

135. 
Taussig  v.  Glenn  (51  Fed.  Rep.  409), 

33. 
Taylor  v.  Alexander  Bank  (5  Leigb, 

Va.,  471),  143. 
Taylor  v.  Arnold  (17  S.  W.  Rep.  361, 

Ky.,  1892),  24. 
Taylor  v.  Association  (68  Ala.   229), 

73a. 
Taylor  v.  Barclay  (2  Sim.  213),  243. 
Taylor  v.  Beavers  (4    E.    D.    Smith, 

215),  218,  221. 
Taylor  v.  Beck   (3  Rand.,  Va.,  216), 

310. 


Taylor  v.  Biggs  (1  Pet.  591),  355. 
Taylor  v.  Boardman  (25  Vt.  581),  242. 
Taylor  v.  Brily  (130    Ind.     484;    30 

N.  E.  Rep.  369),  232. 
Taylor  v.  Brydon  (8  Johns.  173),  159. 
Taylor  v.  Bunker  (Mich.,  1888,  36  N. 

W.  Rep.  166),  308. 
Taylor  v.  Carryl  (20 How.,  U.  S.,  583), 

155. 
Taylor  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (80  Iowa, 

431),  371. 
Taylor  v.  Com.  (18  Atl.  Rep.  588;  109 

Pa.  St.  270),  93,  231. 
Taylor  v.  Com.  (18  S.  W.  Rep.  852, 

Ky.,  1892),  346. 
Taylor  v.  Com.  (Va.,   1893,   17  S.  E. 

Rep.  81),  6,  355. 
Taylor  v.  Cook   (8   Price,    650),    116, 

139. 
Taylor  v.  Cort  (32  Neb.  30),  150a. 
Taylor  v.  Cresswell  (45  Md.  422),  231. 
Taylor  v.  Crowninshield    (5    N.     Y. 

Leg.  Obs.  209,  223),  141. 
Taylor  v.  Davis   (82  Wis.  455;  52  N. 

W.  Rep.  756),  60. 
Taylor  v.  Dominick  (36   S.  C.    368), 

370. 
Taylor  v.  Dusterberg  (109  Ind.  165), 

308. 
Taylor  v.  Forster  (2  C.  P.  195),  169. 
Taylor  v.  Glenn  (29  S.   C.  292),  110, 

115. 
Taylor  v.  Hatch  (12  Johns.  340),  356. 
Taylor  v.  Judd  (62  N.  H.  288),  115. 
Taylor  v.  Kilgore  (33  Ala.  214),  148. 
Taylor  v.   Lawson  (3  C.  &  P.  543), 

330. 
Taylor  v.  Luther  (2  Sumn.,  U.   S., 

238),  223. 
Taylor  v.  Peck  (21  Gratt.,  Va.,  11), 

38. 
Taylor  v.  People  (12  Hun,  212),  323. 
Taylor  v.  Railroad  (48  N.  H.  309),  52. 
Taylor  v.  Roe  (4  Hawks,  116),  115. 
Taylor  v.  Sayre  (24  N.  J.  L  647),  205, 

217. 
Taylor  v.  State  (22  Tex.  App.  753;  3 
'  S.  W.  Rep.  753),  319. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Taylor  v.  State  (29  N.   E.   Rep.  41.3; 

130  Ind.  66),  330. 
Taylor  v.  State  (52  Miss.  84).  343. 
Taylor  v.  State  (83  Ga.  S47 ;  10  S.  E. 

Rep.  442),  354a. 
Taylor  v.  Taylor  (26  Abb.  N.  C.  360), 

145. 
Taylor  v.  Taylor  (79  Tex.  104),  11. 
Taylor,  In  re  (154  Pa.  St.  1S3),  309. 
Teacher  v.  Strauss  (47  Miss.  358),  221. 
Teachout  v.  People  (41   N.  Y.  8),  93. 
Teal  v.  Barton  (40  Barb.,  N.  Y.,  137), 

200. 
Tebbetts  v.  Haskins  (16  Me.  283),  198, 

199. 
Teel  v.  Yart  (128  N.  Y.  387),  159. 
Tees  v.  Huntingdon  (23  How.  11-13), 

349. 
Teeter  v.  Teeter  (20  N.  Y.  S.  259 ;  65 

Hun,  623),  380. 
Teft  v.  Size  (10  111.  432),  143a. 
Telephone  Co.  v.  Thompson  (112  Pa. 

St.  3 IS),  73a. 
Temple  v.  Com.  (75  Va.  892),  354. 
Temple  v.  State  (15  Tex.  App.  405), 

242. 
Temple,  Ex  parte  (2  Ves.  &  B.  391), 

287. 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Runk  (26  N.  J.  L.  513), 

70. 
Ten  Eyck  v.  Witbeck  (69  Hun,  450),  9. 
Tennant  v.  Banigan  (1  Dak.  432),  6. 
Tennessee,    etc.    Co.    v.     Danforth 

(Ala.,  1893,  13  S.  Rep.  51).  33. 
Tennessee  Riv.  Transp.  Co.  v.  Kava- 

naugh  (Ala.,    1893,    13  S.    Rep. 

283),  370. 
Tenney  v.  East  Warren,  etc.  Co.  (43 

N.  H.  343),  131. 
Tenney  v.  Evans  (13  N.  H.  462),   176. 
Tennis  v.  Railroad  Co.  (43  Kan.  503; 

25  Pac.  Rep.  876),  57. 
Tenny  v.  Simpson  (37  Kan.  353),  268. 
Ternes  v.  Dunn  (7  Utah,  497),  18. 
Terpening   v.    Holton  (9  Colo.    30), 

130. 
Terre  Haute  v.  Hudnut  (18  Am.  & 
.  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  302),  198. 


Terre  Haute  v.  Rodel  (89  Ind.    128), 

83. 
Terre  Haute,  etc.    Co.  v.    Clem  (123 

Ind.  15),  8. 
Terre  Haute,  etc.    Co.  v.   Pierce  (95 

Ind.  496),  239. 
Terre   Haute,  etc.  Co.  v.   Stockwell 

(118  Ind.  102),  6. 
Territory  v.  Big   Knot   on    Head  (6 

Mont.  242),  50. 
Territory  v.  Chaves  (N.  M.,  1893,  30 

Pac.  Rep.  903),  6. 
Territory  v.  Clayton  (8  Mont.  1),  350. 
Territory  v.  Edie    (N.    M.,    1893,  30 

Pac.  Rep.  581),  52. 
Territory  v.  Godfrey  (6  Dak.  46),  52. 
Territory  v.  Hanna    (5    Mont.    248), 

384. 
Territory  v.  Jones  (6  Dak.  85),  343. 
Territory  v.  McKern  (Idaho,  1890,  26 

Pac.  Rep.  123),  91. 
Territory  v.  Rehberg  (6  Mont.  467; 

13  Pac.  Rep.  132),  339. 
Terry  v.  Danville,  etc.  Co.  (91  N.  C. 

236),  208. 
Terry  v.  Rodahan  (79  Ga.  278),  38. 
Tetes  v.  Volmer  (58  Hun,  1),  130. 
Tevis  v.  Collier  (84  Tex.  638;  19  S. 

W.  Rep.  801),  81. 
Tewksbury  v.  Schulenberg  (41  Wis. 

584),  239. 
Texas  Cent.    R.   Co.  v.  Burnett  (80 

Tex.   536 ;  16   S.   W.   Rep.    320), 

192. 
Texas,  etc.   Co.   v.   Barron  (78  Tex. 

421),  57,  373. 
Texas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hall  (83  Tex.  675), 

282. 
Texas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Morin  (66  Tex.  133), 

250. 
Texas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Robertson  (82  Tex. 

657),  57. 
Texas  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davidge  (51 

Tex.  244).  211. 
Thalheimer    v.    Klapetzy    (59  Hun, 

619),  347. 
Tharpe  v.  Gisburne  (2  C.  &  P.  21,  12 

E.  C.  L.),  139. 


cuxxx 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Thatcher  v.  Morris  (11  N.  Y.  437), 

242. 
Thatcher  v.  Powell  (6  Wheat.  119). 

232. 
Thayer  v.  Grossman  (1  Mete.  416), 

310. 
Thayer  v.   Finton  (108  N.  Y.   397), 

220. 
Thayer  v.  Thayer  (101  Mass.  Ill),  9. 
Thayer  v.  Wellington  (9  Allen,  283), 

210. 
Theisen  v.  Dayton  (82  Iowa,  74;  47 

N.  W.  Rep.  891),  170. 
Theodorsen  v.  Ahlgren  (37  111.  App. 

140),  3G9. 
Third  Nat.  Bank  v.  Owen  (101  Mo. 

558),  337. 
Thistle  v.  Buford  (50  Mo.  278),  82. 
Thistlethwait   v.    Thistlethwait    (13 

Ind.  355),  119,  309. 
Thomas  v.   Barnes  (156  Mass.  581), 

209. 
Thomas  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (49  Mo. 

App.  110),  380. 
Thomas  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  226),  18. 
Thomas  v.  Com.  (17  S.  E.  Rep.  788, 

Va.,  1893),  240. 
Thomas  v.  England  (71  Cal.  458),  226, 

241. 
Thomas  v.  Griff  en  (Ind.,  1890,  27  N. 

E.  Rep.  754),  173. 
Thomas  v.  Hargrove  (Wright,  Ohio, 

595),  71. 
Thomas  v.  Herrall  (18  Oreg.  546),  57. 
Thomas  v.  Horlocker  (1  Dall.,   Pa., 

14),  139. 
Thomas  v.  Jenkins  (1  N.  &  P.  588), 

115. 
Thomas  v.  Lewis  (89  Va.  1;  15  S.  E. 

Rep.  389),  79. 
Thomas  v.  Loose  (114  Pa.   St.  170), 

212. 
Thomas  v.  Miller   (151  Pa.  St.  482), 

340,  363. 
Thomas  v.  Musser  (1  Dall.  458),  14. 
Thomas  v.  Newton  (1   M.  &  M.  48). 

354a. 


Thomas  v.  People  (67  N.  Y.  218).  10. 
Thomas  v.  Rutledge  (67  111.  212),  73a. 
Thomas  v.  State  (29  Ga.  287),  3:30. 
Thomas  v.  State  (84  Ga.  613;  10  S.  E. 

Rep.  1016),  89. 
Thomas  v.  State  (67  Ga.  460),  193. 
Thomas  v.  State  (103  Ind.  419),  139, 

139a,  140. 
Thomas  v.  Stigers  (5  Pa.  St.  480),  238. 
Thomas  v.  Tanner  (6  T.  B.  Mon.  152), 

148. 
Thomas  v.  Thomas  (16  Neb.  555).  233. 
Thomas  v.  Truscott  (53  Barb.,  N.  Y., 

200),  222. 
Thompson  v.  Bell  (37  Ala.  438),  208. 
Thompson  v.  Blanchard  (2  Iowa,  44), 

77. 
Thompson  v.  Brandt  (98  Cal.  155;  33 

Pac.  Rep.  890),  282. 
Thompson  v.  Brannin  (Ky.,  1S93,  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  1057),  186. 
Thompson  v.  Bullock  (1  Bay,  S.  O, 

364),  108. 
Thompson  v.  Burhans  (61  N.  Y.  52), 

357. 
Thompson  v.  Com.  (88  Va.  45),  283. 
Thompson  v.  Davitt    (59    Ga.    472), 

131. 
Thompson  v.  Deprez    (96    Ind.    67), 

198. 
Thompson  v.  Gregor  (11  Colo.  531), 

350. 
Thompson  v.  Haskell    (21   III.    215), 

240,  244. 
Thompson  v.  Ish(12  S.  W.  Rep.  510; 

99  Mo.  160),  178,  188. 
Thompson  v.  Johnson  (84  Tex.  548), 

136. 
Thompson  v.  Judge  (54    Mich.   237), 

358. 
Thompson  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co. 

(6  N.  Y.  S.  7),  188. 
Thompson  v.  Locke  (65  Iowa,   429), 

214. 
Thompson  v.  Mason  (4  Bradw.,  111., 

452),  149. 
Thompson   v.    McCormack  (136   111. 

135;  26  N.  E.  Rep.  373),  151. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 
References  are  to  sections. 


clxxxi 


Thompson  v.  Newlin  (8  Ired.  Eq.  32), 

231. 
Thompson  v.  Norwood  (64  Hun,  630), 

281a. 
Thompson  v.  Penn.  R.   Co.  (15  Atl. 

Rep.  S33;  51  N.  J.  L.  42),  187. 
Thompson   v.   Poor  (67   Hun,    653), 

262. 
Thompson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (45  Minn. 

13),  362. 
Thompson  v.  Railroad   Co.    (82  Cal. 

497),  220. 
Thompson  v.  Railroad  Co.  (91  Mich. 

255),  S. 
Thompson  v.  Ray  (Ga.,   1S93,   18  S. 

E.  Rep.  59),  333. 
Thompson  v.  Richards  (14  Mich.  172), 

67. 
Thompson    v.   Richardson   (96    Ala. 

4S8;  11  S.  Rep.  728),  124. 
Thompson  v.  State  (38  Ind.  89),  350. 
Thompson  v.  State  (Me.,  13  Atl.  Rep. 

892).  140. 
Thompson   v.    State  (30  Tex.   App. 

325),  384. 
Thompson  v.  Stewart  (3  Conn.  171), 

149. 
Thompson  v.  Stewart  (92  Ind.  246), 

147. 
Thompson  v.  Thompson  (92  Ala.  545 ; 

8S.  Rep.  419),  371. 
Thompson  v.  Thompson  (Ky.,  1893, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  373),  79. 
Thompson  v.  Thompson  (77  Ga.  692), 

229. 
Thompson  v.  Thompson  (88  Cal.  110), 

376. 
Thompson  v.  Thompson  (13  Ohio  St. 

356),  67. 
Thompson  v.  Williams  (30  Kan.  114), 

211. 
Thompson,  In  re  (53  Hun,  608),  187. 
Thompson's  Case  (122  Mass.  248),  286. 
Thompson's  Case  (1  Leach,  325),  95, 

260. 
Thompson-Houston  Electric    Co.  v. 

Palmer  (52  Minn.  174 ;  53  N.  W. 

Rep.  1137),  33. 


Thomson  v.  Beal  (48  Fed.  Rep.  614), 

210. 
Thorndike  v.    Boston   (1   Met.  242), 

56. 
Thorne  v.  Travelers'  Ins.  Co.  (80  Pa. 

St.  15),  208. 
Thornton  v.  Blaisdell  (37  Me.  190), 

302. 
Thornton  v.  Britton  (144 Pa.  St.  126), 

122. 
Thorp  v.  Adams  (58  Hun,  603),  285. 
Thorp  v.  Philbin  (2  N.  Y.  S.  732),  33. 
Thorpe  v.  Barber  (5  M.,  G.  &  S.  675), 

302. 
Thorson   v.   Peterson   (9  Fed.   Rep. 

517),  239. 
Tin-all  v.  Lathrop  (30  Vt.  307),  84. 
Thrasher  v.  Ballard  (33  W.  Va.  285), 

142. 
Thrasher  v.   Overly  (51  Ga.  91),  77, 

314. 
Throckmorton   v.  Throckmorton  (15 

S.  E.  Rep.  289),  304. 
Thurf  jell  v.  Witherbee  (24  N.  Y.  S. 

278),  281a. 
Thurman   v.  Blankenship-Blake  Co. 

(79  Tex.  171),  67. 
Thurman   v.    Cameron  (24  Wend., 

N.  Y.,  91),  135. 
Thurman   v.   Morrison  (14  B.  Mon. 

296),  239. 
Thurston    v.    Luce    (61    Mich.  292), 

142. 
Thurston  v.  Masterson  (9  Dana,  Ky., 

285),  108. 
Tibbals  v.  Jacobs  (31  Conn.  428),  70. 
Tibbetts  v.  Flanders  (18  N.  H.  284), 

124. 
Tibbetts  v.  Sternberg  (66  Barb.,  N. 

Y.,  201),  339. 
Tidmarsh  v.  Wash.  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co. 

(4  Mason,  439),  250. 
Tierney  v.  Corbett  (2  Mackey,  264), 

71. 
Tierney  v.  Railroad  Co.  (24  Am.  L. 

Reg.  669),  194. 
Tilden  v.    Barnard  (43  Mich.   376), 

73a. 


clxxxii 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Tilley  v.  Damon  (11   Cush.,  Mass., 

247),  7G. 
Tillinghast  v.  Champlin  (4  R.  1. 173), 

268. 
Tillinghast  v.  Nourse  (14  Ga.  641), 

73a. 
Tillman   v.  Fletcher  (78  Tex.  673), 

282. 
Tillon  v.  Insurance  Co.  (7  Barb.  564), 

129. 
Tillotson   v.   Mitchell  (111  111.  518), 

83. 
Tillotson  v.  Race  (22  N.  Y.  127),  124. 
Tillotson  v.  Weber  (Mich.,    1893,  55 

N.  VvT.  Rep.  837),  142. 
Tilly  v.   Tilly    (2    Bland   Ch.,   Md., 

444),  233. 
Tilman  v.  Traver  (Moody  &  Ryan, 

141),  140. 
Tilton  v.  Cofield  (93  U.  S.  166),  3S6. 
Timberlake  v.  Brewer  (59  Ala.  10S), 

240. 
Timberlake  v.  Parish  (5  Dana,  346), 

215. 
Timms  v.  Sherman  (19  Md.  296),  212. 
Tingly  v.  Cowgill  (48  Mo.    201),  51, 

168. 
Tinkham  v.  Arnold  (3  Me.  120),  226. 
Tinkler  v.   Walpoli   (14  East,    226), 

144. 
Tinkler's  Case  (1  East,  P.  C.  354),  101. 
Tinnern   v.    Hinz  (38  Hun,  N.  Y., 

465),  67. 
Tinsley  v.  Dowell  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S. 

W.  Rep.  928),  220. 
Tipton  v.  Norman  (72  Mo.  380),  143a. 
Tipton  v.  State  (17  S.  W.  Rep.  1097; 

30  Tex.  App.  530),  352. 
Tipton  v.  Warner  (47  Kan.  606),  232. 
Tisch  v.  Utz  (21  Atl.  Rep.  808;  142 

Pa.  St.  186;  28  W.  N.  C.  55),  67. 
Tischler  v.  Apple  (30  Fla.  132),  370, 

'  380. 
Tisdale  v.   Insurance  Co.  (26  Iowa, 

170),  233. 
Tisdale  v.  State  (17  Tex.  App.  444), 

324. 
Tison  v.  Smith  (8  Tex.  147),  237. 


Titford  v.  Knott  (2  Johns.   Ch.,  N. 

Y,  211),  136. 
Titterington  v.  Trees  (78  Tex.  567), 

115. 
Tittman  v.  Thornton  (107  Mo.  000), 

373. 
Titus  v.  Ash  (54  N.  H.  319),  21. 
Tobey  v.  Bristol  (3  Story,  800),  275. 
Tobey  v.  Leonard  (2  Wall.  403),  304. 
Tobin  v.  Shaw  (45  Me.  331),  229. 
Tobin,  In  re  (4  N.  Y.  S.  59),  233. 
Todd  v.  Dibble  (6  Dem.  Sur.  35),  309. 
Todd  v.  Jones  (22  Iowa,  146),  136. 
Todd  v.  Roberts  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  8), 

220. 
Todd  v.  Stafford  (1  Stew.,  Ala.,  199), 

310. 
Tognini  v.  Kyle  (17  Nev.  209),  24. 
Toledo,  etc.   Co.  v.  Harnsberger  (41 

111.  App.  494),  23. 
Toledo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Milligan  (2  Ind. 

App.  578),  8. 
Toledo,   etc.    R.    Co.    v.    Dunlap  (47 

Mich.  456),  344. 
Toledo,  St.  Louis,  etc.   Co.   v.   Baily 

(145    111.    159;    33    N.    E.    Rep. 

1089),  8. 
Tollarson  v.  Blackstock  (11  S.   Rep. 

2S4,  Ala.,  1892),  246. 
Toiman  v.  Emerson  (4  Pick.,  Mass., 

160),  106. 
Tomblerv.  Reitz  (Ind.,  1893,  33  N. 

E.  Rep.  789),  219. 
Tome  v.  Gerlach  (18  N.  Y.  932),  250. 
Tome  v.  Railroad  Co.  (39  Md.  36,  37, 

90),  38a,  139,  140. 
Tomlinson   v.    Greenfield    (31   Ark. 

557),  237. 
Tomlinson   v.   Lynch  (32  Mo.   160), 

166. 
Tompkins  v.  Corinth  (9  Cow.,  N.  Y, 

255),  128. 
Tompkins  v.  Merriman  (155  Pa.  St. 

440),  220. 
Tompkins  v.  Tompkins  (1  Story,  547), 

150. 
Tompkins  v.  West  (56  Conn.  585), 

189. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxiii 


References  are  to  sections. 


Tonnele,  etc.  v.  Hall  (4  Coiust.  145), 

210. 
Tooker  v.   Sloan  (30  N.  J.  Eq.  94), 

136. 
Toomer  v.  Gadsden  (4  Strob.,  S.  C, 

19:!),  GO. 
Toomes'  Estate  (54  Cal.  514),  185. 
Toomey   v.   Lyman   (61    Hun,   623), 

229. 
Toorle  v.  Smith  (34  Kan.  27),  356. 
Topeka  v.  Sherwood  (39  Kan.  690),  8. 
Topiitz  v.  Hedden  (146  U.  S.  252), 

350. 
Torrey  v.  Forbes  (94  Ala.  135),  136. 
Totten   v.    United  States  (93  U.  S. 

105),  175. 
Touchard  v.  Crow  (20  Cal.  150),  135. 
Tourville  v.  Pierson  (39  111.  446),  136. 
Tow  v.  State  (27  Tex.  App.  175),  69. 
Towle  v.  Blake  (43  N.  H.  92),  52,  192. 
Town  v.  Lamphire  (37  Vt.  52),  71. 
Town  v.  Peebles  (5  Wash.    St.   471), 

83. 
Townley  v.  Coal  Co.   (59  Hun,  316), 

11. 
Townley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  Co.  (89 

Mo.  31),  189. 
Townsend   v.    Bush  (1   Conn.    267), 

323. 
Townsend  v.  Graves  (8  Paige,  455), 

10. 
Townsend  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  209),  354a. 
Townsend  v.  Todd  (47  Conn.  190),  83. 
Townsend  v.  Townsend  (7  Gill,  10), 

231. 
Tracy  v.  Atherton  (36  Vt.  503),  226. 
Tracy  Peerage  Case  (10  C.  &  F.  191), 

190. 
Tracy  v.  Iron  Works  (29  Mo.  App. 

342),  205. 
Traders'  Bank  v.  Parker  (130  N.  Y. 

415),  232. 
Trafton  v.  Hawes  (102  Mass.  541), 

208. 
Trahern  v.  Colburn  (63  Md.  104),  308. 
Trammel  v.    Bassett  (24  Ark.  499), 

80. 


Trammell  v.  Ramage  (Ala.,  1893,  11 

S.  Rep.  916),  199. 
Trammell  v.  Thurmond  (17  Ark.  203), 

136. 
Transp.  Line  v.  Hope  (95  U.  S.  297), 

198. 
Trapnall  v.  Brown  (19  Ark.  48),  246. 
Traser  v.   Haggerty  (86  Mich.  521), 

312. 
Travellers'   Ins.    Co.    v.    Mosley    (8 

Wall.  40S),  56. 
Travellers'  Ins.  Co.   v.  Sheppard  (85 

Ga.  751),  56,  333. 
Travers  v.   Jennings  (S.  C,  1893,  17 

•  S.  E.  Rep.  849),  360. 
Traverse  v.  Satterlee  (67  Hun,  652 ; 

22  N.  Y.  S.  118),  126. 
Travis  v.  Brown  (43  Pa.  St.  12),  141, 

185. 
Travis   v.   Continental  Ins.   Co.   (47 

Mo.  App.  472),  369. 
Travis  v.  Pierson  (43  111.  App.  479),  8. 
Trauer man   v.    Lippincott    (39    Mo. 

App.  478),  151. 
Tread  way  v.  Tread  way  (45  111.  App. 

478),  50. 
Trebilcox  v.  McAlpine  (62  Hun,  317), 

159. 
Tredwell  v.   Inslee  (120  N.  Y.  458), 

226. 
Trent  v.  Fletcher  (100  Ind.  105),  205. 
Trenwith  v.   Small  wood  (111  N.  C. 

132),  134. 
Treon  v.  Brown  (14  Ohio,  482),  310. 
Trese  v.  State  (2  S.  Rep.  390),  241. 
Trevelyan,  Adin'r,  v.  Lofft  (83  Va. 

141),  282. 
Trevor  v.  Wood  (36  N.  Y.  307),  33. 
Trileavan  v.  Dixon  (119  111.  551),  168. 
Trimble  v.  Edwards  (84  Tex.  497),  30. 
Trimble  v.  Mims  (Ga.,  1894,  18  S.  E. 

Rep.  362),  309. 
Trimbo  v.    Trimbo  (47  Minn.   389), 

250. 
Trinity  v.  Lane  (79  Tex.  643),  11. 
Triplett  v.  Gills  (7  J.  J.  Marsh.  433), 

142. 
Triplett  v.  Goff  (83  Va.  784),  69. 


clxxxiv 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


Beferences  are  to  sections. 


Tripp  v.  Cook  (26  Wend.  152),  386. 
Troeder  v.   Hyaras  (27  N.   E.   Rep. 

775),  138. 
Trotter  v.  Mills  (6  Wend.  512),  110. 
Truby  v.  Seybert  (12  Pa.  St.  101),  74. 
Truesdale  v.  Hoyle  (39  111.  App.  532), 

7,  8,  247,  252. 
Truitt's   Estate  (10  Phila.,  Pa.,  16), 

139a. 
Trujillo  v.  Territory  (N.  Mex.,  1893, 

30  Pac.  Rep.  870),  330. 
Trulick  v.  Peeples  (1  Ga.  3),  135. 
Trull  v.  Fisher  (28  Me.  548),  262. 
Trunkey  v.  Hedstrom  (33  111.  App. 

397),  124. 
Trustee,  Ex  parte  (9  Morrell's  Bank. 

Cas.  116),  170. 
Trustees  v.  Bledsoe  (5  Ind.  133),  73a. 
Trustees  v.    McKecbnie  (90   N.   Y. 

618),  136. 
Trustees  v.  Saunders  (Wis.,  1893,  54 

N.  W.  Rep.  1094),  208. 
Trustees   v.   Southard  (31   III.  App. 

359),  219. 
Trustees  v.   Stetson  (5  Pick.,  Mass., 

506),  205. 
Tuck  v.  Olds  (29  Fed.  Rep.  883),  267. 
Tucker  v.    Kellojjg  (8  Utah.  11;  28 

Pac.  Rep.  870).  139,  140. 
Tucker  v.  Page  (69  111.  179),  314. 
Tucker  v.  Peasley  (36  N.   II.  157),  7. 
Tucker  v.  People  (117  111.  91).  142. 
Tucker  v.  Seamen's   Aid   Society  (7 

Mete,  Mass  ,  188),  221. 
Tucker  v.  Smith  (68  Tex.  473;  3  S. 

W.  Rep.  671),  110,  112. 
Tucker  v.  So.  Kingston  (5  R.  I.  558), 

176. 
Tucker  v.  State  (11  Md.  322),  244. 
Tucker  v.  Tucker  (113  Ind.  272;  13 

N.  E.  Rep.  710),  214. 
Tuckwood  v.  Hawthorne  (30  N.  W. 

Rep.  705;  67  Wis.  326),  35. 
Tuley  v.  Barton  (79  Va.  387),  210. 
Tullis  v.  State  (30  Ohio  St.  200),  323. 
Tully  v.  Alexander  (11  La.  Ann.  628), 

166. 
Tunstall  v.  Cobb  (109  N.  C.  316),  13. 


Tuomey  v.  O'Reilly  (22  N.  Y.  S.  930; 

3  Misc.  Rep.  302),  367.  370. 
Turnbull  v.  Lanbagh  (0  Kulp,  Pa., 

126),  361. 
Turnbull  v.  Payson  (95  U.   S.  218), 

148. 
Turnbull    v.    Richardson  (69  Mich. 

400;  4  S.  Rep.  613),  35,  190. 
Turner  v.  Boston,  etc.  Co.  (33  N.  E. 

Rep.  520;  158  Mass.  261),  38a. 
Turner  v.  Coffin  (12  Allen,  401),  84. 
Turner  v.  Connelly   (105  N.    C.    72), 

130. 
Turner  v.  Cook  (36  Ind.  129),  276. 
Turner  v.  Fish  (28  Miss.  300),  242. 
Turner  v.  Hahr  (114  Mo.  335;  21  S. 

W.  Rep.  737),  198. 
Turner  v.   Hellard  (30  Ch.  D.  390), 

150. 
Turner  v.   Holden  (109  N.  C.    182), 

150a. 
Turner  v.  Jenkins  (1  H.  &  J.,  Md., 

161),  80. 
Turner  v.  Lord  (92  Mo.  113),  231. 
Turner  v.  Patten  (49  Ala.   406),  238. 
Turner  v.   Sav.  Inst.   (76   Me.  527), 

222. 
Turner  v.  State  (50  Miss.   351,   354), 

71,  160,  217. 
Turner  v.  State  (89  Tenn.  547),  39. 
Turner  v.  State  (Ala.,    1893,    12    S. 

Rep.  54),  19,  23. 
Turner  v.  Weddington(3  Wash.  126), 

148. 
Turnipseed  v.  Hawkins  (1  McCord, 

272),  138,  139. 
Turpin  v.  State  (55  Md.  462,   477), 

166,  167. 
Tuttle  v.  Rainey  (98  N.  C.  513),  139, 

229. 
Tutwiler  v.  Munford  (68  Ala.   124), 

208. 
Tuxbury   v.    French    (41    Mich.    7), 

220. 
Twiss  v.  Baldwin  (9  Conn.  292),  20. 
Twombly  v.  Leach  (11  Cush.,  Mass., 

405),  193. 
Tyler  v.  Flanders  (57  N.  H.  618),  53. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


olxxxv 


References  are  to  sections. 


Tyler  v.  Hall  (106  Mo.  313),   11,  82, 

169. 
Tyler  v.  Todd  (36  Conn.  218),  140. 
Tyler  v.  Tyler  (126  111.  525),  171. 
Tyres  v.  Kennedy  (126  Ind.  523),  69. 

U. 

Udderzook  v.  Coin.  (76  Pa.  St.  340), 

38a. 
Uhe  v.   Chicago  M.  etc.  Co.  (S.  D., 

1893,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  601),  341. 
Ulmer  v.  State  (14  Ind.  52),  324. 
Umbarger  v.  Chaboya  (49  Cal.  525), 

232. 
Underwood  v.  Hart  (23  Vt.  120),  74, 
Underwood  v.  State.  (72  Ala.  220),  23. 
Underwood  v.  Wing  (19  Beav.  459), 

233. 
Unger  v.  Mooney  (63  Cal.   586),  226. 
Union  v.  Plainfield  (39  Conn.   563). 

53. 
Union  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Insurance  Co. 

(83  Iowa,  647),  372. 
Union  Ins.   Co.   v.   Smith  (8  S.  Ct., 

U.  S.,  534),  198. 
Union  Mat.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mowry 

(96  U.  S.  547-48),  84. 
Union  M.  Ins.   Co.   v.  Wilkinson  (13 

Wall.  231),  205. 
Union  Nat.   Bank  v.  Int.  Bank  (22 

111.  App.  652),  205. 
Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Chicago,  etc. 

Co.  (51  Fed.  Rep.  309),  375. 
Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Fray  (35  Kan. 

700),  73a. 
Union  Pac.   Ry.   Co.   v.  O'Brien  (46 

Fed.  Rep.  538),  333. 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Reese  (56  Fed. 

Rep.  288),  350,  367. 
Union  Stock  Yards  v.  Gillespie  (137 

U.  S.  411).  18. 
Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Cattle  Co. 

(59  Fed.  Rep.  49),  205. 
United  Breth.  M.  A.  I.  Co.  v.  O'Hara 

(120  Pa.  St.  256),  194. 
United   States   v.    Amador  (N.   M., 

1892,  27  Pac.  Rep.  288),  35. 


United  States  v.  American  (1  Woolw. 

217),  238. 
United  States  v.  Angell(ll  Fed.  Rep. 

41,  54),  57,  241,  346. 
United  States  v.  Arredondo  (6  Wall. 

691),  242. 
United  States  v.  Atherton  (102  U.  S. 

375),  386. 
United  States  v.   Babcock  (3  Dill., 

U.  S.,  568),  288. 
United  States  v.  Bailey  (9  Pet.,  U.  S., 

238),  356. 
United  States  v.  Barrells  (8  Blatchf. 

475),  341. 
United   States   v.    Bassett  (5  Utah, 

131;  13  Pac.  Rep.  237),  167. 
United  States  v.  Beebe  (17  Fed.  Rep. 

36).  226. 
United  States  v.  Beebe  (2  Dak.  292), 

237. 
United  States  v.  Bell  (111  U.  S.  477), 

141. 
United  States  v.  Benner  (1    Baldw. 

238),  141. 
United  States  v.  Bennett  (17  Blatchf., 

U.  S.,  357),  384. 
United  States  v.  Boese  (46  Fed.  Rep. 

917),  93. 
United  States  v.  Bott    (11    Blatchf. 

346),  127. 
United  States  v.  Brown  (40  Fed.  Rep. 

457),  346. 
United  States  v.  Button  (2  Mason, 

464),  23. 
United  States  v.   Castro  (24   How. 

346).  106. 
United  States  v.  Chapman  (4  Am. 

Law  J.  440),  90. 
United  States  v.  Clapboards  (4  Cliff. 

303),  9. 
United  States  v.  Council   (54  Fed. 

Rep.  994),  76. 
United  States  v.  Cross  (20  D.  C.  365), 

141,  340. 
United  States  v.  Cushman  (2  Sumn. 

426),  154. 
United  States  v.  Cutler  (19  Pac.  Rep. 
145 ;  5  Utah,  608),  166. 


clxxxvi 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


United     States    v.    Cuttingham    (2 

Blatchf.  470).  127. 
United  States  v.  Ducourr.ac  (54  Fed. 

Rep.  138),  241. 
United   States  v.   Duff  (19  Blatchf. 

10),  126. 
United  States  v.  Durling(4  Biss.  509), 

277. 
United  States  v.  Edme  (9  S.  &  R., 

Pa.,  147),  286. 
United  States  v.  Ferguson  (54  Fed. 

Rep.  28),  804. 
United  States  v.  Ford  (33  Fed.  Rep. 

861),  350,  354Z>. 
United  States  v.  Ford  (99  U.  S.  595), 

323. 
United  States  v.  Gardner   (42   Fed. 

Rep.  832),  88. 
United  States  v.  Gates  (6  Fed.  Rep. 

866),  822. 
United  States  v.  Gibert  (2  Sumn.  16), 

97,  144,  332. 
United  States  v.  Gooding  (12  Wheat. 

469),  97. 
United  States  v.  Green  (6   Mackey, 

562),  232. 
United  States  v.  Guiteau  (3  dim.  L. 

Mag.  347),  197. 
United  States  v.  Hall  (7  Mackey,  14), 

140. 
United  States  v.  Hall  (D.  C,  53  Fed. 

Rep.  352),  320. 
United  States  v.  Hall  (44  Fed.  Rep. 

864),  384. 
United  States  v.  Hartwell  (3  Cliff.  C. 

C.  22),  69. 
United    States    v.    Heath  (20  D.  C. 

272).  101,  234. 
United   States  v.   Heatli  (19  Wash. 

Law  R.  818),  101,  102. 
United  States  v.  Hinz  (35  Fed.  Rep. 

723),  323,  324. 
United  States  v.  Howe  (12  Cent.  L. 

J.  193),  191. 
United  States   v.  Howell  (56    Fed. 

Rep.  21),  324. 
United  States  v.  Hunter  (1  Cranch, 

446),  306,  323. 


United  States  v.  Johns  (4  Dall.  42, 

415),  142. 
United  States   v.  Johnson  (2  Sawy., 

U.  S.,  482),  239. 
United  States  v.  Johnson  (1  Cranch, 

U.  S.,  871),  139. 
United  States  v.  Jones  (10  Fed.  Rep. 

469),  139a. 
United  States  v.  Jones  (32  Fed.  Rep. 

569),  166. 
United  States  v.  Kee  (39  Fed.   Rep. 

606),  281. 
United    States  v.    Keefer  (59    Ind. 

263),  237. 
United  States  v.  Kindred  (4  Hughes, 

U.  S.,  493),  281. 
United  States  v.  Kirkwood  (5  Utah, 

123),  90. 
United  States  v.  Lancaster  (44  Fed. 

Rep.  896),  226. 
United  States  v.  Larned  (4  Cranch, 

312),  139a. 
United  States  v.  Le  Baron  (40  Wall. 

642),  22. 
United  States  v.  Libby  (1  W.  &  M. 

221),  242. 
United  States  v.  Linn  (1  How.  101), 

129. 
United   States   v.  Lucero  (1   N.   M. 

422),  238. 
United  States  v.  Marcus  (53  Fed.  Rep. 

784),  96. 
United  States  v.  McKee  (3  Dill.  C.  C. 

546),  69. 
United  States  v.  McKenzie  (35  Fed. 

Rep.  826),  5. 
United  States  v.  McLaughlin  (24  Fed. 

Rep.  823),  306. 
United  States  v.  McRae  (L.  R.  3  Ch. 

86),  119. 
United  States  v.  Meagher  (37  Fed. 

Rep.  875),  6. 
United  States  v.  Mingo  (2  Curt.  C.  C. 

1),  249. 
United  States  v.  Moses  (4  Wash.  C. 

C.  726),  176. 
United  States  v.  Mullaney  (32  Fed. 

Rep.  730),  346. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxvii 


References  are  to  sections. 


United  States  v.  Neal  (1  Gall.  S87), 

23. 
United  States  v.    Newton    (52  Fed. 

Rep.  275),  6. 
United  States  v.  Noelke  (17  Blatchf. 

570),  56,  57. 
United  States   v.    Nott   (1    McLean, 

499),  89. 
United  States  v.   Palmer  (3  Wheat. 

610),  243. 
United  States  v.  Payne  (2  McCrary, 

C.  C.  289),  242. 
United  States  v.  Peck  (102  U.  S.  64), 

222. 
United  States  v.  Pendergast  (32  Fed. 

Rep.  198),  190. 
United  States  v.  Perot  (8  Otto,  428), 

242. 
United  States  v.  Porter  (3  Day,  283, 

286),  23. 
United  States  v.  Rapp  (30  Fed  Rep. 

822),  127. 
United  States    v.   Reid  (2    Blatchf. 

435),  176. 
United  States  v.   Reynes  (9  How., 

U.  S.,  127),  242. 
United  States  v.  Ross  (92  U.  S.  281), 

226. 
United  States  v.  Six  Lots  of  Ground 

(1  Woods,  C.  C.  234),  175. 
United  States  v.    Slenker    (32  Fed. 

Rep.  694),  127. 
United  States  v.  Smith  (47  Fed.  Rep. 

501),  354a. 
United  States  v.  Spalding  (2  Mason, 

478),  128. 
United  States  v.   Sutton  (21   How. 

170,  175),  126. 
United  States  v.  Taylor  (35  Fed.  Rep. 

484),  354. 
United  States    v.    Teschmaker     (22 

How.  392),  244. 
United  States  v.   Thomas  (47  Fed. 

Rep.  807),  281. 
United  States  v.  Thompson  (98  U.  S. 

489),  226. 
United  States  v.  Tilden  (10  Ben.  566, 

570,  581),  288. 
M 


United  States  v.  Watkins  (3  Cranch, 

442),  347. 
United  States  v.  Whittier  (5  Dill.,  39, 

41),  127. 
United  States  v.  Williams  (4  Biss. 

302),  237. 
United  States  v.  Williams  (6  Mont. 

379),  240. 
United  States  v.  Wilson  (7  Pet,  U.  S., 

150),  320. 
United' States  v.  Woods  (14  Pet.  440), 

384. 
United  States  v.  Workman  (54  Fed. 

Rep.  994),  304. 
United  States  v.    Ybanez  (53  Fed. 

Rep.  536),  3,  226,  288,  324. 
United  States  Exp.  Co.    v.   Jenkins 

(73  Wis.  471),  124. 
Univ.  Fash.  Co.  v.  Skinner  (64  Hun, 

293),  208. 
Upcher  v.  Oberlender  (31  Pac.  Rep. 

1080;  50  Kan.  315),  199. 
Upchurch  v.  Upchurch  (16  B.  Mon. 

102),  131. 
Updyke  v.  Weed  (18  Abb.  Pr.  223), 

252. 
Upham  v.  Draper  (157  Mass.  392;  32 

N.  E.  Rep.  24),  24. 
Upington  v.  Keenan  (67  Hun,  648), 

376. 
Upinton  v.  Carrington  (69  Hun,  320), 

234. 
Upton  v.  Catlin  (17  Colo.  546),  140. 
Urias  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.  (152  Pa.  St. 

326),  380. 
Urnston  v.  State  (73  Ind.  175),  240. 
Utley  v.  Donaldson  (94  U.  S.  29),  33. 

V. 

Vahle  v.  Brackenseick  (111.,  1893,  34 

N.  E.  Rep.  524),  244. 
Vail  v.  Judson  (4  E.  D.  Smith,  N.  Y., 

165),  73a. 
Vail  v.  Lewis  (4  Johns,  450),  18. 
Vail  v.  Rice  (5  N.  Y.  155),  216. 
Vail  v.  Smith  (4  Cow.  71),  146.  ; 

Vail  v.  Strong  (10  Vt.  457),  79. 


CIXXXV1U 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Valensin  v.  Valensin  (14  Pac.   Rep. 

397;  73Cal.  106),  172. 
Valentine  v.  Piper  (22  Pick.  85),  229. 
Vallaint  v.  Dodemead  (2  Atk.  524), 

169. 
Valle  v.  Picton  (91  Mo.  207;  3  S.  W. 

Rep.  860),  281. 
Van  Bokkelen  v.  Berdell  (130  N.  Y. 

141),  35. 
Van   Camp  v.    Hart  man  (126   Ind. 

177),  216. 
Vance  v.  Fare  (24  Cal.  414),  210. 
Vance  v.  Wood  (22  Oreg.  77),  205. 
Vanderburg  v.   Campbell  (.64  Miss. 

89),  378. 
Vanderlin  v.  Hovis  (152  Pa.  St.  11), 

214. 
Van  Deusen  v.  Newcomer  (40  Mich. 

120),  192. 
Vandeusen  v.  Young  (26  N.  Y.  9),  1 99. 
Vandevelde  v.  Snellen  (1  Keb.  220), 

287. 
Vandoren  v.   Baily  (48  Minn.   305), 

73a. 
Vandoren  v.  Jeliffe  (20  N.  Y.  S.  636), 

333. 
Vandoren  v.  Liebman  (11  N.  Y.  S. 

769),  230. 
Vandyck  v.  Van   Buren  (1   Caines, 

84),  226. 
Van  Epps  v.  Van  Epps  (6  Barb.  320), 

231. 
Van  Etten  v.   Newton  (8  N.   Y.   S. 

478),  211. 
Van   Evera  v.  Davis  (51  Iowa,  637), 

205. 
Van  Fleet  v.  Sledge  (45  Fed.   Rep. 

743),  205,  217. 
Van  Hoover  v.  Berghoff  (90  Mo.  487), 

193. 
Van  Horn  v.  Van  Horn  (N.  J.,  1892, 

23  Atl.  Rep.  1079),  205,  250. 
Van  Huss  v.  Rambolt  (42  Tenn.  139), 

197. 
Van  Kamen  v.  Roes  (65  Hun,  625), 

369. 
Van  Keuren  v.  Parmelee  (2  Comst., 

N.  Y.,  523),  69. 


Van  Kleck  v.  McClabe(87  Mich.  599), 

67. 
Vann  v.  State  (83  Ga.  44),  334. 
Vannatta  v.  Duffy  (Ind.,  1893,  30  N. 

E.  Rep.  807),  367 
Vanness  v.  Bank  (13  Pet.  21),  136. 
Van  Peet  v.  McGraw  (4  N.  Y.  110), 

234. 
Vanquelin  v.  Bovard  (9  L.  T.,  N.  S., 

582),  145,  158. 
Van  Sickle  v.  Gibson  (40  Mich.  167), 

53. 
Van   Storch    v.   Griffen  (71  Pa.  St. 

240),  178. 
Van   Swarton   v.  Com.  (24  Pa.    St. 

131),  242. 
Vanway  v.  Klein  (122  Ind.  416),  68. 
Vanzant  v.  Jones  (3  Dana,  Ky.,  464), 

252. 
Vary  v.  Godfrey  (6  Cow.  587),  356. 
Vaugh  v.  McElroy  (82  Ga.  687),  138. 
Vaughan  v.   Warnell  (26  Tex.  117), 

114. 
Vaughn  v.  Com.   (86  Ky.  431 ;  6  S. 

W.  Rep.  153),  101. 
Vaughn  v.  Hixon  (50  Kan.  773),  84. 
Vaughn  v.  Strong  (4  N.  Y.  S.  689), 

60. 
Vaughran  v.  State  (57  Ark.  1 ;  20  S. 

W.  Rep.  588),  5. 
Vaux  Peerage  (5  C.  &  F.  538),  145. 
Vawter  v.  Hulse  (112  Mo.  633),  360. 
Veazey  v.    Brigman   (93  Ala.   548), 

150a. 
Vellum  v.  Demerle  (65  Hun,  543),  82. 
Verdier  v.  Verdier  (8   Rich.,  S.  C, 

135),  138. 
Vernon  v.  Kirk  (30  Pa.  St.  218),  138. 
Vernon,    etc.    Co.    v.    Johnson  (108 

Ind.  128),  276. 
Vernon,  The  (36  Fed.  Rep.  113),  276. 
Verran  v.  Baird  (150  Mass.  150),  39. 
Vette  v.  Leonori  (42  Mo.  App.  217), 

18. 
Vicknair  v.  Trosher  (La.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  486),  208. 
Vickroy  v.  Skelly  (14  S.  &  R.,  Pa., 

372),  139. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


clxxxix 


References  are  to  sections. 


Vicksburg    &    Meridian    R.    Co.  v. 
O'Brfen  (119  U.  S.  99,  105-6),  58. 
Viel  v.  Covvles  (45  Hun,  307),  178. 
Viele  v.  Insurance  Co.  (26  Iowa,  10), 

253. 
Viele  v.  Judson  (82  N.  Y.  32-39),  83. 
Vifquain    v.    Finch    (15    Neb.    505), 

249. 
Village  v.  Record  (46  Hun,  448),  178. 
Vilrnar  v.  Schall  (61   N.  Y.  564),  362. 
Vinal   v.  Burrill  (16  Pick.  401,  407). 

126. 
Vinton  v.  Peck  (14  Mich.  287),  140, 

141. 
Virginia  City  v.  Manufacturing  Co. 

(2  Nev.  86),  242. 
Vogel  v.  Osborne  (21  Minn.  267),  76. 
Vogler  v.  Spaugh  (4  Biss.,  U.  S.,  288), 

205. 
Vogt  v.  Com.  (17  S.  W.  Rep.  213;  92 

Ky.  68),  283. 
Voisin  v.    Insurance  Co.  (67    Hun, 

365),  74. 
Volant  v.  Soyer  (13  Q.  B.  231),  173. 
Volkenan  v.  Drum  (154  Pa.  St.  616), 

208. 
Von  Rosenberg  v.  Haynes(Tex.,  1892, 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  143),  107. 
Von   Stanbenzee  v.  Monk  (32  L.  J. 

Prob.  21),  210. 
VonTrothav.  Bamberger  (15  Colo.  1), 

213. 
Voorhis,  In  re  (125  N.  Y.  765),  269. 
Vorebeck    v.    Roe    (50    Barb.    305), 

262. 
Vosburg  v.  Thayer  (12  Johns.  261). 

60. 
Vosburgh   v.  Putney  (80  Wis.  523), 

188. 
Vose  v.  Morton  (4  Cush.,  Mass.,  27), 

151. 
Voss  v.  King  (33  W.  Va.  236),  309. 
Vowels  v.  Com.  (83  Ky.  193),  369. 
Vowles  v.  Miller   (3  Taunt.  137),  20. 
Vreeland  v.  Vreeland  (48  N.  J.  Eq. 

56),  229. 
Vreeland  v.  Williams  (32  N.  J.  Eq. 
754),  222. 


w. 


Wabash,    etc.   Co.    v.   Ferris  (Ind., 

1893,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  112),  354. 
Wabash,  etc.  Co.   v.  McDougal  (113 

III.  603),  216. 
Wabash  W.  R.  Co.   v.  Friedman  (41 

111.  App.  270),  192. 
Wachterhaus  v.   Smith  (10  N.  Y.  S. 

535),  216. 
Wadd   v.    Hazleton   (62  Hun,  602), 

169,  246. 
Waddams    v.    Humphreys    (22    111. 

661),  166. 
Wade  v.  Brighton  (3  V.  &  B.  29),  139. 
Wade  v.  Ordway  (57  Tenn.  229),  343. 
Wade  v.  Powell  (31  Ga.  1),  77. 
Wade  v.  Scott  (7  Mo.  509),  253. 
Wade  v.  State  (10  S.  Rep.  233),  23. 
Wade  v.  State  (7  Baxt.,   Tenn.,  80), 

124. 
Wadsworth  v.  Alcott  (6  N.  Y.  64), 

211. 
Wagner  v.  Olson  (N.  D.,  1893,  54  N. 

W.  Rep.  286),  249. 
Wagner's  Case  (61  Me.  178),  244. 
Wagoner  v.  Rupply  (60  Tex.  700),  50, 

140. 
Wagonseller  v.  Brown  (7  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 

Rep.  663),  337. 
Wahed  v.  Stein  (59  Hun,  622),  126. 
Waitv.  Fairbanks  (Brayton,  Vt,  77), 

216. 
Waite  v.  Coaracy  (45  Minn.  159),  232, 

233. 
Waite  v.   State  (13  Tex.  App.  169), 

192. 
Wakefield  v.  Day  (41  Minn.  344),  130. 
Walden  v.  Bolton  (55  Mo.  405),  74. 
Walden   v.    Sherbourne  (15   Johns. 

409),  69. 
Waldon  v.  Purvis  (73  Cal.  518),  70. 
Waldron  v.  Tuttle  (4  N.  H.  371),  53, 

108. 
Waldron  v.  Waldron  (45  Mich.  350), 

221. 
Walk  v.  Bank  of  Circleville  (15  Ohio, 
288,  289),  56. 


cxc 


TABLE   OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Walker  v.  Allen  (72  Ala.  456),  239. 
Walker  v.  Bernstein  (43    111.    App. 

568),  199. 
Walker  v.  Camp  (63  Iowa,  627),  214. 
Walker  v.  Cole  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S.  W. 

Rep.  76),  66. 
Walker  v.  Collins  (50  Fed.  Rep.  73), 

199. 
Walker  v.  Cook  (33  111.    App.  561), 

277. 
Walker  v.  Dunspaugh  (20  N.  Y.  170), 

73a,  333. 
Walker  v.  Fields  (28  Ga.  237),  199. 
Walker  v.  Forbes  (25  Ala.  139),  73, 

114. 
Walker  v.  Herring    (21  Gratt,  Va., 

678),  268. 
Walker  v.  Leslie  (Ky.,  1891, 14  S.  W. 

Rep.  682),  153. 
Walker  v.   Moors   (122    Mass.    501), 

114. 
Walker  v.  People  (88  N.  Y.  81),  249. 
Walker  v.  State  (52  Ala.  192),  102. 
Walker  v.  State  (102  Ind.  502),  10. 
Walker  v.  State  (91  Ala.    76;    10   S. 

Rep.  401),  23,  24. 
Walker  v.  State  (96  Ala.   53 ;  12  S. 

Rep.  83),  317. 
Walker  v.  State  (7   Tex.  App.   245), 

89,  202. 
Walker  v.  State  (14  Tex.  App.  609), 

140. 
Walker  v.  Taylor  (43  Vt.  612),  308. 
Walker  v.  Walker  (2  Atk.  98),  223. 
Walker  v.  Walker  (3  Ga.  302),  305. 
Walker  v.  Westfield  (39  Vt.  246),  8. 
Walker  v.  Wilmington,  etc.  Co.  (26 

S.  C.  80),  214. 
Walker  v.  Wmgfield   (18    Ver.  443), 

142. 
Walkoff  v.  Tefft  (12  N.  Y.   S.  464), 

354. 
Walkup  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893,  20  S.  W. 

Rep.  221),  283. 
Walkup  v.  Pratt  (5   Harr.  &  J.  51), 

53,  67. 
Wallace,  In  re  (25  Atl.  Rep.  260 ;  49 

N.  J.  Eq.  539),  35,  114. 


Wallace  v.  Bryne  (17  La.   Ann.  8). 

356. 
Wallace  v.  Harmstead  (44    Pa.    St. 

492),  128. 
Wallace  v.  Kennedy    (47    N.    J.    L. 

246),  8. 
Wallace  v.  Rappleyea  (103  111.  229), 

262. 
Wallace  v.  State  (90  Ga.  117;  15  S. 

E.  Rep.  700),  101. 
Wallace  v.  Story  (139  Mass.  115),  50. 
Wallace  v.  Straus   (113  N.    Y.   238), 

309. 
Wallace  v.  Uni.  Pres.    Ch.  (Ill  Pa. 

St.  164),  225. 
Waller.  In  re  (49  Fed.  Rep.  271),  276. 
Wallers  v.  People  (32  N.  Y.  147),  249. 
Wallich    v.    Morgan   (39    Mo.  App. 

469),  24. 
Wallis  v.  Randell  (81  N.  Y.  164),  69. 
Walradt    v.   Phoenix    Ins.   Co.   (136 

N.  Y.  375),  200. 
Walrath  v.  Whitlekind  (26  Kan.  482), 

209. 
Walsh  v.  ^tna  L.  Ins.  Co.  (30  Iowa, 

133),  200. 
Walsh   v.  Anderson   (135   Mass.  65), 

150a. 
Walsh  v.  Dart  (12  Wis.  635),  242. 
Walsh    v.    People    (88   N.   Y.    458), 

345. 
Walsh  v.  Rogers  (13  How.  286,  287), 

S&l. 
Walsh  v.  Sayre   (52   How.   Pr.  384), 

202. 
Walsh  v.  Washington,    etc.    Co.  (32 

N.  Y.  427),  198. 
Walter  v.  Bolman  (8  Watts,  544),  60. 
Walter  v.  Cronly  (14  Wend.,  N.  Y, 

63),  223. 
Walter  v.  Fairchild  (4  N.  Y.  S.  559), 

172. 
Walter  v.  Moore  (90  N.  C.  41),  150a. 
Walters  v.  Senf  (Mo.,  1893,  22  S.  W. 

Rep.  311),  216. 
Walton  v.  Campbell  (35  Neb.    173; 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  883),  128. 
1  Walton  v.  Jones  (7  Utah,  462),  24,  27. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXC1 


References  are  to  sections. 


Walton  v.  Kansas,  etc.  Co.  (49  Mo. 

App.  620),  3S0. 
Walton  v.  Shelley  (1  T.  R.  296),  310. 
Walton  v.  State  (79  Ga.  46;  5  S.  E. 

Rep.  205),  101. 
Ward  v.  Bartholomew  (6  Pick.  409), 

225. 
Ward  v.  Busack  (46  Wis.  407).  35. 
Ward  v.  Clay  (82  Cal.  502),  371. 
Ward  v.  Dougherty    (75    Cal.    240), 

229. 
Ward  v.  Gould  (5  Pick.  29),  77. 
Ward  v.  Hayden  (2  Esp.  552),  302. 
Ward  v.  Henry  (19  Wis.  76),  244. 
Ward  v.  Howell  (5  H.  &  J.  60),  69. 
Ward  v.  Kilpatrick  (85  N.   Y.  413), 

198. 
Ward  v.  Lewis  (4  Pick.  518),  229. 
Ward  v.  Patton  (75  Ala.  207),  24! 
Ward  v.  Sharp  (15  Vt.  115),  353. 
Ward  v.  State  (22  Ala.  16),  237. 
Ward  v.  Ward  (37  Mich.  253),  50,  79. 
Ware  v.  Smith  (156  Mass.  186;  SON. 

E.  Rep.  869),  83. 
Warfield  v.  Booth  (33  Md.  63),  220, 

222. 
Waring  v.  Suydani  (4  Edw.,  N.  Y., 

362),  305. 
Waring  v.  United  States  (7  Ct.  CI.' 

501),  320.  j 

Warlick  v.  White  (76  N.  C.  175),  345. 
Warner  v.  Bait.  &  O.  R.  R.  (31  Ohio 

St.  265),  138. 
Warner  v.  Hare  (154  Pa.  St.  548),  380.' 
Warner  v.  Warner's  Estate  (37  Vt. 

362),  63,  129. 
Warrall  v.  Munn  (5  N.  Y.  229),  268. 
Warren  v.  Com.  (37  Pa.  St.  45),  10. 
Warren  v.  Gabriel  (51  Ala.  235),  347. 
Warren  v.  Jacksonville  (15  111.  236), 

226. 
Warren  v.  Miller  (38  Me.  108),  205. 
Warren  v.  Press  Pub.  Co.  (132  N.  Y. 

181),  167. 
Warren  v.    Spencer  Water  Co.  (143 

Mass.  155),  31. 
Warren  v.  State  (31    Tex.  Cr.   App. 

573),  10. 


Warren  Co.   v.  State  (15  Ind.  250), 

140. 
Warrick  v.  Hull  (102  III.  280),  309. 
Warrick  v.  Queen's  College  (40  L.  J. 

Ch.  785),  112. 
Warten  v.  Strane  (82  Ala.  311),  310. 
Warwick  v.  Bruce  (2  M.  &  S.  205), 

262. 
Washburn  v.  Cuddely  (8  Gray,  430), 

145. 
Washburn  v.  Railway  Co.  (59  Wis. 

364,  368),  344. 
Washburn  v.  Ramsdell  (17  Vt.  299), 

70. 
Washington   v.   Cole   (6    Ala.   212), 
'       190. 
Washington  v.  Finley(5  Eng.,  Ark., 

423),  242. 
Washington    L.    Insurance    Co.    v. 

Scheible  (1  W.  N.  C.  369),  38. 
Wasson  v.  Bank  (107  Ind.  206),  257. 
Wasson  v.  Connor  (54  Mass.  352),  135. 
Waterman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (52 

N.   W.  Rep.  247;  82  Wis.  613), 

250,  374. 
Waterman  v.  Johnson  (13  Pick.  261), 

220. 
Waterman  v.  Peet  (11  111.  648),  73a. 
Waters  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  284), 

382. 
Watertown  v.  Cowen  (4  Paige,  510), 

72. 
WTatkins  v.  Bowers  (119  Mass.  383), 

212. 
Watkins  v.  Holman  (16  Peters,  257), 

141. 
Watkins  v.  Howeth  (1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 

277),  82. 
Watkins  v.  Paine  (57  Ga.  50),  30. 
Watkins  v.  State  (89  Ala.  82).  39. 
Watkins  v.  Turner  (34  Ark.  663),  167. 
Watrous  v.  Cunningham     (11     Pac. 

Rep.  811 ;  71  Cal.  30),  60,  337. 
Watson    v.  Blymer   Manufg.  Co.  (2 

S.  W.  Rep.  353 ;  66  Tex.  558),  282. 
Watson  v.  Brewster  (1  Barr,  381),  53. 
Watson  v.  Com.  (95  Pa.  St.  418),  6. 

324. 


CXC11 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


Heferences  are  to  sections. 


Watson  v.  Lemon  (9  Colo.  200),  7G. 
Watson  v.  McAllister  (7  Mart.  368), 

139a. 
Watson  v.  Miller  (82  Tex.  279),  205, 

336. 
Watson  v.  Moore  (1 C.  &Kir.  626),  80. 
Watson  v.  Pinckney    (18    N.  Y.    S. 

790),  246. 
Watson  v.  Race  (46   Mo.  App.  546), 

363. 
Watson  v.  Sherman  (84  111.  263),  268. 
Watson  v.  Tyndall  (24  Ga.  494),  233. 
Watt  v.  People  (126  111.  9;  18  N.  E. 

Rep.  340),  7,  346. 
Watt  v.  Womack  (7  Ga.  356),  131. 
Watts  v.  Bruce  (10  B.  &  C.  446),  262. 
Watts  v.  Kilburn  (7  Ga.  356),  131. 
Watts  v.  Territory    (1    Wash.    Ter. 

409),  176. 
Watzel  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  523), 

23. 
Way  v.  Butterworth  (106  Mass.  75), 

176. 
Wayne  v.  Blun  (Ga.,  1893,  17  S.  E. 

Rep.  288),  369. 
Wead   v.   Railroad   Co.  (64  Vt.  52), 

220. 
Weall  v.  King  (12  East,  452),  18. 
Weatherford  v.  State  (31  Tex.  Crim. 

Rep.  530),  176. 
Weathersley  v.  Weathersley  (40  Miss. 

462),  223. 
Weatherwax  v.  Payne  (2  Mich.  555), 

356. 
Weaver  v.  Emigrant,   etc.   Co.   (17 

Abb.  N.  C.  82),  246. 
Weaver  v.  McElbranan  (13  Mo.  89), 

237. 
Weaver  v.  People  (132  111.  536),  6. 
Weaver  v.  Shiply  (127  Ind.  526),  7, 

30. 
Weaver's   Estate  (9   Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 

516),  170,  174. 
Webb  v.  Alexander  (7  Wend.  281, 

286),  147. 
Webb  v.  Gonzales  (69  Tex.  455 ;  6  S. 

W.  Rep.  781),  135. 
Webb  v.  Page  (1  Carr.  &  K.  23),  191. 


Webbv.  Rice  (6   Hill,   N.  Y.,  219), 

223. 
Webb  v.  State  (29  Ohio  St.  351),  322. 
Webb  v.  Taylor  (1  D.  &  L.  676),  275. 
Webb  v.  Webb  (29  Ala.  606),  200. 
Webb,  In  re  (I.  R.  5  Eq.  235),  233. 
Webber  v.  Jackson  (79  Mich.  175;  44 

N.  W.  Rep.  591),  347. 
Weber  v.  Kingsland   (8  Bosw.  415), 

212. 
Weber  v.  Mackey  (31  111.  App.  369), 

151. 
Weber  Wagon  Co.  v.  Kehl  (139  111. 

644;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  714),  185,  333. 
Webster  v.  Clark  (30  Ark.  245),  73a. 
Webster  v.  Daniel  (47  Ark.  131),  147. 
Webster  v.  Frowler  (50  N.  W.  Rep. 

1074;  89  Mich.  303),  11. 
Webster  v.  Hodgkins  (25  N.  H.  128), 

209. 
Webster  v.  Mann  (56  Tex.  119),  145. 
Webster  v.  Stearns  (44  N.   H.   498), 

67. 
Webster  v.  Webster  (1  F.  &  F.  401), 

57. 
Weed  v.  Kellogg  (6  McLean,  U.  S., 

44),  68,  73. 
Weed  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.  (70  N.  Y.  561), 

250. 
Weeks  v.  Inhabitants  (156  Mass.  2S9), 

73a. 
Weeks  v.  Sparks  (1  M.  &  S.  686,  690), 

110,  115. 
Wegner  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  419), 

128. 
Wehle  v.   Spelman  (1    Hun,  N.  Y., 

1),  77. 
Weinberg    v.    Kram   (17    N.    Y.  S. 

535),  8. 
Weinberg  v.   Somps  (Gal.,  1893,  33 

Pac.  Rep.  341),  377. 
Weinecke  v.  State  (34  Neb.  14;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  307),  23. 
Weitman  v.  Jhiot  (64  Ga.  11),  106. 
Welborn  v.  Atl.  R.  Co.  (Ga.,  1893,  17 

S.  E.  Rep.  672),  372. 
Welch  v.  Barrett  (15  Mass.  380),  58. 
Welch  v..  County  (29  W.  Va.  63),  239. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


CXC1U 


References  are  to  sections. 


Welch   v.   Edmiston   (46   Mo.    App. 

282),  220. 
Welch    v.    Horton    (73    Iowa,    250), 

205. 
Welch  v.  Miller  (32   111.    App.  110), 

185. 
Welch  v.  Palmer  (85  Mich.  310),  79. 
Welch  v.  Sackett  (12  Wis.  257),  225. 
Welcome  v.  Batchelder  (23  Me.  85), 

313. 
Welcome  v.  Mitchell  (81  Wis.  566 ;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  1080),  339. 
Weld  v.  Brooks  (25  N.  E.  Rep.  719), 

58. 
Welde  v.  Welde  (2  Lee,  580),  202. 
Welds  v.  Nichols  (17  Pick.  538),  7. 
Welke  v.  Welke  (63  Hun,  625),  351. 
Welland     Canal     v.     Hathaway    (8 

Wend.  480),  38,  80. 
Wellington  v.  Boston  R.  R.  Co.  (158 

Mass.  185;  33  N.  E.  Rep.  393),  82. 
Wellington  v.   Howard   (Ind.,  1893, 

31  N.  E.  Rep.  582),  18. 
Wells  v.  Evans  (20  Wend.,   N.   Y., 

251),  268. 
Wells  v.  Jackson,  etc.  Co.  (48  N.  H. 

491),  333,  341. 
Wells  v.   Leveridge  (20  Oreg.   168), 

220. 
Wells  v.  Railroad  Co.  (110  Mo.  286), 

240. 
Wells  v.  Tucker  (3  Binn.  366),   168. 
Wells  v.  Yarborough  (84  Tex.  660), 

380. 
Welsh  v.  Joy  (13  Pick.  477),  50a. 
Welsh  v.  State    (96   Ala.    92;   11   S. 

Rep.  450),  6,  95. 
Wempler  v.  State  (28  Tex.  App.  352), 

115. 
Wendlinger  v.  Smith  (75  Va.  309), 

212. 
Wendt  v.  Chicago,   etc.  Co.  (S.   D., 

1894,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  226),  73a. 
Werely  v.  Persons  (28  N.  Y.  344),  52. 
Werner  v.  Com.  (80  Ky.  387),  51. 
Werner  v.  Litzinger    (45   Mo.    App. 

106),  229. 
Wesley  v.  State  (37  Miss.  327),  10. 


Wessels  v.  Beeman  (87   Mich.  481), 

11,  82. 
West  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.  (18  Fed.  Rep. 

622),  50. 
West  v.  Randall  (2  Mason,  181),  309. 
West  v.  Smith  (101  U.  S.  263),  75,  76. 
West  v.  State  (76  Ala.  98),  5,  7. 
West  v.  Van  Tuyl  (119  N.  Y.  C20),  60. 
West  Boylston  v.  Sterling  (17  Pick. 

126),  361. 
Westbrook  v.  Aultman  (3  Ind.  App. 

83;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  1011),  341. 
Westbrook   v.    State   (Ga.,   1893,    16 

S.  E.  Rep.  100),  93,  249. 
Westbrooke,    In    re    (W.    N.,    1873, 

p.  167),  233. 
Westerman  v.  Westerman  (25  Ohio 

St.  500),  168. 
Western  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tobin  (32  Ohio 

St.  277),  198. 
Western  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lazarus  (88  Ala. 

453),  199. 
Western  Union  T.  Co.  v.  Bennett  (1 

Tex.  Civ.  App.  28),  73a,  250. 
Western  Union  T.  Co.  v.  Cline  (Ind., 

1894,  35  N.  E.  Rep.  564),  90. 
Western  Union  T.  Co.  v.  Collins  (45 

Kan.  88),  35. 
Western  Union  T.  Co.  v.  Shalter  (71 

Ga.  760),  33. 
Western  Union   T.  Co.  v.  Way  (83 

Ala.  542),  231. 
Westfall  v.  Madison  (62  Iowa,  427), 

346. 
Westman  v.  Krumweide  (30  Minn. 

313),  212. 
Westmoreland   v.   Carsen    (76  Tex. 

619),  216. 
Westmoreland  v.  Richardson  (Tex., 

1893,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  157),  152. 
Westmoreland  v.  State  (45  Ga.  225), 

80. 
Weston  v.  Brown  (30  Neb.  609),  9, 

336,  337. 
Weston  v.  Graves  (49  Vt.  507),  6. 
Weston  v.  Moody  (39  Fla.  169),  272. 
Weston  v.  Penman  (1  Mason,  506), 

144. 


cxciv 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Weston  v.  White  (5  Md.  297),  221. 
Westover  v.  JEtna  L.  I.  Co.  (99  N.  Y. 

57),  17S. 
West  Side  Bank  v.  Meehan  (66  Hun, 

627),  376. 
Wetherbee  v.  Norris  (103  Mass.  565), 

349. 
Wetherill  v.  Sullivan  (65  Pa.  St.  105), 

232. 
Wetumpka  v.  Wharf  Co.   (63  Ala. 

611),  242. 
Wetzel  v.  Kelly  (83  Ala.  440),  237, 

241. 
Weyman  v.  Thompson  (25  Atl.  Rep. 

205),  67. 
Weymouth  v.   Broadway,   etc.    Co. 

(2  Misc.  R.  506),  350. 
Whalen  v.  Brennan  (34  Neb.  129 ;  51 

N.  W.  Rep.  759),  371. 
Whalen  v.  New  York  (17   Fed.  Rep. 

72),  376. 
Wharf  v.  Prescott  (7  Allen,  494),  84. 
Wharter  v.  McMahan  (10  Paige,  N. 

Y,  386),  268. 
Wharton  v.  Douglass  (76  Pa.  St.  273), 

208. 
Wheatly  v.  Williams  (1   M.  &  W. 

533),  170. 
Wheaton  v.  Peters  (8  Pet.  658),  230. 
Wheeler  v.  Alderman  (34  S.  C.  533), 

74. 
Wheeler  v.  Bent  (7  Pick.  61),  129. 
Wheeler  v.  Billings  (38  N.  Y.  263), 

208. 
Wheeler  v.  Doolittle  (3  Wash.  440), 

69. 
Wheeler  v.  McLoughlin  (8  N.  Y.  S. 

95),  150a. 
Wheeler  v.  Nevins  (34  Me.  54),  268. 
Wheeler  v.  Walker  (12  Vt.  427),  123. 
Wheeler  v.  West  (71  Cal.  126),  76. 
Wheeler  v.  Wheeler  (18  N.  Y.  State 

Rep.  445 ;  2  N.  Y.   S.   446),  231, 

309. 
Wheeler  v.   Winn  (53  Pa.   St.   126), 

379. 
Wheelock  v.  Godfrey  (Cal.,  1894,  35 

Pac.  Rep.  317),  197. 


Wheelwright  v.  Akin  (Ga.,  1893,  17 

S.  E.  Rep.  610),  221. 
Wheton  v.  Snyder  (88  N.  Y.  299), 

199. 
Whidby  Land  Co.  v.  Nye  (5  Wash. 

St.  501),  372. 
Whipp  v.  State  (34  Ohio  St.  87,  89), 

166. 
Whitaker  v.  Galesburg(15Pick.  544), 

348. 
Whitaker  v.  Marsh  (62  N.  H.  478), 

121. 
Whitaker  v.  Parks  (42  Iowa,   586), 

189. 
Whitaker  v.  Salisbury  (15  Pick.  534), 

138. 
Whitaker  v.   State  (79  Ga.  87;  3  S. 

E.  Rep.  403),  101. 
Whitaker  v.  White  (69  Hun,  288),  60. 
Whitaker  v.  Williams  (20  Conn.  98), 

84. 
Whitbeck  v.  Walters  (4  C.  &  P.  375), 

53. 
Whitcher  v.  McLaughlin  (115  Mass. 

167),  144. 
Whitcher  v.  Shattuck  (3  Allen,  Masn. , 

545),  200. 
Whitcomb's   Case    (120  Mass.    123), 

288. 
White  v.  Ashton  (51  N.  Y.  280),  83. 
White  v.  Barley  (10  Mich.  155),  697. 
White  v.  Benjamin  (138  N.  Y.  623), 

250. 
White  v.  Connelly  (105    N.   C.   65), 

136. 
White  v.  Crew  (16  Ga.  416),  268. 
White  v.  Davidson  (8  Md.  169),  74. 
White  v.  Davis  (17  N.  Y.  S.  548;  62 

Hun,  622),  197. 
White  v.  German   Bank  (9   Heisk., 

Tenn.,  473),  72. 
White  v.  Graves  (107  Mass.  325),  8, 

157. 
White  v.  Hinton  (3  Wyo.  753),  150a. 
White  v.  Insurance  Co.  (83  Me.  279), 

241. 
White  v.  Johnson  (4  Wash.  St.  113; 

29  Pac.  Rep.  932),  250. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


CXCV 


Keferences  are  to  sections. 


White  v.  Leads  (51  Pa.  St.  189),  336. 
White  v.  Lisle  (4  Madd.  214),  114. 
White  v.  Mass  (75  Ala.  207),  24. 
White  v.  Milw.  etc  Co.  (61  Wis.  536), 

202. 
White  v.Morgan  (119  Ind.  338),  324. 
White  v.  Old  Dotn.  S.  Co.  (102  N.  Y. 

662),  76. 
White  v.  Portland  (63  Conn.  18;  26 

Atl.  Rep.  342),  71,  282. 
White  v.  State  (21  Tex.  App.   339), 

11. 
White  v.  State  (52  Miss.  216),  324. 
White  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  652;  18 

S.  W.  Rep.  462),  103. 
White  v.  Watkins  (23  Mo.  423),  268. 
White  v.  White  (82  Cal.  427 ;  23  Pac. 

Rep.  276),  114,  333. 
White  v.  Whitney    (22     Pac.     Rep. 

1138;  82  Cal.  163),  60,  144. 
White's  Case  (2  Leach's  Crim.   Cas. 

430),  317. 
Whitehall  v.  Kellar  (100  Pa.  St.  89), 

73a. 
Whitehead  v.  Rogers  (106  Mo.  231), 

210. 
Whitehead  v.   School   District   (145 

Pa.  St.  418),  131. 
Whitehurst   v.    Com.   (79   Va.   556), 

123. 
Whiteley  v.  Insurance  Co.  (72  Wis. 

170;  39  N.  W.  Rep.  369),  232. 
Whiteley,   In   re  (1891,   1  Ch.  558), 

314. 
Whitelocke  v.  Baker  (13  Ves.   514), 

113. 
White  Sew.  Mach.  Co.  v.  Dakin  (86 

Mich.  5S1),  128. 
Whitesides  v.   Hunt  (97  Ind.    191), 

249. 
Whiteside's  Appeal  (23  Pa.  St.  114), 

233.  ' 
Whitford   v.   Clark  Co.  (119  U.  S. 

522),  361. 
Whitford  v.  Laidler  (94  N.  Y.  155), 

73a. 
Whiting  v.  Miss.  V.  I.  Co.  (76  Wis. 

592),  333. 


Whiting  v.  Traynor  (74  Wis.  293), 

310. 
Whitlock  v.  Castro  (22  Tex.  108),  239. 
Whitlow  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893,  18  S. 

W.  Rep.  865),  324. 
Whitlock  v.  Ramsey  (2  Munf.   510), 

22. 
Whitman  v.  Haywood  (14  S.  W.  Rep. 

166;  77  Tex.  157),  60,  115. 
Whitmer  v.  Fry  (10  Mo.  348),  128. 
Whitley  v.  Gay  lord  (1  Jones'  L.,  N. 

C,  194),  139. 

Whitman  v.  Henneherry  (73  111.  109), 

105,  108. 
Whitney  v.  Arnold  (10  Cal.  531),  136. 
Whitney  v.  Bigelow(4  Pick.  110),  61. 
Whitney  v.  Cotton  Mills  (Mass.,  1890, 

24  N.  E.  Rep.  774),  225. 
Whitney  v.  Gross  (140  Mass.  232),  8. 
Whitney  v.     Houghton    (125    Mass. 

451),  50,  79. 
Whitney  v.  Nicoll  (46  111.  230),  233. 
Whitney  v.  Phelps  (33  Me.  318),  205. 
Whitney  v.  Shippen  (89  Pa.  St.  22), 

212 
Whitney  Mfg.    Co.  v.  Richmond  & 

D.  R.  Co.  (S.  C,  1893,  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  147),  21. 

Whitney  Wagon  Works  v.    Moore 

(61  Vt,  230;  17  Atl.  Rep.  1007),  75. 
Whitridge  v.  Whitridge  (Md.,  1892, 

24  Atl.  Rep.  645),  250. 
Whittier  v.  Dana  (10  Allen,  326),  214. 
Whittier  v.  Franklyn  (46  N.    H.  23), 

185. 
Whitwell  v.  Winslow  (134  Mass.  343), 

'     83. 
Whitwell  v.  Wyer  (11  Mass.  6,  10), 

80. 
Whyte  v.  Arthur  (17  N.  J.  Eq.  521), 

213. 
Wich  v.  Equitable  F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co. 

(Colo.,  1893,  31  Pac.   Rep.  389), 

200. 
Wichita  University  v.  Schweiter  (50 

Kan.  672),  210. 
Wickersham  v.  Reeves  (1  Iowa,  417), 

136. 


CXCV1 


TABLE   OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Wickes  v.  Swift  E.  L.  Co.  (70  Mich. 

322),  139a,  217. 
Wicks  v.  State  (28  Tex.   App.    448), 

227. 
Wiggin  v.  Chicago  (5  Mo.  App.  347), 

242. 
Wiggins  v.  Burkhara  (10  Wall.  129), 

239. 
Wiggins  v.   Leonard  (9  Iowa,  194), 
;  69. 

Wiggins  v.  Wallace  (19  Barb.  33S), 

198. 
Wigginton  v.  Com.  (17  S.  W.  Eep. 

634 ;  92  Ky.  282),  93. 
Wight  v.  Rindskopf  (43  Wis.   349), 

323. 
Wilbur  v.  Eicholtz  (5  Col.  240),  140. 
Wilbur  v.  Seldon  (6  Cowen,  N.  Y., 

162),  121. 
Wilbur  v.  Strickland  (1  Rawle,  458), 

96. 
Wilbur  v.  Wilbur  (129  111.  892),  248, 

253. 
Wilcox  v.    Corwin  (23  N.   E.   Rep. 

500;  117  N.  Y.  500),  308. 
Wilcox  v.  Greene  (28  Conn.  572),  80/ 
Wilcox  v.  Howell  (44  N.  Y.  398),  84. 
Wilcox  v.  Jackson  (109  111.  261),  237. 
Wilcox  v.  Monday    (89    Ind.     232), 

150a. 
Wilcox  v.  Smith  (5  Wend.  231),  36. 
Wilcox  v.  Wilcox  (46  Hun,  32),  38a. 
Wilcoxon   v.    Osborn  (77  Mo.   621), 

136. 
Wilder  v.  Coles  (100  Mass.  490),  247. 
Wilder  v.  St.    Paul  (12  Minn.    106), 

121. 
,    Wiley  v.  Athol  (150  Mass.  430),  56. 
Wiley  v.  Inhabitants  (150  Mass.  426), 

142. 
Wiley  v.  Moor  (17  S.  &  R.  438),  128. 
Wiley  v.  Morse  (30  Mo.  App.    266), 

308. 
Wiley  v.  State  (74  Ga.  840),  23. 
Wilke  v.  People  (53  N.  Y.  525),  167. 
Wilkerson  v.  Com.  (88  Ky.  29),  283. 
Wilkerson  v.  Schoonmaker  (77  Tex. 

615),  147. 


Wilkersons  v.  Eilers  (Mo.,  1893J  21 

5.  W.  Rep.  134),  341. 
Wilkins  v.   State  (Ala.,   1893,  13  S. 

Rep.  312),  381. 
Wilkins  v.  Stidger  (22  Cal.  231),  79. 
Wilkinson  v.  Moseley  (30  Ala.  562), 

194. 
Wilkinson   v.  Scott  (17  Mass.  257), 

208. 
Wilkinson  v.  Ward  (42111.  App.  541), 

367. 
Wilkinson  v.  Wilkinson  (59  Wis.  64). 

24. 
Willard   v.   Cramer  (36   Iowa,   22), 

135. 
Willard  v.  Judd  (15  John.  531),  356. 
Willard   v.    Killing  worth  (8    Conn. 

247),  143a. 
Willard  v.  Ostrander  (51  Kan.  481 ; 

32  Pac.  Rep.  1092),  152. 
Willard  v.  Siegal  (47  Mo.  App.  1),  10. 
Willard  v.  State  (27  Tex.  App.  386), 

93. 
Willard   v.    Superior  Court  (82  Cal. 

456),  277. 
Willett  v.  Rich  (142  Mass.  357),  247. 
Willey  v.  Portsmouth  (35  N.  H.  303), 

193. 
Williams  y.  Armory  (7  Cranch,  423), 

158. 
Williams  v.   Baker  (71  Pa.  St.  476, 

482),  136,  157. 
Williams  v.  Baldwin  (7  Vt.  506),  168. 
Williams  v.  Breckell  (37  Miss.  682), 

33. 
Williams  v.  Butcher  (22  Neb.  683;  37 

N.  W.  Rep.  586),  353. 
Williams  v.  Clink  (90  Mich.  297),  372. 
Williams  v.  Com.   (Ky.,  1892,   18  S. 

W.  Rep.  364),  378. 
Williams  v.   Com.   (91  Pa.  St.  493). 

384. 
Williams  v.  Conger  (125  U.  S.  397). 

105. 
Williams  v.  Deen  (Tex.,  1894,  24  S. 

W.  Rep.  536),  139. 
Williams  v.   Dickenson  (28  Fla.  90), 

6,  11,  321,  354a. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXCV11 


Keferences  are  to  sections. 


Williams  v.  Fresno  Canal  &  Irr.  Co. 

(30  Pac.  Eep.  961 ;  96  Cal.  14),  369. 
Williams  v.   Hardee  (Tex.,  1893,  21 

S.  W.  Rep.  267),  108. 
Williams  v.  Hubbard  (1  Mich.  446), 

244. 
Williams  v.  Ingell  (21  Pick.,  Mass., 

288),  203. 
Williams  v.   Jones  (5  B.  &  C.  108), 

267. 
Williams  v.  Kaiser  (11  Fla.  234),  80. 
Williams  v.  Lee  (47  Mo.  321),  197. 
Williams  v.  Moore  (68  Ga.  585),  150a. 
Williams  v.  People  (54  111.  422),  102. 
Williams   v.  'Perkins  (83  Mo.    379), 

308. 
Williams  v.  Poppleton  (3  Oreg.  139), 

193. 
Williams  v.  Robinson   (42  Vt.  678), 

231. 
Williams  V.  State  (6  Ala.  33),  139. 
Williams  v.  State  (19  Ga.  402),  121. 
Williams  v.  State  (50  Ark.  511 ;  9  S. 

W.  Rep.  5),  231. 
Williams  v.  State  (52  Ala.  411),  76. 
Williams  v.  State  (12  S.  W.  Rep.  1103 ;' 

28  Tex.  App.  301),  346. 
Williams  v.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  637), 

350. 
Williams  v.  State  (25  Tex.  App.  176), 

348. 
Williams  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893,  13  S, 

Rep.  333),  354. 
Williams  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893,  13  S. 

Rep.  834),  340. 
Williams  v.  State  (64  Ind.  553),  238. 
Williams  v.  State  (Tex.,  1S92,  19  S. 

W.  Rep.  897),  196. 
Williams  v.  State  (67  Ga.  260),  238. 
Williams  v.  State  (24  Tex.  App.  17, 

32;  4  S.  W.  Rep.  64),  88. 
Williams  v.  Stevens  (72  Wis.   487), 

217. 
Williams  v.  Taunton  (125  Mass.  54), 

201. 
Williams  v.  Tracy  (95  Pa.  St.  308),  74. 
Williams  v.  United  States  (137  U.  S. 

113),  376. 


Williams  v.  Vreeland  (29  N.  J.  Eq. 

417),  222. 
Williams  v.  Wager  (64  Vt.  326),  336. 
Williams    v.    Walbridge    (3    Wend. 

415),  310. 
Williams  v.  Walker  (2  Rich.  Eq.  291), 

348. 
Williams  v.  Willard  (23  Vt.  369),  120. 
Williams'    Ex'r   v.    Williams    (Ky., 

1890,  13  S.  W.  Rep.  250),  309. 
Williams  v.  Williamson  (6  Ired.  L., 

N.  C,  281),  73a. 
Williams  v.  Woods  (16  Md.  220),  229. 
Williamson  v.  State  59   Miss.  235), 

308. 
Williamson  v.  State  (30  Tex.  330;  17 

S.  W.  Rep.  722;,  5. 
Williamson  v.  Wright  (75  Me.   55), 

150a. 
Williard  v.  Williard  (56  Pa.  St.  119), 

70. 
Willis  v.  Barnard  (8  Bing.   376),  52. 
Willis  v.  Fernald  (33  N.   J.    L.  206), 

220. 
Willis  v.  Kern  (21    La.    Ann.   749), 

208. 
Willis  v.  Lyman  (22  Tex.  268),  356. 
Willis  v.  West  (60  Ga.  613),  169. 
Willis'  Case  (15  How.   St.  Tr.   623- 

625),  389. 
Willmerding  v.  McGauhey  (30  Iowa, 

205),  217. 
Wilmington  v.  Burlington  (4  Pick. 

174),  53. 
Willoughby  v.  Dewey  (54  III.  206),  7. 
Wilson  v.  Betts  (4  Denio,   201),  108. 
Wilson  v.  Boarem    (15  Johns.    286), 

102. 
Wilson  v.  Bowden   (113   Mass.   422), 

70. 
Wilson  v.  Brownlee  (24  Ark.  546),  53. 
Wilson    v.    Bumstead   (12    Neb.   1), 

241. 
Wilson  v.  Calvert  (8  Ala.  757),  80. 
Wilson  v.  Clark  (1  Ind.  App.  182 ;  27 

N.  E.  Rep.  310),  9. 
Wilson  v.  Cockrell  (8  Mo.  7),  242. 
Wilson  v.  Conine  (2  Johns.  280),  147. 


cxcvm 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Wilson  v.  Donaldson  (117  Ind.  356), 

285. 
Wilson  v.  Heath  (G8  Hun,   209),  376, 

378. 
Wilson  v.  Horn  (G5  Ala.  448),  222. 
Wilson  v.  Irish  (62  N.  Y.  260),  140. 
Wilson  v.  McCullough    (23   Pa.    St. 

440),  333. 
Wilson  v.  Powers  (131  Ind.  539),  212. 
Wilson  v.  Railroad  (114  N.  Y.   487), 

372. 
Wilson  v.  Railroad  (31    Minn.    481), 

33. 
Wilson  v.  Rastall  (4  T.  R.   759),  172, 

178. 
Wilson  v.  Russell  (61  N.  H.  355),  309. 
Wilson  v.  Sheppard    (28   Ala.    623), 

166. 
Wilson  v.  Shipman    (31    Neb.    573), 

150a. 
Wilson  v.  Simpson   (16  S.  W.   Rep. 

40),  100. 
Wilson  v.  Spring  (64  111.  18),  74. 
Wilson  v.   State  (Miss.,  1893,  12  S. 

Rep.  332),  24. 
Wilson  v.  State  (57  Ind.  71),  284. 
Wilson  v.  State  (41  Tex.  320),  193. 
Wilson  v.  State  (30  Fla.  234),  9. 
Wilson  v.  Troup  (7  Johns.   Ch.  25), 

73. 
Wilson  v.  Tucker  (10  R.  I.  578),  210. 
Wilson  v.  Van  Leer  (127  Pa.  St.  371), 

139,  237. 
Wilson  v.  Wright  (8  Utah,   215 ;  30 

Pac.  Rep.  754),  31. 
Wilton  v.  Webster  (7  Car.  &  P.  198), 

52. 
Wimer  v.  Smith  (22  Oreg.  469),  229, 

351. 
Winans   v.   Durham   (5  Wend.   47), 

147. 
Winans  v.   Railroad  Co.  (21  How., 

U.  S.,  101),  189. 
Winch  v.  Norman  (65  Iowa,  186),  140. 
Winchell  v.  Express  Co.  (61  Vt.  15), 

372. 
Winchester  v.  Whitney  (138  Mass. 

549),  68. 


Windom  v.  Schappel  (39  Minn.  35), 

229. 
Windsor  v.  McVeigh  (93  U.  S.  274), 

232. 
Wing  v.  Angrave  (8  H.  L.  Cas.  183, 

198),  233. 
Wing  v.  Peck  (54  Vt.  245),  208. 
Winklemeier  v.  Daber  (52  N.  W.  Rep. 

1036;  92  Mich.  621),  282. 
Winkler  v.  Schlager  (19   N.   Y.    S. 

100),  71. 
Winn  v.  Chamberlain  (32  Vt.   318), 

209. 
Winn  v.   Patterson   (9   Pet.,  U.  S., 

677),  6,  30,  105,  10G. 
Winner  v.  Lathrop  (67   Hun,  511), 

202. 
Winnie  v.  Tousley(36  Hun,  190),  140. 
Winn.  Lake  Co.  v.  Young  (40  N.  H. 

420),  239. 
Winona  v.  Burke  (23  Minn.  254),  242. 
Winship  v.  O'Conner  (42  N.  H.  341), 

233. 
Winslow  v.  Morrill  (68  Me.  362),  343. 
Winslow  v.  State  (92  Ala.  78),  374. 
Winslow  v.  Tulan  (48  111.  145),  69. 
Winsor  v.  Dillaway  (4  Met.  221),  60. 
Winter  v.  Burt  (31  Ala.  33),  73a. 
Winter  v.  Cent.    Iowa    R.    Co.    (80 

Iowa,  443 ;  45  N.  W.  Rep.  737), 

350,  351. 
Wirt  v.   Dinan   (44  Mo.   App.  583), 

353,  358. 
Wischstadt  v.  Wischstadt  (47  Minn. 

38 ;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  225),  340. 
Wisdom  v.  State  (11  Colo.  170),  324. 
Wise  v.  Ackerman  (51  Md.  937),  8. 
Wise  v.   Newatney  (26  Neb.  88;  42 

N.  W.  Rep.  339),  50. 
i  Wiseman   v.    Fleischer  (10  Pa.    Co. 

Ct.  R.  300),  128. 
Witcher  v.   McLaughlin  (115  Mass. 

167),  58. 
Witford  v.  Clark  Co.  (119  U.  S.  522), 

361. 
Wither  v.  Roe  (45  Me.  571),  140. 
Withers  v.  Richardson  (5  T.  B.  Mon., 

Ky.,  94),  84. 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


CXCIX 


References  are  to  sections. 


Witmer  v.  Schlatter  (2  Rawle,  359), 

157. 
Witt  v.  State  (6  Cold.,  Tenn.,  5),  23. 
Witte  v.  Weinberg  (S.   C,   1893,  17 

S.  E.  Rep.  681),  380. 
Witters  v.  Sovvles  (32  Fed.  Rep.  130), 

175. 
Wittier  v.  Gould  (8  Watts,  Pa.,  485), 

139a. 
Witwell  v.  Wyer  (11  Mass.  6),  80. 
Woburn  v.  Henshavv  (101  Mass.  193), 

174. 
Wohlgemuth  v.  United  States  (N.  M., 

1893,  30  Pac.  Rep.  854),  24. 
Wolf  v.  Arthur  (N.  C,  1893,  16  S.  E. 

Rep.  843),  185. 
Wolf  v.  Foster  (13  Kan.  116),  35. 
Wolf  v.  Wolf  (2  Har.  &  G.,  Md.,  382), 

005. 
Wolf  v.  Wyeth  (11  S.  &  R.  149),  124. 
Wolfe  v.  Underwood  (12  S.  Rep.  234; 

96  Ala.  329),  369. 
Wolfe  v.  Washburn  (6  Conn.   261), 

147. 
Wolfert  v.  Pittsburg  R.  Co.  (44  Mo. 

App.  330),  222. 
Wolff  v.  Campbelle  (110  Mo.  114;  19 

S.  W.  Rep.  622).  11. 
Wolff  v.  Mathews  (39  Mo.  App.  376), 

130. 
Wolford  v.  Farnham  (47   Minn.  95), 

7,  37,  372. 
Wolverton  v.  State  (16  Ohio  St.  173), 

38. 
Wood  v.  Barber  (90  N.  C.  76),  69. 
Wood  v.  Council  (143  Pa.  St.  467),  12. 
Wood  v.  Davis  (7  Cranch,  271),  151. 
Wood  v.  Fisk  (62  N.  H.  173),  66,  110, 

115. 
Wood   v.   Insurance  Co.  (46  N.  Y. 

421),  241. 
Wood  v.  Kinsman  (5  Vt.  588),  287. 
Wood  v.  State  (92  Ind.  269),  102. 
Wood  v.  State  (58  Miss.  741),  197. 
Wood  v.  State   (31   Fla.  221 ;    12   S. 

Rep.  539),  6. 
Wood  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893,  33  N.  E. 

Rep.  903),  355. 


Wood  v.  Wattinson  (17   Conn.  500), 

158. 
Wood    v.   Whiting  (21   Barb.    190), 

211. 
Wood  v.  Wood  (47  Kan.  617),  343. 
Woodard   v.  Spiller  (1    Dana,  Ky., 

180),  140. 
Woodbeck   v.  Keeler   (6   Cow.  118), 

384. 
Woodbury  v.  Anoka  (52  Minn.  329; 

54  N.  W.  Rep.  187),  343. 
Woodcock   v.   Woodcock  (36  Minn. 

217),  197. 
Woodcock  v.  Worcester  (138  Mass. 

268),  18. 
Woodcock's   Case  (2   Leach,    C.    C. 

563),  101. 
Woodford  v.  McClenahan   (4  Gilm., 

9  111.,  85),  139. 
Woodin  v.  People  (1  Park.  C.  C,  N. 

Y.,  464),  196. 
Woodman  v.  Dana  (52  Me.  9),  139. 
Woodman  v.  Woodman    (47    N.    H. 

120),  197. 
Wood  River  Bank  v.  Dodge  (36  Neb. 

708 ;  55  N.  W.  Rep.  234),  343. 
Woodruff   v.  Imperial   F.  I.  Co.  (83 

N.  Y.  113),  198. 
Woodruff  v.  McHarry  (56  111.  218), 

135. 
Woodruff  v.  State  (31   Fla.  320;  12 

S.  Rep.  653),  8. 
Woodruff  v.  Taylor  (20  Vt.  65),  158. 
Woodruff  v.  White  (25  Neb.  745),  71. 
Woods  v.  Bank  (14  N.  H.  101),  73a, 

146. 
Woods  v.  Bonner  (89  Tenn.  411),  31. 
Woods  v.  Burke  (67   Mich.  674;   35 

N.  W.  Rep.  768),  130. 
Woods  v.  Com.  (86  Va.  929),  226. 
Woods  v.  Davis  (34  N.  H.  328),  286. 
Woods  v.  Durette  (28  Tex.  429),  24. 
Woods  v.  Graves  (144  Mass.  365),  76. 
Woods  v.  Hilderbrand  (46  Mo.  284), 

128. 
Woods  v.  Keys  (14  Allen,  236),  124. 
Woodson   Mach.    Co.   v.   Morse  (47 

Kan.  429),  247. 


TABLE    OF   CASES. 


Woodward   v.    Buchanan   (5    Q.  B. 

285),  8. 
Woodward  v.  Bugsbee  (2  Hun,  128), 

199. 
Woodward  v.   Foster  (18  N.  Y.    S. 

827),  212. 
Woodward  v.  Leavitt(107  Mass.  453), 

50,  176. 
Woodward  v.  Railroad  Co.  (21  Wis. 

309),  239. 
Woodward   v.  Sibert  (82  Va.   441), 

213. 
Woodworth  v.  Barker  (1  Hill,  176), 

130. 
Woodworth  v.  Cook  (2  Blatchf.  151), 

223. 
Woolen  v.  Wire  (119  Ind.  251),  124. 
Wooley  v.  Constant  (4  Johns.    54), 

128. 
Woolfolk  v.  State  (85  Ga.  69),  90, 176, 

193,  283. 
Woolsey   v.    Bohn   (41    Minn.    237), 

60. 
Woolsey  v.  Jones  (84  Ala.  88),  282. 
Woolworth  v.  McPherson  (55  Fed. 

Rep.  558),  209. 
Wooster   v.   Butler  (13   Conn.   309), 

115. 
Wooster  v.  Simonson  (20  Fed.  Rep. 

316),  208. 
Wooten  v.  Burch  (2  Md.   Ch.   190), 

305. 
Wooten    v.    Wilkins    (39    Ga.    223), 

102. 
Worcester  v.   Cheney  (94    111.   430), 

238. 
Worcester    v.     Northborough    (140 

Mass.  400),  144. 
Worden  v.  Van  Gieston  (6  Dem.,  N. 

Y.  Sur..  237),  131. 
Work    v.    Beach    (129    N.   Y.    651), 

209. 
Workman  v.  Greening  (115  111.  477), 

223. 
WTorley  v.   Hinman  (Ind.,    1893,   33 

N.  E.  Rep.  866),  74,  230. 
Worrell  v.  Forsyth  (111.,  1892,  30  N. 

E.  Rep.  673),  214. 


References  are  to  sections. 

Worsham  v.  McLeod  (Miss  ,  1892,  11 

S.  Rep.  107),  371. 
Worth  v.  McConnell  (42  Mich.  473), 

139. 
Worth  am  v.  Thompson  (81  Tex.  348), 

82. 
Worthington  v.  Mencer  (Ala.,  1892, 

11  S.  Rep.  72),  317. 
Worthington  v.  Scribner  (109  Mass. 

.     487),  175. 
Worthington     v.    Worthington    (32 

Neb.  334),  380. 
Wright  v.  Bundy  (11  Ind.  398),  136. 
Wright   v.    Burritt   (63    Hun,    628), 


Wright  v.  Cane  (18  La.   Ann.  597), 

262. 
Wright  v.  Dickinson  (Mich.,  1890,  42 

N.  W.  Rep.  849),  74. 
Wright  v.   Douglass  (10  Barb.  97), 

232. 
Wright  v.  Fonda  (44  Mo.  App.  634), 

11. 
Wright  v.  Hardy  (22  Wis.  348),  193. 
Wright  v.   Hawkins   (28  Tex.   452), 

239. 
Wright  v.  Hazen  (24  Vt.  143),  82. 
Wright  v.  Hicks  (15  Ga.  160),  350 
Wright  v.  Maseras(56  Barb.  521),  79. 
Wright  v.  McKee  (37  Vt.  161),  10. 
Wright  v.  Mulvaney  (78  Wis.  89),  11. 
Wright  v.  Samuda  (2  Phil.  266,  277), 

233. 
Wright  v.  State  (7    Tex.  App.  574), 

127. 
Wright  v.  Stowe  (4  Jones'  L.,  N.  C, 

516),  124. 
Wright  v.  Weimeister  (87  Mich.  494), 

82. 
Wright    v.   Williams  (47  Vt.    222), 

190. 
Wright   v.   Wilson    (17    Mich.    192), 

135. 
Wright  v.  Wright  (139  Mass.  177),  9, 

250. 
Wright  v.  Wright  (7  N.  J.  L.    175), 

128.  ' 
Wright  v.  Wright  (5  Ind.  389),  129. 


TABLK    OF    CASES. 


CC1 


References  are  to  sections. 


Wurzbiirger  v.  Merie  (20   La.  Ann. 

415),  223. 
Wyckoff  v.  Remsen  (11  Paige,  564), 

229. 
Wynn  v.  City  R.  R.  Co.  (Ga.,  1893, 

17  S.  E.  Rop.  649),  30,  334,  343. 
Wynn  v.  Small  (102  N.  C.  33),  138. 
Wylie  v.  Miss.  Pac.  R.  Co.  (41  Fed. 

Rep.  623),  128. 
Wroe  v.  State  (20  Ohio  St.  460),  102. 
Wyatt  v.  People  (17  Colo.  252),  284. 
Wynne  v.  Glydwell  (17  Ind.  446),  70. 

Y. 

Yadon  v.  Mackey  (50  Kan.  630),  380. 
Yaeger  v.  Henry   (39   111.   App.  21), 

232. 
Yale  v.   Comstock  (112   Mass.  267), 

120. 
Yandes  v.  Lafavour  (2  Blackf.  371), 

69. 
Yarborough  v.  Mass  (9  Ala.  382),  80. 
Yardley  v.  Culbertson  (108  Pa.  St. 

395),  188. 
Yard's  Case  (10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  41), 

288. 
Yates  v.    Fraser  (6  111.    App.    229), 

267. 
Yates  v.  People  (32  N.  Y.  509),  5. 
Yates  v.  People  (38  III.  527),  343. 
Yates  v.  Shaw  (24  III.  367),  115. 
Yates  v.  Yates  (76  N.  C.  142),  140. 
Yeaton  v.  Fry  (6   Cranch,  335),  149, 

242. 
Ycaw  v.  Williams  (15  R.  I.  20),  185, 

197. 
Yehn  Jim  v.  Territory  (I  Wash.  St. 

63),  238. 
Yell  v.  Lane  (41  Ark.  53),  244. 
Yeomans  v.  Petty  (40  N.  J.  Eq.  495), 

140. 
Yerkes  v.  Bank  (69  N.  Y.  383),  242. 
Yocum  v.  Barnes  (8  B.  Mon.,  Ky., 

496),  73a. 
Yordy  v.  Marshall  (Iowa,  1893,  53  N. 

W.  Rep.  298),  73a. 
York  v.  Conde  (66  Hun,  316),  75. 


York  v.  Fortenbury  (15  Colo.  129),  21. 
York  v.  Maine  R.  Co.  (84  N.  Y.  17), 

11. 
York  v.  Pease  (2   Gray,  Mass.,  282), 

375. 
Yorty  v.  Paine  (62  Wis.  154),  136. 
Yost  v.  Mensch  (27  W.  N.  C.  562),  11. 
Yost  v.  Minn.  Hard.  Works   (41    111. 

App.  556),  339. 
Young  v.  Bank  (4  Cranch,  384),  141, 

142. 
Young  v.  Board  of  Mahoning  Co.  (51 

Fed.  Rep.  585),  56,  84. 
Young  v.  Black   (7   Cranch,    U.    S., 

426),  19. 
Young  v.  Brady  (94  Cal.  128),  350, 

374. 
Young  v.  Com.  (8  Bush,  366),  95. 
Young  v.   Cook  (15  La.  Ann.  126), 

211. 
Young  v.  Dearborn  (23   N.  H.   372), 

124. 
Young  v.  Duval  (109  U.  S.  573),  136, 

157. 
Young  v.  English  (7  Beav.  10),  276. 
Young  v.  Heff  ner  (36  Ohio  St.  232), 

233. 
Young  v.  Highland  (9   Gratt.,  Va., 

16).  249. 
Young  v.  Johnson  (123   N.  Y.   226), 

196. 
Young  v.  Kansas  City,   T.  S.  &  M. 

R,  Co.  (39  Mo.  App.  59),  110. 
Young  v.  Laird  (30  Ala.  571),  77. 
Young  v.  Lamont   (Minn.,    1893,    57 

N.  W.  Rep.  478),  250. 
Young  v.  Luce  (66  Hun,  631),  60. 
Young    v.    Rollins    (78    N.    C.  485), 

356. 
Young  v.  State  (30  Tex.  App.  308), 

23. 
Young  v.  State  (Ala.,  1892, 10  S.  Rep. 

913),  13,  101. 
Young  v.  Wright  (1  Campb.  139),  74. 
Youngberg  v.  Nelson  (51  Minn.  172; 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  629),  205,  219. 
Younger  v.  Duffie   (94  N.    Y.   535), 

276. 


ecu 


TABLE    OF    CASES. 


References  are  to  sections. 


Youree  v.  Territory  (Ariz.,  1892,  29 

Pac.  Rep.  894),  93. 
Yrissari  v.  Clement  (2  C.  &  P.  223), 

243. 
Yundt  v.  Hartranft  (41  111.  9),  52. 

z. 

Zabel  v.  Nyenhuis  (83  Iowa,  750),  220. 
Zacharie  v.  Franklin  (12  Pet.  151), 

374. 
Zebley  v.  Storey  (117  Pa.  St.  478), 

350. 
Zechtmann  v,  Roberts  (109  Mass.  53), 

83. 


Zeehandelaur,  Ex  parte  (71  Cal.  238), 

332. 
Zeininger  v.  Schnitzler  (48  Kan.  66), 

24. 
Zepp  v.  Hager  (70  111.  223),  232. 
Zievernick  v.  Kempner  (Ohio,  1892, 

34  N.  E.  Rep.  250),  157. 
Zimmerman  v.  Zimmerman  (23  Pa. 

St.  375),  210. 
Zitser  v.    Merkel  (24  Pa.   St.   408), 

10. 
Zoldoske    v.    State    (82    Wis.    580), 

330. 
Zucker  v.  Karpeles  (88  Mich.  413), 

250,  340. 


THE  LAW  OF  EVIDENCE. 


INTRODUCTORY  CHAPTER. 


§  1.  Early  development  of  law. 

2.  Evidence  defined. 

3.  The  basis  of  belief. 

4.  Direct  and  circumstantial  evi- 

dence distinguished. 


§  5.  Nature  and  effect  of    circum- 
stantial evidence. 
6.  Reasonable  doubt  and  the  weight 
of  evidence. 


§  1.  Early  development  of  law. —  All  law,  whatever  its  ul- 
timate form,  is  in  its  origin  the  result  of  customs  observed  in 
social  and  commercial  intercourse,  which  often  have  their 
commencement  at  a  date  long  anterior  to  the  existence  of  any- 
regular  form  of  government.  Thus,  long  before  any  supreme 
political  authority  exists,  it  is  found  that  rules  are  practiced 
regulating  the  famity  relation,  the  making  of  contracts,  the 
rights  of  ownership,  and  the  punishment  of  violence. 

When  human  controversies  ceased  to  be  wholly  adjusted 
by  force  and  came  before  the  primitive  tribunals  which  obtain  ^ 
in  the  early  history  of  every  nation,  these  customs,  which  are 
merely  a  reflection  or  embodiment  of  the  existing  popular 
morality,  are  impressed  with  the  character  of  legal  rules  by 
their  recognition  by  the  courts. 

Early  procedure  is  conservative  and  artificial.     The  judges^ 
are  of  necessity  compelled  to  rely  on  custom  and  precedent. 
The  private  rights  which  grow  up  around  and  are  based  upon 
the  old  custom  which  has  become  a  rule  of  law  demand  rigid- 
ity and  unchangeableness. 

Early  law  is  always  developed  as  a  system  of  procedure, 
and  by  rude  and  ignorant  peoples  form  and  substance  are  usu- 
ally confounded.  A  blind  devotion  to  the  letter,  causing 
hardship  and  injustice,  is  the  dominating  character  of  early 
jurisprudence.  This  was  particularly  true  of  the  English 
l 


2  INTRODUCTORY.  [§  2. 

common  law,  as  it  was  slowly  developed  by  the  judicial  inter- 
pretation and  recognition  of  feudal  principles  and  customs. 

The  extreme  technicality  of  the  common  law  regarding  the 
ownership  of  real  property,  and  the  framing  of  pleading  in  an 
action,  is  well  known.  Hence  it  need  occasion  no  surprise  that 
when  the  rules  of  legal  evidence  began  to  be  formulated  in 
connection  with  the  development  of  modern  social  and  com- 
mercial progress,  they  were  based  upon  arbitrary  principles 
and  infected  with  the  prejudices  and  superstitions  of  a  rude 
and  unlettered  age. 

So  we  find  at  various  periods  this  branch  of  tlie  law  has 
been  influenced  and  acted  upon  by  such  arbitrary  and  bar- 
barous conceptions  as  that  a  man  would  lie  if  permitted  to 
testify  for  himself,  or  that  truth  could  be  accurately  ascer- 
tained by  the  employment  of  physical  torture  inflicted  on  the 
accused,  or  by  compelling  him.  to  submit  to  a  cruel  ordeal. 
But  the  advance  of  scientific,  commercial  and  political  ideas, 
with  the  progress  of  modern  ideas  bringing  about  legal  re- 
forms, has  had  a  most  important  re-action  upon  the  law  of 
evidence.  That  law  is  no  longer  harsh,  technical  and  irre- 
sponsive to  the  demands  of  progressive  civilization,  but  adapt- 
able to  the  needs  of  an  age  in  which  considerations  of  sim- 
plicity and  justice  are  paramount  to  forms  and  precedents, 
and  when  the  demand  is  not  only  for  logical  development 
and  coherence,  but  for  flexibility  to  new  uses  and  needs  and 
economy  and  speed  in  administration. 

Hence,  at  the  present  day,  the  sole  tests  which  should  be 
applied  to  ascertain  the  utility  of  a  rule  of  evidence  are,  first, 
does  it,  while  admitting  all  facts  which  bear  upon  the  issue, 
tend  to  shorten  or  simplify  legal  proceedings;  and  second,  is 
it  calculated  to  render  this  evidence  more  valuable  by  making 
it  more  cogent  and  trustworthy. 

§  2.  Evidence  defined. —  The  word  "evidence"  having  been 
so  frequently  defined,  it  is  unnecessary  for  the  author  to  at- 
tempt another  definition,  though  it  may  be  of  use  to  ascertain 
what  elements  these  definitions  have  in  common,  and  what 
idea  is  conveyed  by  all  of  them.  It  will  be  seen  that  they 
agree  that  legal  evidence  is  only  a  means  to  an  end,  and  that 
this  end  is  the  ascertainment  of  truth  in  the  clearest  and  most 
speedy  manner. 


•] 


INTRODUCTORY. 


The  truth  of  any  statement  of  fact,  when  ascertained,  is  said 
to  be  proved;  or,  when  mathematical  truth  is  concerned,  the 
word  "  demonstration  "  is  used,  which  excludes  all  possibility 
of  the  existence  of  error.1 

In  the  conduct  of  our  e  very-day  affairs  we  cann'ot  expect, 
and  hence  have  no  right  to  insist  upon,  a  demonstration  of 
the  truth  of  every  statement  of  fact  that  is  made.2  We  must 
be  content  with  evidence  that  will  convince  us  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  and  render  it  easier  to  believe  that  a  given 
proposition  is  probably  true.3 

Cumulative  evidence  means  additional  evidence  of  the  same 
character  to  support  the  same  point  as  other  evidence  already 
given.4 

Corroborative  evidence  is  additional  evidence  proving  simi- 
lar facts,  or  facts  calculated  to  produce  the  same  result  as  facts 
already  given  in  evidence. 

Partial  evidence  is  evidence  of  one  fact  in  a  series  which 
tends  to  prove  the  fact  in  issue.5 


1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  13. 

2 "  Facts  are  the  sources  or  mate- 
rials of  evidence;  evidence  is  the 
medium  by  which  facts  are  present" 
Bouv.  Law  Diet. 

3  "  Evidence  means  and  includes, 
first,  all  statements  which  the  court 
permits  or  requires  to  be  made  be- 
fore it  by  witnesses  in  relation  to 
matters  of  fact  under  inquiry ;  such 
statements  are  called  oral  evidence. 
Second,  all  documents  produced  for 
the  inspection  of  the  court;  such 
documents  are  called  documentary 
evidence."    Indian  Evidence  Act,  §  3. 

"Evidence  means,  first,  statements 
made  by  witnesses  in  court  under  a 
legal  sanction  in  relation  to  matters 
of  fact;  such  statements  are  called 
oral  evidence.  Second,  documents 
produced  for  the  inspection  of  the 
court  or  judge;  such  documents  are 
called  documentary  evidence."  Ste- 
phen, Digest  of  Evidence,  art.  1. 
"  The  word  '  evidence,'  in  legal  ac- 


ceptation, includes  all  the  means  by 
which  any  alleged  matter  of  fact, 
the  truth  of  which  is  submitted  to 
investigation,  is  established  or  dis- 
proved."  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  §  1. 

"  Evidence  includes  the  reproduc- 
tion before  the  determining  tribunal 
of  the  admission  of  parties  and  of 
facts  relevant  to  the  issue.  Evidence 
is  adduced  only  by  the  parties 
through  witnesses,  documents  or  in- 
spection." Wharton  on  Evidence,  §  3. 

The  word  "evidence,"  considered 
in  relation  to  law,  includes  all  the 
legal  means,  exclusive  of  mere  argu- 
ment, which  tend  "to  prove  or  dis- 
prove any  matter  of  fact  the  truth  of 
which  is  submitted  to  judicial  inves- 
tigation." Taylor  on  Evidence,  §  1 
(Text-book  Series). 

4  People  v.  Supervisors,  10  Wend. 
293 ;  Guyot  v.  Butts,  4  id.  582 ;  Par- 
ker v.  Hardy,  24  Pick,  246,  248. 

SMcCarney  v.  People,  83  N.  Y.  408, 
414,  415. 


4  INTRODUCTORY.  [§  3. 

§  3.  Basis  of  belief. —  It  is  a  truism  to  say  that  most  of  the 
knowledge  which  is  possessed  by  any  individual  is  derived 
from  information  imparted  by  others.  So  we  must  recognize 
the  truth  that  the  disposition  to  believe,  or,  in  other  words,  to 
rely  upon  what  others  tell  us,  is  inherent  in  humanity  until,  by 
repeated  acts  of  deception  practiced  upon  us,  we  become  in- 
credulous and  learn  to  distrust  the  statements  of  other  men. 

Thus  at  a  comparatively  early  period  in  life  we  learn  by 
experience  of  the  falsehoods  uttered  in  our  hearing  that  an 
urgent  necessity  exists  for  the  use  of  rules  and  principles  by 
which  the  truth  of  what  is  said  may  be  separated  from  that 
which  is  false. 

In  the  first  place,  the  probability  of  any  new  fact  with 
which  we  become  acquainted  constitutes  a  strong,  although 
not  the  sole,  ground  for  a  belief  in  its  truth.  If  the  new  fact 
is  consistent  with  others  which  we  already  know  or  believe  to 
be  true,  less  evidence,  or  evidence  of  a  less  satisfactory  char- 
acter, is  required  to  convince  us  of  its  truth  than  where  the 
new  fact  is  wholly  unlike  anything  in  our  experience. 

The  confirmation  of  the  truth  of  any  new  fact  by  knowl- 
edge already  possessed  will  vary  in  proportion  to  the  nature 
of  the  fact  communicated  and  the  situation  of  the  individual. 
Thus  a  statement  involving  a  new  scientific  discovery,  as,  for 
example,  that  oral  communication  can  be  had  by  the  telephone 
between  persons  hundreds  of  miles  apart,  will  be  regarded  as 
extremely  probable  or  as  utterly  absurd  according  as  it  is 
made  to  a  well-educated  man  or  to  an  illiterate  savage. 

So,  though  the  direct  evidence  of  a  witness  is  uncontra- 
dicted, the  jury  may  refuse  to  believe  it,  if  from  its  inconsist- 
ency and  improbability  they  conclude  that  it  is  false.1 

Though  we  may  have  been  repeatedly  deceived  by  the  mis- 
representations of  others,  we  find  by  experience  that  men,  as 
a  rule,  tell  the  truth.  Where  neither  prejudice  nor  passion 
exists,  and  where  an  individual  has  no  private  interests  to  ad- 
vance by  distorting  truth,  we  may  rely  upon  the  credibility 
of  his  testimony,  if  we  believe  him  to  be  a  man  of  intelli- 
gence, possessing  adequate  powers  and  opportunity  for  acquir- 

»  Hawkins  v.  Sauby,  48  Minn.  69;  jengren  (Minn.,  1892),  52  id.  219.  See 
50  N.  W.  Rep.  1015;  Anderson  v,  Lil-    1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §§'7-11. 


§  3.]  INTRODUCTORY.  5 

ing  knowledge.  But  where  the  testimony  of  persons,  such 
as  police  and  private  detectives  and  others  engaged  in  the 
detection  of  crime,  or  expert  witnesses  who  are  under  pay,1 
who  from  character  or  position  are  inclined  to  take  prejudiced 
or  distorted  views  is  involved,  it  will  require  a  high  degree  of 
evidence  to  satisfy  the  mind  of  an  impartial  hearer.3 

Again,  the  well-recognized  connection  often  observed  be- 
tween collateral  or  subordinate  facts  which  are  proved  or 
admitted  and  the  main  fact  in  issue  frequently  furnishes  most 
cogent  and  satisfactory  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  latter. 
This  is  only  applying  to  the  law  of  evidence  the  principles  of 
inductive  reasoning,  which  are  used,  often  unconsciously,  by 
all  men  ki  the  conduct  of  their  most  trivial  as  well  as  of  their 
most  important  affairs.  It  furnishes  a  basis  for  the  division 
of  evidence  into  direct  and  circumstantial,  while  on  the  other 
hand,  by  permitting  the  jury  in  a  cause  to  draw  inferences  or 
presumptions  from  the  facts,  it  has  opened  the  door  for  the 
creation  of  presumptions  of  law. 

Another  incident  affecting  the  credibility  of  evidence  is  found 
in  the  frequent  occurrence  of  undesigned  coincidences,  which, 
though  sometimes  startling  and  unexpected,  are  unaccount- 
able except  upon  the  hypothesis  that  the  narrative  of  which 
they  are  a  part  is  true.3  No  event  stands  alone.  It  is  the 
result  of  others  which  preceded  it.  It  may  in  its  turn  be  the 
fruitful  cause  of  many  others  which  follow  or  relate  to  it.  So 
every  fact  or  circumstance  is  connected  with  others  of  a  col- 
lateral nature,  rendering  it  well  nigh  impossible  for  one  to 
concoct  a  narrative  which  on  comparison  writh  other  and 
related  circumstances  will  stand  the  test.4  Even  by  compar- 
ing the  various  parts  of  the  story,  a  mind  trained  in  the  habit 
of  investigation  may  quickly  ascertain  the  truth  or  falsehood  ; 
for  in  such  a  case  the  fabrication,  however  skilfully  con- 
structed, will  crumble  to  pieces  by  reason  of  its  inherent  lack 
of  verity.5 

1  "  Skilled  witnesses  come  with  such  2  Cen.  R.  Co.  v.  Attaway  (Ga.,  1893), 

a  bias  on  their  minds  to  support  the  16  S.  E.  Rep.  956. 

cause  in  which  they  are  embarked  3  United  States  v.  Ybanez,  53  Fed. 

that  hardly  any  weight  should  be  Rep.  536. 

given  to  their  evidence."   In  re  Tracy,  41  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §§  9,  12. 

10  CI.  &  F.  191.    See  post,  %  188.  &  In  Fife,  Jones  &  Stewart  v.  Com., 


6  INTRODUCTORY.  [§  4. 

§  4.  Direct  and  circumstantial  evidence  distinguished. — 

By  direct  evidence  is  meant  evidence  of  such  facts  as  consti- 
tute the  actual  and  present  subject  of  the  judicial  investi- 
gation ;  in  other  words,  of  those  facts  which  are  directly 
in  issue  between  the  parties.  To  say  that  the  evidence  is 
direct  is  equivalent  to  declaring  that  what  the  witness  testifies 
to  as  having-  seen  or  heard  is  the  fact  or  facts  which  are  af- 
firmed and  controverted  by  the  parties.  In  such  a  case  the 
evidence  has  a  direct  and  uninterrupted  bearing  and  applica- 
tion to  the  facts  to  be  proved.  But  where  the  facts  seen  or 
heard  by  the  witness  have,  when  shown,  no  direct  bearing  on 
the  facts  in  issue,  but  require  a  course  of  reasoning  or  inference 
before  their  application  to  the  latter  can  be  apprehended,  or 
before  the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  latter  facts  can  be  presumed, 
the  evidence  is  circumstantial.1 

So  where  the  dead  body  of  defendant's  wife  is  found  with 
her  throat  cut  in  a  manner  which  could  not  have  been  self- 
inflicted,  and  it  is  shown  that  defendant  was  seen  in  her  com- 
pany the  evening  previous ;  that  near  the  body  was  found  a 
razor,  a  walking-stick  that  defendant  admitted  was  his,  and  a 
cuff  button;  that  defendant's  razor  was  missing;  that  the  cuff 
button  matched  one  in  his  possession,  and  that  he  had  aban- 
doned his  wife,  accusing  her  of  infidelity,  a  chain  of  circum- 
stances is  forged  leading  irresistibly  to  the  conclusion  that  ho 
murdered  her.2 

Whether  the  evidence  be  direct  or  circumstantial,  the  truth- 
fulness of  the  witness  may  be  presumed  by  the  jury;  but  in 
the  latter  case  a  further  presumption  is  made,  and  the  exist- 

29  Pa.  St.  429, 438,  the  court  said :  "  It  1 "  Circumstantial  evidence  is  the 

must    be    remembered    that    jurors  proof  of  certain  facts  in  a  given  case 

are  men,  and  that  it  is  because  they  from  which  the  jury  may  infer  other 

have  human  hearts  and  sympathies  connected  facts  which  usually  and 

iirvJ.  judgments  that  they  are  selected  reasonably  follow,  according  to  the 

to  determine  upon  the  rights  of  their  common   experience   of    mankind." 

fellowmen.    .    .     .    Their    oaths  as  State  v.  Avery  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W. 

jurors  rest  on  their  consciences  as  Rep.  193. 

men,  and  as  men  they  are  accountable  2  People  v.  Hamilton,  137  N.  Y.  531. 

to  God  and  to  their  country  for  their  See,  also,  Moreno  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893), 

verdict.  Nothing  more  is  demanded."  21  S.  W.  Rep.  924. 
See  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  12, 


§  5.]  INTRODUCTORY.  7 

ence  or  non-existence  of  the  facts  in  issue  is  deduced  from  the 
proved  existence  of  other  facts.1 

From  the  nature  of  circumstantial  evidence  it  follows  that 
its  force  wholly  depends  upon  the  fact  that  in  each  case  some 
direct  evidence  has  been  given  from  which  the  presumption 
or  inference  may  arise. 

So  in  the  class  of  cases  in  which  fraud  is  alleged,  or  in  which 
it  is  said  that  fraud  will  be  presumed  from  the  circumstances 
of  the  parties,  direct  evidence  of  a  clear  and  satisfactory  char- 
acter must  be  adduced  before  the  existence  of  fraud  will  be 
presumed;  and  the  facts  and  circumstances  must  be  estab- 
lished beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.2 

The  admissibility  of  circumstantial  evidence  depends  solely 
upon  the  strength  and  distinctness  of  the  logical  connection 
between  the  facts  proved  and  the  inference  which  may  be 
made  by  the  jury;  in  other  words,  whether  such  evidence  is 
receivable  depends  upon  its  relevancy  to  the  fact  in  issue. 
The  question  of  relevancy  is  one  for  the  decision  of  the  judge. 
To  guide  him  in  his  decision  upon  the  remoteness  of  the 
evidence  offered  no  general  rule  can  be  enunciated.  Each 
case  must  necessarily  be  decided  on  its  own  circumstances, 
subject  to  the  general  qualification  that  all  the  evidence 
offered,  to  be  admissible,  must  tend  to  prove  or  disprove  the 
fact  in  issue.3 

§5.  Nature  and  effect  of  circumstantial  evidence. —  Cir- 
cumstantial evidence  is  divided  by  the  authorities  into  that 
which  is  certain  and  that  which  is  uncertain.     In  the  former 

1  Cora.  v.  Harmon,  4  Pa.  St.  269.  to  the   inference  must  be  distinctly 

"The  advantage  of  circumstantial  and  independently  proved  bycompe- 

evidence  is    that,   as  it    commonly  tent    evidence;   and    the    inference 

comes  from  different  sources,  a  chain  must  be  fair  and  natural,  not  forced 

of  circu instances  is  less  likely  to  be  or  artificial."    Webster's  Case,  5  Cush. 

falsely  prepared    and    falsehood    is  311.    See  Com.  v.  Howe,  132  Mass. 

more  likely  to  be  detected.     The  dis-  259. 

advantage  is  that  the  jury  have  not  -  McAleer  v.  McMurray,  58  Pa.  St. 

only  to  weigh  the  evidence  of  facts,  126 ;  Douglass  v.  Mitchell,  35  id.  440 : 

but  to  draw  just  conclusions  from  United  States  v.  Ross,  92  U.  S.  281 ; 

them ;  in  doing  which  there  may  be  Kaiser  v.  State,  35  Neb.  704 ;  State  v. 

led  to  make  hasty  and  false  deduc-  Hunter,  50  Kan.    302;   Kennedy  v. 

tions  —  a  source  of  error  not  existing  State,    12    S.    Rep.   858  (Fla.,    1893); 

in  the  consideration  of  positive  evi-  Hutchison  v.  Boltz,  35  W.  Va.  754. 

dence.    Hence,  each  fact  necessary  3  See  §g  7-10. 


8  INTRODUCTORY.  [§  5. 

class  the  conclusion  follows  necessarily  where  the  premises 
are  established ;  in  the  latter  it  may  or  may  not  follow,  ac- 
cording to  the  course  of  reasoning  pursued  by  the  jury.1  This 
classification,  however,  is  of  small  practical  value,  for  the 
weight  of  circumstantial  evidence  and  the  power  to  draw  in- 
ferences from  it  are  matters  which  are  wholly  in  the  hands 
of  the  jury,  and  they  are  not  under  the  necessity  of  being 
convinced  by  any  degree  of  circumstantial  evidence,  however 
satisfactory  or  certain  it  may  appear.  It  is  the  duty  of  the 
judge  to  instruct  them  as  to  the  rules  regulating  the  subject, 
and  where  the  evidence  is  wholly  circumstantial  it  is  reversi- 
ble error  for  him  to  refuse  to  do  so.2 

So  though  the  jury  may,  under  the  direction  of  the  judge 
as  to  the  law,  weigh  the  evidence  and  compare  that  which  is 
circumstantial  with  that  which  is  direct,  they  are  under  no 
sort  of  obligation  to  reject  the  former  in  favor  of  the  latter, 
or  to  ascribe  to  either  any  higher  degree  of  probative  force 
than  to  the  other.  So  the  credibility  of  either  description  of 
evidence  depends  on  its  intrinsic  merit  as  regards  truthful- 
ness and  probability.3  A  conviction  of  crime  may  be  had  on 
circumstantial  evidence  alone,  provided  the  jury  are  convinced 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.4  In  other  words,  the  circum- 
stances should  be  not  only  consistent  with  the  prisoner's  guilt, 
but  irreconcilable  with  any  other  rational  hypothesis.5 

1 1  Greenleaf  on  Evidence,  §  13a.        liable  than  other  evidence."    People 

2  Crowell  v.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  404 ;    v.  Orquidas,  96  Cal.  239. 

Boyd  v.  State,  24  id.  570 :  Crowley  v.  •»  Kaiser  v.  State,  35  Neb.  704 ;  State 

State,  10  S.  W.  Rep.  217 ;  26  Tex.  App.  v.  Hunter,  50  Kan.  302 ;  Kennedy  v. 

278.     But  where  no  question  of  cir-  State  (Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  858. 

cumstantial  evidence  is  involved  the  5  State    v.    Avery   (Mo.,   1893),   21 

court  need  not  instruct  the  jury  upon  S.  W.  Rep.  21 ;  Nail  v.  State  (Miss., 

the  rules  governing  it.     Langdon  v.  1893),  11  S.  Rep.  793;  State  v.  Dav- 

People,  133  111.  382 ;  24  N.  E.  Rep.  874 ;  enport  (S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  37 ; 

Smith  v.  State,  28  Tex.   App.  309 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  239 ; 

Wampler  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  352 ;  111   Mo.   538;    State   v.   Milling,   35 

Vaughan  v.  State  (Ark.,  1893),  20  S.  S.  C.  16 ;  14  S.  E.  Rep.  284 ;  Williaui- 

W.   Rep.   588 ;    Cotton  v.   State,  87  son  v.  State,  30  Tex.  330 ;  17  S.  W. 

Ala.  75.  Rep.  722 ;  State  v.  Woodward  (Iowa, 

3  People  v.  Morrow,  60  Cal.  142 ;  1892),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  885 ;  People  v. 
State  v.  Slingerland,  19  Nev.  135;  Dillwood,  94  Cal.  89;  United  States 
Clark  v.  Com.,  123  Pa.  St.  555.  v.  McKenzie,  35  Fed.  Rep.  826 ;  Leon- 
"  Nothing  in  the  nature  of  circum-  ard  v.  Territory,  2  Wash.  T.  281; 
stantial  evidence  renders  it  less  re-  Overman  v.  State,  49  Ark.  364;  Dean 


6.] 


INTRODUCTORY. 


§  6.  Reasonable  doubt  and  the  weight  of  evidence  —  Alibi 
in  criminal  trials. —  Where  civil  rights  are  involved,  extreme 
strictness  of  proof  is  not  required,  and  the  jury  may  decide 
for  either  parby  according  to  the  probability  and  weight  of 
evidence,  so  long  as  their  verdict  be  in  favor  of  that  litigant 
upon  whose  side  the  evidence  preponderates. 

The  jury  in  criminal  cases,  however,  are  not  permitted  to 
base  their  verdict  on  a  mere  preponderance  of  proof,  but  are 
required,  particularly  where  the  evidence  is  circumstantial  or 
contradictory,  to  be  satisfied  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  that 
the  accused  is  guilty.1 

The  rule  that  a  preponderance  of  evidence  is  sufficient  in  a 
civil  suit  is  based  upon  the  fact  that  proof  arrived  at  by  the 
verdict  will  only  result  as  a  judgment  for  pecuniary  damage 
or  establish  a  civil  right.  But  in  a  criminal  trial  the  accused 
starts  with  a  presumption  of  innocence  which  must  be  over- 
come in  addition  to  the  evidence  which  he  may  adduce  in  his 
own  behalf.     So  the  character,  and  perhaps  the  life,  of  the  ac- 


v.  Com.,  32  Gratt.  912 ;  Davis  v.  State, 
74  Ga.  869 ;  Russell  v.  Cora.,  78  Va. 
600;  Swigar  v.  State,  109  111.  372; 
Poe  v.  State,  10  Lea  (Tenn.),  673; 
State  v.  Anderson,  10  Oreg.  448; 
State  v.  Smith,  73  Iowa,  32 ;  Com.  v. 
Robinson,  146  Mass.  371 ;  Yates  v. 
People,  32  N.  Y.  509 ;  Com.  v.  Web- 
ster, 59  Mass.  295 ;  West  v.  State,  76 
Ala.  98;  People  v.  Beckvvith,  108 
N.  Y.  67 ;  State  v.  Johnson,  37  Minn. 
493;  People  v.  Reich,  110  N.  Y.  660; 
Jones  v.  State,  57  Miss.  684 ;  State  v. 
Brewer,  98  N.  C.  607. 

"Perhaps  strong  circumstantial 
evidence,  in  cases  of  crimes  commit- 
ted for  the  most  part  in  secret,  is 
the  most  satisfactory  of  any  from 
which  to  draw  the  conclusion  of 
guilt;  for  men  may  be  seduced  to 
perjury  by  many  base  motives,  to 
which  the  secret  nature  of  the  of- 
fense may  sometimes  afford  a  temp- 
tation: but  it  can  scarcely  happen 
that  many  circumstances,  especially 
if  they  be  such  over  which  the  ac- 


cuser could  have  no  control,  forming 
altogether  the  links  of  a  transaction, 
should  all  unfortunately  concur  to  fix 
the  presumption  of  guilt  on  an  indi- 
vidual, and  yet  such  a  conclusion  be 
erroneous."  1  East,  P.  G,  ch.  5,  §  9. 
i  Pierce  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W. 
Rep.  587 ;  State  v.  Johnson,  37  Minn. 
493;  Coleman  v.  State,  111  Ind.  563; 
People  v.  Flynn,  73  Cal.  511 ;  Hopt  v. 
People,  7  S.  Ct.  614 ;  McMeen  v.  Com., 
114  Pa.  St.  300;  McKee  v.  State,  82 
Ala.  32 ;  Graves  v.  People  (Colo.,  1893;, 
32  Pac.  Rep.  63 ;  Bramlette  v.  State, 
21  Tex.  App.  611 ;  2  S.  W.  Rep.  765 ; 
State  v.  Blunt,  91  Mo.  503 ;  Gardiner 
v.  State  (N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  30 ; 
Gentry  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  551 ;  McDuffie  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893), 
17  S.  E.  Rep.  505 ;  Woodruff  v.  State 
(Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  653;  State  v. 
Grant  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
120 ;  Weaver  v.  People,  132  111.  536 ; 
Taylor  v.  Com.  (Va.,  1893),  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  81 ;  Kelly  v.  People,  17  Colo. 
130;    Cross   v.   State,   132    Ind.   65; 


10 


INTRODUCTORY. 


[§G. 


cused  is  involved,  while  in  civil  cases  the  loss  he  may  sustain, 
however  great,  may  be  retrieved  by  his  future  efforts.1 

But  where  the  commission  of  a  crime  is  in  issue  in  a  civil 
suit,  an  irreconcilable  lack  of  harmony  prevails  in  the  decis- 
ions. In  England,2  and  in  some  of  the  states  of  the  Union,  it 
is  held  that  where  the  existence  of  a  criminal  intent  is  in  issue 
in  a  civil  proceeding,  the  party  alleging  the  intent  must  prove 
its  existence  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.3  But  the  weight  of 
the  decisions  is  adverse  to  this  proposition,  for  the  great  ma- 
jority of  them  support  the  rule  that  an  accusation  of  crime 
in  a  civil  suit  may,  lx*ce  any  other  fact  in  issue,  be  proven  by 
a  preponderance  of  evidence.4 

The  meaning  of  the  phrase  "  reasonable  doubt "  has  been 
the  subject  of  much  discussion,  and  many  attempts  have  been 
made  to  define  it.5    Thus  it  has  been  defined  as  "  a  doubt  for 


Hunter  v.  State,  29  Fla.  486;  State 
v.  Turner,  110  Mo.  196;  Palmer- 
ston  v.  Ter.,  3  Wyo.  333;  State  v. 
Whiton,  111  N.  C.  695;  People  v. 
Kerr,  6  N.  Y.  Grim.  R.  406;  United 
States  v.  Meagher,  37  Fed.  Rep.  875 ; 
Perry  v.  State,  87  Ala.  30;  State  v. 
Grant  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  120. 

1  See  remarks  of  the  court  in  Mut. 
F.  L  Co.  v.  Usaw,  112  Pa.  St.  89. 

2  Stephen's  Dig.,  art.  94. 
8Polsfcon    v.    See,     46     Iowa,    30; 

Mead  v.  Husted,  52  Conn.  56 ;  Will- 
iams v.  Dickerson,  28  Fla.  90;  Bar- 
ton v.  Thompson,  46  Iowa,  30. 

4  Gordon  v.  Parmlee,  15  Gray 
(Mass.),  413;  Ellis  v.  Burrell,  60  Me. 
209 ;  Burr  v.  Wilson,  22  Minn.  206 ; 
Munson  v.  Atwood,  30  Conn.  102 ; 
Bissell  v.  West,  35  Ind.  54 ;  Weston 
v.  Gravlin,  49  Vt.  507. 

5  State  v.  Whitson,  16  S.  E.  Rep. 
332;  111N.  C.  695. 

"  As  to  questions  relating  to  human 
affairs  a  knowledge  of  which  is  de- 
rived from  testimony,  it  is  impossible 
to  have  the  kind  of  certainty  created 
by  scientific  demonstration.  The 
only  certainty  we  can  have  is  a 
moral  certainty,  which  depends  upon 


the  confidence  placed  in  the  integrity 
of  witnesses  and  their  capacity  to 
know  the  truth.  If,  for  example, 
facts  not  improbable  are  attested  by 
numerous  witnesses  who  are  credi- 
ble, consistent,  uncontradicted,  and 
who  had  every  opportunity  of  know- 
ing the  truth,  a  reasonable  or  moral 
certainty  would  be  inspired  by  their 
testimony.  In  such  case  a  doubt 
would  be  unreasonable,  imaginary 
or  speculative,  which  it  ought  not  to 
be.  It  is  not  a  doubt  whether  the 
party  may  not  possibly  be  innocent 
in  the  face  of  strong  proof  of  his 
guilt,  but  a  sincere  doubt  whether  he 
has  been  proved  guilty,  that  is  called 
reasonable.  And  even  where  the 
testimony  is  contradictor}',  so  much 
more  credit  may  be  due  to  one  side 
than  the  other  and  the  same  result 
will  be  produced.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  opposing  proofs  may  be  so 
nearly  balanced  that  the  jury  may 
justly  doubt  on  which  side  lies  the 
truth.  In  such  case  the  accused  is 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  doubt. 
As  certainty  advances  doubt  recedes. 
If  one  is  reasonably  certain  he  can- 
not at  the  same  time  be  reasonably 


6.] 


INTRODUCTORY. 


11 


which  a  reason  can  be  given;"1  as  a  doubt  that  must  satisfy 
a  reasonable  mind  after  a  full  comparison  and  consideration 
of  the  evidence  ;2  as  "  a  doubt  that  has  something  to  rest  upon, 
and  such  as  a  sensible,  honest-minded  man  would  reasonably 
entertain;"3  as  a  doubt  growing  out  of  the  evidence  and  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case,4  having  a  foundation  in  reason;5  a 
substantial  doubt,  and  not  a  mere  possibility  of  innocence ; H  and 
as  an  honest,  substantial  misgiving  generated  by  insufficiency 
of  proof.7  But  a  mere  whim,  groundless  surmise,8  vague  con- 
jecture,9 captious  doubt  or  misgiving  suggested  by  an  ingen- 
ious counsel,  or  arising  from  a  merciful  disposition  towards 
defendant  or  from  sympathy  for  him  or  his  family,10  is  not  a 
reasonable  doubt.11 


doubtful  —  that  is  have  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  a  fact.  All  that  a  jury  can 
be  expected  to  do  is  to  be  reasonably 
or  morally  certain  of  the  fact  which 
they  declare  by  their  verdict."  By 
Cox,  J.,  in  United  States  v.  Guiteau, 
10  Fed.  Rep.  164 

i  Hodge  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S. 
Rep.  164;  Cohen  v.  State,  50  Ala. 
108. 

2  Wood  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  12  S. 
Rep.  539. 

3  Fletcher  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  100. 

*  Territory  v.  Chavez  (N.  M.,  1893), 
30  Pac.  Rep.  903. 

5  Conrad  v.  State,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  805 ; 
132  Ind.  254 

estate  v.  Wells,  111  Mo.  533. 

"  United  States  v.  Newton,  52  Fed. 
Rep.  275.  See,  also,  Siberry  v.  State 
(Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  681 ;  People 
v.  Kerm  (Utah,  1893),  30  Pac.  Rep. 
988;  Lovett  v.  State,  30  Fla.  142; 
Lyons  v.  People,  137  111.  602 ;  Carroll 
v.  Same,  136  id.  456;  Woodruff  v. 
State  (Fla.,  1893),  22  S.  Rep.  653 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Pallister,  138  N.  Y.  601. 

"A  reasonable  doubt  is  such  a 
doubt  as  the  term  itself  implies.  It 
is  difficult  to  explain  what  a  reason- 
able doubt  is.     It  means  a  doubt  that 


has  something  to  rest  upen;  some 
reason  that  it  is  based  on;  such  a 
doubt  as  would  control  you  and  you 
would  be  governed  by  in  your  im- 
portant business  affairs.  It  means 
such  a  doubt  as  a  sensible,  honest- 
minded  man  would  reasonably  en- 
tertain in  an  honest  investigation 
after  truth ;  a  doubt  that  would 
arise  from  the  evidence  or  the  want 
of  evidence  in  the  case.  It  does  not 
mean  a  mere  vague  conjecture  or  a 
bare  possibility  of  the  innocence  of 
the  accused."  Fletcher  v.  State  (Ga., 
1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  100. 

8  Welch  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S. 
Rep.  450. 

9  Fletcher  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  100. 

w  United  States  v.  Newton,  52  Fed. 
Rep.  275. 

11  Territory  v.  Baningan,  1  Dak.  432 ; 
Spies  v.  People  (Anarchist  Case),  122 
111.  8 ;  Schusler  v.  State,  29  Ind.  394 ; 
Horn  v.  State,  1  Kan.  42;  Com.  v. 
Webster,  59  Mass.  (5  Cush.)  295 ;  Com. 
v.  Harman,  4  Pa  St.  209 ;  Brotherton 
v.  People,  75  N.  Y.  159 ;  McMeen  v. 
Com.,  114  Pa.  St.  300;  State  v.  An- 
derson, 86  Mo.  309;  Bradshaw  v. 
State,  17  Neb,  147. 


12 


INTRODUCTORY. 


[§6. 


Where  the  prisoner  pleads  an  affirmative  defense  as  an 
alibi,  or  denies  that  any  crime  has  been  committed,  the  bur- 
den of  proof  is  on  him  to  show  the  fact.  He  need  not,  how- 
ever, prove  the  fact  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.  Thus,  in 
proving  an  alibi,  the  jury  should  acquit  if  the  prisoner  is  able 
to  show  by  a  preponderance  of  evidence  that  he  was  "  else- 
where "  at  or  about  the  time  the  crime  was  committed,  and 
that  he  was  at  the  place  alleged  such  a  length  of  time  that  he 
could  not  have  committed  the  crime  with  which  he  is  charged.1 

It  is  the  duty  of  a  jury  to  weigh  the  evidence,  and  it  is  not 
for  the  court  to  place  restrictions  upon  this  power.  They  may, 
where  evidence  is  conflicting,  reject  that  which  is  direct  and 
rely  wholly  upon  that  which  is  circumstantial.2  So  it  has  been 
held  error,  under  such  circumstances,  for  the  court  to  instruct 
them  that  the  circumstances  must  not  be  vague,  indefinite  or 
uncertain,  but  convincing  and  clearly  defined.3  So  a  jury  is 
not  compelled  to  draw  an  inference  that  would  necessarily 
follow  upon  the  facts  proven,  but  may  come  to  any  reason- 
able and  probable  conclusion  justified  by  the  evidence.4    So 


i  State  v.  Reed.  62  Iowa,  40;  Peo- 
ple v.  Pearsall,  50  Mich.  233 ;  Stuart 
v.  People,  42  Mich.  255 ;  Landis  v. 
State,  70  Ga.  651 ;  Binns  v.  State,  46 
Ind.  811;  Watson  v.  Com.,  95  Pa. 
St  418;  State  v.  Josey,  64  N.  C. 
56;  State  v.  Watson,  7  S.  C.  63; 
Klein  v.  People,  113  111.  596.  In  other 
words,  if  the  defendant  by  his  evi- 
dence of  an  alibi  succeeds  in  creat- 
ing a  reasonable  doubt  that  he  com- 
mitted the  crime,  then  it  is  for  the 
state  to  overcome  that  doubt.  In  no 
case  is  the  prisoner  compelled  to  sat- 
isfy the  jury  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  that  he  did  not  commit  the 
crime.  Bennett  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
341;  People  v.  Fong,  64  Cal.  253; 
State  v.  Sandars,  106  Mo.  188 ;  State 
v.  Edwards,  109  Mo.  318.  See  post, 
§  240.  The  jury  may  be  cautioned 
that  witnesses  may  be  honestly  mis- 
taken as  to  times  and  places  and 
that  an  alibi  may  be  easily  fabri- 
cated.    People  v.    Wong   (Cal.),    10 


Pac.  Rep.  275.  But  the  law  does  not 
regard  evidence  to  prove  an  alibi  with 
any  greater  degree  of  suspicion  than 
any  other  sort  of  defense.  Albin  v. 
State,  63  Ind.  598 ;  Line  v.  State,  51 
id.  172 ;  Spenser  v.  State,  50  Ala.  124 
Though  a  presumption  is  created 
against  a  prisoner  when  he  is  de- 
tected in  falsely  swearing  to  an  alibi 
(Porter  v.  State,  55  Ala.  95 ;  Com.  v. 
McMahon,  145  Pa,  St.  413),  still  it  has 
been  held  erroneous  to  charge  that 
an  unsuccessful  attempt  to  prove  an 
alibi  is  to  be  considered  as  a  circum- 
stance of  great  weight  against  the 
accused.  People  v.  Molaspina,  57 
Cal.  628 ;  Caffey  v.  State,  94  Ala.  76. 

2  Bowie  v.  ,Maddox,  29  Ga  285 ; 
Deland  v.  Dixon  Nat  Bank,  111  111. 
327. 

3  State  v.  Allen,  103  N.  C.  433 ;  Mc- 
Clesky  v.  State  (Tex.,  1892),  13  S.  W. 
Rep.  997. 

* 127 I1L  507. 


§  6.]  INTRODUCTORY.  13 

to  warrant  a  conviction  on  circumstantial  evidence  it  has  been 
held  that  each  fact  leading  up  to  the  inference  drawn  must  bo 
proven  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  the  facts  thus  proven 
should  be  consistent  with  each  other  and  with  the  guilt  of  the 
person  accused.1 

On  the  other  hand,  many  cases  hold,  and  this  perhaps  is  the 
better  rule,  that  the  jury  need  not  be  satisfied  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt  of  the  truth  of  every  fact  alleged,  if  upon  the 
whole  evidence  they  are  satisfied  of  the  guilt  of  the  accused 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.2 

iGallaher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  Rep.  905;  Weaver  v.  People,  132  111. 

247 ;    Rains    v.   State,    88    Ala.   91  ;  536 ;  Siebert  v.  People  (III.,  1893),  32 

Graves  v.  People  (Cola,  1893),  32  Pac.  N.  E.  Rep.  431;   Harnish  v.  People 

Rep.  63.     See  Tiramerman  v.  Ter.,  17  (111.,  1893),  32  N.  R  Rep.  677 ;  Jamison 

Pac.  Rep.  624 ;  Cotton  v.  State,  87  Ala,  v.  People  (111.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  468 ; 

75 ;  Coleman  v.  State,  87  id.  14.  Timmerman  v.   Ter.,   17  Pac.   Rep. 

2  State    v.    Wells,    111    Mo.    533;  624;  State  v.  Crane,  15  S.  E.  Rep. 

Faulkner  v.  Ter.  (N.  M.,  1893),  30  Pac.  231 ;  110  N.  C.  530. 


CHAPTER  I. 


RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY. 


§  7.  Relevancy  of  evidence. 

8.  Collateral  facts,  how  far  admis- 

sible. 

9.  Evidence  of  intention,  motive, 

good   faith,   etc.,  when   rele- 
vant 


§  10.  Collateral  facts  bearing  on  char- 
acter. 

11.  Province  of  judge  and  jury. 

12.  Blended  questions  of  law  and 

fact 

13.  Preliminary   facts    bearing  on 

admissibility. 


§  7.  Relevancy  of  evidence. —  The  word  "relevant"  means 
that  the  fact  to  which  it  is  applied  is  so  related  to  another 
fact  tliat,  according  to  the  common  course  of  events,  either, 
by  itself  or  in  connection  with  other  facts,  proves  or  renders 
probable  the  existence  or  non-existence,  past,  present  or  future, 
of  the  other.1 

The  logical  connection  of  the  fact  proven  with  the  fact  in 
issue  constitutes  the  basis  for  all  rules  bearing  upon  relevancy ; 
and  while  it  is  important  to  appropriate  some  particular 
word  to  point  out  this  principle,  it  is  useful  to  endeavor  to 
differentiate  certain  terms  frequently  but  erroneously  regarded 
as  synonymous  with  it. 

Thus  the  terms  "competent"  and  "admissible,"2  "proper" 
and  "competent,"3  "admissible"  or  "material"  and  "rele- 
vant," are  used  interchangeably,  little,  if  any,  distinction  being 
made  in  their  various  shades  of  meaning. 

The  word  "competent"  is  correctly  used  in  the  sense  of 
"  qualified,"  to  signify  the  capacity  of  a  person  as  a  witness  or 
his  right  to  testify.  On  the  other  hand,  "  proper  "  is  applicable 
to  the  character  of  evidence,  where  evidence  of  a  particular 
description  is  necessary  to  prove  certain  kinds  of  facts. 

"Material"  is  used  in  a  double  sense.  It  may  express  the 
amount  of  weight  to  be  given  to  a  fact  approximating  to  rele- 


1  Stephen's     Digest    of    Evidence, 
Preliminary  Chapter. 


2  West  v.  Bank,  20  Hun,  408. 

3  Blake  v.  People,  73  N.  Y.  586. 


§  7.]     KKLEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.      L5 

vant  in  meaning,  or  it  may  be  that  certain  facts  in  issue  are 
material,  i.  e.,  necessary  to  be  proved.1 

"  Admissible,"  as  commonly  used,  has  required  a  rather  loose 
and  fluctuating  meaning,  in  the  majority  of  instances  signify- 
ing ''receivable"  merely. 

The  principle  of  the  relevancy  of  evidence  is  stated  by 
Mr.  Greenleaf  in  his  first  rule,  "that  evidence  offered  must 
correspond  with  the  material  and  necessary  allegations  of  the 
pleadings  and  be  confined  to  the  point  in  issue." 2 

This  rule,  by  dispensing  with  proof  of  immaterial  aver- 
ments, being  well  designed  to  facilitate  the  labors  of  the  jury 
and  render  litigation  less  expensive,  should  be  strictly  ad- 
hered to.3 

In  order  to  possess  the  characteristic  of  relevancy  a  fact 
need  not  always  have  a  direct  bearing  upon  the  facts  in  issue; 
but  it  will  be  relevant  though  it  only  tends  to  prove  the  latter 
by  association  with  others  which  go  to  form  the  proof '  re- 
quired.4 

So  evidence  is  admissible  which,  though  apparently  not 
bearing  directly  on  the  facts  in  issue,  yet,  because  it  points 

I  Lindsay  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  143.        Schuchardt  v.  Aliens,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

II  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §51.  359;    Willoughby  v.  Dewey,  54  111. 
3  Montgomery   Co.  v.  Bridge  Co.,     266;  Bibb  v.   Allen,   149  U.  S.  481; 

110  Pa.   St.  54;  Ferrari  v.  Murray,  Hilton  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ala.,  1893),  12 

152    Mass.    496;    Ellen  v.    Lewison,  S.  Rep.  276;  Grantier  v.  Austin,  66 

88  Cal.    253;   Kennedy  v.   Currie,  3  Hun,    157;    Columbus,   etc.    Co.    v. 

Wash.  St.  442 ;    McGrew  v.  M.  Pac.  Semmes,  27  Ga.  283 ;  Tucker  v.  Peas- 

R.  Co.  (Mo.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  53 ;  lee,  36  N.  H.  157 ;  Huntington  v.  At- 

Michigan  Ins.  Bank  v.  Eldred,  143  trill,  118  N.  Y.  365;  Johnson  v.  State, 

U.  S.  293 ;  Gulf,  etc.   Co.  v.  Hepner,  18  Tex.  App.  385 ;  West  v.  State,  76 

83  Tex.  70;  18  S.  W.  Rep.  441;  Mc-  Ala.  98;  Overman  v.   State,  49  Ark. 

Dermott  v.  Falls  Co.  (Iowa,  1892),  52  364;  Davis  v.  State,  74  Ga.  869;  Watt 

N.  W.  Rep.  181;  Weaver  v.  Shipley,  v.  People  (III.),   18  N.   E.  Rep.  340; 

127  Ind.  526;  Clow  v.  Brown  (Ind.,  Schulser  v.  State.  29  Ind.  394;  Com. 

1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  361 ;  Branson  v.  v.  Robinson,  146  Mass.  571 ;  State  v. 

Kitchenman,  148  Pa.  St  541 ;  24  Atl.  Johnson,   37    Minn.   493;    Casey    v. 

Rep.  641:    Faivre  v.  Daley,  93  Cal.  State,  20  Neb.  138;  State  v.  Harrison, 

663;  N..Chic.  Ry,  Co.  v.  Cotton,  140  5  Jones'   (N.  C.)  L.   115;    Henry  v. 

111.  486;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  899;  Freeman  State,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  224;  Trues- 

v.  Fogg,  82  Me.  408.  dell  v.  Hoyle,  39  111.  App.  532 ;  Dean 

^Bohrer   v.    Stumpf,  31    111.  App.  v.  Com.,  32  Giatt.  (Va.)  912;  Leon- 

139;  Sanders  v.  Stokes,  30  Ala.  432;  ard  v.  Territory,  2  Wash.  Ter.  381. 


16      RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.    [§  7. 

out  the  manner  in  which  the  case  is  being  conducted  by  either 
party,  is  relevant  as  tending  to  prove  or  disprove  the  truth  or 
probability  of  the  facts  in  issue. 

No  legal  presumption  generally  arises  from  the  mere  non- 
production  of  certain  witnesses.1  But  evidence  that  a  wit- 
ness is  living  who  has  not  been  produced,2  or  that  a  deposition 
which  has  been  obtained  is  not  offered,3  is  relevant  on  behalf 
of  either  party  to  prove  that  this  testimony,  if  offered,  would 
have  been  adverse  to  the  other.  But  in  any  case  the  infer- 
ence is  for  the  jury;  while  such  evidence  is  only  relevant  if, 
in  the  opinion  of  the  judge,  such  an  inference  may  with  fair- 
ness be  drawn 4  by  reasonable  men. 

The  relevancy  of  evidence  need  not  be  shown  when  it  is 
offered 5  if  it  is  made  to  appear  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court 
that  counsel  will  subsequently  produce  other  evidence  which 
will  render  it  relevant.6  So  if  evidence  is  rejected  because 
irrelevant,  and  proof  is  afterwards  given  showing  its  relevancy, 
it  may  again  be  offered.7 

Evidence  which  would  be  relevant  in  rebuttal  may,  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  be  admitted  in  chief.8  But  an  offer  of 
evidence  must  be  so  explicit  that  the  court  may  see  whether 
or  not  it  is  relevant.5 

i  Showman  v.  Lee,  86  Mich.  556;  Rep.  1037;  Tarns  v.  Bullix,  35  Pa. 
Com.  v.  Mahan,  142  Pa.  St.  413.  St  308 ;  Comstock  v.  Smith,  20  Mich. 

2  Lynch  v.  Peabody,  137  Mass.  93.    338. 

Evidence  to  explain  the  absence  of  a  7  Jones  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  (Ark., 

witness  is    always  relevant    under  1890),   13  S.   W.  Rep.   416.    But  in 

such  circumstances.     Richmond,  etc.  prosecutions  for  crime  it  is  generally 

Co.  v.  Garner  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  required  that  the  corpus  delicti  should 

110;  Staffords  v.  Morning  Journal,  be  shown  first.    People  v.  Millard,  53 

68  Hun,  467 ;  So.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Rauh  Mich.  63. 

1  C.  C.  A.  416.  8  Easley  v.  M.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  (Mo., 

3  Learned  v.  Hall,  133  Mass.  417.  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1073 ;  Lamance  v. 

4  See  §  25.  Byrnes.  17  Nev.  197 ;  Kansas  City  R, 
6  Harris  v.  Holmes,  30  Vt.  352.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  51  Fed.  Rep.  178 ; 
6  Harris   v.    Holmes,   30    Vt.    352;  Cashman  v.  Harrison,  90  Cal.  297. 

Com.  v.  Dam,  107  Mass.  210;  Consaul  "  Wolf  or  d  v.   Farnham,  47  Minn, 

v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247;  Lee  Silv.  Co.  95  ;  Lanter  v.  Simpson,  2  Ind.  App, 

v.Englebach(Colo.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  293;    Alexander    v.    Thompson,    42 

771 ;  Morris  v.  Morton's  Ex'rs  (Kan.,  Minn.  498 ;  Idaho,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brad- 

1892),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  287 ;  McClene-  bury,    132    U.    S.    509 ;  Kennedy  v. 

ghan  v.  Reid  (Neb.,  1893),  51  N.  W.  Currie,  3  Wash.  St  442. 


§  8.]    RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.      17 

§8.  Collateral  facts,  how  far  admissible. —  This  rule  of 
relevancy  does  not  permit  the  introduction  of  wholly  collat- 
eral facts  which  are  not  part  of  the  same  transaction  and 
throw  no  light  upon  the  truth  or  even  the  probability  of  the 
fact  in  issue,  but  which,  if  they  were  introduced  in  evidence, 
would  only  distract  and  confuse  the  minds  of  the  members  of 
the  jury  by  withdrawing  their  attention  from  the  main  point 
in  issue.1 

The  question  whether  a  fact  is  or  is  not  too  remote,  and 
consequently  irrelevant,  is  a  preliminary  question  for  the 
judge,  and  on  this  subject  no  rule  can  be  laid  down  further 
than  the  very  general  one  which  in  practice  is  of  little  value  and 
which  is  implied  in  the  definition  of  the  word  relevant  itself. 

If  the  collateral  fact  introduces  or  will  explain  a  fact  in 
issue2  or  a  relevant  fact,  or  will  rebut  or  support  any  infer- 
ence which  may  be  drawn  by  the  jury  from  a  fact  which  is  in 
issue  or  from  a  relevant  fact,  it  is  admissible.3  In  every  case 
great  care  is  demanded  of  the  judge,  that  by  the  employment 
of  a  wise  discrimination  he  may  admit  as  relevant  all  evi- 
dence which  sheds  any  light  upon  the  issue,  though  weak  and 
uncertain,  rejecting  that  which  by  its  remoteness  cannot  be 
connected  with  the  facts.4  Thus,  where  the  value  of  land  is 
involved,  evidence  of  recent  sales  of  land  under  similar  con- 
ditions in  the  neighborhood  is  relevant  to  show  the  value 
of  the  land  in  question.5  Evidence  to  show  that  the  sales  of 
land  which  have  been  proved  were  made  under  different  cir- 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  52.  Coccon,  140  111.  486 ;  29  N.  E.  Rep. 

2  Truesdale  v.  Hoyle,  39  111.  App.  899.  If  the  relevancy  of  a  fact  de- 
532 ;  Clarke  v.  Van  Court,  51  Neb.  756.  pends  upon  the  proof  of  another  fact 

3  Butler  v.  Cornell  (111.,  1893),  35  N.  upon  which  the  evidence  is  contra- 
E  Rep.  767;  Wallace  v.  Kennedy,  dictory,  the  proper  course  is  to  sub- 
47  N.  J.  L.  246;  Reeve  v.  Dennett,  mit  the  proof  of  both  facts  to  the 
145  Mass.  23;  Collins  v.  Glass,  46  jury.  Day  v.  Sharp,  4  "Whart.  339. 
Mo.  App.  297.  5  Huntington  v.  Attrill,  118  N.  Y. 

4  Davis  v.  Getchell,  32  Neb.  792;  365;  Miller  v.  Windsor  W.  Co.,  30  W. 
Cadwallader  v.  Zeh,  14  S.  Ct  288  N.  C.  85 ;  Prov.  etc.  Co.  v.  Worces- 
(U.  S.,  1894) ;  Bransen  v.  Kitchenman,  ter,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  56 ;  155  Mass.  35 ; 
148  Pa.  St.  541 ;  24  Atl.  Rep.  61 ;  Mo  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Emery  (Kan., 
Culloch  v.  Dobson,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  641 ;  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  631 ;  Cross  v.  Wil- 
133  N.  Y.  114;  Faivre  v.  Daily,  93  kins,  43  N.  H.  332;  Sanford  v.  Peck 
Cal.  664 ;  Lanter  v.  Simpson,  2  Ind.  (Conn.,  1894),  27  Atl.  Rep.  1057 ;  Mel- 
App.  273 ;   North  Chi.   S.  R  Co.  v.  vin  v.  Bullard,  35  Vt.  368 ;  Atchison 

2 


IS      RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JUEY.    [§  8. 

cumstances  is  then  relevant.  Thus  the  land-owner  whose 
property  is  to  be  taken  in  condemnation  proceedings  may 
show  that  his  land  is  of  a  superior  quality.1  So,  also,  if  the 
situation  and  condition  of  the  land  sold,  which  is  used  as  a 
standard  of  comparison,  be  not  substantially  identical  with 
the  land  in  dispute,  or  if  the  sales  were  not  recent  in  point  of 
time,  it  may  become  a  question  for  the  exercise  of  judicial 
discretion  whether  such  evidence  should  not  be  rejected  as  re- 
mote and  hence  irrelevant.2 

Under  the  rule  above  pointed  out,  evidence  of  collateral 
facts  is  sometimes  held  to  be  admissible  where  the  fact  in 
issue  is  the  character  of  the  result  of  a  certain  continued 
course  of  action  which  it  is  alleged  evinces  such  a  lack  of  care 
or  skill  on  the  part  of  the  actor  as  to  constitute  negligence. 
So  where  the  question  hinges  upon  the  proper  performance  of 
official  or  private  duty  in  providing  or  caring  for  public  struct- 
ures or  private  buildings,  or  for  machinery,  or  any  material 
or  mechanical  device  requiring  the  exercise  of  personal  care 
and  diligence,  evidence  of  its  condition,  or  of  accidents  which 
occurred  in  its  use,  prior  to  the  time  when  the  fact  in  issue 
occurred,  is  admissible.3  The  decisions,  however,  are  not  har- 
monious on  this  point,  and  the  cases  in  which  such  evidence 
has  been  excluded  as  irrelevant  are  extremely  numerous.4 

Where  the  issue  involves  negligence  caused  by  the  alleged 
defective  condition  of  a  highway,  evidence  showing  its  con- 

R  R  Co.  v.  Harper,    19  Kan.  529;  McCullough   v.    Dobson,    133  N.   Y. 

Howe  v.  Howard,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  528;  114;  House  v.  Metcalf,  27  Conn.  632; 

Travis  v.  Pierson,  43  111.  App.  479.  Glasier    v.    Hebron,    62    Hun,    137; 

i  Chicago,  K.  &  W.  R  Co.  v.  Em-  Toledo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Milligan,  2  Ind. 

ery  (Kan.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  631.  App.  578;  Chicago  v.  Powers,  42  III. 

2  May  v.  Boston  (Mass.,  1893),  32  169 ;  Presly  v.  Grand  T.  Ry.  Co.  (N.  H., 
N.  E.  Rep.  902 ;  Packard  v.  Bergen  1892),  22  Atl.  Rep.  554 ;  Indianapolis 
Neck  R  Co.,  54  N.  J.  L.  533 ;  Laing  Ry.  v.  Boetcher,  131  Ind.  82 ;  28  N.  E. 
v.  United  N.  J.  R  &  Can.  Co.,  54  id.  Rep.  551 ;  Augusta  v.  Hafers,  61  Ga. 
576 ;  Seattle,  etc.  Co.  v.  Gilchrist,  4  48 ;  Topeka  v.  Sherwood,  39  Kan. 
Wash.  St.  509.  690;   Goshen   v.  England,    119   Ind. 

3  Legg  v.  Blooraington,  40  III.  App.  368 ;  Magee  v.  Troy,  1  N.  Y.  S.  24 ; 
185 ;  Mixter  Coal  Co.  v.  Smith,  152  Masters  v.  Troy,  50  Hun,  485. 

Pa.   St.   395;    Chicago,    etc.    Co.    v.  ^Fordyce  v.  Withers,  1  Tex.   Civ. 

Lewis  (111.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  960;  App.  540;  Baxter  v.   Doe,  142  Mass. 

Ohio  Val.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Watson's  Adm'r  558 ;  Early  v.  Lake  Shore,  etc.  Co.,  30 

(Ky.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  244;   Dar-  Am.  &  Eng.  R   Cas.  163;  Smith  v. 

ling  v.  Westmoreland,  52  N.  H.  401 ;  Railroad    Co.,   25    id.    546 ;  Wise  v. 


§  8.]    KELEVANOY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.      19 

dition,  and  the  existence  of  defects  in  it  at  a  short  distance 
from  the  place  in  issue,1  or  evidence  which  shows  the  condi- 
tion of  the  road  at  the  point  where  the  accident  occurred  a 
short  time  before  or  after,  is  relevant.-  The  test  of  relevancy 
in  all  such  cases,  and  the  principle  upon  which  the  decisions 
may  perhaps  be  reconciled,  is  the  proximity  in  time  or  place 
of  the  facts  testified  to,  whether  they  relate  to  the  condition  of 
the  highway  or  other  object  causing  damage  or  to  repairs  to 
it.  If  the  evidence,  whether  before  or  after,  is  too  remote  in 
point  of  time  or  place,  it  should  be  rejected.3  And  evidence 
that  defendant,  after  the  accident,  repaired  the  place  where 
plaintiff  was  injured  is  generally  irrelevant  and  inadmissible.4 
Upon  the  question  whether,  in  an  action  alleging  the  negli- 
gence of  defendant,  evidence  that  he  is  a  man  of  careful  and 
prudent  demeanor  in  that  line  of  activity  in  which  he  is  al- 
leged to  have  been  negligent  is  admissible,  the  authorities  are 
divided.  By  some  of  the  cases  it  is  held  that  evidence  is  rele- 
vant to  show  that  he  is  competent  and  skilful  and  that  no 
similar  accident  had  ever  before  happened.5  The  contrary 
proposition  has  also  been  held.6 

Ackerman,  51  Md.  937 ;  26  Atl.  Rep.  3  Skattowe  v.  Railway  Co.,  22  Oreg. 

424 ;  Hudson  v.  Chicago  Ry.  Co.,  59  430 ;  30  Pac.  Rep.    222 ;  Mahaney  v. 

Iowa,  581 ;  Hatt  v.  Nay,  144  Mass.  186 ;  Railway  Co.,  108  Mo.  191 ;  18  S.  W. 

North  Chicago,  etc.   Co.  v.  Hudson,  Rep.   895;  Walker  v.    Westfield,   39 

44  111.  App.  60 ;  State  v.  Raymond,  Vt.  246 ;  White  v.  Graves,  107  Mass. 

29  Pac.  Rep.  732.     Where  negligence  325;  Sherman  v.  Kortright,  52  Barb, 

is  alleged,  evidence  that  no  accident  (N.  Y.)  267. 

of  the  nature  of  that  alleged  has  ever  4  Schulte  v.  Cunningham,  14  Daly, 

before  occurred  is  irrelevant.    Lewis  404 ;  Hodges  v.  Percival,  152  111.  53 ; 

v.  Smith,  107  Mass.  334.  23  N.  E.  Rep.  423 ;  Lang  v.  Sanger, 

i  Woodcock  v.  Worcester,  138  Mass.  76  Wis.  71;  44  N.  W.  Rep.  1085; 
268;  Bailey  v.  Trumbull,  31  Conn.  Terre  Haute  R.  Co.  v.  Clem,  123  Ind. 
581 ;  Propson  v.  Leathern,  80  Wis.  15 ;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  965. 
608 ;  Leonard  v.  So.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  21  &  Toledo,  St.  L.  etc.  Co.  v.  Bailey 
Oreg.  555;  Haley  v.  Jump  River  L.  (111.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  1089;  Inter- 
Co.  (Wis.,  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  321.  national,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kuehn  (Tex., 
Contra,  Standard  Oil  Co.  v.  Tierney  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  58 ;  Railway  Co.  v. 
(Ky.,  1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1025 ;  For-  Selby,  47  Ind.  471 ;  Chicago,  etc.  Co. 
dyce  v.  Chaney  (Texas,  1893),  21  v.  Spelker  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep. 
S.  W.  Rep.  181 ;  Thompson  v.  Rail-  280. 

road  Co.,  91  Mich.  255 ;  57  N.  W.  Rep.  «  Ft.  Worth,  etc.  Co.  v.  Thompson 

995.  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  137 ;  Chris- 

2  Salladay  v.  Dodgeville  (Wis.,  1893),  teusen  v.  Union  Trunk  Line  (Wash , 

55  N.  W.  Rep.  696.  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  1018. 


20 


KELEVANOY  AND  PKOVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY. 


[§9. 


So,  generally,  collateral  facts  are  relevant  where  they  show 
the  situation  or  condition  of  the  parties,1  or  identify  them,2 
or  explain  the  reason  or  motive  that  led  to  a  relevant  act,3 
fix  the  time  or  place  of  a  relevant  action4  or  show  an  oppor- 
tunity for  its  commission.5 

§  9.  Evidence  of  intention,  motive,  good  faith,  etc.,  when 
relevant. —  Evidence  of  facts  which  are  seemingly  collateral, 
and  which  at  first  glance  appear  to  have  no  relevancy  to  the 
issue  or  direct  connection  with  it,  is  receivable  in  many  cases 
where  the  party's  intent,  knowledge  or  good  faith  is  a.  mate- 
rial element  of  a  transaction  which  is  proved  aliunde*  Thus, 
proof  of  the  possession  or  of  the  utterance  of  forged  docu- 
ments at  any  time  is  relevant  on  the  trial  of  one  accused  of 
forgery  for  the  purpose  of  showing  the  guilty  knowledge  or 
intent  of  the  accused.7 


1  Woodward  v.  Buchanan,  5  Q.  B. 
285 ;  Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.  Worthington 
(Ala.,  1893),  10  S.  Rep.  839;  Schu- 
man  v.  Expert  (Mich.,  1893),  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  198;  Berry  v.  Kowatsky 
(Cat,  1893),  30  Pac.  Rep.  202 ;  Long 
v.  Straus  (Ind.,  1890),  24  N.  E.  Rep. 
664;  Bohrer  v.  Stump,  31  III.  App. 
139;  Com.  v.  Campbell,  155  Mass. 
127. 

2  James  v.  Ford,  9  N.  Y.  S.  127 ; 
Edmansen  v.  Andrews,  35  111.  App. 
223 ;  McLane  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
482;  Com.  v.  Campbell,  155  Mass. 
127. 

3  Brunei-  v.  Wade  (Iowa,  1892),  51 
N.  W.  Rep.  251 ;  Weinberg  v.  Kram, 
17  N.  Y.  S.  535;  Miller  v.  State,  68 
Miss.  221 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  29  Tex. 
App.  150 ;  State  v.  Hulse,  106  Mo.  41 ; 
State  v.  Lentz,  45  Minn.  377.  '•  The 
possibility  of  error  goes  to  the  weight 
of  evidence  and  is  not  a  ground  for 
rejecting  it.  The  spirit  of  the  law 
permits  a  resort  to  every  reasonable 
source  of  information  upon  a  dis- 
puted question  of  fact  Unless  ex- 
cluded by  some  positive  exception, 
everything  relative  to  the  issue  is  ad- 
missible, and  this  is  extended  to  every 


hypothesis  pertinent  to  the  isoue." 
Bell  v.  Brewster,  44  Ohio  St.  696,  697. 
*  Rollins  v.  Clement.  25  S.  C.  601 ; 
Martin  v.  Victor,  etc.  Co.,  19  Nev. 
180;  Orr  Water  Ditch,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Jones,  19  Nev.  60;  Beakes  v.  Da 
Cunla,  12  N.  Y.  S.  551 ;  58  PIuu,  609 ; 
27  N.  E.  Rep.  251.  Evidence  of 
events  or  acts  which  are  clearly  re- 
membered, or  which  are  notorious, 
is  always  relevant  to  fix  the  date  of 
a  relevant  fact  which  has  been  for- 
gotten. Ritter  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  30 
Mo.  App.  652. 

5  State  v.  Stubbs  (N.  C,  1S92),  13  S. 
E.  Rep.  90;  Eugle  v.  Smith  (Mich., 
1892),  46  N.  W.  Rep.  21 ;  Dowell  v. 
Guthrie,  99  Mo.  653 ;  McCoy  v.  Tucks, 
121  Ind.  292;  Tabor  v.  N.  Y.  E.  R. 
Co.,  58  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  579;  McCul- 
loch  v.  Dobson,  133  N.  Y.  114;  State 
v.  Lentz.  45  Minn.  177. 

6  See  §  8. 

7  State  v.  Minton  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  808 ;  Bridge  v.  Egglestou, 
14  Mass.  245;  Com.  v.  White,  145 
Mass.  392;  Bottomley  v.  United 
States,  1  Story,  143,  144 ;  Devere  v. 
State,  5  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  509 ;  Smith  v. 
State  (Fla.,   1892),    10  S.   Rep.    894; 


9.] 


KELEVAXCV  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY. 


21 


It  may  be  well  to  remark  in  this  place  that  the  general  rule 
is  that  facts  which  are  distinct  from  the  fact  in  issue,  but 
which  may  resemble  it  in  character,  are  not  relevant  to  prove 
or  show  the  probability  of  the  fact  in  issue.  So  no  one  is 
presumed  to  bo  guilty  of  crime  because  he  has  committed 
similar  though  distinct  crimes  at  some  other  time.1 

In  civil  cases  the  rule  is  often  relaxed  to  let  in  seemingly 
irrelevant  facts  to  strengthen  the  probability2  of  some  doubt- 
ful fact  by  showing  to  the  jury  that  the  doubtful  fact  alleged 
might  have  happened,  because  under  circumstances  somewhat 
similar,  if  not  identical,  a  similar  fact  actually  did  happen.3 

In  criminal  cases  the  rule  excluding  evidence  of  transac- 
tions not  specifically  connected  with  the  fact  in  issue  is  very 
strictly  observed.  Still  it  has  been  held  that  evidence  of  other 
distinct  crimes  is  relevant,  not  for  the  purpose  of  proving  di- 
rectly the  act  for  which  the  prisoner  is  on  trial,  but,  that  act 
or  transaction  being  shown  by  other  evidence,  evidence  of  a 
similar  crime  will  be  received  as  showing  or  tending  to  show 
that  the  act  was  done  with  a  criminal  intent  on  the  part  of 
the  accused.4 


Com.  v.  Russell  (Mass.,  1892),  30  N. 
E.  Rep.  763.  Evidence  that  defend- 
ant was  seen  to  practice  writing  the 
name  forged  is  also  relevant.  Insur- 
ance Co.  v.  Phila.  Ry.  Co.,  11  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  Rep.  482. 

i  People  v.  O'Brien,  96  Cal.  171; 
Com.  v.  Saulsbury,  152  Pa.  St.  554; 
Nixon  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  App. 
205;  People  v.  Drake,  65  Hun,  331; 
State  v.  Bronson,  49  Kan.  758 ;  State 
v.  Sterrett,  71  Iowa,  386.  Cf.  State  v. 
Martin,  74  Mo.  547 ;  People  v.  Rogers, 
71  Cal.  565 ;  Kernan  v.  State,  65  Md. 
253.  "  Proof  of  a  general  disposition 
to  do  a  thing  is  not  proof  of  that 
thing.  Thus,  proof  of  a  habit  of 
gambling  when  drunk  is  not  proof 
that  the  person  gambled  when  drunk 
on  a  particular  day.  Nor  will  proof 
of  a  habit  of  loaning  money  at 
usurious  interest  prove  that  a  loan 
was  made  in  a  particular  instance." 
Thompson  v.  Bowie,  4  Wall.  471. 


2 "If  the  evidence  relates  to  the 
transaction  under  consideration,  or  is 
connected  with  it  and  is  not  too  re- 
mote, it  is  competent.  It  is  relevant 
to  put  in  evidence  any  circumstance 
that  tends  to  make  the  proposition  at 
issue  more  or  less  improbable."  Fee 
v.  Taylor,  83  Ky.  264. 

3Dwyer  v.  Bassett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
513.  Contra,  Hartman  v.  Evans 
(W.  Va.,  1894),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  810; 
Palmer  v.  Hamilton  (Ky,  1894),  24 
S.  W.  Rep.  613. 

4Copperman  v.  People,  56  N.  Y. 
591 :  People  v.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228 ; 
State  v.  Myers,  82  Mo.  558 ;  People 
v.  Gibbs,  93  N.  Y.  473;  Kramer  v. 
Com.,  87  Pa.  St.  299;  State  v.  Stice 
(Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  17 ;  Card 
v.  State,  109  Ind.  420 ;  Brown  v.  State, 
26  Ohio  St.  176 ;  State  v.  Porter  (La., 
1893),  12  S.  Rep.  832 ;  State  v.  Place, 
32  Pac.  Rep.  736;  5  Wash.  St.  773; 
Courtney  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E. 


22 


RELEVANCY    AND    PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AND    JURY. 


[§9- 


The  fact  of  adultery  can  seldom  be  proven  by  direct  evi- 
dence. For  this  reason  proof  of  acts  of  adultery  prior  or 
subsequent  to  the  act  charged,1  or  that  the  accused  associated 
with  prostitutes,2  is  admissible  to  show  the  adulterous  dis- 
position and  opportunity  to  commit  the  offense.3 

If  the  intent  or  good  faith  of  a  person  is  in  issue  in  a  civil 
action,  similar  acts  to  those  which  are  alleged  may  be  proven 
to  show  the  mental  state  or  intention  —  as,  for  example,  in 
cases  of  fraudulent  misrepresentations.4 

The  practice  of  permitting  proof  of  acts  or  crimes  of  a 
similar  nature  tending  to  prove  knowledge  or  intention  is 
doubtless  partly  due  to  the  rule  of  the  common  law  by  which 
the  party  was  debarred,  because  of  interest,  from  testifying 
in  his  own  behalf.  This  rule  being  now  almost  universally 
abrogated,  a  party  may  be  called  to  testify  to  his  intention5 
in  doing  a  particular  act,  and  such  evidence,  though  perhaps 
suspicious  because  of  interest,  is  relevant  and  may  be  taken 
by  the  jury  for  what  it  is  worth.6 


Rep.  335 ;  Mason  v.  State,  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  564;  31  Tex.  Crim.  App.  306; 
Strong  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W. 
Rep.  680 ;  State  v.  Winton  (Mo.,  1893), 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  808 ;  State  v.  Crawford 
(S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  799;  Com. 
v.  Shepherd,  2  Pa.  Disk  Rep.  345; 
Smith  v.  State,  29  Fla.  108 ;  Com.  v. 
Russell,  126 Mass.  196.  "Where guilty 
knowledge  is  an  ingredient  of  a 
crime,  evidence  of  the  commission  of 
other  kindred  offenses  about  the  same 
time  is  admissible  as  tending  to  prove 
that  ingredient.  Many  cases  of  fraud 
require  the  application  of  the  same 
principle,  as  fraud  involves  intent, 
and  intent  can  be  deduced  only  from 
a  variety  of  circumstances.  Collat- 
eral facts,  each  insufficient  in  itself, 
whose  joint  operation  tends  to  sup- 
port the  charge  or  to  disprove  it,  are 
then  receivable."  United  States  v. 
Clapboards,  4  Cliff.  303-5. 

i  Garner  v.  State,  28  Fla.  113. 

2  Ciocci  v.  Ciocci,  29  L.  T.  Pr.  &  M. 
60. 


3  State  v.  Henderson  (Iowa,  1892), 
50  N.  W.  Rep.  758 ;  Burnett  v.  State, 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  47 ;  Owens  v.  State,  10 
S.  Rep.  669;  94  Ala,  97;  Thayer  v. 
Thayer,  101  Mass.  Ill;  Com.  v.  Cur- 
tis, 97  Mass.  574. 

4  Continental  Ins.  Co.  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  51  Fed.  Rep.  884;  Kelley  v. 
Owens  (Cal„  1893),  30  Pac.  Rep.  596 ; 
McCasker  v.  Enright,  64  Vt  488; 
James  v.  Work,  24  N.  Y.  S.  147 ;  Dwyer 
v.  Bassett,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  621 ;  1  Tex. 
Civ.  App.  513;  Lawlor  v.  Fritcher,  54 
Hun,  586.  Contra,  McKay  v.  Rus- 
sell, 3  Wash.  St.  378.  The  acts  must, 
it  seems,  be  recent  Wright  v. 
Wright,  139  Mass.  177. 

5  People  v.  Baker,  96  N.  Y.  340; 
White  v.  State,  53  Ind.  595.  A  wit- 
ness cannot  be  permitted  to  testify 
that  another  person  intended  to  do  a 
certain  act.  Kenyon  v.  Luther,  4  N. 
Y.  S.  498 ;  10  id  951 ;  Cihak  v.  Kleke, 
117  111.  643. 

6  Gardom  v.  Woodward,  44  Kan. 
758 ;  Stearns  v,  Gosselin,  58  Vt.  38 ; 


§  9.]    KELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.      23 

The  competency  of  the  party  as  a  witness  has,  on  the  other 
hand,  rendered  proof  of  surrounding  circumstances  to  show 
knowledge,  motive  or  intention  by  inference  much  more  im- 
portant than  formerly,  in  view  of  the  tendency  of  an  interested 
party  to  color  the  facts  in  his  own  favor.  Evidence  of  circum- 
stances is  relevant  in  every  instance  to  show  the  presence  of  a 
motive  or  of  good  or  bad  faith,  or  to  prove  that  a  party  made 
preparations,  i.  <?.,  intended  to  do  any  act  which  is  itself  rele- 
vant.1 So  in  prosecutions  for  crime  the  purchase  or  collecting  of 
murderous  instruments  or  burglarious  tools,  the  going  to  the 
place  of  the  crime,  the  disguising  of  oneself,  and  on  a  trial  for 
arson  the  prior  insurance  of  the  property,  are  relevant  facts.2 
So  evidence  of  the  behavior  of  a  party  subsequent  to  an  act  is 
relevant  to  show  that  his  behavior  is  such  as  would  be  natural 
under  the  supposition  that  the  act  had  been  committed.3  Thus, 
in  a  criminal  trial,  evidence  that  the  accused  had  attempted 
to  escape,4  or  was  in  possession  of  tools  to  effect  an  escape,5 
or  was  living  under  an  assumed  name,6  or  that  he  told  a  false- 
hood in  denying  the  crime,7  is  relevant.  But  the  mere  fact 
that  defendant  left  the  county  is  not  relevant  unless  it  appears 
that  he  did  so  to  avoid  arrest.8  Nor  can  it  be  shown  that  de- 
fendant offered  to  surrender  himself  to  the  authorities.9 

In  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for  murder  the  prosecution 
may  introduce  evidence  of  the  former  altercations,  previous 
threats  and  menacing  declarations  of  the  prisoner  against  the 
deceased,  to  show  the  former's  malice,  or,  if  long  prior  to  the 
killing,  to  show  his  premeditation  —  such  evidence  being  rele- 

Jefferds   v.   Alvord,   151    Mass.   95 ;  8  BanfieM  v.  Whipple,  10  Allen,  29 ; 

Wilson  v.  Clark  (Ind.,  1892),  27  N.  E.  Furnis  v.  Durgin,  119  Mass.  500. 

Rep.  310.  <  State  v.  Palmer,  65  N.  H.  216 ; 

i  State  v.  Brown,  75  Me.  456 ;  Cres-  Baker  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892),  17  S.  W. 

well  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  1 ;  Aaron  Rep.  625 ;  Ryan  v.  State,  84  Wis.  368 ; 

v.  State,  31  Ga  167 ;  Ten  Eyck  v.  Wit-  Com.  v.  McMahon,  145  Pa.  St.  413. 

beck,   69    Hun,    450;    McCarthy  v.  5  state  v.  Duncan  (Mo.,  1893),   22 

Gallegher,  4  Misc.  Rep.  188 ;  Com.  v.  S.  W.  Rep.  699. 

Hudson,    97    Mass.   565;    Kelsoe  v.  e State  v.  Whitson,  111  N.  C.  695. 

State,  47  Ala.  573 ;  Garber  v.  State,  4  '  State  v.  Bradley,  64  Vt  466. 

Cold.    (Tenn.)    161,    165;    Foster    v.  estate  v.  Marshall  (Mo.,  1893),  22 

Dickinson,  64  Vt  233 ;  24  Atl.  Rep.  S.  W.  Rep.  45. 

253.  9  State  v.  Johnston,  94  Ala.  35 ;  Peo- 

2Whart  Cr.  Ev.,  §753.  pie  v.    Rathbun,   21    Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

518  (refusal  to  escape  irrelevant). 


24 


RELEVANCY   AND    PROVINCE    OF   JUDGE    AND   JURY.       [§  10. 


vant  to  show  the  prisoner's  mental  state.1  And  in  a  prosecution 
for  homicide,  evidence  that  after  the  homicide  the  accused 
was  nervous,  excited2  or  preoccupied,3  or  was  silent  when 
accused  of  the  crime,4  or  manifested  a  lack  of  feeling  at  the 
death  of  deceased  where  great  sorrow  would  naturally  be 
expected,5  is  relevant. 

§  10.  Collateral  facts  bearing  on  character. —  Evidence  of 
the  general  character  or  reputation  of  the  parties  is  always 
irrelevant  in  civil  causes,  except  in  cases  where  general  char- 
acter is  involved  in  the  issue  on  account  of  the  peculiar  nature 
of  the  cause  of  action.6  Even  where  the  character  for  chastity 
of  a  wife  or  daughter  is  concerned,  in  an  action  brought  to 
recover  for  her  seduction,  evidence  of  her  general  moral 
character  is  inadmissible,  though  evidence  of  facts  tending  to 
prove  her  previous  chastity  or  lack  thereof  is  relevant,7 
provided  they  occurred  prior  to  the  offense  charged.8    In  a 

1  Harrison  v.  State,  79  Ala.  29 ;  State 


v.  Bradley,  64  Vt.  466;  Hardy  v. 
State,  31  Tex.  C.  Rep.  289 ;  Pitman  v. 
State,  22  Ark.  354;  State  v.  Hoyt, 
47  Conn.  518 ;  State  v.  Green,  1  Houst. 
Cr.  Cas.  (Del.)  217 ;  Dixon  v.  State,  13 
Fla.  636 ;  Everett  v.  State,  62  Ga.  65 ; 
State  v.  Walsh,  44  La.  Ann.  ^1122; 
Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind.  550 ;  State 
v.  McCahill,  72  Iowa,  111 ;  Reily  v. 
Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  222; 
State  v.  Bird  well,  36  La.  Ann.  859; 
Riggs  v.  State,  30  Miss.  635 ;  State  v. 
Partlow,  90  Mo.  608 ;  State  v.  Hymer, 
15  Nev.  49;  Pittman  v.  State  (Ga., 
1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  856 ;  State  v.  Rash, 
12  Ired.  (N.  C.)  L.  382;  Minims  v. 
State,  16  Ohio  St  221 ;  Hopkins  v. 
Com.,  50  Pa,  St.  9 ;  May  v.  State  (Ga., 
1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  108;  Wilson  v. 
State,  30  Fla.  234 ;  Benedict  v.  State. 
14  Wis.  423;  People  v.  Curtis,  52 
Mich.  616;  State  v.  Downs,  91  Mo. 
19 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  44  La.  Ann.  783 ; 
11  S.  Rep.  132;  Hall  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
C.  Rep.  565. 

2  State    v.    Baldwin,    36    Kan.    1; 
Miller  v.  State,  18  Tex.  232. 


3Noftsinger  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App. 
301. 
*  State  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  129. 

5  Greenfield  v.  People,  85  N.  Y.  75. 

6  Fowler  v.  Insurance  Co..  6  Cowen, 
673,  675 ;  Halley  v.  Gregg  (Iowa,  1891), 
48  N.  W.  Rep.  974 ;   Dudley  v.   Mo 
Cluer,  65  Mo.   241 ;    Home  Lumber 
Co.  v.  Hartman,  45   Mo.  App.  647 
McCarty  v.   Leary,    118    Mass.   509 
Scruggs  v.  State,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  1074 
90  Tenn.  81 ;  Goldsmith  v.  Picard,  27 
Ala.  142;  Porter  v.  Seiler,  23  Pa.  St. 
424 ;  Corning  v.  Corning,  6  N.  Y.  97 ; 
Thompson  v.  Brown,  4  Wall.    471 ; 
Leary  v.  Leary,  18  Ga.  696;  Wright 
v.  McKee,  37  Vt.  161.    See  1  Greenl. 
on  Evid.,  §  54. 

"State  v.  Curran,  51  Iowa,  112; 
Badder  v.  Kiefer,  91  Mich.  611;  52 
N.  W.  Rep.  60 ;  State  v.  Eckler,  106 
Mo.  585 ;  Sho  waiter  v.  Bergman,  23 
N.  E.  Rep.  686. 

s  Clifton  v.  Granger  (Iowa,  1893), 
53  N.  W.  Rep.  316 ;  Hallock  v.  Kinney 
(Mich.,  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  706. 
Evidence  of  plaintiff's  adultery  with 
others  than  defendant  is  irrelevant. 
Morris  v.  State,  31  Tex.  App.  597. 


§  10.]        RELEVANCY   AND   PROVINCE    OF   JUDGE    AND    JURY.  25 

criminal  prosecution  for  rape  or  for  an  indecent  assault,  the 
prior  chastity  of  the  prosecuting  witness  is  a  material  fact,  and 
evidence  of  previous  acts  of  unchastity,  committed  with  the 
accused  but  with  no  other  man,  is  relevant.1  But  evidence 
that  the  prosecuting  witness  had  a  bad  reputation  for  chastit}r 
or  was  unchaste  is  irrelevant.2 

"Whether  or  not  an  allegation  of  fraud  in  a  civil  action  to 
recover  damages  for  a  tort  puts  the  character  of  a  party  in 
issue  to  the  extent  that  general  evidence  of  good  character  is 
relevant  depends  more  upon  the  nature  of  the  action  than 
upon  the  character  or  form  of  the  charge  of  fraud.  It  was 
formerly  held  that  where  a  person  is  charged  with  construct- 
ive fraud,  evidence  of  his  good  character  is  relevant  to 
rebut  the  presumption.3  This  rule  is  limited  to  cases  where 
intention  is  sought  to  be  proven  circumstantially,  and  does 
not  apply  where  the  allegation  of  fraud  is  merely  formal,  or, 
in  other  words,  where  from  the  nature  of  the  action  reputa- 
tion is  not  actually  and  necessarily  drawn  in  issue.4  If  the 
plaintiff  bases  his  cause  of  action  upon  an  injury  to  his  general 
reputation  or  character,  as  he  does  in  an  action  to  recover 
damages  for  malicious  prosecution  or  false  imprisonment,  or 
in  an  action  of  slander  or  libel,  his  reputation  becomes  mate- 
rial in  view  of  the  alleged  damage  it  has  received.  Then  evi- 
dence is  relevant  that  plaintiff's  general  reputation  was  bad 
prior  to  the  alleged  injury,  and  this  fact,  if  proved,  should  be 
considered  by  the  jury  in  mitigation  of  damages.  It  is  very 
unlikely  that  a  man  or  woman  of  bad  reputation  would  re- 
ceive the  same  injury  as  one  of  an  unblemished  life  and  high 
moral  standing.5    "Where  a  peculiar  trait  of  character  is  in 

i  State  v.  Cassidy  (Iowa,  1892),  52  456.     See,  contra,  Gough  v.  St.  John, 

N.  W.  Eep.  1;  State  v.  Patrick  (Mo.,  16  Wend.  646;  Pratt  v.  Andrew,  4 

1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  666 ;  O'Blenis  v.  N.  Y.  493.     Cf.  Porter  v.  Seiler,  23 

State,  47  N.  J.  L.  279 ;  Com.  v.  Ken-  Pa.  St.  324. 

dall,  113  Mass.  210.  4  Nash  v.  Gilkerson,  5  S.  &  R.  352 : 

2  Fry  v.  Com.,  82  Va.  334;  Linecum  Anderson  v.  Long,  10  id.  55;  Porter 
v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  328 ;  People  v.  v.  Seiler,  23  Pa.  St.  424 ;  Zitzer  v. 
McLean,  71  Mich.  309.  Merkel,   24  Pa.   St.   408 ;    Givens  v. 

3  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §§  54,  55,  citing  Bradley,  3  Bibb,  192;  Gregory  v. 
Ruan  v.  Perry,  3  Caines,  120 ;  Fowler  Thomas,  2  id.  286,  cited  in  1  Greenl. 
v.   Insurance    Co.,    6    Cowen,    675 ;  on  Evid.,  §  55. 

Townsend  v.  Graves,  3  Paige,  455,        5  As  to  malicious  prosecution,  see 


26 


RELEVANCY   AND    PROVINCE    OF   JUDGE   AND   JURY.       [§  10. 


issue,  as,  for  example,  a  person's  habitual  disregard  of  his 
financial  obligations  or  his  skill  in  the  management  of  the  af- 
fairs  intrusted  to  him,  evidence  of  reputation  bearing  upon 
these  particular  personal  qualifications  becomes  relevant.1 
But  evidence  of  reputation  is  always  required,  and  proof  of 
particular  immoral  acts  or  any  specific  bad  conduct  cannot  be 
relevant  to  show  character.2 

In  prosecutions  for  crime  the  defendant  may  always  give 
or  offer  evidence  of  his  previous  good  character  and  peaceable 
disposition  as  relevant  to  rebut  any  presumption  of  criminal 
intent  which  may  arise  from  the  circumstances  against  him.3 
The  good  character  of  defendant,  however,  cannot  be  attacked 
or  impeached  by  the  state  in  the  first  instance;  but  where  he 
attempts  to  prove  good  character,  evidence  of  his  general  bad 
character,  but  not  of  any  specific  or  particular  vicious  or  crim- 
inal act,  becomes  relevant  in  rebuttal.4 


Gee  v.  Culver,  13  Oreg.  598;  Mclntire 
v.  Levering,  148  Mass.  546 ;  Blizzard 
v.  Hays,  46  Ind.  166 ;  Israel  v.  Brooks, 
23  id.  575 ;  Finley  v.  St.  Louis  Ref. 
Co.,  99  Mo.  559.  Libel  and  slander, 
see  Insurance  Co.  v.  Hazen,  110  Pa. 
St.  537 ;  Treat  v.  Brown,  4  Conn.  408 ; 
Nelson  v.  Wallace,  48  Mo.  App.  193 ; 
Sanford  v.  Rowley,  93  Mich.  119; 
Hallam  v.  Post,  55  Fed.  Rep.  456; 
Morey  v.  Morning  Journal,  123  N.  Y. 
207 ;  Jones  v.  Duchow,  87  Cal.  109. 

1  Buswell  v.  Trimmer,  144  Mass. 
350;  Monahan  v.  Worcester,  150  id. 
440;  Hatt  v.  Nay,  144  id.  186. 

-Leonard  v.  Allen,  11  Cush.  241, 
245;  State  v.  Donellon,  13  La.  1292; 
Frazier  v.  Railroad,  38  Pa.  St.  104; 
Nelson  v.  State  (Fla,,  1893),  13  S.  Rep. 
361. 

3  Hindi  v.  State,  25  Ga.  699 ;  War- 
ren v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  573; 
Dupree  v.  State,  33  Ala  380 ;  State  v. 
Cross,  68  Iowa,  180 ;  Wesley  v.  State, 
37  Miss.  327 ;  Stephens  v.  People,  4 
Park.  Cr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  396 ;  People  v. 
Harrison,  93  Mich.  594;  Murphy  v. 
People,  9  Colo.  435 ;  McCarty  v.  Peo- 


ple, 51  111.  231 ;  Hall  v.  State,  132  Ind. 
317;  State  v.  Dumphy,  4  Minn.  438; 
State  v.  Grate,  68  Mo.  22 ;  Warren  v^ 
Com.,  37  Pa.  St.  45 ;  Walker  v.  State, 
102  Ind.  502 ;  State  v.  Parks,  109  N.  C. 
813;  State  v.  Sterritte,  68  Iowa,  761; 
McDauiel  v.  State,  16  Miss.  (8  Smed. 
&  M.)  40-1;  State  v.  Schleagel,  50 
Kan.  225 ;  People  v.  Stewart,  28  Cal. 
395 ;  People  v.  Mills,  94  Md.  630 ;  State 
v.  Moelschen,  53  Iowa,  310 ;  People  v. 
Garbutt,  17  Mich.  9 ;  Thomas  v.  Peo- 
ple, 6i?  N.  Y.  218 ;  Gibson  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  App.  414;  Carr  v.  State  (Ind., 
1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  593;  Cathcart  v. 
Com.,  37  Pa.  St.  108;  Hopps  v.  Peo- 
ple, 31  111.  385.  The  rule  that  a  de- 
fendant may  introduce  evidence  of 
good  character  has  been  sometimes 
confined  in  its  operation  to  those 
crimes  the  commission  of  which  in- 
volves moral  turpitude  and  not  mere 
statutory  offenses  not  malum  in  se. 
Com.  v.  Nagle  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E. 
Rep.  861. 

*  State  v.  Merrill,  2  Dev.  (N.  C.)  L 
269 ;  Spies  v.  People  (Anarchist  Case), 
122  111.  1 ;  Gibson   v.  State,  23  Tex. 


§11- 


RELEVANCY    AND    PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AM)    .11  lev. 


27 


In  a  trial  for  homicide,  evidence  that  the  deceased  was  re- 
puted to  be  of  a  peaceable  disposition  is  irrelevant,  unless  in 
rebuttal,  where  the  defense  alleges  his  quarrelsome  character.1 
But  evidence  of  the  character  of  the  deceased,  to  show  that  he 
was  quarrelsome,  turbulent  and  vindictive,  or  the  reverse,  is 
admissible  in  behalf  of  the  prisoner  under  a  plea  of  self-defense, 
but  only  where  the  evidence  as  to  this  main  fact  is  contradict- 
ory and  it  is  not  conclusively  shown  that  defendant  was 
solely  in  fault.2 

§  11.  Province  of  judge  and  jury. —  The  main  question  in- 
volved, so  far  as  the  evidence  is  concerned,  where  an  issue  of 


App.  414;  State  v.  Ellwood,  17  R.  I. 
763;  Felsenthal  v.  State,  30  Tex. 
App.  675.  "The  old  rule  that  evi- 
dence of  the  good  character  of  the 
defendant  is  not  to  be  considered  un- 
less other  evidence  leaves  the  mind 
in  doubt  has  been  much  criticised. 
The  weight  of  authority  is  now 
against  it.  If  evidence  of  reputation 
is  admissible  at  all,  its  weight  should 
be  left  to  be  determined  by  the  jury 
in  connection  with  all  the  other  evi- 
dence in  the  case.  The  circumstances 
may  be  such  that  an  established  rep- 
utation for  good  character,  if  it  is 
relevant  to  the  issue,  would  alone 
create  reasonable  doubt,  although 
without  it  the  other  evidence  would 
be  convincing."  Commonwealth  v. 
Leonard,  140  Mass.  470,  479. 

i  Pound  v.  State,  43  Ga.  88 ;  Roten 
v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  910 ; 
Russell  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  288; 
Thomas  v.  People,  67  N.  Y.  218 ;  State 
v.  Hockett,  70  Iowa,  442 ;  People  v. 
Bezy,  67  Cal.  223;  Riley  v.  Com. 
(Ky.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  222 ;  State 
v.  Hogue,  6  Jones  (N.  C),  381 ;  Chase 
v.  State,  46  Miss.  683 ;  State  v.  Pearce, 
15  Nev.  188 ;  Bowman  v.  Smith  (Tex., 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  48;  Fields  v. 
State  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  780. 

2  Perry  v.  State,  94  Ala.  25 ;  West 
v.  State,  12  Tex.  App.  640 ;  Bond  v. 
State,   12  Fla.   738;  Roten   v.   State 


(Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  910 ;  State  v. 
Graham,  61  Iowa,  608;  Alexander  v. 
Com.,  105  Pa.  St.  1 ;  Marts  v.  State, 
26  Ohio  St.  162;  People  v.  Harris 
(Mich.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  645; 
State  v.  Downs,  91  Mo.  19 ;  Smith  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  831 ; 
Reiley  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  22  S.  W. 
Rep.  222 ;  State  v.  Mathews,  78  N.  C. 
523;  State  v.  Pearce,  15  Nev.  188; 
Com.  v.  Strasser,  153  Pa.  St  431; 
Harrison  v.  Com.,  79  Va.  374 ;  State 
v.  Nett,  50  Wis.  524 ;  State  v.  Taylor, 
44  La.  Ann.  783 ;  May  v.  People,  8 
Colo.  210 ;  Drake  v.  State,  75  Ga.  413 ; 
State  v.  Kenion  (R.  I.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  199.  For  evidence  of  a  threat 
made  by  the  victim  against  the  ac- 
cused to  be  admissible,  it  is  generally 
but  not  universally  held  that  it  should 
have  been  communicated  to  him  if 
he  alleges  that  his  actions  were  in- 
fluenced by  it.  People  v.  Scoggins, 
37  Cal.  683.  But  evidence  of  specific 
acts  of  violence  is  not  admissible. 
Campbell  v.  State,  38  Ark.  498 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Druse,  103  N.  Y.  655 ;  Nelson 
v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  361 ; 
Fields  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E. 
Rep.  780.  So  where  the  defense  is 
that  the  deceased  committed  suicide, 
evidence  of  his  melancholy  disposi- 
tion is  relevant  Blackburn  v.  State, 
23  Ohio  St  146. 


2S      RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.   [§  11. 

fact  is  tried  by  the  court  without  a  jury,  must  be  its  weight 
and  sufficiency.  Under  such  circumstances  no  question  of  ad- 
missibility can  arise, —  the  judge  in  any  event  having  to  hear 
or  read  it.  Of  course  the  relevancy  of  the  testimony  is  always 
to  be  considered  whether  the  trial  is  by  jury  or  not;  but 
where  a  jury  is  present,  it  is  the  office  of  the  judge  to  deter- 
mine all  questions  of  admissibility,  basing  his  decision  to  a 
large  extent  upon  the  relevancy  of  the  testimony  offered  to 
the  point  in  issue.1 

The  weight  to  be  given  to  the  evidence  and  the  credibility 
of  the  witnesses,  in  all  cases  where  upon  the  testimony  an 
issue  of  fact  appears  to  arise,  are  for  the  consideration  of  the 
jury  alone.2  "But  whether  there  is  any  evidence  is  a  question 
for  the  judge ;  whether  it  is  sufficient  evidence  is  for  the  jury."  3 

If  the  evidence  offered  by  the  party  upon  whom  the  burden 
of  proof  rests  is  clear,  distinct  and  uncontradicted,  so  that  no 
inference  need  be  drawn,  or  where  only  one  inference  can  be 
possibly  drawn  by  any  reasonable  man,  and  the  other  party 
offers  no  evidence  or  fails  to  prove  one  or  more  material 
points  of  his  defense,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  court  to 
direct  the  jury  to  find  a  verdict  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff.* 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  49.  brook  v.  Howell,  34  III.    App.    571 ; 

2  Campbell  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  18  Wessels  v.  Beeman,  87  Mich.  481  ; 
S.  W.  Rep.  409;  State  v.  Jones,  44  Chicago,  etc.  R  R.  Co.  v.  Fisher  (111., 
La.  Ann.  1120;  State  v.  Plum,  49  1892).  31  N.  E.  Rep.  400;  Didier  v. 
Kan.  679;  People  v.  Zormeck,  66  Penn.  Co.,  146  Pa.  St.  582;  23  A tl.  Rep. 
Hnn,  626;  State  v.  Mexley(Mo.,  1893),  801 ;  Johnson  v.  People,  140  111.  350; 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  575;  Jackson  v.  Times,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  895;  Webster  v.  Frow- 
152  Pa.  St.  406;  White  v.  State,  21  ler,  50  N.  W.  Rep.  1074;  89  Mich.  303; 
Tex.  App.  339 ;  State  v.  Mounts,  106  East  Tenn.  etc.  Co.  v.  Markens,  88 
Mo.  226 ;  State  v.  Kibling,  63  Vt  Ga.  60 ;  Kansas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ryan,  49 
636 ;  People  v.  Minaugh,  131  N.  Y.  Kan.  1 ;  30  Pac.  Rep.  108 ;  Leiber  v. 
563;  Blankenship  v.  State,  55  Ark.  Chicago,  M.  &  St.  P.  Co.  (Iowa,  18921, 
244 ;  People  v.  Cowgill,  93  Cal.  596 ;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  547 ;  Albertsen  v. 
Newberry  v.  State  (Fla.,  1890),  8  S.  Terry,  109  N.  C.  8;  Williams  v.  Dick- 
Rep.  445 ;  Weston  v.  Brown  (Neb,  enson,  28  Fla.  90 ;  Conde  v.  Wiltsic, 
1890),  46  N.  W.  Rep.  826  ;  Louisville,  131  N.  Y.  647.  See  post,  §  342a. 
etc.  Co.  v.  Stommel,  126  Ind.  35;  3 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  49. 
Henderson  v.  Miller,  36  111.  App.  232;  4  Sauber  v.  Collins,  40  111.  App. 
Stanley  v.  Montgomery,  102  Ind.  102;  426;  Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Parmenrer, 
Davis  v.  Hays,  89  Ala.  563;  Higgin-  39  111.  App.  270;  Wolff  v.  Campbell, 
botlinm  v.  Campbell, 85 Ga.  638;  Yost  110  Mo.  114;  19  S.  W.  Rep.  622; 
v.  Mensch,  27  W.  N.  C.  562 ;  West-  Meyer  v.  Houck,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  235 ; 


§11.] 


RELEVANCY    AND    PliOVIXCK    OF    JL'DGK    AND    JURY. 


20 


On  the  other  hand,  where  the  party  on  whom  is  cast  the 
burden  of  proof  fails  to  substantiate  his  allegations  by  evi- 
dence showing  that  he  has  in  law  a  prima  facie  cause  of  action, 
then  there  is  no  case  for  the  jury,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  judge 
to  direct  a  nonsuit.1 

The  question  of  the  power  of  the  jury  to  determine  ques- 
tions of  law,  though  much  discussed,  may  now  be  considered 
settled.2  It  is  a  proposition  of  almost  universal  acceptance 
that  in  all  cases,  both  civil  and  criminal  (except  where  a  con- 
trary rule  is  laid  down  by  some  constitutional  or  statutory 
enactment),3  the  power  of  the  jury  is  confined  to  determining 
the  issue  of  fact,  and  that  the  rulings  of  the  judge  on  the 
principles  and  rules  of  law  involved  are  to  be  received  by 
them  as  obligatory  and  to  be  implicitly  followed.4     The  pre- 


McMullen  v.  Carsen,  48  Kan.  263; 
29  Pac.  Eep.  317 ;  Fitzgerald  v.  Hart, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  369 ;  Gildersleeve  v. 
Atkinson  (N.  M.,  1892),  27  Pac.  Rep. 
477;  Schmidt  v.  Garfield  Nat.  Bank, 
19  N.  Y.  S.  252  :  64  Hun.  298  ;  Fox  v. 
Spring  L.  Co.,  89  Mich.  387 ;  Haugen 
v.  G,  M.  &  St.  P.  Ry.  Co.  (S.  D.,  1893), 
53  N.  W.  Rep.  769;  Eisenlord  v. 
Cluni.  67  Hun,  518.  See  post,  §§  247- 
250. 

1 "  Where  the  facts  are  undisputed 
their  effect  is  for  the  judgment  of  the 
court.  Where  different  minds  may 
honestly  draw  different  conclusions 
from  the  facts,  as  where  care  and 
negligence  is  to  be  inferred,  the  ques- 
tion is  for  the  jury."  Sioux  City,  etc. 
R.  Co.  v.  Stout,  17  Wall.  663 ;  Still- 
water v.  Archer,  18  N.  Y.  S.  888; 
Candelaria  v.  Railroad  Co.  (N.  M., 
1892),  27  Pac.  Rep.  497 ;  Leavitt  v. 
Dodge,  61  Hun,  627 ;  Johnson  v.  Ridir 
(Iowa,  1892),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  36 ;  Rum- 
sey  v.  Boutwell,  61  Hun,  165;  Col- 
lins v.  Burlington,  etc.  Co.,  83  Iowa, 
346 ;  49  N.  W.  Rep.  848 ;  Central  R 
etc.  Co.  v.  Ingram  (Ala.,  1892),  10  S. 
Rep.  516. 

2  For  an  outline  of  the  discussion, 
see  1  Greenl.  Evid.,  §  49. 


3  See  Goldman  v.  State  (Md.,  1892), 
23  Atl.  Rep.  1097;  Blaker  v.  State,  29 
N.  E.  Rep.  1077 ;  130  Ind.  203.  By 
the  constitution  of  many  of  the  states 
it  is  expressly  provided  that  in  prose- 
cutions for  libel  the  jury,  under  the 
direction  of  the  courfc,  shall  deter- 
mine the  law  and  the  facts.  Latly 
v.  Emeiy,  59  Hun,  237;  State  v. 
Armstrong  (Mo.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  Rep. 
604 ;  State  v.  Burpee  (Vt.,  1893),  25 
Atl.  Rep.  964. 

4  People  v.  Lem  Yon  (Cat,  1893), 
32  Pac.  Rep.  11;  Wright  v.  Fonda, 
44  Mo.  App.  634 ;  Sherwood  v.  Chi- 
cago, etc.  Co.,  88  Mich.  108 ;  Daven- 
port v.  Hannibal,  108  Mo.  471 :  18  S. 
W.  Rep.  1122;  Richards  v.  Wede- 
meyer,  75  Md.  10;  Gallon  v.  Van 
Wormer  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
547 ;  Kidwell  v.  Carson  (Tex.,  1893), 
22  id.  534  ;  Harper  v.  Morse  (Mo.,  1893), 
21  id.  517 ;  Chandler  v.  Knott  (Iowa, 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  88 ;  Willard  v. 
Siegel,  47  Mo.  App.  1 ;  Chicago  Ch. 
Co.  v.  Fogg,  53  Fed.  Rep.  72 ;  Elliott 
v.  Wanamaker,  155  Pa.  St.  67  ;  Camp- 
bell v.  Juimies,  3  Misc.  R.  316; 
Simpson  v.  Pegram  (N.  C,  1893),  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  430.  As  bearing  upon  the 
right  of  the  jury  to  decide  questions 


30  RELEVANCY    AND    PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AND    JURY.       [§  11. 

liminary  question,  whether  there  is  adequate  or  sufficient  evi- 
dence, where  evidence  is  given  on  both  sides  from  which  an 
inference  either  way  may  be  drawn,  is  for  the  judge;  and  if 
there  is  such  evidence,  no  matter  how  contradictory  on  the 
whole  it  may  seem  to  him,  it  will  be  his  duty  to  send  the  case 
to  the  jury.1  ]STow  the  inquiry,  is  there  fit  or  sufficient  evi- 
dence to  send  the  case  to  the  jury,  can  only  be  decided  by  the 
judge  by  the  employment  and  application  of  legal  rules;  and 
the  main  question  is,  are  there  any  facts  in  evidence  which,  if 
uncontradicted  or  proved,  would  justify  men  of  ordinary  rea- 
son, intelligence  and  fairness  in  deciding  in  favor  of  plaintiff? 
Though  the  judge  may  be  convinced  that  plaintiff  has  not 
proved  his  case,  if  he  believes  that  reasonable  men  may  enter- 
tain a  different  conclusion,  or  draw  a  different  inference 
from  those  facts,  then  it  is  his  duty  to  submit  them  to  the 
jury;  and  so  long  as  the  inference  drawn  by  the  jury  is  fair 
and  reasonable,  it  will  be  valid  even  though  contrary  to  the 
conclusion  which  the  judge  may  draw.2  But  the  court  in 
charging  the  jury  should  not  assume  facts  as  proved  upon 
which  no  evidence  was  offered  or  to  which  the  evidence  is  so 
contradictory  that  reasonable  men  may  form  different  opin- 
ions thereon.3     Where,  however,  the  fact  is  conceded  by  all 

of  law,  see  Pierce's  Case,  13  N.  H.  be  some  evidence  to  sustain  every 

536;  State  v.  Hodge,  50  N.  H.  510;  element  of  the  case  competent  both 

Com.   v.    McManus,  143  Pa.   St.  64;  in   quality  and  quantity  in  law  to 

People  v.  Pine,  2  Barb.  566 ;  Brown  sustain  it,  and  yet  it  may  be  met  by 

v.  Com.  (Va.,  1890),  10  S.  E.  Rep.  745  ;  countervailing  proof  so  potent  as  to 

Com.  v.  Abbott,   13  Mete.  123,  124 ;  leave  no  reasonable  doubt  of  the  op- 

Higginbotham  v.  Campbell,  43  Mo.  posing  conclusion."    Metropolitan  R 

App.  i76;  Cochran  v.  Jones,  85  Ga.  Co.  v.  Moore,  121  U.  S.  567-569. 

678.     The  province  of  the  court  and  2  "The  jury  should  take  the  law  as 

jury  is  frequently  defined  by  statute,  laid  down  by  the  court  and  give  it 

as,    for    example,    in     Connecticut,  full  effect,  but  its  application  is  for 

Morehouse  v.  Remsen,  59  Conn.  392.  them  to  determine.     The  court  may 

1  "  Strictly    speaking,    evidence  is  not  enter  their  distinctive  province, 

insufficient  in  law  only  when  there  These   are    the    check  and   balance 

is  a  total  absence  of  such  proof  in  which  give  to  trial  by  jury  its  value." 

quantity  or  kind  as,  in  the  particular  Hickman   v.  Jones,  9  Wall.  (U.  S.) 

case,  a  rule  of  law  requires  as  essen-  201-2.    See  post,  §  377. 

tial  to  the  establishment  of  the  fact.  3  Wright  v.  Fonda,  44  Mo.  App.  634 ; 

Insufficiency  in  point  of  fact  may  Griel  v.  Lomax,  94  Ala.  641 ;  Newton 

exist  where  there  is  no  insufficiency  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  560; 

in  point  of  law ;  that  is,  there  may  Patrick  v.   Skoman  (Colo.,  1892),  29 


§  11.]   BELEVANOY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JUET.      31 

parties,  or,  being  proved,  is  not  disputed,  it  is  not  an  invasion 
of  the  province  of  the  jury  for  the  court  to  state  that  fact  as 
true  in  its  charge.1  The  jury  must,  in  the  rendition  of  their 
verdict,  determine  the  whole  issue,  involving,  as  it  may,  ques- 
tions of  law  as  well  as  of  fact.  In  pursuance  of  this  duty  as 
jurors,  and  having  in  view  their  oaths  as  such,  they  may  dis- 
regard any  and  all  expression  of  opinion  on  the  part  of  the 
judge  upon  any  questions  of  fact  and  decide  adverse  to  such 
opinion,  provided  their  decision  is  not  contrary  to  the  evi- 
dence. On  the  other  hand  it  is  not  only  the  right,  but  the 
duty,  of  the  presiding  judge  to  instruct  the  jury  regarding 
all  points'  of  law  involved,  and  it  is  the  duty  of  the  jury  to 
receive  and  observe  these  instructions  and  to  make  their  ver- 
dict conform  thereto.  So  though  the  weight,  sufficiency  and 
credit  to  be  given  to  the  evidence  are  exclusively  a  matter  for 
the  jury,  the  court  may  express  its  opinion  as  regards  the 
character  of  the  evidence,  provided  it  is  done  in  such  a  way 
that  the  province  of  the  jury  as  triers  of  the  issue  of  fact  is 
not  invaded.  When,  after  a  proper  instruction  as  to  the  prin- 
ciples and  rules  of  law  concerned,  the  jury  wholly  disregard 
the  evidence  and  the  rules  of  law,  the  court  may  set  their  ver- 
dict aside  as  against  the  weight  of  the  evidence  and  as  not 
conformable  to  the  law.2 

The  court  may  call  attention  to  the  remarks  of  counsel  in 
connection  with  the  evidence ; 3  may  caution  the  jury  to  be 
slow  in  rejecting  evidence,4  or  may  point  out  how  the  inten- 
tion of  a  party  should  be  proved ; 5  may  call  attention  to  the 
gravity  of  the  offense  with  which  the  prisoner  is  charged,6  or 
define  malice,  or  point  out  the  fact  that  a  criminal  intent  may 

Pac.   Rep.   21 ;  Chicago,  etc.    Co.  v.  263 ;  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  79  Tex.  104 ; 

Remminger,    140  111.   334 ;    State    v.  Trinity,  etc.  Co.   v.  Lane,  79  id.  648 ; 

Hope,    102   Mo.   410;    Hitchcock    v.  McGuire  v.  Railroad  Co.,  43  Mo.  A  pp. 

Thayer,  32  Neb.  477;  49  N.  W.  Rep.  354;  Bragg  v.    Bletz,  7   D.    C.    105; 

374;  St  Louis   v.  Trimble,  54  Ark.  Long  v.  Milford,  137  Pa.  St  122. 

354;    15  S.    W.    Rep.   899;    Potts  v.  2  See  post,  §  377. 

Jones,  140  Pa.  St.  48 ;  Dulaney  v.  St.  3  Griffin,   etc.   Co.   v.    Joannes,   80 

Louis  S.   R.  Co.,  42  Mo.  App.  659;  Wis.  601. 

Horn  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  4  Lyts  v.  Keevey,  5  Wash.  St  606. 

329;  Townley  v.  Coal  Co.,  59  Hun,  »  Tyler  v.  Hall,  106  Mo.  313. 

646.  estate  v.  Mcintosh  (S.  C,  1893),  17 

i  Mooney  v.  York  Iron  Co.,  82  Mich.  S.  E.  Rep.  446. 


52      RELEVANCY  AND  TROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.   [§  11. 

be  inferred  from  circumstantial  evidence,1  or  may  suggest  that 
certain  evidence  is  uncorroborated;2  may  suggest  possible  ex- 
planations of  seeming  discrepancies  in  the  evidence  and  show 
how  that  which  is  inconsistent  may  be  reconciled ; 3  may  state 
to  the  jury  that  what  a  party  admits  against  his  interest  on 
the  witness  stand  may  be  considered  as  true;4  may  call  atten- 
tion to  the  necessity  of  a  jury  agreeing  upon  a  verdict;5  may 
state  a  hypothetical  case  for  the  guidance  of  the  jury  and  to 
emphasize  more  clearly  the  principles  of  law  involved.6  But 
to  state  certain  facts  as  testified  to,  ignoring  all  others,  and 
to  inform  the  jury  that  from  those  facts  they  have  a  right  to 
draw  a  certain  inference,  is  an  invasion  of  the  province  of  the 
jury.7  On  the  other  hand,  the  law  does  not  require  the  in- 
structions on  the  evidence  to  be  entirely  colorless,  so  far  as 
the  opinion  as  to  the  credibility  of  evidence  is  concerned,  if  the 
whole  case  is  submitted  to  the  jury  to  decide  on  all  the  facts 
and  the  law  is  accurately  stated.  A  mere  hint  of  an  opinion 
upon  the  evidence  by  the  court,  or  his  evident  leaning  to  one 
party  or  the  other,  is  not  enough  to  warrant  a  new  trial.8  So 
the  court  may  aid  the  jury  by  recapitulating  the  evidence,  re- 
freshing their  minds  where  their  recollection  is  likely  to  be  dim, 
elucidating  that  which  is  complicated  and  involved,  and  so 
advising  them  that  they  may  be  able  to  take  a  just  and  im- 
partial view  of  all  parts  of  the  evidence  in  their  true  re- 
lations.9 

1  State  v.  Mcintosh,  supra.  Y.  420 ;  McGee  v.  Wells  (S.  C,  1893), 

2  People  v.  Rohl,  138  N.  Y.  616.  16  S.  E.  Rep.  89;  Hoff  v.  State  (Ga., 

3  York  v.  Maine  R.  Co.,  84  N.  Y  17.  1893),    16    S.   E.   Rep.    99 ;    State  v. 

4  State  v.  Brooks,  99  Mo.  137;  12  S.  Crawford  (S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep. 
IV.  Rep.  633.  199. 

5  State  v.  Hawkins,  18  Oreg.  476 ;  23  »  "  What  is  said  by  the  court  as  to 
Pac.  Rep.  475.  the  weight  of  evidence  is  advisory, 

6  Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kleinsmith,  38  in  nowise  intended  to  fetter  the  exer- 
111.  App.  45;  People  v.  Rohl,  138  N.  cise  of  the  jui-or's  independent  iudg- 
Y.  616;  Cobb  v.  Covenant  Ins.  Co.,  ment.  With  this  limitation  it  is  the 
153  Mass.  176;  Wright  v.  Mulvaney,  right  and  duty  of  the  court  to  aid 
'78  Wis.  89.  them  by  recalling  the  testimony  to 

'i  Peters  v.  Bourneau,  22  111.  App.  their  recollection,    by  collecting  its 

177 ;  State  v.  Choy,  84  Cal.  276.  details,   by    suggesting    grounds    of 

8  McClain  v.  Com.,  110  Pa.  St  263 ;  1  preference  where  there  is  contradic- 

Atl.  Rep.  45 ;  People  v.  McLean,  184  tion,  by  directing  their  attention  to 

Cal.  480 ;  Hurlbut  v.  Hurlbut,  128  N.  the  most  important  facts,  by  elimi- 


§  12.]        RELEVANCY    AND    PROVINCE    OF    JUDGE    AND   JURY.  33 

§  12.  Blended  questions  of  law  and  fact. —  The  rule  that 
pure  questions  of  law  and  of  fact  are  for  the  solution  of  the 
judge  and  jury  respectively  is  on  some  occasions  difficult  of 
application,  because  of  the  blending  of  these  questions  in  one 
issue  in  such  a  manner  that  they  are  not  easily  susceptible  of 
separate  determination.  In  an  action  for  a  malicious  prose- 
cution, the  question  of  the  existence  of  probable  cause  is  for 
the  court.  In  other  words,  where  the  evidence  is  conflicting 
it  is  for  the  court  to  say  what  particular  facts  constitute  prob- 
able cause,  leaving  it  for  the  jury  to  find  whether  or  not  such 
facts  are  proved  by  the  evidence.1  Perhaps  the  most  impor- 
tant subject  concerning  which  the  respective  provinces  of  the 
judge  and  the  jury  have  been  discussed  is  that  of  the  reason- 
ableness of  time  or  of  a  person's  care  or  skill  under  certain 
circumstances.  The  correct  practice  in  all  cases  where  negli- 
gence is  alleged  is  for  the  judge  to  instruct  the  jury  upon  the 
amount  or  nature  of  the  care,  diligence  or  skill  which  may  be 
ilegally  incumbent  upon  persons  in  the  circumstances  of  the 
defendant,2  leaving  it  for  the  jury  to  determine,  in  all  cases 
where  the  evidence  on  this  point  is  contradictory,  what  the 
circumstances  were,  and  whether  the  defendant  has  properly 
exercised  the  required  care,  skill  or  diligence.  The  degree  of 
reasonableness  of  the  care  is  ordinarily  defined  in  general 
terms,  and  the  instruction  amounts  usually  to  a  mere  state- 
ment that  negligence  consists  in  doing  or  omitting  to  do  an 
act  which  a  person  of  ordinary  care  or  skill  would  or  would 
not  do  under  the  circumstances.3     This  instruction  would  be 

nating  the  true  points  of  inquiry,  by  Pa.  St   458 ;    Boogher  v.  Howe,   99 

resolving  the  evidence,  however  com-  Mo.  183.    Contra,  Low  v.  Greenwood, 

plicated,  into  its  simpler   elements,  30  111.  App.  184;  Archibald  v.  Mc- 

and  by  showing  the  bearing  of  its  Laurin,  21  Can.  S.  C.  R  588 ;  Sanders 

several  parts  and  their  combined  ef-  v.  Palmer,  55  Fed.  Rep.  217. 

fects  stripped  of  every  consideration  z  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  50. 

which   might  otherwile  mislead  or  SDeming  v.   Merch.    etc.    Co.,   90 

confuse  them.     How  this  duty  shall  Tenn.  306 ;  Summers  v.  Bergner  & 

be  performed  depends  upon  the  dis-  Eng.  Co.,  143  Pa.  St.   114;  Millott  v. 

cretion  of  the  judge.     Without  this  N.  Y.  &  N.  E.  R  Co.,  19  N.  Y.  S.  122 ; 

aid,  chance,  mistake  or  caprice  may  Colvin  v.  Peabody,  155  Mass.  104;  29 

determine  the  result."    Nudd  v.  Bur-  N.  E.  Rep.   59 :  Mullen   v.  Railroad 

rows,  91  U.  S.  439.  Co,,  21  N.  Y.  S.  101 ;  Murphy  v.  Rail- 

i  Cheever  v.  Sweet  (Mass.,  1890),  23  road   Co.,   62   Hun,   587 :  Gaynor  v. 

N.  E.  Rep.  831 ;  Leahey  v.  March,  155  Old  Colony  R  R,  100  Mass.  208;  Ly- 
3 


34      RELEVANCY  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JUUY.   [§  13. 

correct,  and  it  has  accordingly  been  held  that  if  the  court  in- 
structs the  jury  that  the  commission  or  omission  of  specific 
or  particular  acts  constitutes  negligence,  then  he  invades  the 
province  of  the  jury  by  drawing  inferences  of  fact  and  en- 
deavoring to  force  his  opinions  upon  them.1 

§13.  Preliminary  questions  of  fact  bearing  on  admissi- 
bility.—  To  ascertain  whether  evidence  is  admissible,  certain 
preliminary  questions  of  fact,  often  of  a  complex  nature,  must 
be  considered,  and  these  may,  it  is  settled,  be  decided  by  the 
court  unaided  by  the  jury.  Thus  it  is  for  the  judge  to  say 
whether  the  witness  is  qualified  to  testify  as  an  expert,2  and 
on  what  subjects  he  may  be  examined;3  whether  a  dying 
declaration  is  inadmissible  because  the  declarant  expected  to 
recover;4  and  to  decide  upon  the  authenticity  and  proper  exe- 
cution of  deeds  and  writings  generally.5  So  questions  as  to  the 
voluntary  nature  of  confessions,6  as  to  what  is  hearsay  evi- 
dence,7 the  admissibility  of  statements  claimed  to  constitute  a 
part  of  the  res  gestce,8  or  to  be  admissible  as  evidence  of 
pedigree,9  the  capacity  of  witnesses  to  testify,10  and  as  to 
the  admissibility  of  depositions  where  the  witness  cannot  be 

man  v.  Union  R.  R„  114  id.  83;  John-  care."     Galveston    City    R.    Co.    v. 

son  v.  Kelleher,  155  Mass.  125 ;  29  N.  Hewitt,  67  Tex.  478. 

E.   Rep.   200;  Nesbitt  v.   Greenville  *  Bridges  v.  North  London  Ry.  Co., 

(Miss..  1892S   10  S.  Rep.  452;  Wood  L.  R  7  H.  L.  213;  Avilla  v.  Nash,  117 

v.  Council,  143  Pa.  St.  467 ;  Butler  v.  Mass.  318 ;  Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v. 

Chicago  R.  R.  (Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Henrice,  92  Pa.  St  431. 

Rep.  208 ;  Payne  v.  Troy,  etc.  Co.,  83  2  See  §§  187, 188. 

N.  Y.  572;  Hodges  v.  St  Louis,  etc.  » Jones  v.  Tucker,  41   N.  H.   546; 

Co.,  71  Mo.  50;  Shafter  v.  Evans,  53  §  187. 

Cal.  32;  Savings,  etc.  Co.  v.  Phillips  *  See  post,  §§  100-113;  Hall  v.  Com. 

(Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  82;  Mason  (Va.,  1892),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  517;  Young 

v.  Atl.  Av.  R  R  Co.,  4  Misc.  R  291 ;  v.  State  (Ala.,  1892),  10  S.  Rep.  913. 

Hilton  v.  Ala.,  etc.  Co.,  12  S.   Rep.  STunstall   v.  Cobb,  109   N.  C.  316; 

276;  Kansas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  Collins  v.  Ball,  82  Tex.  259;  Com.  v. 

25  Kan.  391.     "What  facts  will  con-  Coe,  115  Mass.  481.     See  §  130. 

stitute  that  diligence  which  the  law  ''See  post,  §  90;  State   v.  Carson 

requires  must  depend  upon   the  cir-  (S.  C,  1892),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  588. 

cumstances  of  each  case.    The  omis-  "Harter  v.  Hopkins,  83  Wis.  309; 

sion  must  be  considered  in  relation  post,  §§  50-62. 

to  the  business  in  which  the  person  6Post,  §  54  et  seq. 

who  is   to  exercise  the  care  is  en-  9  Doe  v.  Davies,  10  Q.  B.  314 ;  post, 

gaged,  and  with  reference  to  the  per-  §  53. 

sons,    whether    adults    or    children,  ™  Post,  §§  313-317. 

who  may  be  injured  by  the  want  of 


§  13.]   RKLKVANOT  AND  PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE  AND  JURY.      35 

produced,1  are  for  the  court.  Upon  these  and  similar  questions 
of  fact  his  decision  is  final  unless  objected  and  excepted  to  at 
the  time  and  submitted  to  an  appellate  court  for  review  upon 
a  proper  bill  of  exceptions  in  which  the  evidence  is  fully  set 
forth.2  It  is  discretionary  with  the  judge,  however,  in  case 
the  proof  is  not  convincing,  to  submit  the  evidence  on  any  one 
of  these  preliminary  questions  to  the  jury;  and  where  the 
issue,  as  usually  happens,  is  one  of  mingled  law  and  fact,  he  is 
bound  to  advise  them  as  to  the  rules  of  law  involved  which  are 
obligator}'  upon  them  in  deciding  these  collateral  issues.3 

1  See  post,  §§  361-363 ;  Omaha  v.  22  S.  W.  Rep.  419 ;  Fleming  v.  Latham, 
Jensen,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  833 ;  Schind-  48  Kan.  773 ;  Farncomb  v.  Stern 
ler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Mich.  400.  (Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  612;  Jones 

2  State  v.  Pike,  49  N.  H.  399 ;  Mat-  v.  Charlotte,  etc.  (S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E. 
son  v.  Frazer,  48  Mo.  App.  302 ;  Rep.  698 ;  State  v.  Mitchell,  37  W.  Va. 
Haines  v.  Sairers,  93  Mich.  440;  Car-  565.     See  post,  §§  366-370. 

penter  v.  Willey  (Vt,  1893),  26  Atl.        3  See  ante,  §  12. 
Rep.  488 ;  Wells  v.  Burtz  (Tex.,  1893), 


CHAPTER  II. 


SUBSTANCE  OF  THE  ISSUE. 


18.  Matter  of  substance  and  of  es- 

sential description. 

19.  Allegations  of  value,  quantity, 

time,  place,  etc. 

20.  Formal  allegations. 

21.  Proof  of  contracts. 


§  22.  Variance  in  the  proof  of  sealed 
instruments. 

23.  Substance  of  the  issue  in  crimi- 

nal trials. 

24.  Variance. 


§  18.  Matter  of  substance  and  of  essential  description. — 

As  regards  the  amount  of  evidence  which  is  requisite  in  any 
case,  it  is  a  general  rule  that  it  is  necessary  only  that  the  sub- 
stance of  the  issue  should  be  proved.1  By  the  rules  of  plead- 
ing at  common  law,  matter  which  was  essentially  descriptive  — 
that  is,  which  identifies  the  subject-matter  on  which  the  cause 
of  action  is  based  —  must  be  literally  proved.  Any  variance, 
however  slight,  between  the  allegation  of  the  facts  in  the 
pleading  and  their  proof  would  be  fatal.  So  in  a  suit  to  re- 
cover damages  for  false  imprisonment,  a  failure  to  prove  that 
plaintiff  was  acquitted  on  the  precise  day  alleged  is  no  vari- 
ance if  the  substance  of  the  issue  —  *'.  e.,  the  acquittal  —  is 
proved.2  But  where  it  is  alleged  that  the  plaintiff  was  ar- 
rested uon  a  charge  of  larceny  and  for  stealing  an  ox,"  and 
it  is  proved  that  the  arrest  was  because  plaintiff  "  did  remove 
or  steal  one  ox  from  said  range,"  the  action  should  be  dis- 
missed because  of  a  material  variance  in  a  matter  of  essential 
description.3 


1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  56 ;  Sommer  v. 
Smith  (Cal.,  1892),  27  Pac.  Rep.  208 ; 
Vette  v.  Leonori,  42  Mo.  App.  217; 
Singleton  v.  O'Blenis,  125  Ind.  151; 
Cahill  v.  Colgan  (Cal.,  1893),  31  Pac. 
Rep.  614 ;  Scanlan  v.  Hodges,  52  Fed. 
Rep.  354 ;  Baxter  v.  Chicago,  R  I.  & 
P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  350;  Wellington  v.  Howard 
(Ind.,  1893),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  852;  Corn'rs 


v.  Lomax  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
800;  Hartsock  v.  Mort,  76  Md.  281; 
Ahern  v.  Telephone  Co.  (Oreg..  1893), 
33  Pac.  Rep.  403;  Olds  v.  Marshall 
(Ala..  1890),  8  S.  Rep.  284. 

2  Vail  v.   Lewis,   4  Johns.   450;  1 
Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  56. 

3  Thompson  v.   Richardson   (Ala., 
1893),  US.  Rep.  728. 


§   IS.]  SUBSTANCE    OF   THE    ISSUE.  37 

JSTo  general  test  can  be  given  by  which  it  can  always  be  ac- 
curately determined  whether  a  given  allegation  is  formal  or 
essentially  descriptive.  The  question  turns  largely  upon  the 
circumstances  of  each  case.  The  strict  rules  of  common-law 
pleading  have,  however,  been  greatly  relaxed  in  modern  times, 
and  an  extreme  particularity  of  proof  is  now  often  dispensed 
with,  provided  the  opposite  party  is  not  surprised  or  preju- 
diced thereby.1  Thus,  proof  that  the  plaintiff  jumped  from 
a  car  will  sustain  an  allegation  that  he  fell  from  one;2  while 
a  charge  that  he  was  injured  by  a  "rocket"  is  sustained  if  it 
be  shown  that  he  was  struck  by  a  bomb.3 

In  defining  matter  of  essential  description  we  must  first 
consider  does  the  allegation  narrow  or  limit  the  description 
of  something  which  is  necessary  to  the  cause  of  action.4  Thus 
of  contracts  either  parol  or  written  it  is  said  that  all  particu- 
lars of  time,  value,  person,  place,  size  and  name  are  essentiallv 
descriptive,  serving  to  identify  the  contract,  and  they  must 
generally  be  precisely  proved.5  So,  too,  the  allegation  of  the 
capacity  in  which  the  plaintiff  sues,  or  of  his  title,  is  usually 
descriptive  and  must  be  strictly  proved.8  Proof  of  ownership 
must  generally  correspond  precisely  with  the  allegation.7 

*See  §  24.  ville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hurt  (Ala..  1893),  13 

2  Gulf,  etc.   Co.  v.  Johnson  (Tex.,  S.  Rep.  130);  but  au  allegation  that 

1892).  19  S.  W.  Rep.  151.  a  horse  "  was   driven  at  a  furious 

3Colviu  v.  Peabody  (Mass.,  1892),  rate"  is  mere  surplusage  and  need 

29  N.  E.  Rep.  59.     For  similar  cases  not  be  proved.     Robbins  v.  Diggins 

of  immaterial  variance,  see  Carroll  (Iowa,    1889),    43    N.    W.    Rep.    306. 

v.    Water    Co.,    5    Wash.    St.    613;  Proof  that  an  injury  was  caused  by 

Bevens   v.    Barnett  (Ark.,    1893),   22  a  team  will  not  sustain  an  allegation 

S.  W.    Rep.    160 ;  Roe   v.    Cutter,   4  of  injury  by  machinery.    McPherson 

Wash.  St.  611;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  v.  Bridge  Co.  (Oregon,  1890),  26  Pac. 

Dolan,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  802 ;  Chicago,  Rep.  560. 

etc.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Ind.,  1893,',  33  N.  .     ■»  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  57. 

E.  Rep.  241 ;  Parsons  v.  Hughes,  62  5  Elting  v.  Dayton,  63  Hun,  629.; 

Hun,  621 ;  Paris,  etc.  Co.  v.  Greiner,  Higman  v.  Hood,  3  Ind.   App.  456 ; 

84  Tex.  443;  19  S.  W.  Rep.  564;  Lake  29  N.  E.  Rep.  1141 ;  Ternes  v.  Dunn, 

Shore  Ry.  Co.  v.  Hundt,  140  111.  525 ;  7  Utah,  497 ;  27  Pac.  Rep.  692 ;  Brown 

Ashman  v.  Flint,  etc.  Co.,  90  Mich.  v.  Rouse,  93  Cal.  237 ;  Weall  v.  King, 

567;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  645;  Norcross  v.  12  East,  452;  Ferguson  v.  Harwood, 

Weldon,    59    Vt.    50;    Struthers    v.  7  Cranch,  408,  413.     Con tra,  Kidder 

Drexel,  7  S.  Ct.  1293.     Wanton  neg-  v.  Vandersloot,  114  111.  133. 

ligeuce,    when    charged,     must    be  6 1  Greenl.  on   Evid.,   §  57,  citing 

proven   strictly  (Richmond,  etc.  Co.  Moises  v.  Thornton,  8  T.  R.   303,  308. 

v.  Farmer,  12  S.  Rep.  86.   Cf.  Louis-  *  Galveston,  etc.  Co.  v.  Becht  (Tex., 


38  SUBSTANCE    OF   THE    ISSUE.  [§  19. 

§  19.  Formal  allegations. —  Regarding  those  allegations  in 
a  pleading  which  are  formal  and  technical  merely,  as  the  alle- 
gation in  trover  that  plaintiff  lost  the  goods,  or  in  assumpsit 
that  he  promised  to  pay  for  them  what  they  were  worth,1  or 
the  allegation  in  an  indictment  for  homicide  that  death  was 
caused  by  some  particular  weapon  or  means,2  it  may  be  said 
that  though  by  a  general  denial  in  a  civil  action,  or  by  a  plea 
of  not  guilty  to  the  indictment,  they  are  put  directly  in  issue, 
they  are  not  generally  regarded  as  essentially  descriptive  and 
need  not  be  precisely  proved  as  alleged.3  In  trover  the  sub- 
stance of  the  issue  is  the  conversion  by  the  defendant,  and 
this  of  course  must  be  proved  substantially  as  alleged.  So  in 
a  trial  for  homicide,  if  the  killing  by  the  defendant  be  proved, 
the  proof  of  the  manner  of  the  killing,  so  long  as  it  agrees  in 
substance  with  that  alleged,  is  immaterial.4 

All  allegations  essentially  descriptive  must  be  proved,  no 
matter  what  their  form,  while  allegations  not  material  and 
having  no  bearing  on  the  issue  need  not  be  proved,  and  may 
and  should  be  regarded  as  surplusage,  though  alleged  with 
extreme  explicitness  and  formality.  But  allegations  not  es- 
sentially descriptive  may  be  made  so  by  their  connection  with 
those  that  are,  and  they  must  then  be  proved  as  alleged  if 
they  are  not  pleaded  with  a  videlicet.5  Thus  when  the  exact 
price  of  the  goods  is  alleged  in  an  action  for  a  breach  of  war- 
ranty, it  must  be  strictly  proved  unless  alleged  with  a  videlicet, 
when  the  form  of  the  allegation  would  be  that  the  sale  was  for 
a  valuable  consideration  videlicet,  to  wit,  for  $100.6     It  should 

1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  971.     Cf.  Union  » 1  Greenl.    on   Evid.,   §  60.     The 

Stock  Yards  v.  Gillespie,  137  U.S.  effect  of  this  word  as  used  in  a  plead- 

411 ;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Rolvink,  31  ing    is    to    show    that   the    pleader 

III.  App.  596.  does  not    undertake    to    prove   his 

1  Fairfax  F.  M.  Co.  v.  Chambers  allegations  precisely.  Stephen  on 
(Md.,  1893),  23  Atl.  Rep.  1024;  Math-  Pleading,  309;  1  Chitty  on  Pleading, 
ews  v.  Tappan,  6  Mo.  276.  261,  262,  348.     "A  '  viz.'  serves  to  give 

2  2  Russell  on  Crimes,  p.  711 ;  Turner  additional  particulars  of  time  or 
v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  54;  place  or  circumstances  explanatory 
Thomas  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  of  previous  statements  made  in  gen- 
Rep.  226;  Hernandez  v.  State  (Tex.,  eral  terms;  it  cannot  render  nugatory 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  972.  previous  specific  averments."   Lewis 

« Young  v.  Black,  7  Cranch  (U.  S),     v.  Hitchcock,  10  Fed.  Rep.  7. 
426 ;  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  59.  « 1  Greenl.  on    Evid.,   §  60,  citing 

*  See  §23.  Arnfield  v.  Bate,  3  M.  &  S.  173. 


§  20.]  SUBSTANCE    OF   THE    ISSUE.  39 

not  be  understood  that  a  variance  may  be  avoided,  or  exact 
proof  of  material  allegations  dispensed  with,  by  the  use  of 
the  v.'ord  videlicet}  In  pleading  unnecessary  averments  a 
party  may  sometimes,  uuless  he  plead  with  a  videlicet,  incur 
the  burden  of  proving  them  precisely  as  laid.2 

§  20.  Allegations  of  value,  quantity,  time,  place,  etc.— 
Among  allegations  which  are  often  considered  immaterial, 
and  of  which,  therefore,  strict  proof  is  not  required,  are  those 
of  time,3  place,4  value,  quantity  and  quality.5  So  in  an  action 
to  recover  damages  for  negligence,6  or  for  an  assault  to  the 
person,  the  details  of  the  time  and  place  of  its  occurrence  are 
immaterial,  except  where,  by  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  case, 
time  and  place  are  rendered  essential.7 

Averments  of  value,  as,  for  example,  of  the  amount  of  rent 
claimed  to  be  due,  or  of  the  value  of  goods  taken  in  trover, 
and  generally  of  matter  which  is  alleged  solely  in  aggravation 
of  damages,  and  which  does  not  involve  the  plaintiff's  right 
of  action,  need  not  be  precisely  proved.8  Sometimes  an  allega- 
tion of  place  may  be  material  and  require  to  be  strictly  proved. 
Thus,  when  the  declaration  in  an  action  to  recover  damages 
for  negligence  shows  that  plaintiff  was  a  passenger  between 
stations  A.  and  B.,  and  the  proof  shows  that  he  was  a  pas- 
senger from  C.  to  D.,  between  which  stations  A.  and  B.  were 
located,  the  variance  will  be  fatal.9 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  60.  Nat   Bank  v.   Stephenson,   82  Tex. 

2 1  Greenl.   on   Evid.,   §  60,  citing  435 :  Holman  v.  Pleasant  Grove  City, 

Grimwood  v.  Barrit,  6  T.  R.  460 ;  Brug-  30  Pac.  Rep.  72. 

nier  v.  United  States,  1  Dak.  9 ;  Twiss  *  Brown   v.  Sullivan,  71  Tex.   470; 

v.  Baldwin,  9  Conn.  292 ;  State  v.  Mur-  St.  Louis  Railway  Co.   v.  Turner,  1 

phy,  55  Vt  549 ;  Panton  v.  Holland,  Tex.   Civ.    App.    625 ;    McCaslin    v. 

17  Johns.   92;    Vowles  v.   Miller,  3  Lake  Shore  R.  R  Co.,  93  Mich.  553; 

Taunt  137 ;  Gould  on  Pleadings,  58,  Georgia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Miller  (Ga.,  1893), 

Bees.  35-41.  16  S.  E.  Rep.  939 ;  Lake  Shore,  etc. 

3Halfin  v.  Winkleman,  18  S.  W.  Co.  v.  Hundt  (111.,  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep 

Rep.   443 ;  Ericksen  v.   Schuster,  44  458 ;  Rockford  v.  Hollenbeck,  34  I1L 

Minn.  441 ;  Lasater  v.  Van  Hook,  77  App.  40. 

Tex.  650 ;  St  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Evans,  5  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  61. 

78    id.   369 ;    Ridenhour    v.   Kansas  6  See  notes  3  and  4,  supra. 

City   Cable  Ry.   Co.,    102    Mo.    270;  1  Phettiplace    v.  N.  Pac.  Ry.    Co. 

Hudson  v.  Hudson  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  (Wis.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  1092. 

E  Rep.  349 ;  Devlin  v.  Boyd.  69  Hun,  8  Hutchins  v.  Adams,  3  Greenl.  174. 

328;  James  v.  Work,  24  N.  Y.  S.  149;  Cf.  Ross  v.  Malone  (Ala,  1892),  12  S. 

Russell    v.   Bradley.   47    Kan.    438;  Rep.  182. 

Drown  v.  Forrest  63  Vt  557 ;  First  s  Wabash,   etc.    Co.    v.    Friedman 


40 


SUBSTANCE    OF    THE    ISSUE. 


[§  2L 


§  21.  Proof  of  contracts. —  A  written  contract,  in  cases 
not  within  the  statute  of  frauds,1  is  not  required  to  be  proved 
unless  it  is  set  out  in  the  pleadings.2  If  a  contract,  whether 
oral  or  written,  is  pleaded,  it  must  be  substantially  proved  as 
alleged,  particularly  as  to  those  portions  by  which  an  obliga- 
tion is  created,  including  all  circumstances  relating  to  consid- 
eration, time  and  mode  of  performance.3  Proof  of  an  alter- 
native or  conditional  contract  will  not  support  an  allegation 
of  one  which  is  absolute;4  nor  will  proof  of  one  that  is  abso- 
lute sustain  an  averment  of  one  in  the  alternative.5  An  alle- 
gation of  an  implied  contract  will  be  supported  by  proof  of 
an  express  one,6  though  a  declaration  alleging  money  had  and 
received,  it  has  been  held,  is  not  sustained  by  proof  of  a 
promise  to  pay  money.7 

The  consideration,  with  all  attendant  details,  should  be 
pleaded ;  and  where  this  is  done,  the  party  will  be  held  to 
prove  the  consideration  strictly  as  it  is  alleged.8  Accord- 
ingly, proof  of  an  agreement  to  pay  a  fixed  and  definite  sum 
will  not  sustain  an  allegation  of  a  contract  to  pay  merely 
what  is  reasonable.9 


(111.,  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep.  353.  See, 
also,  Montezuma  v.  Wilson  (Ga.,  1889), 
9  S.  E.  Rep.  17;  Whitney  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co.  (S.  C,  1893),  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  147 ;  Hood  v.  Pioneer  M. 
&  M.  Co.  (Ala.,  1892),  11  S.  Rep.  10. 
A  defendant  is  entitled  to  judgment 
if  he  proves  one  of  several  pleas  iu 
bar,  though  lie  fails  to  prove  the 
other.   Leiter  v.  Day,  35  111.  App.  248. 

>  See  2>ost,  §g  261-270. 
'  2  Hemminger  v.  West.  Ass.  Co. 
(Mich.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  949; 
Soaps  v.  Eiltberg,  42  111.  App.  375 ; 
Hansen  v.  Hale.  44  id.  474 ;  Hargrove 
v.  Adcock,  111  N.  C.  166. 

8  Le  Baron  v.  United  States,  4 
Wall.  642.  A  writing  is  admissible 
to  prove  the  contract  alleged,  though 
not  alleged  to  be  in  writing.  Fiedler 
\.  Stone,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  340. 

4 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  58 ;  Saxton  v. 
Johnson,  14  Johns.  418;  Alexander 
v.  Harris,  4  Cranch^  299 ;  Baylies  v. 


Fettyplace,   7  Mass.    325;    Lower  v. 
Conyers,  7  Cow.  263. 

5  Browning  v.  Berry,  107  N.  C.  231. 
An  allegation  of  a  joint  loan  is  not 
supported  by  proof  of  a  loan  to  one. 
York  v.  Fortenbury,  15  Colo.  129. 

6  Ashton  v.  Shepherd  (Ind.,  1890), 
22  N.  E.  Rep.  98. 

7  Clark  v.  Sherman,  5  Wash.  St. 
681. 

s  Bromley  v.  Goff,  75  Me.  213; 
Benson  v.  Dean,  40  Minn.  455 ;  Rob- 
inson Con.  Coal  Co.  v.  Johnson,  22 
Pac.  Rep.  459. 

9  Cleaves  v.  Lord,  3  Gray  (Mass.), 
66,  71.  Nor  is  an  agreement  to  pay 
money  sustained  by  proof  of  a  prom- 
ise to  deliver  goods.  Titus  v.  Ash, 
24  N.  H.  319.  A  landlord  cannot  re- 
cover for  goods  furnished  a  tenant 
in  a  suit  for  the  rent.  Atkinson  v. 
Cox  (Ark.,  1890),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  124. 
But  where  a  contract  of  hiring  at  a 
stipulated   rate  is   alleged,   plaintiff 


§  22.]  SUBSTANCE    OF    THE    ISSUE.  41 

If  the  consideration,  though  containing  more  than  one 
promise,  be  entire,  it  must  be  proved  as  alleged.  So  a  party 
cannot  allege  that  he  has  agreed  to  do  one  thing  and  recover 
by  proving  that  he  has  performed  some  act  of  a  distinct 
character.  Accordingly,  proof  that  one  agreed  to  finish  a 
ship  will  not  sustain  an  allegation  that  he  promised  to  build 
one;1  nor  will  proof  that  he  delivered  spruce  lumber  sustain 
a  contract  to  deliver  pine.  An  allegation  of  a  note  pa}'able 
without  defalcation  or  discount  is  not  sustained  by  proving 
one  payable  "without  defalcation.1'2  But  a  plaintiff,  though 
he  cannot  sue  in  tort  and  recover  on  contract,  may  recover 
for  a  wrong  which  is  alleged  and  proved,  though  in  the  same 
action  he  sue  on  a  contract  which  he  fails  to  prove.3 

§  22.  Variance  in  the  proof  of  sealed  instruments. —  Ac- 
cording to  the  rules  of  common-law  pleading,  where  a  deed  is 
pleaded  according  to  its  tenor  —  that  is,  by  setting  out  an 
exact  copy  in  full  —  every  part  so  stated  was  regarded  as 
essentially  descriptive,  and  it  was  required  to  be  literally 
proved  in  every  particular.  In  the  absence  of  a  statutory 
power  of  amendment,  a  variance  was  fatal.4  But  when  a  deed 
or  other  instrument  is  pleaded  according  to  legal  effect  — i.  e., 
where  the  purport  only  is  set  out  —  the  same  preciseness  of 
proof  is  not  required,  and  proof  of  a  deed  conforming  in  sub- 
stance and  legal  effect  with  the  allegation  will  suffice,  though 
a  verbal  variance  exists.5  When  oyer  of  the  deed,  or  its 
modern  equivalent,  the  production  of  the  deed  or  a  copy  of  it 
in  court,  is  claimed,  the  party  has  a  right  to  a  verbatim  copy, 
though  at  this  day,  in  consequence  of  the  very  liberal  con- 
struction of  the  statutes  of  amendment,  any  discrepancy  not 
going  to  the  merits  of  the  case  would  be  disregarded.6 

may  recover  the  fair  value  of  his  guson  v.  Harwood,  7Cranch,  408, 413; 

services,  though  he  fail  to  prove  the  Bowditch  v.  Mawley,  1  Campb.  195 ; 

rate  alleged,  if  a  promise  to  pay  can  People   v.   Warner,    5    Wend.    273* 

be  implied  from  the  circumstances.  Sheehy  v.  Mandeville,  7  Cranch,  208: 

Miller  v.  Eldrtdge,  126  Ind.  461.  United  States  v.  Le  Baron,  40  Wall. 

i  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  68.  642.     See  post,    "  Private  writings," 

2  Addis  v.  Van   Buskirk,   4  Zabr.  g  125  et  seq. 

218 ;  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  68.  5  Whitlock  v.  Ramsey,  2  Munf.  510 ; 

sCrothers  v.  Acock,  43  Mo.  App.  Ankerstein  v.  Clarke,  4  T.  R.  616. 

818.  6  See  post,  §  126 ;  Goodbub  v.  Schee- 

4 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  69,  citing  Fer-  ler,  3  Ind.  App.  318;  Glacier  Mount 


42  SUBSTANCE    OF    THE    ISSUE.  [§  23. 

§  23.  Substance  of  the  issue  in  criminal  trials. —  Whether 
greater  strictness  of  proof  is  required  in  criminal  than  in  civil 
proceedings  in  favor  of  life  and  liberty  is  a  question  upon 
which  a  diversity  of  opinion  is  found.1  But  no  variance  will 
be  deemed  to  exist  if  the  indictment  is  separable  and  the  sub- 
stance of  the  offense  is  proven,  though  certain  averments 
which  are  not  material  remain  unproved.2  Thus,  where  sev- 
eral fraudulent  misrepresentations  are  alleged  in  a  prosecu- 
tion for  obtaining  money  or  goods  by  false  pretenses,  it  will 
be  enough  to  prove  a  material  part  of  them.3  So,  too,  it  has 
been  held  that  larceny  may  be  proven  on  the  trial  of  an  in- 
dictment for  burglary,4  or  robbery  from  the  person.5 

All  the  circumstances  of  person,  place  or  thing  which  are 
described  in  an  indictment  with  extreme  or  unnecessary  par- 
ticularity must  be  proven  strictly,  where  by  such  a  course  of 
pleading  these  details  are  essential  to  describe  its  identity  to 
the  jury.  So  where  one  is  indicted  for  stealing  a  horse  which 
is  described  either  by  color,  age  or  brand,  these  averments  are 
material,  and  a  variance  is  fatal.6     In  a  prosecution  for  an  as- 

James    v.   Walrath,   8    Johns.    410;  things  without  proof  of  the  commis- 

Silver  Mining  Co.  v.  Willis,  127  U.  S.  sion  of  the  others."    Bork  v.  People,  91 

480;    Dorr  v.   Fenno,  12  Pick.  521;  N.  Y.  13;  State  v.  Gray,  29  Minn.  144. 
Clifford  v.  Mayer  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.        3  pe0ple  v.  Haynes,  11  Wend.  (N. 

E.  Rep.   127.     Cf  Toledo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Y.)  565;    Beasley   v.  State,   59  Ala. 

Harnsberger,  41  111.  App.  494.  20;  Com.  v.   Morrill,  62  Mass.  571; 

1  Beech's  Case,  1  Leach  Cas.  158;  State  v.  Vorback,  66  Mo.  168;  State 
United  States  v.  Porter,  3  Day,  283,  v.  Dunlop,  24  Me.  77. 

286,  cited  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  65,  4  Barlow  v.  State,  77  Ga.  448.     Cf. 

maintain  that  the  rules  of  evidence  Groves  v.  State,  76  Ga.  808;  State  v. 

are  the  same;  but  see,  contra,  2  Rus-  Colclough,  31  S.  C.  156;  Kennegar  v. 

sell  on  Crimes,  588 ;  Roscoe's  Crim.  State,  120  Ind  176. 

Ev.   73;  United  States  v.   Button,  2  5  State  v.  Keeland,  90  Mo.  237. 

Mason,  464;  Kline  v.  Baker,  106  Mass.  6  Coleman  v.   State  (Tex.,  1887),  2 

161.    See  Walker  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  S.  W.  Rep.  859;  State  v.  Jackson,  30 

10  S.  Rep.  401.  Me.  29 ;  Wiley  v.  State,  74  Ga.  840 ; 

2  Finney  v.  State,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  175.  Sweat  v.  State,  4  Tex.  App.  617 ; 
"  Wbere  an  offense  may  be  commit-  Groom  v.  State,  23  id  83.  When  a 
ted  by  doing  any  one  of  several  statutory  distinction  is  *iade  between 
things,  the  indictment  may  in  a  sin-  the  species  of  any  animal,  proof  of 
gle  count  group  them  together  and  one  is  a  variance  if  another  species 
charge  the  defendant  with  having  was  alleged.  State  v.  Buckles,  26 
committed  them  all,  and  a  convic-  Kan.  237 ;  Marshall  v.  State,  31  Tex 
tion  may  be  had  of  any  one  of  those  471.    So  an  allegation  of  stealing  an 


§  23.] 


6URSTANCE    OF    TIIE    ISSUE. 


43 


sauit,  its  date,1  or  the  locality2  where  it  was  committed,  need 
not  be  precisely  proved,  as  such  facts  do  not  constitute  essen- 
tial elements  of  the  crime.3  But  where  place  or  time  is  mate- 
rial, as  in  a  prosecution  for  selling  liquor  between  specified 
dates,4  or  for  transporting  liquors  between  two  given  points,5 
the  particulars  of  time  and  place  must  be  precisely  proved. 
A  variance  between  the  allegation  of  the  name  of  a  person 
and  the  proof,  whether  it  be  that  of  the  person  upon  whom 
an  assault  was  committed  or  of  whose  murder  the  accused 
stands  charged,  or  who  was  the  owner  of  the  property  stolen, 
has  often  been  held  fatal.6  But  a  mere  error  in  spelling,  or 
the  use  of  a  nickname,  is  not  a  variance ;  and  if  the  names  be 
idem  sonans,  or  if  sufficient  evidence  can  be  introduced  to 
identify  the  person,  an  immaterial  variance  of  name  will  be 
disregarded.' 


animal  is  not  supported  by  proof  of 
the  theft  of  the  carcass.  Hunt  v. 
State,  55  Ala.  138. 

i  Cross  v.  State,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1096. 
Cf.  People  v.  Formosa,  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
492 ;  131  N.  Y.  47S.  Generally,  unless 
time  or  place  is  an  element  in  the 
nature  of  or  is  made  part  of  the  stat- 
utory description  of  a  crime,  it  need 
not  be  strictly  proven  though  alleged, 
provided  the  offense  is  shown  to  have 
been  committed  prior  to  the  date  of 
the  indictment  and  witliin  the  juris- 
diction. Arcia  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 
198;  State  v.  Dorr,  82  Me.  212;  Jack- 
son v.  State,  88  Ga  787;  Clark  v. 
State,  16  S.  E.  Rep.  96;  Com.  v. 
Riggs,  14  Gray,  376;  Burge  v.  State, 
62  Ga.  170.  Contra,  Callahan  v.  State, 
41  Tex.  439  (theft  from  a  house); 
Com.  v.  Lester,  129  Mass.  101;  People 
v.  Honeyman,  3  Den.  121;  State  v. 
Porter,  10  Rich.  (S.  C.)  145;  Com.  v. 
Laugh lin,  11  Cush.  598, 

^  Blackvvell  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
416;  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1061. 

3  See  Com.  v.  Keefe,  140  Mass.  301 ; 
Weineck  v.  State  (Neb.,  1892),  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  307  (placing  obstruction  on 
railroad  track). 


*  Com.  v.  Purdy,  146  Mass.  138. 

5  State  v.  Libbey,  84  Me.  461. 

6  King  v.  State,  44  Ind.  285 ;  People 
v.  Hughes,  41  Cal.  234 ;  Underwood 
v.  State,  72  Ala.  220 ;  Henley  v.  Com., 
1  Bush  (Ky.),  11;  State  v.  Gafbery, 
12  La.  Ann.  265;  State  v.  Taylor,  15 
Kan.  420,  514;  Humbard  v.  State,  21 
Tex.  App.  200 ;  Lewis  v.  State  (Ga., 
1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  697 ;  Owens  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  558; 
Com.  v.  Morningstar,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R 
34 ;  Clements  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App. 
258 ;  Wade  v.  State,  10  S.  Rep.  233 ; 
Sykes  v.  People  (111.,  1891),  23  N.  E. 
Rep.  391. 

f  Kennedy  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  250 
State  v.   Humble,  34  Ma  App.  343 
Watzel   v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  523 
Martin  v.  State,  28  id.  364 ;  State  v. 
Bain,  43  Kan.  638 ;  State  v.  Flack,  48 
Kan.  146 ;  Young  v.  State,  17  S.  W. 
Rep.  413;  30  Tex.  App.  308;  Com.  v. 
Caponi,  155  Mass.  534 ;  30  N.  E  Rep. 
82;    Com.    v.   Beckley,   3   Mete.   330 
("Jr.,"  "Sr."  or  "Mrs."  no  part  of  a 
name);  State  v.  Best,   12  S.  E.  Rep. 
907 ;  Com.  v.  Gould  (Mass.,  1893),  33 
N.  E.  Rep.  656 ;  Rogers  v.  State  (Ga., 
1893),   16   S.   E.   Rep.    205;  State  v. 


44 


SUBSTANCE    OF    THE    ISSUE. 


[§23. 


The  substance  and  essence  of  homicide  being  the  felonious 
killing  by  means  of  shouting,  cutting,  etc.,  proof  of  a  killing 
in  any  manner  that  substantially  conforms  to  the  description 
is  sufficient,  and  the  details  or  identity  of  the  offense  need  not 
be  precisely  proved  as  alleged.1  Thus  proof  of  killing  by 
shooting  with  a  pistol  will  sustain  an  indictment  for  killing 
with  a  sun:2  and  an  averment  that  one  was  killed  with  a 
bowie-knife  is  sufficiently  sustained  by  proof  that  he  was  slain 
with  a  butcher-knife.3  An  indictment  for-  the  larceny  of 
chickens,4  a  cow,5  or  of  a  sheep,6  or  horse,7  or  hog,8  will  be  sus- 
tained by  proof  of  the  larceny  of  any  variety  or  sex  of  those 
animals.  But  where  the  allegation  is  that  bank-notes9  or 
promissory  notes,10  greenbacks ll  or  "  money  " 12  were  stolen,  the 
proof  must  correspond  with  the  allegation,  and  any  material 
variance  will  be  fatal.  But  an  indictment  for  stealing  $30  in 
money  is  sufficiently  sustained  by  proof  that  three  ten-dollar 
bills  were  taken.13  Where  one  is  indicted  for  perjury  in  court, 
not  only  must  the  term  of  the  court  be  strictly  proved,14  but 


Brin,  30  Minn.  522 ;  Elberson  v.  Rich- 
ards, 42  N.  J.  L.  70. 

1 "  In  an  indictment  any  allegation 
not  descriptive  of  the  identity  of  the 
offense  which  can  be  omitted  with- 
out affecting  the  charge,  and  with- 
out detriment  to  the  complaint,  may 
be  treated  as  surplusage  and  need 
not  be  proved."  Commonwealth  v. 
Rowell,  146  Mass.  130. 

2  Turner  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  12 
S.  Rep.  54.  Proof  of  strangling  with 
a  scarf  is  sufficient  where  strangling 
with  the  hands  was  alleged.  Thomas 
v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 
226 ;  Rex  v.  Waters,  7  C.  &  P.  250. 

■i  Hernandez  v.  State,  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
972.  C/.  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush. 
321 ;  Com.  v.  McLaughton,  105  Mass. 
460.  See,  also,  Rodgers  v.  State,  50 
Ala.  102;  Witt  v.  State,  6  Cold. 
(Tenn.)  5 ;  State  v.  Smith,  32  Me.  369 ; 
State  v.  Lautenschlager,  22  Minn. 
514;  State  v.  Kilgore,  70  Mo.  546; 
State  v.  Fox,  25  N.  J.  L.  256 ;  State 


v.  Gould,  90  N.  C.  380;  People  v. 
Holt,  3  Hill  (N.  Y.),  432 ;  Goodwin  v. 
State,  12  Miss.  520.  Of.  Guedel  v. 
People,  43  III.  226.  Allegations  as  to 
place  or  nature  of  wounds  are  gen- 
erally immaterial.  Com.  v.  Coy 
(Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  4;  State 
v.  Waller,  88  Mo.  402;  Nelson  v. 
State,  1  Tex.  App.  41 ;  Bryan  v.  State, 
19  Fla.  364. 

4  State  v.  Bassett,  34  La.  Ann.  1108. 

5  Parker  v.  State,  39  Ala  365. 
6McCully's  Case,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  272; 

Reg.  v.  Spicer,  1  Den.  C.  C.  82. 

•Davis  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  210. 

sState  v.  Gordet,  7  Ired.  (N.  C.)  210. 

9  Pomeroy  v.  Com.,  2  Va.  Cas.  343. 
1«  Stewart  v.  State,  62  Md.  412. 
ii  State  v.  Collins,  72  N.  C.  144. 

12  Lancaster   v.  State,  9  Tex.  App. 
393. 

13  Roth  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App.  7. 

«  United  States  v.  Neal,  1  Gall.  387; 
Rex  v.  Leefe,  2  Campb.  134,  140. 


§  24:.]  SUBSTANCE    OF   THE    ISSUE.  45 

the  title  of  the  action,1  and  the  exact  time  of  the  day,  must  be 
proved  with  extreme  particularity.2 

§24.  Variance  —  Amendments. —  Variance  in  the  law  of 
evidence  maybe  defined  as  a  disagreement  between  an  allega- 
tion in  a  pleading  and  the  facts  proved  to  support  it  which  is 
of  such  a  nature  that  the  claim  made  is  not  supported.3 

In  order  to  determine  whether  a  material  variance  exists, 
the  essential  facts  and  principles  constituting  together  the 
proposition  of  law  involved,  and  which  are  indispensable  to 
show  the  legal  right  of  the  pleader,  must  be  ascertained.  Hav- 
ing arrived  at  a  clear  determination  of  the  principles  and  facts, 
everything  else  is  mere  surplusage  and  may  be  disregarded  as 
not  needing  proof. 

By  statute  in  England,  and  in  almost  all  of  the  states  of  the 
Union,  the  courts  are  vested  with  power  to  grant  amend- 
ments to  the  record  in  all  cases  where  a  variance  exists  be- 
tween the  allegations  in  the  pleadings  and  the  proof,  on  such 
terms  as  may  seem  reasonable  to  the  court,  provided  the 
rights  of  neither  party  are  prejudiced  thereby.4  The  party 
at  fault  will  usually  be  required  to  pay  the  costs  of  the  pro- 
ceedings which   are   invalidated   by  the   amendment.5     The 

1  Walker  v.  State  (Ala,  1893),  11  matter  which  in  point  of  law  is  es- 
S.  Rep.  401.  Cf.  Wohlgemuth  v.  sential  to  the  charge  or  claim.*' 
United  States  (N.  M.,  1893),  30  Pac.  Anderson's  Law  Diet. ;  House  v. 
Rep.  854.  Metcalf,  27  Conn.  63S. 

2  Reg.  v.  Bird,  17  Cox's  Cr.  C.  387.  4  Sandford  Tool  Co.  v.  Mullen  (Ind., 
As  to  variance  in  the  crime  of  for-  1890).  27  N.  E.  Rep.  448;  Dexter  v. 
gery,  see  Wilson  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893),  Ivins,  133  N.  Y.  986;  Listman  v. 
12  S.  Rep.  332 ;  State  v.  Gryder,  44  Hickey,  65  Hun,  8 ;  19  N.  Y.  S.  880 ; 
La.  Ann.  962;  Simms  v.  State  (Tex.,  Evarts  v.  United  States  M.  Ace.  Ins. 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  876.  Co.,  61  Hun,  624;  Taylor  v.  Arnold 

3  Stephen  on  PL,  107,  108;  House  (Ky.,  1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  361;  Cain 
v.  Metcalf,  27  Conn.  638 ;  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Cody  (Cal.,  1892),  29  Pac.  Rep.  778 ; 
v.  Hubbard,  86  Ga.  623;  Dennis  v.  Cargain  v.  Everett,  62  Hun,  620; 
Spencer,  45  Minn.  250 ;  Haughey  v.  Walton  v.  Jones,  7  Utah,  462 ;  27 
Joyce,  41  Mo.  App.  564;  Richards  v.  Pac.  Rep.  580;  Denham  v.  Bryant, 
Green  (Ariz.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  266;  139  Mass.  110. 

Becker  v.  Baurngartner  (111.,  1893),  32  SBausch  v.  Ingersoll,  61  Hun,  627; 

N.  E.  Rep.  786 ;  Mobile,  etc.   Co.   v.  Keeler  v.  Shears,  6  Wend.  540 ;  Woods 

George  (Ala.,   1892),   10  S.  Rep.  145 ;  v.  Durett,  28  Tex.  429 ;  McClellan  v. 

Atkinson  v.  Cox  (Ark.,  1892),  16  S.  W.  Osborne,   51   Me.    118.      No  amend- 

Rep.  124.    "A  disagreement  between  ment  will  be  allowed  which  will  add 

the  allegations  and  the  proof  in  some  or  substitute  a  new  cause  of  action 


46 


SUBSTANCE    OF    TIIE    ISSUE. 


[§24. 


power  to  allow  amendments  is  wholly  discretionary,  and  is 
usually  not  reviewable  unless  in  the  case  of  its  manifest 
abuse.1  If,  however,  the  adverse  party  has  been  actually  mis- 
led to  his  prejudice2  in  maintaining  the  action  or  defense 
upon  its  merits,  the  variance  will  be  deemed  material  and  the 
court  will  refuse  permission  to  amend.3  The  variance  must 
be  taken  advantage  of  by  specific  objection  clearly  pointing 
it  out  at  some  period  before  final  judgment  that  it  may  re- 
ceive consideration  before  it  shall  have  been  aided  by  the  ver- 
dict.4 Though  contributory  negligence  should  be  specially 
pleaded,  if  the  parties  proceed  to  a  trial  of  the  issue  on  that 
point  in  a  case  where  defendant  does  not  plead  it,  it  will  be 
deemed  waived.5 


or  a  new  defense  (Wilkinson  v. 
Wilkinson,  59  Wis.  64;  Ward  v.  Pat- 
ton,  75  Ala.  207 ;  Freeman  v.  Grant, 
132  N.  Y.  33;  Tatham  v.  Ramey,  82 
Pa.  St.  120;  Switzer  v.  Claflin,  82 
Tex.  513;  Shearer  v.  Middleton,  88 
Mich.  621 ;  White  v.  Mass,  75  Ala. 
207;  Carpenter  v.  Huffsteller,  87  N. 
C.  273 ;  Snyder  v.  Harper,  24  W.  Va. 
206 ;  Shenandoah  V.  R.  v.  Griffith.  76 
Va.  913 ;  Culp  v.  Steare,  47  Kan.  746 ; 
Brodeck  v.  Hirschfield,  57  Vt  12; 
Galbreath  v.  Newton,  45  Mo.  App. 
312) ;  though  usually  the  form  of  the 
action  may  be  changed  under  the 
statutes  allowing  amendments.  Red- 
strake  v.  Insurance  Co.,  44  N.  J.  Eq. 
294.  Cf.  Moseley  v.  Richmond,  etc. 
Co.,  87  Ga.  747. 

i  Brady  v.  Casidy,  13  N.  Y.  S.  824; 
Gormly  v.  Bringam,  138  N.  Y.  623 ; 
Bondur  v.  Le  Bourne,  79  Me.  21 ;  Greer 
v.  Covington  (Ky.,  1887),  2  S.  W.  Rep. 
323 ;  Randall  v.  Baird  (Mich.,  1887), 
33  N.  W.  Rep.  506. 

2  That  a  party  has  been  prejudiced 
should  be  shown  by  affidavit  in  the 
trial  court  Ridenhour  v.  Kansas 
City,  eta  Co.,  102  Mo.  270. 

3Zeininger  v.  Schnitzler,  48  Kan. 
66;  Hall  v.  Roberts,  63  Hun,  473; 
Crane  v.  Ring,  48  Kan.  61 ;  Crothers 


v.  Acock,  43  Mo.  App.  318;  Rozet  v. 
Harvey,  26  111.  App.  558 ;  Robbins  v. 
Diggins  (Iowa.  1890),  43  N.  W.  Rep. 
306;  Northern  P.  etc.  Co.  v.  O'Brien 
(Wash.,  1890),  21  Pac.  Rep.  32 ;  Chew- 
acla  Works  v.  Dismukes,  87  Ala.  344 ; 
Brown  v.  Sullivan,  71  Tex.  470. 

*See  post,  §  232;  Walhch  v.  Mor- 
gan, 39  Mo.  App.  469 ;  Henry  v.  Diet- 
rich, 7  N.  Y.  S.  505;  Richards  v. 
Bestor,  90  Ala,  352 ;  O'Conner  v.  De- 
lany  (Minn.,  1893),  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
1108;  McCormick  H.  Co.  v.  Burandt, 
23  N.  E.  Rep.  588;  Tall  man  v.  Earley, 
13  N  Y.  S.  805;  Tognini  v.  Kyle,  17 
Nev.  209 ;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bethel, 
42  111.  App.  475;  Long  v.  Campbell, 
37  W.  Va.  665.  This  is  provided  for 
by  statute  in  many  of  the  states. 
Salmon  Bank  v.  Leyser,  22  S.  W. 
Rep.  504.  See  Brace  v.  Doble  (S.  .D., 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  859;  Upham  v. 
Draper  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  2; 
Sheppard  v.  Newhall,  54  Fed.  Rep.  306. 
Variance  cannot  be  shown  on  appeal. 
In  re  Lincoln,  19  Fed.  Rep.  460; 
Wasatch  Min.  Co.  v.  Crescent  Miu. 
Co.,  147  U.  S.  293;  Perry  v.  Plunket, 
74  Me.  328 ;  Liddell  v.  Fisher,  48  Mo. 
App.  449. 

5  Railroad  Co.  v.  Farmer  (Ala,, 
1893;,  12  S.  Rep.  86,  89,  432. 


CHAPTER  III. 


PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  EVIDENCE. 


§  30.  Primary  and    secondary   evi- 
dence distinguished. 

31.  Instruments    required  by  law 

to  be  in  writing. 

32.  Disputed  writings. 

33.  Contracts    and  other  transac- 

tions   actually    reduced    to 
writing. 

34.  Collateral  writings. 


§  35.  Exceptions  in  the  case  of  rec- 
ords and  appointments  to 
office. 

36.  Exceptions  in  the  case  of  evi- 

dence of  general  results. 

37.  Admissions    as    primary    evi- 

dence. 

38.  Photographs    as    primary  evi- 

dence. 

39.  Exhibition  of  articles  in  court 


§  30.  Primary  and  secondary  evidence  distinguished. — 

The  rule  requiring  the  introduction  of  the  best  evidence  has 
reference  generally  to  offers  of  oral  evidence  to  prove  tha 
contents  of  a  writing  where  the  writing  itself  should  be  pro- 
duced.1 The  rule  does  not  require  the  production  of  the 
strongest  and  most  convincing  evidence,  so  that  no  principle 
of  law  is  violated  by  the  production  of  faint  or  weak  evi- 
dence, and  the  withholding  of  that  which  is  stronger,  more 
cogent  and  convincing,  so  long  as  both  are  equally  original.2 
But  it  is  a  natural  inference,  in  the  absence  of  explanatory 
circumstances,  that  a  party  who  is  withholding  the  best  evi- 
dence of  any  fact  in  issue  does  so  with  a  wrong  motive  which 
would  be  defeated  by  its  production.3  When,  therefore,  evi- 
dence is  produced  that  presupposes  the  existence  of  other  evi- 
dence to  the  same  facts  of  a  more  original  character,  which  is 


1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  82. 

2  Ellsworth  v.  Insurance  Co.,  105 
N.  Y.  624;  Anglo-Am.  P.  &  P.  Co. 
v.  Cannon,  31  Fed.  Rep.  313 ;  Rich- 
ardson v.  Milburn,  17  Md.  67;  Mc- 
Creary  v.  Turk.  29  Ala.  244 ;  Wynn 
v.  City,  etc.  R.  R  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  649 ;  Norton  v.  East  St.  Louis,  36 
111.  App.  371.  A  party  is  not  under 
the  necessity  of  calling  a  particular 


witness  upon  the  ground  that  his 
testimony  is  the  best  evidence  if  he 
choose  to  produce  other  evidence 
equally  original.  N.  E.  Mon.  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  144  Pa.  St.  61. 

3 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  82,  citing 
Taylor  v.  Riggs,  1  Pet  591,  596 ;  Minor 
v.  Tillotson,  7  Pet.  100.  Cf.  Reich  v. 
Berdel,  120  111.  499;  11  N.  E.  Rep. 
912. 


48  PKIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  [§  3d. 

more  immediate,  and  which  lies  closer  to  the  facts  which  are 
in  issue,  the  evidence  produced  will  be  regarded  as  substitu- 
tionary, and,  as  such,  will  be  rejected. 

The  principle  by  which  the  best  evidence  is  demanded  is  the 
basis  for  the  common  division  of  evidence  into  primary  and 
secondary.1  Primary  evidence  of  any  fact  may  be  defined  as 
the  highest  or  best  evidence  which  from  the  nature  of  the  fact 
in  the  abstract  can  be  procured,  and  which  in  the  circum- 
stances of  the  particular  case  affords  the  greatest  certainty  of 
the  fact  or  renders  the  probability  of  its  existence  most 
apparent  to  the  mind.  It  is  such  evidence  as  does  not  indi- 
cate the  existence  of  any  other  evidence  which  is  less  remote 
to  the  facts  to  be  proved.2  Thus  the  primary  evidence  of  a 
written  instrument  is  the  writing  itself,  and  unless  it  be  shown 
that  the  party  claiming  thereunder,  after  a  diligent  search,  is 
unable  to  produce  it,  no  other  evidence  of  its  contents  will  be 
admitted.3  So  where  a  letter,  if  producible,  is  primary  evi- 
dence of  any  relevant  fact,  press  copies  of  the  letter  are  inad- 
missible except  as  secondary  evidence,  and  after  the  loss  or 
destruction  of  the  original  letter  has  been  shown.4  If  a  writing 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  84           ■  <Krag  v.  Worthington,  73  111.  161 ; 

2  Anderson's  Law  Diet.  Smith  v.  Brown,  151  Mass.  339 ;  Anglo- 

3  Trimble  v.  Edwards,  84  Tex.  497;  American  P.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Cannon,  31 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  772;  Isley  v.  Boon,  Fed.  Rep.  313;  Marsh  v.  Hand.  35  Md. 
109  N.  C.  555;  Carwin  v.  Morehead,  123;   Goodrich  v.  Weston,  102  Mass. 

51  Iowa,  99 ;  Henry  v.  Whitaker,  82  362 ;  Watkins  v.  Paine,  57  Ga.  50.  See 
Tex.  5;  Daly  v.  Bernstein,  28  Pac.  §126.  "The  rule  that  a  copy  of  a  copy 
Rep.  764;  Blalock  v.  Miland,  87  Ga.  is  not  admissible  evidence  is  correct 
573 ;  Buchanan  v.  Wise,  34  Neb.  695 ;  in  itself,  when  properly  understood 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  163 ;  Grant  v.  Oliver,  and  limited  to  its  true  sense.  The 
91  Cal.  158 ;  Taylor  on  Evid.  94.  rule  properly  applies  to  cases  where 
"  The  question  whether  evidence  is  the  copy  is  taken  from  a  copy,  the 
primary  or  secondary  has  reference  original  being  still  in  existence  and 
to  the  nature  of  the  case  in  the  ab-  capable  of  being  compared  with  it, 
stract,  and  not  to  the  circumstances  for  then  it  is  a  second  remove  from 
under  which  the  party,  in  the  partic-  the  original ;  or  where  it  is  a  copy  of 
ular  cause  on  trial,  may  be  placed,  a  copy  of  a  record,  the  record  being  in 
It  is  a  distinction  of  law  and  not  of  existence,  it  is  not  by  the  law  deemed 
fact ;  referring  only  to  the  quality  as  high  evidence  as  the  original,  for 
and  not  to  the  strength  of  the  proof,  then  it  is  also  a  second  remove  from 
Evidence  which  carries  on  its  face  no  the  record.  But  it  is  quite  a  difficult 
indication  that  better  remains  be-  question  whether  it  applies  to  cases 
hind  is  not  secondary  but  primary."  of  secondary  evidence  where  the 
1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  84.  original  is  lost,  or  the  record  of  it  is 


§  31.]     ;    PKIMAEY  AND  SECONDARY  EVIDENCE.  49 

is  executed  by  all  the  parties  in  several  parts  or  copy,  each 
part  is  primary  evidence  of  the  writing.1  But  where  a  writing 
is  executed  in  counterpart  —  that  is,  in  duplicate  —  each  part 
essentially  the  same  as  the  other,  but  being  signed  by  one  of 
the  parties,  it  is  primary  evidence  only  against  the  party  sign- 
ing it.2  "Where  a  number  of  copies  are  all  made  by  printing, 
lithography,  photography,  or  by  any  process  which  will  secure 
exact  uniformity,  each  is  primary  evidence  of  all  the  others, 
though  when  all  are  from  a  common  original,  none  is  primary 
evidence  of  that  original.3  It  has  been  held  in  several  cases 
where  the  loss  of  the  original  and  of  a  press  copy  of  a  letter 
was  proved,  that  a  copy  of  a  copy  of  the  original  was  admis- 
sible where  its  correctness  as  a  copy  was  vouched  for  under 
oath.4 

§  31.  Instruments  required  by  law  to  be  in  writing. — 
Oral  or  secondary  evidence  is  inadmissible  where  the  law 
requires  facts  to  be  evidenced  in  writing,  or  where  a  party,  to 
substantiate  his  claims  or  the  title  upon  which  he  relies,  must 
produce  some  written  instrument.  As  examples  of  such  writ- 
ings may  be  instanced  judicial  and  other  public  records,  deeds 
of  conveyance  and  contracts  not  to  be  performed  within  a 
year.5  The  requirement  that  such  transactions  should  be  evi- 
denced by  writing  is  usually  statutory,  and  to  ascertain  its 
effect  and  scope  the  statute  will  have  to  be  consulted.  If, 
therefore,  the  law  demands  that  written  proof  must  in  any 
given  case  be  produced,  no  oral  evidence  is  admissible  if  the 
writing  is  in  existence  and  is  under  the  control  of  the  party 

not  deemed  as  high  evidence  as  tli3  292 ;  1  Whart.  Evid.,  §  74 ;  Lewis  v. 

original,  or  when  the  copy  of  a  copy  Eoberts,  103  E.  C.  L.  29.    See  Ander- 

is  the  highest  pi'oof  in  existence."  son's  Law  Diet,  "  Counterpart." 

Winn  v.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  (U.  S.)  677.  3  Wharton  on  Evid.,  §  92 ;  Foote  v. 

iCrossman  v.  Crossman,  95  N.  Y.  Bentley,  44  N.  Y.  166;  Memphis,  etc. 

145 ;  Hubbard  v.'  Russell,   24  Barb.  Co.  v.  Beuson,  1  Pick.  627 ;  People  v. 

404;  Gardner  v.  Eberhart,  82  111.  316 ;  Williams,  64  Cal.  87;  Ford  v.  Cun- 

Cleveland,   etc.    Co.    v.    Perkins,   17  ningham,  87  Cal.  409. 

Mich.   296;    Dyer  v.   Fredericks,   63  *  Goodrich    v.   Weston,    102  Mass. 

Me.  173 ;    State  v.  Gurnee,  14  Kan.  362 ;  Winn  v.  Paterson,  9  Pet.  (U.  S.) 

Ill;  Weaver  v.  Shipley  (Ind.,  1891),  663;  Grade  v.   Morris,  22  Ark.  415. 

27  N.  E.  Rep.  146.  See,  also,   1  Cush.  189 ;  35  Md.   123 ; 

2  Roe  v.  Davis,  7  East,  362 ;  Anglo-  37  Conn.  555 ;  1  Whart  Evid.,  §§  90- 

Amer.  P.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Cannon,  31  Fed.  100. 

Rep.  313;  Mann  v.  Godbold,  3  Bing.  ssee^os^,  §§  261-270. 
4 


50 


PKIMABY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE. 


[§31. 


claiming  under  it.1  But  where  a  party  claiming  under  a  deed 
or  other  instrument  required  to  be  in  writing  can  show  to  the 
satisfaction  of  the  court  that  it  was  executed,  and  that  it  was 
destroyed  or  cannot  be  found  after  a  thorough  search,  he  may 
prove  its  contents  by  secondary  evidence.2 

The  rule  above  outlined  is  chiefly  applicable  in  the  case  of 
transactions  which  are  required  by  the  statute  of  frauds  to  be 
in  writing,3  and  to  the  proof  of  public  records  required  by  law 
to  be  kept.4  Thus,  a  judgment  of  a  court,5  or  the  appoint- 
ment of  an  official  whose  appointment  is  recorded,6  or  the  nat- 
uralization of  an  alien,7  must  be  shown  by  the  production  of 
the  record  or  of  a  certified  copy  thereof. 

In  many  of  the  states  statutory  provisions  exist  permitting 
any  instrument  acknowledged  and  recorded  to  be  proved  by 
a  certified  copy  where  the  original  is  not  procurable.8  Such 
a  provision  is  of  peculiar  advantage  to  one  who,  not  being  a 
party  to  the  deed,  never  had  it  in  his  custody,  and  hence  may 
not  be  able  to  account  for  its  absence ; 9  but  it  cannot  be  em- 
ployed by  a  party  to  the  deed  where  he  could  as  easily  pro- 
duce the  orioinal  instrument.10 


i  Buck  v.  Gage,  27  Neb.  306 ;  Ever- 
son  v.  Mayhew,  85  Cal.  1 ;  Poorman 
v.  Miller,  44  Cal.  269 ;  Whitehead  v. 
School  District,  145  Pa.  St.  418 ;  Ney 
v.  Mumme,  66  Tex.  268 ;  Louisville, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Orr  (La.,  1892),  10  S.  Rep. 
167 ;  State  v.  Reid,  45  La.  Ann.  162 ; 
Bode  v.  Trimmer,  82  Cal.  513 ;  Bounds 
v.  Little,  79  Tex.  128. 

2  Eversole  v.  Rankin,  102  Mo.  488 ; 
Bounds  v.  Little,  79  Tex.  128 ;  Abele 
v.  Brewster,  58  Hun,  605.  See  post, 
§  130;  Nolan  v.  Pelham,  77  Ga.  262; 
Gayle  v.  Perryman  (Tex.,  1894),  24 
S.  W.  Rep.  850. 

3  See  post,  §  261. 

4  Childrey  v.  Huntington,  34  W.  Va. 
457 ;  Christman  v.  Phillips,  58  Hun, 
282 ;  Nesbit  v.  Bendheim,  15  N.  Y.  S. 
300. 

BSee§§  142-149. 

e  Boree  v.  McLean,  24  Wis.  225. 

■Bode  v.  Trimmer,  82  Cal.  513. 
Where  no  record  can  be  produced  to 
show  naturalization,  it  may  be  in- 


ferred from  the  fact  that  he  has  voted, 
held  office  and  exercised  the  rights  of 
citizenship.  Such  facts  would  then  be 
relevant  to  show  his  naturalization. 
Cowan  v.  Prowse  (Ky.,  1892),  19  S.  W. 
Rep.  407 ;  Boyd  v.  Nebraska,  12  S.  Ct 
375 ;  143  U.  S.  135. 

8  See  post,  §§  134,  142c-149;  Ed- 
wards v.  Osmon,  84  Tex.  656 ;  19  S.  W. 
Rep.  868 ;  Saders  v.  Giddings,  90  Mich. 
50 ;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  265 ;  Tevis  v.  Col- 
lier, 84  Tex.  638 ;  19  S.  W.  Rep.  801. 
It  has  been  held  that  a  copy  of  a  rec- 
ord made  according  to  law  must  pre- 
vail over  the  oral  testimony  of  a 
person  who,  on  examining  the  rec- 
ord, testifies  that  he  cannot  find  the 
part  certified.  Boyce  v.  Auditor,  52 
N.  W.  Rep.  754 ;  90  Mich.  314. 

9  Frank  v.  Reuter,  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
812 :  Woods  v.  Bonner,  89  Tenn.  411 ; 
Kenosha  Co.  v.  Shedd,  48  N.  W.  Rep. 
933. 

10  Wilson  v.  Wright  (Utah,  1893),  30 
Pac.  Rep.  754. 


§  32.]  PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  51 

§  32.  Disputed  writings. —  Where  the  existence  of  a  writing 
material  to  the  case  or  having  an  important  bearing  upon  the 
credibility  of  a  witness  is  disputed,  its  contents  cannot  be  shown 
by  the  verbal  testimony  of  witnesses.  Thus  where,  in  the  case 
of  a  civil  action  or  a  criminal  prosecution  based  upon  the 
violation  of  a  statute  or  municipal  ordinance,  it  becomes  nec- 
essary to  prove  the  fact  of  the  existence  of  the  written  statute 
or  by-law,  it  cannot  be  done  by  verbal  evidence.1  As  matter 
of  experience  it  has  been  found  that  the  memory  is  treacher- 
ous and  unreliable.  Aside  from  the  temptation  to  commit 
fraud  and  perjury,  to  prevent  the  commission  of  which  this 
rule  has  been  adopted,2  which  would  be  alwa37s  present  if  the 
terms  of  disputed  documents  were  allowed  to  be  given  by  oral 
evidence,  the  court  has  a  right  to  see  the  whole  document, 
which  may,  in  its  entirety,  possess  a  meaning  far  different 
from  that  of  any  detached  part.  Where  a  witness  is  ques- 
tioned on  cross-examination  as  to  the  contents  of  a  letter 
which  it  is  alleged  he  has  written,  -with  a  view  to  impeach  him 
by  bringing  out  contradictory  statements  contained  therein,  the 
letter  must  first  be  read  to  him  and  he  must  be  asked  if  he 
has  written  it.3  In  no  event  would  it  be  proper  to  read  a  por- 
tion of  the  letter  or  to  embody  a  part  or  all  of  it  in  an  inter- 
rogatory and  ask  the  witness  if  he  wrote  a  letter  to  that  effect.4 
So  where  the  witness  is  examined  by  a  commission,  and  in 
reply  to  a  question  gives  the  contents  of  a  letter  without  pro- 
ducing it,  it  will  be  stricken  out,  there  being  no  method  of 
obtaining  the  letter  itself.5 

The  erroneous  admission  of  parol  evidence  of  a  writing  is 
cured  by  its  subsequent  production6  by  the  party  claiming 
under  it  or  by  his  adversary.7     A  copy  of  an  instrument  may 

i  Ex   parte    Canto,   21   Tex.    App.  stock  v.  Carnley,  4  Blatchf.  C.  C.  58 : 

61;  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.   Dulaney,  Peck  v.  Parchen,  52  Iowa,  46 ;  Dwyer 

43  111.  App.  297.     See  post,  %%   143,  v.   Dunbar.   5  Wall.    318;    Leese  v. 

143a.  Clarke,  29  Cal.  664 ;  Lowry  v.  Harris, 

2  Anglo- Am.  P.  &  C.  Co.  v.  Cannon,  12  Minn.  255. 

31  Fed.  Rep.   313;    Cornett  v.  Will-  « Linton  v.  Allen,   154  Mass.  432; 

iams,  20  Wall.  226.  Jones  v.  Tallant,  90  Cal.  386 ;  Avery 

3Seeposf,  §  342.  v.  Starbuck,  127  N.  Y.  675. 

*  See  post  §  350.  1  Glover  v.  Thomas,  75  Tex.  506 ; 

&  Beall  v.  Poole,  27  Md.  245 ;  Com-  Stewart  v.  De  Loach,  86  Ga.  729. 


52  PRIMARY    AND   SECONDARY   EVIDENCE.  [§  33. 

be  received  to  prove  the  contents  of  the  writing  upon  con- 
dition that  its  correctness  as  a  copy  shall  subsequently  be 
made  to  appear.  Any  impropriety  in  the  reception  of  such  a 
copy  is  cured  by  proof  that  it  is  a  true  copy  of  the  original.1 

§  33.  Contracts  or  other  transactions  actually  reduced  to 
writing. —  Where  parties  to  a  contract  have  reduced  their 
agreement  to  writing,  the  existence  of  the  written  obligation 
being  to  a  certain  extent  the  main  fact  in  issue,  the  writing 
itself  must  be  given  in  evidence,  and  oral  evidence  of  its  con- 
tents will  not  be  received  unless  the  absence  of  the  writing  is 
satisfactorily  accounted  for.2  Though  this  rule  is  usually  in- 
voked in  cases  where  rights  under  a  written  contract  are 
sought  to  be  enforced,  it  is  equally  applicable  in  the  case  of 
any  writing  which  has  expressly  or  by  implication  been  agreed 
on  by  the  parties  as  a  history  or  record  of  a  transaction  in 
which  either  or  both  were  interested.  So  where  the  exami- 
nation of  a  judgment  debtor  in  supplementary  proceedings  was 
taken  in  writing  and  signed  by  him,  oral  evidence  to  prove 
what  he  said  is  inadmissible.3 

In  the  case  of  a  written  contract  it  is  fair  to  infer  that,  the 
parties  having  embodied  their  transactions  in  writing,  the 
writing  will  contain  the  final  form  which  their  dealings  may 
have  assumed,  and,  having  given  and  accepted  written  evi- 
dence of  a  contractual  relationship,  they  are  compelled  to 

1  Kendrick  v.  Latham,  6  S.  Rep.  shown  to  be  in  existence  but  beyond 
871 ;  25  Fla.  819.  After  a  witness  the  jurisdiction  may  be  shown  by 
has  been  allowed  without  objection  secondary  evidence  (Thomson-Hous- 
to  give  oral  evidence  of  the  contents  ton  El.  Co.  v.  Palmer  (Minn.,  1890 j, 
of  a  writing  which  he  could  have  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1137;  Tenn.  etc.  Co. 
produced  as  the  best  evidence,  any  v.  Danforth  (Ala.,  1S93),  13  S.  Rep. 
objection  to  a  question  put  to  him  to  51 ;  Missouri,  etc.  Co.  v.  German,  84 
ascertain  his  purpose  in  making  it  or  Tex.  141);  as  by  a  letter-press  copy, 
to  any  relevant  question  comes  too  Smith  v.  Traders*  Bank,  82  Tex.  3G8. 
late.  See  post,  §§  126,  130,  132,  148,  149. 

2  Lott  v.  King,  79  Tex.  292 ;  Mem-  3  Kain  v.  Larkin,  131  N.  Y.  300. 
phis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Benson,  1  Pick.  627 ;  Nor  can  an  employee  of  a  commei- 
Pendery  v.  Crescent,  21  La.  Ann.  410 ;  cial  agency  give  oral  evidence  of  a 

"Kleiman  v.  Geiselman,  45  Mo.  App.  merchant's  credit  or  rating  where 

497 ;  Lewis  v.  Hadmon,  56  Ala.  186 ;  such  facts  are  recorded  in  books  kept 

Steele  v.  Etheridge,   15  Minn.   501 ;  for  that  purpose  and  which  are  easily 

Taussig  v.  Glenn,  51  Fed.  Rep.  409;  accessible.    Deere  v.  Bagley,  80  Iowa, 

Stebbins   v.   Duncan,   108  U.   S.  43.  197 ;  45  N.  W.  Rep.  557. 
The  contents  of  writings  which  are 


§  33.]         PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  EVIDENCE.  53 

abide  by  their  action  and  are  not  allowed  to  substitute  evi- 
dence of  a  verbal  understanding  in  its  place.1  So  it  is  said 
that  here  the  writing  is  not  collateral  but  is  of  the  essence  of 
the  contract.2 

In  an  action  to  recover  rent  or  wages,  if  plaintiff  relies  upon 
a  written  lease  or  contract  of  hiring,  he  must  produce  it  or 
account  for  its  absence ;  for  the  amount  due  can  only  be  prop- 
erly ascertained  by  an  examination  of  the  terms  of  the  con- 
tract as  they  are  contained  in  the  writing.3  On  the  other 
hand,  where  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant,  or  of 
master  and  servant,  is  the  sole  fact  in  issue,  then,  while  it 
could  be  readily  proved  by  the  production  of  a  written  con- 
tract by  which  it  was  known  to  have  been  created,  yet  this  is 
not  indispensable.4 

"Where  the  facts  in  issue  are  not  the  relative  rights  and 
duties  of  the  parties  under  the  written  instrument,  but  some 
fact  collateral  to  the  writing,  the  production  of  the  instru- 
ment as  primary  evidence  of  that  fact  is  not  necessary,  and 
the  fact  in  issue  may  be  proved  by  parol  evidence  under  the 
rule  that  if  such  evidence  is  as  near  the  fact  to  be  proved  as 
written  evidence,  then  both  are  primary  evidence  of  that  fact.5 
So  where  the  contents  of  a  telegram  or  letter  are  essential  in 
determining  the  rights  of  the  parties,  it  must  be  produced  as 
primary  evidence  of  those  rights.  But  where  the  independent 
fact  in  issue  and  to  be  proved  is  only  that  a  letter  or  telegram 
purporting  to  have  been  sent  was  actually  sent  or  received, 
the  writing  need  not  be  produced.6    In  the  case  of  telegraphic 

1  See  post,  §  205.  legher  v.  Insurance  Co.,  30  W.  N.  C. 

2  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  87.  105 ;  Philips  v.   Huntington,  35   W. 

3  State  v.  New  York,  etc.  Co.  (N.  Y.,     Va.  406. 

1890),  8  Atl.  Rep.  290.  5  Thus,  where  the  question  involved 

4  File  v.  Springel,  132  Ind.  312 ;  was  the  rental  value  of  premises  in  a 
Martin  v.  Bowie  (S.  C,  1893),  15  S.  E.  suit  to  recover  compensation  for  the 
Rep.  736.  So  the  owner  of  real  or  condemnation  under  the  right  of 
personal  property  will  not  be  re-  eminent  domain,  the  production  of 
quired  to  produce  a  writing  by  which  the  lease  in  writing  is  not  necessary, 
the  ownership  became  vested  in  him,  hut  the  rental  value  may  be  proved 
but  may  testify  to  the  fact  of  owner-  by  verbal  evidence  from  tenants, 
ship  where  he  does  not  base  his  Griswold  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  Co., 
claim  on  a  writing  and  where  the  14  Daly,  484. 

fact  of  ownership  is  collateral.    Gal-       6  Conner  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  378 ; 


51 


PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE. 


[§35. 


dispatches,  where  the  receiver  of  the  dispatch  is  the  employer 
of  the  company,  the  original  is  the  writing  delivered  to  the 
company's  operator  by  the  sender.  But  where  the  company 
is  the  agent  of  the  sender,  then  the  original  is  the  written 
message  which  is  delivered  to  the  addressee.1 

§  35.  Collateral  writings. —  In  circumstances  where  the 
writing  has  no  clear  and  direct  bearing  upon  or  connection 
with  the  point  in  issue  or  any  relevancy  to  it,  but  is  only  col- 
lateral, no  objection  exists  to  introducing  oral  or  second- 
ary evidence  of  its  contents.  Thus,  a  report  of  an  accident 
made  by  a  witness  as  part  of  his  duty  need  not  be  accounted 
for  to  render  his  oral  testimony  admissible.2  So,  too,  in  an 
action  on  contract,  a  written  offer  by  one  party  which  has 
not  been  accepted  by  the  other  may  be  proved  by  parol.3 

An  oral  communication  accompanying  a  written  transaction 
and  having  the  same  significance  and  effect  may  be  shown 
orally  as  independent  evidence.4     So  payment  may  be  shown 


Holcombe  v.  State,  28  Ga.  66 ;  West- 
ern Union  Tel.  Co.  v.  Cline  (Ind., 
1894),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  564. 

1  Thorp  v.  Philbin,  2  N.  Y.  S.  732; 
Utley  v.  Donaldson,  94  U.  S.  29; 
Saveland  v.  Green,  40  Wis.  431 ;  Will- 
iams v.  Breckell,  37  Miss.  682 ;  Magie 
v.  Herman  (Minn.,  1892),  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  909;  Anheuser-Busch  v.  Hut- 
macher,  127  111.  657;  Durkee  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  29  Vt.  127 ;  Western  Union 
Tel.  Co.  v.  Shatter,  71  Ga.  760 ;  Trevor 
v.  Wood,  36  N.  Y.  307 ;  Godwin  v. 
Francis,  1  L.  R.  C.  P.  293 ;  Wilson  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  31  Minn.  481.  Under 
exceptional  circumstances,  as  where 
the  original  telegram  has  been  lost, 
it  has  been  held  that  its  contents 
may  be  shown  orally  where  no  writ- 
ing or  copy  whatever  exists.  Terre 
Haute,  etc.  Co.  v.  Stockwell,  118  Ind. 
102.  Cf.  McCormick  v.  Joseph,  83  Ala. 
401 ;  Prather  v.  Wilkins,  68  Tex.  187. 

2  Jacksonville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wellman, 
7  S.  Rep.  845.  Cf.  Daniels  v.  Smith, 
130  N.  Y.  696. 

3  Schoenberger  v.  Hackman,  37  Pa. 


St.  87 ;  Pickett  v.  Abney  (Tex.,  1893), 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  859 ;  Supples  v.  Lewis, 
37  Conn.  568;  Tuckwood  v.  Haw- 
thorn, 30  N.  W.  Rep.  705 ;  67  Wis. 
326 ;  Ward  v.  Busack,  46  Wis.  407 ; 
Bowen  v.  Bank,  18  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct. 
226.  A  parent  may  testify  orally  to 
the  birth  of  a  child,  as  the  entry  in  a 
family  bible  is  not  the  best  evidence. 
State  v.  Woods  (Kan.,  1892),  30  Pac. 
Rep.  520 ;  Dobson  v.  Cathron,  34  S.  C. 
518.  If  the  action  is  not  to  enforce 
the  contract  itself  or  to  recover  dam- 
ages for  its  breach,  but  of  the  nature 
of  replevin  or  an  action  of  claim  and 
delivery  to  obtain  possession  of  the 
instrument  itself,  the  plaintiff  is  ab- 
solved both  from  producing  the 
paper  or  accounting  for  its  absence. 
Ross  v.  Bruce,  1  Day  (Conn.),  100 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Holbrook,  13  Johns.  90,  cited  in 
1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  88 ;  Pritchard  v. 
Norwood,  155  Mass.  539;  30  N.  E- 
Rep.  80. 

4  See  post,  %  212 ;  Cramer  v.  Shriner, 
18  Md.  140 ;  File  v.  Springel,  132  Ind. 
312. 


§  30.]  PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  55 

by  evidence  of  the  tender  and  acceptance,  though  a  written 
receipt  has  been  given;1  and  an  oral  demand  may  be  proved 
though  a  written  demand  has  been  made.2  So  in  an  action  to 
recover  for  delay  in  completing  a  building,  the  owner  may 
show  he  has  leased  it  without  producing  the  lease,  though  it 
was  in  writing.3 

A  certificate,  parish  register,  transcript  of  a  public  record, 
or  other  writing  is  not  the  best  evidence  of  the  existence  of 
the  marriage  relation,  even  though  it  has  been  declared  by 
statute  to  be  presumptive  evidence  of  that  fact.4  Though  a 
certificate  which  is  known  to  exist  is  not  produced,  the  mar- 
riage may  be  proved  hy  other  evidence  equally  primary  and 
original.-  Thus  it  may  be  shown  by  the  witnesses  who  were 
present  when  it  was  solemnized,  by  the  declarations  or  ad- 
missions of  the  parties,  whether  against  interest  or  forming  a 
part  of  the  res  gestce,  or  it  may  be  inferred  or  presumed  from 
reputation5  combined  with  cohabitation  and  other  circum- 
stances and  the  conduct  of  the  parties.6 

§  36.  Exceptions  in  the  case  of  records  and  appointments 
to  office. —  Public  records  of  every  sort,  from  the  general  in- 
convenience which  would  result  from  their  removal  from  the 
usual  places  of  custody,  may  be  proved  by  a  duly  authenti- 
cated or  certified  copy  or  transcript.7  The  courts  in  recent 
times  have  shown  every  disposition  to  extend  this  rule,  and  it 
has  been  applied  to  the  books  of  private  corporations  where 
It  was  very  inconvenient  to  produce  them;8  but  in  such  cases 
a  reasonable  effort  must  be  shown  to  have  been  made  to  ob- 
tain possession  of  the  original.9    Where  a  statutory  mode  of 

i  See  post,  §  211;  Coonrad  v.  Mad-  6  In  re  Wallace,  25  Atl.  Rep.  260; 

den,    126    Ind.    197 ;    Kingsbury    v.  49  N.  J.  Eq.  539 ;  Baily  v.  State  (Neb., 

Moses,  45  N.  H.  222;  Wolf  v.  Foster,  1894),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  241 ;  In  re  Drink- 

13  Kan.  116 ;  Van  Bokkelen  v.  Ber-  house,  24  Atl.  Rep.  1083 ;  151  Pa.  St. 

dell,  130  N.  Y.  141.    Cf.  contra,  Steed  294 ;    Arnold    v.    Cheseborough,    46 

v.  Knowles  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  75.  Fed.  Rep.  700 ;  United  States  v.  Ama- 

2  Smith  v.  Young,  1  Campb.  439.  dor  (N.  M.,  1892),  27  Pac.  Rep.  288; 
Cf.  Wollner  v.  Lehman  (Ala.,  1888),  In  re  Hamilton,  12  N.  Y.  S.  708; 
4  S.  Rep.  643 ;  W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Col-  Smith  v.  Smith,  52  N.  J.  L.  207 ;  In  re 
lins,  45  Kan.  88.  Gall,  9  N.  Y.  S.  426. 

3  Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247.  "  §§  142,  146-150. 

Cf.  Schurtz  v.  Kerkow,  85  Cal.  277.  s  Fox  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Co.,  34  W. 

*  Com.  v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  226.  Va.  466. 

5  See  §  114.  9  Bourck  v.  Miller,  26  Pac.  Rep.  861. 


56  PKIMAKY   AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  [§  36. 

proving  a  record  by  a  certified  copy  is  established,  it  cannot 
be  proven  by  parol.1  It  has  also  been  held  that,  where  the 
records  are  lost,  the  loss  and  their  contents  may  be  shown  by 
the  testimony  of  a  person  having  actual  knowledge  thereof.2 
Based  upon  the  inconvenience  entailed  in  compelling  their 
production  and  their  general  notoriety,  it  has  been  repeatedly 
held  that  oral  evidence  may  be  given  of  the  contents  of  reso- 
lutions passed  at  public  meetings  and  of  the  inscriptions  upon 
banners  or  flags  used  in  public  parades.3 

Another  exception  to  the  rule  requiring  the  production  of 
written  as  the  best  evidence  occurs  in  cases  where  a  party  is 
called  upon  to  prove  the  validity  of  the  appointment  of  a 
public  officer.  The  writing  by  which  the* officer  was  appointed 
need  not  generally  be  produced ;  but  on  proof  that  the  public 
official  has  acted  notoriously  as  such,  he  will  be  presumed,  in 
collateral  proceedings  at  least,  to  have  been  legally  and  prop- 
erly appointed,  and  this  presumption  will  obtain  until  the 
contrary  shall  be  made  to  appear.4  It  is  of  no  importance  in 
what  manner  the  question  arises,  or  whether  the  officer  be  a 
party  to  the  action,  for  it  is  a  general  principle  that  so  far  as 
his  relations  toward  the  public  are  concerned  the  appointment 
and  tenure  of  a  de  facto  official  are  prima  facie  as  valid  as 
those  of  an  officer  dejure? 

The  true  basis  for  the  admission  of  oral  evidence  or  certi- 
fied copies  of  the  contents  of  records  being  the  inconvenience 
which  would  ensue  if  their  actual  production  were  required, 
it  follows  that  monuments,  natural  or  artificial,  used  to  mark 

i  Roberts  v.  Connelle,  71  Tex.  11 ;  8  46  N.  W.  Rep.  872 ;  Shiver  v.  Bentley, 

S.  W.  Rep.  626 ;  Kentzler  v.  Kentzler,  78  Ga.  537 ;  3  S.  E.  Rep.  770 ;  Burke 

3  Wash.  166.  v.  Cutler  (Iowa,  1890),  43  N.  W.  Rep. 

2  Cilley  v.  Van  Patten  (Mich.,  1888),  204.  That  a  commission  is  only 
35  N.  W.  Rep.  831;  69  Mich.  400;  prima  facie  evidence  of  title,  see 
Richards'  Appeal  (Pa.,  1888),  15  All.  State  v.  Peel  (Ind.,  1890),  24  N.  E. 
Rep.  903 ;  Turnbull  v.  Richardson,  69  Rep.  440.  Contra,  Webb  Co.  v. 
Mich.  400 ;  4  S.  Rep.  613.  Gonzales  (Tex.,  1889),  6  S.  W.  Rep. 

3  Rex  v.  Hunt,  3  B.  &  A.  566 ;  Sher-  781. 

idan's  Case,  31  How.  St  Tr.  672.  5  Com.   v.  Kane,    108    Mass.   423 ; 

*  North  v.  People,  28  N.  E.  Rep.  Woolsey  v.  Roundout,  4  Abb.  (N.  Y.) 

966 ;  Wilcox  v.  Smith,  5  Wend.  231 ;  App.  Dec.  172 ;  Cromer  v.  Bornest, 

Plymouth  v.  Painter,  17  Conn.  585;  27  S.  C.  436;  3  S.  E.  Rep.  849;  New 

East    Tenn.  etc.  Co.  v.  Davis,  8  S.  Portland  v.  King,  55  Me.  172. 
Rep.  349 ;  State  v.  Row  (Iowa,  1892), 


§  37.]  PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY   EVIDENCE.  57 

the  boundaries  of  land,  mural  tablets,  gravestones  and  similar 
bulky  articles  need  not  be  produced  in  court  for  the  purpose 
of  proving  the  inscriptions  upon  them.  So  the  oral  evidence 
of  the  surveyor  who  has  surveyed  land  is  admissible,  not  only 
to  show  the  original  location  of  a  boundary  line,1  and  the  po- 
sition of  the  monuments  by  which  it  was  settled,  even  when 
the  monuments  have  been  destroyed,2  but  his  testimony  is 
also  admissible,  from  necessity,  of  the  marks  which  were 
blazed  upon  the  trees  along  the  boundary  line.3  But  by 
United  States  statutes,  section  2390,  the  field-notes  and  plats 
of  the  original  surveyor  are  made  primary  evidence  of  the 
original  boundary  of  public  lands. 

§  37.  Exception  in  the  case  of  general  results. —  To  pre- 
vent the  time  of  the  court  from  being  unduly  occupied  in  the  ex- 
amination of  evidence  consisting  of  numerous  and  bulky  books 
and  papers  in  order  to  prove  a  single  fact  or  circumstance,  the 
production  of  such  voluminous  writings  may  be  dispensed  with, 
and  a  witness  may  state  verbally  the  general  result  of  his  ex- 
amination of  books  or  written  instruments  made  out  of  court. 
Here  it  should  be  noted  the  witness  is  not  asked  to  testify  to 
the  contents  of  the  writings.  He  is  asked  to  give  primary 
evidence  of  an  independent  fact  within  his  personal  knowledge 
which  he  has  ascertained  by  the  use  of  his  own  powers  of  ob- 
servation.4 Thus  an  expert  who  has  examined  the  books  of 
account  bearing  upon  the  facts  in  issue  may  testify  that  a  cer- 
tain general  balance  is  due  thereon;5  and  where  an  issue  of 
bankruptcy  or  insolvency  is  concerned,  the  general  result  of 
an  examination  of  the  books  and  securities  of  the  debtor  may 
be  stated  without  their  actual  production  in  court.6    But  a 

1  Sheetz  v.  Sweeney,  26  N.  E.  Rep.  if  the  books  are  themselves  in  evi- 
648.  dence,  it  is  not  error  to  permit  an 

2  Bohrer  v.  Lange,  44  Minn.  381.  expert    book-keeper    who    has    ex- 

3  Ayers  v.  Watson,  137  U.  S.  584.        aminecl  them  to  state  the  result  of 
4Schroeder  v.  Fry,  14  N.  Y.  S.  71;    his  examination  on  the  witness  stand. 

Burton  v.  Driggs,  20  Wall.  (IT.  S.)  Culver  v.  Marks,  122  Ind.  554;    22 

136 ;  Boston,  etc.  Co.  v.  Dana,  1  Gray  N.  E.  Rep.  1086. 

(Mass.),  83;  Holbrook  v.  Jackson,  7  5  Culver  v.   Marks,  122  Ind.  554; 

Cush.  136 ;  Stocking  v.  St.  Paul  Trust  Wolford  v.  Farnham,  47  Minn.  95. 

Co.,  39  Minn.  40 ;  40  N.  W.  Rep.  365.  6  Meyer  v.  Sefton,  2  Stark.  274.    A 

Contra,  Fox  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Co.,  12  debtor's  liabilities  can  be  proved  by 

S.  E.  Rep.  757 ;  34  W.  Va.  466 ;  McCall  the  verbal  evidence  of  his  creditors 

v.  Moscowitz,  14  Daly,  16.    A  fortiori  without  producing  any  written  evi- 


58  PRIMARY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  [§  38. 

witness  will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  to  the  single  fact  that 
a  certain  sale  had  not  been  made  where  he  learns  that  fact 
only  from  an  examination  of  the  plaintiff's  books,  unless  the 
books  are  also  produced.1 

§  38.  Admissions  as  primary  evidence. —  As  to  whether  a 
party's  admission  of  the  existence  and  contents  of  a  writing  will 
render  unnecessary  notice  to  him  to  produce  it,  and  whether 
his  admission  can  be  used  against  him  as  secondary  evidence 
of  the  contents  of  the  writing,  the  cases  are  divided.  The  ex- 
ecution of  a  deed  or  other  attested  instrument  must  be  proved 
when  it  is  produced,  though  the  grantor,  while  denying  its 
execution,  may  have  admitted  all  its  statements  of  fact.2  If 
the  existence  or  contents  of  a  deed  or  other  instrument  which 
is  not  produced  be  in  issue,  it  has  been  held  that  the  admis- 
sion of  the  party  claiming  under  it  or  of  a  party  holding  under 
him  is  primary  evidence  of  the  truth  of  any  fact  which  is  re- 
cited therein.3  But  there  are  decisions  which  sustain  the  con- 
trary proposition ; 4  and  in  any  event  the  admission  of  the  party 
ought  to  be  rejected  where,  instead  of  a  statement  of  facts 
recited  in  the  writing,  it  consists  of  a  oonfessio  juris  or  opinion 
of  the  party  upon  its  legal  operation  and  effect.5  Where  the 
admission  involves  a  statement  of  facts  as  well  as  a  statement 
of  the  legal  effect  of  a  writing,  as  where  the  party  declared 
he  was  "  possessed  of  a  leasehold," 6  or  had  "  dissolved  articles 
of  partnership,"  '  it  will  be  admissible  as  primary  evidence  of 
the  contents  of  the  writing  itself,  in  its  entirety.8 

deaces  of  indebtedness  which  they  278;   Edgar  v.  Richardson,  33  Ohio 

may  hold.     Rutledge  v.  Hudson,  80  St.  581 ;  Cumberland  Mut.  Fire  Ins. 

Ga.  266 ;  5  S.  E.  Rep.  93.  Co.  v.  Giltmau,  48  N.  J.  L.  495 ;  7 

i  Hamilton  v.   Northwood   (Mich.,  Atl.   Rep.   424;  Wolverton  v.  State, 

1391),  49  N.  W.  Rep.  37.  16  Ohio  St.  173. 

-See post,  §  133.  41  Greenl.  on    Evid.,  §  96,   citing 

3Slatterie   v.  Pooley,  6   M.    &   W.  Lawless  v.  Quele,  8  Ir.  L.  382;  Wel- 

664 ;  Murray  v.  Gregory,  5  Wels.  &  land  Canal  v.  Hathaway,  8  Wend.  480 ; 

H.  468 ;  Morey  v.  Hoyt  (Conn.,  1893),  Jenner  v.  Jolliffe,  6  Johns.  9 ;  Has- 

26  Atl.  Rep.  127;  Taylor  v.  Peck,  21  brouck  v.  Baker,  10  id.  248. 

Gratt.  (Va.)  11;  Loomis  v.  Wadham,  ^Bloxam  v.  Elsie,  1  C.  &  P.  558; 

8    Gray  (Mass.),    557 ;     Hoefliug    v.  Scott  v.  Clare,  3  Campb.  236 ;  Rex  v. 

Hambleton   (Texas,   1892),  19  S.  W.  Inhabitants,  3  B.  &  Aid.  588. 

Rep.  689;  Edwards  v.  Tracy,  62  Pa.  6Digby  v.  Steel,  3  Campb.  115. 

St.  374;  Blackington  v.  Rockland,  66  ?Doe  v-  Miles,  1  Stark.  181. 

Me.  332;  Terry  v.  Rodahan,  79  Ga.  8  See  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  86. 


§  38a.] 


PKIMAKY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE. 


59 


§  38a.  Photographs  as  primary  evidence. —  Photographs 
are  admissible  as  primary  evidence  upon  the  same  grounds 
and  for  the  same  purposes  as  are  diagrams,  maps  and  draw- 
ings of  an  object  or  locality  which  is  the  subject  of  contro- 
versy. Photographs  have  been  received  for  the  purpose  of 
describing  and  identifying  the  premises  which  are  in  litiga- 
tion,1 or  to  furnish  a  means  of  identifying  persons,2  to  present 
visible  representation  of  physical  injuries,3  to  supply  accurate 
facsimiles  of  public  records  which  could  not  themselves  be 
conveniently  brought  into  court ; 4  and  enlarged  photographs 
of  disputed  writings  emphasizing,  illustrating  and  making 
more  prominent  peculiarities  of  handwriting  have  been  em- 
ployed by  experts  as  standards  of  comparison/'  If  the  accu- 
racy of  the  photograph  is  shown  prima  facie  either  by  the 
party  taking  it  or  by  some  other  competent  witness6  giving 
evidence  that  the  photograph  faithfully  represents  the  object, 
it  should  go  to  the  jury  subject  to  impeachment  by  the  other 
side  by  means  of  testimony  tending  to  show  its  inaccuracy.7 


iNies  v.  Broadhead,  27  N.  Y.  S. 
52 ;  Cozzens  v.  Higgins,  33  How.  Pr. 
439;  Blair  v.  Pelham,  118  Mass.  421 ; 
Ayers  v.  Harris,  77  Tex.  108 ;  Church 
v.  Milwaukee,  31  Wis.  519;  Locke  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  46  Iowa,  112. 

2  People  v.  Smith,  121  N.  Y.  578; 
Luke  v.  Calhoun  Co.,  52  Ala.  118; 
Wash.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Scheible,  t  W. 
N.  C.  369;  Wilcox  v.  Wilcox.  46 
Hun,  32 ;  Udderzook  v.  Com.,  76  Pa. 
St.  340:  Ruloff  v.  People,  45  N.  Y. 
224. 

3  Franklin  v.  State,  09  Ga.  42. 

4  Leathers  v.  Salvor  Wrecking  Co., 
2  Woods,  682 ;  Luco  v.  United  States, 
23  How.  541 ;  Daly  v.  Maguire,  6 
Blatchf.  137. 

5  Rowell  v.  Fuller,  59  Vt.  688 ;  Buz- 
ard  v.  McAnulty,  77  Tex.  438 ;  Tome 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  39  Md.  90 ;  Marcy  v. 
Barnes,  16  Gray,  163 ;  Eborn  v.  Zim- 
pleman,  47  Tex.  519 ;  Foster's  Will, 
34  Mich.  237.  See,  also,  Anderson's 
Law  Diet ;  20  Alb.  L.  J.  4-6 ;  24  id. 
182-184 


6  Roosevelt  v.  Railroad  Co.,  66  Hun, 
633. 

7  Turner  v.  Boston,  etc.  Co.  (Mass., 
1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  520 ;  Leidlein  v. 
Mayer  (Mich.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep. 
367 ;  Omaha,  etc.  Co.  v.  Beeson  (Neb., 
1893),  54  id.  557 ;  Missouri,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Moore  (Tex.,  1891),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  714 ; 
Kansas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith,  90  Ala. 
25 ;  Com.  v.  Switzer,  134  Pa.  St.  383 ; 
Ming  v.  Foote,  9  Mont.  201 ;  Archer 
v.  N.  Y,  N.  H.  etc.  Co.,  106  N.  Y.  603 ; 
Cowley  v.  People,  83  N.  Y.  464 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Buddensieck,  103  id.  500 ;  Durst 
v.  Masters,  L.  R.  10  Prob.  Div.  373, 
378 ;  Ortiz  v.  State,  30  Fla.  256.  If  a 
party  denies  that  he  signed  an  instru- 
ment a  photograph  of  which  is  in- 
troduced, it  has  been  held  that  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  who  is  ac- 
quainted with  his  handwriting  is 
not  admissible  to  show  that  the 
photograph  accurately  reproduces 
his  genuine  signature.  Buzard  v. 
McAnulty,  77  Tex.  438;  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
138.     In  criminal  trials  a  photograph 


60  PKIMARY    AND   SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  [§  39. 

But  the  photograph,  plan  or  diagram  must  be  relevant,  and 
its  relevancy  will  depend  on  whether  the  scene  or  object 
which  it  portrays  is  relevant.  The  question  of  relevancy  as 
distinct  from  the  correctness  of  the  photograph  is  for  the 
judge  exclusively,  and  is  to  be  determined  upon  the  same  con- 
siderations which  govern  him  where  the  relevancy  of  any  sort 
of  evidence  is  concerned.1 

Upon  the  same  ground  that  photographs,  maps  and  plans 
have  been  admitted  in  evidence,  pencil  or  pen-and-ink  sketches 
will  be  received  to  identify  or  explain  localities.  Their  accu- 
racy ought,  however,  to  be  shown  by  the  testimony  of  the 
person  who  made  them,  or  some  other  competent  witness,  stat- 
ing under  oath  that  of  his  own  knowledge  and  observation 
they  faithfully  represent  the  object  depicted.2 

§  39.  Exhibition  of  articles  in  court. —  An  article  the 
relevancy  of  which  has  been  shown  by  being  identified  with 
the  subject-matter  of  the  issue  may  be  exhibited  to  the  jury 
in  the  court-room  to  enable  them  to  understand  the  evidence 
or  to  realize  more  fully  its  force  and  cogency.  Thus  the  dis- 
trict attorney  has  been  permitted  to  exhibit  to  the  jury  an 
instrument  with  which  it  is  alleged  an  abortion  was  commit- 
ted,3 or  a  pistol  or  other  weapon  or  article  with  which  a  homi- 
cide has  been  committed,  and  a  witness  will  be  allowed  to  ex- 

of  the  defendant  taken  shortly  after  111.    474.     The  relevancy   of   photo- 

or  prior  to  his  arrest  is  admissible  to  graphs  is  largely  in  the  discretion  of 

show  his  appearance  on   or  about  the  court,  and,  unless  a  manifest  in- 

that  date,  particularly  where  the  evi-  justice  has  been  done,  its  action  will 

dence  of  his  personal  appearance  is  not  be  reviewed.     So  even  where  a 

contradictory.     State  v.  Ellwood,  17  party,  because  of  personal  injuries, 

R.    I.    763 ;  Com.  v.  Morgan  (Mass.,  is  himself  unable  to  be  present  and 

1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  458.  testify,  it  was  held  proper  to  refuse 

1  Verran  v.  Baird,  150  Mass.  150.  to  receive  a  photograph  of  him  made 

The  fact  that  a  change   had  been  a  year  before  as  proof  of  his  condi- 

made  in    the    building   which  was  tion  at  the  date    he  was    injured, 

photographed  does  not  render  the  though  it  was  shown  his  condition 

latter  irrelevant  if  the  change  is  not  had  not  changed.     Gilbert  v.  West 

material.    Glasier  v.  Hebron,  62  Hun,  End  St.  Ry.  Co.  (Mass.,  1894),  36  N.  E. 

137 ;  Pashall  v.  Railroad  Co.,  66  id.  Rep.  60. 

633.     A    photograph    taken    by    an  2  People  v.  Johnson  (N.  Y.,  1893),  35 

amateur  who  had  never  visited  the  N.  E.  Rep.  604. 

place  before  was  held  inadmissible  in  3  Com.  v.  Brown,  14  Gray  (Mass.), 

Cleveland,  etc.  Co.  v.  Monaghan,  140  419. 


§  30.]         TKIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  EVIDENCE.  Gl 

plain  how  it  could  have  been  used.1  The  clothing  worn  by  the 
deceased  may  be  shown  to  illustrate  to  the  jury  how  close 
the  defendant  was  to  him  when  he  was  killed.2  Under  simi- 
lar circumstances  the  vertebra  of  the  deceased,  if  properly 
identified,  may  be  submitted  to  the  inspection  of  the  jury,  an 
objection  that  such  a  course  is  prejudicial  to  the  accused  as 
calculated  to  excite  feelings  of  horror  in  the  mind  of  the  jurors 
being  deemed  without  merit.3  Portions  of  a  body  of  a  woman 
on  whom  an  abortion  is  alleged  to  have  been  committed,  pre- 
served in  spirits,  may  be  shown  to  the  jury  as  explanatory 
and  illustrative  of  the  evidence  of  the  physician  who  con- 
ducted the  post-mortem  examination.4  The  clothing  of  the 
defendant  may  be  exhibited  to  the  jury  to  show  that  spots 
thereon  are  blood-stains,  though  the  article  itself  may  have 
been  procured  from  him  without  his  knowledge  of  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  was  to  be  used.5  So  criminating  articles 
which  are  relevant  may  be  shown  on  the  trial,  though  they 
were  irregularly  or  illegally  obtained  from  the  defendant ; fi 
nor  does  a  constitutional  enactment  providing  that  no  one 
shall  testify  against  himself  hinder  the  use  of  the  garments 
or  other  articles  belonging  to  the  prisoner  for  this  purpose.7 
Ordinarily  it  is  necessary  that  the  articles  exhibited  should  be 
connected  prima  facie  at  least  with  the  transaction  in  issue. 
Though  it  has  been  permitted,8  the  propriety  and  justice  of 

i  State  v.  Roberts,  63  Vt.  159  ;•  Si-  Tex.  App.  203 ;  People  v.  Knapp,  71 

berry  v.   State  (Iud.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Cal.  1 ;  Abb.  Cr.  Brief,  §  586. 

Rep.  681 ;  Rocleriquez  v.  State;  (Tex.,  3  Turner  v.   State,   89  Terra.   547 ; 

1893),  22  S.  W.   Rep.    978 ;  Com.    v.  State  v.  Moxley,  102  Mo.  374. 

Brown,   121   Mass.   69;    Hornsby  v.  4  Com.  v.  Brown,  14  Gray  (Mass.), 

State,  94  Ala.  55 ;  State  v.  Crow  (Mo.,  419. 

1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  744 :  People  v.  5  State  v.  Baker,  33  W.  Va.  379. 

Gonzales,   35   N.   Y.   49 ;    People   v.  6  Com.  v.  Tibbetts  (Mass.,  1893),  32 

Fernandez,   35   id.   49,   64;   State  v.  N.  E.  Rep.   910;  Gindrat  v.  People 

Mordecai,  68  N.  C.   207 ;  Leonard  v.  (111.,  1893),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  1085 ;  Sie- 

Raihvay  Co.,  21  Oreg.  655 ;  Gardiner  bert  v.  People  (111.,  1893),   32  N.    E. 

v.  People,  6  Park.  Cr.  Cas.  (N.  Y.)  157 ;  Rep.  431.    See  post,  §§  197,  198. 

State  v.  Graham,  74  N.  C.  646.  '  Drake  v.  State,  75  Ga.  413,  415 ; 

2  People  v.  Wright  (Mich.,  1892),  50  State  v.    Ah  Clung,  14  Nev.  79,  83; 

N.  W  Rep.  792 ;  Watkins  v.  State,  89  State  v.  Garrett,  71  N.  C.  95. 

Ala.  82 ;  Frizzed  v.  State  (Tex.,  1891),  8  State  v.    Ellwood,   24  Atl.   Rep. 

16  S.  W.  Rep.  751;  Levy  v.  State,  28  782;  17  R.   I.  763;  State  v.   Duncan 

(Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  690. 


62  PBIMABY    AND    SECONDARY    EVIDENCE.  [§  39. 

permitting  articles  such  as  deadly  weapons,  lanterns,  masks 
and  other  tools  used  by  burglars  and  similar  articles  which 
are  not  the  articles  alleged  or  shown  by  any  evidence  to  have 
been  employed  by  the  accused  to  be  exhibited  to  the  jury 
may  well  be  doubted.  Such  a  custom,  under  the  guise  of  il- 
lustrating and  explaining  the  evidence,  is  well  calculated  to 
create  prejudice  in  the  jury. 


CHAPTER  IV. 


HEARSAY. 


§  50.  Definition  —  Grounds   for   its 
rejection. 

51.  Statements  to  be  proved  as  facts. 

52.  Expressions  of  bodily  or  mental 

feeling. 

53.  Pedigree  —  Oral    and  written 

declarations. 

54.  Declarations  constituting  a  part 

of  the  res  gestae. 

55.  Requisites. 

56.  Must  be  illustrative    and  con- 

nected with  main  transaction. 


§  57.  Must  be  contemporaneous. 

58.  Entries  as  part  of  the  res  gest<v 

and  made  by  third  persons. 

59.  Entries    against    interest    and 

entries  which  are  part  of  the 
res  gestce  distinguished. 

60.  A  party's  own  books  as  evi- 

dence. 

61.  The  declarations  of  agents  when 

a  part  of  the  res  gestce. 

62.  Indorsements    as  part  of  the 

res  gestce. 


§50.  Definition  —  Grounds  for  its -rejection. —  The  term 
"  hearsay,"  as  used  in  the  law  of  evidence,  signifies  all  evidence 
which  is  not  founded  upon  the  personal  knowledge  of  the 
witness  from  whom  it  is  elicited,  and  which  consequently  does 
not  depend  wholly  for  its  credibility  and  weight  upon  the 
confidence  which  the  jury  may  have  in  him.1     Its  value,  if 

1893),  11 S.  Rep.  838 ;  Dountain  v.  Con- 
nellee  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  856 ; 
Befay  v.  Wheeler  (Wis.,  1893),  53  N. 
W.  Rep.  1121;  Mathis  v.  Pridham,  1 
Tex.  Civ.  App.  58 ;  Atchison,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Parker,  55  Fed.  Rep.  595;  Ellis  v. 
Whitehead  (Mich.,  1893),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  752.  Self-serving  statements  — 
i.  e.,  statements  made  out  of  court 
bjr  a  party  in  his  own  favor  —  are 
hearsay  if  not  acquiesced  in  by  the 
adverse  party  so  as  to  operate  as  ad- 
missions or  b\^  way  of  estoppel.  Whit- 
ney v.  Houghton,  125  Mass.  451 ;  Siva 
v.  Wabash  R.  R.  Co.  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  915.  But  it  is  not  hearsay  for 
a  witness,  whether  a  party  or  not,  to 
repeat  on  the  witness  stand  his  prior 
statement  made  out  of  court.  Charles 
v.  State,  49  Ala.  332.     See  post,  §  79. 


1  "Hearsay  is  that  kind  of  evidence 
which  does  not  derive  its  value  solely 
from  the  credit  to  be  given  to  the 
witness  himself,  but  rests  also  in  part 
on  the  veracity  and  competency  of 
some  other  person."  1  Greenl.  on 
Evid.,  §  99.  "Hearsay  is  .  .  . 
literally  what  the  witness  says  he 
heard  another  person  say."  Bouvier's 
Law  Diet.  "Hearsay  is  what  is 
heard  as  rumored ;  testimony  not  a 
matter  of  personal  knowledge  with 
the  witness."  Anderson's  Law  Diet. 
The  question,  Is  evidence  when  pre- 
sented hearsay  or  original?  is  one  in 
the  exclusive  province  of  the  court. 
Harter  Medicine  Co.  v.  Hopkins,  83 
Wis.  309;  53  N.  W.  Rep.  501.  See, 
also,  Gross  v.  Moore,  68  Hun,  412 ;  2^ 
N.  Y.  S.  1019 ;  Brown  v.  Prude  (Ala., 


€4  HEARSAY.  [§  50. 

any,  is  measured  by  the  credit  to  be  given  to  some  third  per- 
son not  sworn  as  a  witness  to  that  fact,  and  consequently  not 
subject  to  cross-examination.  When  the  requirement  is  made 
that  a  witness  can  testify  to  those  facts  only  of  which  he  has 
some  personal  knowledge,1  it  is  not  meant  that  each  witness 
must  have  actual  personal  knowledge  of  the  principal  facts 
which  are  in  issue  on  the  one  hand,  or  a  full  knowledge  of  all 
the  details  to  which  he  is  expected  to  testify  on  the  other. 
The  utmost  reasonable  requirement  that  can  be  made  is  that  he 
should  have  an  actual  knowledge  of  the  facts,  not  derived  from 
any  other  person's  knowledge  of  the  truth  or  falsity  of  any 
transaction  to  which  he  is  going  to  testify.2  Any  statement 
made  by  him  of  anything  which  another  person  has  told  him 
as  to  those  facts  is  generally  hearsay  and  inadmissible,  no 
matter  how  worthy  of  credit  that  person  would  be  if  called 
as  a  witness. 

The  utility  and  value  of  cross-examination  and  of  the  sanction 
of  an  oath  as  tests  of  the  truth  of  testimony  being  evident 
from  long  experience,  it  is  necessary  under  such  circumstances 
to  call  the  person  who  was  the  witness'  informant  to  testify 
to  those  matters  which  are  hearsay  in  the  mouth  of  any  other 
person.3 

1  The  fact  that  a  witness  claims. to  115 ;  Dubois  v.  Perkins,  21  Oreg.  1S9 ; 
be  testifying  from  his  own  personal  Orr  v.  Orr,  34  S.  C.  275 ;  Glenn  v. 
knowledge  is  not  of  course  con-  Ligett,  47  Fed.  Rep.  472 ;  Corwin  v. 
elusive.  He  may  be  self-deceived ;  Morehead,  51  Iowa,  99 ;  Mutual,  etc. 
and  what  he  calls  his  personal  Co.  v.  Tillman,  84  Tex.  31 ;  19  S.  W. 
knowledge  may  consist  of  mental  Rep.  294;  McLeod  v.  Lee,  17  Nev. 
impressions  created  by  circumstances  103  (declaration  of  decedent) ;  Hard 
collateral  to  the  main  point  in  issue  v.  Ashley,  63  Hun,  634 ;  Sangster  v. 
or  stamped  unconsciously  upon  his  Dalton  (Ark.,  1890),  12  S.  W.  Rep. 
mind  by  the  statement  of  others,  but  202 ;  Fordyce  v.  McCants,  51  Ark. 
which  from  lapse  of  time  and  his  509;  Fitzgerald  v.  Williams,  148 
unshaken  belief  in  their  truth  he  Mass.  462;  Harris  v.  Railroad,  78 
now  regards  as  acquired  through  his  Ga.  525 ;  Tarbox  v.  Shuegrue,  36 
own  powers  of  observation.  Lamar  Kan.  225 ;  Armstrong  v.  Ackley,  71 
v.  Pearce  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  92.  Iowa,  76 ;  Alabama,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Ar- 

2  West  v.  Home  Ins.  Co.,  18  Fed.  nold  (Ala.),  2  S.  Rep.  837 ;  East  Tenn., 
Rep.  622,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Maloy,  77  Ga.  237 : 

3 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §§  98, 124, 163 ;  Wagoner  v.  Ruply,  69  Tex.  700 ;  111. 

Bacon  v.  Hanna,  63  Hun,  625 ;  Hun-  Cent.  R  R.  Co.  v.  Ruffin  (Miss.,  1888), 

ter  v.  Lanius,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  201;  82  3S.  Rep.  578;  Kaufman  v.  Springer, 

•Tex.  677 ;  Wallace  v.  Story,  139  Mass.  38  Kan.  730 ;  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v. 


■§  50.]  HEARSAY.  G5 

Hearsay  evidence  is  not  confined  to  the  repetition  of  that 
which  is  orally  communicated.  If  information  contained  in 
a  writing  addressed  to  or  read  by  him  is  given  in  evidence, 
not  to  prove  the  existence  or  to  show  the  contents  of  the  writ- 
ing, but  as  having  a  direct  bearing  upon  some  fact  in  issue, 
then  such  evidence  is  hearsay. 

The  rule  requiring  the  production  of  the  best  evidence  of 
?my  transaction  is  founded  upon  the  principle  that  oral  evi" 
dence  of  the  contents  of  a  writing  is  substitutionary  and  its 
introduction  indicative  of  better  existing  evidence  which  is 
withheld.  The  withholding,  retention  or  suppression  of  better 
or  more  original  evidence  furnishes  only  a  partial  reason  for  the 
rejection  of  hearsay,  for  hearsay  evidence  is  intrinsically  and 
peculiarly  weak  at  its  inception.  As  applied  to  writings,  the 
rule  requiring  the  production  of  the  best  evidence  and  the  rule 
rejecting  hearsay  are  frequently  confused.1  This  fact,  taken 
in  connection  with  the  vague  and  loose  meaning  of  the  word 
"  hearsay,"  as  it  is  used,  renders  some  further  elucidation  nec- 
essary. For  example,  suppose  the  existence,  but  not  the  con- 
tents, of  a  writing  is  inquired  into.  A  witness  may  testify  that 
he  has  seen  it,  and  may  further  relate  what  disposition  has 
been  made  of  it.2  Such  evidence,  as  we  shall  see  later,  is  not 
secondary,  nor  is  it  hearsay,  but  is  original  primary  evidence 
of  an  independent  fact  —  i.  e.,  the  visual  existence  of  the  writ- 
ing.3 If,  however,  the  witness  is  questioned  as  to  the  con- 
tents of  a  writing,  its  production  is  indispensable  by  the  rule 
requiring  the  best  evidence  of  its  contents,  and  oral  evidence 
will  not  be  received  until  its  absence  is  satisfactorily  accounted 
for.4  Bat  if  the  witness  in  his  evidence  testilies  as  to  some 
particular  matter  of  fact  —  as,  for  example,  the  injury  to  the 
plaintiff,  the  knowledge  of  which  has  come  to  him  not  through 
his  personal  observation  and  presence,  but  from  the  perusal  of 
a  letter  written  by  some  third  person, —  then  his  evidence  is 

Wood,   113  Ind.   544;    St.   Louis  v.  i  See  ante,  §  30  et  seq. 

Aruot,  94  Mo.  275 ;  7  S.  W.  Rep.  15 ;  2  Ramsey  v.  Hurley,  72  Tex.  194 ; 

Eddy  v.  McCall  (Mich.,  1888),  39  N.  Neland    v.    Murphy,    73    Wis.   326 ; 

W.  Rep.  734;  Iusurance  Co.  v.  Lane,  State  v.  Sterling,  41  La.  Ann.  679. 

46  N.  J.  Eq.  316 ;  Central  R.  Co.  v.  3  See  §  51. 

Kent,  84  Ga.  351 ;  Doyle  v.  Church,  *  See  post,  §  130. 
118  N.  Y.  678;  Nixon  v.  McKinney, 
105  N.  C.  23. 
5 


60  UEARSAY.  [§  51. 

hearsay  and  inadmissible.  Under  such  circumstances  the  writer 
of  the  letter  should  be  called  to  witness  to  the  fact  in  issue. 
Thus,  where  it  was  sought  to  hold  defendant  responsible  for 
money  left  with  him  to  be  forwarded  to  A.,  the  witness  was 
not  permitted  to  testify  that  A.  had  never  received  it,  his  only 
source  of  knowledge  being  letters  received  from  A.1 

The  intervention  of  an  interpreter  in  an  interview  in  which 
the  witness  participated,  and  through  whom  the  witness  ac- 
quired his  information,  does  not  render  his  knowledge  of  what 
was  said  hearsay,  as  the  interpreter  is  regarded  as  the  agent 
of  both  parties  for  the  time  being.2 

The  rule  by  the  operation  of  which  hearsay  evidence  is  re- 
jected because  of  the  facility  for  the  commission  of  fraud  and 
perjury  which  would  result  from  its  acceptance  being  of  gen- 
eral application,  it  becomes  of  great  importance  to  distinguish 
carefully  between  evidence  which  is  hearsay  and  that  which 
may  be  considered  original.  No  general  rule  of  differentia- 
tion can  be  laid  down.  Whether  evidence  is  original  or  hear- 
say depends  of  course  to  a  very  large  extent  upon  the  nature 
of  the  facts  themselves  —  that  is,  whether  they  are  within  the 
personal  knowledge  of  the  witness  or  not.  But  much  depends 
upon  the  circumstances  of  each  particular  case  and  upon  the 
facts  which  are  sought  to  be  proved ;  so  that  evidence  which 
consists  of  the  language  of  a  third  person  and  which  under 
some  circumstances  would  be  rejected  as  hearsay,  will,  in  dif- 
ferent circumstances,  be  admitted  as  original.  The  various 
cases  in  which  declarations  or  writings  of  third  parties  not 
produced  as  witnesses  are  original  evidence  will  now  be  con- 
sidered. 

§  51.  Statements  to  be  proved  as  facts. —  In  cases  where 
the  truth  or  falsity  of  the  statement  made  is  immaterial,  but 
the  main  question  is  whether  the  statement,  information  or 
advice  was  actually  given  or  made,  a  witness  may  testify  con- 
cerning statements  made  by  third  persons  out  of  court  who 

i  Goldberg  v.  Wolff,  10   N.  Y.  S.  355.   See,  also,  post,  §§  77,  331a.    But 

544.  see,  contra,  Territory    v.  Big  Knot 

2  State  v.  Hamilton,  8  S.  Rep.  304;  on  Head,  6  Mont  242;  11  Pac.  Rep. 

42  La.  Ann.  1204 ;  Wise  v.  Newatney,  670.     See,  also,  1   Whart.  on   Evid., 

26  Neb.  88 ;  42  N.  W.  Rep.  339 ;  Corn.  §  193. 
v.  Vose  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep. 


§  51.]  •  HEARSAY.  *  67 

are  not  introduced  as  witnesses.  Thus,  if  it  is  necessary  to 
ascertain  the  motives  which  actuated  a  person's  conduct,  the 
information  upon  which  he  relied  is  important,  and  in  sub- 
stantiating the  prudence,  legality  or  good  faith  with  which  he 
claims  to  have  acted  he  may  introduce  evidence  of  what  ad- 
vice or  information  he  received.  For  this  reason,  in  a  suit  for 
malicious  prosecution,  the  advice  or  information  which  de- 
fendant acted  upon  may  be  given  in  evidence  as  original  evi- 
dence tending  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  probable  cause.1  But 
it  has  been  held  that  the  declaration  of  one  not  a  party  to  the 
suit  is  not  admissible  to  show  the  declarant's  intention.2  So, 
too,  where  the  question  of  a  person's  sanity  is  involved,  oral 
and  written  communications  had  with  the  alleged  lunatic  are 
admissible  to  show  how  his  mental  condition  was  regarded 
by  those  having  dealings  with  him,  but  only  in  a  case  where 
the  communications,  being  connected  with  some  act  done  by 
him,  have  become  a  part  of  the  res  gestcz? 

To  prove  the  fact  of  bankruptcy,  or  that  a  bankrupt  has 
absconded,  a  witness  may  testify  to  what  the  bankrupt  said 
about  his  financial  condition  or  his  future  intentions.4  The 
same  rule  is  applicable  to  the  statement  made  to  persons  en- 
deavoring to  serve  civil  process  where  one  is  alleged  to  be 
avoiding  its  service.5  So  language  used  by  a  person,  either 
contemporaneous  with  or  shortly  before  or  after  a  certain  act, 
is  admissible  to  show  the  condition  of  his  mind,  i.  e.,  its  weak- 
ness or  strength  at  the  time  of  the  act.  But  such  declara- 
tions are  not  admissible  to  show  his  intention  where  the  law 

1  Lcahey  v.  Marsh,  155  Pa.  St.  458 ;  person  are  always  admissible  to 
McClafferty  v.  Phelp,  151  id.  86;  prove  or  to  rebut  the  fraudulent  in- 
Com.  v.  Felch,  132  Mass.  22 ;  Finn  v.  tent.  O'Hare  v.  Duckworth,  4  Wash. 
Frink,  84  Me.  261 ;  Mark  v.  Hastings  St.  470 ;  Ferbrache  v.  Martin  (Idaho, 
(Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  297;  Owens  v.  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  252;  Snyder  v. 
State,  74  Ala.  401 ;  Hahn  v.  Schmidt,  Free  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  847 ; 
64  Cal.  284;  Atkins  v.  State,  69  Ga.  Hicks  v.  Sharp,  89  Ga.  311. 

595 ;  Johnson  v.  Miller,  82  Iowa,  693.  4  O'Hare   v.  Duckworth,  4  "Wash. 

2  North  Stonington  v.  Stonington,  St.  470 ;  State  v.  Penn,  13  Bank.  Reg. 
31  Conn.  412.  464. 

3  Paine  v.  Aldrich.  30  N.  E.  Rep.  5  Sumner  v.  Williams,  5  Mass.  144 ; 
725 ;  133  N.  Y.  544.     So  where  fraud-  Buswell  v.  Luicks,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.),  518. 
ulent  intent  is  in  issue,  the  declara-  Cf.  Werner  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  387. 
tions  of  a  party  or  of  some  third 


68 


HEARSAY. 


:§  5s 


requires  intention  to  be  manifested  in  writing  as  in  the  case 
of  wills.1 

So,  generally,  if  the  only  fact  in  issue  is  whether  a  certain 
statement  was  or  was  not  made  by  some  third  person,  it  is 
not  absolutely  necessary  to  call  that  person,  but  the  substance 
of  his  language  may  be  given  in  evidence  by  one  who  was 
present  and  heard  it.2 

§  52.  Expressions  of  bodily  or  mental  feeling. —  Oral  ex- 
pressions of  mental  or  physical  sensations,  where  the  declar- 
ant's condition  of  body  or  mind  is  material,  may  be  given  in 
evidence  by  a  person  who  has  heard  them.  The  fact  primar- 
ily in  issue  under  such  circumstances  is  whether  the  exclama- 
tions indicating  pain,  anger,  malice  or  other  passion  were 
uttered,  and  to  this  fact  the  witness  may  testify,  leaving  all 
inquiry  whether  the  feelings  were  feigned  or  real  for  the  jury 
to  determine.  So  ejaculations  indicating  the  existence  of 
pain3  or  malice4  may  be  testified  to  by  any  one  who  heard 


1  Canada's  Appeal.  47  Conn.  450 ; 
Mooney  v.  Olsen,  22  Kan.  69 ;  Maye 
v.  Bradlee,  127  Mass.  414;  Bush  v. 
Bush,  87  Mo.  480 ;  Tingly  v.  Cowgill, 
48  Mo.  201 ;  Rusling  v.  Rusling,  36 
N.  J.  Eq.  726 ;  Marx  v.  McGlynn,  88 
N.  Y.  357;  Herster  v.  Herster,  122 
Pa.  St.  239 ;  Conway  v.  Vizzard,  122 
Iud.  266 ;  Potter  v.  Baldwin,  133  Mass. 
427;  Shailer  v.  Bumstead,  99  Mass. 
112;  Gibson  v.  Gibson,  24  Mo.  227; 
Middleditch  v.  Williams,  45  N.  J.  Eq. 
726.  Where  undue  influence  is  al- 
leged in  the  execution  of  a  will,  the 
declarations  of  the  testator  are  ad- 
missible to  show  the  state  of  his  mind 
and  his  feelings  towards  his  relatives 
and  the  beneficiaries  under  the  will. 
Jones  v.  Roberts,  37  Mo.  App.  163 ; 
Gardner  v.  Frieze,  16  R.  I.  640.  See 
post,  §g  208,  222. 

-'  Phelps  v.  Foot,  1  Conn.  387. 

3  Bloomington  v.  Osterlee,  139  111. 
120;  Bennett  v.  Northern  Pac.  R  R. 
Co.  (N.  D.,  1893),  49  N.  W.  Rep.  408; 
Lacas  v.  Detroit  City  R.  Co.  (Mich., 
1893;,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  745 ;  Sturgeon  v. 


Sturgeon  (Ind.,  1893),  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
805 ;  Holly  v.  Bennett,  46  Minn.  386 : 
Blair  v.  Madison,  81  Iowa,  313 ;  Smith 
v.  Dittman,  16  Daly,  427;  Grand 
Rapids,  etc.  Co.  v.  Huntley,  38  Mich. 
537 ;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Mosley,  8  Wall. 
(U.  S.)  397;  Rogers  v.  Grain,  30  Tex. 
284 ;  Sanders  v.  Reister,  1  Dak.  Ter. 
151;  Towle  v.  Blake,  43  N.  H.  92; 
Hanna  v.  Hanna  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W. 
Rep.  720 ;  Butler  v.  Man.  Ry.  Co.,  24 
N.  Y.  S.  142;  Hatch  v.  Fuller,  131 
Mass.  574 ;  Livingston's  Case,  14 
Gratt.  (Va.)  592 ;  Stevenson  v.  State, 
69  Ga.  68. 

4  State  v.  Crawfoot  (Mo.,  1893),  23 
S.  W.  Rep.  371 ;  Hall  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
Crim.  Rep.  565 ;  Gibson  v.  State,  23  Tex. 
414;  State  v.  Corcoran,  38  La.  Ann. 
949;  Harrison  v.  State,  79  Ala.  29; 
Newton  v.  State,  42  La.  Ann.  33;  Pit- 
man v.  State,  22  Ark.  354;  State  v. 
Bradley,  64  Vt.  466;  State  v.  Gainor 
(Iowa,  1892),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  947: 
State  v.  Hoyt,  46  Conn.  330 ;  Le  Beau 
v.  People,  34  N.  Y.  223 ;  State  v.  Har- 
rod,  102  Mo.  590 ;  State  v.  Wentworth, 


§52.] 


n  EARS  AY. 


CO 


them.1  This  principle  is  applied  in  an  action  brought  by  a 
wife  to  recover  damages  for  the  alienation  of  her  husband's 
affections.  The  husband's  declarations  or  letters,  addressed 
to  the  wife  or  to  third  persons,  dating  prior  to  the  alleged 
perpetration  of  the  wrong  by  defendant,  are  admissible  as 
original  evidence  of  the  fact  that  before  the  alienation  she 
possessed  his  affection.2 

The  statements  or  declarations  of  a  sick  person,  or  of  one 
who  has  met  with  an  accident,  regarding  his  present  pain  and 
suffering,  and  the  nature,  present  symptoms  and  existing 
effects  of  the  illness  or  accident  from  which  he  is  suffering, 
are  admissible  as  original  evidence.3  When  the  declarations 
of  the  sick  person  are  merely  narrative  of  prior  details  con- 
nected with  his  illness,  the}r  will  generally  be  inadmissible 
whether  made  to  a  physician  or  to  some  other  person,  unless, 
being  connected  with  the  patient's  present  condition,  they  are 
considered  a  part  of  the  res  gestae.* 


37  N.  H.  196 ;  Pete  v.  State,  44  La. 
Ann.  14;  Dixon  v.  State,  13  Fla. 
636 ;  Hardee  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim. 
Rep.  289 ;  Everett  v.  State.  62  Ga.  65 ; 
Riggs  v.  State,  30  Miss.  635 ;  School- 
craft v.  People,  117  111.  271 ;  State  v. 
Sullivan,  51  Iowa,  142;  State  v. 
Hymer,  15  Nev.  49.    See  post,  §  189. 

1  On  this  ground  the  threats  made 
by  a  person  charged  with  homicide 
are,  if  not  too  remote,  admitted  to 
show  his  malice  or  premeditation. 

2Yundt  v.  Hartranft,  41  111.  9; 
Rounds  v.  Rounds,  64  Vt.  432 ;  Willis 
v.  Barnard,  8  Bing.  376 ;  Gilchrist  v. 
Bale,  8  Watts,  355 ;  Wilton  v.  Web- 
ster, 7  Car.  &  P.  198;  Coleman  v. 
White,  43  Ind.  429;  Bigocnette  v. 
Paulet,  134  Mass.  123. 

3  Helton  v.  Alabama  M.  R)r.  Co. 
(Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  276;  Hewett 
v.  Eisenbart  (Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W. 
Rep.  252;  Bush  v.  Barnett,  96  Cal. 
202 ;  International,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kuehn 
(Texas,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  58; 
Schuler  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  Co.,  1  Misc. 
R.  351 ;  Brusch  v.  St.  Paul  City  Ry. 


Co.  (Minn.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  57; 
Newson  v.  Dodson,  61  Texas,  91 ;  Fay 
v.  Harlan,  128  Mass.  244;  Earl  v. 
Tupper,  45  Vt.  275;  Matteson  v.  N. 
Y.  &  R.  R.  Co.,  62  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  364 ; 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Spilker  (Ind., 
1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  280;  State  v. 
Howard,  32  Vt.  380 ;  Taylor  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  48  N.  H.  309 ;  Gray  v.  Mc- 
Laughlin, 26  Iowa,  279 ;  Blooming- 
ton  v.  Osterle,  139  111.  120;  Bennett 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  2  N.  D.  112;  Lacas 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  92  Mich.  412. 

4  Roosa  v.  Boston  Loan  Co.,  132 
Mass.  439 ;  Jones  v.  Portland,  88  Mich. 
598 ;  Collins  v.  Waters,  54  111.  485 ; 
Davidson  v.  Cornell,  132  N.  Y.  228 ; 
Smith  v.  Stat-,  53  Ala.  486;  Ashland 
v.  Marlborough,  99  id.  47 ;  Mayo  v. 
Wright,  63  Mich.  40 ;  Illinois  Central 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton,  42  id.  438 ;  Lacas 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  92  Mich.  412 ;  Barber 
v.  Miriam,  11  Allen  (Mass.),  322; 
Schuler  v.  Third  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  20 
N.  Y.  S.  683;  Holly  v.  Bennett,  46 
Minn.  486 ;  Blair  v.  Madison,  81  Iowa, 
313.     Cf.  post,  §§  188-190. 


70  HEARSAY.  [§  52. 

There  are  many  cases,  however,  which  sustain  a  different 
rule  as  regards  declarations  descriptive  of  past  events.  Thus, 
where  a  physician  is  called  to  diagnose  the  disease  or  deter- 
mine the  nature  of  the  accidental  injury  with  a  view  to  the 
proper  method  of  treating  it,  or  to  testify  as  an  expert,  it  is 
held  that  he  may  testify  to  language  of  the  patient  describing 
his  symptoms,  condition,  feelings  and  other  details  either 
past  or  present.  Only  language  which  is  used  in  the  examina- 
tion or  treatment,  or  to  enable  the  physician  to  testify  as  an 
expert,  is  admissible.1  The  admissibility  of  statements  of 
physical  suffering  of  this  sort  is  largely  due  to  the  necessity 
of  proving  facts  which  can  only  become  known  to  others 
through  the  utterances  of  the  sufferer  himself.  A  scream, 
a  groan,  or  a  cry  of  some  sort,  is  the  natural  expression  of 
intense  pain  in  man,  and  testimony  that  a  scream  was  heard 
is  always  original  evidence.  Some  of  the  courts  seem  to  limit 
the  admissibility  of  testimony  to  mere  involuntary  exclama- 
tions or  ejaculations  of  pain,  as  screams,  groans  or  sighs, 
basing  their  rulings  upon  the  fact  that  as  the  common-law 
disability  of  a  party  as  a  witness  no  longer  exists,. the  sufferer 
may  and  should  be  placed  upon  the  stand,  if  living,  while,  if 
deceased,  his  prior  suffering  is  immaterial,  as  it  does  not  con- 
stitute an  element  in  the  damages  to  be  recovered  by  his  rep- 
resentatives.2 

The  competency  of  a  party  as  a  witness  is  purely  statutory, 
and  the  rule  that  statutes  amendatory  of  or  derogatory  to  the 
common  law  should  be  strictly  construed  would  doubtless 
apply.  It  cannot  be  reasonably  conceived  that  the  legislature, 
by  adding  to  the  rights  of  the  party  by  making  him  compe- 

i  Equitable  Mut.  Life  Ace.  Ass'n  v.  139  111.   120;    Pullman  v.  Smith,  79 

McCluskey  (Colo.,  1893),  29  Pac.  Rep.  Tex.  468.     Contra,  Abbot  v.  Heath 

383 ;  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tillman,  84  (Wis.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  574 ;  Jones 

Tex.  31;  19  S.  W.  Rep.  294;  David-  v.  Portland,  88  Mich.  598;  Davidson 

sou  v.  Cornell,  10  N.  Y.  S.  521 ;  Quaife  v.  Cornell,  132  N.  Y.  228. 

v.  Chicago,  etc.  Ry.  Co.,  48  Wis.  513;  2  Stewart  v.  Everts  (Wis.,  1890),  44 

Louisville,  New  Alb.  &  Chick.  R.  R.  N.  W.  Rep.  1092 ;  Caldwell  v.  Murphy. 

Co.  v.  Falvey,  104  Ind.  416;  Cleve-  11  N.  Y.  416;  Reid  v.  N.  Y.  C.  R.  R 

land,  Col.,  C.   &  Ind.  R.  R.   Co.  v.  Co.,  45  N.  Y.  574 ;  Werely  v.  Persons. 

Newell,  104  Ind.  269;  Chicago,  etc.  28  N.  Y.  344;  Abbot  v.  Heath  (Wis., 

Co.  v.  Spilker  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  574. 
Rep.   280;    Bloomington  v.  Osterle, 


§  53.]  HEARSAY.  71 

tent  as  a  witness,  intended  by  implication  to  abridge  his 
rights  in  another  direction  and  deprive  him  of  the  legitimate 
advantage  which  he  had  enjoyed  by  having  his  declaration  of 
suffering,  other  than  mere  ejaculations,  rendered  inadmissible.1 

The  fact  that  a  victim  of  rape  was  crying,2  or  made  imme- 
diate complaint,  being  material  evidence  of  such  complaint,  is 
admissible  as  original  evidence,3  though  it  seems  that  a  witness 
will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  to  the  particular  facts  and 
details  of  the  assault  as  related  by  the  complainant,4  unless  the 
statement  is  so  closely  connected  with  the  commission  of  the 
crime  in  time  and  place  as  to  form  a  part  of  the  res  gestce? 

§  53.  Pedigree — Oral  and  written  declarations. — The  term 
"pedigree"  includes  facts  relating  to  the  descent  and  relation- 
ship of  an  individual,  to  his  birth,  marriage  and  death,  and  to  the 
dates  upon  which  these  several  events  occurred.0  The  decla- 
rations of  third  persons  to  such  facts  are  receivable  if  the  de- 
clarants are  deceased,  if  they  were  related  to  the  person  whose 
pedigree  is  involved  or  to  one  from  whom  he  is  descended, 
so  that  they  would  not  only  have  adequate  means  of  knowing 
but  an  active  interest  in  knowing  the  facts.  So  it  was  held 
at  an  early  period  that  the  deceased  declarant  must  have 
been  connected  by  family  ties,  either  of  marriage  or  blood, 
with  the  party  whose  pedigree  is  under  investigation.7 

1  Hancock  v.  Leggett,  115  Ind.  546.  ceived.    State  v.  Jerome,  82  Iowa, 

2  State  v.  Bedard,  26  Atl.  Rep.  719.  749 ;  48  N.  W.  Rep.  722. 

3  Johnson  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  61  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  104;  1 
368 ;  Territory  v.  Godfrey,  6  Dak.  46.  Whart.  on  Evid.,  §  208 ;    Swink  v. 

4  Territory  v.  Edie  (N.  M.,  1893),  30  French,  11  Lea,  80;  Amer.  Tr.  Co.  v. 
Pac.  Rep.  581 ;  Baccio  v.  People,  41  Rosenagle,  77  Pa.  St.  516.  In  Ste- 
N.  Y.  265;  People  v.  O'Sullivan,  104  phen's  Dig.  Evid.,  §31,  this  rule  is  con- 
N.  Y.  493 ;  People  v.  McCrea,  32  Cal.  fined  to  cases  where  the  pedigree  is 
98 ;  People  v.  Stewart  (Cal.,  1893),  32  directly  in  issue,  and  where  the  pedi- 
Pac.  Rep.  8.  Contra,  Barnes  v.  State,  gree  while  relevant  is  merely  collat- 
88  Ala.  204.  If,  however,  the  com-  era],  the  evidence  is  excluded.  Whit- 
plaint  is  too  long  delayed,  it  will  not  beck  v.  Walters,  4  C.  &  P.  375.  This 
be  admissible.  Richards  v.  State  (Neb.,  rule,  however,  has  not  received  uni- 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1027.  But  eon-  versal  support.  See  contra,  Clark  v. 
tra,  State  v.  Mulkern,  85  Me.  106.  Owens,  18  N.  Y  434 ;  North  Brook- 

^McMurrin  v.  Rigby,  80  Iowa,  322;  field  v.  Warren,  16  Gray,  174. 

Castillo  v.  State  (Texas,  1892),  19  S.  U  Greenl.  on   Evid.,  §  103,  citing 

W.  Rep.  892.     The  declarations  of  a  Vowlesv.  Young,  13  Ves.  140;  Casey  v. 

child  four  years  old  have  been  re-  O'Shaughnessy,  7  Jur.  1140;  Gregory 


72  HEARSAY.  [§  53. 

A  stricter  rule  is  adopted  in  the  English  cases,  which  hold 
declarant  must  have  been  legitimately  related  by  blood  to 
the  person  whose  pedigree  is  in  question,  or  he  or  she  must 
have  been  the  husband  or  wife  of  that  person.1  However  con- 
sonant to  principles  of  public  policy  this  stringent  rule  may 
seem,  it  is  obviously  inapplicable  in  a  thinly-inhabited  com- 
munity whose  residents  are  constantly  changing  their  places 
of  domicile  and  where  family  connections  and  acquaintance 
with  family  affairs  are  more  or  less  disregarded.  On  this  ac- 
count the  more  liberal  rule  by  which  the  declaration  of  any 
deceased  member  of  the  family  is  admitted  is  supported  by 
the  large  majority  of  the  American  decisions.2  It  is  for  the 
judge  to  decide  whether  the  person  who  is  quoted  was  a  mem- 
ber of  the  family ; 3  and  the  fact  of  relationship,4  together  with 
the  death  of  the  declarant,  must  be  shown  prior  to  the  admis- 
sion of  the  declaration.5 

This  rule  by  which  the  introduction  of  evidence  of  pedigree 
is  permitted  is  not  confined  to  oral  statements.  Memoranda 
or  entries  made  in  family  bibles  or  other  books  appertaining 
to  facts  of  family  history  or  pedigree  are  admissible  as  decla- 
rations of  the  person  making  the  entries  if  he  was  a  member 
of  the  family.6     So,  too,  declarations  or  recitals  upon  matters 

v.  Baugh,  4  Rand.  607 ;  Kay  wood  v.  Mooers  v.  Bunker,  29  N.  H.  42 ;  Tyler 

Barnett,  3  Dev.  &  B.  91 ;  Waldron  v.  v.  Flanders,  57  N.  H.  618;  Kelly  v. 

Tuttle,  4  N.  H.  371 ;  Jewell  v.  Jewell,  McGuire,  15  Ark.  555.     The  declara- 

17  Pet.  213;  Chapman  v.   Chapman,  tions  must  have  been  made  prior  to 

2  Conn.   347;    Boone  v.   Miller,    73  the    inception    of.  the    controversy, 

Tex.  557.  though  they  are  not  inadmissible  be- 

i  Smith  v.  Tebbitt,  L.  RIP.  &  M.  cause  they  were  njade  to  prevent  it. 

354;    Shrewsbury    Peerage  Case,    7  Com.  v.  Felchs,  132  Mass.  23;  Cau- 

H.L.C.  26;  Hitchins  v.  Eardley,  L.  R.  jolle  v.  Ferrie,  23   N.  Y.  91;  Hill  v. 

2  P.  &  M.  248.  Hibert,  19  W.  R.  250 ;  Berkely  Peer- 
2  Butrick  v.  Tilton  (Mass.,  1892),  29  age  Case,  4  Campb.  401-417 ;  Shed- 

N.  E.  Rep.  1088 :  Boone  v.  Miller,  73  den  v.  Patrick,  2  Sw.  &  Tr.  170. 
Tex.  564;  Eisenlord  v.  Krum  (N.  Y.,        3Doe  v.  Davis,  11  Jur.  607. 
1890),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  1024 ;  Walkup  v.        4  Thompson  v.  Wolf,  8  Oreg.  454. 
Pratt,  5  Harr.  &  J.  51 ;  Banert  v.  Day,        5  Greenleaf  v.  Dubuque  R.  R.  Co., 

3  Wash.  C.  C.  243 ;  Cuddy  v.  Brown,  30  Iowa,  301 ;  Northrop  v.  Hale,  76 
78  111.  415 ;  Backdahl   v.  Lodge,  46  Me.  309. 

Minn.  61;  Jackson  v.  Cooley,  8  Johns.  6  Berkley  Peerage  Case,  4  Campb. 

(N.  Y.)  128 ;  Jones  v.  Jones,  36  Md.  401,  418 ;  Jackson  v.  Cooley,  8  Johns. 

417 ;  Dawson  v.  Mayall,  45  Minn.  408 ;  128,  131 ;  Douglas  v.  Saunderson,  2 

Lowder   v.   Schluter,    78    Tex.    103;  Dall.  116;  Carskadden  v.  Poorman, 


§  53.]  HEARSAY.  73 

of  pedigree  contained  in  family  charts  of  pedigree  or  in  family 
correspondence,1  in  wills,  deeds  of  settlement  or  partition,2 
pleadings3  and  affidavits  4  are  admissible.5  The  principle  upon 
which  this  description  of  evidence  of  pedigree  is  admitted 
being  that  such  statements  evincing  the  prevalent  belief  of  those 
who  had  the  best  opportunities  to  acquaint  themselves  with  the 
facts,  it  follows  that  inscriptions  upon  family  monuments  and 
tombstones  and  on  family  portraits,  being  of  a  semi-public 
nature,  are  peculiarly  within  the  rule.  ISTor  is  it  necessary  to 
show  that  these  inscriptions  were  made  by  a  member  of  the 
family ;  for  though  this  circumstance,  in  connection  with  the 
shortness  of  the  period  which  has  elapsed  between  the  event 
they  commemorate  and  the  date  of  their  erection,  is  strongly 
corroborative  of  their  authenticity,  their  public  character  or 
the  assent  of  the  family  is  equivalent  to  proof  that  they  repre- 
sent the  opinions  of  all  its  members.6 

A  declaration  of  a  deceased  parent  as  to  the  place  of  birth 
of  his  child  is  not  receivable,  a  distinction  being  made  be- 
tween the  place  of  birth  and  the  fact  of  the  birth.7 

Evidence  of  general  repute  which  prevails  in  a  family  as  to 
the  death,3  relationship 9  or  birth  of  one  of  its  members,  proved 

10  Watts,  82 ;  Watson  v.  Brewster,  1  L.  C.  1.    Where  an  inscription  on  a 

Barr,  381;  Fulkerson  v.  Holmes,  117  tombstone  was  offered  to  show  that 

U.  S.  397,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  a  person  was  not  the  youngest  son, 

§  104.  it  was  held  inadmissible  in  the  ab- 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  104 ;  Murray  sence    of  evidence    identifying   the 

V.   Milner,    L.    R.    12   Ch.    Div.   845;  person  buried.     Gehr  v.  Fisher,  143 

Scharff  v.    Keener,  64  Pa.  St.   376;  Pa.  St.  311. 

Pearson  v.  Pearson,  46  Cal.  609 ;  Neal  7  Union  v.  Plainfield,  39  Conn.  563 ; 
v.  Wilding,  2  Str.  1151;  Elliott  v.  Pier-  Tylers  v.   Flanders,   57  N.    H.    618; 
soil,  1  Pet.  328;  1  Ph.  Evid.,  216,  217.  Wilmington  v.  Burlington,  4  Pick. 
2  Fort  v.  Clarke,  1  Russ.  601.     See  174;  McCarty    v.    Deming,   4  Lans. 
Jackson  v.  Cooley,  8  Johns.  128;  Jack-  444.     As  matter  of  pedigree,  a  moth- 
son  v.  Russell.  4  Wend.  543 ;  Keller  v.  er's  language  disparaging  the  legiti- 
Nutz,  5   S.   &  R.  251;  1   Greenl.  on  macy  of    her  child  is  inadmissible. 
Evid.,  §  104.  Hargrave  v.  Hargrave,  2  C.  &  K.  701. 
s  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Evid.,  231,  232.  »  Mason  v.  Fuller,  45  Vt.  29 ;  Ander- 
4  Hurst  v.  Jones,  1  Wall.  Jr.  373.  son  v.  Parker,  6  Cal.  197.    Cf.  Wilson 
5 See  "Ancient  Documents,"  §  106;  v.  Brownlee.  24  Ark.  546;  Morton  v. 
Hodges  v.  Hodges,  106  N.  C.  374.  Barrett,  19  Me.  109 ;  Jackson  v.  Bene- 
&  North   Brookfield  v.    Warren,  16  ham,  15  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  226;  Morrill  v. 
Gray  (Mass.),  174;  Sowles  v.  Young,  Foster,  33  N.  H.  379;  Primm  v.  Stew- 
13Ves.  144;  Eastman  v.  Martin,  19  art,  7  Tex.  178. 

N.  H.  152;  Camoy's  Peerage,  6  CI.  &  9  Pierce  v.  Jacobs,  7  Mackey,  498; 

Fin.  789 ;  Shrewsbury  Peerage,  7  H.  Backdahl  v.  Lodge,  46  Minn.  61. 


74  'hearsay.  [§  54. 

by  the  evidence  of  a  surviving  member,  is  admissible  as  a 
matter  of  pedigree.1  So  a  person  may  testify  to  the  date  of 
his  own  birth  according  to  reputation  in  his  family,2  though 
evidence  of  family  reputation  as  to  a  party's  age  has  on  the 
other  hand  been  rejected.3 

In  the  reception  of  traditionary  evidence,  caution  should  be 
employed  in  view  of  the  inherent  fallibility  of  the  human 
memory,  even  in  matters  in  which  all  men  may  be  deemed  to 
i  have  a  personal  interest.  Error  being  intermixed  with  truth, 
by  dint  of  constant  repetition  and  belief  becomes  at  last  in- 
distinguishable from  it.  Though  this  sort  of  evidence  is 
peculiarly  subject  to  such  disadvantages,  that  fact  furnishes 
no  valid  ground  for  its  rejection ;  but  it  remains  for  the  jury, 
under  proper  instructions  from  the  court,  to  decide  upon  its 
weight  and  sufficiency  and  to  consider  what  credit  to  give  to 
the  witness  from  whom  it  is  elicited.4 

§54.  Declarations  constituting  res  gestae. —  It  is  almost 
always  the  case  that  the  facts  or  transactions  which  are  in 
issue  in  any  judicial  proceeding  do  not  stand  alone  and  uncon- 
nected with  any  other  facts  and  circumstances.  In  conse- 
quence of  the  intricate  and  involved  character  of  all  human 
affairs,  the  main  fact,  the  truth  of  which  is  sought  to  be  sub- 
stantiated or  overthrown,  may  be,  and  usually  is,  either  the 
cause  or  effect  of  many  others,  or  is  collaterally  connected 
with  other  facts.  Evidence  of  surrounding  and  connected 
circumstances  relevant  to  the  main  point  in  issue  or  growing- 
out  of  it  is  always  admissible,  and  it  is  for  the  jury  to  deter- 
mine upon  its  weight  and  sufficiency.  When  the  surrounding 
circumstances  are  acts  to  which  the  witness  is  able  to  testify  of 

1  Van  Sickle  v.  Gibson,  40  Mich.        3  Albertsen  v.  Robeson,  1  Dall.  (U.  S.) 
!    167 ;  Morrill  v.  Foster,  33  N.  H.  379 ;     9 ;    Colclough   v.  Smith,    15  Ir.    Ch. 

Eaton   v.   Tallmadge,   24  Wis.    217;  347;  Rex  v.  Wedge,  5  C.  &  P.  298. 

Clements  v.  Hunt,   1  Jones  (N.  C),  Cf.  Rex  v.  Hayes,  2  Cox  C.  C.  226 ; 

400.  Rogers  v.   Coal  Co.   (Ala.,    1893),    12 

2  Bain  v.  State,  61  Ala.  75;  State  v.  S.  Rep.  81.  Age  generally  must  be 
Cain,  9  W.  Va.  559 ;  Cherry  v.  State,  proved,  and  cannot  be  determined  by 
68  Ala.  29 ;  Cheever  v.  Congdon,  34  the  jury  from  the  appearance  of  a 
Mich.  296 ;  State  v.  McClain.  49  Kan.  person.  Stephenson  v.  State,  28  Ind. 
730 ;  Houlton  v.  Manteuffel  (Minn.,  272 ;  State  v.  Arnold,  13  Ired.  184. 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  541;  State  v.  ^McGoon  v.  Irvin,  1  Pinney  (Wis.), 
Best  (N.  C,  1891),  12  S.  E.  Rep.  907.  526. 


§§  55,  5G.]  HEARSAY.  75 

his  own  knowledge,  no  question  can  arise  as  to  the  original 
character  of  the  evidence,  and  though  the  circumstances  may 
be  only  remotely  connected  with  the  main  fact,  yet,  if  rele- 
vant at  all,  it  cannot  be  objected  that  such  evidence  is  hear- 
say.1 Upon  the  same  principle  the  declarations  of  a  person 
are  admitted  as  evidence  because  of  their  connection  with  and 
relevancy  to  the  principal  fact  by  virtue  of  what  is  termed 
the  rule  of  the  res  gestce.2 

§  55.  Requisites. —  These  declarations  are  not  hearsay  evi- 
dence. They  are  original  evidence  connected  with  the  main 
facts  in  issue  and  from  which  the  truth  or  untruthfulness  of 
such  facts  may  be  inferred.3  To  render  such  declarations 
admissible  as  original  evidence  they  must  possess,  besides 
relevancy,  three  other  characteristics,  viz. :  First,  they  must 
have  been  uttered  contemporaneously  with  and  grow  out  of 
the  act  upon  which  they  have  a  bearing;  second,  they  must 
qualify,  illustrate,  explain  or  unfold  its  nature  or  meaning,  so 
as,  thirdly,  to  be  connected  Avith  it  in  such  a  way  that  the 
declaration  and  the  act  will  form  but  a  single  transaction.4 

§  56.  Must  foe  illustrative  of  and  eouuected  with  main 
trausaction. —  The  range  of  events  included  by  the  term  res 
gestae  varies  according  to  the  circumstances  of  each  particular 
case.  The  principle  upon  which  these  declarations  are  ad- 
mitted is  their  spontaneous  and  undesigned  character  and 
their  explanatory  or  illustrative  value  in  conjunction  with 
the  main  event.5 

1  See  1  Green!,  on  Evid.,  §  108.  People,  42  111.  App.  427 ;   Beaver  v. 

2  Graves  v.  People  (Colo.,  1893),  32    Taylor,  1  Wall.  642 ;  Hewitt  v.  Eisen- 
Pac.  Rep.  63.  bart,  55   N.  W.   Rep.  252 ;  Missouri, 

3 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  108.  etc.  Co.  v.  Bond  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S.  W. 

4 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  108 ;  Sterling  Rep.  930 ;  Missouri,  etc.  Co.  v.  Baier 

v.  Buckingham,  46  Conn.  464.  (Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  913;  Poole 

5  Travellers'   Ins.  Co.  v.  Sheppard,  v.  East  Tenn.  etc.   Co.  (Ga.,  1893),  17 

85  Ga.  751 ;  Glass  v.  Bennett  (Tenn.,  S.  E.  Rep.  267 ;  Kane  v.  Troy,  48  Hun, 

1890),   14  S.  W.  Rep.   1085 ;  Bank  v.  619 ;  Sistare  v.    Hecksher,   63  Hun, 

Kennedy,  17  Wall.  19,  23,  24 ;  Rich-  634 ;  Hermes  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  80 

mond,   etc.   Co.  v.  Hammond  (Ala..  Wis.  590;  Brooks  v.  Duggan,  149  Mass. 

1890),  9  S.  Rep.  577 ;  Koetler  v.  Man.  396 ;  Schlemmer  v.  State,  51  N.  J.  L. 

Ry.  Co.,  59  Hun,  623 ;  United  States  29 ;  Fellows  v.   Williamson,  1  M  & 

v.  Noelke,  17  Blatchf.  570;  King  v.  M.  306;  Hunter  v.  State,  11  Vroom, 

King,  42  Mo.  App.  454;  Edwards  v.  495. 
Watertown,  59  Hun,  620 ;  Powers  v. 


?6  HEARSAY.  [§  56.. 

It  is  impossible  to  lay  down  any  general  rule  upon  the 
question  of  what  declarations  do  or  do  not  constitute  a  part 
of  the  res  gestae.  The  main  points  to  be  considered  are  the 
explanatory  character  of  the  declaration  under  the  particular 
circumstances  which  are  in  litigation.  Accordingly,  where  it 
is  sought  to  show  that  a  certain  relationship  existed  between 
persons  or  to  ascertain  the  feeling  toward  each  other  of  those 
who  have  been  connected  by  social  or  other  ties,  evidence  of 
the  declarations,  spoken  or  written,  of  the  parties  involved  is 
admissible  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce.1  But  declarations  form- 
ing a  part  of  the  res  gestce  are  only  relevant  where  the  act 
itself  is  equivocal  or  when  its  nature  or  motive  is  doubtful  and 
the  statements  of  the  party  are  invoked  to  make  his  act  or 
intention  clear  and  easy  to  be  understood.2  Thus  where  the 
intention  or  purpose  of  a  corporative3  or  individual  act,4  or  a 
question  of  domicile,5  is  involved,  the  resolutions  of  the  cor- 
poration or  the  declaration  of  the  person  about  to  change  his 
domicile,  or  while  absent  from  it,  if  precisely  contemporaneous 
with  it  and  explanatory  of  the  act,  are  admissible. 

"Where,  as  for  example  in  the  trial  of  an  indictment  for 
murder,  the  question  of  malice  or  premeditation  is  raised,  the 
statements  of  the  accused,  constituting  often  the  only  evi- 
dence procurable  of  his  mental  condition,  are  admissible  to 
show  whether  the  killing  was  deliberate  or  under  the  sudden 
impulse  of  fear  or  anger.8 

i  Peyser   v.    Myers,    63   Hun,    634  ham  v.  Canton,  5  Me.  266 ;  Travellers' 

(proof  of  partnership).  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mosley,  8  Wall.  408. 

2  Holmes  v.  Goldsmith,  147  U.  S.  »Ayer  v.  Weeks,  65  N.  H.  248; 
150 ;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Clowdis  (Ga.,  Besch  v.  Beach,  27  Tex.  290 ;  Kilburn 
1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  88;  Nutting  v.  v.  Bennett,  3  Mete.  (Mass.)  199;  Jen- 
Page,  4  Gray,  584.  nison  v.  Hapgood,  10  Pick.  77 ;  Bur- 

3  Baker  v.  Maloney  (Tex.),  4  S.  W.  gess  v.  Clark,  3  Ind.  250 ;  Marsh  v. 
Rep.  469 ;  Clever  v.  Hilberry,  116  Pa.  Davis,  24  Vt.  363 ;  College  v.  Gore,  15 
St.  431 ;  Wiley  v.  Athol,  150  Mass.  Pick.  372 ;  Ennis  v.  Smith,  14  How. 
430;  McLeod  v.  Ginter,  80  Ky.  403.  (U.  S.)  400,  421 ;  Fulham  v.  Howe,  60 

4  Chattanooga  Co.  v.  Clowdis  (Ga.,  Vt.  351 ;  Richmond  v.  Thomaston,  38 
1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  88 ;  Young  v.  Me.  232 ;  Dupuy  v.  Wurtz,  53  N.  Y. 
Board  of  Mahoning  County,  51  Fed.  556;  Gilman  v.  Gilman,  52  Me.  165; 
Rep.  585 ;  Rudd  v.  Rounds,  64  Vt.  432 ;  Thorndike  v.  Boston,  1  Met.  242. 
Lake  Shore,  etc.  Co.  v.  Herrick  (Ohio,  fi  Gantier  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S. 
1892),  29  N.  E.  Rep.  1052;  St.  Louis,  W.  Rep.  255;  Miller  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
etc.  Co.  v.  Murray,  55  Ark.  218;  Cal-  Crim.  App.  109;  §§  51,  52;  State  v. 
deron  v.  O'Donahue,  47  Fed.  Rep.  39 ;  Walker,  77  Me.  490. 

Small  v.  Williams,  87  Ga.  681 ;  Gor- 


§  57.]  HEARSAY.  77 

§  57.  Declarations  must  be  contemporaneous  or  nearly  so. 

The  necessity  for  the  contemporaneous  character  of  the  decla- 
rations has  been  much  discussed,  but  it  is  impossible  to  lay  down 
any  rule  which  will  be  applicable  to  all  cases.  In  one  instance l 
an  exclamation  uttered  only  a  few  moments  after  a  person 
had  been  assaulted,  and  while  she  was  seeking  to  escape,  was 
held  inadmissible  because  not  contemporaneous  with  the  main 
transaction. 

Though  the  majority  of  the  American  decisions,  however, 
do  not  require  that  the  act  and  the  declarations  should  be 
precisely  contemporaneous  provided  they  are  otherwise  con- 
nected, in  many  of  the  states  the  strict  English  doctrine  is 
adhered  to.2  Their  unpremeditated  and  spontaneous  charac- 
ter being  the  main  ground  for  their  reception,  it  is  clear  on 
the  whole  that,  where  any  interval  has  elapsed  between  the 
act  and  the  declaration,  the  likelihood  that  the  declarant  has 
taken  advice  or  considered  what  he  should  say  would  have  a 
bearing  on  their  exclusion.3  It  has  been  repeatedly  held  that, 
when  a  single  day  had  intervened,  the  declaration  was  not 
admissible.4  But  where  the  declaration  was  made  soon  after 
the  event  with  which  it  was  connected,  it  is  admissible,5  pro- 

1  Reg.  v.  Bedingfield,  14  Cox's  Cr.  75  Mich.  472 ;  Durham  v.   Shannon, 

Cas.  341.  116  Ind.  403. 

3  United  States  v.Noelke,  17  Blatchf.        3Goff  v.  Bank,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  190. 
570;  United  States  v.  Angell,  11  Fed.        4  Noyes  t.    White,  19   Conn.    250; 

Rep.  41 ;  State  v.  Moore  (Mo.,  1893),  Montgomery  v.  McGuire,  25  111.  App. 

22  S.  W.  Rep.  1086 ;  State  v.  Mason,  31 ;  Ft.  Smith  Oil  Co.  v.  Slover  (Ark., 

112  Mo.  374;  Penn.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Lyons,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  106;  Short  v.  N. 

129  Pa.  St.  113;  Levvke  v.  D.  D.  E.  B.  Pac.    El.    Co.,   45    N.   W.    Rep.   708; 

etc.  Co.,  46  Hun,  283;  Texas,  etc.  Co.  Southerland  v.  W.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  11 

v.    Barron,   78   Tex.   421;  Dwyer   v.  S.   E.   Rep.   189;  106  N.  C.   100;  Co- 

Bassett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  513;  Evans  rinth  v.  Lincoln,  34  Me.  310. 
v.  State  (Ark.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.        ^Harriman   v.  Stowe,  57   Mo.  93; 

1026;  State  v.  Raven  (Mo.,  1893),  22  Insurance    Co.    v.    Mosley,    8    Wall. 

S.  W.  Rep.  376;  State  v.  Daugherty,  (U.  S.)  397;  Hanna  v.  Hanna  (Tex., 

17  Nev.  376;  Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Culli-  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  720;  Chapin  v. 

son,  40  111.  App.  67;  Texas,  etc.  Co.  Cambria  Iron  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  478; 

v.  Robertson,  82  Tex.  657 ;  Mayes  v.  Butler  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  24  N. 

State,  64  Miss.  329 ;  State  v.  Frazier,  Y.  S.  442 ;  Miss.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Baier 

1   Houst  (Del.)  176 ;  Jones  v.  State,  (Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  913 ;  Ohio 

71   Ind.  66;  Gulf,   etc.  Co.   v.  York,  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stern  (Ind.,  1892),  31 

74  Tex.  374;    12    S.     W.    Rep.    68;  N.  E.    Rep.   180;  Jewel  v.  Jewel,    1 

Wormsdorf  v.  Detroit  City  R  Co.,  How.   (U.   S.)  219 ;    Penn.  R.  Co.  v. 


78  HEARSAY.  [§  58. 

vided  a  period,  however  short,  has  not  elapsed  which  would 
give  an  opportunity  for  deliberation.1 

§  58.  Entries  a  part  of  the  res  gestae  and  made  by  third 
persons. —  Sometimes  entries  made  by  third  parties  in  books 
of  record  or  account,  or  letters  and  telegrams  sent  by  them, 
are  original  and  primary  evidence,  even  though  the  parties 
themselves  be  not  called.  Entries  are  divided  into  public  and 
private.  The  former  are  those  made  by  a  public  official  in 
the  course  of  his  public  duties.  The  latter  are  made  by  pri- 
vate persons  in  the  exercise  of  their  commercial  or  profes- 
sional callings. 

To  render  entries  made  by  a  third  party  admissible  as  orig- 
inal evidence,  they  must  possess  substantially  the  character- 
istics requisite  in  the  case  of  verbal  declarations  which  are 
a  part  of  the  res  gestae. 

The  general  rule  is  that,  whether  the  entry  or  writing  be 
one  that  is  made  in  the  performance  of  an  official,  professional 
or  private  duty,  the  party  must  have  been  legally  authorized 
to  make  it  and  it  must  have- been  made  in  the  course  of  busi- 
ness.2    So  the  writing  itself  must  be  relevant  to  the  transac- 

Lyons,  18  Atl.  Rep.  759 ;  129  Pa.  St.  of  a  declaration  in  connection  with 

113;  Lewke  v.  D.  D.  E.  B.  &  B.  R.  evidence    of  the   principal    fact,   as 

Co.,  46  Hun,  283 ;  Thomas  v.  Herrall,  stated  by  Mr.  Greenleaf,  must  be  de- 

18  Oreg.  546 ;  Insurance  Co.  v.  Shep-  termined  by  the  judge  according  to 

pard,  85  Ga.  751 ;  Stevens  v.  Castel,  the  degree  of  its  relation  to  the  fact 

63  Mich.  118.  and  in  the  exercise  of  a  sound  discre- 

1  Durkee   v.    Cent.   P.   Ry.  Co.,  69  tion;  it  being  extremely  difficult,  if 

Cal.   533 ;     Tennis    v.    Railway    Co.  not  impossible,  to  bring  this  class  of 

(Kan.,  1891),  25  Pac.  Rep.  876.     "The  cases  within  the  limits  of  a  more 

modern  doctrine  has  relaxed  the  an-  particular  description.     The  priuci- 

cieut  rule  that  declarations,  to  be  ad-  pal  points  of  attention  are,  he  adds, 

missible  as  part  of  the   res  gestce,  whether  the  declaration  was  contem- 

must    be    strictly   contemporaneous  poraneous  with  the  main  fact  and  so 

with  the  main  transaction.     It  now  connected  with  it  as  to  illustrate  its 

allows  evidence  of  them  when  they  character."    Vicksburg  &  Meridian 

appear  to  have  been  made  under  the  R.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  119  U.  S.  99,  105-6, 
immediate  influence  of  the  principal        2  Rollins  v.  United  States,   23  Ct, 

transaction    and   are    so    connected  CI.  106  (official  letter) ;  McDonald  v, 

with  it  as  to  characterize  or  explain  Carnes,  7  S.  Rep.  919;  90  Ala.  147 

it.     "What  time  may  elapse  between  State  v.  Martin,  15  S.  W.  Rep.  529 

the  happening  of  the  event  and  the  Cobb  v.    Malone,  86  Ala.  571 ;  8  S 

time  of  the  declaration,  and  the  dec-  Rep.   693;  Boiling  v.  Fannin  (Ala., 

laration  be  yet  admissible,  must  de-  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  59;  Webster  v.  Web- 

pend    upon    the    character    of    the  ster,  1  F.  &  F.  401. 
transaction  itself.     The  admissibility 


§  58.]  HEARSAY.  79 

tion  with  which  it  is  sought  to  be  connected,  and  must  relate 
to  and  be  contemporaneous  with  it  and  be  illustrative  of  it.1 
It  is  also  required  that  the  person  who  is  the  author  of  the 
entry  or  writing  should  have  been  in  a  position  where  he 
would  have  peculiar  opportunities  of  possessing  a  knowledge 
of  the  occurrence  to  which  the  entrv  relates,  and  that,  having 
such  knowledge,  he  must  also  have  been  impartial  and  with- 
out apparent  motive  to  deceive  by  fabricating  evidence  or 
perverting  the  circumstance  described.2  These  requirements 
being  met,  the  writings  are  admissible  as  original  evidence, 
and  though  the  party,  if  living  and  if  he  can  be  found,  should 
be  called  to  testif}7",  yet  his  non-production  or  incompetency 
as  a  witness 3  will  not  render  the  entries  or  writing  hearsay 
evidence.4  A  foundation  for  the  introduction  of  the  entries 
or  documents  must  be  laid  by  testimony  which  will  serve  to 
identify  them  and  show  their  contemporaneous  character  as 
a  part  of  the  res  gestw.5 

The  rule  under  consideration  is  of  very  extensive  usefulness 
and  application.  Under  it  not  only  are  books  of  account 
and  public  records  kept  by  third  persons  admitted  as  original 

1  Stallings  v.  Hallum,  79  Tex.  421 ;  indorser  has  received  notice  of  pro- 
Baldridge  v.  Peuland,  68  Tex.  441 ;  test  for  non-payment.  Welch  v.  Bar- 
Cont.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Insurance  Co.,  51  rett,  15  Mass.  380;  Halliday  v.  Mar- 
Fed.  Rep.  884 ;  Lassone  v.  Boston  &  tinett,  20  Johns.  168;  Bank  v. 
L.  R.  Co.  (N.  H.,  1893),  24  Atl.  Rep.  Mitchell,  15  Conn.  206;  Nichols  v. 
902 ;  Lewis  v.  Meginnis,  30  Fla.  419 ;  Webb,  8  Wheat  326 ;  Nichols  v.  Gold- 
Boiling  v.  Fanning  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  smith,  7  Wend.  360 ;  Sherman  v. 
Rep.  59;  Farrington  v.  Hayes  (Vt,,  Crosby,  11  Johns.  70;  Sherman  v. 
1893),  25  Atl.  Rep.  1091 ;  Livingston's  Atkins,  4  Pick.  283;  Hart  v.  Ken- 
Appeal  (Conn.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  dall,  82  Ala.  144,  cited  in  1  Greenl. 
470.  on  Evid.,  §  114. 

2  Welch  v.  Barrett,  15  Mass.  380 ;  3  Augusta  v.  Windsor,  19  Me.  317 ; 
Bank  v.  Whitehill,   16  S.  &  R.  89 ;  Nichols  v.  Webb,  8  Wheat  326. 
Davis  v.  Fuller,  12  Vt.  178;  Nichols  *  But  see  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hen- 
v.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  326 ;  Brewster  v.  derson   (Ark.,   1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
Doan,  2  Hill,  537 ;  Hart  v.  Kendall,  873. 

82    Ala.    144 ;    Kansas,    etc.    Co.  v.  5  Meconce  v.  Mower,  37  Kan.  298 ; 

Smith,  90  Ala.  25 ;  McVey  v.  Durkin,  15  Pac.  Rep.  155 ;  Fowler  v.  Schafer, 

136  Pa.  St.  418.     Entries  made  by  a  32  N.  W.  Rep.  292 ;  Stallings  v.  Gott- 

bank  messenger  or  notary  public  in  schalk  (Md.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  524; 

books  ordinarily  kept  by  such  per-  Healey  v.  Bauer,  65  Hun,  621 ;  Liv- 

sons  are  admissible  in  an  action  on  ingston's  Appeal  (Conn.,  1893),  26  Atl. 

a  promissory  note  to  show  that  pay-  Rep.  470 ;  Farrington  v.  Hayes  (Vt, 

ment  has  been  demanded  and  that  the  1893),  25  Atl.  Rep.  1091. 


SO  HEARSAY.  [§  50. 

evidence,1  but  private  books,2  photographs,3  maps  and  surveys 
have  also  been  received.4  Thus  an  entry  made  in  the  diary 
of  a  surgeon  who  was  present  in  a  professional  capacity  at 
the  birth  of  a  person  is  admissible  when  the  exact  date  of 
that  event  is  iu  issue.5  Though  a  certificate  of  a  person's  bap- 
tism is  inadmissible  to  show  the  date  of  his  birth,6  yet  his  bap- 
tism may  be  shown  by  the  entry  made  at  the  time  according 
to  the  rules  of  the  church  by  the  priest  who  baptized  him, 
where  the  entry  was  made  as  a  part  of  the  ceremony,  though 
the  book  in  which  it  was  made  was  not  required  to  be  kept.7 
From  these  instances  it  will  be  seen  that  the  rule  by  which 
such  entries  are  admitted  as  original  evidence  of  the  occur- 
rence which  they  record  and  of  which  they  form  a  part  is  not 
confined  to  records  of  a  public  character. 

In  very  many  cases  private  entries  and  writings,  such  as 
receipts,  indorsements  of  service  on  legal  process,8  and  press 
copies  of  letters,  have  been  received  when  the  part}''  who 
made  them  was  dead  or  for  other  reasons  could  not  be  pro- 
duced, and  it  was  shown  that  the  party  was  impartial,  and, 
having  com  patent  knowledge,  had  made  a  true  and  accurate 
record  of  the  transaction.9 

§  51).  Entries  against  interest  and  entries  which  are  a 
part  of  the  res  gestae  distinguished. —  Entries  and  writings 

1  Bell  v.  Kendrick  (Fla.,  1890),  6  S.  718;  Kennedy  v.  Doyle,  10  Allen 
Rep.  868.     See  post,  §g  I42a-160.  (Mass.),  161 ;  Witcher  v.  McLaughlin, 

2  Chenango  Corp.  v.  Lewis,  63  115  Mass.  167;  McGuirk  v.  Mut.  L. 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  111.  Ins.  Co.,  66  Hun,  628.     The  register 

3  Mississippi,  etc.  Co.  v.  Moore,  15  S.  of  a  parish  kept  by  its  priest  is  ad- 
W.  Rep.  714 ;  Kansas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith,  missible  to  prove  a  marriage  solem- 
90  Ala.  25 ;  8  S.  Rep.  48.     See  §  38.  nized  by  him  if  regularly  kept  and  if 

4  Ewing  v.  State,  81  Tex.  172 ;  Row-  it  shows  the  facts  which  are  essen- 
land  v.  McCowan,  20  Oregon,  538;  tial  to  constitute  a  valid  marriage 
26  Pac.  Rep.  853 ;  McVey  v.  Durkin,  contract.  State  v.  Doris,  40  Conn. 
136  Pa.  St.  416 ;  Weld  v.  Brooks,  25  145 ;  Erwin  v.  English,  61  id.  502 ;  23 
N.  E.  Rep.  719;  152  Mass.  297.  See  Atl.  Rep.  753;  Jacobi  v.  Order  of 
post,  §  145.  Germania,  26  N.  Y.  S.  318. 

5  Higham  v.  Ridgway,  10  East,  109.        sSee  post,    §   150a;    Stapylton    v. 

6  Lavin  v.  Aid  Society,  74  Wis.  349.  Clough,  2  El.  &  Bl.  933. 

Contra,  Jacobi  v.  Order  of  Germania,  9  De  Arnold  v.  Neasmith,  32  Mich. 

26  N.  Y.  S.  318.  231 ;  Steubing  v.  New  York  El.   R. 

i  Hunt  v.  Order  of  Chosen  Friends,  Co.,  19  N.  Y.  S.  313 ;  Gould  v.   Con- 

434  Mich.  671;   31   N.  W.  Rep.  576;  way,  59  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  355;  Bank  v. 

Kabok  v.  L.  I.  Ins.  Co.,  4  N.  Y.  S.  Mitchell,  15  Conn.  206. 


§  60.]  HEARSAY.  81 

or  declarations  made  by  persons  who  are  not  parties  to  the 
suit  which  are  admissible  as  evidence  because  they  are  concom- 
itant of  the  main  transaction  and  form  a  part  of  it  should 
be  distinguished  from  those  which  are  admissible  solely  be- 
cause they  are  against  the  interest  of  the  declarant.  The 
former  are  original  evidence  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestae, 
and  the  fact  that  they  were  made,  rather  than  their  truth  or 
falsity,  is  the  main  fact  to  be  shown.  Hence  the  fact  that 
the  declarant  is  alive  or  dead,  or  the  fact  that  he  is  interested 
or  the  amount  of  his  interest  in  making  the  entry  or  declara- 
tion, has  no  material  bearing  on  the  admissibility  of  such 
statements,  although  his  interest  may  be  considered  by  the 
jury  in  estimating  the  weight  or  credit  which  they  may  at- 
tach to  such  entries.1  But  in  the  latter  class  of  declarations 
the  primary  fact  that  they  are  against  interest  is  never  to  be 
lost  sight  of;  nor  should  it  be  forgotten  that  these  declarations, 
constituting  not  original  evidence  but  an  exception  to  the  rule 
rejecting  hearsay,  are  introduced  to  substantiate  the  truth  of 
the  facts  asserted  in  them,  and  not  merely  to  show  that  they 
were  uttered  at  the  date  of  the  transaction  in  issue.2 

§  60.  A  party's  own  books  are  evidence.—  Upon  the  ques- 
tion whether  entries  made  in  the  books  of  a  party  to  the  suit 
are  admissible  as  evidence  in  his  own  favor  under  the  proposi- 
tion that  such  entries  constitute  a  part  of  the  res  geske,  the 
cases  are  at  considerable  variance.  If  the  entry  was  made  by 
an  employee  of  the  party  having  personal  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  in  the  usual  course  of  his  employment,  in  books  which 
were  kept  for  such  entries,  and  if  it  was  made  at  or  near  the 
date  of  the  transaction  and  is  illustrative  of  it,  then  there  can 
be  no  objection  to  its  admission  upon  the  principles  already 
laid  down.  It  is  really  hearsay  evidence,  however,  because 
the  book-keeper  or  other  person  making  the  entry  was  not  on 
oath  or  cannot  be  produced,  or,  being  produced,  has  wholly 
forgotten  the  circumstances  attending  the  transaction.3 

1  §g  117,  118.  Ross   v.    Brusie,    11    Pac.    Rep.  760; 

2 1  GreenL  on  Evid.,  §§  120,  147.  70  Cal.  465 ;  Moore  v.  Knott,  14  Oreg. 

3  Schuckman  v.  Winterbottom,   9  35 ;  Lamberty  v.  Roberts,  9  N.  Y.  S. 

N.  Y.  S.  733 ;  Hancock  v.  Kelly,  2  S.  607 ;  Griesbacher  v.    Tanenbaum,    8 

Rep.   281;    81  Ala.   368;  Brower   v.  id.  582;  Blumbart  v.   Rohr,  70  Md. 

East  Rome  Town  Co.,  84  Ga.  219;  339;    Barnes   v.   Dow,   59    Vt.   530; 

6 


82 


HEARSAY. 


[§  60. 


At  common  law,  partly  from  the  necessity  of  the  case  be- 
cause of  the  incompetency  of  a  party  to  testify  as  a  witness, 
entries  made  by  him  personally  in  his  own  books  were  con- 
sidered admissible  as  evidence  forming  a  part  of  the  res  gestae} 
But  to  render  them  admissible  it  must  be  affirmatively  shown 
that  the  books  are  books  of  first  or  original  entry,  were  regu- 
larly kept  in  the  course  of  business,  and  that  no  other  books 
of  account  bearing  upon  the  same  transaction  were  kept  at 
that  time.  The  entries  must  have  been  made  at  the  time 
they  purport  to  have  been  made  and  contemporaneously  with 
the  transactions  they  describe  or  to  which  they  refer.  If  the 
entry  be  made  by  a  party  to  the  action  himself,  it  must  also 
be  shown  that  he  had  no  book-keeper  or  clerk  whose  regular 
duty  it  was  to  make  such  entries,  and  that  he  (the  party)  was 
present  at  the  time  of  the  transaction.2  The  formal  character 
of  the  books,  whether  ledgers  or  sales-books,  is  immaterial  so 
far  as  their  admissibility  is  concerned,  if  it  be  shown  that  they 


Lewis  v.  Meginnis,  30  Fla.  419;  Kuh 
v.  Michigan  Bank,  93  Mich.  511; 
Goff  v.  State  Bank  (Wis.,  1893),  54  N. 
W.  Rep.  732 ;  Bedford  v.  Sherman, 
68  Hun,  317 ;  Morris  v.  Morton,  20 
S.  W.  Rep.  287 ;  Johnson  v.  Culver, 
116  Ind.  278;  Culver  v.  Marks,  122 
id.  554.  A  promise  to  pay  for  the 
goods  charged  cannot  be  proven  by 
an  entry  in  a  party's  books.  Somers 
v.  Wright,  114  Mass.  171 ;  Keithe  v. 
Kibbe,  10  Cush.  (Mass.)  35.  But  a 
credit  may  be  proven  by  the  party 
giving  it.     Ross  v.  Brusie,  70  Cal.  465. 

1  Entries  in  the  diaries  or  account 
books  of  physicians  and  attorneys 
have  been  held  competent  to  prove 
the  value  of  services  rendered  by 
them.  Codmon  v.  Caldwell,  31  Me. 
560;  Bay  v.  Cook,  22  N.  J.  L.  343; 
Murphy  v.  Gates  (Wis.,  1892),  51  N. 
W.  Rep.  573.  Contra,  Hale's  Ex'rs 
v.  Ard,  48  Pa.  St  22;  Briggs  v. 
Georgia,  15  Vt  6k 

*  Ailing  v.  Brazee,  27  111.  App.  595; 
Watrous  v.  Cunningham,  11  Pac. 
Rep.  811;   71  Cal.  30;  Cogswell   v. 


Dolliver,  2  Mass.  217 ;  White  v.  Whit- 
ney, 82  Cal.  163 ;  Burnham  v.  Adams, 
5  Vt.  313;  Barnes  v.  Dow,  59  id.  230; 
Prince  v.  Smith,  4  Mass.  455 ;  Mathes 
v.  Robinson,  8  Met  269 ;  Rexford  v. 
Comstock,  3  N.  Y.  S.  876 ;  Rodman 
v.  Hoops,  1  Dall.  85 ;  Setchers  v. 
Keigwin,  57  Conn.  573;  Smith  v. 
Rentz,  131  Pa.  St.  169;  Cormac  v. 
Western  White  Bronze  Co.,  77  Iowa, 
32 ;  Roberts'  Appeal,  26  Pa.  St.  102 ; 
Doty  v.  Smith,  68  Hun,  199.  Where 
the  entries  are  in  the  handwriting 
of  a  party,  the  delivery  of  the  goods 
thus  charged  must  be  shown  by  in- 
dependent evidence.  Baldridge  v. 
Penland,  68  Tex.  441 ;  4  S.  W.  Rep. 
565.  The  admissibility  of  a  party's 
own  entries  is  for  the  court  Pratt 
v.  White,  132  Mass.  477.  An  entry 
made  personally  by  a  party  has  been 
held  inadmissible  to  prove  a  debt 
(Doty  v.  Smith,  68  Hun,  199),  even 
though  supplemented  by  his  oath. 
Sauter  v.  Carroll,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct  R 
192. 


§  60.]  HEARSAY.  83 

were  fairly  and  honestly  kept,  are  books  of  original  entry, 
and  are  free  from  material  alterations,  interlineations  or  other 
circumstances  calculated  to  arouse  a  suspicion.1 

When  the  books  of  original  entry  of  a  party  are  produced 
as  evidence  in  his  favor,  it  is  necessary  that  they  should  be 
supplemented  by  his  oath  as  to  the  main  transaction  involved. 
Thus,  if  the  book  entry  relates  to  a  sale  of  goods,  the  party 
will  be  called  upon  to  swear  that  the  sale  was  actually  made 
and  the  goods  delivered,  although  the  details  of  the  transac- 
tion —  as,  for  example,  the  quantities  and  prices  charged  — 
may  have  to  be  gathered  from  the  written  entry.2 

In  a  suit  brought  by  an  executor  or  administrator,  the  books 
of  the  decedent  are  still  admissible  as  evidence  under  the  con- 
ditions above  outlined.  Of  course  the  absence  of  the  oath  of 
the  party  who  has  made  the  entry  may  detract  from  its  evi- 
dential force,  and  in  such  circumstances  his  personal  repre- 
sentative should  be  called  upon  to  show,  so  far  as  he  knows 
the  books  are  the  actual  books  of  deceased,  that  the  entries 
are  original  and  contemporaneous3  and  any  other  facts  neces- 
sary to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  admission  of  such  evidence. 
So  the  handwriting  of  the  party  who  has  made  the  entry 
must  be  proven.4  The  same  principles  apply  where  the  party 
is  a  lunatic,  if  that  fact  and  the  identity  of  the  handwriting 
be  shown.5  A  party's  own  entries  are  not  universally  admis- 
sible in  his  favor  at  common  law,  and  in  many  instances  where 
they  have  become  admissible  their  admission  is  founded  on 
the  necessity  of  the  case  and  is  due  to  a  statutory  modifica- 


1  Lewis  v.  Meginnis,  30  Fla.  419 
Goodwin  v.  O'Brien,  6  N.  Y.  S.  239 
Rexford  v.  Comstock,  3  N.  Y.  S.  876 
Vaugh  v.  Strong,  4  N.  Y.  S.  689 
Ailing  v.  Wenzel,  27  111.  App.  511 
Churchman  v.  Smith,  6  Whart.  106 
Hancock  v.  Flynn,  8  N.  Y.  S.  133 
White  v.  Whitney,  22  Pac.  Rep.  1138 


2  Baldridge  v.  Pen  land,  66  Tex.  441 ; 
Dwinel  v.  Pottle,  3  Me.  167 ;  Painer 
v.  Hodge,  71  N.  Y.  598;  Guy  v. 
Mead,  22  id.  462. 

3  Pratt  v.  White,  132  Mass.  478; 
Davis  v.  San  ford,  9  Allen,  216. 

4  Kinney  v.  United  States,  54  Fed. 
Rep.    312;    McLellan    v.    Crofton,   6 


82  Cal.  163.  In  Stuckslager  v.  Neel,  Greenl.  307 ;  Chipman  v.  Kellogg,  60 
123  Pa  St.  60,  it  was  held  that  a  Mich.  438.  Contra,  Bowers  v.  Over- 
party's  books  are  not  admissible  to  field,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  273. 
prove  the  sale  of  an  article  not  dealt  5Holbrook  v.  Gay,  6  Cush.  215. 
in  by  him  in  the  usual  course  of  See  1  Smith's  Lead.  Cases,  139,  note 
business.  So  in  Baldridge  v.  Pen-  to  case  of  Price  v.  Tarrington. 
land,  68  Tex.  441 ;  4  S.  W.  Rep.  565. 


84 


HEARSAY. 


[§60. 


tion  of  the  common  law,  and  not  entirely  to  the  fact  that  the 
entries  constitute  a  part  of  the  res  gestae. 

A  full  discussion  of  the  statutory  rules  being  impossible  here, 
the  reader  is  referred  to  the  cases  cited  in  the  notes  and  to  the 
statutes  of  his  own  state  for  a  further  elucidation  of  the  sub- 
ject.1 

Books  of  account  not  regularly  kept,  or  in  which  only  a  few 
or  only  occasional  entries  are  made,  are  not  admissible.2  But 
the  circumstance  that  a  party's  books  are  largely  in  the  hand- 
writing of  some  third  person  is  immaterial.3  Testimony  of 
this  sort,  in  order  to  be  admissible,  must  be  contained  in  books 
of  original  entry,  though  upon  the  question  what  shall  consti- 
tute a  book  of  original  entry  the  courts  are  by  no  means  har- 
monious.4 If  books  are  kept  regularly,  so  that  the  memo- 
randa or  slips  upon  which  the  earliest  entries  are  made  are 
immediately  transcribed  into  the  books  of  account,  then  the 


1 1  Greenl.  on  Evict,  §  118,  citing 
Vosburg  v.  Thayer,  12  Johns.  261; 
Prince  v.  Smith,  4  Mass.  455 ;  Burns 
v.  Fay.  14  Pick.  8;  Richards  v.  How- 
ard, 2  Nott.  &  McC.  474 ;  Winsor  v 
Dillaway,  4  Met.  221 ;  Kerr  v.  Love, 
1  Wash.  172 ;  Lonergan  v.  Whitehead, 
10  Watts,  249  ;  Newton  v.  Higgins,  2 
Vt.  366;  Dunn  v.  Whitney,  10  Me.  9; 
Green  v.  Pratt,  11  Conn.  205;  Prest 
v.  Mersereau,  10  N.  J.  L.  268 ;  Gau- 
ther  v.  Jenks,  76  Mich.  510;  In  re 
Simpson,  5  N.  Y.  S.  868;  Watrous  v. 
Cunningham,  71  Cal.  32;  Rumsey  v. 
N.  Y.  &  N.  J.  Tel.  Co.,  49  N.  J.  L.  323 ; 
Roche  v.  Ware,  71  Cal.  375 ;  Setchel 
v.  Keigvvin,  57  Conn.  478;  Green  v. 
Mill,  60  Vt.  442;  Woolsey  v.  Bohn, 
41  Minn.  237;  Ailing  v.  Wenzel,  27 
111.  A  pp.  516.  In  Missouri  a  party's 
hooks  are  not  admissible  in  his  favor. 
Nipper  v.  Jones,  27  Mo.  App.  558. 

-Nat.  Ulster  Co.  Bank  v.  Madden, 
114  N.  Y.  280;  Kibbe  v.  Bancroft,  17 
111.  18;  Godding  v.  Orcutt,  44  Vt. 
54 ;  Korwitz  v.  Wright,  37  Tex.  82 ; 
McNulty's  Appeal,  135  Pa.  St  210. 


3Vosburgh  v.  Thayer,  12  JoIids. 
461 ;  Young  v.  Luce,  66  Hun,  631. 
Entries  in  a  depositor's  pass-book 
are  not  admissible  in  a  suit  by  the 
bank  against  a  third  person,  as  the 
book  is  not  a  book  of  original  entry. 
Wills  Pt.  Bank  v.  Bates,  72  Tex.  137. 
But  contra  in  Kux  v.  Central  M. 
Sav.  Bank,  93  Mich.  511;  Goff  v. 
Stoughton  St.  Bank,  54  N.  W.  Rep. 
732,  where  the  suit  was  by  the  de- 
positor against  the  bank. 

4  Where  it  is  sought  to  prove  a 
charge  or  debt,  mere  memoranda, 
such  as  would  be  made  upon  the 
stubs  of  a  check-book  or  in  an  order- 
book,  are  not  admissible.  Flood  v. 
Mitchell,  68  N.  Y  507;  Moore  v. 
Meacham,  10  id.  207 ;  Cooper  v.  Mor- 
rell,  4  Yeates,  341.  But  a  bank  check 
drawn  by  a  decedent  is  admissible  in 
an  action  against  his  estate  to  show 
payments  made  by  him  to  the  plaint- 
iff. Jesse  v.  Davis,  34  Mo.  App.  341. 
If  the  book  is  mutilated  it  may  be 
excluded.  Lovelock  v.  Gregg,  14 
Colo.  53. 


§  60.]  HEARSAY.  85 

latter  of  course  become  books  of  original  entry  and  are  unob- 
jectionable.1 But  where  the  books  are  written  up  at  short 
and  regular  intervals  —  as,  for  example,  at  the  close  of  each 
day's  business,  or  on  the  following  da}7  —  from  written  memo- 
randa made  at  the  precise  time  of  the  transaction,  the  books 
cannot  be  rejected  because  of  an  alleged  lack  of  originality.2 
The  principle  of  law  that  in  the  case  of  an  entry  made  by 
an  employee  in  the  party's  own  books  the  employee  must 
have  a  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts  he  records  has  been 
somewhat  modified  from  necessity  where  numerous  entries 
involving  many  details  are  in  question.  Thus  in  large  com- 
mercial undertakings,  where  many  laborers  are  employed  or 
where  very  many  sales  and  deliveries  of  goods  are  made,  it  is 
not  possible  for  the  book-keeper  to  have  a  personal  knowl- 
edge of  every  transaction,  and  he  is  compelled  to  rely  upon  a 
fellowr-servant,  as  a  time-keeper  or  salesman,  for  his  information. 
Such  entries,  made  in  the  course  of  business,  are  admissible 
if  corroborated  by  the  evidence  of  both  employees  to  the  ef- 
fect that  they  made  true  and  accurate  reports  and  entries  in 
the  course  of  the  performance  of  their  duty  to  the  master.3 
The  entry  need  not  be  a  complete  statement  of  the  transac- 

1  So  a  book  into  which  entries  were  But  a  ledger  is  not  a  book  of  original 
regularly  made  from  way-bills  by  the  entry.  Jilmar  v.  Schell,  35  N.  Y. 
freight  agent  is  admissible  without  Sup.  Ct.  67;  Lawhorn  v.  Carter,  11 
producing  .the    bills.     Robinson    v.  Bush  (Ky.),  7. 

Mulder,  81  Mich.  75.  3  New  York  City  v.  Second  Av.  R. 

2  Walter  v.  Bolman,  8  Watts,  544;  R.  Co.,  102  N.  Y.  579;  Nat.  Ulster 
Boggan  v.  Horn,  97  N.  C.  268;  Lur-  Bank  v.  Madden.  114  id.  283;  Bed- 
ren  v.  Crawford,  4  S.  &  R.  3,  5;  ford  v.  Sherman,  68  How.  312;  Rudd 
Wxoolsey  v.  Boon,  41  Minn.  235 ;  v.  Robinson,  7  N.  Y.  S.  535 ;  Young 
Faxon  v.  Hollis,  13  Mass.  427 ;  Taylor  v.  Luce,  66  How.  631 ;  Morris  v.  Mor- 
v.  Davis  (Wis.,  1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  ton  (Ky.,  1893).  20  S.  W.  Rep.  287; 
756;  Patton  v.  Ryan,  4  Rawle,  408;  Taylor  v.  Davis  (Wis.,  1892),  52  N.  W. 
Hartley  v.  Brooks,  6  Whart.  189;  Rep.  756;  Nelson  v.  New  York,  131 
Moses  v.  Penquit,  82  Ala.  370;  34  N.  N.  Y.  4.  The  circumstance  that  de- 
W.  Rep.  445 ;  Stroud  v.  Tilton,  4  fendant  has  recognized  the  accuracy 
Abb.  (N.  Y.)  App.  324 ;  Jeffries  v.  of  the  books  of  the  plaintiff  in  trans- 
Urmy,  3  Houst.  (Del.)  653 ;  Barker  v.  actions  with  other  persons  is  ma- 
Haskell,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  218 ;  Kent  v.  terial  as  bearing  on  their  admissi- 
Garvin,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  148;  Hall  bility.  West  v.  Van  Tuyl,  119  N.  Y. 
v.  Glidden,  39  Me.  445;  Powers  v.  620;  Pub.  Ass'n  v.  Fisher  (Mich., 
Savin,  28  Abb.  N.  C.  463.  Contra,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  759. 
Robertson  v.  Reed,  38  Mo.  App.  32. 


86  HEARSAY.  [§  61. 

tion,  for  books  which  only  contain  marks,  signs  or  figures  are 
admissible,  provided  there  is  other  evidence  which  will  ren- 
der these  entries  intelligible  and  show  their  explanatory  con- 
nection with  the  main  transaction.1  So  the  fact  that  the  ac- 
count is  kept  by  notches  cut  in  a  stick,2  or  is  marked  on  a 
slate3  or  board  with  a  piece  of  chalk,4  will  not  render  the 
book  into  which  it  is  transferred  inadmissible.  So  the  fact 
that  a  written  entry  is  in  cipher  will  not  cause  its  exclusion.5 

Mere  memoranda  of  transactions  in  dispute,  made  in  books 
or  on  loose  papers,  made  for  the  purpose  not  of  charging 
either  party,  but  merely  to  aid  the  memory  of  the  person 
making  them,  are  not,  it  has  been  sometimes  held,  admissible 
as  independent  evidence,  but  may  be  read  by  the  witness  to 
refresh  his  memory.  He  will  then  be  required  to  testify  of 
his  own  knowledge  to  the  facts  and  transactions  which  are 
contained  in  his  memoranda.6 

§  61.  Indorsements  as  part  of  the  res  gesta?. —  Under  the 
rule  of  the  res  gestce  is  included  the  acknowledgment  of  a 
partial  payment  indorsed  by  the  holder  of  negotiable  paper 
upon  the  note  or  other  security.  Such  an  indorsement,  tend- 
ing to  show  payment  by  the  creditor  or  maker  of  the  negoti- 
able paper,  is  admissible  evidence  of  his  acknowledgment  of 
the  debt,  and  the  effect  of  such  part  payment  may  be  to  pre- 
vent the  note  from  being  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitation. 
If,  therefore,  a  note  so  indorsed  be  offered  in  evidence,  it  will 
be  presumed,  in  the  absence  of  circumstances  to  the  contrary, 
that  the  receipt  was  indorsed  at  the  time  of  the  payment 
according  to  the  ordinary  and  well-recognized  mercantile  cus- 
tom, and  that  the  payment  was  actually  made.7    The  indorse- 

i  Miller  v.  Shay,  145  Mass.  162 ;  13  s  Monroe  v.  Snow,  131  111.  126. 

N.  E.  Rep.  468 ;  Springs  v.  Schenck,  6  Bonnett  v.  Glatfeldt,  120  111.  166 ; 

106   N.    C.    153;  Pratt  v.  White,    132  Baum  v.  Reay,  96  Cal.  642;  Bates  v. 

Mass.  477.  Sabin,   64  Vt.    511 ;  Bates  v.   Preble 

2  Kendall  v.  Field,  14  Me.  30.  (U.  S.,  1894),  12  S.  Ct.  277 ;  Whitaker 

3  Faxon   v.    Hollis,    13    Mass.    42;  v.  White,  69   Hun,   288;  Cunard   v. 
Kendall  v.  Field,  14  Me.  30.  Manhattan,   1   Misc.   Rep.    151.    See 

*  Smith   v.   Sanford,  12  Pick.  139;  post,  §§337,  338. 

Pallman  v.  Smith  (Pa.,  1890),  19  Atl.  "Nichols  v.  Webb,  8  Wheat.  326; 

Rep.  891 ;  Crane  Lumber  Co.  v.  Otter  Whitney  v.   Bigelow,   4   Pick.    110; 

Creek  Lumber   Co.   (Mich.,  1890),  44  Manson  v.  Lancey,  84  Me.  389 ;   Gib- 

N.  W.  Rep.  788 ;  Barker  v.  Haskell,  9  son  v.  Peebles,  2  McCord,  418. 
Cush.  218. 


§  61.]  HEARSAY.  87 

merit  thus  being  a  part  of  the  res  gestae,  i.  e.t  the  act  of  pay- 
ment, it  is  admissible  as  original  evidence  for  the  creditor  to 
show  an  acknowledgment  of  the  debt  by  the  debtor.1  "When, 
however,  the  statute  has  run  upon  the  instrument,  a  subse- 
quent indorsement  by  the  creditor  purporting  to  show  a  part 
payment  by  the  debtor  will  be  to  so  large  a  degree  in  the  in- 
terest of  the  former  that  no  presumption  of  payment  will 
arise.  Under  these  circumstances  he  will  be  compelled  to 
prove  actual  payment  by  evidence  extrinsic  to  this  indorse- 
ment.2 

»  McCrillis  v.  Millard,  24  Atl.  Rep.  boom  v.  Billington,  17  Johns.  182 ; 

576;    17  R   I.   724;    Oughterson  v.  In  re  Clapsaddle,  24  N.  Y.  S.  313; 

Clark,  65  Hun,  624.  4  Misc.  Rep.  355. 

2 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  121 ;  Rose- 


CHAPTER  Y. 


ADMISSIONS. 


§  65.    Definition  and  character. 
66.     Privity  as  affecting  admissions. 

Parties  whose  admission  is  re- 
ceived —  Joint  interest,  when 
required. 

Admissions  of  partners — Their 
effect  after  dissolution. 

Declarations  of  conspirators. 

Assignor  and  assignee. 

Wife's  admission — When  bind- 
ing on  husband. 

Admissions  of  inhabitants  of 
towns. 

Admissions  of  strangers  to  the 
record  —  Principal  and 
surety  —  Admissions  of  real 
parties. 
73a.  The  declarations  of  agents. 
74.  Admissions  by  attorneys  of 
record. 


07. 


08. 

09. 

70. 
71. 

72. 

73. 


§75. 


76. 

77. 

78. 

79. 

80. 

81. 

82. 

83. 
84. 
85. 


Offers  of  compromise  —  Ad- 
missions under  duress  against 
interest. 

Admissions  in  pleadings. 

Admissions  by  reference  — 
Awards. 

Admissions  from  conduct  and 
assumed  character. 

Self-serving  declarations. 

Mode  of  proof  —  Nature  of  the 
admissions. 

Weight  and  sufficiency  of  ad- 
missions. 

Admissions,  when  conclusive — 
Mistake. 

Estoppel  defined. 

Intention  of  party  estopped. 

Admissions  and  communica- 
tions sent  and  received  by 
telephone. 


§  65.  Definition  and  character. —  An  admission  is  a  con- 
cession or  voluntary  acknowledgment  made  by  a  party  of  the 
existence  or  truth  of  certain  facts.1  The  reception  of  admis. 
sions  as  evidence  constitutes  an  exception  to  the  rejection  of 
hearsay  evidence  and  depends  upon  well-recognized  principles 
of  justice  and  of  public  policy  by  which  men  are  prevented 
from  taking  advantage  of  their  acts  or  statements  intended  to 
promote  their  own  interests  without  being  compelled  to  as- 
sume full  responsibility  for  them  so  far  as  they  control  or 
even  influence  the  affairs  of  other  men.  The  facts  to  which 
the  admission  made  by  a  party  refers  are  peculiarly  within 
his  own  knowledge.  This  circumstance,  with  the  indisposi- 
tion of  men  to  admit  things  which  are  against  their  interests, 
lends  weight  and  credibility  to  this  description  of  evidence. 

The  word  "  admissions  "  is  confined  to  statements  made  or 


1  Bouvier's  Law  Diet 


§  (50.]  ADMISSIONS.  8D 

conduct  occurring  in  transactions  not  criminal,  and,  for  con- 
venience sake,  they  may  be  divided  into  direct,  i.  e.,  express 
admissions,  incidental  admissions,  and  implied  admissions. 

In  implied  admissions  are  included  all  those  that  may  be 
inferred  from  the  conduct  or  character  of  the  party,  from  his 
act  or  omission,  or  from  his  acquiescence  and  silence  under 
circumstances  where  it  is  his  duty  to  speak  or  act.1 

The  form  of  the  declaration  is  not  material  if  its  terms  are 
clear  and  binding-  upon  the  party  making  them  or  upon  those 
in  privity  with  him.  Thus,  where  defendant  made  statements 
over  a  telephone,  the  witness  was  permitted  to  give  evidence 
of  them  upon  his  testifying  that  he  knew  and  could  distin- 
guish defendant's  voice.2 

§  6G.  Privity  as  affecting  admissions. —  By  privity  is  meant 
a  mutual  or  successive  relationship  to  the  same  rights  of  prop- 
erty,3 and  this  relationship  presupposes  such  an  identity  of 
interest  that  the  admission  of  one  privy  is  by  the  law  regarded 
as  the  admission  of  all  the  others.4  If  a  party  has  limited  or 
qualified  his  own  rights  of  enjoyment  or  ownership  over  prop-  , 
erty,  it  is  only  just  that  those  who  enjoy  those  rights  concur- 
rently with  him,  or  who  succeed  to  them,  should  in  accepting 
the  benefits  be  burdened  with  the  disadvantages  and  responsi- 
bilities. Thus  the  declarations  of  the  ancestor  or  of  a  testator  or 
grantor  in  disparagement  of  the  title  by  which  he  holds,  made 
during  the  period  he  is  owner  of  the  property,  are  binding 
upon  the  heirs,  executors  or  devisees  or  grantees  respectively.5 
But  the  declarations  of  a  grantor  of  real  property,  made  sub- 
sequent to  the  date  on  which  he  parted  with  his  title,  are 
never  admissible  against  subsequent  purchasers,  even  though 
the  declarations  refer  to  the  condition  and  boundaries  of  the 
land  as  it  was  while  he  was  the  owner  of  it.6    So  where  a  per- 

i  See  §§  18,  83.  han,  94  111.  142 :  Miller  v.  Ternane,  50 

2  Stepp  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  App#  N.  J.  L.  32 ;  Platner  v.  Platner,   78 

349.  N.  Y.  90 ;  Wood  v.  Fisk,  62  N.  H.  173 ; 

s  Co.  Lit.  271a;  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.>  Whitman  v.  Haywood,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 

§189.  166;  77  Tex.    157;  Lewis  v.  Adams, 

*  See  post,  §§  68-73a.  61  Ga.  549 ;  Stockwell  v.  Blarney,  129 

5  Leggat  v.  Leggat  (Mont.,  1893),  33  Mass.  312. 
Pac.  Rep.  5 ;  Snow  v.  Starr,  12  S.  W.        8  Hills  v.  Ludwig,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  596 ; 

Rep.    673;  75    Tex.    411;    Pierce    v.  46  Ohio  St.  513;  Casto  v.  Fry,  10  S.  E. 

Robert,    57    Conn.    31 ;    Hughes    v.  Rep.  799 ;  33  W.  Va.  449 ;  Bentley  v. 

Boone,  102  N.  C.  137;  Mueller  v.  Rel-  O'Brien,  111  111.  53;  Taylor  v.  Dev- 


90  ADMISSIONS.  [§  07. 

son  admitted  that  he  held  the  land  as  a  tenant,  his  declaration 
will  be  binding  upon  his  heir  or  devisee  l  in  an  action  against 
the  latter  to  recover  the  land. 

The  adverse  and  continuous  character  of  one's  possession 
may  in  like  manner  be  shown  by  the  declaration  of  a  grantor 
on  whose  alleged  title  the  plaintiff  in  ejectment  founds  his.8 
So  where  a  question  of  boundary  is  concerned,  the  declara- 
tions of  a  former  owner,  made  while  in  possession  of  the  land, 
I  are  always  admissible  against  a  subsequent  purchaser.3 

§  67.  Parties  Avhose  admission  is  received  —  Joint  inter- 
est, when  required. —  The  admissions  of  a  party  to  the  record 
or  of  one  identified  in  interest  with  him  are  receivable  against 
him,  as  a  general  rule.  Though  several  persons  may  sue  or 
be  sued,  the  admission  of  one,  though  receivable  against  him, 
will  not  bind  the  others  unless  a  joint  interest  or  privity  exists 
between  them.4  A  mere  community  of  interest  is  not  enough. 
But  where  the  required  joint  interest  exists,  the  admission  of 
one  of  the  parties,  made  in  the  prosecution  of  the  common 
undertaking  and  within  its  scope,  is  receivable  in  evidence 
against  any  or  all  of  his  associates.5     So,  because  the  neccs- 

erell,  43  Kan.  469;  Walker  v.  Cole  4Petrie  v.  Williams,  68  Hun,  589; 
(Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  76.  Contra,  23  N.  Y.  S.  237 ;  Thompson  v.  Rich- 
Hart  v.  Randolph  (111.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  ards,  14  Mich.  172;  State  v.  Ah  Tom, 
Rep.  517.  8  Nev.  213;  Grace  v.  Nesbitt,  109 
i  Fellows  v.  Smith,  130  Mass.  78.  Mo.  3 ;  Burnham  v.  Svveatt,  16  N.  H. 

2  Alexander  v.  Caldwell,  55  Ala.  418;  Bensley  v.  Brockway,  27  111. 
217;  Stockton  v.  Staples  (Cal.,  1893),  App.  410;  Dan  v.  Brown,  4  Cow. 
32  Pac.  Rep.  936 ;  Hurley  v.  Lockett,  (N.  Y.)  483 ;  Lenhart  v.  Allen,  32  Pa. 
72  Tex.  262 ;  Parrott  v.  Baker,  82  Ga.  St.  312 ;  McElroy  v.  Ludlum,  32  N.  J. 
364;  Lawrence  v.  Wilson  (Mass.,  Eq.  828;  Morris  v.  Nixon,  1  How. 
1894),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  858.  (U.  S.)    118;    Redding  v.  Wright,  49 

3  Wood  v.  Fiske,  62  N.  H.  173 ;  Whit-  Minn.  322 ;  Leeds  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co., 
man  v.  Haygood,  77  Tex.  557.     "  On  2  Wheat.  (IT.  S.)  380  ;    Kiser  v.  Dan- 

.'  a  question  of  private  boundary,  deck-  nenburg,  88  Ga.  541 ;  Roberts  v.  Ken- 
rations  of  a  particular  fact,  as  dis-  dall,  3  Ind.  App.  339 ;  Thurman  v. 
tinguished  from  reputation,  made  by  Blankenship-Blake  Co.,  79  Tex.  171. 
a  deceased  person,  are  not  admissible  s  See  post,  §§  68,  69,  71,  73a; 
unless  it  is  shown  that  such  person  Collett  v.  Smith,  143  Mass.  473 ; 
had  knowledge  of  that  whereof  he  Vankleck  v.  McClabe,  87  Mich.  599 ; 
spoke,  and  was  on  the  land  or  in  9  N.  W.  Rep.  872.  Cf.  Rich  v.  Flan- 
possession  of  it  when  the  declaration  ders,  39  N.  H.  304 ;  Carson  v.  Gillitt, 
was  made  as  part  of  the  res  gestce."  2  N.  D.  255 ;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  710 ;  Web- 
Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  363,  ster  v.  Stearns,  44  N.  H.  498 ;  McKee 
364.  v.  Hamilton,  33  Ohio  St  7 ;  Peyson 


§  67.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


91 


sary  joint  interest  is  lacking,  it  has  been  held  that  the  ad- 
mission of  a  tenant  in  common  is  not  receivable  against  his 
fellow-tenants,1  nor  of  an  executor,  trustee  or  administrator 
against  those  officially  associated  with  him,2  nor  of  an  heir  or 
devisee  to  bind  the  other  heirs  or  devisees.3  So  no  joint 
interest  exists  between  successive  indorsers,4  or  between  a 
promisor  and  an  executor  of  a  co-promisor;5  between  an  ad- 
ministrator and  an  heir  of  the  intestate;6  between  remainder- 
man and  life-tenant;7  among  co-underwriters;8  between  the 
person  assured  and  the  beneficiary,9  or  among  directors 10  or 
stockholders  of  a  corporation  u  which  will  render  the  admis- 
sion of  one  receivable  as  evidence  against  the  others.12 


v.  Meyers,  63  Hun,  634;  Lewis  v. 
McGinnis,  30  Fla.  419;  Mathews  v. 
Herdtfelder,  15  N.  Y.  S.  165. 

i  Bryant  v.  Booze,  55  Ga.  438 ;  Mc- 
Lellan  v.  Cox,  36  Me.  95 ;  Page  v. 
S  wanton,  39  Me.  400 ;  Dobson  v.  Ku- 
hula,  66  Hun,  627 ;  Lyons  v.  Pyatt 
(N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  834 ;  Ronne- 
baum  v.  Mt  Auburn  Ry.  Co.,  29 
Weekly  L  Bui.  338 ;  Talkin  v.  An- 
derson (Tex.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  350 ; 
Eakle  v.  Clark,  30  Md.  322 ;  Dan  v. 
Brown,  4  Cow.  (N.  J.)  483. 

-Weyman  v.  Thompson,  25  Atl. 
Rep.  205;  Dye  v.  Young,  55  Iowa, 
433;  McMillan  v.  McDill,  110  111.  47; 
Prewet  v.  Coopwood,  30  Miss.  369; 
Thompson  v.  Thompson,  13  Ohio  St. 
356 ;  La  Bau  v.  Vanderbilt,  3  Redf. 
(N.  Y.)  384 ;  Forney  v.  Terrell,  4  W. 
Va.  729 ;  Hayes  v.  Burkam,  67  Ind. 
359 ;  Prewet  v.  Land,  36  Miss.  495 ; 
Hamberger  v.  Root,  6  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 
431 ;  Irwin  v.  West,  81  Pa.  St.  157 ; 
Elwood  v.  Diefendorf,  5  Barb.  498. 

3  Roberts  v.  Trawick,   13  Ala.  68 
Berden  v.   Allen,   10    111.   App.    91 
Church  v.  Howard,  79  N.  Y.   415 
O'Conner  v.  Madison  (Mich.,  1894),  57 
N.  W.  Rep.  105 ;  Walk  up  v.  Pratt,  5 
Harr.  &  J.  (Md.)  41 ;  Hueston  v.  Hues- 
ton,  2  Ohio  St.  488 ;  Tinnern  v.  Hinz, 
38    Hun    (N.   Y.),    465;     Hamon   v. 
Huntley,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  493 ;  Walker 


v.  Dunspaugh,  20  N.  Y.  170 ;  Pease  v. 
Phelps,  10  Conn.  62.  The  declaration 
of  a  legatee  who  it  is  claimed  ob- 
tained the  will  by  the  employment 
of  undue  influence  is  not  admissible 
in  a  contest  to  set  it  aside  where 
other  legatees  are  mentioned.  Liv- 
ingston's Appeal,  26  Atl.  Rep.  470 
(Conn.,  1893) ;  In  re  Baird,  47  Hun,  77. 

4  Slaymaker  v.  Gundackei-,  10  S.  & 
R  (Pa.)  75. 

5  Hathaway  v.  Haskell,  9  Pick. 
(Mass.)  42 ;  Slater  v.  Lawson,  B.  &  Ad. 
396 ;  Atkins  v.  Tregold,  2  B.  &  C.  23. 

6  Lawrence  v.  Wilson  (Mass.,  1894), 
35  N.  E.  Rep.  858. 

'Hill  v.  Roderick,  4  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 
221 ;  McCune  v.  McCune,  29  Mo.  117 ; 
Pool  v.  Morris,  29  Ga.  374. 

8  Lambert  v.  Smith,  1  Cranch(U.  S.), 
361. 

9  Supreme  Lodge  v.  Schmidt,  98 
Ind.  374. 

io  Eakle  v.  Clarke,  30  Md.  322;  Bry- 
ant v.  Booze,  55  Ga.  438. 

"Hartford  Bank  v.  Hart,  3  Day 
(Conn.),  495. 

12  The  admissions  of  a  judgment 
debtor  are  not  binding  on  the  cred- 
itor or  his  assignee.  Tisch  v.  Utz, 
21  Atl.  Rep.  808  (Pa.,  1890),  28  W.  N. 
C.  55.  C/.  1  Addison  on  Cont.,  78-88, 
and  1  Pars,  on  Cont.,  11,  for  test  be- 
tween joint  and  common  interests. 


92  admissions.  [§  68. 

§68.  Admissions  of  partners  —  Their  effect  when  made 
after  dissolution. —  If  individuals  are  associated  together  with 
a  common  design  in  view,  the  law,  presuming  that  the  ben- 
efits, if  any,  which  will  inure  from  its  accomplishment  will  be 
shared  by  all,  will  not  permit  any  member  of  the  combina- 
tion to  escape  the  consequences  of  the  acts  or  declarations  of 
those  joined  with  him.1  Thus,  the  declarations  or  acts  of  a 
partner  made  during  the  existence  of  the  partnership,  apper- 
taining to  its  affairs  and  within  its  scope,  and  calculated  to 
advance  the  interests  of  the  firm,  will  bind  all  his  associates, 
the  law  regarding  each  partner  as  the  agent  of  all  so  far  as  the 
firm's  affairs  are  concerned.2  The  fact  of  the  existence  of  the 
partnership  must,  however,  be  established,  at  least  prima 
facie,  by  other  evidence,  or  the  declarations,  which  are  ad- 
mitted only  because  contemporaneous  with  it,  will  be  rejected.' 
Accordingly,  where  the  execution  of  a  note  was  in  issue  in  an 
action  against  alleged  partners,  the  admission  of  its  signature 
by  one  was  not  sufficient  to  enable  plaintiff  to  recover,  though 
the  signature  of  the  others  had  been  proved,  in  the  absence  of 
other  proof  of  an  existing  partnership.4  But  by  suing  or  de- 
fending as  partners  the  existence  of  the  joint  interest  is  in- 
cidentally admitted,5  and  also  if  each  individual  admits  in 
turn  that  he  is  a  partner  with  the  others,  such  an  admission, 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  111.     See,  People  v.  Stanley,  47  Cal.  113;  Berry 

also,  post,  §  69.  v.   Lathrop,   24  Ark.    12 ;    Alcott  v. 

2  Weed  v.  Kellogg,  6  McLean  (U.S.),  Strong,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  323;  Humes 

44;  Hunter  v.  Hubbard,  26  Tex.  537:  v.  O'Brien,  74  Ala.  64;  Vanway  v. 

Mamlock  v.  White,  20  Cal.  598 ;  Park  Klein,  122  Ind.  416 ;  Rich  v.  Flanders. 

v.  Wooton,  35  Ala.   242 ;  Munson  v.  39  N.  H.  304 ;  Cowen   v.  Kinney,  33 

Wickwire,  21  Conn.  513;  Holmes  v.  Ohio  St.  422;  Buckman  v.  Barnum, 

Budd,  11  Iowa,  186;  Collett  v.  Smith,  15  Conn.   68;  Clark  v.  Hoffaker,  26 

143  Mass.  473 ;  Rich  v.  Flanders,  39  Mo.    264 ;    Winchester  v.   Whitney, 

N.  H.  304 ;  McKee  v.  Hamilton,  33  138  Mass.  549 ;  Jones  v.  O'Farrell,  1 

Ohio  St.  7 ;  Hutzler  v.  Hubbard,  26  Nev.  354 ;  Henry  v.  Willard,  73  N.  C. 

Tex.   537;  Peden   v.    Mail,  118  Ind.  35;    Cowan  v.  Kinney.  33  Ohio  St 

560 ;  Brunei-  v.  Nesbitt,  31  111.  App.  423 ;  McCorkle   v.    Doby,    1   Strobh. 

517 ;  Coit  v.  Tracy,  8  Conn.  268 ;  Boyd  (S.  C.)  396 ;  Bensley  v.  Brockway,  27 

v.  Thompson,  153  Pa.  St.  78;  Begg  v.  111.  App.  410. 

Blake,  6  Q.  B.  126;  Schull's  Appeal,        *  Conley  v.  Jennings,  22  111.  App. 

115  Pa.  St  141 ;  Pierce  v.  Roberts,  57  547 ;  Gay  v.  Palmer,  1  Esp.  135.    But 

Conn.  40 ;  Allen  v.  Clark,  66  Hun,  see,  contra,  Fleming  v.  Stearns  (Iowa, 

628.  1890),  44  N.  W.  Rep.  376. 

s  Kelly   v.   People,   55  N.  Y.  565 ;        s  Lucas  v.  De  Cour,  1  M.  &  S.  249. 


§  68.]  ADMISSIONS.  93 

it  is  held,  will  be  sufficient  to  establish  the  joint  relation 
against  all.1 

It  is  well  settled  that  a  partner  has  no  implied  power  to 
bind  the  firm  by  any  sealed  instrument,2  though  a  document 
which  merely  releases  an  existing  obligation  without  creating 
a  new  one  is  not  inoperative  merely  because  under  seal.3  It 
would  seem  logical,  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  to  the 
contrary,  that  on  the  dissolution  of  the  partnership  an  indi- 
vidual's declarations  relating  to  the  business  of  the  firm  would 
be  no  longer  binding  upon  those  with  whom  he  had  been  but 
was  not  now  associated.4  But  where  such  declaration  is  con- 
nected with  a  firm  transaction  which  took  place  before  the 
dissolution,  it  has  been  received  in  evidence  as  binding  on  the 
other  partners.5 

Upon  the  question  whether  an  acknowledgment  or  part 
payment  of  a  debt  after  dissolution  will  revive  a  debt  barred 
by  the  statute  of  limitation,  the  cases  are  not  altogether  har- 
monious. If  the  acknowledgment  be  regarded  as  a  new  con- 
tract, the  original  debt  being  extinct  and  the  cause  of  action 
gone,  the  declaration  cannot  be  admissible  as  evidence  against 
the  partners,  though  the  declarant  has  been  intrusted  with  the 
liquidation  of  the  firm's  affairs.  The  power  to  distribute  the 
effects  of  the  firm  and  to  settle  its  affairs  by  discharging  its 
valid  debts  does  not  confer  a  power  to  bind  its  members  by  a 

1  Edwards  v.  Tracy,  62  Pa.  St.  374.        ^So  a  partner  may,  after  dissolu- 

2Massey  v.  Pike,  20  Ark.  92;  Sib-  tiou,  waive  demand  and   notice  on 

ley  v.  Young,  26  S.  C.  415;  McDon-  paper  indorsed  by  the  firm.    Darling 

aldson  v.  Eggleston,  26  Vt.  154.  v.    Marsh,   22    Me.    184;    Seldner  v. 

3  Morse  v.  Bellows,  7  N.  H.  549;  Bank.  66  Md.  88.  See  generally, 
Pierson  v.  Hooker,  3  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  Harding  v.  Butler,  30  N.  E.  Rep.  168; 
68;  Fox  v.  Norton,  9  Mich.  207.  156  Mass.  34;  Beitz  v.  Fuller,  1  Mc- 

4  Hopkins  v.  Bank,  7  Cowen,  650 ;  Cord,  541;  Lefavour  v.  Yandes,  2 
Curry  v.  White,  51  Cal.  530 :  Miller  Blackf.  240 ;  Walden  v.  Sherbourne, 
v.  Neimerick,  19  111.  172;  Craig  v.  15  Johns.  409:  Loomis  v.  Loom  is,  26 
Alvarson,  6  J.  J.  Marsh.  (Ky.)  609 ;  Vt.  198 ;  Pierce  v.  Wood,  23  N.  H. 
Rowland  v.  Boozer,  10  Ala.  690;  519;  Nalle  v.  Gates,  20  Tex.  315; 
Johnson  v.  Marsh,  2  La.  Ann.  772 ;  Curry  v.  Kurtz,  33  Miss.  24 ;  Meyers 
Flanagin  v.  Champion,  1  Green  Ch.  v.  Stand  art,  11  Ohio  St.  39.  After 
(N.  J.)  51 ;  Winslow  v.  Tulan,  48  111.  dissolution  a  partner  cannot  confess 
145;  Stockton  v.  Johnson,  6  B.  Mon.  judgment  against  the  firm  (Mair  v. 
(Ky.)  409  ;  Hogg  v.  Orgill,  34  Pa.  St.  Beck,  2  Atl.  Rep.  218),  though  he  may 
344;  Baker  v.  Stockpoole,  9  Cosv.  (N.  compromise  the  firm's  debts.  Can- 
Y.)  420;  Maxey  v.  Strong,  53  Mo.  280.  non  v.  Wildman,  28  Conn.  472. 


94 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§69. 


new  promise  or  to  charge  them  with  new  debts.1  There  are 
some  early  cases  which  support  a  contrary  rule  upon  the  er- 
roneous supposition  that  the  acknowledgment  does  not  create 
a  new  debt  but  merely  continues  one  already  existing.2 

The  weight  of  the  decisions  sustains  the  proposition  that  an 
acknowledgment  or  part  payment  after  dissolution  before  the 
debt  has  become  barred  is  not  admissible  to  extend  the  time 
of  limitation,3  though  the  opposite  theory,  that  as  paying 
debts  is  included  in  the  power  to  wind  up  the  firm  affairs,  a 
part  pa}mient  with  partnership  funds  is  valid  to  bar  the  stat- 
ute as  against  the  other  partners,  is  not  without  support.4 

§69.  Declarations  of  conspirators. —  This  rule  by  which 
the  declarations  of  a  partner 5  or  of  a  fellow-conspirator  are 
admitted  as  original  evidence  "binding  on  his  associates  is  not 
based  upon  the  fact  that  such  declarations  are  admissions  or 
confessions,6  but  upon  the  fact  that  they  are  verbal  acts  form- 


iKerper  v.  Wood,  29  N.  E.  Rep. 
501 ;  48  Ohio  St.  613 ;  Jones  v.  Moore, 
7  Binn.  573 ;  Story,  J.,  in  Bell  v.  Mor- 
rison, 1  Pet.  367.  See  Levy  v.  Cadet, 
17  S.  &  R.  127;  Searight  v.  Craig- 
head, 1  Penn.  125;  Yandes  v.  La- 
favour,  2  Blackf.  371 ;  Roosevelt  v. 
Marks,  6  Johns.  Ch.  266,  291;  Van 
Keuren  v.  Parmelee,  2  Comst.  (N.  Y.) 
523;  Hackley  v.  Patrick,  3  Johns. 
536,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  112 ; 
Bush  v.  Stowell,  71  Pa.  St.  208; 
Hance  v.  Hair,  25  Ohio  St.  349 ;  Wal- 
lis  v.  Randall,  81  N.  Y.  164 ;  Rogers  v. 
Clements,  92  N.  C.  81. 

2  Martin  v.  Root,  17  Mass.  222; 
Ward  v.  Howell,  5  H.  &  J.  60 ;  Wheel- 
ock  v.  Doolittle,  3  Wash.  440 ;  Cady 
v.  Shepherd,  11  Pick.  400;  Bridge  v. 
Gray,  14  id.  61 ;  Fisher  v.  Tucker,  1 
McCord,  175;  Mclntire  v.  Oliver,  2 
Hawks,  209;  Bissell  v.  Adams,  55 
Conn.  399 ;  Buxton  v.  Edwards,  134 
Mass.  567;  Patterson  v.  Choate,  7 
Wend.  441 ;  Shepley  v.  Waterhouse, 
22  Me.  497;  Merritt  v.  Day,  38  N. 
J.  L  32 ;  Hopkins  v.  Banks,  7  Cow. 
650 ;  Goddard  v.  Ingram,  3  Q.  B.  839 ; 


Whitcomb  v.  Whiting,  2  Doug.  652 
(Eng.,  1781) ;  Jackson  v.  Fairbanks,  2 
H.  Bl.  340,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid., 
§  112.  Sometimes  a  distinction  has 
been  made  and  it  has  been  held  that 
the  admission  is  only  admissible  to 
show  non-payment,  and  that  the 
original  debt  must  be  established 
otherwise.  Patterson  v.  Choate,  7 
Wend.  441 ;  Orange  v.  Low,  5  Gill  & 
J.  134,  and  cases  supra. 

3  Espey  v.  Comer,  76  Ala.  501 ;  Bis- 
sell v.  Adams,  35  Conn.  299;  Mer- 
ritt v.  Pollys,  16  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  355; 
Newman  v.  McComas,  43  Md.  70; 
Graham  v.  Selover,  59  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
313;  Reppert  v.  Colvin,  48  Pa.  St. 
248. 

*Greenleaf  v.  Quincy,  12  Me.  11; 
Beardsley  v.  Hall,  36  Conn.  270 ;  Mc- 
Clurg  v.  Howard.  45  Mo.  365 ;  Case- 
bolt  v.  Ackerman,  46  N.  J.  L.  169 ; 
Wood  v.  Barber,  90  N.  C.  76 ;  Mix  v. 
Shattuck,  50  Vt.  421;  Tappan  v. 
Kimball,  30  N.  H.  136;  Buxton  v. 
Edwards,  134  Mass.  367. 

s  See  §68. 

e  See  post,  §  97. 


§69.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


95 


ing  a  part  of  the  principal  transaction  or  res  gestw.  That  they 
should  be  against  the  interests  of  the  declarant  or  his  asso- 
ciates is  not  always  necessary  if  they  possess  the  contempo- 
raneous character  and  explanatory  effect  required.1  Thus,  in 
the  case  of  a  conspiracy,  it  is  requisite  that  its  existence  should 
be  presumptively  established  by  evidence  sufficient  to  go  to 
the  jury ; 2  the  language  of  one  who  is  shown  to  have  been  en- 
gaged in  it  is  original  evidence  against  his  fellow-conspirators. 
It  matters  not  at  what  stage  of  the  undertaking  any  one  may 
have  joined,  the  fact  of  his  association  with  it  being  equiva- 
lent to  ratification  of  what  has  preceded  it  or  whatever  may 
subsequently  be  done  or  said.3  But  it  is  a  fundamental  rule 
that  the  declarations  or  acts,  including  written  as  well  as  oral 
utterances,  should  have  occurred  during  the  existence  of  the 
criminal  association,  and  that  they  were  designed  to  aid  in  its 
accomplishment.  If  subsequent,  they  are  narrative  simply 
and  constitute  no  part  of  the  transaction.4 


1  As  to  confessions,  see  §§  96-98. 

2  Rutherford  v.  Schattman,  119  N.  Y. 
604;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  440;  Foster  v. 
Thrasher,  45  Ga.  517 ;  Reid  v.  Louisi- 
ana, etc.  Co.,  29  La.  Ann.  388 ;  Ham- 
ilton v.  People,  29  Mich.  195 ;  Holliday 
v.  Jackson,  30  Mo.  App.  263 ;  Wig- 
gins v.  Thrasher,  9  Iowa,  194;  Com. 
v.  Crown inshield,  10  Pick.  497; 
Ormsby  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  472 ;  Kel- 
sey  v.  Murphy,  26  Pa.  St.  78 ;  United 
States  v.  McKee,  3  Dill.  (U.  S.)  546 ; 
Moore  v.  Shields,  121  Ind.  267 ;  Cars- 
kadon  v.  Williams,  7  W.  Va.  784; 
Triplett  v.  Goff,  83  Va.  784 ;  McGraw 
v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  279 ; 
Amos  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S.  Rep. 
424.  The  declaration  may  be  admit- 
ted prior  to  the  proof  of  the  conspir- 
acy. Hall  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  12 
S.  Rep.  449;  State  v.  Grant  (Iowa, 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  120. 

3  McRae  v.  State,  71  Ga.  96 ;  Amer. 
F.  Co.  v.  United  States,  2  Pet  358, 
365 ;  People  v.  Kerr,  6  N.  Y.  S.  674 ; 
Rex  v.  Hardy,  24  How.  St.  Tr.  451 
et  seq. ;  State  v.  McCahill,  72  Iowa, 


111;  Kehoe  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  St.  127; 
Tow  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  175; 
United  States  v.  McKee,  3  Dill.  C.  C. 
546;  Smith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S. 
W.  Rep.  876 ;  People  v.  Collins,  64  Cal. 
293 ;  Ryan  v.  State,  83  Wis.  486 ;  Deak- 
ers  v.  Temple,  41  Pa.  St.  234 ;  Smith  v. 
State,  52  Ala.  407 ;  Colt  v.  Eves,  12 
Conn.  243 ;  Kelley  v.  People,  55  N.  Y. 
565;  Philpot  v.  Taylor,  75  111.  309; 
State  v.  Ross,  29  Mo.  32;  Mask  v. 
State,  32  Miss.  405 ;  Bryce  v.  Buttler, 
70  N.  C.  585 ;  Lees  v.  Lamprey,  43 
N.  H.  13;  Dart  v.  Walker,  3  Daly 
(N.  Y),  138. 

<  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  1 ;  State  v. 
Melrose,  98  Mo.  594;  Kunde  v.  State, 
22  Tex.  App.  65 ;  State  v.  Grant  (Iowa, 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  120;  State  v. 
Larkin,  49  N.  H.  39;  State  v.  Minton 
(Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  808 ;  Card 
v.  State,  109  Ind.  418 ;  Searles  v.  State, 
6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  331 ;  People  v. 
Irwin,  77  Cal.  494 ;  People  v.  McQuade, 
110  N.  Y.  284;  People  v.  Kief,  12  N. 
Y.  S.  896 ;  58  Hun,  337. 


96  ADMISSIONS.  [§  70. 

So  where  a  conspiracy  was  shown  to  exist,  a  book  purport- 
ing to  be  a  treatise  upon  modern  methods  of  employing  ex- 
plosives to  secure  a  radical  revolution  in  the  social  system 
was  admitted  to  illustrate  the  purpose  of  the  conspirators 
where  several  of  them  were  tried  for  murder.  The  book  was 
distributed  among  the  members  of  an  association  to  which 
the  conspirators  belonged,  was  commended  by  their  newspa- 
pers, and  was  constantly  consulted  and  circulated  by  them.1 

§  70.  Assignor  and  assignee. —  An  assignee  of  a  chose  in 
action  or  chattel,  with  the  exception  of  a  bo?ia  fide  holder  of 
a  negotiable  instrument  not  yet  due,  is  bound  by  the  admis- 
sions of  his  assignor,  made  prior  to  the  assignment,  disparag- 
ing or  qualifying  the  title  by  which  the  assignor  holds.2  But 
declarations  in  disparagement  of  title  to  property,  real  or  per- 
sonal, in  order  to  be  valid  as  admissions  against  the  grantee 
or  assignee,  must  be  made  while  the  grantor  or  the  assignor 
is  in  possession.3  Thus,  the  admissions,  made  after  the  assign- 
ment, of  one  who  has  made  an  assignment  for  the  benefit  of 
creditors  are  not  admissible  against  the  assignee  to  set  aside 
the  assignment,4  unless  it  is  shown  that  a  conspiracy  has  been 

i  Spies  v.  People,  122  111.  1 ;  3  Am.  Fovvner,  69    N.   Y.   404 ;  Platner   v. 

St.  Rep.  320 ;  9  Cr.  L.  Mag.  829.    See,  Platner,  78  N.  Y.  90 ;  Gidney  v.  Lo- 

also,  McRae  v.  State,  71  Ga.  96;  Ke-  gan,  79  N.  C.  214;  Hunt  v.  Haven,  56 

hoe  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  St.  127;  People  N.  H.  87;  Ten  Eyck  v.  Runk,  26  N. 

v.  Geiger,  49  Cal.  643 ;  State  v.  Mc-  J.   L.   513 ;  Williard  v.  Williard,  56 

Cahill,  72  Iowa,  121.  Pa.  St.  119. 

2  Alger    v.   Andrews,  47    Vt.  238;        3  Mobile    Bank    v.    McDonnell,  89 

Crow  v.  Watkius,  48  Ark.  169 ;  Lears  Ala.  434 ;  Shipley  v.  Fox,  69  Md.  572  ; 

v.    Rice,    65    Mich.    97 ;   Howell    v.  Crow  v.  Watkins,  48  Ark.  169 ;  Davis 

Howell,  47  Ga.  492 ;  Roberts  v.  Med-  v.  Evans,   102  Mo.    164 ;    Flagler   v. 

bury,    132   Mass.    100 ;  Alexander  v.  Wheeler,  40  Hun,  125,  178 ;  Waldou 

Caldwell,  55  Ala.  517 ;  Dodge  v.  Freed-  v.   Purvis,  73    Cal.   518;    Harrell  v. 

man,  etc.  Co.,  93  U.  S.  579;  Roebke  Culpepper,   47    Ga.   635;    Marion  v. 

v.  Andrews,  26  Wis.  311 ;  Downs  v.  Hoyt,  72  id.  117;  Proctor  v.  Cole,  164 

Beldon,    46    V t.  674 ;  Harrington  v.  Ind.  373 ;  Benson  v.  Lundy,  52  Iowa, 

Chambers,  3  Utah,  94 ;  McFadden  v.  256 ;  Randegger  v.  Ehrhardt,  51  111. 

Ellmaker,  52  Cal.   348;  McSweeney  101 ;  Deasy  v.  Thurman,  1  Idaho,  775 ; 

v.  McMillan,  96  Ind.  298 ;  Ramsbot-  Roberts  v.  Medbury,  132  Mass.  100 ; 

torn  v.  Phelps,  18  Conn.  278 ;  Mueller  Gordon  v.  Ritenour,  87  Mo.  54. 
v.  Rebhan,  94  111.   142;  Robinson  v.        4  Wynne  v.  Glydwell,  17  Ind.  446; 

Robinson,  22  Iowa,  247 ;  Fellows  v.  Burt  v.   McKinstry,   4    Minn.    146 ; 

Smith,  130  Mass.  378;  Tyres  v.  Ken-  Frear  v.  Evertsen,  20  Johns.  (N.  Y) 

nedy,  126  Ind.  523 ;  Adams  v.  David-  142 ;  Myers    v.    Kinzie,   26    111.   36 ; 

son,    10    N.    Y.    309;    Chadwick    v.  Bartlett  v.  Marshall,  2   Bibb  (Ky.), 


71.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


97 


formed  between  them  to  defraud  the  creditors,  when  the  dec- 
larations of  the  assignor  are  admissible  as  a  part  of  the  res 
(jestce.1  The  rule  by  which  such  admissions  are  receivable 
against  the  assignee  is  not  applicable  to  bind  the  holder  of  a 
promissory  note  which  is .  taken  without  notice  and  before 
maturity.2  If  the  promissory  note  is  transferred  after  it  is 
due,  the  declarations  of  the  indorser,  made  while  the  note  was 
in  his  possession,  are  admissible  against  the  indorsee  to  prove 
payment  or  any  equitable  defense  which  may  have  existed 
between  him  and  the  maker.3 

§71.  Wife's  admission  —  When  binding  on  husband. — 
The  declarations  of  a  wife  are  not  to  be  regarded  as  the  ad- 
missions of  the  husband  unless  authority  to  make  them  has 
been  conferred  upon  her  by  him.4     If  they  are  binding  it  is 


467;  Hey  wood  v.  Reed,  4  Gray 
(Mass.),  574 ;  Carlton  v.  Baldwin,  27 
Tex.  572 ;  Peck  v.  Grouse,  46  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  151;  Bates  v.  Ableman,  13 
Wis.  644 

iTibbals  v.  Jacobs,  31  Conn.  428; 
Ewing  v.  Gay,  12  Ind.  64 ;  Souder  v. 
Schechterly,  91  Pa.  St  83 ;  Hutchings 
v.  Castle,  48  Cal.  152;  Hodge  v. 
Thompson,  9  Ala.  131 ;  Boyd  v.  Jones, 
60  Mo.  454 ;  De  France  v.  Howard,  4 
Iowa,  524 ;  Cuyler  v.  McCartney,  33 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  165 ;  Perkins  v.  Towle, 
59  N.  H.  583. 

2  Blanc  Jour  v.  Tutt,  32  Mo.  576; 
Hackett  v.  Martin,  8  Greenl.  (Me.)  77 ; 
Paige  v.  Cagwin,  7  Hill  (N.  Y),  361 ; 
Bristol  v.  Daun,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  142 ; 
Wilson  v.  Bowden,  113  Mass.  422; 
Osborn  v.  Robbins,  37  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
481;  Washburn  v.  Ramsdell,  17  Vt. 
299. 

3  Sandifer  v.  Howard,  59  111.  246 ; 
Glanton  v.  Griggs,  5  Ga.  424 ;  Dren- 
non  v.  Smith,  3  Head  (Tenn.),  389 ; 
Miller  v.  Bingham,  29  Vt  82 ;  Pilcher 
v.  Kerr,  ?  La.  Ann.  244 ;  Sylvester  v. 
Crapo,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)  92 ;  Kane  v. 
Tarbit  23  111.  App.  311;Robbv. 
Schmidt,  35  Mo.  290;  McLanathan 
v.  Patten,  39  Md.  142 ;  Fisher  v.  True, 

7 


38  id.  534;  Hutchins  v.  Hutchins,  98 
N.  Y.  56 ;  Sanford  v.  Ellithorpe,  95 
N.  Y.  48;  Headen  v.  Womack,  88 
N.  C.  468 ;  Hirschfeld  v.  Williamson, 
18  Nev.  66 ;  McLaughlin  v.  McLaugh- 
lin, 91  Pa.  St.  462 ;  Downs  v.  Belden, 
46  Vt.  674;  Tierney  v.  Corbett  2 
Mackey,  264. 

*  Edwards  v.  Tyler  (111.,  1892),  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  312;  Rochelle  v.  Harri- 
son, 8  Port.  (Ala.)  351 ;  Perry  v.  Gra- 
ham, 18  Ala.  822;  White  v.  Portland 
(Conn,,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  342; 
Snohll  v.  Met.  R  Co.,  19  D.  C.  399 ; 
Hunt  v.  Strew,  33  Mich.  85 ;  Johnson 
v.  Sherwin,  3  Gray  (Mass.).  374; 
Evans  v.  Evans,  155  Pa.  St.  572 ;  May 
v.  Little,  3  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  27 ;  Gar- 
field v.  Scott,  40  111.  App.  380 ;  Lay 
Grae  v.  Peterson,  2  Sandf.  (N.  Y.) 
338 ;  Riley  v.  Suydam,  4  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
222;  Park  v.  Hopkins,  2  Bailey 
(S.  C),  408 ;  Berg  v.  Warner,  47  Minn. 
250 ;  Winkler  v.  Schlager,  19  N.  Y.  S. 
100;  Higham  v.  Vanosdol,  101  Ind. 
160;  Queener  v.  Morrow,  1  Coldw. 
(Tenn.)  123;  Baker  v.  Witten  (Okl., 
1892),  39  Pac.  Rep.  491 ;  Norfolk  Nat 
Bank  v.  Wood,  33  Neb.  113;  49  N. 
W.  Rep.  958;  Rose  v.  Chapman,  44 
Mich.  312 ;  Coryell  v.  State,  62  Ind. 


98 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§71. 


not  because  of  the  le-ial  character  of  the  marriage  relation, 
but  solely  because  the  husband  has  constituted  her  his  agent,1 
and  given  her  authority  to  act  for  him. 

The  considerations  regulating  this  subject  are  analogous  to 
those  which  determine  the  existence  of  the  relation  of  prin- 
cipal and  agent,  modified  somewhat  by  the  peculiar  position 
of  the  parties  and  the  intimacy  which  usually  exists  between 
them.  At  common  law,  in  consequence  of  the  merger  of 
legal  identity  of  the  wife  in  that  of  the  husband,  her  admis- 
sions did  not  bind  him  where  he  sued  as  her  representative 
during  coverture  to  reduce  her  choses  in  action  to  possession.2 
In  consequence,  however,  of  the  modern  statutes  by  which 
a  married  woman  is  enabled  to  carry  on  business  and  to  act 
in  general  with  the  powers  of  a  feme  sole,  this  rule  is  of  minor 
importance  and  of  infrequent  application.  In  any  event,  if 
the  existence  of  the  relationship  of  principal  and  agent  is 
shown  to  exist  by  evidence  aliunde,2  the  statements  of  the 
wife  relating  to  the  business  of  the  agency,  made  during  its 
continuance  and  within  the  scope  of  her  authority,  are  re- 
ceivable against  the  husband.4 


307 ;  Goodrich  v.  Tracy,  43  Vt.  314 ; 
Donaldson  v.  Everhart,  50  Kan.  718. 
The  declarations  of  the  husband  are 
not,  where  no  agency  exists,  admis- 
sible in  an  action  against  the  sepa- 
rate estate  of  the  wife.  Clapp  v. 
Engledow,  82  Tex.  290;  Martin  v. 
Rutt,  127  Pa.  St.  380;  Mclntire  v. 
Costello,  6  N.  Y.  S.  397;  Woodruff 
v.  White,  25  Neb.  745 ;  Hunt  v.  Poole, 
139  Mass.  224 ;  Bunson  v.  Brooks,  68 
Ala.  248 ;  State  v.  Bank,  10  Mo.  App. 
482 ;  Keller  v.  Railway  Co.,  27  Minn. 
178;  Kingen  v.  State,  50  Ind.  537. 
But  where  husband  and  wife  claim 
by  adverse  possession,  his  admissions 
are  binding  on  her  solely  by  reason 
of  the  joint  interest  Hurley 
Lockett,  72  Tex.  262.  Cf.  Holton  v, 
Carter  (Ga.,  1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  819 

i  See  §  73a. 

*  Turner  v.  State,  50  Miss.  351,  354 
Meredith  v.  Footner,  11  M.  &  W.  202 ; 


Burnett  v.  Burkhead,  21  Ark.  77; 
Jordan  v.  Hubbard,  26  Ala.  433 ;  Coe 
v.  Turner,  57  Conn.  937. 

3  Butler  v.  Price,  115  Mass.  578; 
Hunt  v.  Strew,  33  Mich.  85 ;  Deck  v. 
Johnson,  1  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.) 
497.  The  mere  existence  of  the  rela- 
tion of  husband  and  wife  will  never, 
it  is  held,  render  the  admission  of 
one  binding  on  the  other.  Deck  v. 
Johnson,  supra;  Schmidt  v.  Keen, 
10  N.  Y.  S.  267. 

4  Chamberlain  v.  Davis,  33  N.  H. 
121 ;  McLean  v.  Jagger,  13  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  494;  Murphy  v.  Hubert,  16 
Pa.  St.  50 ;  Colgan  v.  Phillips,  7  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  359;  Robertson  v.  Biost,  83 
111.  116 ;  Arndt  v.  Harshaw,  53  Wis. 
269;  Bradford  v.  Williams,  2  Md. 
Ch.  1,  3 ;  Lunay  v.  Vantyne,  40  Vt 
501;  Town  v.  Lamphire,  37  id.  52; 
Thomas  v.  Hargrove,  Wright  (Ohio), 
595. 


§§  72,  73.]  admissions.  90 

§  72.  Admissions  of  inhabitants  of  towns. —  At  common 
law  the  admission  of  a  parishioner  or  inhabitant  of  an  incor- 
porated political  division  was  receivable  against  the  corpora- 
tion.1 In  this  country  this  rule  is  repudiated.  By  analogy 
to  private  corporations,  the  declarations  of  the  residents  of 
municipal  or  quasi-mxmicip&l  corporations  as  towns  and  coun- 
ties are  not  receivable  against  the  corporation,  even  under  cir- 
cumstances where  the  action  is  in  form  against  the  inhabitants, 
and  their  individual  property  is,  as  in  New  England,  subject 
to  execution  on  the  judgment  which  ma}T  be  rendered.2 

§  73.  Admissions  of  strangers  to  the  record  —  Principal 
and  surety  —  Admissions  of  real  parties. —  The  admissions  of 
the  real  parties  in  interest,  though  they  may  not  be  parties  to 
the  record,  are  usually  receivable.  Thus  it  has  been  held  that 
the  admissions  of  a  debtor  are  receivable  against  the  surety,3 
of  the  guarantor  against  his  principal,4  of  the  actual  bene- 
ficiary in  an  insurance  taken  in  the  name  of  another,5  of  a 
deputy-sheriff  against  the  sheriff,6  of  the  deceased  intestate 
against  the  administrator.7  So  where  an  individual  has  a  real 
interest  in  the  litigation,  although  he  may  not  be  an  actual 
party  of  record,  yet,  so  long  as  the  actual  defendant  may  in 
turn  recover  over  against  him,  he  is  bound  by  the  judgment, 
which  would  then  be  evidence  against  him,  and  his  admissions 
are  receivable  against  himself  and  against  the  nominal  de- 
fendant.8 But  this  admission  by  the  real  party  in  interest  to 
be  binding  on  the  party  to  the  suit  must  be  made  while  he  had 
an  interest,  that  is,  during  the  existence  of  joint  interest  or 
privity,  and  it  must  relate  to  the  transaction  in  which  both 

iRex  v.  Hardvvick,  11  East,  579;  i  Keifer  v.  Carnsi,  7  D.  C.  156. 

Reg.  v.  Adderbury,  5  Q.  B.  187.  8  Bank   v.   Smith    12    Allen,   243; 

2  Landaff's  Petition,  34  N.  H.  164 ;  Weed  v.  Kellogg,  6  McLean,  44 ; 
Watertown  v.  Cowen,  4  Paige,  510 ;  Bond  v.  Ward,  1  Nott  &  McCord, 
Burlington  v.  Calais,  1  Vt.  385;  Low  201;  McShane  v.  Bank,  73  Md.  135; 
v.  Perkins,  10  Vt.  532;  Davis  v.  Savage  v.  Balch,  8  Greenl.  27 ;  Union 
Rochester,  66  Hun,  629.  See  Tiede-  Bank  v.  Edwards,  1  Swan  (Tenn.). 
man  on  Municipal  Corporations,  208 ;  Atlas  Bank  v.  Brownell,  9  R.  I. 
§  103,  160.'  168 ;  Bartlett  v.  Delprat,  4  Mass.  702, 

3  Walker  v.  Forbes,  25  Ala.  139.  708 ;  MacCready  v.  Schenck,  41  La. 
*  Chapel  v.  Washburn,  11  Ind.  393 ;     Ann.  456 ;  Bayly  v.  Bryant,  24  Pick. 

Brown  v.  Munger,  16  Vt.  12.  (Mass.)  198 ;    Clark  v.    Carrington,   7 

5  Bell  v.  Ausly,  16  East,  141.  Cranch,  308,  322;  Markland  v.  Kira- 

e  Snowball  v.  Goodricke,  4  B.  &  Ad.  mell,  87  Ind.  566. 

541. 


100  ADMISSIONS.  [  §  73. 

are  concerned.1  Thus,  where  it  is  sought  to  introduce  the 
admission  of  the  principal  in  a  suit  against  a  surety,  it  should 
be  remembered  that  the  latter  is  only  obligated  for  the  prin- 
cipal's acts  and  not  for  his  language.  If,  therefore,  the  ad- 
mission does  not  constitute  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  or,  in  other 
words,  if  it  is  not  a  verbal  act,  then  the  surety  is  not  bound 
thereby.2  So  where  payment  is  guarantied  for  goods  sold 
and  delivered,  an  acknowledgment  by  the  purchaser  of  the 
goods,  made  subsequent  to  the  deliver}'-,  that  he  has  received 
the  goods,  is  not  admissible  in  an  action  against  the  surety 
for  the  price.3 

The  admissions  of  a  fiduciary  official,  made  after  an  embez- 
zlement or  other  breach  of  trust,  are  not  competent  or  receiv- 
able as  admissions  against  his  surety  where  an  action  is  brought 
on  the  bond  to  recover  for  the  official  misfeasance.4  The  ad- 
missions of  a  nominal  party,  as  of  a  trustee  or  guardian,  made 
subsequent  to  the  bringing  of  the  suit,  are  not  binding  on  the 
party  he  represents.5  So,  too,  the  statements  of  a  trustee, 
administrator6  or  guardian,  made  before  he  was  appointed  or 
before  the  suit  in  which  he  sues  in  his  representative  capacity 
was  commenced,  are  not  receivable  as  admissions  against  him.T 

1  Chapel  v.  Washburn,  11  Ind.  393;  983;  42  Minn.  468;  Otis  v.  Van 
Brown  v.  Hunger,  16  Vt.  12.     It  has    Storch,  15  R.  I.  41. 

been  held   that   the  admission  of  a  3  Longenecker  v.  Hyde,  6  Binn.  1. 

surety  is  competent  against  the  prin-  4  Dawes  v.  Shedd,  15  Mass.  69 ;  Stet- 

cipal.     Chapel  v.  Washburn,  11  Ind.  son  v.  City  Bank,  2  Ohio  St.  167,  177 

393;  Brown  v.    Munger,  16  Vt.  12;  Blair  v.  Insurance  Co.,  10  Mo.  559 

Brockway  v.  Petted  (Mich.,  1890),  45  Republica  v.  Davis,  3  Yeates,    128 

N.  W.  Rep.  61 ;  Hall  v.  Brackett,  62  Hotchkiss  v.    Lyon,  2   Blackf.  222 

N.  H.  509.  Miller  v.  Stewart.  9  Wheat.  703. 

2  Lee  v.  Brown,  21  Kan.  458 ;  Dex-  5  Sykes  v.  Lewis,  17  Ala.  261 ;  Sar- 
ter  v.  Clemans,  17  Pick.  175 ;  Labaree  geant  v.  Sargeant,  18  Vt.  371 ;  Dazey 
v.  Klesterman  (Neb.,  1892):  49  N.  W.  v.  Mills,  10  111.  67;  Hough  v.  Barton, 
Rep.  1102;  33  Neb.  150;  Bank  of  20  Vt.  455 ;  Mayes  v.  Inman,  2  Swan 
Monroe  v.   Gifford,    70    Iowa,   580;  (Tenn.),  80. 

Keegan  v.    Carpenter,  47  Ind.  597;  6Prud.  Ins.  Co.   v.  Fredericks,  41 

Cheltenham  Co.  v.  Cook,  44  Mo.  29 ;  111.  App.  419. 

Chemsford  Co.  v.  Demarest,  7  Gray  7  Mertz  v.   Detweiler,   8  W.  &  S. 

(Mass.),  1 ;  Hatch  v.  Elkins,  64  N.  Y.  (Pa.)  376 ;  Plant  v.  McEwen,  4  Conn. 

489 ;  White  v.  German  Bank,  9  Heisk.  544 ;  Moore  v.   Butler,  48  N.  H.  161 ; 

(Tenn.)  473;  Ayer  v.  Getty,  46  Hun,  Fraser  v.  Marsh,  2  Stark.  41;  Legge 

287;  Bank  v.  Darragh,  1  Hun,  113;  v.  Edmonds,  25  L.  J.  Ch.  125. 
Bardwell  v.   Dewitt,  44  N.  W.  Rep. 


§  73tf.]  ADMISSIONS.  101 

§  73a.  The  declarations  of  agents. —  The  legal  unity  of 
principal  and  agent  in  respect  to  matters  growing  out  of  the 
agency  or  to  which  it  relates  is  the  basis  for  the  rule  that  the 
declarations  or  admissions  of  an  agent,  made  during  the  ex- 
istence of  the  agency  and  relating  to  its  object,  are  binding 
on  the  principal.1  Thus,  an  agent  to  sell  may  by  his  admis- 
sions bind  his  principal  upon  the  question  of  the  value  of  the 
property;2  and  where  a  principal  directs  some  third  person 
to  pay  money  or  ship  goods  to  his  agent,  the  acknowledgment 
or  receipt  of  the  agent  is  an  admission  of  the  principal.3  If 
made  during  the  period  of  the  continuance  of  the  agency  and 
by  reason  of  some  special  or  express  authorization  by  the 
principal  to  make  the  given  admission  or  declaration,  then  the 
words  of  the  agent  are  admissible  against  his  principal  upon 
the  same  grounds  that  the  latter's  own  admission  would  be 
evidence  against  him.  But  where  no  express  authority  is 
given  to  make  the  declaration,  and  where  the  agent  is  a  special 
agent,  and  the  only  ground  for  claiming  its  admission  as  orig- 
inal evidence  is  an  implied  authority  to  make  it,  derived  from 
the  existence  of  the  agency,  then  the  declaration  is  admitted 
solely  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestae,  and  accordingly  must  be  con- 
temporaneous with  and  explanatory  of  it. 

Unauthorized  admissions  made  subsequent  to  the  transac- 
tion to  which  they  relate,  and  merely  narrative  of  it,  are  not 
binding  upon  the  principal,-  though  the  relation  of  principal 
and  agent  exists  for  other  purposes.4     Thus,  the  declarations 

i  Hawk  v.  Applegate,  37  Mo.  App.  Noble,  6G  Ga.  367 :  Adams  v.  Hum- 

32 ;  Davis  v.  Rochester,  66  Hun,  629 ;  phreys,  54  Ga.  396 ;  Pavey  v.  Wint- 

W.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Bennett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  rode,  87  Ind.   379 ;  Mix  v.   Osby,  62 

App.  28 ;  McElwee  v.  Trowbridge,  68  111.     193;     Hitcbings    v.    St.    Louis 

Hun,  28;  Loomis  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Transp.  Co.,  68  Hun,  33;  Yocum  v. 

R,  Co.  (Mass.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  30 ;  Barnes,  8  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  496 ;  Peck  v. 

Mars  v.  Virginia  Home  Ins.  Co.,  17  Kitchie,   G6   Mo.    114;    Hammett  v. 

S.  C.  514 ;  Josepbi  v.  Mady  Clo.  Co.  Emerson,  27  Me.  308. 

(Mont,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  1 ;  Citizens'  2  Bank  v.  Gidrot,  19  Ga.  421. 

Gasligbt  Co.  v.  Granger,  19  111.  App.  » Click  v.  Hamilton,  7  Rich.  (S.  C.) 

201 ;  Rowell  v.  Klein,  44  Ind.  290 ;  65 ;  Webster  v.  Clark,  30  N.  H.  245. 

Donnel  v.  Clark,  12  Kan.  154;  Ham-  4  Phelps  v!  James  (Iowa,  1893),  53 

ilton  v.  Iowa  Co.  (Iowa,  1893).  53  N.  N.   W.  Rep.  74;  Yordy  v.  Marshall 

W.  Rep.  496;  Coyle  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  Co.  (Iowa.  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  298; 

R  Co.,  11  W.  Va.  94;  Bohannan  v.  St.    Louis,  etc.   Co.   v.   Sweet  (Ark., 

Chapman,  13  Ala.  641;  Galceran  v.  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  787;  Mobile,  etc. 


102 


ADMISSIONS. 


[•§  T8«. 


of  an  engineer  or  conductor  of  a  train,  made  after  an  accident 
and  constituting  no  part  of  the  transaction,  are  not  receivable, 
as  he  has  no  implied  authority  to  make  statements  which  will 
be  binding  on  his  principal.1  So  a  corporation  is  not  bound 
by  the  admissions  of  its  officers,  trustees,  directors  or  stock- 
holders unless  either  they  have  been  specially  authorized  to 
make  the  admission  or  it  has  been  made  as  a  part  of  some 
authorized  transaction;2  for  it  is  a  general  rule  that  admis- 


Co.  v.  Klein,  43  111.  App.  63 ;  Louis- 
ville, etc.  Co.  v.  Foley  (Ky.,  1893),  21 
H.  W.  Eep.  866;  Bradford  v.  Will- 
iams. 2  Md.  Ch.  1 ;  Phelps  v.  George's 
Creek,  etc.  R.  Co.,  60  Md.  536 ;  Gar- 
field v.  Knight's  Ferry,  etc.  Co.,  14 
Cal.  35 ;  Tillinghast  v.  Nourse,  14  Ga. 
641 ;  Chicago,  etc.  Road  v.  Fietsam, 
19  111.  App.  55 ;  Board  of  Com'rs  of 
Franklin  County  v.  Bunting,  111  Ind. 
143;  Dietrich  v.  Baltimore,  etc.  R. 
Co.,  5S  Md.  347;  Aldridge  v.  Mid- 
land, etc.  Co.,  78  Mo.  559;  Craig  v. 
Gilbreth,  47  Me.  416 ;  Dome  v.  South- 
work  Manuf'g  Co.,  11  Cush.  (Mass.) 
205 ;  Batcheldor  v.  Emery,  20  N.  H. 
165 ;  Murphy  v.  May,  9  Bush  (Ky.), 
33;  Clark  v.  Anderson,  14  Daly,  464; 
Winter  v.  Burt,  31  Ala.  33;  Michigan 
Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Gougar,  55  111.  503 ; 
Union  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Fray,  12  Pac. 
Rep.  98;  35  Kan.  700;  Osgood  v. 
Bringolf,  32  Iowa,  265 ;  Hawk  v.  Ap- 
plegate,  37  Mo.  App.  32;  Gooch  v. 
Bryant,  13  Me.  386;  Lowry  v.  Harris, 
12  Minn.  166;  Jones  v.  Jones,  120  N. 
Y.  589 ;  McDermot  v.  Hannibal,  etc. 
R.  Co.,  73  Mo.  516;  Burnham  v.  Ellis, 
!  39  Me.  319;  Memphis,  etc.  R.  Co.  v. 
Cock,  64  Miss.  713;  Converse  v. 
Blumiich,  14  Mich.  109;  Woods  v. 
Banks,  14  N.  H.  101;  Demeritt  v. 
Meserve,  39  N.  II.  521 ;  Runk  v.  Ten 
Eyck,  24  N.  J.  L.  750;  American 
Steamship  Co.  v.  Landreth,  102  Pa. 
St.  131 ;  Raiford  v.  French,  11  Rich. 
(S.  C.)  367 ;  Austin  v.  Chittenden,  33 
Vt.  53 ;  Goetz  v.  Kansas  City  Bank, 
119  U.   S.   318,   551;  Packet  Co.   v. 


Clough,  20  Wall.  (U.  S.)  528;  Fogg 
v.  Child,  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  246;  Patten 
v.  Messenger,  25  Pa.  St.  393 ;  Cobb  v. 
Johnson,  2  Sneed  (Tenn.),  73;  Barn- 
ard v.  Henry,  25  Vt.  289. 

i  Fort  Smith  Oil  Co.  v.  Slover  (Ark., 
1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  106;  Wendt  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (S.  D.,  1894),  54  N. 
W.  Rep.  226 ;  East  Tennessee,  etc.  R. 
Co.  v.  Maloy,  2  S.  E.  Rep.  (Ga.)  941 ; 
Furst  v.  Second  Ave.  R  Co.,  72  N.  Y. 
542;  Michigan  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Car- 
jow,  73  111.  348 ;  Ballard  v.  Manuf'g 
Co.,  15  N.  Y.  S.  405.  The  printed 
rules  of  a  railroad  company  are  ad- 
missible as  its  admissions.  Railroad 
v.  Ward,  35  111.  App.  423. 

2  Bullock  v.  Consumers'  Lumber 
Co.  (Cat,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  307 ;  Rail- 
way Co.  v.  Levy  (Ind.  Sup.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  815 ;  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Levy  (Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  245 ; 
Johnson  v.  East  Tenn.,  Va.  &  P.  Ry 
Co.  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  21 ;  La 
Rue  v.  St.  Anthony  &  D.  Elevator 
Co.  (S.  D.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  806 ; 
Pittsburg  &  L.  S.  Iron  Co.  v.  Kirk- 
patrick,  92  Mich.  252 ;  Van  Doren  v. 
Bailey,  48  Minn.  305;  Missouri  Pa- 
cific Ry.  Co.  v.  Sherwood,  84  Tex. 
125;  Bellow  v.  Fuller,  id.  450;  Rodes 
v.  Elevator  Co.,  49  Minn.  370 ;  Weeks 
v.  Inhabitants,  156  Mass.  289 ;  Thomas 
v.  Rutledge,  67  111.  213;  Jacksonville, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Pen.  Trans.  Co.  (Fla.,  1890), 
9S.  Rep.  661;  Peek  v.  Detroit  Nov- 
elty Works,  29  Mich.  313 ;  Lime  Rock 
Bank  v.  Hewitt,  52  Me.  531 ;  Walker 
v.  Dunspaugh,  20  N.  Y.  170 ;  Abbott 


§  73a.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


103 


sions  or  declarations  of  an  agent  which  are  narrative  in  char- 
acter must,  in  order  to  bind  the  principal,  be  within  the  scope 
of  his  power,  whether  general  or  special,  or  must  relate  to 
the  subject  of  his  agency  and  be  a  part  of  it.1  Accordingly 
the  principal  is  never  bound  by  the  admission  or  declaration 
of  a  person  made  by  the  latter  before  he  has  become  an  agent 
or  after  the  agency  has  terminated.2 

As  regards  written  admissions  under  seal,  no  particular 
form  of  words  is  necessary  to  bind  the  principal,  provided 
the  instrument  is  sealed  with  the  principal's  seal  and  signed 
with  his  name  by  the  agent  for  him.  If  the  instrument  does 
not  show  that  it  is  intended  to  be  the  admission  of  the  prin- 
cipal, it  will  not  generally  bind  him,  though  the  agent  in 
signing  may  have  affixed  his  title  or  indicated  that  he  signs 


v.  Seventy-six  L.  &  W.  Co.,  87  Cal. 
323;  Pemigewasset  Bank  v.  Rogers, 
18  N.  H.  255 ;  Green  v.  North  Buffalo, 
56  Pa.  St.  110;  Salado  College  v.  Da- 
vis, 47  Tex.  131 ;  Wellington  v.  Bos- 
ton R.  R.  Co.  (Mass.,  1893),  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  393;  Schroepel  v.  Syracuse 
Plankroad,  7  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  94; 
Low  v.  Connecticut,  etc.  R.  Co.,  45 
N.  H.  370;  Cleveland,  C,  C.  &  I.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Closser,  126  Ind.  348.  See  Res 
Gestae,  §§  54-57. 

1  Beasley  v.  Fruit  Packing  Co.,  92 
Cal.  388 ;  Ohio  &  M.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Stein 
(Ind.,  1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  180;  Straw- 
bridge  v.  Spann,  8  Ala.  820 ;  Phelps 
v.  James  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
274;  Perkins  v.  Burnett,  2  Root 
(Conn.),  30;  Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v.  Klein, 
43  111.  App.  63 ;  Galceran  v.  Noble,  66 
Ga.  367 ;  Maltby  v.  Kirkland,  48  Fed. 
Rep.  760 ;  Mix  v.  Osby,  62  111.  193 ; 
Covington,  etc.  Road  v.  Ingles,  15  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  637;  Idaho  Ford  Co.  v. 
Firemen's  Ins.  Co.  (Utah,  1893),  29  Pac. 
Rep.  826;  Yordy  v.  Marshall  Co. 
(Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  298; 
Gutchess  v.  Gutchess,  66  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
483;  Telephone  Co.  v.  Thompson,  112 
Pa.  St  118;  Vassar  v.  Knickerbocker 


Ice  Co.,  17  N.  Y.  S.  182 ;  Holt  v.  Spo- 
kane R.  Co.  (Idaho,  1894),  35  Pac. 
Rep.  39.  Where  the  authority  of  the 
agent  is  disputed  by  the  principal, 
the  declarations  and  acts  of  the  al- 
leged agent  are  not  received  in  favor 
of  a  third  party  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  the  agency.  Mussey  v. 
Beecher,  3  Cush.  (Mass.)  517 ;  Trust- 
ees, etc.  v.  Bledsoe,  5  Ind.  133 ;  Brig- 
ham  v.  Peters,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  145 ; 
Dowden  v.  Cryler  (N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  941. 

2  Bensley  v.  Brockway,  27  111.  App. 
410;  Levy  v.  Mitchell,  6  Ark.  138; 
Wiggins  v.  Leonard,  9  Iowa,  194; 
Haven  v.  Brown,  7  Me.  421 ;  Stiles  v. 
Western,  R.  Co.,  8  Met.  (Mass.)  44; 
Williams  v.  Williamson,  6  Ired.  L. 
(N.  C.)  281;  Raiford  v.  French,  11 
Rich.  (S.  C),  367 ;  Colquitt  v.  Thomas, 
8  Ga.  268;  Watermann  v.  Peet,  11 
111.  648;  Renolds  v.  Rowley,  2  La. 
Ann.  890 ;  Polleys  v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co., 
14  Me.  141 ;  Caldwell  v.  Garner,  31 
Mo.  131;  Vail  v.  Judson,  4  E.  D. 
Smith  (N.  Y. ),  165 ;  Brigham  v.  Carr, 
21  Tex.  142;  Rahm  v.  Deig,  121  Ind. 
283;  Davis  v.  Whitesides,  1  Dana 
(Ky.),  177. 


104 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§?4. 


in  a  representative  capacity,1  as  by  inserting  in  some  part  of 
the  instrument  the  name  of  the  principal.2 

Declarations  of  an  agent  are  inadmissible  to  prove  the  ex- 
istence of  the  agency 3  or  to  show  that  the  extent  of  the 
authority  actually  conferred  was  larger  or  smaller  than  is 
alleged.4  . 

§  74.  Admissions  Tby  attorneys  of  record. —  The  declara- 
tions of  an  attorney  are  only  binding  as  admissions  upon  his 
client  when  they  are  formal  and  deliberate,  as  where  written 
stipulations  are  entered  into  to  facilitate  the  prosecution  of 
the  suit  by  dispensing  with  some  technical  rule  of  procedure  5 
or  agreeing  upon  certain  proof  which  it  is  proposed  to  pro- 
duce.6   But  verbal  statements  by  the  attorney  in  casual  con- 


1  Briggs  v.  Partridge,  64  N.  Y.  357; 
Meech  v.  Smith,  7  Wend.  315 ;  Whit- 
ford  v.  Laidler,  94  N.  Y.  155 :  Dayton 
v.  Warne,  43  N.  J.  L.  659 ;  Mahoney 
v.  McLean,  26  Minn.  415 ;  Taylor  v. 
Association,  68  Ala.  229 ;  Hancock  v. 
Yunker,  83  111.  208. 

UFaw  v.  Meals,  65  Ga.  711 ;  Robin- 
son v.  Kanawha,  etc.  Co.,  8  N.  E. 
Rep.  683 ;  Sturdivant  v.  Hull,  59  Me. 
172 ;  Tilden  v.  Barnard,  43  Mich.  376. 

3  Hardy  v.  Cheny,  42  Vt.  417; 
Rhodes  v.  Lowry,  54  Ala.  4 ;  Duryea 
v.  Vosburgh  (N.  Y,  1890),  24  N.  E. 
Rep.  308 ;  French  v.  Wade,  35  Kan. 
391;  Haughton  v.  Maurer,  55  Mich. 
323;  Lafayette,  etc.  Co.  v.  Elman, 
30  Ind.  83 ;  Seymour  v.  Matteson,  42 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  496;  Osgood  v. 
Pacey,  23  111.  App.  116;  Bowker  v. 
Deloug,  141  Mass.  351. 

4  Lycoming  Ins.   Co.   v.  Ward,  90 
111.  545;  Chicago  R.  Co.  v.  Fox,  41  id 
106 ;  Galbreath  v.  Cole,  61  Ala.  139 
Stollenmaeck  v.  Thatcher,  115  Mass 
224 ;  Lolmer  v.  Insurance  Co.,  121  id 
439;   Mapp  v.   Phillips,   32   Ga.   72 
Carter   v.    Burnham,   31    Ark.   212 
Dawson  v.  Landreaux,  29  La.  Ann 
363 ;  Grover,  etc.  Co.  v.  Polhemus,  34 
Mich.  247 ;  Stringham  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  4  Abb.  App.  Dec.  (N.  Y.)  315. 


5  Hanson  v.  Hoit,  14  N.  H.  56. 

6Voisin  v.  Insurance  Co.,  67  Hun, 
365 ;  McRea  v.  Insurance  Bank,  16 
Ala.  755;  Mather  v.  Phelps,  2  Root 
(Conn.),  150;  Perry  v.  Simpson  Mfg. 
Co.,  40  Conn.  313;  Worley  v.  Hin- 
man  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  866; 
Proctor  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  154 
Mass.  251;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  13;  Martin 
v.  Capital  Ins.  Co.,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  534 ; 
Reynders  v.  Hindman,  88  Ga.  314. 
Cf.  Milbank  v.  Jones,  17  N.  Y.  S.  464. 
An  attorney  cannot  compromise  a 
suit  without  express  authority  (Maye 
v.  Cogdell,  69  N.  C.  93;  Repp  v. 
Wiles  (Ind.,  1892),  29  N.  E.  Rep.  441 ; 
Holker  v.  Parker,  7  Cranch,  436 ; 
Peters  v.  Lawson,  66  Tex.  336 ;  Bar- 
rett v.  Railroad  Co.,  45  N.  Y  628,  638 ; 
Granger  v.  Batchelder,  54  Vt.  348; 
Crotty  v.  Egle,  35  W.  Va.  143 ;  White- 
hall v.  Kellar,  100  Pa.  St.  89 ;  Martin 
v.  Insurance  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  52  N. 
W.  Rep.  534) ;  though  he  may  submit 
a  demand  to  arbitration.  Brooks  v. 
New  Durham,  55  N.  H.  559 ;  McElrath 
v.  Middleton  (Ga.,  1893),  14  S.  E.  Rep. 
906 ;  Talbot  v.  McGee,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
377;  White  v.  Davidson,  8  Md.  169; 
Williams  v.  Tracy,  95  Pa.  St  308. 


§?*.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


105 


versation  J  cannot  be  regarded  as  the  admissions  of  the  client, 
though  pertaining  to  the  subject  of  litigation,  for  the  attorney 
is  the  agent  of  the  client  only  so  far  as  the  management  of 
the  cause  which  has  been  committed  to  him  in  court  is  con- 
cerned,2 and  upon  general  principles  cannot  bind  his  principal 
outside  of  the  scope  of  his  authority.3 

Written  admissions  by  an  attorney,  made  either  before 
beginning  suit  or  after  its  termination  and  referring  to  it, 
are  never  admissible  against  the  client  unless  they  were  ex- 
pressly authorized  by  him.4 

A  client  is  estopped  by  the  admissions  of-his  attorney,  in  the 
absence  of  gross  mistake  or  fraud,  where,  relying  on  such  ad- 
missions, reciprocal  admissions  have  been  made  by  his  oppo- 
nent.5 If  the  authority  of  the  attorney  to  make  the  admis- 
sions exists  generally,  his  admissions,  when  not  acted  on  by  the 
other  side,  are  prima  facie  evidence  only,  their  sole  effect 
being  merely  to  relieve  the  adverse  party  from  showing  the 
facts  involved  in  them.6 


1  Angle  v.  Bilby,  25  Neb.  595. 

2  See  as  to  admissions  of  agents, 
§73a. 

3  Bank  v.  Anderson,  28  S.  C.  148 ; 
Perry  v.  Simpson  Co.,  40  Conn.  313 ; 
Lord  v.  Bigelovv,  124  Mass.  185 ;  Lewis 
v.  Duane,  G8  Hun,  28 ;  Underwood  v. 
Hart,  23  Vt.  120;  Young  v.  Wright, 
1  Campb.  139;  Wright  v.  Dickinson 
(Mich.,  1890),  42  N.  W.  Rep.  849.  An 
unauthorized  communication  by  the 
attorney  to  a  person  against  whom 
the  client  intends  to  bring  suit  is  not 
binding  on  him.  Salomon,  etc.  Co. 
t.  Jones,  34  Kan.  443.  So  the  malice 
of  plaintiff  in  an  attachment  suit 
cannot  be  shown  by  the  admissions 
of  his  attorney.  Floyd  v.  Hamilton, 
33  Ala.  235. 

*  Proctor  v.  Old  Colony  R.  Co.,  28 
N.  E.  Rep.  13;  Morris  v.  Balkham,  12 
S.  W.  Rep.  970;  75  Tex.  Ill;  Jane- 
way  v.  Skerritt,  30  N.  J.  L.  97 ;  Mar- 
shall v.  Cliff,  4  Camp.  133 ;  Walden  v. 
Bolton,  55  Mo.  405 ;  Moffitt  v.  Wither- 


spoon,  10  Ired.  L.  185 :  Murray  v. 
Chase,  134  Mass.  92;  Reineman  v. 
Blair,  96  Pa.  St.  155.  If  the  attorney 
is  authorized  to  speak  for  his  client, 
the  admission  of  the  attorney's  clerk 
is  the  admission  of  the  attorney.  Tay- 
lor v.  Williams,  2  B.  &  Ad.  845;  Grif- 
fith v.  Williams,  1  T.  R.  710.  An  ad- 
mission of  the  truth  of  a  fact  by  an 
attorney  in  one  suit  is  admissible  in 
another  suit  only  where  the  client 
authorizes  it  by  his  acquiescence  in 
it.  Nichols  v.  Jones,  32  Mo.  A  pp. 
657;  Morris  v.  Balkham,  75  Tex.  111. 

5  See  post,  §  83 ;  Wilson  v.  Spring, 
64  111.  18 ;  Wheeler  v.  Alderman,  34 
S.  C.  533 ;  Smith  v.  Milliken,  2  Minn. 
319. 

6  See  §§  82-84;  Truby  v.  Seybert,  12 
Pa.  St.  101;  Floyd  v.  Hamilton,  23 
Ala.  235;  People  v.  Garcia,  25  Cal. 
531;  Moulton  v.  Bowker,  59  N.  Y. 
533;  Cassels  v.  Usry,  51  Ga.  621; 
Bathgate  v.  Haskin,  59  N.  Y.  533. 


106 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§75. 


§  75.  Offers  of  compromise  —  Admissions  under  duress. — 

Admissions  involved  in  overtures  for  a  settlement  of  litigation 
or  in  offers  of  compromise  understood  to  be  without  prejudice 
will  not  be  admissible  in  evidence  against  a  party.1  Evidence 
of  an  offer  to  pay  a  sum  of  money  to  stop  litigation  or  buy 
peace,  without  reference  to  the  justice  of  the  demand,  is  al- 
ways rejected  on  grounds  of  public  policy  and  from  the  fact 
that  such  evidence  is  usually  wholly  irrelevant.2 

If  the  admission  of  a  collateral  fact  tends  to  admit  the 
merits  of  the  case,  it  may  be  presumed  from  the  circumstances 
that  the  admission  was  confidential  and  without  prejudice, 
and  an  agreement  will  be  implied  that  it  was  not  to  be  used 
against  the  party.3 


1  Huetteman  v.  Viesselmann,  48  Mo. 
App.  582;  Darby  v.  Roberts  (Tex., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  529;  Hand  v. 
Swarm,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  241 ;  York 
v.  Conde,  63  Hun,  316;  Olson  v. 
Peterson,  33  Neb.  358 ;  Smith  v.  Whit- 
tier,  95  Cal.  279 ;  West  v.  Smith,  101 
U.  S.  263 :  Perkins  v.  Concord  Road, 
44  N.  II.  22o  ;  Daniels  v.  Woonsocket, 
1 1  R.  I.  4 ;  Gay  v.  Bates,  99  Mass.  263 ; 
Strong  v.  Stewart,  9  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
137;  Duff  v.  Duff,  71  Cal.  513;  Jack- 
son v.  Clopton,  66  Ala.  29 ;  Gommer- 
sol  v.  Crew,  10  N.  Y.  S.  231 ;  Daily  v. 
Coons,  64  Ind.  545;  Mundhenk  v. 
Central  Iowa  R.  Co.,  57  Iowa,  718; 
Campau  v.  Dubois,  39  Mich.  274 ;  State 
Bank  v.  Dutton,  11  Wis.  271 ;  Patrick 
v.  Crowe,  15  Colo.  543;  Keaton  v. 
Mayo,  71  Ga.  649 ;  Barker  v.  Bushnell, 
75  111.  220.  As  to  power  of  attorney 
to  compromise,  see  §  74.  Contra,  Mc- 
Elwee  v.  Trowbridge,  68  Hun,  28. 
Whether  a  payment  of  a  claim  is  an 
admission  of  its  justice  or  a  mere 
purchase  of  peace  is  a  question  of 
fact  to  be  determined  by  the  court. 
Colburn  v.  Groton  (N.  H.,  1894),  28 
Atl.  Rep.  95. 

2Davey  v.  Lohrman,  14  N.  Y.  S. 
922;  Davis  v.  Simmons,  25  Pac.  Rep. 
535 ;  Eldridge  v.  Hargreaves,  30  Neb- 


638 ;  46  N.  W.  Rep.  923 ;  International 
Co.  v.  Ragsdale,  67  Tex.  27 ;  Barker 
v.  Bushnell,  75  111.  220;  Strong  v. 
Stuart,  9  Heisk.  137 ;  Williams  v. 
State,  52  Ala.  411 ;  Draper  v.  Hatfield, 
124  Mass.  53 ;  Daniels  v.  Woonsocket, 
11  R.  I.  4  ;  Hood  v.  Tyner,  3  Ind.  App. 
51;  Cooper  v.  Jones,  79  Ga.  379; 
Manistee  Bank  v.  Sprague,  64  Mich. 
59 ;  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wright,  115 
Ind.  378;  West  v.  Smith,  101  U.S. 
273.  An  admission  of  an  independ- 
ent or  collateral  fact  not  involving 
the  merits  of  the  case  will  be  received 
against  the  pari}-  making  the  offer  un- 
less the  whole  offer  was  expressly  with- 
out prejudice.  Fuller  v.  Hampton, 
5  Conn.  416:  Akers  v.  Kirk  (Ga., 
1891),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  366;  Mayor  v. 
Howard,  6  Ga.  213;  Doon  v.  Ravey, 
49  Vt.  293 ;  Cates  v.  Kellogg,  9  Ind. 
506;  Arthur  v.  James,  28  Pa.  St.  236: 
Church  v.  State,  1  A.  K.  Marsh.  (Ky.) 
328 ;  Central  Branch  U.  P.  R.  Co.  v. 
Butman,  23  Kan.  446;  Plumer  v. 
Currier,  53  N.  II.  287 ;  Cole  v.  Cole, 
33  Me.  542 ;  Garner  v.  Myrick,  30  Miss. 
418 :  West  v.  Smith,  101  U.  S.  273 ; 
Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Baltimore  W.  Co., 
93  id.  548. 

3  White  v.  Old   Dom.   S.  Co.,    102 
N.  Y.   662 ;  Brice  v.   Bauer,    108   id. 


§  76.]  ADMISSIONS.  107 

While  confessions  in  criminal  cases  must  be  entirely  free 
and  involuntary,1  admissions  are  not  rejected  because  made 
under  compulsion  or  constraint.  But  the  influence  must  be 
legal,  and  any  compulsion  amounting  to  duress  or  undue  in- 
fluence either  in  law  .or  equity  would  render  an  admission  so 
obtained  inadmissible.  The  fact  that  it  was  elicited  on  cross- 
examination  in  reply  to  questions  which  the  witness  answered 
voluntarily,  but  which  he  might  have  refused  to  answer,  will 
not  render  it  inadmissible.2 

§  76.  Admissions  in  pleadings.— In  considering  how  far  a 
party  is  bound  by  statements  or  admissions  made  in  plead- 
ings, the  fairest  and  most  satisfactory  criterion  is  the  amount 
of  his  actual  knowledge  of  the  contents  of  those  documents. 
If  it  appears  prima  facie  that  the  pleadings  were  signed  and 
filed  by  the  attorney  (particularly  when  they  are  formal  only), 
and  there  is  nothing  to  show  that  the  client  had  personal 
knowledge  of  their  contents,  generally  he  will  not  be  bound. :t 
This  rule,  while  sustained  by  the  weight  of  the  decisions  and 
by  reason  and  good  sense,  is  not  universal.  The  contrary 
presumption,  that  a  pleading,  even  though  formal  and  signed 

433 ;  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bait.   Ware-  171 ;  Newhall  v.  Jenkins,  2  Gray,  562 ; 

house  Co.,  93  U.   S.  548 ;  Campau  v.  Tilley  v.   Damon,   11  Cush.   (Mass.) 

Dubois,  39  Mich.  274 ;  West  v.  Smith,  247. 

101  U.  S.  263.  Contra,  Kahn  v.  Insur-  3  Eaton  v.  Telegraph  Co.,  68  Me. 
ance  Co.  (Wyo.,  1894),  34  Pac.  Rep.  63 ;  Callan  v.  McDaniel,  72  Ala.  96 ; 
1059;  Ashlock  v.  Linder,  50  111.  159;  Guy  v.  Manuel,  89  N.  C.  83;  Smith 
1  Greenl.  Evid.,  §  192.  But  evidence  v.  Davidson,  41  Fed.  Rep.  172;  State 
is  admissible  to  show  the  fact  of  a  v.  Samuels,  28  Mo.  App.  649;  Wat- 
compromise  having  been  made  or  son  v.  Lemon,  9  Colo.  200;  Board  of 
attempted  where  the  question  is  not  Com'rs  v.  Diebold  S.  &  L.  Co.,  133 
upon  the  merits,  but  whether  a  com-  U.S.  473;  Dennie  v.  Williams,  135 
promise  was  attempted  or  effected.  Mass.  28 ;  Meade  v.  Black,  22  Wis. 
Jones  v.  Foxall,  15  Beav.  338 ;  Col-  232 ;  Ferris  v.  Hard,  135  N.  Y.  354 ; 
lierv.  Mokes,  2  C.  &  K.  1012:  Whit-  Delaware  County  v.  Diebold  Safe 
ney  Wagon  Works  v.  Moore  (Vt,  Co.,  133  U.  S.  487;  Pope  v.  Allis,  115 
1890),  17Atl.  Rep.  1007.  The  reply  U.  S.  363 ;  Scholl  v.  Bradstreet  (Iowa, 
to  a  letter  offering  to  compromise  is  1S92),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  500 ;  Kentucky 
not  receivable  as  an  admission,  v.  I.  Cent.  Co.  (Ind.,  1892),  30  N.  E. 
though  it  may  not  have  been  marked  Rep.  802;  Hamilton  v.  Patrick,  62 
without  prejudice  if  the  letter  was  Hun,  74;  Grimmer  v.  Carlton,  93 
so  marked.  Hoghten  v.  Hoghten,  15  Cal.  189 ;  Hall  v.  Brennan,  19  N.  Y.  S. 
Beav.  321.  623 ;  Halpin  v.  Manny,  33  Mo.  App. 

i  See  post,  §  89.  388. 

1  Collett  v.  Keith,  4  Esp.  212 ;  4  id. 


108 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§  76 


by  the  attorney,  and  containing  no  specific  allegation  of  fact, 
was  within  the  knowledge  of  the  party  and  may  be  used  as 
his  admission,  is  supported  by  many  cases.1 

Where  a  party  has  sworn  to  his  pleadings,2  or  if  they  were 
drawn  by  his  express  directions,  or  where  they  contain  matter 
not  merely  formal  but  specifically  and  particularly  descriptive 
of  facts  which  must  have  been  within  the  personal  knowledge 
of  the  party,  and  which  could  not  have  been  inserted  by  the 
attorney  acting  only  under  general  instructions,  he  will  be 
conclusively  presumed  to  have  been  fully  informed  as  to  all 
statements  contained  therein,  and  they  will  be  competent  as 
his  admissions.3 

As  regards  the  admissibility  of  admissions  contained  in  the 
pleadings  in  the  suit  in  which  they  are  filed,  it  is  a  general 
rule,  confirmed  by  statute  in  some  states,  that  the  pleadings 
are  not  evidence  nor  open  to  comment  or  criticism  by  counsel. 
The  pleadings  are  considered  in  the  light  of  technical  formulas, 
not  importing  absolute  veracity  in  their  contents,  but  are  meant 
to  define  the  issue  and  facilitate  the  labors  of  the  jurors  in  ar- 
riving at  a  conclusion.4 


i  Smith  v.  Pelott.  68  Hun,  632; 
Coward  v.  Clanton,  79  Cal.  29 ;  Vogel 
v.  Osborne,  32  Minn.  167;  Rich  v. 
Minneapolis,  40  Minn.  84;  Lamar 
v.  Pearce,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  92 ;  Soaps  v. 
Eichbevg,  42  111.  A  pp.  375;  Ballock 
v.  Hooper,  146  U.  S.  363;  Crump  v. 
Gerick,  40  Miss.  785;  Buzard  v. 
McAnulty,  77  Tex.  438;  Kankakee, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Horan  (111.,  1890),  23  N.  E. 
Rep.  621;  Baily  v.  O'Bannon,  28 
Mo.  App.  39;  Beale  v.  Brown,  0 
Mackey,  574 ;  Wheeler  v.  West,  71 
Cal.  126 ;  Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type 
Foundry,  29  Mo.  App.  541 ;  McCor- 
mick  M.  Co.  v.  Snell,  23  111.  App.  79. 
An  original  pleading  which  has  been 
superseded  by  an  amended  one  is 
not  admissible  as  an  admission. 
Wheeler  v.  West,  71  Cal.  126.  Con- 
tra, Baily  v.  O'Bannon,  28  Mo.  App. 
39. 

2  National  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Tugman,  143 
TJ.  S.  28 ;  Murphy  v.  St.  Louis  Type 


Foundry,  supra;  Cook  v.  Ban-,  44 
N.  Y.  156;  Asbach  v.  Railroad  Co. 
(Iowa,  1892),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  90. 

3  Spencer  v.  Fortesque,  16  S.  E. 
Rep.  898;  Nichols  v.  Jones,  32  Mo. 
App.  664 ;  Central  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Stol- 
mer,  51  Fed.  Rep.  518;  Johnson  v. 
Russell,  144  Mass.  409;  Eaton  v. 
Telegraph  Co.,  68  Me.  63;  Judd  v. 
Gibbs,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  539;  Lillis  v. 
Erin  Ditcli  Co..  95  Cal.  553;  State 
v.  Littlefield,  3  R.  I.  124;  Buzard  v. 
McAnulty,  77  Tex.  445;  Woods  v. 
Graves,  144  Mass.  365 ;  Miller  v.  James 
(Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  227. 

4  See  Gould,  Plead.,  pp.  4-10;  Phil- 
lips v.  Smith,  110  Mass.  61 ;  Taft  v. 
Fiske,  140  Mass.  250.  AVhere  the  ad- 
mission is  contained  in  one  clause  of 
a  pleading,  the  party  has  a  right  to 
claim  that  a  clause  qualifying  it  shall 
be  read.  Spencer  v.  Fortescue  (N.  C, 
1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  898.  Cf.  Parker 
v.  Lanier,  82  Ga.  216. 


§  77.]  ADMISSIONS.  109 

The  answer  of  an  administrator  to  interrogatories  in  a  bill 
in  equity  will  not  bind  the  estate; l  nor  is  the  answer  of  a  de- 
fendant in  a  court  of  equity  generally  admissible  against  his 
co-defendants,2  though  where  there  is  a  real  and  joint  interest 
between  the  parties,  or  -where  an  actual  privity  of  interest 
exists,  the  answer  of  one  defendant,  relating  to  the  common 
undertaking,  as  in  cases  of  partnership,  is  an  admission  by 
which  the  others  will  be  bound.3 

Declarations  in  an  answer  filed  in  a  court  of  chancery  are 
admissible  against  a  sole  defendant,  even  though  the  answer 
is  withdrawn  or  abandoned  by  him,4  or  stricken  out  on  mo- 
tion.5 

§  77.  Admissions  by  reference  —  Awards  of  arbitrators. 
Where  a  party  has  referred  another  to  a  third  person  not  in- 
terested or  in  privity  with  either,  the  party  referring  will  be 
bound  by  any  statements  the  referee  shall  make  pertaining  to 
the  subject-matter.  The  statement  of  the  referee  is  con- 
sidered the  admission  of  the  person  referring."  The  state- 
ments and  replies  will  only  be  regarded  as  the  admissions  of 
the  party  so  far  as  they  convey  information  relative  to  the 
facts  which  constitute  the  subject  of  the  inquiry.7 

This  principle  is  applicable  to  awards.  If  a  controversjr  is 
submitted  to  arbitrators  chosen  for  the  purpose  of   bringing 

iCrandall  v.  Gallup,  12  Conn.  565;  dyk,  9  Cranch,  153,  156;  Hartley  v. 

Dent  v.  Dent,  3  Gill  (Md.),  482;  El-  Mathews  (Ala.,  1890»,  11  S.  Rep.  452. 

wood  v.  Diefendorf,  5  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  4  Brown   v.  Pickard,  4   Utah,  292 ; 

398;  Marshall  v.  Adams,  11  111.  37.  Daub  v.  Eugelback,  109  111.  267. 

A  demurrer  to  a  bill  in  equity,  in  5Peckham  Iron  Co.  v.  Harper,  41 

order  to  be  used  as  an  admission  of  Ohio  St.  100 ;  Fite  v.  Elack  (Ga.,  1893), 

the  facts  stated  in  the  bill,  must  have  17  S.  E.  Rep.  349. 

been  adjudged  insufficient.     Kanka-  6  Chapman  v.  Twitchell,  37  Me.  59. 

kee,  etc.  Co.  v.  Horan,  131  111.  288;  23  The  word  "referee,*'  as   thus  used. 

N.  E.  Rep.  621.     Cf.  post,  §  303.  means  a  person  to  whom  a  voluntary 

a  Leeds  v.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  2  Wheat,  reference  is  made  and  not  one  ap- 

380;  Field  v.  Holland,  6  Cranch,  8;  pointed  b}r  the  court  as  a  substitute 

Morris  v.  Nixon,  1  How.  (S.  C.)  118;  for  a  jury. 

McElroy  v.  Ludlum,  32  N.  J.  Eq.  245.  "Barnard   v.    Macy,   11   Ind.   536; 

In  equity,  if  the  complainant  waives  Duval  v.  Covenhoven,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 

the  respondent's  oath,  a  sworn  an-  561;  Lambert  v.  People,  GAbb.  N.  C. 

swer  has  only  the  force  of  an  affida-  (N.    Y.)    181;    Allen  v.    Killinger.    8 

vit    United  States  v.  Council,  54  Fed.  Wall.  (U.S.)  480;  Over  v.  Schifling, 

Rep.  994.     See  post,  %  303.  102   Ind.    191    (master   referring    to 

3  See  ante,  §  66 ;  Field  v.  Holland,  servant). 
€  Cranch,  8 ;  Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Riems- 


110 


ADMISSIONS. 


[{ 


about  a  fair  settlement  and  to  avoid  future  litigation,  the  re- 
sult of  the  arbitration  will  be  conclusive  and  will  be  regarded 
as  the  admissions  of  the  parties  referring,  unless  corruption  or 
partiality  or  gross  fraud,  collusion  or  mistake  is  shown.1 

An  arbitrator  or  referee  may  testify  to  what  matters  were 
referred  to  him.2  But  where  the  award  is  in  writing  it  is 
considered  as  the  written  admission  of  both  parties,  and  neither 
will  be  allowed  to  contradict  or  vary  its  terms  by  the  parol 
evidence  of  the  arbitrator.3  On  the  other  hand,  an  award 
may  be  set  aside  if  'prima  facie  irregular,  uncertain  or  lacking 
in  mutuality,4  or  if  it  appears  upon  its  face  to  have  been 
rendered  upon  ex  parte,  improper  or  grossly  insufficient  evi- 
dence.5 Generally,  however,  an  arbitrator  to  whom  the  par- 
ties have  voluntarily  referred  a  controversy  is  not  bound  by 
strict  legal  rules  as  to  the  reception  of  evidence.  He  may,  in  his 
discretion,  receive  evidence  which  would  be  inadmissible  in  a 
court,  provided  he  keeps  within  the  limits  of  the  subject- 
matter  referred,  and  the  reception  by  him  of  such  evidence  is 


i  Wade  v.  Powell,  31  Ga.  1 ;  N.  Y. 
Lumber,  etc.  Co.  v.  Schneider,  119 
N.  Y.  475 ;  Davy  v.  Faw,  7  Cranch 
(U.  S.),  171 ;  Overly  v.  Thrasher,  47 
id.  10 ;  Sherfey  v.  Graham,  72  III.  158 ; 
Colder  v.  Mueller,  22  111.  App.  527; 
Kendrick  v.  Turbell,  26  Vt.  416; 
Harris  v.  So.  Mfg.  Co.,  8  R.  I.  133 ; 
Carter  v.  Carter,  100  Mass.  309 ;  State 
v.  Appleby,  25  S.  C.  500 ;  McDowell 
v.  Thomas,  4  Neb.  542;  Cooper  v. 
Andrews,  44  Mich.  94 ;  Pierce  v. 
Pierce,  60  N.  H.  355 ;  Sisson  v.  Balti- 
more, 51  Md.  83 ;  Jenkins  v.  Meagher, 
46  Miss.  84 ;  Crumlish  v.  Wilmington, 

5  Del.  Ch.  270;  Cushing  v.  Babcock, 
38  Me.  452 ;  Halstead  v.  Seaman,  52 
How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  415;  Bennett  v. 
Russell,  34  Mo.  524 ;  Young  v.  Laird, 
30  Ala.  371. 

2  Hawksworth  v.  Brammel,  5  M. 

6  Cr.  281;  Hale  v.  Huse,  10  Gray 
(Mass.),  99;  Thrasher  v.  Overly,  51 
Ga.  91. 

3  Cobb  v.  Dortch,  52  Ga.  548;  Aid- 
rich  v.  Jessiman,  8  N.  H.  516 ;  Alex- 


ander v.  McNear,  28  Fed.  Rep.  403 ; 
Mulligan  v.  Perry,  64  Ga.  567 ;  Kings- 
ton v.  Kincaid,  1  Wash.  (U.  S.)  448 ; 
Ward  v.  Gould,  5  Pick.  29;  Chap- 
man v.  Ewing,  78  Ala.  403.  See  post, 
§  205  et  seq. 

4Blackledge  v.  Simpson,  2  Hayw. 
(S.  C.)  30;  Purdy  v.  Delavan,  1 
Caines,  304;  Weed  v.  Ellis,  2  id.  254; 
Spofford  v.  Spofford,  10  N.  H.  254 ; 
Gilson  v.  Powell,  13  Miss.  712;  Han- 
son v.  Weber,  40  Me.  194. 

5  Conrad  v.  Mass.  I.  Co.,  4  Allen 
(Mass.),  20 ;  Hogaboom  v.  Herrick,  4 
Vt.  131 ;  Fluharty  v.  Beatty,  22  W. 
Va.  698 ;  Thompson  v.  Blanchard,  2 
Iowa,  44;  Cutting  v.  Carter,  29  Vt 
72.  The  party  impeaching  an  award 
upon  the  grounds  that  evidence  had 
been  improperly  excluded  must 
have  objected  at  the  time  of  its  ex- 
clusion (Patten  v.  Hunnewell,  8  Me. 
19),  and  must  show  that  the  evidence 
would  have  been  pertinent  and  ma- 
terial. Halsted  v.  Seaman,  52  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  415. 


§§   78,  70.]  ADMISSIONS.  Ill 

in  good  faith  and  docs  not  result  in  any  substantial  injustice 
to  either  of  the  parties.1 

Under  the  rule  above  explained,  that  where  a  party  has  re- 
ferred another  to  a  third  person,  the  latter  has  power  to  bind 
the  party  referring  by  his  statements  relating  to  the  subject- 
matter,  is  included  the  case  of  an  interpreter  who  participates 
in  an  interview  between  the  parties.  Either  party  may  tes- 
tify to  the  statements  of  the  interpreter,  which  is  under  such 
circumstances  equivalent  to  the  admission  of  the  adversary.2 

§  78.  Admissions  from  conduct  and  assumed  character. — 
This  class  of  admissions  is  of  extensive  application,  but  in  the 
main  as  admissions  by  conduct  are  rather  to  be  regarded  as 
forming  a  part  of  the  law  of  equitable  estoppel,  the  principles 
upon  which  they  are  admitted  as  a  part  of  the  law  of  evidence 
is  of  doubtful  correctness.  They  will  be  found  elsewhere 
treated  under  their  appropriate  head.3 

§  79.  Self-serving  declarations.— The  admissions  of  a 
party,  being  presumably  against  his  interest,  may  be  given  in 
evidence  by  any  one  who  heard  them.  But  a  party  cannot 
claim  the  same  for  statements  made  by  him  in  his  own  favor. 
Such  declarations  cannot  be  testified  to  by  third  persons  as 
substantive  evidence  of  the  facts  therein  stated,  and  if  they 
are  to  be  produced  in  evidence  the  party  himself  must  go 
upon  the  stand.4     If  the  declaration  is  made  in  the  presence 

>  Hooper  v.  Taylor,  39  Me.  224;  451;  Ward  v.  Ward,  37  Mich.  253; 
Fennimore  v.  Chikls,  1  Halst.  (N.  J.)  In  re  Bronson,  67  Hun,  237;  Bement 
386  ;  Maynard  v.  Frederick,  7  Cush.  v.  May  (Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  327  ; 
246;  Shaifer  v.  Baker,  38  Ga.  135;  Hammond  v.  Beeson,  112  Mo.  190; 
Bassett  v.  Cunningham.  9  Gratt.  (Va.)  Smith  v.  Wilson,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
684;  Campbell  v.  Western,  3  Paige  115;  Schmidt  v.  Packard,  132  Ind. 
(N.  Y.),  124;  Pike  v.  Gage,  9  Fost  398;  Alexander  v.  Handley,  11  S. 
(N.  H.)  461 ;  Chesley  v.  Chesley,  10  Rep.  390 ;  Shiner  v.  Abbie,  77  Tex. 
N.  H.  327 ;  McCrae  v.  Robeson,  2  1 ;  Melcher  v.  Derkum,  44  Mo.  App. 
Murph.  (N.  C.)  127.  But  evidence  as  650 ;  Steel  v.  Shafer,  39  111.  App.  185 ; 
to  a  claim  which  is  not  legally  en-  Thomas,  Adm'r,  v.  Lewis  (Va.,  1892), 
forceable  should  be  rejected  by  the  15  S.  E.  Rep.  389 ;  Saenger  v.  Night- 
arbitrator.  De  La  Riva  v.  Berreysea,  ingale,  48  Fed.  Rep.  708 ;  Cherry  v. 
2  Cal.  195.  Butler,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1090 ;  Tisch  v. 

2  Nadau  v.  White  River  Lumber  Co.  Utz,  142  Pa.  St.  186 ;  Schwab  v.  Hein- 

(Wis.,  1890),  43  N.  W.  Rep.  1035.  del,  16  Daly,  164 ;  Welch  v.  Palmer, 

» See  post,  §§  83,  84.  85  Mich.  310 ;  Baily  v.  Pardridge,  134 

*  Whitney  v.  Houghton,  125  Mass.  111.  188. 


112  ADMISSIONS.  [§  79. 

and  hearing1  of  the  other  party  or  of  his  agent,  in  a  way 
and  under  such  circumstances  that  required  him  to  reply,  deny 
or  qualify  the  truth  of  the  facts  asserted,  it  is  no  longer  inad- 
missible as  self-serving  and  hearsay,  but  as  adopted  and  rati- 
fied by  the  party  hearing  it,  and  is  receivable  as  his  admission.2 
The  statement  must  not  only  have  been  made  in  the  presence 
of  the  party,  but  the  language  used  must  have  been  fully  un- 
derstood before  his  silence  can  be  construed  into  an  admission.3 
Thus,  if  he  is  a  foreigner  not  thoroughly  conversant  with  the 
language,  it  must  be  shown  that  an  interpreter  was  present 
and  that  the  meaning  of  the  words  used  was  explained  to 
him.4  The  circumstances  of  the  conversation  should  have 
been  such  as  would  naturally  demand  a  denial  or  reply,5  for 
no  man  is  called  upon  to  enter  into  useless  discussion  or  to 
meet  every  vague,  hasty  or  extravagant  assertion  concerning 
his  rights  that  is  made  in  his  hearing,0  whether  it  be  addressed 
to  him  or  to  third  persons.  So  no  man  is  under  any  sort  of 
necessity  or  obligation  to  answer  questions  put  to  him  with- 
out knowing  their  purpose  and  object;  and  where  questions 
seriously  affecting  one's  own  interest  are  put  by  an  adversary, 
the  right  of  the  questioner  to  the  knowledge  must  be  shown 
before  silence  or  an  express  refusal  to  answer  should  be  con- 
strued into  a  damaging  admission.7 

1  In  all  cases  of  this  class  the  pres-  W.  Rep.  373 ;  Hunt  v.  Johnson,  11  S. 
ence  of  the  person  to  be  affected  is  a  Rep.  387.  If  a  party's  declarations 
very  material  element.  Martin  v.  are  admitted  in  his  own  favor,  they 
Capital  Ins.  Co.  (Iowa,  1892),  52  N.  should  be  confined  to  corroboration 
W.  Rep.  534 ;  Gainsey  v.  Rhodes,  63  alone.  Sprague  v.  Bond  (N.  C,  1894), 
Hun,  632 ;  Dawson  v.  Schloss,  93  Cal.  18  S.  E.  Rep.  701. 

134;  Taliaferro  v.  Goudelock,  82  Tex.  3  Riley  v.  Martinelli  (Cal.,  1893),  32 

521 ;  Simonds  v.  Partridge,  154  Mass.  Pac.  Rep.  579. 

500;  Sanscraints  v.  Torongo,  87  Mich.  4  Wright  v.  Maseras,  56  Barb.  521. 

69;  Downing  v.   Iron   Co.,   93  Ala.  5  Giles  v.  Vandiver,  17  S.  E.  Rep. 

262:  Cain  v.  Cain,  140  Pa.  St.  144;  115. 

Farrell  v.  Weitz  (Mass.,  1894),  35  N.  6  Whitney  v.  Houghton,  127  Mass. 

E.  Rep.  783.  527 ;  Siva  v.  Wabash  Ry.  Co.  (Mo., 

2  Des  Moines  Sav.  Bank  v.  Hotel  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  915. 

Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  67;  'Des  Moines  Bank  v.   Hotel   Co. 

Evans  v.  Montgomery  (Mich.,  1893),  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  67 ;  Brain- 

55  id.  362 ;  Giles  v.  Vandiver,  17  S.  ard  v.  Buck,  25  Vt.  573 ;  Corser  v. 

E.   Rep.   115;  Claflin  v.   Rodenburg  Paul,   41    N.    H.   24;    Blanchard    v. 

(Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  272;  Thomp-  Evans,   55    N.   Y.    Super.    Ct    543; 

son  v.  Thompson  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  Pierce  v.   Goldsburg,   3b    Ind.   317 ; 


§  79.]  ADMISSIONS.  113 

So  admissions  which  are  inferred  from  silence  should  be 
and  are  received  with  caution,  the  very  liberal  policy  as  to 
their  reception  which  obtained  in  the  earlier  cases  being  no 
longer  countenanced.  Subject  to  this  precaution  and  having 
in  view  the  facility  with  which  evil-disposed  persons  may 
abuse  the  principle  here  involved  by  the  employment  of  de- 
nunciation or  offensive  or  scurrilous  language  or  impertinent 
questions  towards  their  adversary  and  in  his  hearing,  admis- 
sions implied  by  silence  are  receivable  against  the  party. 

So  where  a  tenant  receives  notice  to  quit1  without  objec- 
tion, or  where  an  account  is  rendered  to  the  debtor  and  not 
promptly  objected  to  by  him,2  the  silence  of  the  parties  will 
be  received  as  an  admission  of  the  correctness  of  the  notice 
or  account. 

So  where  books  or  documents  arc  proved  to  have  been  in 
the  possession  of  a  person,  or  where  it  is  known  that  he  had 
or  could  have  had  constant  access  to  them  either  personally 
or  by  his  agent,  it  will  be  presumed  that  he  inspected  them 
and  has  acquired  a  knowledge  of  their  contents.  Under  such 
circumstances  his  silence  or  failure  to  object  promptly  to  the 
accuracy  of  the  entries,  so  far  as  they  affect  his  interest  and  so 
far  as  the  circumstances  call  for  an  objection  on  his  part,  will 
make  the  statements  of  fact  contained  in  the  writings  com- 
petent as  his  admissions.3 

People  v.   Driseoll,    107  N.   Y.  424;  v.  Sawyer,  15  S.   W.  Rep.   998;  104' 

Wilkius  v.  Stidger,  22  Gat  231 ;  Duty  Mo.  36. 

v.    Hervey,    126   Mass.    517;    Vail  v.        SKirwan  v.  Henry  (Ky.,  1890),  1G ' 

Strong,  10  Vt.  457  •  Higgins  v.  Del-  S.  W.  Rep.  828 ;  Fenuo  v.  Weston,  31 

linger,  22  Mo.   397 ;  Hackett  v.  Col-  Vt.  345 ;  Coe  v.  Hutton,  1  S.   &  R 

lender,    32    Vt.    97;    McClenkan    v.  398;    Corps  v.   Robinson,   2    Wash. 

McMillan,  6  Barr,  366 ;  Corn.  v.  Call,  C.  C.  388 ;  McBride  v.  Watts,  1   Mc- 

21   Pick.    515;   Com.   v.  Kenney,  12  Cord;   384;    Allen    v.    Coit,   6    Hill 

Mete.   235 :    Hildreth    v.    Martin,    3  (N.  Y.),  318.     See  1  Greenl.  on  Evid., 

Allen  (Mass.),  371 ;  Com.  v.  Densmore,  g  197.  But  statements  in  unanswered 

12  id.  535;  1  Greenl.  on  Evict,  §  197.  letters    in    the    parties'     possession, 

1  Cons.  Coal  Co.  v.  Schaefer,  31  111.  where  no  reply  was  reasonably  re- 

App.  364.  quired  by  circumstances,  cannot  be 

2Freeland  v.  Herron,  7  Cranch,  147,  received    against    the     person     ad- 

151;  House  v.  Beak,  43  111.  App.  615:  dressed.     Waring  v.  U.  S.  Tel.   Co., 

141   111.290;  Mackin  v.   O'Brien,   33  44   How.    (N.    Y.)   69;  4   Daly,    233; 

id.  474;  Fleishner  v.  Kubli,  20  Oreg.  Com.  v.  Eastman,  1  Cush.  (Mass.)  189; 

323 ;  25  Pac.  Rep.  1086 ;  McCormack  Richardson  v.  Frankum,  9  C.   &  P. 


1  1-i  ADMISSIONS.  [§  SO. 

§  80.  Mode  of  proof— Nature  of  the  admission.— Admis- 
sions by  third  persons  in  privity  with  the  party  against  whom 
they  are  offered  may  be  shown  by  the  testimony  of  any  com- 
petent witness  who  was  present  and  has  heard  them.1  The 
main  fact  is  rather  the  actual  making  of  the  declaration  than 
its  truth  or  falsity,  so  that  evidence  is  always  receivable  on 
the  part  of  the  persons  against  whom  the  admission  is  intro- 
duced to  show  either  that  he  did  not  make  it,  or,  if  it  was  made 
by  third  persons,  that  the  statements  of  fact  contained  in  it 
are  not  true.2  It  is  sufficient  if  the  substance  of  the  admission 
be  stated,3  though  in  any  case  the  whole  of  the  declaration 
relating  to  the  same  subject  must  be  introduced  in  order  that 
its  credibility  may  be  determined  by  the  jury  after  a  careful 
comparison  and  weighing  of  those  parts  which  are  favorable 
with  those  that  are  adverse  to  the  party.4 

In  case  letters  forming  a  correspondence  are  introduced  by 
the  plaintiff,  the  defendant  may  read  his  own  answer  to  plaint- 
iff's last  letter.5 

The  credibility  or  weight  of  the  admissions  is  always  a 
question   for  the   jury.     All  parts   of   the   declaration  may 

221 ;  Talcott  v.  Harris,  93  N.  Y.  567,  Murphy,  39  Cal.  52 ;  Morris  v.  Stokes, 

571 ;  Leonard  v.  Tillotson,  97  N.  Y.  24  Ga.  552 ;  Moore  v.  Wright,  90  111. 

8,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  197.  470 ;  Withers  v.  Richardson,  5  T.  B. 

i  Miller  v.  Wood,  44  Vt.  378 ;  Wil-  Mon.  (Ky.)  94 ;  Turner  v.  Jenkins,  1 

cox  v.  Green,  28  Conn.  572;  Shepp  v.  H.  &  J.  (Md.)  161 ;  Storer  v.  Gowen, 

State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  349;  Green  18   Me.    174;    Witwell   v.   Wyer,   11 

v.  Cawthorn,  4  Dev.  L.  (N.  C.)  409 ;  Mass.  6 ;  Perego  v.  Purdy,  1  Hilton, 

Com.  v.  Griffin,  110  Mass.  181;  Ober-  269;  Bristol  v.  Warner,  19  Conn.  7; 

mann   Brew.   Co.  v.  Adams,  35   111.  Simmons  v.  Haas,  56  Md  153;  Searles 

App.  540;  Seers  v.  So.  R  Co.  (Mo.,  v.  Thompson,  18  Minn.  316;  Adams 

1891),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  1007.   He  should  v.  Eames,  107  Mass.  275 ;  Kelsey  v. 

be  required  to  identify  the   person  Busch,  2  Hill  (N.  Y),  440;  Devylyn 

making  the  admissions  or  declara-  v.  Killcrease,  2  McMull.  (S.  C.)  425.   A 

tions   where    their   admisibility   de-  copy  of  a  written  statement  made  to 

pends  on  their  being  made  by  a  par-  a  witness  by  a  party  is  primary  evi- 

ticular  person.     Smith  v.  Williams,  dence  of  the  admissions  therein  if  its 

15  S.  E.  Rep.  130.  correctness  is  verified  by  the  witness 

2C'Bannon  v.  Vigus,  32  111.  App.  who  made  it.     Butler  v.  Cornell  (111., 

473.  1894)»35  N.  E.  Rep.  767. 

^Kittridge  v.  Russell,  114  Mass.  67.        sRoe  v.  Day,  7  C.    &  P.  705.     So 

4 See,  also,  "Confessions,"  §§93,  94;  where  a  letter  which  is  alleged  to  be 

Wilson  v.  Calvert,  8  Ala.  757 ;  Tram-  in  answer  to  another  letter  is  offered, 

rnel  v.  Bassett,  24  Ark.  499 ;  Barnum  the    latter  must  also  be  produced. 

v.  Barnum,  9  Conn.  242 ;  People  v.  Watson  v.  Moore,  1  C.  &  Kir.  626. 


§  80.]  ADMISSIONS.  115 

not  be  equally  credible,  and  they  may  refuse  to  believe  any 
part  of  it  and  may  reject  the  part  unfavorable  to  the  party 
against  whom  it  is  offered  and  believe  that  which  is  in  his 
favor.1  Statements  wholly  distinct  from  the  admission  need 
not  be  shown ; 2  nor  need  the  witness  in  testifying  to  the  ad- 
mission be  asked  concerning  contradictory  statements  which 
have  been  made  later.3 

Where  the  witness  was  present  during  only  part  of  the  con- 
versation in  which  the  admission  was  made,  he  may  testify  to 
that  part  which  he  has  heard,4  and  other  parts  of  that  con- 
versation relating  to  and  qualifying  it  may  be  shown  by  the 
adverse  party;  as,  by  putting  an  admission  in  evidence,  all  that 
was  said  at  the  time  necessary  to  comprehend  it  is  rendered 
admissible.5 

Although  all  admissions  are  hearsay  so  far  as  the  witness 
himself  is  concerned,  a  distinction  is  made  in  their  character 
as  viewed  from  the  standpoint  of  the  party  who  uttered  them 
and  who  might,  if  on  the  witness  stand,  be  able  to  testify  to 
their  contents  of  his  own  personal  knowledge.  If  the  admis- 
sion assumes  to  be  a  statement  of  some  fact,  the  whole  of  it 
will  be  binding  upon  the  part}?-  in  the  same  manner  as  though 
it  were  an  actual  statement  of  fact,  though  it  appears  that  a 
portion  of  it  is  not  in  the  personal  knowledge  of  the  person 
making  it,  and  is  derived  from  the  information  of  others. 
But  where  the  statement  is  expressly  made  on  information 

»  Ayers  v.  Metcalfe,  39  111.  307 ;  Li-  11 ;  Edward  v.  Ford,  2  Bailey  (S.  C), 

cett  v.  State,  23  Ga.   57 ;  Pearson  v.  461 ;  Hatch  v.  Potter,  2  Gilm.  (111.) 

Sabin,   10  N.   H.   205 ;  Newcomb  v.  725.     See  post,  §  342a. 

Jones,  37  Mo.  App.  475 ;  Mattocks  v.  <  Williams  v.  Kaiser,  11  Fla.  234 ; 

Lyman,  18  Vt.  98 ;  Roberts   v.   Mc-  State  v.  Pratt,  88  N.  C.  639 ;  Denver, 

Gee,  15  Barb.   449 ;  Brown's  Case,  9  etc.  Co.   v.  Neis,  56  Cal.  56 ;  Mays  v. 

Leigh,   633;  Yarborough  v.  Moss,   9  Deaver,  1  Iowa,  260;  State  v.  Cov- 

Ala.  382;  Whitwell  v.  Wyer,  11  Mass.  ington,   2   Bailey  (S.  C),  569;  West- 

6,  10.  moreland  v.  State,  45  Ga.  225.     Ad- 

2  Darby  v.  Ouseley,  1  H.  &  N.  1 ;  missions  which  are  competent  are 
Sturge  v.  Buchanan,  2  M.  &  R.  90.  not  rendered  inadmissible  because 
Cf.  Lamar  v.  Pearce  (Ga.,  1893),  17  the  party  contradicts  them.  Griffith 
S.  E.  Rep.  92.  But  an  admission  can-  v.  Sauls  (Tex.,  1890),  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
not  prevail  over  an  agreed  statement  230. 

of  facts.  Adams  v.  Eichenberger  5  Moore  v.  "Wright,  90  111.  470; 
(Ark.,  1893),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  853.  Giklersleeve  v.  Mahoney,  5  Duer,  383 ; 

3  People  v.  Green,  1  Park.  Cr.  Cas.    Pennell  v.  Meyer,  8  C.  &  P.  470. 


116  ADMISSIONS.  [§§  81,  82, 

and  belief,  it  will  be  inadmissible  either  against  the  party  or 
in  his  favor.1 

Yerbal  admissions  are  not  generally  admissible  to  prove 
those  facts  which,  under  the  circumstances  or  by  some  rule  of 
law,  can  only  be  properly  proved  by  written  evidence,2  unless 
the  loss  of  the  writing  be  shown  or  its  absence  be  accounted 
for.3 

§  81.  Weight  and  sufficiency  of  admissions. —  The  some- 
what unreliable  character  of  verbal  admissions,  made  often 
hastily  and  inadvertently  or  in  casual  conversation,  has  been 
often  adverted  to.4  The  language  used  may  have  been  mis- 
understood, or  not  understood  at  all  by  the  witness,  or  it  may 
be  perverted  by  him  who  testifies  through  passion  or  preju- 
dice or  because  unable  to  recollect  the  language  used.  For 
several  eye-witnesses  to  give  different  accounts  of  the  same 
occurrence  which  they  saw  is  very  common.  Where  language 
is  to  be  repeated,  only  those  who  are  skilled  in  detecting  the 
niceties  of  meaning  which  attach  to  many  words  and  phrases 
will  be  able  to  narrate  correctly  even  the  substance  of  what 
they  have  heard.  So  the  witness  may  allow  knowledge  of 
facts  which  he  has  subsequently  ascertained  to  color  and  dis- 
tort the  meaning  of  the  language  which  was  employed  and 
which  he  heard.  Upon  the  whole,  the  unsubstantial  char- 
acter of  this  sort  of  evidence  is  such  that  it  is  only  receivable 
from  the  necessity  of  the  case  and  in  the  absence  of  evidence 
of  a  more  reliable  character. 

§82.  Admissions,  when  conclusive  —  Mistake. —  Judicial 
admissions  in  the  form  of  express  stipulations  by  the  party  or 
his  attorney,  which,  on  being  filed,  become  a  part  of  the  rec- 

1  Roe  v.  Ferrais,  2  B.  &  P.  548  (ap-  land  Canal  Co.  v.  Hathaway,  8  Wend, 
plying  the  rule  to  an  answer  in  chan-  480;  McPhaul  v.  Gilchrist,  7  Ired. 
eery);  Chaddock  v.  Clifton,  22  Wis.  (N.  C.)  L.  169;  Scott  v.  Clare,  3 
115 ;  Stephens  v.  Vroman,  16  N.  Y.  Campb.  236 ;  Sykes  v.  Hayes,  5  Biss. 
301.  Of.  Chapman  v.  Chicago,  etc.  529;  Newhall  v.  Holt,  6  M.  &  W.  662. 
Co.,  26  Wis.  295.  See  as  to  personal  But  c/.  Jackson  v.  Dobbin,  3  Johns, 
knowledge,  §  50.  223 ;  Earle  v.  Picken,  5  C.  &  P.  542. 

2  Walker  v.  Dunspaugh,  20  N.  Y.  See  ante,  §§  30-33,  37. 
170;  Jeuner  v.  Jolliffe,  6  Johns.  9;  3See  post,  §§  130,  133. 

Jackson  v.  Miller,  6  Cow.  751,  755 ;        4  Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  Kerler,  88 
Jackson  v.  Cary,  16  Johns.  306 ;  Wei-    Ga.  39. 


§  88.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


117 


ords  of  the  court,  or  payment  of  money  into  court,  are  con- 
clusive of  all  the  facts  either  directly  or  incidentally  involved.1 
Thus,  by  payment  into  court,  the  party  admits  the  amount  of 
the  indebtedness,2  that  it  is  due,3  as  well  as  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
court,4  and  the  capacity 5  of  his  adversary  to  sue.  So  the  suf- 
ficiency of  the  pleading  is  also  admitted.6  So,  also,  express 
admissions  of  facts  contained  in  a  party's  pleadings  are  usually 
conclusive  upon  him,  constituting  as  they  do  a  legal  estoppel 
of  record.7 

"While  judicial  admissions  becoming  a  part  of  the  record  are 
regarded  as  conclusive,  admissions  out  of  court  are  not  gener- 
ally so  regarded  as  to  the  facts  contained  therein,  unless  by 
means  of  the  admission  the  conduct  of  some  other  person  has 
been  so  influenced  that  he  has  altered  his  condition  to  such 
an  extent  that  he  will  be  damaged  by  allowing  their  falsity  to 
be  shown.8  The  admission  may  then  be  regarded  as  working 
an  estoppel  upon  the  party  making  it.9     But  estoppels  differ 


i  See  ante,  §S  74-76. 

2  Boyden  v.  Moove,  5  Mass.  365,  369. 

3  Jones  v.  Hoar,  5  Pick.  285 ;  Cons. 
Gas  Co.  v.  Harless  (Ind.,  1891),  29  N. 
E.  Rep.  1002. 

*  Miller  v.  Williams,  5  Esp.  19,  21. 

5  Lipscombe  v.  Holmes,  2  Campb. 
441. 

6  Randall  v.  Lynch,  2  Camp.  352, 
357.  See,  also,  Baker  v.  Charlton,  7 
Cush.  581. 

»  Bowers  v.  Smith,  8  N.  Y.  S.  226 ; 
Simis  v.  Davidson,  54  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct  235;  Sheehan  v.  Loler,  36  Mo. 
App.  224 

8  Bank  v.  Natchez,  3  Rob.  (La.)  293 ; 
Newton  v.  Belcher,  12  Q.  B.  921; 
Reed  v.  Newcomb  (Vt,  1890),  19  Atl. 
Rep.  367 ;  Kinney  v.  Farnsworth,  17 
Conn.  355 ;  O'Bannon  v.  Vigus,  32  111. 
App.  473;  Newcomb  v.  Jones,  37  Mo. 
App.  475 ;  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L  Co. 
v.  Berry  (Ind.,  1894),  35  N.  E.  Rep. 
565.  An  admission  of  payment  of 
consideration  in  a  deed  is  not  con- 
clusive. See  §  208.  So  an  admission 
contained  in  an  alleged  agreement  is 


not  binding  as  an  estoppel.    Josey  v. 
Davis,  55  Ark.  318. 

9  "  To  constitute  such  an  estoppel  a 
party  must  have  designedly  made  an 
admission  inconsistent  with  the  de- 
fense or  claim  he  proposes  to  set  "up, 
and  another  party  have  with  his 
knowledge  and  consent  so  acted  on 
that  admission  that  he  will  be  injured 
by  allowing  that  admission  to  be  dis- 
proved." Cooley,  J.,  in  Hawes  v. 
Marchant,  1  Curt,  C.  C.  144.  So  in 
Heane  v.  Rogers,  9  B.  &  C.  577,  586, 
the  court  said :  "  There  is  no  doubt 
but  that  the  express  admissions  of  a 
party  to  the  suit  or  admissions  im- 
plied from  his  conduct  are  evidence 
and  strong  evidence  against  him : 
but  we  think  that  he  is  at  liberty  to 
prove  that  6uch  admissions  were 
mistaken,  or  were  untrue,  and  is  not 
estopped  or  concluded  by  them,  un- 
less another  person  has  been  induced 
by  them  to  alter  his  condition ;  in 
such  a  case  a  party  is  estopped  from 
disputing  their  truth  with  respect  to 
that  person  (and  those  claiming  under 


118 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§ 


from  admissions  in  that  the  former,  being  a  legal  defense, 
mast  be  specially  pleaded,  the  facts  which  are  to  support  them 
being  given  in  evidence;  though  they  resemble  admissions  in 
that  they  are  binding  only  upon  privies  or  upon  parties  among 
or  between  whom  a  joint  interest  or  privity  exists.1 

An  admission  is  always  matter  of  evidence  alone,  and  the 
facts  admitted  need  not  be  pleaded,  but  are  for  the  considera- 
tion of  the  jury.  So,  except  perhaps  in  the  case  of  judicial 
admissions  or  extra-judicial  admissions  under  oath  or  in  which 
gross  fraud  or  crime  is  involved,  the  party  may  be  allowed  to 
rebut  the  truth  of  the  statement  or  show  that  it  was  made 
under  duress,  or  ignorantly  or  by  mistake,  or  while  intoxicated, 
in  all  cases  where,  not  having  been  acted  upon,  the  other  party 
Will  not  be  prejudiced.2 

§  83.  Estoppel  defined. —  Estoppels  are  divided  into  estop- 
pels by  deed  —  that  is,  by  some  admission  or  agreement  con- 
tained in  a  valid  sealed  instrument ;  by  record,  which  shows 


him)  and  that  transaction,  but  as  to 
third  persons  he  is  not  bound." 

1  Parker  v.  Crittenden,  37  Conn. 
148;  Gould  v.  West,  32  Tex.  338; 
Eaton  v.  N.  E.  Tel.  Co.,  68  Me.  63 ; 
Wright  v.  Hazen,  24  Vt.  143 ;  Thistle 
v.  Buford,  50  Mo.  278 ;  McCrawey  v. 
Remsen,  19  Ala.  430 ;  Peters  v.  Jones, 
35  Iowa,  412;  Kinnear  v.  Mackey,  85 
111.  96 ;  Simpson  v.  Pearson,  31  Ind. 
1 ;  Murray  v.  Sells,  53  Ga.  257.  That 
estoppels  must  be  specially  pleaded, 
see  Tyler  v.  Hall,  106  Mo.  313;  Good- 
ing v.  Underwood,  89  Mich.  187; 
Wessels  v.  Bleaman,  87  Mich.  481 ; 
Vellum  v.  Demerle,  65  Hun,  543; 
Churchill  v.  Bowman,  95  Cal.  54. 

2  Kenton  v.  First  Nat.  Bank  (Ky., 
1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  841;  Miller 
Hardw.  Lumb.  Co.  v.  Wilson  (Ark., 
1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  974;  Tower  v. 
Haslam,  84  Me.  84 ;  Gooding  v.  Un- 
derwood, 89  Mich.  187;  Wortham  v. 
Thompson,  81  Tex.  348;  Wright  v. 
Weimeister,  87  Mich.  494;  Stiff  v. 
Ashton  (Mass.,  1892),  29  N.  E.  Rep. 
203;    Hill   v.    Wand,   47   Kan.    340; 


Thompson  v.  Thompson  (Ky.,  1893). 
20  S.  W.  Rep.  873;  Hoi  man  v.  Boyce 
(Vt.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  832;  Watkins 
et  al.  v.  Howeth,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  277 ; 
Board  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  24  N.  Y.  S. 
392 ;  Platto  v.  Gettelman  (Wis.,  1893), 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  167 ;  Newcomb  v.  Jones, 
37  Mo.  App.  475.  The  principles  lying 
at  the  foundation  of  the  doctrine  of 
estoppel  as  it  is  now  recognized  both 
in  law  and  equity  are  thus  admirably 
summed  up  by  the  court  in  Dickin- 
son v.  Colegrove,  100  U.  S.  580:  "The 
vital  principle  is  that  he  who  by  his 
language  or  conduct  leads  another  to 
do  what  he  would  not  otherwise  have 
done  shall  not  subject  such  person  to 
loss  or  injury  by  disappointing  the 
expectations  upon  which  he  acted. 
A  change  of  position  would  involve 
fraud  and  falsehood.  The  remedy  is 
available  only  for  protection  and  can- 
not be  used  as  a  weapon  of  assault. 
It  accomplishes  that  which  ought  to 
be  done  between  man  and  man,  and 
is  not  permitted  to  go  beyond  this 
limit." 


§  83.]  ADMISSIONS.  119 

a  final  adjudication  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction,1  and 
estoppels  in  pais,  or,  using  the  modern  term,  equitable  es- 
toppels. 

Estoppels  are  defined  by  Lord  Coke  as  follows:  "An  es- 
toppel is  where  a  man  is  concluded  by  his  own  act  or  accept- 
ance to  say  the  truth." 

In  the  case  of  most  estoppels  in  law  —  that  is,  estoppels  by 
deed  or  record  —  the  truth  is  absolutely  excluded  without  dis- 
criminating whether,  in  tne  particular  case,  its  exclusion  will 
work  an  injustice  or  not.  An  estoppel  in  pais  or  by  conduct, 
so  far  at  least  as  it  is  governed  by  equitable  principles,  is  only 
allowed  to  exclude  the  truth  when  its  assertion  would  be  un- 
just to  the  person  who  has  relied  upon  the  statement  or  con- 
duct of  the  party  estopped. 

In  the  case  of  strictly  legal  estoppels  in  pais,  such  as  those, 
for  example,  which  arise  by  an  acceptance  of  rent  or  estate  or 
by  partition,  the  truth  is  excluded  partly  because  of  maxims 
of  public  policy  and  partly  to  obtain  a  consistent  and  unvary- 
ing administration  of  the  law.2 

In  order  to  constitute  a  declaration  or  act  an  estoppel  in 
pais  there  must  have  been  a  material  misrepresentation  of 
fact  or  a  concealment  of  or  silence  respecting  certain  facts  or 
circumstances  which  it  was  the  duty  of  the  party  to  make 
known.3 

1  See  "  Judgments,"  post,  §§  151-  actions  of  law.  But  it  does  not  fol- 
156.  low  because  equitable  estoppels  may 

2  Horn  v.  Cole,  51  N.  H.  287.  originate  legal  as  distinguished  from 

3  See  Tiedeman  on  Equity.  §  107  equitable  rights,  that  it  may  not  be 
et  seq. ;  Eaton  v.  Tel.  Co.,  68  Me.  523 ;  necessary,  in  particular  cases,  to  re- 
People  v.  Brown,  67  111.  435 ;  Home  sort  to  a  court  of  equity  to  make 
v.  Cole,  51  N.  H.  287-290;  Stevens  v.  them  available.  All  that  can  prop- 
Dennett,  51  N.  H.  324 ;  Peters  v.  erly  be  said  is  that  to  justify  a  resort 
Jones,  35  Iowa,  512;  Continental  to  a  court  of  equity  it  is  necessary  to 
Bank  v.  Bank  of  Commonwealth,  50  show  some  ground  of  equity  other 
N.  Y.  575  ;  Zechtmanu  v.  Roberts,  109  than  the  estoppel  itself  whereby  the 
Mass.  53 ;  Reis  v.  Grafman,  56  Mo.  party  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  it  is 
434;  Oakland  v.  Rye,  52  Cal.  270;  prevented  from  making  it  available 
Viele  v.  Judson,  82  N.  Y.  32-39 ;  in  a  court  of  law.  In  other  words. 
Hamlin  v.  Seers,  82  N.  Y.  327 ;  Com-  the  case  shown  must  be  one  where 
stock  v.  Smith,  26  Mich.  306 ;  Abrams  the  forms  of  law  are  used  to  defeat 
v.  Seale,  44  Ala.  297.  "The  meaning  that  which  in  equity  constitutes  the 
is  not  that  equitable  estoppels  are  right.''  Drexel  v.  Berney,  122  U.  S. 
cognizable  only  in  courts  of  equity,  253. 

for  they  are  commonly  enforced  in 


120 


ADMISSIONS. 


[§83. 


If  one  is  not  under  any  obligation  to  speak,  or  if  he  has  no 
reasonable  opportunity  to  do  so,  his  silence  will  not  constitute 
an  estoppel.1  Thus  the  circulation  of  a  plat  or  map  upon  which 
property  is  described  as  subdivided  in  blocks  will  not  estop 
the  owner  when  it  is  done  without  his  knowledge.2  On  the 
other  hand,  where  an  owner  of  lands  allows  another  to  make 
improvements  without  warning  him  of  his  title,3  or  allows 
another  person  to  deal  with  his  property  as  his  own,  he  will 
be  estopped  against  all  persons  who,  relying  upon  his  silence, 
have  acquired  any  title  to  the  property  because  of  a  belief  in 
the  validity  of  the  title  of  the  third  person.4 

The  Verbal  statement  of  fact,  in  order  to  operate  as  an  es- 
toppel, must  be  distinct  and  clear,5  and  must,  as  a  general  rule, 
pertain  to  some  past  or  present  event.  In  no  case  will  a  mere 
expression  of  opinion  or  of  future  intention,  unless  a  contract 
be  created,  be  binding  as  an  estoppel.6 


i  Rosenfield  v.  Fortier,  94  Mich.  34 ; 
Collier  v.  White  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S. 
Rep.  385 ;  Mathews  v.  Alsworth  (La., 
1893),  12  S.  Rep.  578;  Diffenbach  v. 
Vogeler,  61  Md.  370;  Terre  Haute  v. 
Rodel,  89  Ind.  128 ;  Veile  v.  Judson, 
82  N.  Y.  32 ;  Bull  v.  Rovve,  13  S.  C. 
355 ;  Bramble  v.  Kingbury,  39  Ark. 
131 ;  Mills  v.  Railroad  Co.,  41  N.  J. 
Eq.  1. 

*  Sullivau  v.  Davis,  29  Kan.  28. 

a  Ware  v.  Smith  (Mass.,  1892),  30  N. 
E.  Rep.  869 ;  Planet,  etc.  Co.  v.  Rail- 
road Co.  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
616 ;  Town  v.  Peebles,  5  Wash.  St. 
471 ;  Cross  v.  Kansas  City,  90  Mo.  13. 

4  Tiedeman  on  Equity,  §  109 ;  Du- 
pree  v.  Woodruff  (Tex.,  1892),  19  S. 
W.  Rep.  469 ;  Long  v.  Kee  (La.,  1892), 
10  S.  Rep.  854;  Foreman  v.  Weil 
(Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  815 ;  Stewart 
v.  Armstrong,  56  Fed.  Rep.  167; 
Lawrence  v.  Guaranty  Co.  (Kan., 
1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  816 ;  Mathews  v. 
Morgan  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep. 
478;  Mathews  v.  Culbertson  (Iowa, 
1893),  50  id.  201 ;  Chapman  v.  Pingry, 
67  Maine,  198;  Hawkins  v.  Church, 
23  Minn.  256;  Roberts  v.  Davis,  72 


Ga.  819;  Redman  v.  Graham,  80  N. 
C.  231 ;  Stewart  v.  Munford,  91  111. 
158 ;  Kirk  v.  Hamilton,  102  U.  S.  68. 

5  Graham  v.  Thompson,  55  Ark. 
296;  Townsend  v.  Todd,  47  Conn. 
190;  Moors  v.  Albro,  129  Mass.  9; 
Davenport  v.  Gas  Co.,  43  Iowa,  301 ; 
Bennett  v.  Dean,  41  Mich.  472 ;  Lash 
v.  Rendall,  72  Ind.  475 ;  Roach  v. 
Brannon,  57  Miss.  490;  Tillotson  v. 
Mitchell,  111   111.   518;    Grinman  v. 

'  Dean,  62  Tex.  218 ;  Hill  v.  Wand,  47 
Kan.  240 ;  Sparks  v.  Texas  Loan 
Agency,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  256. 

6  White  v.  Ashton,  51  N.  Y.  280; 
Jackson  v.  Allen,  120  Mass.  64;  Allen 
v.  Hodge,  51  Vt.  436 ;  White  v.  Water, 
31  111.  422-437 ;  Whitwell  v.  Winslow, 
134  Mass.  343;  Insurance  Co.  v. 
Morey,  96  U.  S.  544 ;  Birdsey  v.  But- 
ter field,  34  Wis.  52 ;  McGirr  v.  Sell,  60 
Ind.  249;  Chatfield  v.  Simonson,  92 
N.  Y.  209;  Phelps  v.  Railroad  Co., 
94  111.  548 ;  Shields  v.  Smith,  37  Ark. 
47.  "  The  only  case  in  which  a  rep- 
resentation as  to  the  future  can  be 
held  to  operate  as  an  estoppel  is  when 
it  relates  to  an  intended  abandon- 
ment of  an  existing  right  and  is  made 


§84.] 


ADMISSIONS. 


121 


§  84.  Intention  of  party  estopped. —  In  order  to  constitute 
an  estoppel  it  is  necessary  that  the  misrepresentation  should 
have  boon  intended  to  influence  the  conduct l  of  some  other 
person;  but  it  is  also  held  that  the  existence  of  an  actual  in- 
tention need  not  be  shown,  but  that  an  intention  may  be  im- 
plied from  circumstances  which  would  induce  others  to  act.2 

On  the  other  hand,  the  party  pleading  the  estoppel  must 
have  relied  upon  the  misrepresentation  or  silence  of  the  party 
estopped,  so  that  he  would  sustain  a  loss  were  the  latter  to  be 
allowed  to  disprove  the  truth  of  his  statement.3 

While  a  fraudulent  intent  on  the  part  of  the  person  estopped 
is  never  absolutely  required,  it  has  been  repeatedly  held  that 
he  must  know  what  he  says  to  be  false  or  must  have  no 
reasonable  grounds  for  believing  his  statement  to  be  true.4 

On  the  other  hand,  the  party  who  claims  the  benefit  of  the 
estoppel  must  prove  that  he  was  ignorant  of  the  truth  of  the 
statements  he  relied  upon,  and  that  he  had  no  opportunity  and 


to  influence  others  and  by  which 
they  have  been  induced  to  act  An 
estoppel  cannot  arise  from  a  promise 
as  to  future  action  with  respect  to  a 
right  to  be  acquired  upon  an  agree- 
ment not  yet  made."  Union  Mut. 
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Mowry,  96  U.  S. 
547-48. 

i  Harvey  v.  West.  87  Ga.  553; 
Bishop  v.  Mintou  (N.  C,  1893),  17 
S.  E.  Rep.#436;  McCabe  v.  Raney,  33 
Ind.  309;*Clark  v.  Culidge,  8  Kan. 
189-195;  Pierce  v.  Andrews,  6  Cush. 
4 ;  Wilcox  v.  Howell,  44  N.  Y.  398 ; 
Turner  v.  Coffin,  12  Allen,  401 ;  Kuhl 
v.  Mayer,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  84,  85 ;  South- 
ard v.  Sutton,  68  Me.  575 ;  Carroll  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  Ill  Mass.  1 ;  Brown  v. 
Bowen,  30  N.  Y.  519;  Holdane  v. 
Colespring,  21  N.  Y.  474. 

2  Parlin  v.  Stone,  48  Fed.  Rep.  808 ; 
Mattes  v.  Frankel,  65  Hun,  203; 
Stockton  Sav.  Bank  v.  Staples  (Cal., 
1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  936 ;  Anderson  v. 
Ar instead,  69  111.  452-454;  Home  v. 
Cole,  51  N.  H.  287 ;  Ries  v.  Bruce,  49 
Mo.   231-234;    Bank   v.   Hazard,   30 


N.  Y.  226-230 ;  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Norris, 
31  N.  J.  Eq.  583-585. 

'Gerlach  v.  Turner,  89  Cal.  446; 
Draffiu  v.  Railroad  Co.,  34  S.  C.  464 ; 
Stevens  v.  Ludlum,  46  Minn.  160; 
Home  v.  Bank,  108  N.  C.  109 ;  Hol- 
man  v.  Boyce  (Vt.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep. 
632;  Vaughn  v.  Hixon,  50  Kan.  773; 
Hopkins  v.  McCrillis  (Mass.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  1026 ;  Curnen  v.  Mayer,  79 
N.  Y.  511-514 ;  Stevens  v.  Dennett,  51 
N.  H.  324-333 ;  Eaton  v.  Tel.  Co.,  68 
Me.  63 ;  Graves  v.  Blandell,  70  id.  190. 

4  In  re  King,  29  W.  N.  C.  426 ;  Bell 
v.  Goodnature  (Minn.,  1892),  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  908 ;  Raner  v.  Timerson,  51  Barb. 
517 ;  Holmes  v.  Crowell,  73  N.  C.  613 ; 
Whitaker  v.  Williams,  20  Conn.  98 ; 
Reed  v.  McCourt,  41  N.  Y.  435 ;  Thrall 
v.  Lathrop,  30  Vt.  307;  Adams  v. 
Brown,  16  Ohio  St.  419;  Smith  v. 
Hutchinson,  61  Mo.  83 ;  Lafferty  v. 
Moore,  33  N.  Y.  658 ;  Wharf  v.  Pres- 
cott,  7  Allen,  494 ;  Dorlarque  v.  Cress, 
71  111.  380-382;  Graves  v.  Blondell, 
70  Me.  90. 


122  ADMISSIONS.  [§  85. 

was  not  negligent  in  inquiring  after  the  knowledge  of  their 
truth.1 

§  85.  Admissions  and  communications  sent  and  received 
by  telephone. —  A  communication  sent  or  received  over  a 
telephone  is  a  message  in  its  legal  meaning  and  relations,2 
the  idea  conveyed  by  the  word  "telephone"  being  nearly 
equivalent  to  that  involved  in  the  word  "  telegram  " — i.e., 
information  received  from  a  distance.  The  message  thus  sent 
may  constitute  an  oral  admission  under  circumstances  which  are 
analogous  to  those  rendering  admissible  a  party's  declarations 
against  him.  So  a  conversation  had  over  a  telephone  with  a 
person  who  is  shown  to  have  such  an  instrument  in  his  place 
of  residence. or  business  is  competent  as  his  admission,  and  it 
may  be  stated  by  the  hearer  without  the  latter  identifying 
the  party  at  the  other  end  of  the  wire.3  Usually,  however,  a 
witness  who  testifies  to  an  admission  or  declaration  heard 
over  a  telephone  should  identify  the  party  speaking  to  him.4 
This  he  must  do  ex  necessitate  rei  by  his  recognition  of  the 
voice  of  the  speaker,  and  the  admissibility  of  his  testimony 
will  depend  on  his  previous  acquaintance,  however  slight,  with 
the  party's  voice.3  If  he  has  heard  him  speak  but  once  before, 
his  evidence  of  identity  will  not  be  thereby  rendered  incom- 
petent, though  his  consequent  lack  of  familiarity  with  the 
voice  may  be  brought  out  to  affect  the  value  of  his  evidence 
of  identification.6  The  identity  of  the  speaker  may  of  course 
be  shown  by  other  competent  evidence  than  that  of  the  wit- 
ness who  heard  the  statement.7  When  for  any  reason  direct 
communication  between  parties  through  a  telephone  is  im- 
possible, so  that  either  one  with  the  assent  of  the  other  re- 

i  Martin  v.  Martin,  1  Misc.  Rep.  181 ;  33  N.  W.  Rep.  451 ;  Wolfe  v.  Miss. 

In  re  Turner,  id.  58 ;  Young  v.  Board  Pac.  R.  Co.,  97  Mo.  473 ;  11  S.  W.  Rep. 

of  Com'rs  of  Mahoning,  51  Fed.  Rep.  49 ;  Miss.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v.  Heidenheimer, 

585 ;  Northern  Mich.  Lumber  Co.  v.  82  Tex.  195.     Of.  24  Weekly  L.  Bui. 

Lyon  (Mich.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  438 ;  245. 

Tibbie  v.  Anderson,  63  Ga.  41 ;  Shaply  4  Stepp  v.  State,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  753 ; 

v.  Abbott,  42  N.  Y.  443 ;  Rosebrough  31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  349. 

v.  Ansley,  35  Ohio  St.  107;    Bright-  3  Stepp  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep. 

man  v.  Hix,  108  Mass.  246.  349. 

2  Attorney-General  v.  Edison  Tele-  6  People  v.  Ward,  3  N.  Y.  Crim. 
phone  Co.,  43  L.  T.  703,  cited  in  An-  Rep.  483,  511;  Miss.  Pac.  R.  Co.  v. 
derson's  Law  Diet,  p.  1013.  Heidenheimer,  82  Tex.  195. 

3  Reed  v.  Burlington,  73  Iowa,  160 ;  '  Davis  v.  Walter,  70  Iowa,  405. 


§  85.]  ADMISSIONS.  123 

quests  an  operator  at  an  intermediate  station  to  speak  for 
him,  the  operator  becomes  the  agent  of  the  speaker ; '  and  as 
each  party  is  usually  in  turn  speaker  and  receiver,  the  oper- 
ator stands  in  the  place  of  an  interpreter,  and  statements 
made  by  him  may  be  regarded  as  the  admissions  of  either 
party.  Such  statements  are  admissible  under  the  principle 
which  lets  in  admissions  by  reference.2 

Sullivan  v.  Kuykendall,  83  Ky.        2  Oskamp  v.  Gadsden  (Neb.),  52  N. 
483.  W.  Rep.  718.    See  ante,  §  77. 


CHAPTER  VI. 


CONFESSIONS. 


88. 

Definition  and  classification. 

§93. 

88a. 

To  be  regarded  with  caution. 

89. 

Voluntary  character  of   con- 
fessions. 

94. 

90. 

Confessions,  when  voluntary — 

95. 

Inducements  offered. 

96. 

91. 

Confessions  need  not  be  spon- 

3-      taneous. 

-    97. 

92. 

Preliminary  examination. 

98. 

Extra-judicial  confessions 
must  be  corroborated. 

Conclusive  character  of  judi- 
cial confessions. 

Persons  offering  inducements. 

Confessions  of  persons  other 
than  defendant. 

Confessions  of  conspirators. 

Confessions  of  treason. 


§  88.  Definition  and  classification. —  Confessions  are  ad- 
missions made  at  any  time  by  a  person  charged  with  a  crime 
stating  or  suggesting  the  inference  that  he  committed  that 
crime,1  and  they  may  be  either  judicial  or  extra-judicial.  The 
former,  as  the  term  indicates,  are  those  which  are  made  either 
at  the  preliminary  examination  or  at  the  trial  of  the  accused. 
The  latter  are  made  out  of  court,  and  include  not  only  explicit 
or  express  verbal  or  written  admissions  of  guilt,  but  all  ad- 
missions from  which  the  guilt  of  the  accused  may  be  inferred.2 

Confessions  ma}^  thus  be  divided  into  express  confessions 
and  those  which  are  implied  from  the  actions  of  the  accused, 
such  as  his  resistance  or  avoidance  of  arrest,3  his  attempts  to 
escape  from  custody,4  and  his  silence  when  accused  of  crime 
under  circumstances  where  he  might  be  naturally  expected  to 
speak.5  For  silence  to  be  equivalent  to  confession  it  must  be 
shown  that  the  accused  heard  and  understood  the  specific 


1  Stephen's  Dig.,  §  421. 

2 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  216. 

3  State  v.  Taylor  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  806;  Jamison  v.  People  (111., 
1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  486;  State  v. 
Moncla,  39  La.  Ann.  368;  People  v. 
Fine,  77  Cal.  147;  Carden  v.  State 
(Ala.,  1888),  4  S.  Rep.  823;  Com.  v. 
Brigham,  147  Mass.  414. 


4  Williams  v.  State,  24  Tex.  App. 
17,  32:  4  S.  W.  Rep.  04;  People  v. 
Ogle,  104  N.  Y.  511;  Ryan  v.  State, 
83  Wis.  468;  Elmore  v.  State  (Ala., 
1893),  13  S.  Rep.  427. 

5  Com.  v.  Trefetheu  (Mass.,  1893), 
31  N.  E.  Rep.  961;  Bro%vn  v.  State 
(Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  596 ;  State 
v.  Reed,  62  Me.  129. 


§  88«.]  CONFESSIONS.  1 25 

charge  which  was  made  against  him,1  and  that  ho  heard  it 
under  circumstances  calling  upon  him  to  deny  it.2  The  pris- 
oner may  show  that  his  silence  or  suspicious  actions  were 
caused  by  threats,3  or  that  the  accusations  were  made  in  judi- 
cial proceedings;4  as,  for  example,  at  a  coroner's  inquest.5  A 
statement  implicating  the  accused,  made  by  some  third  per- 
son to  whom  he  has  referred,  where  the  information  which 
was  given  is  responsive  to  the  inquiry  made,  may  be  admitted 
as  his  confession,  if  he  acquiesces  in  it.6 

§  88a.  To  be  regarded  with  caution. —  Writers  on  evidence 
have  pointed  out  the  necessity  for  caution  in  the  reception  of 
confessions.7  Among  the  facts  which  furnish  a  basis  for  the 
employment  of  a  careful  scrutiny  of  this  kind  of  evidence  are 
the  peculiar  circumstances  in  which  the  accused  finds  himself  — 
that  is,  embarrassed  by  a  present  incarceration  and  threatened 
with  future  imprisonment  or  death.8  The  zeal  of  acute  and 
experienced  police  officials  accustomed  to  dealing  with  crim- 
inals and  apt  to  regard  the  accused  as  guilty  until  his  inno- 
cent shall  be  made  to  appear  may  often  lead  to  a  wilful  or 
even  an  unconscious  suppression  of  facts  which  indicate  his 
innocence,  while  exaggerating  others  which  point  to  his  guilt.9 

Numerous  cases  of  false  confessions  are  mentioned  in  the 
books  which  are  calculated  to  incite  suspicion  that  the  accused 
may  be  endeavoring  to  secure  some  object  not  apparent  at 
first  glance.  He  may  be  seeking  to  divert  suspicion  from  some 
other  suspected  person,  knowing  well  that  on  his  own  trial  he 
will  be  able  to  establish  his  innocence.10  Such  cases  are  ad- 
mitted, however,  to  be  exceptional,  and,  while  not  without 

'  Brown  v.  Com.,  86  Va.  935 ;  Sauls  5  The  fact  that  the  accused  had  im- 

v.  State  (Tex.,  1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  plements     in    his    possession    with 

1066;  Robertson  v.  State,  17  id.  1068;  which  to  attempt  an  escape  may  be 

30  Tex.  App.  496 ;  Brookser  v.  State,  shown  against  him.     Slate  v.  Duu- 

26  Tex.  App.  593.  can  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  699. 

'•^Felder  v.  State,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  145;  «  United  States  v.  Gardner,  42  Fed. 

State  v.  Carroll,  30  S.  C.  85;  Camp-  Rep.  832.     Cf.  People  v.  Powell,  87 

bell  v.  State,  55  Ala.  80 ;  Drumright  Cal.  318. 

v.  State,  29  Ga.  430;  State  v.  Smith,  U  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  219. 

35  La.  Ann.  457;  Keller  v.  State,  55  SBrister  v.  State,  26  Ala.  107. 

N.  Y.  565.    See  §§  78,  79,  82-84.  9 See  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  217. 

3  Golden  v.  State,  25  Ga.  527 ;  State  10  Wills  on  Circumstantial  Evidence, 
v.  Flanagan,  25  Ark.  92.  p.  88;  Phil.   &  Am.   on  Evid,  419; 

4  State  v.  Mullins,  101  Mo.  514.  Chilty,  Criin.  Law,  vol.  1,  p.  85. 


126  CONFESSIONS.  [§  89. 

weight  in  estimating  the  true  nature  of  this  sort  of  evidence, 
they  should  not  be  invoked  without  discrimination  to  im- 
peach the  general  character  of  a  confession  which  was  made 
under  conditions  which  properly  render  it  admissible.1  So 
the  infirmities  incident  to  all  evidence  which  consists  of  the 
reception  of  language  used  by  others  in  the  presence  and  hear- 
ing of  the  witness  and  which  have  been  adverted  to  in  another 
place2  must  be  taken  into  consideration. 

§  89.  Voluntary  character  of  confessions. —  Whether  a 
confession  is  judicial  or  extra-judicial  it  must  be  shown  that  it 
was  wholly  free  and  voluntary.3  And  a  proper  foundation 
should  first  be  laid  for  its  reception  by  asking  the  witness 
whether  the  prisoner  had  been  informed  that  it  would  be  ad- 
vantageous for  him  to  confess,  or  whether  any  language  had 
been  used  towards  him  which,  by  filling  his  mind  with  hope 
and  fear,  would  render  his  confession  forced  or  involuntary.4 
If  such  a  course  has  been  pursued  by  some  third  person,  the 
confession  will  be  rejected.5  This  preliminary  question  of  the 
voluntary  character  of  the  confession  bearing  upon  its  admis- 
sibility as  evidence  is  a  preliminary  question  for  the  judge,6 

1 A  confession  is  admissible  though  Chisenhall,    11   S.  E.  Rep.   518;  106 

made  to  free  another  from  arrest.  N.  C.  676 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  76  Ga.  76. 

People  v.  Smalling,  94  Cal.  112.  *  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  219. 

2  See  ante,  §§80-82.  « People  v.  Taylor,  93  Mich.   638; 

3  Gentry  v.  State,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  660;  Cook  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W. 
24  Tex.  App.  80;  Collins  v.  State,  24  Rep.  23;  State  v.  Chambers,  45  La. 
Tex.  App.  141 ;  Ross  v.  State,  67  Md.  Ann.  36 ;  Smith  v.  State,  88  Ga.  627 ; 
286 ;  People  v.  Taylor,  93  Mich.  638 ;  Craig  v.  State,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  297 ; 
Com.  v.  Morey,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  461 ;  State  v.  Carson,  36  S.  C.  524 ;  Green 
Spears  v.  Ohio,  20  Ohio  St.  583.  This  v.  State,  88  Ga.  516 ;  State  v.  Carroll, 
rule,  does  not  apply  to  admissions  of  30  S.  C.  85 ;  State  v.  Kinder,  96  Mo. 
collateral  facts  not  involving  crim-  548;  People  v.  Fox,  3  N.  Y.  S.  359; 
inal  intent  State  v.  Knowles,  48  State  v.  Grant,  22  Me.  171 ;  Fife  v. 
Iowa,  593 ;  People  v.  Barton,  49  Cal.  Com.,  29  Pa.  St  329.  See  post, 
632.     Contra,  Marshall    v.   State,    5  §§  90,  92. 

Tex.  App.  273 ;  Quinland  v.  State,  16  6  Com.  v.  Taylor,  5   Cush.  (Mass.) 

S.  W.  Rep.  258 ;  29  Tex.  App.  401.  606 ;  People  v.  Fox,  24  N.  E.  Rep.  923 ; 

As  to   the  voluntary  character    of  aff'g  3  N.  Y.  S.  359;  Chabbock's  Case, 

confessions,  see  Stafford  v.  State,  55  1  Mass.  144;  Thomas  v.  State,  84  Ga. 

Ga.  592;  State  v.  Sopher,  70  Iowa,  618;  State  v.  Holden,  44  N.  W.  Rep. 

494;  Huberts   v.  Com.  (Ky.),  7  S.  W.  123;  42  Minn.  350;  State  v.  Harmon 

Rep.  401;  Alfred   v.  State,   37  Miss.  (Del.),  3  Harr.  567 ;  People  v.  Sweet- 

296 ;  People  v.  Deacons,  109  N.  Y.  374 ;  laud,  77  Mich.  53 ;  People  v.  Howes, 

State  v.  Dildy,  72  N.  C.  325 ;  State  v.  81  Mich.  396 ;  People  v.  Barker,  60 


§89.] 


CONFESSIONS. 


127 


who  should  on  request  examine  into  the  matter  out  of  the  pres- 
ence and  hearing  of  the  iurv.1  Where  the  evidence  as  to  the 
voluntary  character  of  the  confession  is  conflicting,  the  ques- 
tion may  be  left  to  the  jury  under  judicial  instructions  that  if 
on  all  the  evidence  they  find  that  it  was  not  voluntary  they 
should  reject  it.2 

The  burden  of  proof  to  show  that  the  accused  has  been 
unduly  influenced  is  upon  the  defense.3  A  refusal  to  allow 
the  counsel  for  the  prisoner  to  cross-examine  the  witness  upon 
this  point  is  reversible  error.4 

It  is  extremely  difficult  to  enunciate  any  general  rule  by 
which  may  be  measured  the  amount  or  degree  of  duress  or 
improper  influence  which  will  destroy  the  voluntary  charac- 
ter of  the  confession.  The  mere  fact  that  the  accused  was  in 
charge  of  an  armed  police  official  or  a  sheriff,  or  was  hand- 
cuffed,5 or  tied,6  or  in  prison,7  will  not  alone  render  his  con- 
fession involuntary.8  Threats  or  promises  of  immunity  which 
would  have  no  effect  whatever  upon  a  well-balanced,  deter- 
mined, courageous  and  experienced  man  would  make  a  very 
deep  impression  on  a  feeble  woman  or  upon  one  of  weaker 
intellect  or  will  power,  or  on  a  person  of  immature  years  and 
lacking  in  experience.9 


id.  277;  Com.  v.  Morey,  1  Gray 
(Mass.),  461 ;  Biscoe  v.  State.  67  Md.  6 ; 
United  States  v.  Nott,  1  McLean,  499 ; 
State  v.  Moorman,  27  S.  C.  22 ;  Mur- 
ray v.  State,  25  Fla.  528. 

i  Ellis  v.  State,  65  Miss.  44 ;  Carter 
v.  State,  37  Tex.  362. 

2  Thomas  v.  State,  84  Ga.  613;  10 
S.  E.  Rep.  1016;  Carr  v.  State,  10  S. 
E.  Rep.  626;  84  Ga.  250;  People  v. 
Howes  (Mich.,  1890),  45  N.  W.  Rep. 
961 ;  Com.  v.  Piper,  120  Mass.  185 ; 
People  v.  Cassidy,  14  N.  Y.  S.  349. 

SRufer  v.  State,  25  Ohio  St  464; 
People  v.  Cassiday,  133  N.  Y.  612; 
State  v.  Howard,  14  S.  E.  Rep.  481. 
Contra,  People  v.  Sweetland,  77  Mich. 
53;  43  N.  W.  Rep.  779;  Nicholson  v. 
State,  38  Md.  140;  Barnes  v.  State, 
36  Tex.  356 ;  People  v.  Soto,  49  Cal. 
69;  Johcson  v.  State,  30  La.  Ann. 
881. 


*  State  v.  Miller,  42  La.  Ann.  186. 
The  voluntary  character  of  the  state- 
ment should  be  shown  before  its  ad- 
mission, though  if  this  proof  is  omitted 
it  may  be  introduced  after  the  con- 
fession is  received.  Smith  v.  State, 
15  S.  E.  Rep.  675 ;  88  Ga.  627. 

estate  v.  Whitfield,  109  N.  C.  876. 

g  State  v.  Rogers  (N.  C,  1893),  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  297. 

7  People  v.  Gastro,  75  Mich.  127; 
Com.  v.  Smith,  119  Mass.  305 ;  People 
v.  Rogers,  18  N.  Y.  9 ;  Cox  v.  People, 
19  Hun,  340. 

*  McQueen  v.  State,  10  S.  Rep.  433; 
94  Ala.  50 ;  Hornsby  v.  State,  10  S. 
Rep.  522 ;  94  Ala.  50 ;  State  v.  Coella, 
3  Wash.  St.  99;  Anderson  v.  State, 
25  Neb.  550 ;  State  v.  Carlisle,  57  Mo. 
102. 

&  See  Iloober  v.  State,  81  Ala.  51 ; 
1  Grcenl.  on  Evid.,  §  219. 


128 


CONFESSIONS. 


[§90. 


The  statement  that  a  confession  extorted  by  threats  or 
promises  of  immunity  is  not  voluntary,  and  is  inadmissible,  is 
not  difficult  to  understand.  The  main  difficulty  lies  in  the 
ascertainment  of  what  language  used  towards  the  prisoner 
would  constitute  a  threat  or  promise.1  So  where  defendant 
voluntarily  testified  before  the  grand  jury  his  testimony  is 
admissible  against  him.2  In  any  event,  if  it  shall  appear  to 
the  court  that  the  will  of  the  prisoner  has  been  overcome,  it 
matters  not  whether  it  be  by  threats  of  harm,  promises 
of  favor,  the  fear  of  detection,  or  by  flattery  or  trickery,  it  is 
the  duty  of  the  judge  to  exclude  the  confession.3 

§  90.  Confessions,  when  voluntary  —  Inducements  offered. 
When  a  prisoner  is  first  cautioned  that  what  he  is  about  to 
say  will  be  taken  down  and  may  be  used  against  him  his  con- 
fession is  not  thereby  rendered  involuntary.4     On  the  other 


1  Thompson's  Case,  1  Leach,  825 ; 
Cass'  Case,  id.  328;  Com.  v.  Harm  an, 
4  Barr,  269 ;  Boyd  v.  State.  2  Humph. 
37;  Dillon's  Case,  4  Dall.  116;  Reg. 
v.  Garner,  12  Jur.  944;  Canada  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1890),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  341. 
The  testimony  of  the  accused  volun- 
tarily given  as  a  witness  in  a  prior 
trial  of  another  person  for  the  crime 
with  which  the  witness  is  now 
charged  may  be  used  against  him. 
See  post,  §§  320,  321;  Burnett  v. 
State,  87  Ga.  622;  People  v.  Mitchell, 
94  Cal.  550 ;  People  v.  Gallagher,  75 
Mich.  512;- State  v.  Glahn,  97  Mo. 
579. 

2  State  v.  Carroll,  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
1159;  State  v.  Coffee,  56  Conn.  399. 

3  Regina  v.  Baldy,  16  Jur.  599 ; 
Bubster  v.  State,  33  Neb.  663;  50  N. 
W.  Rep.  953;  Lauderdale  v.  State 
(Tex.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  679 ;  Rex 
v.  Kingston,  4  C.  &  P.  387 ;  Reg.  v. 
Jarvis,  L.  R.  1  C.  C.  R.  (C.  B.)  96 ; 
McClain  v.  Com..  110  Pa.  St.  209. 
A  promise  that  the  accused  will  be 
used  as  a  witness  for  the  state  (State 
v.  Johnson,  80  La.  Ann.  881),  or  that 
he  will  be  helped  if  he  confesses 
(State  v.  Von  Sachs,  30  La.  Ann.  042), 


or  a  declaration  that  a  suspected  per- 
son had  better  pay  for  what  he  had 
taken  (Cook  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  23),  that  he  might  as  well 
own  up,  coupled  with  an  accusation 
of  theft  (Smith  v.  State,  88  Ga.  627), 
a  promise  to  get  the  accused  out  of 
the  trouble  (Searcy  v.  State,  28  Tex. 
App.  513 ;  Clayton  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
Crim.  App.  489),  or  a  threat  to  kill 
(Bush  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892),  17  S.  W. 
Rep.  330),  advice  that  to  own  up  will 
save  defendant  from  a  heavy  sen- 
tence (Searles  v.  State,  6  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  331),  that  he  ought  to  be  hung 
(State  v.  Carson,  36  S.  C.  524),  a 
promise  by  the  district  attorney  that 
he  will  not  be  prosecuted  (Neely  v. 
State,  27  Tex.  App.  324),  to  tell  the 
truth  and  have  no  more  trouble 
(Biscoe  v.  State,  67  Md.  6),—  have  all 
been  held  enough  to  render  a  con- 
fession inadmissible  because  invol- 
untary. 

*  Reg.  v.  Holmes,  1  C.  &'K.  248 ;  Reg. 
v.  Atwood,  5  Cox  C.  C.  322;  Rizzolo 
v.  Com.,  126  Pa.  St.  54 ;  United  States 
v.  Kirkwood,  5  Utah,  123 ;  Maples  v. 
State,  3  Heisk.  408 ;  Rex  v.  Baldry,  2 
Den.  C.  C.  430.    See  post,  §  92. 


91.] 


CONFESSIONS. 


129 


hand,  while  such  a  warning  is  advisable  on  grounds  of  human- 
ity and  justice,  it  is  not,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  an  absolute 
prerequisite  to  be  complied  with  before  the  confession  will  be 
valid.1 

If  the  accused,  on  being  apprehended,  has  been  threatened 
or  promised  immunity  in  order  to  obtain  a  confession,  and  if 
subsequently,  when  these  means  are  found  ineffectual,  the 
promise  or  threat  has  been  withdrawn  so  that  he  is  no  longer 
inlluenced,  his  confession  then  made  will  be  deemed  to  be  free 
and  voluntary.2  Even  if  a  confession  is  involuntary,  no  valid 
reason  exists  why  another  later  and  wholly  distinct,  volun- 
tarily made  to  the  same  or  to  another  person  after  the  undue 
influence  has  ceased,  should  not  be  received.  It  has  accord- 
ingly been  held  that  where  it  is  shown  that  the  hopes  or  fears 
which  were  attendant  upon  the  former  confession  no  longer 
obtain,  the  later  confession  is  admissible.3 

§  91.  Confession  need  not  be  spontaneous. —  It  is  not  nec- 
essary for  a  confession  to  be  the  spontaneous  utterance  of  the 
accused.4  It  will  be  received  though  it  may  have  been  ob- 
tained solely  by  persistent  questions  put  to  him  by  ollicials 


i  Woolfolk  v.  State,  85  Ga.  69 ;  Re- 
gina  v.  Arnold,  8  C.  &  P.  622 ;  Kirby 
v.  State,  5  S.  W.  R  1C5 ;  28  Tex.  App. 
13.  Where  by  statute  such  a  caution 
is  required,  a  confession  of  one  crime, 
made  while  defendant  was  in  custody 
charged  with  another,  is  inadmissible 
on  his  trial  for  the  former  offense. 
Niederluck  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  320. 

*  Rex  v.  Clewes,  4  C.  &  P.  221 ;  Mc- 
Adory  v.  State,  62  Ala.  154;  State  v. 
Chambers,  39  Iowa,  179 ;  Reg.  v.  Bate, 
11  Cox  C.  C.  686;  Walker  v.  State,  7 
Tex.  App.  245 ;  State  v.  Jones,  54  Mo. 
478. 

3 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  221,  citing 
Guild  Case,  5  Halst.  180;  Roberts' 
Case,  1  Dev.  259,  264 ;  Com.  v.  Her- 
man, 4  Barr,  269.  The  improper 
influence  under  which  the  prior  con- 
fession is  made  is  presumed  to  con- 
tinue until  the  contrary  is  shown 
(United   States  v.  Chapman,  4  Am. 


Law  Jour.  440;  Murray  v.  State,  6 
S.  Rep.  498;  Coffee  v.  State  (Ala.. 
1891iT  6  S.  Rep.  493.  See.  also,  post, 
§  321);  and  the  evidence  which  will 
rebut  the  presumption  of  a  continu- 
ance of  the  influence  must  be  clear 
and  satisfactory.  Porter  v.  State,  55 
Ala.  95;  Com.  v.  Cullen,  111  Mass. 
435 ;  State  v.  Jones,  54  Mo.  478 ;  State 
v.  Lawhorne,  66  N.  C.  638;  Berry  v. 
United  States,  2  Colo.  Terr.  186; 
Walker  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  245; 
Kollenberger  v.  People,  9  Colo.  233; 
People  v.  Johnson,  41  Cat  452.  It  is 
for  the  judge  to  say  whether  the  pre- 
sumption has  been  rebutted  (Porter 
v.  State,  supra) ;  and  it  has  been  held 
that  the  fact  that  the  prisoner  was 
cautioned  that  he  need  not  speak  is 
sufficient  to  rebut  the  presumption. 
Com.  v.  Ackert,  133  Mass.  402 ;  Reg. 
v.  Bate,  11  Cox  C.  C.  686. 
4 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  229. 


130  CONFESSIONS.  [§  91. 

or  private  persons,  even  where  the  questions  by  their  form 
presuppose  his  guilt,1  if  in  putting  such  assuming  questions  no 
unfair  advantage  amounting  to  duress  is  gained  over  him.2 
In  the  absence  of  statutes  rendering  such  communications 
privileged,  statements  made  to  a  spiritual  adviser  are  admis- 
sible against  the  prisoner.3 

A  voluntary  confession  is  not  inadmissible  because  made 
under  a  sworn  promise  of  secrecy,4  or  procured  by  the  promise 
of  some  benefit  having  no  connection  with  the  crime  con- 
fessed,5 as,  for  example,  by  a  promise  that  the  prisoner  may 
see  visitors  or  have  his  shackles  removed,6  or  be  released  from 
a  rigorous  confinement.7  So  it  has  been  held  that  a  voluntary 
confession  is  not  to  be  rejected  because  it  was  obtained  by 
means  of  deception  or  artifice  practiced  on  the  prisoner  if  the 
inducement  employed  did  not  cause  him  to  make  an  untrue 
statement.8  Thus,  confessions  procured  by  reason  of  the  ac- 
cused having  been  made  drunken  have  been  received.9  The 
authorities,  however,  are  not  harmonious,  and  in  more  recent 
cases  it  has  been  decided  that  confessions  obtained  by  a  per- 
son who,  falsely  representing  himself  to  be  an  attorney  at 
law,  obtained  the  confidence  of  the  prisoner,10  or  by  an  officer 
who  procured  the  intoxication  of  the  prisoner,11  are  not  ad- 

i  Rex  v.  Wild,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  452.  People,  5  Park.  C.  R  547 ;  Com.  v. 

2McClain  v.  Com.,  110  Pa.  St.  259.  Howe,  9  Gray,  110;  State  v.  Feltes, 
A  voluntary  confession,  otherwise  51  Iowa,  495 ;  Territory  v.  McKern 
admissible,  will  not  be  rejected  be-  (Idaho,  1890),  26  Pac.  Rep.  123.  See 
cause  when  made  the  accused  was  post,  §  127.  And  a  voluntary  con- 
unlawfully  imprisoned.  Balbo  v.  fession  made  to  a  detective  who  is 
People,  19  Hun  (N.  Y.),  424.  locked  up  with  the  prisoner  for  that 

3  Rex  v.  Wild,  1  Mood.  Cr.  Cas.  452 ;  purpose,  or  who  in  the  guise  of  a 
Rex  v.  Court,  7  C.  &  P.  486.  See  friend  obtains  the  confession,  is  ad- 
post,  §  177.  missible  despite  the  deception  em- 

4  State  v.  Darnell,  1  Houst.  C.  C.  ployed.  State  v.  Brooks  (Mo.,  1887), 
(Del.)  321;  Com.  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  5  S.  W.  Rep.  257;  Heidt  v.  State 
496.  (Neb.,  1887),  30  N.  W.  Rep.  626 ;  Os- 

5  State  v.  Wentworth,  37  N.  H.  196 ;  born  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W. 
Rex  v.  Green,  6  C.  &  R  655.  Rep.  223.     Cf.  Stafford  v.  State,  55 

e  Rex  v.  Lloyd,  6  C.  &  P.  393.  Ga.  392.    See  post,  §  127. 

i  State  v.  Tatro,  50  Vt.  483.  10  People  v.  Stewart,  75  Mich.  21 ; 

s  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  229 ;  Rex  v.  Cotton  v.  State,  87  Ala.  875. 

Derrington,  2  C.  &  P.  418.  »  McCabe  v.  Com.  (Pa,,  1887),  8  Atl. 

9  Lester  v.  State,  32  Ark.  727 ;  Esk-  Rep.  45. 
ridge  v.  State,  25  Ala.  30 ;  Jefferds  v. 


§  92.]  CONFESSIONS.  131 

missible.  But  an)T  person  who  overhears  the  remarks  of  the 
prisoner  made  to  himself  or  to  a  person  such  as  an  attorney 
or  spiritual  adviser  who  is  incompetent  as  a  witness  may  tes- 
tify to  what  he  has  heard.1  So  a  confession  constituting  a 
part  of  a  prayer  may  be  testified  to  by  one  who  has  overheard 
it,  though  he  may  not  have  heard  the  whole  prayer;2  and  a 
confession  made  to  a  fellow-prisoner  in  the  erroneous  belief 
that  one  criminal  could  not  testify  against  another  is  not  in- 
admissible.3 

§  92.  Preliminary  examination. —  The  main  objects  of  the 
preliminary  examination  of  an  accused  person  are  to  perpetuate 
the  testimony 4  and  to  ascertain  whether  the  accused  should  be 
admitted  to  bail,  and  the  prisoner  can  only  be  questioned 
upon  the  charge  against  him  after  all  the  evidence  incrimi- 
nating him  has  been  received.  Not  only  must  he  be  free  at 
the  examination  from  the  influences  of  hope  or  fear,  but  he 
must  reaMze  that  he  is  so.  Hence  he  must  not  be  sworn ;  and 
if  by  mistake  his  statement  is  taken  under  oath,  it  will  be 
inadmissible  upon  the  ground  that  its  free  and  voluntary  char- 
acter has  been  destroyed  by  adding  to  the  existing  embarrass- 
ment of  his  condition  the  apprehension  of  a  possible  punish- 
ment for  perjury.5  But  the  fact  that  a  person  who  voluntarily 
appears  before  a  magistrate  and  confesses  is  sworn  does  not 
render  his  confession  inadmissible.6  The  signature  of  the  ac- 
cused, unless  required  by  statute  to  his  statements,  which 
have  been  committed  to  writing,  is  not  indispensable ;  but  as  it 

i  Rex  v.  Simmons,  6  C.  &  P.  540,  Cal.  421 ;  24  Pac.  Rep.  1006 ;  Miller 

and  cases  in  last  note.  v.  State,  62  Miss.  221 ;  8  S.  Rep.  273; 

2  Woolfolk  v.  State,  85  Ga.  69.  State  v.  Riley,  8  S.  Rep.  469 ;  42  La. 

*  State  v.  Mitchell,  Phill.  (N.  C.)  L.  Ann.  995 ;  State  v.  Jackson,  9  Mont. 

447.  458. 

4  So  it  is  frequently  provided  by  6  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  225 ;  Salas  v. 
statute  that  the  evidence  of  witnesses  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  R  485 ;  People 
on  the  preliminary  examination,  v.  Gibbons,  43  Cal.  557;  Com.  v. 
when  committed  to  writing,  shall  be  Brown,  150  Mass.  330;  State  v.  Gar- 
admissible  on  the  subsequent  trial  of  vey,  25  La.  Ann.  191 ;  Hendrickson 
the  accused  in  case  they  shall  be  dead,  v.  People,  10  N.  Y.  13.  Cf.  People  v. 
absent  from  the  state  or  otherwise  Kelley,  47  Cal.  125;  Rex  v.  Lewis,  6 
unable  to  testify.  McCollum  v.  State,  C.  &  P.  161 ;  Reg.  v.  Owen,  9  id.  238. 
14  S.  W.  Rep.  1020 ;  29  Tex.  App.  162 ;  6  People  v.  McGloin,  91  N.  Y.  241 ; 
Potts  v.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  663;  14  Com.  v.  Clark,  130  Pa,  St  650;  18 
&  W.  Rep.  446;  People  v.  Nelson,  85  Atl.  Rep.  988. 


132  CONFESSIONS.  [§  92. 

is  of  use  as  a  means  of  identification,  it  should  be  procured 
when  possible.  If  he  signs  it  he  makes  its  language  his  own 
and  waives  all  objection  to  its  reception  as  evidence;1  and  this 
is  so  though  the  writing  is  in  a  language  not  understood  by 
the  accused,  provided  its  contents  have  been  translated  to  him.2 

The  necessity  that  the  accused  should  be  examined  without 
being  sworn  is  well  illustrated  where  the  prisoner  has  been 
a  witness  at  a  coroner's  inquest  into  the  crime  of  which  he 
stands  charged.  If  the  prisoner  was  a  witness  at  the  coroner's 
inquest,  and  if  at  that  time  he  was  not  under  arrest  and  not 
charged  with  the  crime,  his  sworn  testimony  as  a  witness  may 
be  used  against  him  upon  his  trial  for  the  same  offense,  even 
though  at  the  date  of  giving  his  testimony  at  the  inquest  he 
may  have  been  strongly  suspected  of  committing  the  crime.3 
On  the  contrary,  where  he  is  under  arrest  wThen  he  testifies  at 
the  inquest,  he  stands  in  the  position  of  one  accused  of  crime 
and  cannot  be  compelled  to  testify  against  himself,  and  is  en- 
titled to  the  same  rights  and  warning,  so  far  as  his  sworn 
statement  is  concerned,  as  is  a  prisoner  on  a  preliminary  exam- 
ination.4 

The  examination  to  be  admissible  must  be  identified.  If 
the  accused  has  signed  with  his  mark  alone,  or  if  his  signature 
has  not  been  obtained,  it  must  be  shown  by  parol  that  the 
statement  was  read  to  him  and  that  he  assented  thereto  or 
acquiesced  in  it.5  One  of  the  principal  purposes  of  the  prelim- 
inary examination  being  to  preserve  the  evidence  against  the 
prisoner,  the  minutes  of  the  examination  and  the  statements 
of  the  witnesses  and  of  the  prisoner,  when  committed  to  writ- 
ing, are  usually  signed  by  the  magistrate  and  transmitted  to  the 

"Com.  v.  Coy  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  514.    Cf.  State  v.  Gilman,  51  Me.  306; 

E.  Rep.  4.  Kirby   v.    State,   23   Tex.     App.    13; 

2  State  v.  Demareste,  41  La.  Ann.  Lovett  v.  State,  60  Ga.  257;  State  v. 

617.  Young,  1  Winst.  (N.  C.)  L.,  No.  1.  126 ; 

•'State  v.  Senn  (S.  C,  1890).  11  S.  E.  State  v.  Zellers,  7  N.  J.  L.  220;  Sny- 

Rep.  292.  der  v.  State,  59  Ind.  109),  his  state- 

4Hendrickson  v.  People,  10  N.  Y.  ment  is  admissible  against  him. 

13;  Teachout  v.  People,  41  N.  Y.  8;  5  Harris  v.  State,   6  Tex.  App.  97; 

People  v.   Mondon,  103    N.   Y.  214.  State   v.    Mullins,  101   Mo.  514.     Cf. 

See  post,  §  345a.     But  where  he  ap-  Steagels  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  464; 

pears  voluntarily    and    is    properly  State  v.  Miller,  35  Kan.  328;  State  v. 

cautioned  (State  v.  Leuth,  5  OhioCir.  Dufour,  31  La.  Ann.  804. 
Ct.  R.  94;  State  v.  Mullins,  101  Mo, 


§  93.]  CONFESSIONS.  133 

district  attorney  or  other  officials  charged  with  the  duty  of 
prosecuting  offenders.  In  accordance  with  the  presumption 
that  an  official  has  properly  performed  his  duty,1  the  state- 
ment as  thus  written  is  conclusive  of  the  fact  that  everything 
material  that  was  said  or  done  has  been  accurately  stated, 
and  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible  to  show  the  contrary. - 

When  the  examination  has  not  been  committed  to  writing, 
or  if  the  written  examination  is  inadmissible  because  of  a 
lack  of  jurisdiction  apparent  on  its  face,  or  for  any  other  sub- 
stantial reason,  parol  evidence  of  what  the  prisoner  volun- 
tarily stated  upon  his  examination  will  be  received.3  So  parol 
evidence  of  a  confession  made  extrajudicially  is  never  ren- 
dered inadmissible  by  the  fact  that  on  his  judicial  examina- 
tion or  by  the  prisoner  himself  his  confession  has  been  taken 
down  in  writing.4  The  fact  that  the  prisoner  desires  to  waive 
the  preliminary  examination  will  not,  if  he  has  been  properly 
cautioned,  render  his  statements  inadmissible.5 

§  93.  Extra-judicial  confessions  must  be  corroborated. — 
A  naked  confession  is  one  uncorroborated  by  independent  proof 
of  the  corpus  delicti;  G  and  the  rule  is  that  while  a  conviction 
may  be  had  upon  such  a  confession  if  judicial,  as,  for  example, 
by  a  plea  of  guilty  in  open  court,  yet  in  the  case  of  extra-judi- 
cial confessions  the  corpus  delicti  must  be  proved  by  evidence 
aliunde  before  a  conviction  will  be  warranted.7 

i  See  post,  §  231.  5  Shaw  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S. 

s  People   v.   Hinchman,   75    Mich.  W.  Rep.  588. 

587 ;  Rex  v.  Weller,  2  Car.  &  K.  223 ;  «  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  217. 

Hill  v.  State.  64  Miss.  431 ;  1  S.  Rep.  <  Martin  v.  State  (Ala.,  1890),  8  S. 

494;  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  230.     See  Rep.  858  (confession  of  child  under 

post,  §  205  et  seq.  fourteen) ;  Mullins  v.Com.  (Ky.,  1893), 

3  Jeans  v.  Wheedon,  2  M.  &  Rob.  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1035;  Westbrook  v. 
484;  State  v.  Vincent,  1  Houst.  (Del.)  State  (Ga.,  1893),  10  S.  E.  Rep.  100; 
11 ;  State  v.  Parrish,  Busb.  Law,  239.  United  States  v.  Boese,  46  Fed.  Rep. 
Parol  evidence  of  the  prisoner's  state-  917;  Wigginton  v.  Com.,  17  S.  "VY. 
raent  while  undergoing  examination  Rep.  634;  Willard  v.  State,  27  Tex. 
is  not  admissible  if  the  magistrate  App.  386 :  Patterson  v.  Com.,  88  Ky. 
returns  that  the  prisoner  refused  to  313 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  59  Ala.  37 ; 
speak.     Rex  v.  Walter,  7  C.  &  P.  267.  Priest  v.  State,  10  Neb.  393 :  People 

4  State  v.  Head  (S.  C,  1893),  16  S.  v.  Hennessy,  15  Wend.  147 ;  State  v. 
E.  Rep.  892 ;  Rowland  v.  Ashby,  Ry.  Keeler,  28  Iowa,  551 ;  Osborn  v. 
&  M.  231;  Roscoe,  Crim.  Evid.,  45;  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  223: 
Rex  v.  Spilsbury,  7C.  &  P.  188;  State  Bergen  v.  People,  17  111.  426;  Ruloff 
v.  Leuth,  5  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  94.  v.  People,  18  N.  Y.  179.     Of.  Com.  v. 


134  CON  F  K8SIONS.  [§  94. 

In  testifying  to  extra-judicial  confessions  it  is  absolutely- 
essential  that  the  language  of  the  accused  should  be  given 
in  its  entirety.1  To  permit  the  introduction  of  fragmentary  re- 
marks, admitting  those  which  indicate  the  prisoner's  guilt  and 
suppressing  others  which  by  limiting  or  modifying  the  former 
may  establish  his  innocence,  is  inconsistent  with  principles  of 
justice  and  humanity.  The  whole  of  what  the  prisoner  said 
to  the  witness  must  be  put  in  evidence  and  its  sufficiency  and 
weight  are  for  the  jury,  the  prosecuting  official  being  per- 
mitted to  contradict  or  impeach  that  portion  which  mav  be 
favorable  to  the  accused,2  and  the  confession,  so  far  as  it  is 
either  favorable  or  against  the  prisoner,  may  be  altogether  re- 
jected Irv  the  jury  in  case  it  is  not  believed  by  them.3 

If  a  confession  is  complete  as  to  incriminating  facts  it  will 
not  be  excluded  because  the  accused  was  interrupted  and  pre- 
vented from  stating  exculpatory  facts.4  The  credit  to  be 
given  to  the  confession  depends  wholly  upon  the  circumstances 
of  each  case.5  A  witness  will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  that 
the  prisoner  confessed  to  him  that  he  had  committed  a  crime 
which  has  no  connection  with  the  offense  for  which  he  is  on 
trial.6 

§  94.  Conclusive  character  of  judicial  confessions. —  The 
guilt  of  the  accused  may  or  may  not  be  inferred  by  the  jury 
from  evidence  that  the  accused  made  an  extra-judicial  confes- 

Sanborn,    116   Mass.   61;    Brown   v.  v.  State,  86  Ala.  60 ;  State  v.  Feltes,  51 

State,  32  Miss.  433 ;  State  v.  Leuth,  5  Iowa,  495.     See  ante,  §  80. 

Ohio   Cir.   Ct.  Rep.  94.     Where   the  3  State  v.  Mahan,  32  Vt.  241 ;  People 

corpus  delicti  on  an  indictment  for  v.  Taylor,  93  Mich.  638 ;  Respublica  v. 

passing  counterfeit  money  is  shown  McCarthy,  2  Dall.  86,  88;  People  v. 

by   proof   that  the  counterfeit  was  Cassidy,    133    N.   Y.    612;    Com.    v. 

passed  as  genuine,  the  confession  of  Brown,  149  Mass.  35;  Long  v.  State, 

the  accused  that  he  passed  the  note  86  Ala.  36 ;  State  v.  West,  1  Houst. 

is    corroborated.      United   States   v.  (Del.)  371 ;  Griswold  v.  State,  24  Wis. 

Marcus,  53  Fed.  Rep.  784.  144 ;  Furst  v.  State,  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1116; 

i  Berry  v.  Com.,  10  Bush  (Ky.),  15 ;  31  Neb.  403 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  86  Ga. 

Cable  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  90.     See,  also,  as  to  admissions,  §  81. 

Rep.  220;  Pace  v.  Com.  (Tex.,  1893),  4Levison  v.  State,  54  Ala.  520. 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  762 ;  Com.  v.  Goddard,  5  Coon  v.  State,  13  Sm.  &  M.  246. 

80  Mass.  402 ;  Real  v.  People,  42  N.  Y.  6  Com.  v.  Campbell,  155  Mass.  537 ; 

270 ;  State  v.  Mack,  48  Wis.  271.  30  N.  E.  Rep.  72 ;  Youree  v.  Territory 

2  Taylor  v.  Com,,  18  Atl.  Rep.  588;  (Ariz.,  1892),  29  Pac.   Rep.  894;  Reg. 

People  v.  Irwin,  77  Cal.  494;  Dodson  v.  Butler,  2  Car.  &  Kir.  221.    Contra, 

State  v.  Underwood,  75  Mo.  230. 


§  05.]  CONFESSIONS.  135 

sion,  according  as  they  believe  it  is  corroborated  as  to  the 
corpus  delicti  But  a  judicial  confession  voluntarily  made  in 
the  hearing  of  the  jury  by  the  prisoner  is,  if  he  is  of  sound 
mind,  conclusive  on  them.  On  such  a  confession,  furnishing 
direct  and  original  evidence  of  guilt,  the  prisoner  may  be  con- 
victed and  sentenced  to  death  or  a  term  of  imprisonment.1 
When,  however,  the  confession  of  the  accused  is  elicited  in 
the  preliminary  examination  under  the  statutes  1  and  2  P.  & 
JVL,  ch.  13;  7  Geo.  4,  ch.  64,  and  similar  statutory  provisions 
existing  in  the  United  States,  the  confession  of  the  prisoner 
committed  to  writing  must  be  submitted  with  other  evidence 
to  the  trial  jury  to  be  weighed  by  them.2 

§95.  Persons  offering  inducements. —  A  conclusive  pre- 
sumption that  a  confession  is  involuntary  is  created  by  the 
circumstance  that  the  person  who  has  induced  the  accused  to 
confess  by  employing  threats  or  promises  was  so  .related  to 
him  that  he  could  exercise  authority  or  power  over  him.3 
Thus,  where  the  inducements  proceed  from  the  prosecuting 
witness,4  from  the  district  attorney,5  from  members  of  the 
coroner's  jury,6  from  a  police  official  or  jailor  in  whose  custody 
the  accused  is,7  or  from  a  magistrate,8  the  confession  will  be 
rejected.9 

Whether  a  confession  procured  by  a  threat  or  promise  by 
one  having  no  power  over  the  prisoner,  and  consequently  un- 
able to  fulfill  the  threat  or  promise,  creates  a  conclusive  presum  p- 
tion  of  the  existence  of  duress,  the  authorities  are  divided.10 
So  it  has  been  held  that  a  threat  made  by  any  one  would  cre- 
ate a  conclusive  presumption  that  the  confession  was  not  free 

i  Com.  v.  Brown,  150  Mass.  C30.  estate  v.  Carson,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  588. 

2  A  confession  made  before  a  cor-  i  Clayton  v.  State,  31  Tex.  dim.  R. 

oner    is    not    a  judicial    confession  489;  Com.  v.  Russell,  156  Mass.  196: 

which  will  dispense  with  corrobora-  30  N.  E.  Rep.  763 ;    People  v.   Thom- 

tion.      State  v.  Leuth,   5  Ohio  Cir.  son,  84  Cal.   598  (sheriff);    Com.  v. 

Ct,  Rep.  94.  Mosler,  4  Barr,  264. 

»1  Greenl.   on   Evid.,  §  222.     See  8  Guild's  Case,  5  Halst.  163. 

ante,  §  89.  <J  Neeley  v.  State,  27  Tex.  A  pp.  324 ; 

*  Roberts'  Case,  1  Dev.  259;  Com.  State  v.  Didy,  72  N.  C.  325;  State  v. 

v.  Sego.  105  Mass.  210 ;   Thompson's  Crowson,  98  id.  595. 

Cases,  1  Leach  C.  C.  325.  10  Parke,  B.,  in  Rex  v.  Spencer,  7  C. 

sSearles  v.  State,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  &  P.  776. 
331. 


136  confessions.  [§§  96,  97. 

and  voluntary.1  The  contrary  doctrine  is  maintained  in  some 
of  the  cases,2  which  support  the  proposition  that  a  threat  or 
a  promise  must  be  made  by  one  actually  in  authority. 

Upon  general  principles,  the  distinction  made  where  threats 
are  made  by  private  persons  would  seem  without  foundation, 
inasmuch  as  the  question,  was  the  will  of  accused  actually  sub- 
jugated, is  one  of  fact,  to  be  decided  on  all  the  circumstances 
of  each  particular  case.3  But  the  fact  that  the  person  using 
threats  did  not  possess  the  means  of  carrying  them  into  exe- 
cution would  doubtless,  if  known  to  the  prisoner,  detract  from 
or  wholly  nullify  the  effect  calculated  to  be  produced  upon 
his  mind.4 

§  96.  Confessions  of  persons  other  than  defendant. —  The 
incriminating  declarations  of  third  persons  that  they  com- 
mitted the  crime  with  which  the  prisoner  is  charged  are 
merely  hearsay  unless  such  persons  are  produced  as  witnesses.5 
13ut  where  the  prosecution  alleges  that  the  third  person  was 
an  accomplice,  his  confession  that  he  was  the  principal  is  ad- 
missible upon  the  trial  of  the  latter.6 

§  *.)7.  Confessions  of  conspirators. —  The  same  principle 
that  obtains  in  cases  of  joint  civil  liability  is  applicable  where 
two  or  more  persons  are  jointly  indicted  for  the  same  crime.7 
The  existence  of  the  conspiracy  or  combination  being  satis- 
factorily established,8  the  confession  or  incriminating  declara- 
tions or  acts  of  any  member  made  in  the  prosecution  of  the 
enterprise  are  admissible  against  all.  When,  however,  the  com- 
mon undertaking  is  consummated  or  abandoned,  the  com- 

1  Rex  v.  Dunn,  4  C.  &  P.  543 ;  Rex  4  Com.   v.  Gorey,    1  Gray  (Mass.), 

v.  Slaughter,  8  id.  734 ;  Guild's  Case,  463. 

5  Halst.  163;  Knapp  Case,   9  Pick.  &  Welsh  v.  State  (Ala,  1893),  11  S. 

41)6,  500,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  Rep.  450;  State  v.  West,  45  La.  Ann. 

§  223.  14 ;  13  S.  Rep.  173 ;  State  v.  Duncan 

-'  Early  v.  Com.,  86  Va.  921 ;  Rex  v.  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  699 ;  State 

Uardwick,  6  Pet.  Abr.  84;    Rex  v.  v.  Fletcher  (Oreg.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep. 

Moore,  2    Den.    C.    C.   522 ;    Reg.  v.  575 ;  Owensby  v.  State,  82  Ala.  63 ; 

Reeve,  12  Cox  C.  C,  179.  2  S.  Rep.    764;  State  v.  Duncan,  6 

3  McAdory  v.  State,  62  Ala.   154 ;  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  236 ;  State  v.  Haynes, 

Cum.   v.  Tuckermau,   10  Gray,  190;  71  N.  C.  79. 

Com.  v.  Howe,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  153;  6  pace  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  a 

Newman  v.  State,  49  Ala.  9 ;  Johnson  W.  Rep.  762.     See  as  to  testimony  of 

v.  State,  61  Ga.  305;  State  v.  Darnell,  accomplices,  £§  320,  321. 

1   Houst.  (Del.)  32!  ;  Flagg  v.  People,  '  See  ante,  §  69. 

40  Mich.  706;  State  v.  Phelps,  11  Vt.  sjjcGraw  v.  Com.  (Ky.,   1893),  20 

114  S.  W.  Rep.  879. 


§98.] 


CONFESSIONS. 


137 


m unity  of  interest  no  longer  exists.  The  confession  of  any 
participant  in  the  criminal  design  is  then  only  receivable 
against  himself.1  In  other  words,  the  confession  of  an  accom- 
plice or  participant  in  a  criminal  act  is  only  receivable  against 
his  associates  when  it  can  be  connected  with  and  is  relevant 
to  acts  for  which  the  latter  are  responsible.2 

Where  persons  other  than  the  defendant  are  mentioned  in 
a  confession,  and  it  is  not  alleged  in  the  indictment  that  they 
are  implicated  in  the  crime,  the  confession  is  admissible  and 
the  court  must  instruct  the  jury  to  disregard  this  fact.3 

§  98.  Confessions  of  treason. —  In  consequence  of  the  stat- 
utory requirement  that  to  convict  a  prisoner  of  the  crime  of 
treason  the  testimony  of  two  witnesses  to  an  overt  act  was 
required,  it  was  at  one  time  doubted  whether  an  extra-judicial 
confession  of  treason  was  admissible  against  one  charged  with 
that  crime.4  It  is  now  the  law  that  while  no  one  can  be  con- 
victed of  the  crime  solely  upon  a  confession  which  does  not 
assume  the  form  of  a  plea  of  guilty  in  open  court,  yet  any 
confession,  made  extra-judicially,  is  admissible  against  him,  its 
weight  and  credibility  being  for  the  jury.  It  must,  however, 
be  proved  by  two  witnesses  to  be  admissible.5 


i  Pace  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  30  S.  W 
Rep.  762 ;  Ryan  v.  State,  83  Wis.  486 ; 
State  v.  Grant  (Iowa,  1803),  53  N.  W. 
Rep.  120;  Wilbur  v.  Strickland,  1 
Rawle,  458 ;  United  States  v.  Gibert, 
2  Sumn.  16;  State  v.  Donelon  (La., 
1893),  12  S  Rep.  922;  Cable  v.  Com., 
20  S.  W.  Rep.  220;  Searles  v.  State,  6 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct  R  331 ;  Belcher  v.  State, 
125  Iud.  419;  State  v.  McKenzie,  102 
Mo.  620 ;  McGraw  v.  State,  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  279;  People  v.  Collins,  64  Cal. 
293;  United  States  v.  Gooding,  12 
Wheat.  469 ;  Amer.  Fur  Co.  v.  United 
States,  2  Pet.  358 ;  Corbett  v.  State, 
5  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  155.  The  confession 
or  incriminating  act  may  be  given  in 
evidence  prior  to  proof  of  the  con- 
spiracy on  the  promise  of  the  prose- 
cutor to  establish  a  prima  facie  con- 
spiracy later.  Hall  v.  State  (Fla., 
1893),  12  S.  Rep.  449 ;  State  v.  Grant 
(Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  120; 
State  v.  McGee,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  764. 


2  Priest  t.  State,  10  Neb.  393 ;  State 
v.  Minis  (S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep. 
850;  State  v.  Weasel,  30  La.  Ann. 
919;  Crosby  v.  People,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
49;  Gove  v.  State,  58  Ala.  391; 
Spencer  v.  State,  31  Tex.  64 ;  State  v. 
Tibeau,  30  Vt.  100 ;  Ake  v.  State,  31 
Tex.  476;  Com.  v.  Thompson,  99 
Mass.  444.  The  silence  or  failure  to 
explain  of  one  jointly  indicted  with 
others  where  statements  incriminat- 
ing him  are  made  by  one  of  his  asso- 
ciates does  not,  it  is  held,  raise  a 
presumption  against  him.  Com.  v. 
McDermott,  123  Mass.  441. 

3  Rex  v.  Hearne,  4  C.  &  P.  215: 
State  v.  Carr,  53  Vt.  37,  41. 

*  1  East  P.  C.  131-133.  See  post, 
§380. 

*Fra-ncisr  Case,  1  East  P.  C.  133- 
135;  1  Burr's  Trial.  196,  cited  in  1 
Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  235. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

DYING  DECLARATIONS. 

§  100.  Definition.  i  §  102.  In  what  cases  admissible. 

101.  Sense  of  approaching  death.     |      103.  Form  of  the  declaration. 

§  100.  Definition. —  Another  class  of  exceptions  to  the  rule 
rejecting  hearsay  comprises  dying  declarations.  These  decla- 
rations may  be  defined  as  statements  or  declarations  of  some 
material  fact  concerning  a  homicide,  made  by  a  person  who 
is  the  victim  and  who  fully  realizes  that  he  is  in  imminent 
danger  of  death,  and  that  in  a  very  short  time.1  The  fact 
that  the  speaker  believes  he  is  at  the  point  of  death,  and  that 
in  all  probability  in  a  very  short  time  all  that  is  spiritual  and 
immortal  will  forever  forsake  the  body,  and  will  encounter 
the  dread  possibilities  of  the  unknown  and  supernatural  world, 
is  deemed  to  furnish  a  sanction  equivalent  to  that  of  a  solemn 
and  positive  oath  administered  in  court.2  If,  therefore,  the 
deceased  was  totally  irreligious,  so  that  he  had  no  belief  in  a 
state  of  future  reward  or  punishment,  this  fact  alone,  while 
not  rendering  his  statement  inadmissible,  is  competent  to  go 
to  the  jury  as  affecting  the  credit  to  be  given  it.;i 

On  the  other  hand,  the  fear  of  punishment  for  perjury,  so 
far  as  it  can  be  administered  in  this  world,  is  wholly  absent, 
and  unless  the  dying  man  possesses  and  is  controlled  by  a 
vivid  and  conscientious  feeling  of  accountability  to  the  Judge 
of  all  men  in  whose  presence  he  expects  soon  to  appear,  it  is 
probable  that  his  utterances  may  be  materially  influenced  and 
biased  against  the  accused  by  the  passions  of  revenge  and 
anger.  But  the  fact  that  the  declarant  believed,  as  a  matter 
of  religious  opinion,  that  he  may  repent  of  any  sin  at  any 

'See   1   Greenl.   on   Evid.,  §   156;  Goodall  v.  State,  1  Oreg.  333;  State 

People  v.  Olmstead,  30  Mich.  435.  v.  Elliott.  45  Iowa,  386;  State  v.  Ah 

-Rex   v.  Woodcock,  2  Leach    Cr.  Lee,  8  Oreg.  214.     See  post,  §  313,  as 

Cas.  567.  to  the  requirements  of  religious  be- 

3  Hill  v.  State,  64  Miss.   431:  1   S.  lief  of  witnesses. 
Kep.  494 :  People  v.  Chin,  51  Cal.  597 ; 


§  ioi.] 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


139 


moment  before  death,  will  not  render  his  declaration  inad- 
missible.1 

§  101.  Sense  of  approaching  death. —  The  deceased  person 
when  he  made  the  declaration  must  have  been  conscious  of 
the  near  approach  of  death,  and  must  believe  that  there  is 
absolutely  no  hope  of  his  recovery.2  The  mental  condition 
of  the  declarant  in  this  respect  must  therefore  be  shown  be- 
fore his  declaration  is  received,  and  if  he  entertains  any  hopes, 
however  slight,  that  his  injury  is  not  mortal,  his  statement 
will  be  rejected.3 

The  statement  of  the  dying  person  himself  that  he  is  dying 
should  always  be  received,4  as  it  is  the  most  satisfactory  and 
convincing  evidence;  but  upon  this  important  point  no  form 
of  words  is  necessary,  nor  is  it  the  only  evidence.  So  his 
resignation  to  approaching  death  or  his  belief  that  he  may  re- 
cover may  be  shown  by  independent  evidence  and  may  be 
proven  by  the  statements  of  those  attending  him  or  inferred 
from  the  circumstances  of  the  case.5     Thus,  where  the  de- 


i  North  v.  People,  28  N.  E.  Rep. 
966:   139  111.  81. 

-'  Whitaker  v.  State,  79  Ga.  87 ;  3 
S.  E.  Rep.  403 ;  State  v.  Johnson,  34 
N.  W.  Rep.  177;  72  Iowa,  396;  Ste- 
phenson v.  State,  110  Ind.  358;  State 
v.  Mathes,  90  Mo.  571 ;  Darbey  v. 
State.  23  Tex.  App.  407 ;  Irby  v.  State, 
23  id.  103 ;  Peak  v.  State,  50  N.  J.  L. 
179;  12  Atl.  Rep.  701;  Walton  v. 
State,  79  Ga.  46 ;  5  S.  E.  Rep.  205 ; 
Vaughn  v.  Com.,  86  Ky.  431 ;  6  S.  W. 
Rep.  153;  State  v.  Murdy,  81  Iowa, 
603 ;  People  v.  Bemmerly,  87  Cal.  117 ; 
25  Pac.  Rep.  266 ;  Snell  v.  State,  29 
Tex.  App.  236 ;  State  v.  Turlington, 
102  Mo.  642;  Hammill  v.  State,  90 
Ala.  577 ;  United  States  v.  Heath,  19 
Wash.  Law  R.  818;  Hall  v.  Com. 
(Va.,  1892),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  517;  Young 
v.  State  (Ala.,  1892),  10  S.  Rep.  913; 
State  v.  Bannister.  35  S.  C.  290 ;  14 
S.  E.  Rep.  678 ;  McQueen  v.  State,  94 
Ala.  50 ;  10  S.  Rep.  433 ;  Archibald  v. 
State.  122  Ind.  122 ;  Scott  v.  People, 
63  I1L  508 ;  Kehoe  v.  Com.,  80  Pa.  St 


127:  Com.  v.  Black,  108  Mass.  296; 
State  v.  Blackburn,  80  N.  C.  474; 
State  v.  Daniel,  31  La.  Ann.  91 ;  Com. 
v.  Thompson  (Mass.,  1893),  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  1111;  State  v.  Spencer,  30  La. 
Ann.  362:  State  v.  Schmidt,  73  Iowa, 
469 ;  Powers  v.  State,  87  Ind.  144. 

3  See  cases  in  last  note.  If  the  de- 
clarant is  conscious  of  approaching 
death,  it  is  not  material  that  no  one 
told  him  that  he  was  about  to  die. 
Hammel  v.  State,  90  Ala  577. 

4  Com.  v.  Thompson  (Mass.,  1893), 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  1111. 

5  People  v.  Bemmerly,  25  Pac.  Rep. 
266;  87  Cal.  117;  People  v.  Samario, 
84  Cal.  484 ;  Fulcher  v.  State,  13  S. 
W.  Rep.  750 ;  28  Tex.  App.  465 ;  Pul- 
liam  v.  State,  6  S.  Rep.  839 ;  88  Ala. 
1 ;  Archibald  v.  State,  122  Ind.  122 ; 
People  v.  Smith,  104  N.  Y.  491 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Ramirez,  73  Cal.  403 ;  State  v. 
Newhouse,  38  La.  Ann.  862 ;  2  S.  Rep. 
799 ;  Ledbetter  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App. 
247 ;  State  v.  Schmidt,  73  Iowa,  469 ; 
35  N.  W.  Rep.  590 ;  People  v.  Farmer, 


140 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


[§  101. 


ceased  states  that  he  was  sure  to  die; '  that  he  never  expected 
to  recover  from  his  wound  ;2  that  he  knew  he  could  not  live; 3 
that  he  was  killed,4  or  makes  use  of  similar  expressions,  it  is 
conclusively  presumed  that  he  spoke  under  a  full  sense  of  ap- 
proaching death.  But  where  the  declarant  merely  states  that 
he  has  "no  hope  at  present,"5  or  says  "Who  knows?  perhaps 
I  may  get  well,"6  or  expresses  a  hope  if  he  dies  to  meet  one 
in  heaven,7  his  declaration  not  being  made  in  apprehension  of 
approaching  death,  is  inadmissible.8 

Though  the  dying  statement  was  made  while  the  deceased 
was  still  hopeful  of  recovery,  yet  it  is  receivable  if  he  subse- 
quently ratifies  it  when  all  hope  has  departed.9  So,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  that  the  dying  man  is  afterwards  encour- 
aged to  believe  that  he  will  recover  will  not  render  inadmis- 
sible  his  statement  previously  made  in  immediate  expectation 
of  death.10    But  the  fact  that  death  does  not  immediately  ensue 


18  Pac.  Rep.  800;  State  v.  Block,  42 
La.  Ann.  861 ;  United  StatQs  v. 
Heath,  20  D.  C.  272 ;  Jordan  v.  State, 
81  Ala.  20 ;  Dixon  v.  State,  13  Fla.  636 ; 
Dumas  v.  State,  62  Ga.  58 ;  State  v. 
Wilson,  24  Kan.  189 ;  People  v.  Com., 
87  Ky.  487 ;  9  S.  W.  Rep.  509 ;  Mock- 
abee  v.  Com.,  78  Ky.  380;  State  v. 
Mills,  91  N.  C.  581 ;  Railing  v.  Com., 
113  Pa.  St.  37. 

i  State  v.  Umble  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  378 ;  Crump  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
1893),  20  id.  390;  State  v.  Aldrich,  50 
Kan.  666;  Wallace  v.  State  (Ga., 
1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  700;  Evans  v. 
State  (Ark.,  1893).  22  S.  W.  Rep.  1026 ; 
State  v.  Fletcher  (Oreg.,  1893),  33 
Pac.  Rep.  575 ;  State  v.  Turlington, 
102  Mo.  642;  Pulliam  v.  State,  88 
Ala.  1. 

2  State  v.  Nance,  25  S.  C.  168. 

3  People  v.  Callaghan,  4  Utah,  49. 

4  State  v.  Russell,  32  Pac.  Rep.  854; 
State  v.  Elkins,  101  Mo.  344;  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  11G;  Luker  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
1887),  5  S.  W.  Rep.  354. 

8  Rex  v.  Jenkins,  L.  R  1  Cr.  Cas. 
187. 


6  Jackson  v.  Com.,  19  Gratt..656. 

'  State  v.  Medlicott,  9  Kan.  257. 

s  Graves  v.  People  (Colo.,  1893),  S2 
Pac.  Rep.  63. 

9  Reg.  v.  Steele,  12  Cox  C.  C.  168. 

10  State  v.  Shafer  (Oreg.,  1893),  32 
Pac.  Rep.  545;  State  v.  Tilghman, 
11  Ired.  (N.  C.)  Law,  573;  State  v. 
Turlington,  102  Mo.  642;  Lursher  v. 
Com.,  26  Gratt.  963.  Cf.  Ex  parte 
Nettles,  58  Ala.  268.  It  is  for  the 
court  to  determine  whether  the  sense 
of  approaching  death  was  present 
(Roten  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep. 
890) ;  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon 
the  prosecution.  Peak  v.  State,  50 
N.  J.  L.  222;  Digby  v.  People,  113  III. 
125 ;  Wallace  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  15 
S.  E.  Rep.  710 ;  Evans  v.  State  (Ark., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  1026.  A  state- 
ment made  two  or  three  minutes  be- 
fore death  is  admissible  as  a  dying 
statement,  though  the  deceased  did 
not  say  he  believed  he  was  going  to 
die  until  after  he  had  finished  his 
declaration.  People  v.  Sai*e  Bo,  72 
Cal.  623;  State  v.  Spencer,  30  La. 
Ann.  362. 


§  102.] 


DYING    DEC  r.AKATIONS. 


141 


furnishes  no  valid  ground  for  rejecting  the  declaration  of  the 
deceased,  if  when  it  was  made  it  is  shown  he  was  fully  im- 
pressed with  the  feeling  that  he  would  die  in  a  short  time.1 
Thus,  declarations  made  forty-eight  hours,2  ten  days,3  eleven 
days 4  or  six  weeks 5  before  the  death  of  the  declarant  have 
been  received." 

§  102.  In  what  cases  admissible. —  The  declaration  of  a 
deceased  person  which  is  offered  in  evidence  as  his  dying  dec- 
laration is  only  admissible  where  his  death  is  the  subject  of 
an  accusation  of  homicide  and  the  circumstance  of  that  death 
the  subject-matter  of  the  declaration.7 


1  State  r.  Schmidt,  73  Iowa,  469. 

2  Woodcock's  Case,  2  Leach  Cr.  Cas. 
583. 

3  Tinkler's  Case,  1  East  P.  C.  354. 
*  Rex  v.  Mosely,  1  Mood.  97. 

5  Fulcher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  465. 

« State  v.  Crabtree  (Mo..  1892),  20 
S.  W.  Rep.  7;  State  v.  Bannister,  35 
S.  C.  290;  14  S.  E.  Rep.  678;  Cora.  v. 
Hauey,  127  Mass.  455  (four  days) ; 
Kehoe  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  St  127  (two 
days).  The  law  governing  the  ad- 
missibility and  use  as  evidence  of 
dying  declarations  is  thus  admirably 
summed  up  by  the  court  in  People  v. 
Taylor,  59  Cal.  640:  "Declarations 
of  the  deceased  are  admissible  upon 
a  trial  for  murder  only  as  to  those 
things  as  to  which  he  would  have 
been  competent  to  testif}'  if  sworn  as 
a  witness  in  the  cause.  They  must 
relate  to  facts  only,  not  to  mere  mat- 
ters of  opinion.  It  is  essential  to  the 
admissibility  of  such  declarations,  and 
it  is  a  primary  fact  to  be  proved  by 
the  party  offering  them,  that  they 
were  made  under  a  sense  of  impend- 
ing death.  But  it  is  not  necessary 
that  they  be  stated  at  the  time  to  be 
so  made.  It  is  enough  if  it  satisfac- 
torily appears  in  any  mode  that  they 
were  made  under  that  sanction, 
whether  it  be  directly  proved  by  the 
express  language  of  the  declarant,  or 
be  inferred  from  his»evident  danger, 


from  the  opinions  of  the  medical  or 
other  attendants  expressed  to  him,  or 
from  his  conduct  or  other  circum- 
stances of  the  case.  Such  declara- 
tions must  relate  to  the  circumstances 
of  the  death  ;  they  cannot  be  received 
as  proof  when  not  connected  as  res 
gestcc  with  the  death." 

'  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  156;  Rex  v. 
Mead,  2  B.  &  C.  605 ;  People  v.  Fong 
Ah  Sing,  70  Cal.  8;  Marcum  v.  Com. 
(Ky.,  1890),  1  S.  W.  Rep.  727;  People 
v.  Smith,  104  N.  Y.  505;  State  v. 
Perigo  (Iowa),  45  N.  W.  Rep.  399: 
People  v.  Davis,  56  N.  Y.  96;  Hines 
v.  Com.  (Ky.).  13  S.  W.  Rep..  445; 
State  v.  Baldwin,  79  Iowa,  714  ;  45 
N.  W.  Rep.  297;  United  States  v. 
Heath,  19  Wash.  L.  R,  818;  State  v. 
Shelton,  2  Jones'  (N.  C.)  L.  360 ;  State 
v.  Nelson,  101  Mo.  464 ;  Com.  v.  Cary, 
12  Cush.  (Mass.)  246;  Crookham  v. 
State,  5  W.  Va.  510 ;  People  v.  Knapp, 
26  Mich.  113;  Walker  v.  State,  52 
Ala.  192.  If  a  crime  is  by  statute 
declared  to  be  murder  in  case  the 
person  upon  whom  it  was  committed 
dies,  as,  for  example,  committing  an 
abortion,  dying  declarations  are  gen- 
erally inadmissible  under  the  rule 
stated  in  the  text,  as  the  party  is  not 
indicted  for  the  homicide.  The  fact 
of  death  is  not  a  constituent  of  the 
crime,  but  affects  the  punishment 
alone.    Railing  v.  Com.,  110  Pa.  St 


142  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  [§  102. 

In  this  connection  it  may  be  well  to  distinguish  clearly  be- 
tween declarations  of  deceased  persons  which  are  admissible 
as  original  evidence  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestte  and  those  which 
are  wholly  hearsay  but  which  are  received  solely  because  they 
are  the  dying  declarations.  In  regard  to  the  former  it  need 
only  be  said  here  that  the  grounds  for  their  admission  being 
their  natural,  contemporaneous  and  explanatory  connection 
with  the  main  transaction,  they  are  admitted  in  all  cases 
whether  criminal  or  civil.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  declara- 
tions of  the  deceased  not  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gestcc, 
but  which  are  his  dying  declarations,  are  mainly  admitted  as  a 
matter  of  necessity  in  order  that  homicide  may  not  go  un- 
punished in  cases  where  the  declarant's  death  is  the  matter  of 
a  criminal  investigation.  Here,  if  no  third  person  was  present 
at  the  instant  of  the  homicide  (and  this,  it  is  believed,  is  very 
frequently  the  case),  it  would  be  practically  impossible  to  pro- 
cure any  direct  evidence  upon  the  main  fact  in  issue,  the  mouth 
of  the  accused  being  closed  by  the  policy  of  our  law  unless  he 
shall  see  fit  to  open  it.2 

When  the  injured  party,  if  living,  would  be  a  competent 
witness  against  the  accused,  no  injustice  will  be  done  by  ad- 
mitting his  language,  relevant  to  the  issue,  uttered  under  cir- 
cumstances which  are  considered  as  equal  to  his  being  sworn.3 
Hence  where  the  declarant  would  not  have  been  a  competent 
witness  if  alive,  his  ante-mortem  declaration  will  not  be  re- 

103:  People  v.  Davis,  56  N.  Y.  95;  Graves  v.  People  (Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac, 

State  v.    Harper,   35   Ohio    St.    78;  Rep.  63;  Eiland  v.  State,  52  Ala.  322; 

Maine  v.  People,  9  Hun,  113;  People  Palmore  v.  State,  29  Ark.  248;  People 

v.  Aiken,  15  Oregon,  137;  Wooten  v.  v.  Lee  Chuck  (Cal.),  15  Pac.  Rep.  322; 

State,  39  Ga.  223 ;  Starkey  v.  People,  Keener  v.  State,  18  Ga.  194 ;  Williams 

17  III.  21 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  50  Ala.  v.  People,  54  111.  422 :  State  v.  Elliot, 

456.     Contra,  Montgomery  v.  State,  45  Iowa,  486 ;  Carico  v.  Com.,  7  Bush 

80  Ind.  338;  State  v.  Dickinson,  41  (Ky.),  124;  State  v.  Robinson,  —  La. 

Wis.  299 ;  Com.  v.  Homer,  153  Mass.  Ann.  340 ;  State  v.  Spalding,  34  Minn. 

343.  361 ;  Hawthorne  v.  State,  61  Miss.  749 ; 

1  See  State  v.  Sullivan,  51  Iowa,  142 ;  State  v.  Downs,  91  Mo.  19 ;  State  v. 

Walker  v.  State,  63  Ala.  105 ;  State  v.  Matthews,  78  N.  C.  523 ;  State  v.  Dod- 

Ramsay,    82    Mo.    133;    Howard   v.  son,  4  Oreg.  64 ;  Horbach  v.  State,  43 

State,  23  Tex.  A  pp.  255;  Cluverius  v.  Tex.  242;  State  v.  Abbott,  8  W.  Va, 

Com.,  81  Va.  787 ;  Darby  v.  State,  3  741 ;  Wood  v.  State,  92  Ind.  269.   See 

S.  E.  Rep.  363.  post,  §  345. 

2 See  State  v.  McCoy,  111  Mo.  017;        3 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  157. 


102.] 


DYING    DECLARATIONS. 


Ul 


ceived.1  Thus,  statements  made  by  the  deceased  which,  if  he 
were  on  the  stand,  would  be  hearsay  will  not  be  received. - 
So,  too,  the  declarations  must  be  relevant,  and  must  con- 
tain statements  of  facts  and  circumstances  and  not  merely 
conclusions,  mental  impressions  or  matters  of  opinion,3  ex- 
cept in  the  cases  where  an  expression  of  opinion  would  be 
relevant  if  the  declarant  himself  were  testifying  in  court.4 
So  a  dying  declaration  that  the  killing  was  intentional,5  with- 
out reason  or  provocation,"  or  for  nothing,7  is  not  such  an  ex- 
pression of  opinion  as  will  render  it  incompetent. 

The  admissibility  of  dying  declarations  does  not  depend 
upon  the  small  amount  of  evidence  against  the  prisoner,8  or 
upon  the  plea  in  defense,  whether  it  is  an  alibi,  insanity  or 
self-defense.9  Like  all  preliminary  questions  bearing  upon  the 
admissibility  of  evidence,  the  determination  whether  a  dying 
declaration  is  to  be  received  is  for  the  judge  upon  all  the  facts 
involved.10 

To  obviate  the  creation  of  prejudice  against  the  accused  in 
the  minds  of  the  jurors,  it  is  advisable,  as  a  matter  of  practice, 
to  examine  the  witness  out  of  their  presence  and  hearing.11    It 


1  Reg.  v.  Perkins,  9  C.  &  P.  395 ; 
State  v.  Thomason,  1  Jones'  (N.  C.) 
Law,  274 ;  State  v.  Foot  Yon  (Oreg., 
1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  537 ;  North  v.  Peo- 
ple, 139  111.  81. 

2  Johnson  v.  State,  17  Ala.  618. 

3  State  v.  Williams,  67  N.  C.  12 ; 
States  Elkins,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  116; 
101  Mo.  344 ;  State  v.  Perigo,  45  N. 
W.  Rep.  399 ;  80  Iowa,  37 ;  State  v. 
Saunders,  12  Pac.  Rep.  441;  State  v. 
Black,  42  La.  Ann.  861 ;  8  S.  Rep. 
594;  State  v.  O'Brien  (Iowa,  1891),  46 
N.  W.  Rep.  752;  Matherly  v.  Com. 
(Ky.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  977 ;  Jones 
v.  State,  52  Ark.  345 ;  Scott  v.  People, 
63  111.  508;  People  v.  Olmstead,  30 
Mich.  431.     See  post,  g§  186,  187. 

4  Brotherton  v.  People,  75  N.  Y.  159 ; 
State  v.  Foot  Yon  (Oreg.,  1893),  33 
Pac.  Rep.  537. 

3  Boyle  v.  State,  105  Ind.  470 ;  State 
v.  Nettlebush,  20  Iowa,  257 :  Payne 
v.  State,  61  Miss.  161. 


e  State  v.  Black,  42  La.  Ann.  861 ; 
Wroe  v.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  460. 

'Roberts  v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  141. 

SLuker  v.  State  (Ky.,  1888),  5  S. 
W.  Rep.  354. 

9  Boyle  v.  State,  105  Ind.  469.  A 
failure  to  object  promptly  to  a  dec- 
laration as  inadmissible  because  con- 
sisting of  opinion  waives  the  objec- 
tion.   State  v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa,  88. 

]<>State  v.  Baldwin,  45  N.  W.  Rep. 
297;  State  v.  Poll,  1  Hawks,  444; 
McDaniel  v.  State,  8  Sm.  &  M.  401 ; 
Com.  v.  Murray,  2  Ashm.  41 ;  State 
v.  Frazier,  1  Houst.  176 ;  Territory  v. 
Klehn  (Wash.,  1889),  21  Pac.  Rep.  31 ; 
Hill's  Case,  2  Gratt.  594;  Kehoe  v. 
Com.,  85  Pa.  St.  127 ;  Roten  v.  State 
(Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  910.  See  ante, 
§  13.  Contra,  Dumas  v.  State,  62 
Ga.  58. 

«  People  v.  Smith,  104  N.  Y.  493; 
State  v.  Furney,  41  Kan.  115; 
Swisher  v.  Com.,  26  Gratt.  (Va.)  963 ; 
Price  v.  State,  72  Ga.  441. 


144  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  [§  102. 

is  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  however,1  to  hear  the  evidence 
bearing  on  the  admissibility  of  the  declaration  in  the  presence 
of  the  jury,  they  being  instructed  by  the  court  that  they 
should  not  allow  anything  then  heard  to  influence  their  ver- 
dict.2 

When  it  has  been  decided  that  a  dying  declaration  is  ad- 
missible, its  credibility  and  weight  are  wholly  within  the 
province  of  the  jury,3  and  the  evidence  contained  in  the  dec- 
laration is  to  be  weighed  by  them  by  the  application  of  the 
same  rules  that  are  employed  in  the  case  of  a  living  witness.4 
The  declaration  itself  can  be  introduced  in  evidence  not  only 
against  the  accused  but  in  his  favor  as  well.5  In  case  onlv  a 
portion  of  the  declaration  is  admissible  it  has  been  held  that 
the  incompetent  portion  may  be  stricken  out  on  motion;6  but 
generally  all  that  the  deceased  said  relevant  to  the  guilt  or 
innocence  of  the  accused  and  bearing  upon  the  facts  of  the 
killing  should  be  admitted,  and  it  is  error  for  the  court  to 
refuse  to  do  so.7 

So  it  has  been  held  that  the  admission  of  a  dying  declara- 
tion does  not  violate  a  constitutional  provision  that  the  accused 
shall  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against  him  and  shall 
hear  the  testimony  against  himself.8  Dying  declarations  as 
such  are  never  admissible  in  civil  cases,  although  they  may  be 
admissible  upon  other  grounds  than  their  ante-mortem  charac- 
ter;9 and  the  same  principle  is  observed  as  to  their  admissibil- 

i  State  v.  Schafer  (Oreg.,  1893),  32  rejected.     State  t.  Nelson,   101  Mo. 

Pac.  Rep.  545.  464. 

2  People  v.  Smith.  104  N.  Y.  498 ;  «  People  v.   Farmer,  77  Cal.   1 ;  18 
Johnson  v.  State,  47  Ala.  9;  State  v.  Pac.  Rep.  800. 

Cain,  20  W.  Va.  679 :  Prince  v.  State,         <  Mattox  v.  United  States,  146  TJ.  S. 

72  Ga.  441.  140 ;  People  v.  Beach,  87  N.  Y.  508. 

3  State  v.  McCanon,  57  Mo.  160 ;  6  State  v.  Saunders,  14  Oreg.  300 ; 
State  v.  Mathes,  90  id.  571.  Com.   v.   Cary,  12  Cush.  246;  Camp- 

*  Jones  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893),  12  S.  bell  v.  State,  11  Ga.   353;  Brown  v. 

Rep.  444.  Com.,  73  Pa.  St.  321;  State  v.  Dick- 

ft  People  v.    Knapp,   26    Md.    112;  inson,  41  Wis.  299;  Robbins  v.  State, 

Brock  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892).  17  S.  W.  8  Ohio  St.  131 ;  People  v.  Murray,  52 

Rep.  337 ;  Rex  v.  Scaife,  1   Mood.  &  Mich.  388. 

R.  551 ;  Felder  v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  *  Wooten  v.  Wilkins,  39  Ga.  223  ; 

477 ;  Chittenden  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1888),  Daily  v.  N.  Y.  etc.  Co.,  32  Conn.  356 : 

9  S.  W.  Rep.  386.     But  a  declaration  Friedman  v.  Railway  Co.,  7  Phila. 

of  the  deceased  that  he  did  not  want  203 ;  Marshall  v.  Railroad  Co.,  48  111. 

the  accused  to  be  prosecuted  will  be  475.  Cf.  Cajolle  v.  Ferrie,  23  N.  Y.  90. 


§    103.]  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  145 

ity  upon  the  trials  of  indictments  for  all  crimes  when  homicide 
h  not  an  essential  and  indispensable  element  in  the  nature  of 
the  offense.1  An  apparent  exception  to  this  rule  occurs  in  the 
case  of  the  killing  of  two  or  more  persons  by  the  prisoner  for 
the  murder  of  one  of  whom  he  is  placed  on  trial.  Upon  the 
ground  that  the  two  deaths  are  merely  parts  of  one  transac- 
tion, the  dying  declaration  of  A.  has  been  admitted  on  a  trial 
for  the  killing  of  B.  where  it  was  shown  that  the  deaths  were 
nearly  identical  in  place  or  time,  and  the  means  adopted  by 
the  defendant  in  bringing  about  the  death  of  B.  resulted  also 
in  the  death  of  A.*  But  the  circumstance  taken  alone  that 
the  declarant's  death  occurred  in  the  disturbance  in  which  the 
person  for  whose  homicide  the  prisoner  was  indicted  was  also 
killed  is  insufficient  to  admit  his  declaration  when  it  is  not 
shown  that  his  death  was  directly  due  to  some  act  of  the  de- 
fendant.3 

§  103.  Form  of  the  declaration. —  That  the  deceased  should 
have  been  formally  examined  or  that  he  should  be  questioned 
as  though  he  were  upon  the  witness  stand  is  never  required. 
Dying  declarations  elicited  by  means  of  leading  questions  or 
urgent  and  persistent  solicitations  are  receivable.4  The  fact 
that  deceased  was  under  the  influence  of  a  narcotic  while- 
making  his  statement  will  not  render  it  inadmissible,5  pro- 
vided they  are  complete  in  themselves  and  nothing  remains 
to  be  said  by  the  declarant  which  will  qualify,  enlarge  or  re- 
strict their  meaning.6 

i  Johnson   v.    State,    50   Ala.   456 :  v.  People,  139  111.  81 ;  28  N.  E.  Rep: 

State  v.  Bohan.  15  Kan.  407;  People  866;  Com.  v.  Haney,  127  Mass.  455; 

v.   Aiken,  15  Oregon,  137;  Com.   v.  State  v.  Foot  You  (Oreg.,  1893),  32 

Homer,  153  Mass.  343 ;  Rex  v.  Mead,  Pac.  Rep.  103. 

2  B.  &  C.  605  (robbery) ;  Wilson  v.        5  Hays   v.  Com.   (Ky.,  1S90),  14  S. 

Boarem,   15  Johns.   286.     See  ante,  W.  Rep.  833.     And  where  the  declar- 

£  102.  ant  is  unable  to  speak  he  may  make 

-  Rex  v.  Baker,  2  M.  &  Rob.  53 ;  his  statement  by  using  signs,  and. 

State  v.  Terrell,  12  Rich.  (S.  C.)  321;  however  slight  they  may  be,  as,  for 

State   v.  Wilson,   23  La.   Ann.    559.  example,    squeezing    the    hand,   his 

Contra,   Brown  v.   Com.,  73  Pa.  St  declaration   is   not  inadmissible    on 

321.  that    account.     Com.   v.   Carsey,    11 

;i  State  v.  Westfall,  49  Iowa,  328;  Cush.  417. 
State  v.  Bohan,  15  Kan.  407.  6  Com.  v.  Vass,  3  Leigh,  787;  State 

4  Com.  v.  Vass,  3  Leigh,  786 ;  Peo-  v.    Murdy,   81   Iowa,   88 ;   People  v. 

pie  v.  Bcmiberly,  87  Cal.  117;  North  Brady,  72  Cal.  490;  State  v.  Martin, 
10 


146  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  [§  103. 

The  dying  declaration  is  customarily  expressed  in  language, 
but  this  is  by  no  means  alwaj^s  necessary.  The  declaration 
may  be  by  signs,  where  the  dying  person  is  unable  to  speak ;  as, 
for  example,  by  a  pressure  of  the  hand,  a  nod  of  the  head,  or 
by  pointing  to  visible  objects  or  persons  in  response  to  ques- 
tions put  to  him.  Under  such  circumstances  it  should  be 
made  to  appear  by  independent  evidence  that  the  deceased 
was  conscious  and  realized  his  condition.1 

In  all  cases  where  the  language  of  the  deceased  has  been 
committed  to  writing  and  signed  by  him,  or  where,  if  he  is 
physically  unable  to  sign,  a  written  statement  has  been  read 
and  assented  to  by  him  in  the  presence  of  attesting  witnesses, 
the  writing  should  be  produced  as  the  best  evidence  of  its 
contents.2 

When  a  declaration  made  by  deceased,  though  committed 
to  writing,  was  neither  read  nor  signed  by  him,  its  contents 
may  be  shown  verbally,  though  its  absence  be  unaccounted 
for.3  So  where  some  of  the  declaration  is  in  writing  and  some 
is  not,  that  which  is  verbal  may  be  received  though  the  writ- 
ing is  not  produced.4  But  testimony  that  the  deceased  made 
contradictory  verbal  statements  will  not  be  received  to  vary 
or  qualify  a  writing  signed  and  verified  by  him  unless  the 
witness  can  give  the  substance  of  the  statements.5 

As  a  general  rule,  the  contradictory fi  or  untruthful  char- 
acter7 of  the  dying  declarations  constitutes  no  valid  objection 
to  its  admission  as  evidence,  however  much  it  may  detract 
from  the  credit  to  be  given  to  it  by  the  jury.     But  declara- 

30  Wis.  216.     Cf.  Mattox  v.  United  572 ;    51  Iowa,  142 ;  Darby  v.  State, 

States,  146  U.  S.  140.     A  verification  92  Ala.  9. 

under  oath,  while  of  great  value,  does  4  Rex  v.  Reason,   1   Str.   409,   500 ; 

not  strengthen  it  as  a  dying  declara-  State  v.  Schmidt.  73  Iowa,  469;  Peo- 

tion perse.     State  v.  Frazier,  1  Houst.  pie  v.  Glenn,  10  Cal.  32;    Krebs  v. 

(Del.)  176;  Turner  v.  State,  89  Tenn.  State,  8  Tex.  App.  1 ;  Com.  v.  Haney, 

297.  127  Mass.  455. 

•Com.  v.  Casey,  11   Cush.  (Mass.)  sSnell  v.  State,  29  Tex.   App.  296; 

417;  People  v.  Shaw,  63  N.  Y.  40.  15  S.  W.  Rep.  722;  State  v.  Schmidt 

2  King  v.  State,  91  Tenn.  617 ;  Peo-  73  Iowa,  469 ;  State  v.  Mathes,  00  Mo. 

pie  v.  Callaghan,  4  Utah,  49;  Drake  571. 

v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  293.     But  cf.  6Rjchards  v.  State,  82  Wis.  172;  51 

contra,  State  v.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  308 ;  N.  W.  Rep.  652. 

State  v.  Wilson,  111  N.  C.  695.  i  White  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  652; 

*  State  v.  Sullivan,  50  N.  W.  Rep.  18  S.  W.  Rep.  462. 


§  103.]  DYING    DECLARATIONS.  147 

tions  made  by  the  deceased  which  contradict  his  dying  decla- 
rations are  admissible  to  impeach  the  latter,  though  they  are 
not  made  under  a  sense  of  impending  death.1 

The  witness  called  to  prove  the  declaration  is  not  under  the 
necessity  of  repeating  its  exact  language  provided  he  can  give 
the  substance  of  all  statements  in  a  connected  and  complete 
form.2 

1  Morelock  v.  State,  90  Tenn.  528.       v.  People,  17  111.  17;  Montgomery  v. 

2  People  v.  Chin  Mock.  51  Cal.  597 ;    State,  11  Ohio,  424 ;  Mattox  v.  United 
Roberts  v.  State,  5  Tex.  A  pp.  141 ;    States,  146  U.  S.  140. 

McLean  v.  State,  16  Ala  672;  Stark 


CHAPTER  VIII. 


ANCIENT  DOCUMENTS. 


105.  Definition. 

106.  Documents  must  come  from 

propei"  custody. 


§  107.  Execution  need  not  be  proved, 
108.  Extent  of    corroboration   re- 
quired. 


§  105.  Definition.—  Another  class  of  exceptions  to  the 
rule  rejecting  hearsay  evidence  comprises  those  cases  in  which 
a  claim  to  possession  is  sought  to  be  substantiated  by  the  pro- 
duction in  evidence  of  what  are  termed  ancient  documents} 
To  constitute  an  ancient  document,  the  deed,  record  or  other 
written  instrument  must  be  at  least  thirty  years  old  when 
offered  in  evidence,2  and,  while  it  is  by  no  means  necessary 
that  the  documents  should,  in  strictness  of  language,  be  shown 
to  form  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  these  instruments  are  generally 
connected  collaterally  with  some  of  the  facts  which  are  in 
issue.  The  law  raises  a  very  strong  presumption  in  favor  of 
the  authenticity  and  genuineness  of  such  documents,  and  even 
when  these  characteristics  are  impeached  by  affidavits  which 
assert  the  fraudulent  nature  of  their  contents  or  that  the  docu- 
ment is  a  forgery,  it  is  held  that  the  party  offering  the  ancient 
document  is  not  under  the  necessity  of  disproving  the  charge.5 


il  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  141. 

2Mapes  v.  Leal,  27  Tex.  345;  Whit- 
man v.  Henneberry,  73  111.  109;  Mc- 
Gennis  v.  Allison,  10  S.  &  R.  (Pa.) 
197.  It  is  not  enough  that  the  docu- 
ment purports  to  be  over  thirty  years 
old.  Fairly  v.  Fairly,  38  Miss.  280; 
Whitman  v.  Henneberry,  supra.  In 
the  case  of  a  will  the  thirty  years 
would  in  America  be  counted  from 
the  death  of  the  testator.  Jackson  v. 
Blanshan,  3  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  292 ;  Gard- 
ner v.  Grannis,  57  Ga.  539 ;  Jackson 
v.  Luquere,  5  Cow.  221,  224 ;  Hewlett 
v.  Cook,  7  Wend.  374.  But  the  Eng- 
lish courts  reckon  from  the  date  of 


the  will.   Doe  v.  Deakin,  3  Carr.  &  P. 
402. 

3  Winn  v.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  675 ; 
McWhirter  v.  Allen,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
649;  Williams  v.  Conger,  125  U.  S. 
397;  Settle  v.  Alison,  8  Ga.  201; 
Parker  v.  Chancellor,  11  S.  W.  Rep. 
503 ;  73  Tex.  475  ;  Strihling  v.  Atkin- 
son, 79  Tex.  162;  Bennett  v.  Runyon, 
4  Dana,  422 ;  Norton  v.  Conner,  14 
S.  W.  Rep.  193 ;  Northrop  v.  Wright, 
24  Wend.  221.  Contra,  Parker  v. 
Waycross,  etc.  Co.,  81  Ga.  387.  Cf. 
Almy  v.  Church  (R.  I.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  58. 


§  IOC]  ANCIKNT   DOCUMENTS.  149 

§  106.  Documents  must  come  from  proper  custody.—  In 

the  case  of  an  ancient  conveyance  produced  to  substantiate 
the  claim  of  one  in  possession,  the  fact  of  a  long,  continuous 
and  uninterrupted  seizin  by  the  claimant  is  often  a  very  ma- 
terial circumstance1  in  rebutting  any  presumption  or  suspicion 
which  may  arise  that  the  instrument  was  fabricated.  The 
fact  that  the  deed  has  always  been  in  the  possession  of  the 
party  claiming  under  it  does  not  militate  against  its  recep- 
tion. 

In  all  cases,  however,  where  ancient  documents  are  offered 
as  proof,  it  is  required  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  their  gen- 
uineness that  they  shall  be  produced  from  the  proper  custody.2 
In  no  case  is  it  necessary  that  the  custody  in  which  the  docu- 
ment has  been  found  should  be  the  best,  safest  and  most 
proper  repository.  Of  course,  where  such  is  shown  to  be  the 
case,  all  trace  of  suspicion  as  to  their  genuineness  is  removed.3 

When,  however,  documents  are  produced  and  it  is  shown 
that  they  have  been  in  the  hands  of  those  who  from  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  case  it  was  reasonable  and  probable  to  sup- 
pose would  naturally  have  had  charge  of  them,  then  the 
requirements  of  the  law  have  been  complied  with,  even  though 
a  safer  place  of  custody  might  have  been  found.4     In  other 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  141 ;  King  v.  Conger,  125  U.  S.  417.  Contra,  Har- 
Merrill,  34  N.  W.  Rep.  689;  Smith  v,  ris  v.  Hoskins,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  231. 
Swan  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  247 ;  » As  in  the  case  of  a  military  pay- 
Wilson  v.  Simpson,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  40 ;  roll  found  in  the  custody  of  the  sec- 
80  Tex.  279.  See  §  108.  Where  the  retary  of  war.  Bell  v.  Brewster,  10 
authenticity  of  an  ancient  deed  is  N.  E.  Rep.  679.  See,  also,  Whitman 
free  from  suspicion,  the  courts  follow  v.  Henneberry,  73  111.  109;  United 
a  liberal  rule  as  to  their  admission.  States  v.  Castro,  24  How.  346 ;  King 
Doev.  Keeling,  11  Q.  B.  884.  v.  Little,  1   Cush.    (Mass.)  436;  Jack 

2  Doe  v.  Roe,  31  Ga.  593 ;  Goodwin  v.  Blanshan,   3  Johns.    (N.  Y.)  292. 

v.  Jack,  62  Me.  414 ;  Carter  v.  Chan-  The  question  whether  a  deed  comes 

dron,  21  Ala.  72;  Weitman  v.  Jhiot,  from  proper  custody  is  for  the  judge. 

64  Ga.  11;  Bell  v.  Brewster,  44  Ohio  Rees  v.  Walters,  3  M.  &  W.  527,  531. 

St.  694;  Hedger  v.  Ward,  15  B.  Mon.  But  where  an  ancient  deed  is  ad- 

(Ky.)    106 ;  Tolman    v.    Emerson,  4  mitted  in  evidence  against  the  objec- 

Pick.  (Mass.)  160 ;  Duncan  v.  Beard,  tion  of  the  grantor,  who  denies  its 

2  Nott  &  McCord  (S.  G),  400;  King  execution,  its  genuineness  is  for  the 

v.  Sears  (Ga,  1893),  18  S.E.  Rep.  830;  jury.     Stooksberry    v.   Swan    (Tex.. 

Applegate  v.  Lexington,  etc.  Mining  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  694. 

Co.,    117    U.    S.    263;    Williams    v.  4  Bishop  of  Meath  v.  Marquess  of 

Winchester,  3  Bing.  N.  C  183. 


150  ANCIENT   DOCUMENTS.  [§  107. 

\ 

words,  the  proper  repository  or  custody  for  an  ancient  docu- 
ment is  the  place  where  papers  of  its  kind  are  usually  depos- 
ited.1 Thus,  in  the  case  of  deeds  conveying  interests  in  real 
property,  the  proper  because  usual  custodian  is  the  grantee  of 
the  deed  or  those  claiming  under  him  by  force  of  its  opera- 
tion.2 So  the  lessor  is  the  proper  custodian  of  an  expired  lease  ;3 
and  in  regard  to  any  document  the  question  of  what  is  its 
proper  custody  is  one  of  law  and  exclusively  for  the  consider- 
ation of  the  judge.4 

§  107.  Execution  need  not  be  proved. —  It  is  never  required 
to  prove  ancient  documents.  It  is  a  conclusive  presumption 
arising  from  lapse  of  time  that  the  witnesses  together  with 
those  who  might  identify  their  writing  are  dead.5  The  wit- 
nesses need  not  be  called,6  even  though  living  within  the  ju- 
risdiction 7  or  in  the  court.8  Slight  irregularities  appearing 
on  the  face  of  such  documents  will  be  disregarded.9  The  ex- 
istence of  a  power  of  attorney,10  of  capacity  in  the  grantor,11 
or  the  authenticity  of  a  seal  attached  to  the  writing,13  will  be 
presumed.  But  a  copy  of  an  ancient  document,  even  though 
over  fifty  years  old,  is  not  admissible,  unless  the  execution  of 
the  original  is  proved ; 13  nor  can  a  sheriff's  deed  be  considered 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  142,  citing  Atl.  Rep.  497 ;  Crain  v.  Huntington, 

Barr  v.   Gratz,  4  Wheat.  213,  221;  81    Tex.    614;    Von     Rosenberg     v. 

Winn  v.  Patterson,  9  Pet.  663;  Jack-  Haynes  (Tex.,  1392),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 

son  v.  Laroway.  3  Johns.  383:  Hew-  143;  Northrop  v.  Wright,  24  Wend, 

lett  v.  Cock.  7  Wend.  371,  374;  Tol-  221 ;  McClaskey  v.  Barr,  47  Fed.  Rep. 

man  v.  Emerson,  4  Pick.  160 ;  Duncan  154;  Parker  v.  Chancellor,  73  Tex. 

v.  Beard,  2  Nott  &  McC.  400 ;  Shinn  475 ;  Ruby  v.  Van  Valkenberg,  72  id. 

v.  Hicks,  68  Tex.  277 ;  Bell  v.  Brews-  459. 

ter,  44  Ohio  St.  690 ;  Brown  v.  Simp-  6  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wheat  213. 

son's  Heirs,  67  Tex.  225;    Almy  v.  "Jackson   v.  Christman,  4   Wend. 

Church  (R.  I.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  58.  (N.  Y.)  277. 

Cf.  Harris  v.  Hoskins  (Tex.,  1893),  22  »  Marsh  v.  Colnett,  2  Esp.  665. 

S.  W.  Rep.  251.  9  Johnson  v.  Timmons,  50  Tex.  521 ; 

2  Parker  v.  Chancellor,  73  Tex.  475.  Hogan  v.  Corinth,  19  Fla.  84. 

The  proper  custodian  of  a  deed  of  a  10  Storey  v.  Flanagan,  57  Tex.  649; 

land    certificate  is  the   person  who  Lum  v.  Scarborough  (Tex.,  1893),  24 

filed  the  certificate.      Masterson    v.  S.  W.  Rep.  846 ;  Doe  v.  Campbell,  10 

Todd  (Tex.,  1893),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  682.  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  475. 

3  Doe  v.  Keeling,  36  Leg.  Obs.  312.  «  Rex  v.  Inhabitants,  1  B.  &  C.  573. 

4  Rees  v.  Walters,  3  M.  &  W.  527.  12  Hooper  v.  W.  W.  Co.,  37  Hun,  568. 
6  Winn  v.   Patterson,  9   Pet.  675;  WSchunior  v.  Russell,  83  Tex.  83; 

Havens  v.   Sea  Shore   Railroad,   20     18  S.  W.  Rep.  484. 


§   108.]  ANCIENT    DOCUMENTS.  151 

an  ancient  document  which  does  not  recite  the  court  or 
county  in  which  it  was  issued.1  So,  also,  an  unrecorded  deed 
showing  neither  the  place  of  its  execution  nor  the  fact  of  its 
delivery  will  be  rejected  unless  its  due  execution  is  proved.2 
§108.  Extent  of  corroboration  required. —  Some  uncer- 
tainty at  one  period  existed  as  to  the  necessity  for  the  intro- 
duction of  evidence  tending  to  show  acts  done  in  reference  to 
the  documents  offered  in  evidence.  Where  a  deed  or  other 
document  is  extremely  old,  to  require  evidence  of  an  act  done 
contemporaneously  with  its  execution  as  a  necessary  prelim- 
iiuiry  to  its  reception  as  evidence  would  be  often  tantamount 
to  rejecting  it.3  If,  as  is  conceivable,  the  writing  is  dated 
post  litem  motam,  a  suspicion  will  thereby  be  cact  upon  its  genu- 
ineness and  impartiality  which  will  cause  the  court  to  demand 
evidence  of  co-existing  facts  to  dissipate.4  So  where  evidence 
of  comparatively  recent  facts  which  have  occurred  subsequent 
to  the  execution  of  the  document  is  demanded,  no  objection 
can  with  fairness  be  made.  Thus,  if  the  document  be  a  deed 
produced  by  the  grantee  who  claims  under  it,  and  it  is  stated 
by  him  to  have  been  in  his  possession  for  a  period  of  time 
sufficient  to  give  it  the  character  of  an  ancient  document,  he 
will  ordinarily  be  required  to  give  evidence  showing  his  en- 
joyment of  the  property  conveyed  therein,  or  some  other 
competent  facts  sufficiently  corroborative.  So  it  was  at  one 
time  held  that  in  such  a  case  proof  of  possession  in  corrobora- 

1  French  v.  McGinnis,  69  Tex.  19.  strangers  they  are  of  such  character 
See  as  to  administrator's  deed,  Fell  as  usually  accompanies  transfers  of 
v.  Young,  Go  111.  106.  title  or  acts  of  possession  and  pur- 

2  Long  v.  Georgia,  etc.  Co.,  82  Ga.  port  to  form  a  part  of  actual  trans- 
628.  See  Bo}de  v.  Chambers,  32  Mo.  actions  referring  to  co-existing  sub- 
46;  Smith  v.  Rankin,  20  111.  14;  jects  by  which  their  truth  can  be 
Fogal  v.  Perio,  10  Bosw.  (N.  Y.)  100 ;  tested,  and  there  is  deemed  to  be  a 
Clark  v.  Ovvens,  18  N.  Y.  434 ;  presumption  that  they  are  not  fab- 
Coulson  v.  Walton,  9  Pet.  62,  where  ricated.  But  platting  for  plans  and 
proof  of  ancient  documents  was  re-  field-notes  are  memoranda  only, 
quired.  which  may  never  have  been   acted 

3Bristow  v.  Cormican,  L.  R.  3  App.  upon."    Boston  Water-Power  Co.  v. 

Cas.  641.     Cf.  Gardner  v.  Granis,  57  Hanlon,  132  Mass.  484. 

Ga.  539.     "The  evidence  of  such  an-  4  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  143;  United 

cient  documents  is  admitted  upon  States  v.  Castro,  24  How.  316. 
the  ground   that  although  between 


152 


ANCIENT   DOCUMENTS. 


[§  108. 


tion  of  the  deed  was  indispensable.1  On  the  other  hand,  it  has 
been  repeatedly  held  that  the  genuineness  of  a  deed  purport- 
ing to  be  an  ancient  document,  if  coming  from  proper  custody, 
may  be  established  by  proof  of  circumstances  other  than  pos- 
session or  acts  of  ownership  under  it.2  Thus,  a  certificate  of 
registration  of  an  ancient  deed  being  itself  more  than  thirty 
years  old  is  admissible  as  evidence  of  the  antiquity  and  gen- 
uineness of  the  deed  itself.3 

Where  proof  of  possession  is  required  it  has  been  held  in 
some  cases  that  thirty  years'  possession  was  necessary,4  while 
other  cases  hold  that  possession  for  any  particular  period  need 
not  be  shown.5  So  it  seems  that  possession  of  part  of  the 
premises  is  enough,"  and  the  document  may  be  admitted  in 
evidence  without  prior  proof  of  possession.7 


1  Jackson  v.  Laroway,  3  Johns.  Cas. 
283;  Jackson  v.  BlanshaD,  3  Johns. 
293,  298.  See  Gardner  v.  Grannis, 
57  Ga.  539 ;  Thurston  v.  Masterson,  9 
Dana  (Ky.),  285 ;  Nixon  v.  Porter,  34 
Miss.  697 ;  Homer  v.  Cilley,  14  N.  H. 
85;  McGennis  v.  Allison,  10  Serg.  & 
R.  (Pa.)  197 ;  Thompson  v.  Bullock,  1 
Bay  (S.  C),  364 ;  Bank  of  Middlebury 
v.  Rutland,  33  Vt.  414;  Dishazer  v. 
Maitland,  12  Leigh  (Va.),  524. 

2  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wheat.  213 ;  Wil- 
son v.  Betts,  4  Denio,  201 ;  Jackson  v. 
Luquere,  5  Cow.  221 ;  Hewlett  v.  Cock, 
7  Wend.  371 ;  Kenerson  v.  Henry,  101 
Mass.  152 ;  Jackson  v.  Lamb,  7  Cowen, 
431 ;  Prigden  v.  Green  (Ga.,  1888),  7  S. 
E.  Rep.  97 ;  Lawrence  v.  Tennant,  64 
N.  H.  532  ;  Amnions  v.  Dwyer,  78  Tex. 
639;  Parker  v.  Chancellor,  73  Tex. 
475;  Ruby  v.  Van  Valkenburg.  72 
Tex.  450 ;  Com.  v.  Heffron,  102  Mass. 
161;  Fulkerson  v.  Holmes,  117  U.  S. 
389;  Applegate  v.  Mining  Co.,  117  id. 
255;  Nowlin  v.  Burwell,  75  Va.  551; 
Ensign  v.  McKinney,  30  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
249 ;  Harlan  v.  Howard,  79  Ky.  373 ; 
Whitman  v.  Henneberry,  73  111.  109 ; 
Brown  v.  Wood,  6  Rich.  (S.  C.)  Eq. 
155 ;  Williams  v.  Hardee  (Tex.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  267. 


3  Prigden  v.  Green,  supra.  In  Bris- 
tow  v.  Cormican,  L.  R.  3  App.  Cas. 
641,  Blackburn,  J.,  said  :  "  Inasmuch 
as,  after  a  long  time,  all  the  witnesses 
who  could  prove  such  possession  are 
dead,  the  law  permits  ancient  docu- 
ments, either  with  or  without  evi- 
dence of  ancient  payment  of  rent,  to 
be  given  as  evidence,  from  which  the 
jury  may  properly  draw  an  inference 
that  there  was  such  possession.  For, 
in  the  ordinary  course  of  things,  men 
do  not  make  leases  unless  they  acton 
them,  and  lessees  do  not,  in  general, 
pay  rent  unless  they  are  in  possession, 
so  that-ancient  payment  of  rent  adds 
weight  to  the  ancient  indenture." 

*  Nowlin  v.  Burwell,  75  Va.  551 ; 
Jackson  v.  Blanshan,  3  John.  292, 298 ; 
Shaler  v.  Brand,  6  Binn.  439. 

5  Bank  v.  Rutland,  33  Vt.  414; 
Nixon  v.  Porter,  34  Miss.  697 ;  Wald- 
ron  v.  Tuttle,  4  N.  H.  371 ;  Ridgely  v. 
Johnson,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  527. 

6  Jackson  v.  Luquere,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.) 
221. 

"  Hoopes  v.  Burgin  W.  W.  Co.,  37 
Hun,  568 ;  Burgin  v.  Chenault,  9  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  285;  Shaler  v.  Brand,  6 
Binn,  (Pa.)  435. 


CHAPTER  IX. 


GENERAL  REPUTATION. 


§  110.  Adequate  knowledge  of   de- 
clarant. 

111.  Identity  of  declarant. 

112.  Death  of  declarant. 

113.  Date  of  the  declaration. 


§  114.  Evidence  of  reputation  in  the 
case  of  private  rights. 

115.  Traditionary  evidence  regard- 

ing private  boundaries. 

116.  Documents  showing  general 

reputation. 


§  110.  Public  and  general  reputation  —  Adequate  knowl- 
edge of  declarant. —  By  reputation  is  meant  what  a  com- 
munity thinks,  believes  or  says,  and  not  merely  the  declara- 
tion of  a  single  person  as  to  a  particular  fact  not  of  a  public 
nature.1  As  regards  subjects  or  rights  which  are  of  general 
or  public  interest,  and  which,  therefore,  concern  all  or  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  the  community,  evidence  of  declarations 
constituting  general  reputation  and  tending  to  show  how  such 
matters  were  regarded  by  those  who  were  most  interested  is 
admissible  as  an  exception  to  the  rule  rejecting  hearsay.  If 
the  matter  concerned  all  the  citizens,  as,  for  example,  the  ded- 
ication of  a  public  highway  and  its  enjoyment  and  use  by 
the  inhabitants  of  a  town,2  or  the  exercise  of  some  franchise 
by  a  public  corporation  or  official,  it  is  a  presumption  that, 
such  things  being  the  theme  of  interested  and  widespread  dis- 
cussion, the  utterances  of  persons  who  are  necessarily  in- 
terested in  public  matters  must  be  reliable  and  true. 

But  the  admissibility  of  hearsay  evidence  of  general  repu- 
tation is  limited  by  the  consideration  of  the  question  whether 
the  person  whose  language  is  quoted  was  in  a  position  to  pos- 
sess and  did  actually  have  sufficient  knowledge.  Thus,  if  it 
be  a  matter  of  public  cognizance  affecting  a  large  class  of 
persons,  the  declarations  of  any  of  them,  no  matter  how 
scattered  the   class  may  be,  are  admissible.     A  distinction  is 

i  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  citing  Hun-  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  779;  Crease  v. 
nicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  363.  Barrett,  1  C,  M.  &  R.  919;  Lawrence 

2  Albert    v.   Gulf,    etc.   Co.    (Tex.,     v.  Tennant,  64  N.  H.  532. 


154  GENERAL    REPUTATION.  [§  110. 

drawn,  however,  by  the  adjudged  cases  and  by  the  authori- 
ties upon  this  subject  between  public  rights  or  customs  and 
general  rights  or  customs.  A  public  right  is  a  right  which  is 
common  to  all  the  citizens  of  a  state  or  of  any  large  govern- 
mental division,  while  a  general  right  is  one  which  is  common 
to  a  considerable  though  limited  number  of  persons;  as,  for 
example,  to  the  residents  of  a  parish,  township  or  similar  cir- 
cumscribed district.1 

In  the  case  of  public  rights,  declarations  showing  reputa- 
tions, made  by  persons  deceased,  are  deemed  competent  with- 
out preliminary  proof  that  the  party  had  full  knowledge  of 
the  matter  involved.2  But  declarations  concerning  general 
rights  known  only  among  a  relatively  small  number  of  per-* 
sons  are  not  admissible  unless  it  is  shown  that  the  party  had 
competent  means  of  knowledge. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  declarations  of  persons  as  to  gen- 
eral reputation  who  have  resided  in  a  circumscribed  district 
will  not  be  rejected  on  that  account  if  it  can  be  shown  that 
the  matter  upon  which  they  have  a  bearing  was  such  that 
those  persons  would  have  been  likely  to  possess  adequate 
knowledge.3  In  the  latter  case,  however,  evidence  of  reputa- 
tion current  elsewhere  than  the  locality  in  question  would 
not  be  received.4 

It  is  not  necessary  that  the  main  fact  in  issue  should  be  of  a 
public  or  general  nature.  Though  the  litigation  turn  upon  a 
private  right,  evidence  of  public  reputation  is  admissible  to 
show  some  public  and  general  right  ou-t  of  which  it  sprang  or 
with  which  it  may  be  connected.5 

•Stephen's     Digest,     art.     30;     1  v.  White,  19  Conn.  250;  Dunbar  v. 

Greenl.  on   Evid.,   §   128;  Weeks  v.  Mulvy,  8  Gray,  163;  People  v.  Vel- 

Sparks,  1  M.  &  S.  686,  690.  larde,  59  Cal.  457  ;  .Hodges  v.  Hodges, 

-'Freeman  v.  Phillips,  4  M.  &  S.  486.  11  S.   E.   Rep.   364;  106   N.   C.   374; 

3  Mullaney  v.  Duffy  (111.,  1893),  33  Young  v.  Kansas  City,  F.  S.  &  M.  R 

N.   E.  Rep.   250 ;  Green  v.  Mumper,  Co.,  39  Mo.  App.  59. 
138   111.   434;  Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton,        8  Young  v.  Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.,  39 

102  U.   S.    333;  Wood  v.   Fiske,  62  Mo.  App.  53;  Weeks  v.  Sparke,  1  M. 

N.  H.  173 ;  Dugger  v.  McKesson.  100  &  S.  679 ;  Sanscrainte  v.  Torongo,  87 

N.  C.  1 ;  Milford  v.  Povvner,  126  Ind.  Mich.  69;  Butrick  v.  Tilton,  155  Mass. 

528 ;  State  v.  Best,  12  S.  E.  Rep.  907  :  461 ;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  10S8 ;  Backdahl  v. 

Taylor  v.  Glenn,  29  S.  C.  292.  Grand   Lodge,   48  N.   W.   Rep.   454; 

*1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  128;  Noyes  Tucker  v.  Smith,  3  S.  W.  Rep.  671; 


§§  111-113.]  GENERAL    REPUTATION.  155 

§  111.  Identity  of  informant  or  declarant. —  A  witness 
who  is  permitted  to  testify  to  statements  made  by  a  person 
deceased  upon  the  ground  that  such  utterance  was  evidence 
of  general  reputation  will  not  be  required  to  give  the  name 
of  his  informant.1  Nor  is  such  a  declaration  rejected  though 
the  witness'  informant,  had  he  been  living,  would  not  have 
been  a  competent  witness  because  of  interest.  The  fact  that 
the  deceased  was  in  a  position  to  have  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
subject  and  that  at  the  date  of  making  his  declaration  he  was 
seemingly  impartial  being  the  sole  grounds  for  the  admission 
of  his  declaration  renders  it  unnecessary  to  consider  his  other 
characteristics  or  qualifications.2 

§  112.  Death  of  declarant. —  But  it  is  also  a  rule  that  the  de- 
clarant should  be  dead  or  should  be  supposed  to  be  so  at  the 
time  of  trial.  If  such  is  not  the  case,  evidence  of  reputation  will 
be  rejected  and  his  oral  testimony  will  be  required  as  original 
evidence  in  conformity  with  the  doctrine  that  hearsay  evi- 
dence is  never  received  when  original  evidence  can  be  ob- 
tained.3 It  was  at  one  time  held,  when  title  to  real  property 
was  in  dispute,  that  evidence  of  general  reputation  was  only 
admissible  in  case  the  party  could  show  actual  enjoyment  of 
the  property  prior  to  its  reception.4  Such,  however,  is  not 
now  the  law,  though  evidence  of  enjoyment  would  have  great 
corroborative  force.5 

§113.  Date  of  the  declarations  ante  litem  motam. —  In 
considering  the  admissibility  of  such  declarations  as  evidence 
of  common  or  general  reputation,  the  date  at  which  the  dec- 
larations were  made  must  be  considered.  As  common  report  is 
only  admitted  as  evidence  in  matters  which  concern  the  pub- 
lic, it  is  valueless  where  it  is  infected  with  bias  or  partial- 
ity because  the  declarant's  "mind  does  not  stand  in  an  even 
position  without  any  temptation  to  exceed  or  fall  short  of  the 

Lord   Dunraven   v.  Lewellyn,  15  Q.  Tucker  v.  Smith,  68  Tex.  473 ;  3&W. 

B.  785 ;  Warrick  v.  Queen's  College,  Rep.  671. 

40  L  J.  C.  785.  *Moorevvood  v.  Wood,  14  East,  330. 

*Mose]y  v.  Davis,  11  Price,  162.  *Curson    v.   Lomax,    5    Esq.    90; 

2 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  135.  Steele  v.   Prickett,  2  Stark.  463,  466. 

3  Lawrence  v.  Tennaut,  64  N.   H.  See,  also,  cases  cited  under  §§  115  and 

532 ;  Hodges  v.  Hodges,  106  N.  C.  374 ;  116. 


156  GENERAL    REPUTATION.  [§  113. 

truth."  '  If,  therefore,  the  matter  upon  which  evidence  of 
reputation  is  sought  has  become  the  subject  of  a  general  or 
public  controversy,  so  that  men,  having  begun  to  arrange 
themselves  upon  different  sides,  have  thus  acquired  distorted 
views  and  have  allowed  the  knowledge  which  they  possess  to 
he  biased  by  passion  or  prejudice,  their  declarations  will  be 
no  longer  admissible  as  reputation.  Hence,  all  declarations 
made  before  the  suit  but  since  the  commencement  of  the 
controversy,  that  is,  since  that  "state  of  facts  has  arisen  upon 
which  the  claim  in  issue  is  based,"  are  excluded.2 

The  controversy  which  will  render  the  declarations  inad- 
missible must  be  precisely  the  same  as  that  before  the  court. 
The  general  discussion  of  allied  or  collateral  controverted 
subjects,  so  long  as  the  point  litigated  was  not  then  in  dispute, 
will  not  bring  about  the  rejection  of  evidence  of  general  rep- 
utation, for  here  the  point  which  is  on  trial  cannot  be  said  to 
have  been  in  controversy  at  all.3  The  fact  that  the  declarant 
was  wholly  unaware  of  the  existence  of  any  controversy  is 
not  enough  to  render  admissible  his  utterances  made  subse- 
quent to  its  inception.  He  might  have  known  of  it,  and,  as 
he  is  always  absent  and  usually  dead  when  the  matter  is  under 
judicial  consideration,  it  is  practically  impossible  to  prove 
either  that  he  did  or  did  not.  It  is  therefore  fair  to  presume 
that,  the  controversy  being  upon  a  subject  of  general  interest, 
the  declarant  was  informed  as  to  its  existence,  and  that  his 
mind  was  not  uninfluenced  by  it.4 

If  the  declarations  as  dated  are  ante  litem  motam,  they  will 
not  be  inadmissible  because  made  expressly  to  prevent  a  con- 
troversy,5 or  directly  in  support  of  the  title  or  right  of  the 
declarant,0  though  this  fact  may  be  considered  as  bearing  upon 
credibility.     Neither  is  the  fact  that  the  declarant  stood  or 

i  Whiteloeke  v.  Baker,  13  Ves.  514,  7  Scott  N.  R.  214 ;  Donohue  v.  Whit- 

per  Lord  Eldon.  #ney,  15  N.  Y.  S.  632. 

2  Hodges  v.  Hodges,  106  N.  C.  374;  *  Freeman   v.  Phillips,  4  M.  &  S. 

Berkley  Peerage  Case,  4  Campb.  404 ;  486,  497 ;  Stephen's  Dig.,  art.  3. 

Rex  v.  Cotton,  3  Campb.  444,  446;  41  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  133. 

Partridge  v.  Russell,  2  N.  Y.  S.  529 ;  »  Goodright  v.  Mass,  2  Cowp.  591 ; 

50  Hun,  601 ;  Richards  v.  Bassett,  10  Monkton  v.  Attorney-General,  2  R.  & 

B.  &  C.  657;  Butler  v.  Mountgarret,  M.   147,  160,  164;  Slaney  v.  Wade,  1 

7  H.  L.  Cas.  633 ;  Davies  v.  Lowndes,  M.  &  C.  338. 

« Doe  v.  Davis,  10  Q.  B.  314,  325. 


§  114.]  GENERAL    REPUTATION".  157 

believed  that  he  stood  in,  pari  jure  with  the  party  introducing 
the  declaration  enough  to  render  it  inadmissible;1  for  the  fact 
that  he  was  in,  pari  casu  with  the  party  would  furnish  him 
with  an  excellent  opportunity  of  acquiring  adequate  knowl- 
edge, while  it  would  hardly  prejudice  him  in  a  party's  favor 
prior  to  the  existence  of  any  actual  controversy. 

§  114.  Evidence  of  reputation  in  case  of  private  rights. — 
The  possession  of  competent  knowledge  by  the  informant  of 
the  witness  being  essential  to  the  admissibility  of  evidence  of 
reputation,  it  follows  that,  as  to  matters  wholly  private,  evi- 
dence of  reputation  is  rejected  upon  the  presumption  that  he 
did  not  possess  such  knowledge,  coupled  with  the  impossibility 
of  showing  affirmatively  that  he  did  possess  it.  To  permit 
or  require  proof  that  a  person  long  since  deceased,  whose  very 
name  has  been  perhaps  forgotten  or  is  unknown,  was  prob- 
ably informed  concerning  a  subject-matter  which  related  to 
one  individual  alone,  would  open  the  door  to  fraud  and  per- 
jury, and  cast  doubt  and  suspicion  upon  all  testimony  of  this 
sort.  The  main  question  in  issue  may  be  one  of  purely  private 
right.2  But  the  question  must  have  possessed  such  a  public 
or  quasi-public  interest  as  to  have  been  the  subject  of  discus- 
sion by  a  portion  of  the  public,  however  limited. 

Publicity  is  largely  relative,  and  matters  which  in  one  sec- 
tion of  the  community  are  the  subject  of  continual  public  dis- 
cussion would  elsewhere  be  disregarded  by  all  except  those 
directly  concerned.  In  populous  cities  the  discussion  of  purely 
private  affairs  is  not  carried  on  to  such  an  extent  as  in  sparsely 
settled  communities,  where  a  dearth  of  incident  renders  any 
event,  however  private  and  trivial,  the  subject  of  general  if 
not  public  discussion.     These  well-recognized  facts  should  be 

i  Taylor,  Ev.   565,  566;    Deade  v.  Ellis  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  24  S.  W. 

Hancock,  13  Price,  236,  237;  Free-  Rep.   894;   Molyneux  v.   Collier,    13 

man  v.  Phillips,  4  M.  &  S.  486,  491;  Ga.  406.     Cf.  Angell  v.  Rosenburg. 

Nichols  v.  Parker,  14  East,  331  ;  Doe  12  Mich.  241 ;  Bank  v.  Rutland,  23 

v.  Tarver,  Ry.  &  M.  141,  142.  Vt.  414 ;  Walker  v.  Moors,  122  Mass. 

2  It  is  for  this  reason  that  a  per-  501.  So  evidence  of  a  general  re- 
son's  insolvency  or  insanity,  being  a  port  that  a  person  has  changed  his 
private  matter,  cannot  be  proven  residence  is  not  admissible  under  the 
by  evidence  of  general  reputation,  rule  admitting  reputation.  Ferguson 
Walker  v.  Forbes,  25  Ala,  139;  v.  Wright  (N.  C,  1894),  18  S.  E.  Rep. 
Vaughan   v.   Warnell,  26  Tex.   117;  691. 


158 


GENERAL    REPUTATION. 


[§  H5. 


borne  in  mind  when  evidence  of  reputation  of  matters  seem- 
ingly private  is  admitted.  In  all  such  cases  it  will  be  found 
that  the  subject,  by  reason  of  surrounding  circumstances,  pos- 
sessed at  least  a  quast-^ubWo  character  and  was  naturally  the 
subject  of  discussion  by  those  in  the  neighborhood.1 

It  is  sometimes  said  that  the  marriage  of  parties  competent 
to  enter  into  the  marriage  contract  may  be  inferred  or  proved 
by  the  reputation  of  marriage.  It  is  perhaps  more  correct  to 
say  that  reputation  is  an  incident  from  which,  in  conjunction 
with  cohabitation,  a  valid  marriage  may  be  presumed  to  ex- 
ist. In  any  case  the  reputation  of  marriage  should  be  gen- 
eral among  the  acquaintances  and  relatives  of  the  parties.2 

§  115.  Traditionary  evidence  regarding  private  bound- 
aries.—  The  rule  is  well  established  that  at  common  law  evi- 
dence of  general  reputation  is  not  admissible  in  matters  of 
private  right  or  interest.  Hence,  though  the  boundary  lines 
between  public  territorial  divisions,  however  small,  can  be 
shown  by  such  evidence,  it  is  not  permissible  to  do  so  in  the  case 
of  boundaries  between  the  adjacent  lands  of  private  owners, 
unless  the  private  boundary  is  identical  with  a  public  bound- 
ary.3 


1  Jennings  v.  Bank,  8  Mich.  181 ; 
Curtis  v.  Aaronson,  49  N.  J.  L.  68; 
Reed  v.  State,  16  Ark.  499 ;  Russell 
v.  Stockton,  8  Conn.  236 ;  Adams  v. 
State,  25  Ohio  St  584;  Richards  v. 
Bassett,  10  B.  &  C.  657;  Green  v. 
Mumper,  138  111.  434 ;  Price  v.  Little- 
wood,  3  Camp.  288 ;  White  v.  Lisle, 
4  Madd.  214;  Bryan  v.  Walton,  20 
Ga.  480 ;  Hard  v.  Brown,  18  Vt.  87 ; 
Elliott  v.  Pearl,  10  Pet.  412. 

2 "Reputation  is  an  incident  from 
which,  being  joined  to  cohabitation, 
the  married  relation  may  be  inferred. 
It  is  essential,  however,  that  the 
reputation  of  marriage  be  general. 
The  conduct  of  the  parties  must  be 
such  as  to  make  almost  every  one 
infer  that  they  were  married.  It  is 
the  reputation  arising  from  holding 
themselves  out  to  the  world  as  occu- 
pying that  relation  to  which  the  law 


refers.  It  is  not  enough  that  an 
opinion  may  exist  that  they  ought  to 
be  married  from  their  intimacy ;  it  is 
the  belief  that  they  are  married  which 
constitutes  the  reputation  of  it.  Their 
acts  should  be  inconsistent  with  any 
other  inference  than  that  of  mar- 
riage to  justify  the  repute  of  it,  and 
this  repute  should  be  credited  by  their 
relatives,  neighbors,  friends  and  ac- 
quaintances." Brinckle  v.  Brinckle, 
34  Leg.  Int.  428.  See,  also,  Arthur  v. 
Broadnax,  3  Ala.  375 ;  Whjte  v.  White, 
82  Cal.  427 ;  23  Pac.  Rep.  276 ;  In  re 
Wallace's  Estate,  25  Atl.  Rep.  260; 
49  N.  J.  Eq.  530. 

3  Curtis  v.  Aaronson,  7  Atl.  Rep. 
886 ;  49  N.  J.  L.  68 ;  Thomas  v.  Jen- 
kins, 1  N.  &  P.  588 ;  Doe  v.  Thomas, 

14  East,  323;  Weeks  v.  Sparke, 
1  M.  &  S.  688 ;  Dunraven  v.  Llewellyn, 

15  Q.  B.  791 ;  15  Ad.  &  EL  791 :  Taylor 


§   115.]  GENERAL    REPUTATION.  159 

In  the  United  States  some  exceptions  to  this  doctrine  have 
occurred.  It  has  been  held  in  many  states  that  evidence  of 
declarations  tending  to  show  common  reputation  is  admissible 
in  the  case  of  private  boundaries  irrespective  of  the  fact  that 
they  do  not  coincide  with  boundaries  of  a  public  nature.1 
The  origin  of  this  doctrine  is  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  mode 
in  which  the  government,  whether  state  or  federal,  or  other 
original  proprietor  of  the  land  caused  it  to  be  surveyed  and 
divided  preparatory  to  its  conveyance  to  those  who  subse- 
quently cultivated  it. 

In  the  West  particularly,  the  public  domain  was  by  act  of 
congress  surveyed  and  divided  into  townships,  sections  and 
subdivisions  of  sections,  and  in  making  conveyances  of  the 
lands  to  private  individuals  reference  was  made  to  these  quasi- 
public  boundary  lines. 

So  in  the  East  the  large  domains  granted  by  the  crown  had 
been  subdivided  by  surveyors  into  numerous  small  farms  by  in- 
tersecting lines  extending  from  one  boundary  of  the  tract  to 
the  other. 

Thus  in  both  classes  of  cases  it  happened  that  lines  of  a  public 
or  quasi-x>x\h\\o,  nature  have  become  absolutely  identical  with 
private  boundary  lines,  so  that  the  exception  to  the  rule  of  the 
English  common  law  is  more  apparent  than  real. 

It  has  been  held  in  many  cases  where  private  and  public 

v.   Roe,  4   Hawks,    116;   Ralston   v.  Wooster,  15  id.  412;  Taylor  v.  Judd, 

Miller,  3  Rand.  (Va.)  44;  Morris  v.  62  id.  288;  Wentman  v.  Haywood,  77 

Callanan,    105   Mass.    129;   Drury  v.  Tex.  557;  Dugger  v.  McKesson,  100 

Midland  R.  R.  Co.,  127  id.  571 ;  Mul-  N.  C.  1 ;  6  S.  E.  Rep.  746;  Arueson  v. 

lauey  v.  Duffy  (111.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Spann  (S.   D.,  1892),  49  N.  W.  Rep. 

Rep.  250;  Arnson  v.   Spawn  (S.   D.,  1066;  Harris  v.  Oakley,  130  N.  Y.  1: 

1892),  49  N.  W.  Rep.  1066;  Green  v.  Smith  v.  Powers,  15  N.  H.  546;  Lay 

Mumper,  138  111.  434;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  v.    Neville,   25  Cal.   545;   Austin   v. 

1075.  Andrews,  71  Cal.  98 ;  Smith  v.  Shack- 

JBoardman  v.  Reed,  6   Pet.    328;  elford,  9  Dana,  452;  McCoy  v.  Gallo- 

Donohue  v.  Whitney,  15  N.  Y.  S.  622 ;  way,  3  Ohio,  283 ;  Partridge  v.  Russell, 

Com.  v.  Penn.,  1  Pet  C.  C.  496;  Sasser  2  N.  Y  S.  529;  Nixon  v.  Porter,  34 

v.  Herring,  3  Dev.  (N.  C.)  340 ;  Woos-  Miss.  697 ;  Yates  v.  Shaw,  24  111.  367 ; 

ter  v.  Butler,  13  Conn.  309 ;  Stetson  Roberts  v.    Preston,  1C0  N.  C.  243 ; 

v.  Freem  n,   35  Kan.  523;  Spear  v.  Stroud  v.    Springfield.   28  Tex.  649; 

Coate,  3  McCord  (S.  C),  227;  Jackson  Hunnicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  IT.  S.  333; 

v.  McCall,  10  Johns.   377;  Wood  v.  Abert  v.  Van  Gelder,  33  N.  Y.  513. 
Fiske,  62  N.    H.  173 ;  Great  Falls  v. 


100  GENERAL    REPUTATION.  [§  116. 

boundaries  were  not  coincident  that  declarations  of  deceased 
persons  were  admissible  to  show  private  boundaries,  even 
where  they  are  not  declarations  against  interest  or  in  dispar- 
agement of  the  title  of  the  declarant.1  So  the  declarations  of 
a  deceased  or  absent  surveyor  in  the  form  of  maps,  surveys 
or  plats  are  received  to  explain  ambiguous  or  doubtful  con- 
veyances, particularly  when  they  are  referred  to  therein.2 
Usually,  however,  it  is  said  that  the  declarations  must  have 
been  made  by  some  one  in  possession  of  the  land  as  owner 
at  the  time,  though  they  need  not  then  be  against  interest 
when  they  will  be  admissible  as  part  of  the  res  gestae*  But 
the  declarations  of  third  persons  not  against  interest  who 
have  competent  knowledge,  made  on  the  land,  but  which  do 
not  range  themselves  under  either  of  the  above  heads,  will  be 
received.  Thus,  a  verbal  statement  of  a  deceased  surveyor 
who  had  no  interest  in  the  land,  but  Avho  may  have  surveyed 
it,  will  be  received,  though  such  evidence  can  hardly  be  called 
general  reputation.4 

§  116.  Writings  showing  general  reputation. —  Not  only 
are  verbal  statements  of  deceased  persons  received  as  evidence 
of  general  reputation,  but  written  instruments  such  as  maps 

i  Whitman  v.  Haywood,  77  Tex.  « Child  v.  Kingsbury,  46  Vt.  47; 
557;  Daggett  v.  Shaw,  5  Met.  (Mass.)  Hadley  v.  Howe,  46  Vt.  112;  Mc- ' 
223 ;  Curtiss  v.  Aaronson,  49  N.  J.  L.  Causland  v.  Fleming,  63  Pa.  St.  36 ; 
68 ;  Adams  v.  Swansea,  116  Mass.  591 ;  Hurt  v.  Evans,  49  Tex.  311 ;  Donohue 
Sharp  v.  Blankenship,  79  Cal.  411;  v.  Whitney,  15  N.  Y.  S.  622.  In  Hun- 
Fellows  v.  Smith,  130  Mass.  378;  nicutt  v.  Peyton,  102  U.  S.  333,  the 
Lawrence  v.  Tennant,  64  N.  H.  532.  court  says:  "In  questions  of  private 
Contra,  Titteriugton  v.  Trees,  78  Tex.  boundaries,  declarations  of  particular 
567;  Taylor  v.  Glenn,  29  S.  C.  292.  facts  as  distinguished  from  reputa- 

2  Curtiss  v.  Aaronson,  49  N.  J.  L.  tion  are  not  admissible  unless  made 
68 ;  7  Atl.  Rep.  886 ;  Davidson  v.  by  persons  who  had  knowledge  of 
Arledge,  97  N.  C.  172 ;  Coles  v.  Yorks,  that  whereof  they  spoke  and  who 
36  Minn.  388;  31  N.  W.  Rep.  353.  were  on  the  land  or  in  possession  of 

3  Roberts  v.  Medbury,  132  Mass.  it  when  the  declarations  were  made ; 
200;  Fowler  v.  Stimpson,  79  Tex.  and  these  to  be  evidence  must  have 
611;  Wood  v.  Fiske,  62  N.  H.  173;  been  made  while  the  declarant  was 
Royal  v.  Chandler,  87  Me.  119:  21  pointing  out  or  making  the  bound- 
Atl.  Rep.  842 ;  Brown  v.  Kenyon,  108  aries  or  discharging  some  duty  re- 
Iud.  284;  Harris  v.  Oakley,  130  N.  Y.  lating  thereto."  Cf.  Royal  v.  Chand- 
1;  Curtiss  v.  Aaronson,  49  N.  J.  L.  lev,  83  Me.  151;  21  Atl.  Rep.  842; 
75;  Austin  v.   Andrews,  77  Cal.  98;  Titteriugton  v.  Trees,  78  Tex.  567. 

16  Pac.  Rep.  546;  Whitman  v.  Hay- 
wood, 77  Tex.  557. 


116.] 


cexeual  imputation. 


161 


prepared  by  deceased  persons,1  deeds  and  leases,2  decrees  and 
orders  of  court,3  and  similar  evidential  instruments 4  are  re- 
ceived under  the  rules  and  limitations  considered  in  the  pre- 
ceding- sections  as  applicable  to  this  class  of  exceptions.5  It  is 
immaterial  that  the  documents  are  private  if  the  subject- 
matter  to  which  they  testify  is  one  calculated  to  have  inter- 
ested all  or  any  considerable  portion  of  the  public,  and  if  it  is 
probable  that  the  author  of  the  writing  possessed  competent 
knowledge  of  the  matters  which  are  described  therein.  Thus, 
it  is  a  general  rule  that  maps  and  plats  showing  the  public  or 
quasi-ipxihUc  boundary  lines,  or  which  tend  to  prove  a  dedica- 
tion by  a  private  owner  of  lands  to  public  uses  as  highways  or 
parks,  are  admissible  to  show  the  general  reputation  regard- 
ing such  matters.8 


1  See  §§115, 145 ;  Donohue  v.  Whit- 
ney, 15  N.  Y.  S.  622;  Ayers  v.  Wat- 
son, 137  U.  S.  584;  11  S.  Ct.  201. 

2Plaxton  v.  Dare,  10  B.  &  C.  17. 

3  Duke  of  Newcastle  v.  Braxtowe, 
4  B.  &  Ad.  273. 

*  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  C,  M.  &  R, 
928 ;  Clarkson  v.  Woodhouse,  5  T.  R. 
412. 

5  Taylor  v.  Cook,  8  Price,  650; 
Barnes  v.  Mawson,  1  M.  &  S.  77; 
Smith  v.  Earl  Brownlow,  L.  R.  9  Eq. 
241 ;  Beaufort  v.  Smith,  4  Ex.  450 ; 
Donohue  v.  Whitney,  15  N.  Y.  S.  622; 
Foss  v.  Hinkel  (Cal.,  1891),  25  Pac. 
Rep.  762. 
11 


6  Morris  v.  Callanan,  105  Mass.  129: 
Los  Angeles,  etc.  Co.  v.  Los  AngeleB 
(Cal.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  240;  Noyes 
v.  White,  9  Conn.  250;  Attorney- 
General  v.  Abbott,  154  Mass.  423; 
Brown  v.  Stark,  83  Cal.  636 ;  People 
v.  Hibernia  Sav.  Bank,  84  Cal.  634. 
Proof  of  any  particular  instance 
when  the  right  was  exercised  is  not 
required  in  the  case  of  a  public  or 
private  right  shown  to  exist  by  writ- 
ten evidence  of  common  reputation. 
Doe  v.  Sisson,  12  East,  62;  Beebe  v. 
Parker,  5  T.  R  26,  32. 


CHAPTER  X. 

STRANGERS'  DECLARATIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST. 


§  1 17.  Declarations  of  third  persons 
and  other  declarations  dis- 
tinguished. 

118.  Declarations  must  be  against 

interest. 

119.  The  interest  of  the  declarant 
119a.  The  death  of  the  declarant 


§  119b.  The  knowledge  of  the  declar- 
ant. 
119c.  Statements  of  predecessor 
against  interest,  when  evi- 
dence in  behalf  of  succes- 
sor. 


§  117.  Declarations  of  third  persons  and  other  declara- 
tions distinguished. —  The  declarations  of  third  persons  who 
are  neither  parties  to  the  suit  nor  in  privity  with  the  parties 
constitute  another  exception  to  the  rule  rejecting  hearsay  evi- 
dence. To  render  such  declarations  admissible  and  to  permit 
the  production  of  the  declarant  as  a  witness  to  be  dispensed 
with  three  elements  must  concur.  In  the  first  place  it  must 
be  shown  affirmatively  that  the  declarant  cannot  be  produced 
because  he  is  dead,  for  declarations  of  this  description  are  not 
only  hearsay  but  are  secondary  evidence  as  well. 

As  in  the  case  of  declarations  constituting  evidence  of  repu- 
tation, it  must  also  be  shown  that  the  person  possessed  ade- 
quate knowledge  or  was  in  such  a  situation  that  the  possession 
of  adequate  knowledge  may  be  presumed  from  the  circum- 
stances. And  finally  the  declarations  must  have  been  against 
his  interest  when  they  were  made. 

It  may  be  of  value  to  distinguish  declarations  which  are 
admissible  on  the  ground  just  described  from  those  which  are 
receivable  as  evidence  of  reputation  and  pedigree  or  as  a  part 
of  the  res  gestce,  on  the  one  hand,  and  from  those  which  are 
receivable  because  they  are  admissions,  on  the  other. 

The  principal  basis  for  the  reception  of  admissions  is  the 
strong  presumption  of  their  truth,  arising  from  the  fact  that 
they  are  declarations  against  interest,  made  by  a  party  to  the 
suit  or  by  some  one  in  privity  with  him.  The  declarations 
which  are  under  consideration  in  this  chapter  resemble  ad- 


§118.]         STUANGERS'    DECLARATIONS    AGAINST    INTEREST.  1C3 

missions  in  that  they  are  against  interest,  but  they  differ  from 
admissions  in  that  they  are  admissible  not  because  against  the 
interest  of  parties  to  the  suit  or  persons  in  privity  with  them, 
but  because  they  are  against  the  interest  of  strangers,  i.  e., 
third  persons  who  had  no  interest  in  the  present  su'jject- 
matter  and  who  are  not  identified  in  any  way  with  those  who 
are  parties  or  privies  to  it.  The  persons  who  have  made  these 
declarations  must  have  been  possessed  of  adequate  knowledge 
and  must  be  deceased  at  the  time  of  the  suit,  the  declarations 
in  these  respects  resembling  pedigree,1  while  in  the  case  of 
admissions,  no  such  requirements  exist,  though  on  the  other 
hand  a  joint  interest  or  identity  of  interest  must  be  shown 
prior  to  the  admission  of  the  latter. 

The  declarations  of  third  parties  against  interest  need  not, 
though  they  often  do,  constitute  a  part  of  the  res  gestae  which 
is  in  litigation,  nor  need  they  be  such  entries  as  are  made  in 
the  course  of  official  or  private  duty,  though  it  usualty  hap- 
pens that  they  often  possess  such  characteristics  in  common 
with  the  others  which  render  them  admissible. 

The  declarations  of  third  persons  against  interest  usually 
consist  of  written  entries  made  in  books  of  record  or  account, 
and  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case  it  frequently  happens 
that  such  books,  aside  from  any  question  of  competency,  are 
provable  under  the  rules  laid  down  with  respect  to  ancient 
documents.  But  in  most  of  the  cases  these  book-entries 
against  interest  are  wholly  or  partly  admissible  on  other 
grounds,  i.  <?.,  as  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gestae  and  as 
made  in  the  course  of  the  performance  of  private  or  profes- 
sional duty. 

§118.  Declarations  must  be  against  interest. —  In  the 
first  place  the  declarations  must  have  been  against  the  interest 
of  the  third  person  at  the  time  they  were  made.2  Self-interest 
prompts  all  persons  to  exercise  a  certain  degree  of  care  and 
attention  in  the  conduct  of  their  own  affairs  and  to  acquire  a 
more  or  less  intimate  knowledge  of  what  concerns  themselves. 
Based  upon  these  considerations,  a  strong  probability  exists 
that  such  declarations  are  true,  while,  on  the  other  hand,  the 

1  See  §  53.  Hosford  v.  Rowe,  41  Minn.  247 ;  Bla- 

2  Briberg  v.  Donovan,  23  111.   App.     lock  v.  Miland,  87  Ga.  573. 
62;  Bartlett  v.  Patton,  33  W.  Va.  71 ; 


104  STRANGERS'    DECLARATIONS    AGAINST    INTERE3T.         [§    110. 

necessity  of  the  case  requires  their  admission,  as  the  only  per- 
sons who  have  perhaps  the  amplest  knowledge  are  long  since 
deceased.1 

The  question  has  been  raised  whether  the  declaration  is  re- 
ceivable as  evidence  of  all  the  facts  which  are  contained  in 
it  or  only  as  evidence  of  those  facts  by  virtue  of  which  it  is 
opposed  to  the  pecuniary  interest  of  the  person  making  it. 
Though  controverted  bv  the  earlier  cases,  it  is  now  the  rule 
that  the  whole  declaration  or  entry  maybe  given  in  evidence 
to  show  statements  independent  of  and  collateral  to  the  main 
assertion.  So  the  written  receipt  of  a  deceased  person  is 
admissible  not  only  to  show  that  the  payment  was  made, 
which  is  the  fact  against  his  interest,  but  to  show  also  the  time 
or  place  of  payment  and  the  person  for  whose  account  the 
money  was  paid.2  But  statements  of  facts  collateral  to  the 
fact  which  constitutes  the  entry  a  declaration  against  interest 
are  not  receivable  unless  connected  with  it  by  reference  or 
by  necessity  in  order  to  explain  it.  The  mere  fact  that  they 
were  contemporaneously  made  does  not  render  them  admis- 
sible.3 

§  119.  The  interest  of  the  declarant. —  The  declaration 
must  have  been  opposed  to  the  pecuniary  or  proprietary  in- 
terest of  the  person  making  it,4  and  the  adverse  interest  should 
be  shown  by  independent  evidence  or  be  inferable  from  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  itself.5 

A  declaration  is  opposed  to  a  person's  interest  if  a  part  only 

•Bird  v.  Hueston,  10  Ohio  St.  4ia  *  Davis  v.  Lloyd,  1  C.  &  K.  276; 

2  Lamar  v.  Pearse  (Ga.,  1893),  17  Bartlett  v.  Patton,  33  W.  Va.  71. 
S.  E.  Rep.  92;  Davie  v.  Humphreys,  Cf.  Thistlethwait  v.  Thistlethwait, 
6  M.  &  W.  153 ;  In  re  Grade's  Estate  13  Ind.  355. 

(Pa.,  1893),  27  Atl.  Rep.  1083 ;  Marks  v.  5  Lamar  v.  Pearse  (Ga.,    1893),    17 

Lahee.  3  Biug.  N.  C.  408.    Cf.  Edward  S.  E.  Rep.  92;  Higham  v.  Ridgway, 

v.  Cook,  4  Esp.  49.  10  East,  109 ;  Ivat  v.  Finch,  1  Taunt 

3  Livingston  v.  Arnoux,  56  N.  Y.  141;  In  re  Grade's  Estate  (Pa.,  1893), 
507.  Cf.  Malone  v.  Gates,  66  Tex.  22,  27  Atl.  Rep.  1083.  Though  the  de- 
whieh  was  an  action  to  recover  for  clarant  may  be  deceased,  and  though 
the  value  of  a  quantity  of  timber,  he  may  have  had  competent  knowl- 
The  party  who  measured  the  timber  edge,  his  declarations  not  constituting 
being  dead,  it  was  held  proper  to  ad-  part  of  the  res  gestae  are  inadmissible 
mit  all  his  declarations  as  to  the  if  not  against  his  interest  Blalock 
manner  in  which  he  made  the  scale  v.  Miland,  87  Ga,  573. 

or  measure  used  by  hi  in. 


§§  119«-19J.]     STRANGERS'  DECLARATIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST.      1G5 

charges  him  with  a  liability,  or  where  other  portions  of  the 
book  or  document  in  which  it  occurs  may  discharge  him  from 
liability  in  whole  or  in  part.1  So  a  declaration  in  the  form  of 
a  book  entry  is  admissible  where  it  is  the  only  evidence  of 
the  charge,  and  even  where  the  same  book  shows  a  counter- 
balancing or  overbalancing  entry,  so  that  upon  the  whole  the 
declaration  or  entry  does  not  charge  the  party  and  is  not 
against  his  interest.2 

§  110a.  Death  of  the  declarant. —  To  render  declarations  of 
third  persons  against  interest  admissible  against  the  parties 
it  must  be  shown  that  the  declarant  is  deceased;3  and  it  has 
also  been  held  in  such  a  case  that  the  deceased  person  must 
have  been  competent  to  testify  as  to  the  declaration  against 
his  interest  if  he  had  been  alive  at  the  date  of  the  suit.4  The 
earlier  decisions,  however,  support  the  contrary  rule,  that  the 
incompetency  of  the  declarant  as  a  witness,  if  living,  is  imma- 
terial, basing  their  reasoning  upon  the  fact  that,  as  the  declara- 
tion is  in  its  nature  an  admission  or  confession,  it  is  very 
probably  true,5  despite  the  disqualification  of  the  person  from 
testifying  because  of  interest. 

§  119b.  Knowledge  of  the  declarant. —  These  declarations 
of  deceased  persons  against  their  interest,  while  differing  in 
some  respects  from  declarations  or  entries  made  in  the  usual 
course  of  employment,  resemble  them  in  this:  that  they  must 
have  been  made  by  a  person  who  had  a  good  knowledge  of 
the  facts  or  whose  duty  and  interest  it  was  to  have  that 
knowledge.6  If  the  stranger  was  possessed  of  competent 
knowledge  of  the  transaction,  it  is  immaterial  that  the  entry 
does  not  show  that  it  was  made  on  his  personal  knowledge.7 

1  Stepheu's  Dig.,  art.  28.  able  to   testify  iu  court  or  to  have 

2 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  151 ;  Higham  his  deposition  taken. 

v.  Ridgway,  10  East,  109;  Rowe  v.  4Heidenheimer     v.    Johnston,    76 

Brenton,  3  Man.  &  R.  2G7.  Tex.  200 ;  13  S.  W.  Rep.  46. 

3  Bartletfc  v.  Patton,  10  S. E.  Rep.  4 ;  si  Greenl.  on  Evidence,  §  153,  cit- 
33  W.  Va.  71 ;  Hosford  v.  Hosford,  ing  Doe  v.  Robson,  15  East,  32;  Mid- 
41  Minn.  245;  42  N.  W.  Rep.  1018;  dleton  v.  Melton,  10  B.  &  C.  317; 
Linuey  v.  Wood,  66  Tex.  22.  In  Schenck  v.  Warner,  37  Barb.  258. 
Griffith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1890),  14  S.  W.  «CIapp  v.  Engledow,  72  Tex.  252; 
Rep.  230,  it  was  held  that  declara-  10  S.  W.  Rep.  252 ;  Friberg  v.  Dono- 
tions  which  are  admissible  because  van,  20  111.  App.  62. 
the  declarant  is  deceased  are  also  ad-  7 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §153,  citing 
missible  where  he  is  so  physically  or  Crease  v.  Barrett,  1  Cr.,  M  &  R  219. 
mentally  incapacitated  that  lie  is  un- 


100  strangers'  declarations  against  interest.     [§  119c. 

Entries  made  in  the  performance  of  professional  or  private 
duty,  such  as,  for  example,  indorsements  of  service  or  the  returns 
made  on  writs  by  the  officials  or  private  persons  serving  them, 
are  receivable  against  the  parties  to  a  suit,  partly  because  of 
the  implied  agency  which  exists  between  the  party  against 
whom  they  are  introduced  and  the  declarant,  but  mainly  be- 
cause the  entries  form  a  part  of  the  res  (jestce,  i.  e.,  the  fact  of 
service.  Such  entries,  however,  are  only  available  as  evidence 
so  far  as  they  consist  of  statements  of  fact  which  it  was  the 
duty  of  the  person  to  record,  while  the  entry  of  a  stranger 
against  his  interest  is  evidence  of  all  facts  contained  in  it 
which  were  actually  recorded. 

§  119c.  Statements  of  predecessor  against  interest,  when 
evidence  in  behalf  of  successor. —  The  statements  of  a  de- 
ceased owner  of  property  in  his  own  favor  are  never  admis- 
sible evidence  in  behalf  of  those  claiming  the  property  by 
virtue  of  a  title  derived  from  him,1  except  where  they  are  a 
part  of  the  res  gestae  already  in  evidence,2  or  have  been  ac- 
quiesced in  by  the  adverse  party  or  by  one  in  privity  with 
him.3  Neither  are  statements  against  interest  made  by  a  pred- 
ecessor in  estate  admissible  as  evidence  for  his  successor  after 
his  decease.4 

In  England  one  exception  was  made  to  the  rule  that  no 
proprietor  can  make  evidence  in  favor  of  his  successor  in  in- 
terest. From  the  very  earliest  times  the  book  entries  of  a 
deceased  rector  or  vicar  were  received  as  evidence  for  or 
against  his  successor,  but  only  to  show  the  receipt  of  tithes  or 
other  money  due  the  church,  or  similar  entries  against  the  in- 
terest of  the  party  who  made  them  and  which  from  this  cir- 
cumstance were  presumed  to  be  true.5 

1  Reese  v.  Murnane,  31  Pac.  Rep.  But  in  White  v.  Chouteau,  10  Barb. 
1027 ;  5  Wash.  St.  372 ;  In  re  Smith.  202,  the  declaration  of  the  owner  of 
95  N.  Y.  517;  Schmidt  v.  Packard,  31  the  goods  against  interest  was  re- 
N.  E.  Rep.  944 ;  132  Ind.  398 ;  Blalock  ceived  in  favor  of  a  surety  claiming 
v.  Miland,  87  Ga.  573.  under  him  as  against  the  principal 

2  See  ante,  §  115,  "  Boundaries."  debtor. 

sSee§79.  &1  Greenl.  on   Evid.,  §   155,  citing 

<Outram  v.  Morewood,  5  T.  R  123.    Short  v.  Lee,  2  Jac.  &  W.  477. 


CHAPTER  XL 


WITNESSES  ABSENT  OR  DISQUALIFIED. 


§  120.  Testimony    of    missing    wit- 
nesses. 

121.  Witness  need  not  be  deceased. 

122.  Witnesses  who  have  become 

sick,  decrepit  or  insane. 


123.  Cross-examination  at  former 

trial  requisite  —  Identity  of 
parties. 

124.  Precise  language  of  witness, 

how  far  necessary. 


§  120.  Testimony  of  missing  witnesses. — The  main  grounds 
for  the  rejection  of  hearsay  evidence  are  the  absence  of  an 
oath  and  of  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine  the  person  who  is 
the  informant  of  the  witness.  But  if  a  witness  who  has  given 
testimony  in  a  judicial  proceeding  cannot  be  produced  at  a 
subsequent  trial  between  the  same  parties  for  the  same  cause 
of  action,  there  can  be  no  objection  on  this  ground  to  receiv- 
ing his  sworn  testimony  in  the  former  trial.1 

§  121.  Witness  need  not  be  deceased. —  It  was  at  one  time 
doubted  whether  the  testimony  of  a  witness  in  a  former  pro- 
ceeding would  be  admitted  in  his  absence  from  a  later  trial 
in  case  it  was  not  shown  that  he  was  dead.  So  where  the 
witness  had  become  incompetent   merely,2  or  interested3  in 


iRuch  v.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S. 
693:  Gastrell  v.  Phillips,  64  Miss. 
474;  Costen  v.  McDowell,  107  N.  C. 
546;  Berg  v.  McLafferty,  12  Atl. 
Rep.  460;  Lohman  v.  Stocke,  94  Mo. 
672 ;  Marshall  v.  Hancock,  80  Cal.  82 ; 
Lewis  v.  Roulo,  93  Mich.  475 :  Dwyer 
v.  Bassett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  513 ;  Rey- 
nolds v.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  155; 
Bank  of  Monroe  v.  Gifford,  79  Iowa, 
300 ;  Costigan  v.  Lunt,  127  Mass.  355 ; 
Yale  v.  Comstock,  112  id.  267;  Will- 
iams v.  Willard,  23  Vt.  369 ;  Barker 
v.  Hebbard.  81  Mich.  627;  Kendrick 
v.  State.  10  Humph.  479;  Harrison  v. 
Charlton,  42  Iowa,  573.  But  the  evi- 
dence, if  irrelevant,  will  not  be  ad- 


mitted on  the  second  trial,  though, 
inadvertently,  its  incompetency  was 
not  recognized  and  it  was  not  ob- 
jected to  at  the  earlier  trial.  Petrie 
v.  Railway  Co.  (S.  C,  1890),  7  S.  E. 
Rep.  815.  The  testimony  of  one  of 
defendant's  witnesses  in  the  former 
trial  who  is  absent  at  the  second  trial 
may  be  used  by  the  plaintiff  in  his 
own  favor  (Hudson  v.  Roos,  76  Mich. 
173;  Stayner  v.  Joyce,  22  N.  E.  Rep. 
1889),  and,  if  lie  is  present  as  a  wit- 
ness, to  impeach  his  credibility. 
Johnson  v.  Clements,  25  Kan.  376 ; 
Nuzum  v.  State,  8S  Ind.  599. 

2  Lee,  Adm'r,  v.  Hill,  87  Va.  497. 

8  Chess  v.  Chess,  17  S.  &  R.  409. 


1G8  WITNESSES    ABSENT    OK    DISQUALIFIED.  [§  121. 

the  subject  of  litigation,  or  where  he  was  out  of  the  state,1  or, 
being  found,  had  wholly  forgotten  the  facts  of  the  case,2  his 
testimony  given  at  a  former  trial  has  been  held  inadmissible. 
But  the  weight  of  the  modern  cases  sustains  the  more  liberal 
and  reasonable  rule  by  which  the  testimony  of  an  absent  wit- 
ness is  admitted  not  only  in  case  of  his  death  but  where  ho 
has  become  incompetent  by  insanity,  imbecility  or  sickness.3 
The  testimony  of  a  non-resident  witness  or  of  one  who  is 
merely  temporarily  out  of  the  jurisdiction4  given  at  a  former 
trial,  it  is  now  well  settled  in  England  and  in  many  of  tho 
states,  is  admissible  in  a  subsequent  trial  of  the  same  issue.5 
And  if  the  witness  is  within  the  jurisdiction  but  is  kept  con- 
cealed by  the  other  party,  so  that  it  is  impossible  to  serve  him. 
with  a  subpoena,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  admit  evi- 
dence of  his  testimony  given  at  the  prior  trial."  This  propo- 
sition, however,  is  denied  by  many  of  the  cases  if  the  witness 
is  not  shown  to  be  dead ;  and  a  fortiori  where  the  residence  of 
the  absentee  from  the  jurisdiction  is  known  and  his  deposition 
can  be  procured,  it  has  been  held  elsewhere  that  his  former 
testimony  was  inadmissible,7  and  that  his  deposition  must  be 
procured.     In  criminal  cases,  though  this  sort  of  evidence  is 

1  Wilber  V.  Selden,  6  Cowen  (N.  Y.),  v.  State,  92  Ala.  41 ;  Hudson  v.  Roos, 
162 ;  Rosenfeld  v.  Case, 87  Mich.  295 ;  76  Mich.  180 ;  Mailer  v.  State,  67  Ala. 
Finn's  Case,  5  Rand.  (Va.)  701.  55  ;  Howard  v.  Patrick,  38  Mich.  795  ; 

2  Stein  v.  Swenson,  46  Minn.  360;  Rothrock  v.  Gallaher.  91  Pa.  St.  108; 
Dayton  v.  Wells,  1  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  Rosenfield's  Case,  87  Mich.  295; 
C.)409.  Whitaker  v.  Marsh,  62  N.    H.   478; 

8  Hudson   v.   Roos,  76  Mich.   180 ;  People  v.  Devine,  46  Cal.  225. 

Reynolds  v.  United  States,  98  U.  S.  6Reynolds    v.    United    States,    98 

155.     In  New  York  the  testimony  of  U.  S.  155;  Cook  v.  Stout,  47  111.  530; 

a  deceased  witness  only  can  be  read  Williams  v.  State,  19  Ga.  402. 

in  evidence   in  a  subsequent  trial.  ''See  post,   §  359  et  seq. ;  Gastrell 

Crary  v.  Sprague,  12  Wend.  41 ;  Wil-  v.  Phillips,  64  Miss.  473;    Savannah, 

ber  v.  Selden,  6  Cow.  162 ;  Mut.  Life  etc.    Co.    v.   Flanagan,   82    Ga.   579; 

Ins.  Co.  v.  Anthony,  50  Hun,  101.  Rosenfield's  Case,  87  Miss.  295;  Sul- 

4  "Out of  the  jurisdiction"  signifies  livan  v.  State,  6  Tex.  App.  319; 
out  of  the  reach  of  a  subpoena.  Mej-er  Slusser  v.  Burlington,  47  Iowa,  300; 
v.  Roth,  51  Cal.  582.  Stein  v.  Swenson,  46  Minn.  360 ;  Col- 

5  Omaha  v.  Jensen  (Neb.,  1892),  52  lins  v.  Com.,  12  Bush,  271;  Kellogg 
N.  W.  Rep.   833;    Minn.   M.   Co.    v.  v.  Secord,  42  Mich.  318;    Brogy  v. 
Minn.   etc.   Ry.  Co.,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  Com.,  10  Gratt.  (Va.)  722 ;  Gerhauser 
639;    Gunn    v.   Wade,   65    Ga.    537;  v.  North  Brit  etc.  Co.,  7  Nev.  175. 
Dolan  v.  State,  40  Ark.  454;  Pruitt 


122,  123.]       WITNESSES    ABSENT    OK   DISQUALIFIED. 


Ifi9 


sometimes  admitted,  it  should  not  be  received  until  a  diligent 
search  has  been  made  for  the  missing  witness.1 

§  122.  Witnesses  who  have  become  sick,  decrepit  or  in- 
sane.— The  testimony  of  a  witness  at  a  former  trial  who  has 
since  become  mentally  incapacitated  to  testify  by  reason  of 
insanity,2  or  who  is  confined  to  his  house  by  illness  or  by 
physical  disability  3  arising  from  weakness  or  from  the  decrepi- 
tude of  old  age,4  may  be  given  in  a  subsequent  trial  between 
the  same  parties  of  the  same  cause  of  action. 

§  123.  Cross-examination  at  former  trial  requisite  — ■ 
Identity  of  parties. —  In  order  that  the  testimony  of  a  de- 
ceased or  absent  witness  may  be  admissible  against  a  party  in 
a  subsequent  trial,  it  is  absolutely  essential  that  the  party 
should  have  had  a  full  opportunity  at  the  earlier  trial  of  cross- 
examining  the  witness.5     If  an  opportunity  of  cross-exam  ina- 


i Shackelford  v.  State,  33  Ark.  539; 
Sullivan  v.  State.  G  Tex.  App.  319; 
Wilder  v.  St.  Paul,  12  Minn.  108. 

2  Whitaker  v.  Marsh,  62  N.  H.  477 ; 
Harrison  v.  Blades,  3  Campb.  453; 
Stein  v.  Swenson,  49  N.  W.  Rep.  55 ; 
46  Minn.  360;  Marler  v.  State,  67  Ala. 
55;  State  v.  King,  86  N.  C.  803;  Rex 
v.  Criswell,  3  T.  R.  721 ;  State  v.  Laque, 
41  La.  Ann.  1070. 

3  Perriu  v.  Wells,  155  Pa.  St.  299 ; 
Miller  v.  Russell,  7  Mart.  (N.  S.)  266; 
State  v.  King,  86  N.  G  603.  If  it 
seems   likely  that   the   witness   will 


N.  W.  Rep.  402 ;  O'Brien  v.  Com.,  6 
Bush  (Ky.),  563-,  State  v.  Johnson.  12 
Nev.  121 ;  State  v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa, 
88 ;  Marshall  v.  Hancock,  80  Cal.  82. 
The  evidence  of  witnesses  before  ar- 
bitrators will  be  receivable  in  a  sub- 
sequent trial  in  court  of  the  same 
matter.  Barley  v.  Woods,  17  N.  H. 
305 ;  Jaccard  v.  Anderson,  37  Mo.  91 : 
Bishop  v.  Tucker,  4  Rich.  (S.  C.)  78 ; 
Osborn  v.  Bell,  5  Denio,  370;  Orr  v. 
Hadley,  36  N.  H.  575.  In  the  trial  of 
an  indictment  for  murder  the  testi- 
mony taken  at  the  coroner's  inquest 


shortly  recover  from   his  illness  the    held  to  investigate  the  death  of  the 


court  may,  it  has  been  held,  adjourn 
the  trial.  Harrison  v.  Blades,  3 
Campb.  458. 

4  Evidence  given  on  a  former  trial 
cannot  be  produced  on  a  second  trial 


deceased  is  not  admissible  where  the 
witness  cannot  be  produced  (State  v. 
Campbell.  1  Rich.  (S.  C.)  124;  Farkas 
v.  State,  60  Miss.  847 ;  Whitehurst  v. 
Com.,  79   Va.  556 ;  State  v.  Cecil,  54 


without  calling  the  witness,  upon  the     Md.  426  ;  McLain  v.  Com.,  99  Pa.  St. 


ground  that  he  has  forgotten  par- 
ticular facts,  unless  his  failure  to  re- 
member is  the  result  of  mental  imbe- 
cility. Stein  v.  Swenson,  46  Minn. 
360 ;  49  N.  W.  Rep.  55.  See  Thornton 
v.  Britton,  144  Pa.  St.  126,  as  to  testi- 
mony of  aged  witness. 

5  Bradley  v.  Merrick,  91  N.  Y.  293; 
Hudson  v.  Applegate  (Iowa,  1893),  54 


86;  Dupree  v.  State,  33  Ala.  380; 
State  v.  McNeil,  33  La.  Ann.  1332), 
though  in  one  case  it  was  admitted 
in  behalf  of  defendant.  So  the  testi- 
mony of  a  witness  at  a  coroner's 
inquest  is  not  admissible  in  a  subse- 
quent action  to  recover  for  the  wrong- 
ful death,  though  the  witness  is  dead. 
Pittsburg,  etc.  Co.  v.  McGrath,  115 


170 


WITNESSES    ARSENT    OK    DISQUALIFIED. 


[§  123. 


tion  has  been  afforded  the  party  against  whom  the  testimony 
of  the  absent  witness  is  subsequently  put  in  evidence,  it  is  not 
always  necessary  that  the  parties  to  the  several  actions  should 
be  precisely  identical  or  that  the  issue  should  be  the  same  on 
both  occasions.1  Thus,  if  the  second  proceeding  is  between 
those  in  privity  with  the  parties  to  the  earlier  trial,  the  tes- 
timony of  a  witness  in  the  trial  between  the  original  parties 
is  admissible  against  those  in  privity  with  them,  though  the 
subject-matter  of  the  later  litigation  is  not  identical  with  that 
of  the  earlier.2  But  though  exact  identity  of  subject-matter 
is  not  generally  required,  yet  the  issue  in  the  second  proceed- 
ing must  have  been  so  far  identified  and  connected  with  the 
subject  of  the  former  litigation  that  the  party  against  whom 
the  evidence  is  introduced  must  have  had  a  right,  according 
to  the  rules  of  evidence,  to  cross-examine.  In  other  words, 
it  is  required  that  the  evidence  should  not  be  incidental,  but 
that  it  should  be  equally  relevant  to  the  issues  in  both  trials.3 
It  is  requisite  that  in  the  former  trial  the  court  should  have 
had  jurisdiction,  and  if  the  proceeding  were  substantially 
regular  the  testimony  will  not  be  rejected  subsequently  on 
account  of  informalities.4 


111.  172.  The  constitutional  right  of 
the  accused  to  meet  the  witnesses 
face  to  face  is  not  violated  by  the  ad- 
mission of  the  testimony  of  an  ab- 
sent witness  taken  on  a  former  trial 
where  he  had  an  opportunity  to  cress- 
exam  ine  the  witness.  Com.  v.  Rich- 
ards, 18  Pick.  (Mass.)  434;  State  v. 
Blemis,  24  Mo.  402.  An  opportunity 
to  cross-examine  is  not  shown  b}r  evi- 
dence that  counsel  in  the  pending 
action  was  present  at  the  previous 
proceeding.  Jackson  v.  Crilly,  16 
Colo.  103. 

i  Jackson  v.  Crilly,  16  Colo.  103; 
Mathews  v.  Colburn,  1  Strobh.  258; 
Jackson  v.  Lavvsou,  15  Johns.  544; 
Schindler  v.  Railroad  Co.,  87  Mich. 
400;  Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v.  How- 
ard, 13  How.  (U.  S.)307;  Hunter  v. 
Burlington,   etc.   Co.,  76  Iowa,  490; 


Goodlett  v.  Kelly,  74  Ala.  213 ;  Charles- 
worth  v.  Tinker,  J 8  Wis.  633. 

2  Lee's  Adm'r  v.  Hill,  12  S.  E.  Rep. 
1052;  87  Va.  497;  Shelton  v.  Bar- 
bour, 2  Wash.  64 ;  Seattle,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Gilchrist,  4  Wash.  St.  509;  Yale  v. 
Comstock,  112  Mass.  267;  Fisher  v. 
Monroe,  2  Misc.  Rep.  326 ;  Indianap- 
olis, etc.  Co.  v.  Stout,  53  Iud.  543; 
Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  Co.,  49 
N.  W.  Rep.  670 ;  87  Mich.  400 ;  Jack- 
sou  v.  Crissey,  3  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  251 ; 
Strickland  v.  Hudson,  55  Miss.  235. 

3  Jackson  v.  Winchester,  4  Dall. 
206;  Melvin  v.  Whiting,  7  Pick.  79. 
Cf.  Stayner  v.  Joyce,  22  N.  E.  Rep. 
89;  Schindler  v.  Milwaukee,  etc.  Co., 
87  Mich.  400. 

4  State  v.  Johnson,  12  Nev.  121. 
So  where  on  the  earlier  trial  the 
witness  was  not  sworn  by  consent 
Wheeler  v.  Walker,  12  Vt  427. 


§  124.] 


WITNESSES    ABSENT    OK    DISQUALIFIED. 


171 


§  124.  Precise  language,  how  far  requisite. —  Formerly  it 
was  considered  essential  that  the  person  who  testified  to  the 
evidence  of  an  absent  witness  should  state  the  exact  language 
of  the  witness.1  This  rule,  however,  was  soon  relaxed,  and  it 
is  now  the  law  that  the  exact  language  need  not  be  given  if 
its  substance  is  accurately  stated  in  the  later  trial.2  But  the 
whole  of  the  testimony  of  the  witness  upon  a  particular  point 
should  be  repeated  in  language  as  nearry  identical  as  possible, 
so  that  the  effect  produced  may  correspond  with  the  impres- 
sion made  upon  the  jury  by  the  testimony  of  the  witness  in 
the  original  trial.3  Accordingly,  the  testimony  of  the  witness 
elicited  on  his  cross-examination  must  be  substantially  re- 
peated.4 

At  the  present  time  the  custom  of  employing  a  court  ste- 
nographer, whose  duty  it  is  to  take  down  the  testimony  of  the 
witnesses  examined,  is  nearly  universal.  He  is  usually  a  sworn 
officer  of  the  court,  and  his  notes  or  transcripts  of  them  pos- 
sess an  official  character  and  authenticity  which  render  them 
of  great  value  in  case  of  the  subsequent  death  or  absence 
of  a  witness.5     "Where  such  records  exist,  their  production  on 


i 1  Greenl.  on  Evid..  §  165 ;  Wilber 
v.  Selden,  6  Cow.  165;  Montgomery 
v.  State,  11  Ohio,  421 ;  United  States 
v.  Wood,  3  Wash.  440;  Foster  v. 
Shaw,  7  S.  &  R  163 ;  Com.  v.  Rich- 
ards, 18  Pick.  464. 

-1  State  v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa,  88;  46 
N.  W.  Rep.  752 ;  Bennett  v.  State,  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  284 ;  Buie  v.  Carver,  73  N. 
C.  264 ;  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.) 
80 ;  Gannon  v.  Stevens,  13  Kan.  447  ; 
Brown  v.  Com..  73  Pa.  St.  321 ;  Stein  v. 
Swenson,  46  Minn.  360 ;  Johnson  v. 
Powers,  40  Vt.  611 ;  Mitchell  v.  State, 
71  Ga.  128;  Home  v.  Williams,  23 
Ind.  37 ;  Smith  v.  Natchez  S.  Co.,  1 
How.  (Miss.)  479;  Lathrop  v.  Atkin- 
son, 81  Ga.  339;  Martin  v.  Cope,  3 
Abb.  Dec.  182 ;  Young  v.  Dearborn, 
22  N.  H.  372 ;  Emery  v.  Fowler,  39 
Me.  326 ;  Lime  R  Bank  v.  Hewett, 
52  id.  531 ;  Caton  v.  Lenox,  5  Rand. 
(Va.)  31. 


3  Bennett  v.  State,  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
684. 

*  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  80;  Gilder- 
sleeve  v.  Caraway.  10  Ala.  260 ;  Block 
v.  Woodron,  39  Md.  194;  Wolf  v. 
Wyeth,  11  S.  &  R.  149;  Woods  v. 
Keys,  14  Allen,  236 ;  Puryear  v.  State, 
63  Ga.  692;  Marsh  v.  Jones,  21  Vt. 
378;  State  v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa,  88; 
Hepler  v.  Mt.  Carm.  Sav.  Bank,  97  Pa. 
St.  420;  Black  v.  Woodson.  39  Md. 
194;  Tibbetts  v.  Flanders,  18  N.  H. 
284;  Wright  v.  Stowe,  4  Jones'  L  (N. 
C.)  516.  The  objection  that  the  wit- 
ness fails  to  remember  the  cross-exam- 
ination is  waived  if  not  made  im- 
mediately. State  v.  O'Brien,  81  Iowa, 
88 ;  46  N.  W.  Rep.  752. 

5  That  a  stenographer's  notes  are 
competent,  see  District  v.  Wash.  Gas 
Co.,  20  D.  C.  39 ;  Hicks  v.  Lovell,  64 
Cal.  14 ;  Quinn  v.  Halbert,  57  Vt.  178 ; 
Labor  v.  Crane,  56  Mich.  585;  John- 


172  WITNESSES    ABSENT   OR   DISQUALIFIED.  [§  124. 

the  subsequent  trial  should,  it  seems,  be  required  under  the 
rule  requiring  the  production  of  the  best  evidence.  But  the 
verbal  testimony  of  the  stenographer,  it  has  been  held,  in  such 
a  case,  given  after  refreshing  his  memory  by  a  perusal  of  his 
notes,  is  admissible,1  provided  the  notes  are  shown  to  the  op- 
posite party  and  he  is  given  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine 
the  witness  as  to  their  accuracy.2  A  stenographer's  notes 
taken  out  of  the  jurisdiction,3  or  taken  down  from  the  lips  of 
an  interpreter  where  the  witness  testifies  in  a  foreign  lan- 
guage,4 or  when  the  reporter  is  dead,5  or  .when  for  any  reason 
the  notes  are  not  shown  to  be  correct,6  have  been  held  inad- 
missible to  prove  the  testimony  which  a  witness  gave  at  a 
former  trial.  The  judge's  notes  also  are  not  competent  to 
show  what  the  witness  said  until  it  is  shown  that  they  con- 
tain an  accurate  and  complete  account  of  the  substance  of 
the  witness'  language.7  Their  incompetency  is  due  to  the 
fact  that  they  are  no  part  of  the  record  and  are  not  made 
within  the  scope  of  official  duty  or  under  the  sanction  of  an 
official  oath,  which  would  guaranty  that  they  are  complete  or 
correct.8  So  when  it  is  sought  to  show,  by  the  bill  of  ex- 
ceptions, or  a  case  on  appeal,  the  testimony  of  a  witness 
at  a  former  trial,  a  foundation  must  be  laid  by  proving 
that  the  bill  does  actually  contain  all  the  evidence  given  by 
the  witness.9     When,  however,  the  record  is  not  obtainable, 

son   v.  Spear,  82  Mich.  453;  Sage  v.  8  Elberfeklt  v.  Waite,  79  Wis.  284; 

State,  27  Ind.  15;  26  N.  E.  Rep.  667.  Ex  parte  Learmouth,  6  Madd.   113; 

'  Rounds  v.  Slate,  57  Wis.  45 ;  Peo-  Regina   v.  Child,  5   Cox  C.  C.   197; 

pie  v.  Chung,  57  Cal.  567 ;  Hicks  v.  Schafer  v.  Schafer,  93  Ind.  586 ;  Miles 

Lovell,  64  Cat    14 ;    Shackelford   v.  v.  O'Hara,  4  Binn.  (Pa.)  108 ;  Huff  v. 

State,  33  Ark.  559;  Moore  v.  Moore,  Bennett,  4  Saudf.  (N.  Y.)  120;  Sar- 

39  Iowa,  461.  geant  v.  Marshall,  38  111.  App.  642. 

2  People  v.  Lon  You  (Cat,  1893),  32  9  Woolen   v.    Wire,  110   Ind.    251; 

Pac.  Rep.  11.  Case  v.  Blood,  71  Iowa,  632;  Slinger- 

*Herrick  v.  Swomley,  56  Md.  439.  land   v.   Slingerland,  46   Minn.  100; 

^  People  v.  Ah  Yute,  56  Cal.  119.  Davis   v.   Kline,  9  S.  W.   Rep.  724; 

5  Trunkey  v.  Hedstrom,  33  111.  App.  Odell  v.   Solomon,  4  N.  Y.   S.  440 ; 

397.  Dwyer    v.    Rippetoe,   72    Tex.    520; 

c  People  v.  Sligh,  48  Mich.  54.  Coughliu  v.  Haensler,  50  Mo.  126 :  St. 

7  Simmons  v.  Spratt,  1  S.  Rep.  860 ;  Joseph  v.  Union  Ry.  Co.  (Mo.,  1893), 

Thompson  v.  Richardson  (Ala.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  794;  Fisher  v.  Fisher, 

1 1  S.  Rep.  728 ;  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  131  Ind.  462.     Cf.  Elgin  v.  Welch,  23 

(Tenu.)   80;   Elberfeklt  v.  Waite,  79  111.  App.  185. 
Wis.  284. 


§  124.]  WITNESSES    ABSENT   OR    DISQUALIFIED.  173 

any  person  who  has  heard  the  witness,  as,  for  example,  the 
counsel  of  one  of  the  parties  or  a  juror,1  a  justice,2  master  in 
chancery,3 committing  magistrate,4  interpreter5  or  newspaper 
correspondent6  will  be  allowed  to  testify  to  the  language  of 
an  absent  witness  from  notes  taken  on  the  former  trial.7  In 
case  counsel  in  the  subsequent  trial  enter  into  a  stipulation  by 
which  they  agree  upon  the  admissibility  of  the  witnesses' 
notes,  a  verification  or  identification  under  oath  may  be  dis- 
pensed with.8  But  such  a  stipulation  does  not  make  the  tes- 
timony taken  in  the  prior  case  evidence  unless  it  is  actually 
introduced  as  such.9 

iHutchings  v.  Corgan,  59  111.  70.  Davis  v.  Kline  (Mo.,  1888),  9  S.  W. 

2Elberfeldt  v.  Waite,  79  Wis.  284;  Rep.  724;  People  v.  Murphy,  45  Cal. 

48  N.  W.  Rep.  525 ;  Chase  v.  Debolt,  137 ;  Ruch  v.  Rock  Island,  97  U.  S. 

7  111.  571.  693. 

3  Yale  v.  Comstock,  112  Mass.  267.  »Nutt  v.  Thompson,  69  N.  C.  548; 

4  Wade  v.  State,  7  Baxt.  (Tenn.)  80.  Clark  v.  Vance,  15  Wend.  193;  Lath- 

5  People  v.  Ah  Yute,  56  Cal.  119.  rop  v.  Adkinson,  87  Ga.  389. 

6  Moore  v.  Moore,  39  Iowa,  461.  » Pitts  v.  Lewis,  81  Iowa,  51 ;  46  N. 
*  Carpenter  v.  Tucker,  98  N.  C.  316 ;  W.  Rep.  739 ;  United  States  Exp.  Co. 

Loughry  v.  Wait,  34  111.   App.  523 ;     v.  Jenkins,  73  Wis.  471. 


CHAPTER  XII. 


PRIVATE  WRITINGS. 


§  125.  Definition   and  classification. 

126.  Production  of  writing  —  Proof 

of   contents    by  secondary 
evidence. 

127.  Writings  obtained  by  fraud  or 

deceit  —  Decoy  letters. 

128.  Spoliation  and  alteration  dis- 

tinguished —  Effect  of  ma- 
terial alterations. 

129.  Alterations  —   Presumptions 

and  burden  of  proof  to  ex- 
plain. 

130.  Private  writings  lost  or  de- 

stroyed. 

131.  Handwriting  defined. 

132.  Production  of  writings,  when 

necessary. 

133.  Proof  by  admissions  of  party. 


§  134.  When  proof  of  handwriting 
may  be  dispensed  with  — 
Acknowledgments. 

135.  Who  may  take  acknowledg- 

ments. 

136.  The  certificate. 

137.  Impeaching  the  certificate. 

138.  Proof    by    subscribing     wit- 

nesses. 

139.  Proof  by  witnesses  acquainted 

with  party's  handwriting. 
139a.  Mode  of  examining  witnesses 
as  to  handwriting. 

140.  Comparison  of  handwriting. 

141.  To  what  expert  may  give  evi- 

dence. 

142.  Proof  of  exhibits  in  equity. 


§  125.  Definition  and  classification. —  "  The  word  '  writing ' 
in  its  broadest  sense  means  words  traced  with  a  pen,  or 
stamped,  printed  or  engraved,  or  made  legible  by  any  other 
device."  1  Writings  are  divided  into  two  classes  —  public  and 
private.  A  public  writing  may  be  defined  as  the  written  act 
or  record  of  the  business  of  the  people  of  the  community 
proceeding  from  the  supreme  executive,  legislative  or  judicial 
authority  either  of  the  federal  government,  of  the  government 
of  a  state  or  foreign  country,  or  of  some  public  officer,  court 
or  official  body  created  by  law  and  deriving  their  powers  from 
that  government,  including  also  all  official  records  of  private 
writings. 

Public  writings  are  subdivided  into  four  classes,  viz. :  Pub- 
lic laivsj  judicial  records;  records  kept  by  public  officials  in 


'Anderson's  Diet ;  Henshaw  v.  Fos-  common  law. 
ter,  9  Pick.  318.  A  printed  ticket  is  127  U.  S.  467. 
a  "  writing  "  and  may  be  forged  at 


Benson  v.  McMahon, 


§  120.]  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  175 

pursuance  of  statute  or  as  a  part  of  their  official  duty,  and 
public  records  of  private  writings} 

All  writings  not  comprised  in  any  of  these  classes,  and 
which  concern  the  affairs  of  one  or  more  individuals  only,  are 
private.2  The  words  "document"  and  "writing"  approxi- 
mate closely  in  meaning  and  may  be  and  are  often  used  inter- 
changeably with  correctness.  The  word  "instrument"  has 
perhaps  a  more  restricted  meaning;  for  while  it  is  often  used 
to  describe  any  writing,  its  more  proper  meaning  is  a  docu- 
ment or  writing  of  a  formal  or  deliberate  character  which 
is  intended  to  be  used  as  a  means  of  judicial  evidence.  Thus 
under  the  words  "instrument"  or  "written  instrument" 
would  properly  be  included  bonds,  conveyances,  wills  and 
other  formal  or  solemn  instruments;  while  on  the  other  hand, 
letters,  accounts,  memoranda  and  the  like,  the  creation  of 
which  was  not  primarily  intended  to  create  a  binding  obliga- 
tion or  title,  could  not  in  strictness  of  language  be  called 
instruments.3 

§126.  Production  of  writings  —  Proof  of  contents  by 
secondary  evidence. —  In  the  absence  of  statute  the  produc- 
tion of  private  writings  may  be  secured  either  by  a  bill  of 
discovery  in  chancery  or  by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum}  By  fed- 
eral statutes  and  by  statutes  regulating  practice  in  the  states 
which  have  adopted  the  reformed  procedure  it  is  now  per- 
mitted for  the  court,  after  notice  to  the  other  party  and  upon 
motion,  to  grant  an  order  for  the  discovery  and  production 
of  books  and  papers  in  his  hands  or  to  compel  him  to  grant 
an  inspection  of  them  and  permission  to  take  copies  thereof. 

The  party  compelled  to  produce  papers  is  allowed  a  reason- 
able time  to  do  so,  but  if  he  fails  to  comply  with  the  order,  the 
court  may  in  its  discretion  order  that  the  action  to  which  the 
document  is  relevant  be  dismissed  or  his  pleading  be  stricken 
out  and  judgment  be  rendered  accordingly.  The  court  may 
also  direct  that  the  writing  shall  not  be  admitted  in  evidence 
in  favor  of  the  party  refusing  to  produce  and  may  punish  him 

1  Abbott's  Dig.,  vol.  3,  title  "  Evi-  3  Abbott's  Law    Diet ;  Hankinson 

dence."     See,  also,  McCall  v.  United  v.  Page,  3  Fed.  Rep.  186 ;  State  v.  Kel- 

States,  1  Dak.  321-328.  sey,  44  N.  J.  Law,  34 

*  Anderson's    Law    Diet,    "  Doeu-  <  See  post,  §  279. 
nients." 


176 


PRIVATE    WHITINGS. 


[§  126. 


for  contempt,  or  both.1  These  statutes2  have  superseded  the 
necessity  of  a  notice  to  produce;  but  where  they  do  not  ob- 
tain, the  common-law  notice  to  produce  is  still  employed,  irre- 
spective of  the  fact  that  in  consequence  of  the  statutory 
competency  of  the  party  as  a  witness  the  production  of  the 
papers  may  be  secured  by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum? 

At  common  law,  in  order  to  lay  a  foundation  for  the  introduc- 
tion of  secondary  evidence  of  a  writing  where  the  adverse  party 
has  refused  to  produce  it,  it  is  necessary  to  prove  the  exist- 
ence of  the  writing  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  court,4  and  that 
it  is  in  the  possession  or  control  of  the  adverse  part}7,5  though 
if  the  writing  is  in  the  possession  of  another  in  privity  with 
him,  notice  to  the  latter  is  sufficient.6  The  notice  to  produce 
may  be  verbal,7  but  must  describe  the  writing  required  with 
reasonable  precision.8  A  notice  to  produce  a  letter  will  re- 
quire the  production  of  its  envelope,9  and  should  be  season- 
ably served  on  the  part}'  or  his  attorney  10  before  the  com- 
mencement of  the  trial.11  Where  the  writing  is  collateral  to 
the  issue,12  or  if  an  adverse  party  has  b}T  force  or  fraud  ob- 
tained possession  of  the  papers,13  or  attempts  to  give  second- 
ary evidence  of  their  contents,14  or  offers  to  produce  them,15 


1  N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  P.,  803-809.  See, 
also,  Traverse  v.  Satterlee,  67  Hun, 
652;  22  N.  Y.  S.  118;  Schwartz  v, 
Atkin,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  373;  Simon 
v.  Ash,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  202;  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  719 ;  Gould  v.  McCarty,  1  Ker- 
nan,  575;  Sanchez  v.  Dickinson,  19 
N.  Y.  S.  733. 

2  See  Marrone  v.  N.  Y.  Jockey 
Club,  14  N.  Y  S.  199;  Bridgman  v. 
Scott,  13  id.  338;  59  Hun,  624;  Fro- 
wein  v.  Lindheim,  11  N.  Y.  S.  495; 
Wahed  El  Tazi  v.  Stein,  59  Hun, 
622;  Rigdon  v.  Conley,  31  111.  App. 
630. 

3  Rigdon  v.  Conley,  supra;  Roberts 
v.  Dixon,  50  Kan.  436 ;  Spiers  v.  Wil- 
son, 4  Cranch,  398 ;  Homeyer  v.  N. 
J.  S.  &  W.  Co.,  66  Hun.  626 ;  Doon 
v.  Donaher,  113  Mass.  151;  Vinal  v. 
Burrill,  16  Pick.  401,407;  Northrup 
v.Jackson,  13  Wend.  86;  Pangburn 
v.  Insurance  Co.,  62  Mich.  638. 

*  Sharpe  v.  Lamb,  3  P.  &  D.  454. 


5Dix  v.  Atkins,  128  Mass.  43;  Rob- 
erts v.  Spencer,  123  id.  397  ;  Henry  v. 
Leigh,  3  Camp.  499,  502. 

6  Sinclair  v.  Stevenson,  1  C.  &  P. 
582. 

"Brokman  v.  Myers,  59  Hun,  623. 

8Austine  v.  Treat  (Mich.,  1888),  39 
N.  W.  Rep.  749. 

9  United  States  v.  Duff,  19  Blatchf. 
10. 

10  Pitts  v.  Emmons,  92  Mich.  542; 
Glenn  v.  Rogers,  3  Md.  312;  Holt  v. 
Miers,  9  C.  &  P.  191 ;  Reg.  v.  Kitson, 
20  Eng.  L  &  Eq.  509. 

"Chattues  v.  Raitt,  20  Ohio,  132; 
Sturm  v.  Jeffers.  2  C.  &  K.  442 ;  Em- 
erson v.  Fisk,  6  Greenl.  200 ;  Hughes 
v.  Budd,  8  Dowl.  315. 

"Coonrod  v.  Madden,  126  Ind.  197. 

13  Doe  v.  Ries,  7  Bing.  724 ;  Neally 
v.  Greenough,  5  Foster  (N.  H),  325. 

14  Bartholomew  v.  Stephens,  8  C. 
&  P.  728. 

15  Dwinell  v.  Larrabee,  38  Me.  464 


§  127.]  PRIVATE    "WRITINGS.  177 

notice  to  produce  is  not  necessary  in  order  to  Lay  a  founda- 
tion for  secondary  evidence.1  But  writings  which  have  been 
produced  upon  notice  are  not  thereby  made  evidence  unless 
the  party  demanding-  their  production  so  inspects  them  as  to 
become  acquainted  with  their  contents.  If  he  does  examine 
them,  to  that  extent  they  are,  according  to  some  of  the  de- 
cisions, evidence  for  both  parties  to  the  cause.2 

If  the  fact  of  a  demand  and  refusal  to  produce  be  left  in 
doubt,  or  if  the  existence  of  and  the  search  for  the  writing  are 
not  shown,  secondary  evidence  of  the  contents  of  the  instru- 
ment will  not  be  received.3  The  sufficiency  of  the  proof  that 
the  instrument  cannot  be  produced  by  the  party  desirous  of 
proving  its  contents  by  secondary  evidence  is  for  the  judge,4 
and  his  decision  will  not  be  reviewed  unless  it  is  based  upon 
an  error  of  law.5 

§  127.  Writings  obtained  by  fraud  or  deceit  —  Decoy  let- 
ters.—  The  fact  that  documentary  evidence  has  been  obtained 
illegitimately  or  irregularly,  or  secured  by  the  practice  of 
deceit  upon  a  person  against  whom  they  are  introduced,  will 
not,  if  it  is  in  other  respects  admissible,  cause  its  rejection." 
So  documentary  evidence  obtained  by  the  use  of  cTecoy  letters 
is  admissible  very  often  from  the  necessity  of  the  case  in  the 
prosecution  of  a  person  indicted  for  mailing  obscene  articles, 

1 1   Greenl.   on  Evid.,   §  561.     Cf.  berg,  27  Mo.  App.  285 ;  Stratton  v. 

Bourne    v.    Boston,    2    Gray,    494 ;  Hawks,  43  Kan.  541 ;  Carr  v.   Miller, 

Blanchard  v.  Young,  11  Cush.  341,  42  111.  179;  Walker  v.  Schoul  Dist., 

345.  22  Conn.  326. 

2  Calvert  v.  Flower,  7  C.  &  P.  386;  » Smith  v.  Brown  (Mass.,  1890),  24 
Long  v.  Drew,  114  Mass.  77;  Clark  N.  E.  Rep.  31:  Bonds  v.  Smith,  106 
v.  Fletcher,  1  Allen,  53.  Contra,  N.  C.  553 ;  Gorgas  v.  Hertz,  150  Pa. 
Blake  v.  Russ,  33  Me.  360 ;  Austin  v.  St.  538 ;  Bain  v.  Welsh,  85  Me.  108. 
Thompson,  45  N.  H.  113.  Marking  *l  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  254a,  citing 
paper  as  an  exhibit  does  not  neces-  Com.  v.  Dana,  2  Met.  327,  329 ;  Legatt 
sarily  make  a  writing  evidence.  Cas-  v.  Tollervey,  14  East,  202.  "  Where 
tell  v.  Millison,  41  Bl.  App.  61.  See  the  guilty  intent  to  commit  crime  has 
post,  §  142.  been  formed,  any  one  may  furnish 

3  Nolan  v.  Pelhara,  77  Ga.  262 ;  opportunities  or  even  lend  assistance 
Hanover  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Lewis,  23  Fla.  to  the  criminal  to  expose  him.  But 
193;  1  S.  Rep.  863.  no  court  will  countenance  a  violation 

4Milford  v.  Veazie  (Me.,   1888),  14  of  positive  law  or  contrivances  for 

Atl.  Rep.  730;  Smith  v.  Brown,  151  inducing    a    person    to    commit    a 

Mass.  339;  United  States  v.  Sutton,  crime."     Uuited  States  v.  Whittier, 

21  How.  170,  175 ;  Lindauer  v.  Mey-  5  Dill.  39,  45,  by  Treat,  J. 
12 


178  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  [§  12S. 

for  robbing  the  mails,  or  for  a  violation  of  the  postal  or 
revenue  laws.  The  manner  in  which  the  evidence  has  been 
procured  will  not  be  inquired  into  by  the  court,  nor  should  it 
be  permitted  to  discredit  its  force  in  the  mind  of  the  jury.1 
In  the  case  of  an  indictment  for  sending  obscene  literature 
through  the  mails,  it  is  immaterial  that  the  evidence  against 
the  accused  consisted  of  certain  writings  sent  to  a  detective 
under  an  assumed  name.2  But  it  is  always  necessary  in  prose- 
cuting for  a  theft  of  mail  matter  that  the  decoy  letter  should 
have  become  a  part  thereof  by  deposit  in  the  mail  in  some  of 
the  ways  provided  by  the  postoffice  department.3 

§  128.  Spoliation  and  alteration  distinguished  —  Effect 
of  material  alterations. —  The  act  of  a  stranger  to  the  writ- 
ing resulting  in  its  alteration  or  mutilation  does  not  change 
its  legal  effect  if  the  writing  remains  legible  and  a  trace  of  the 
seal  can  be  seen  where  a  seal  is  required.4  Accordingly  the 
alteration  or  total  destruction  of  a  deed  or  other  writing  by  a 
stranger  has  no  other  effect  upon  the  rights  of  the  party  claim- 
ing under  it  than  to  compel  the  proof  of  its  loss  to  allow  the 
introduction  of  secondary  evidence  of  its  contents.5  But  a 
distinction  is  made  between  a  spoliation  by  a  stranger,  fre- 
quently done  accidentally,  and  for  which  the  innocent  party 
cannot  justly  be  called  upon  to  suffer  a  loss,  and  the  deliberate 
alteration  of  the  writing.  The  word  "  alteration "  as  thus 
used  does  not  refer  to  every  cancellation,  interlineation  or 

i  United  States  v.  Slenker.  32  Fed.  *  1  Greenl.  Evid.,  §  566. 

Rep.  694;   Speiden  v.  State,  3  Tex.  SQonsaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247 

A  pp.  156 ;  Wright  v.  State,  7  id.  574 ;  In  re  Leigh  (1892),  Prob.  82 ;  Cutts  v, 

United  States  v.  Rapp,  30  Fed.  Rep.  United   States,  1   Gall.  69 ;  Boyd  v 

818;  Saunders  v.    People,   38  Mich.  McConnell,   10   Humph.  (Tenn.)  68 

222 ;  United  States  v.  Cuttinghara,  2  United  States  v.  Spalding,  2  Mason 

Blatchf.  470 ;    People  v.   Collins,  53  478 ;  Boteler  v.  Dexter,  20  D.  C.  26 

Cal.   185;   State  v.  Jansen,   22  Kan.  Anthony    v.     Beal,    111     Mo.     637 

498;  People  v.  Noelke,  94  N.  Y.  137;  Marshal  v.  Yougler,  10  S.  &  R.  164 

Commonwealth  v.  Cohen,  127  Mass.  Raper    v.    Birkbeck,    15    East,    17 

282.  Nichols  v.  Johnson,  10   Conn.  192 

2  United  States  v.  Bott,  11  Blatchf.  White  Sew.  M.  Co.  v.  Dakin,  86  Mich 
346 ;  Bates  v.  United  States,  10  Fed.  581 ;  Davis  v.  Shafer,  50  Fed.  Rep.  74 
Rep.  92,  97-100.  Contra,  United  Wylie  v.  Miss.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  41  Fed 
States  v.  Whittier,  5  Dill.  39-41.  Rep.  623. 

3  United  States  v.  Rapp,   30  Fed. 
Rep.  822. 


§  128.]  PRIVATE   WRITINGS.  179 

erasure  made  in  the  instrument,  but  is  confined  to  those  by 
which  the  original  legal  significance  of  its  language  is  changed ; 
and  usually  to  those  changes  only  in  which  a  fraudulent  intent 
exists  or  may  be  implied  from  all  the  circumstances.1  Where 
such  an  alteration  is  shown  to  have  been  made  by  a  party,  the 
decisions  are  unanimous  in  supporting  the  rule  that  the  writ- 
ing, whether  under  seal  or  not,  is  thereby  made  void,  upon  the 
manifestly  just  principle  that  no  man  shall  be  allowed  to  act 
fraudulently  without  assuming  the  risk  of  losing  if  his  fraud 
is  detected.2  But  mere  memoranda  made  on  a  writing,3  or 
immaterial  alterations  by  which  the  writing  is  not  made  to 
convey  a  different  meaning  in  any  essential  respect,  will  not 
avoid  it,  provided  they  are  innocently  made.  So  where  terms 
are  inserted  by  a  party  which  the  law  would  supply,  or  which 
have  no  meaning,  his  act  will  not  be  a  material  alteration  or 
vitiate  the  whole  instrument.4  Where  an  alteration  is  fraudu- 
lently made  it  has  been  considered  to  be  of  no  importance 
whether  it  is  material,  the  presence  of  a  fraudulent  intent 
being  deemed  sufficient  to  avoid  the  writing.5 

In  the  discussion  of  the  alteration  of  writings  the  distinc- 
tion between  covenants  and  contracts  which  are  executed  and 

i  Express  Co.  v.  Aldine  Press,  126  7  N.  Y.  S.  98 ;  Bank  v.  Wolff,  79  Cal. 

Pa.  St.  347 ;  King  v.  Rea,  21  Pac.  Rep.  69 ;  Burrows  v.  Klunk,  70  Md.  451. 

1084 ;  Croswell  v.  Labree,  81  Me.  44  ;  The  materiality  of  the  alteration  is  a 

First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Carson,  60  Mich,  question  for  the  court.     Pritchard  v. 

432.  Smith,  77  Ga.  463 ;  Mclntyre  v.  Velte, 

2  Wegner  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  419 ;  153  Pa,  St.  350. 

Hollingsworth  v.   Holbrook    (Iowa,  3Maness  v.  Henry  (Ala.,  1893),  11 

1890),  45  N.  W.  Rep.  561 ;  Palmer  v.  S.  Rep.  470. 

Poore,    121     Ind.    135;    Flanigan    v.  4Swigart  v.  Weare,   37    111.  App. 

Phelps,  42  Minn.  186;  Sanders  v.  Bag-  258;    Reed    v.   Kemp,    16    111.    445; 

well  (S.  C,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  770;  Mach.  Co.  v.  Barry,  2  Misc.  Rep.  264 ; 

Bank  v.  Nickell,  34  Mo.  App.  295 ;  Hunt  v.  Adams,  6  Mass.  519 ;  Smith 

Wiseman  v.  Fleischer,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  v.  Crooker,  5  Mass.  538 ;  Fischer  v. 

R.  300  ;  Magers  v.  Dunlap,  39  111.  App.  King,  53  Pa,  St.  3 ;  Knapp  v.  Maltby, 

618 ;  Walton  v.  Campbell  (Neb.,  1892),  13  Wend.  5S7 :  Green  v.  Beckney,  3 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  883 ;  Gordon  v.  Bank,  Ind.  App.  39 ;  Bank  v.  Good,  44  Mo. 

144  U.  S.  97 ;  Sherwood  v.  Merritt,  83  App.    129 ;    Brown  v.   Purkham,  18 

Wis.  233 ;   Burnham   v.  Gosnell,  47  Pick.  172 ;  Magers  v.  Dunlap,  39  111. 

Mo.  App.  637 ;  Little  Rock  Trust  Co.  App.  618. 

v.  Martin,  21  S.  Rep.  468 ;  Croswell  v.  5 1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  568.  See  cases 

Labree,  81   Me.  44 ;  Clapp  v.  Collins,  supra;  Smith  v.  Dunbar,  8  Pick,  246. 


180 


PKIVATE    WKITINGS. 


[§  123. 


those  which  are  executory  merely  should  not  be  lost  sight  of.1 
Thus  in  the  case  of  a  deed  the  grantee  does  not  hold  his  title 
by  virtue  of  the  existence  of  the  deed,  which  is  now  only  the 
written  evidence  of  a  past  transaction,  and  after  his  estate  is 
once  vested  he  may  alter  or  destroy  the  deed  without  destroy- 
ing his  title  to  the  estate.2  But  the  deed,  where  it  has  been 
materially  altered  by  him  with  a  fraudulent  intent,  is  no 
longer  evidence  in  his  hands  in  any  proceedings  founded  upon 
its  covenants  or  agreements.3  Where  the  alteration  is  made 
before  delivery,4  or  after  delivery  with  the  consent  of  both 
parties,5  the  validity  of  the  instrument  will  not  be  affected. 
Where  a  power  of  attorney,6  deed7  or  custo,...s  bond8  or  an 
undertaking  on  appeal9  or  similar  instrument  is  intentionally 
executed  in  blank  as  to  subject-matter,  or  amount  or  name  of 
the  party,  and  is  subsequently  filled  in  by  one  of  the  parties, 
the  writing  will  be  valid  and  will  be  admissible  in  evidence.10 

i  Gleason  v.  Hamiltou,   138  N.  Y.  « Stewart  v.  Preston,  1  Fla.  10 ;  Bos- 

353.  ton  v.   Benson,  12  Cush.  (Mass.)  Gl ; 

-  If  the  alteration  was  made  before  Wright  v.  Wright,  7  N.  J.   L.   175; 

record,  where  record  is  necessary  to  Campbell    v.    McArthur,    2    Hawks 

vest  title  in  the  grantee,  the  altered  (N.    C),    33 ;  Britton    v.    Stanley,    4 


deed,  when  registered,  will  be  in- 
operative and  title  will  remain  in  the 
grantor.  Respess  v.  Jones,  102  N.  C.  5. 
3  Woods  v.  Hilderbrand,  46  Mo. 
284 ;  Wallace  v.  Harmstead,  44  Pa. 
St.  492;  Dana  v.  Newhall,  13  Mass. 
498  ;  Fletcher  v.  Memsur,  5  Ind.  267  ; 
Rifener  v.  Bowman,  53  Pa.  St  318 ; 
Bliss  v.  Mclntire,  18  Vt.  466;  Coit  v. 
Starkweather,  8  Conn.  289 ;  Com.  v. 
Hanson,  1  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  554 ;  1 
Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  568;  Holiis  v. 
Harris  (Ala.,  1893),  10  S.  Rep.  377; 
Jackson  v.  Gould,  7  Wend.  364 ;  Rus- 
sell v.  Longmore,  29  Neb.  286 ;  Arri- 
son  v.  Harmstead,  2  Ban-,  191 ; 
Hatch  v.  Hatch,  9  Mass.  307 ;  Mcln- 
tyre  v.  Velte,  153  Pa.  St.  350 ;  Whit- 
mer  v.   Fry,    10  Mo.   348;  Alkire  v. 


Whart.  (Pa.)  114;  Ravisies  v.  Alston, 
5  Ala.  297. 

5  Wooley  v.  Constant,  4  Johns.  54 ; 
Speake  v.  United  States,  9  Cranch, 
28;  Smith  v.  Weed,  20  Wend.  184; 
Berry  v.  Haines,  4  Wheat.  17 ;  Stiles 
v.  Probst,  69  111.  382 ;  Tompkins  v. 
Corinth,  9  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  255 ;  Jack- 
son v.  Johnson,  67  Ga.  187 ;  Collins 
v.  Collins,  51  Miss.  511;  Bassett  v. 
Bassett,  55  Me.  125. 

e  Egleton  v.  Gutteridge,  11  M.  &  W. 
468. 

•Cribben  v.  Deal,  21  Oreg.  211. 

8  Bank  v.  Kortright,  22  Wend. 
348. 

9  Ex  parte  Decker,  6  Cowen,  59. 

10  Christian  Co.  Bank  v.  Good,  44 
Mo.   App.  129 ;  Gordon   v.  Jeffery,  2 


Kahla,  123  111.  496.     So  it  has  been  Leigh  (Va.),  410 ;  Gilbert  v.  Anthony, 

held  that  the  grantee  will  not  be  per-  1   Yerg.   69 ;    Knapp  v.   Maltby,    13 

mitted   to  prove    the    covenant   by  Wend.  587 ;  Plank-road  Co.  v.  Wetsel, 

parol.     Martindale  v.  Follet,  1  N.  H.  21  Barb.  56 ;  Shelton  v.  Dealing,  10  B. 

9  j,  and  cases  supra.  Mon.  405.     See  remarks  of  Mr.  Jus- 


§  129.]  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  181 

Tf  a  person  through  inadvertence  and  negligently  issues  a 
negotiable  instrument  in  which  spaces  or  blanks  are  left,  af- 
fording an  opportunity  for  the  insertion  of  words  without 
exciting  suspicion,  and  the  note  is  altered,  the  writing  will  be 
evidence  against  the  maker  in  the  hands  of  a  dona  fide  holder 
for  value.1 

§  129.  Alterations  —  Presumptions  and  burden  cf  proof 
to  explain. —  When  an  instrument  offered  shows  alterations  or 
interlineations  on  its  face,  it  may  justly  be  regarded  with 
some  suspicion  and  the  party  claiming  under  it  should  be  com- 
pelled to  account  for  its  altered  condition.2  This  he  may  do 
by  slight  evidence  if  upon  examination  the  alteration  is  noted 
in  the  attestation  clause  as  having  been  made  prior  to  or  con- 
temporaneously with  its  execution,  or  if  the  alteration  is> 
against  his  interest.3  Whether  any  presumption  exists  as  to 
the  date  of  an  unexplained  alteration  in  a  deed  or  similar 
writing  the  courts  are  divided.  It  has  been  held  that,  as  fraud 
will  not  be  presumed,  an  alteration  in  an  instrument  inter 
vivos  will,  in  the  absence  of  suspicious  circumstances,  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  made  before  delivery.4  On  the  other 
hand,  other  decisions  deny  the  existence  of  any  presumption,5 

tice  Johnson  in  Duncan  v.  Hughes,     Bailey  v.  Taylor,  11  Conn.  531 ;  Coul- 

I  McCord,  239,  240.  son  v.  Walton,  9  Pet.  62;    Russell  v. 

1  Brown  v.  Phelan,  2  Swan  (Tenn.),  Longmore,  29  Neb.  209 ;  Zitnmer- 
629 ;  Meikel  v.   Savings   Institution,     man  v.  Camp,  155  Pa.  St.  352. 

36  Ind.  355;  Bechtel's  Appeal  (Pa.,  •*Stillwell  v.  Patton,  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
1890),  19  Atl.  Rep.  412 ;  Beaman  v.  1075 ;  108  Mo.  353 ;  Boothby  v.  Stan- 
Russell,  20  Vt.  205 :  Bailey  v.  Taylor,  ley,  34  Me.  515 ;    No.  Riv.    Meadow 

II  Conn.  531;  McCormick  v.  Fitz-  Co.  v.  Shrewsbury  Church,  2  N.  J.  Eq. 
morris,  39  Mo.  34;  Muckleroy  v.  424;  Houston  v.  Jordan,  82  "Tex.  352; 
Bethany,  27  Tex.  551.  Dow  v.  Jeurl,  18  N.  H.  356;  Gallaud 

2  Elgin  v.  Hall,  82  Va.  680;  Hess'  v.  Jackman,  26  Cal.  85 ;  United  States 
Appeal,  26  W.  N.  C.  121 ;  Capehart  v.  Linn,  1  How.  104 ;  Harding  v. 
v.  Mills  (Ala.,  1893);  Johnson  v.  Bank,  81  Iowa,  499 ;  Bedgood  v.  Mc- 
First  Mar.  B.  R.  28  Neb.  492 ;  Tillon  Lain,  89  Ga.  793 ;  Jackson  v.  Osborn, 
v.  Insurance  Co.,  7  Barb.  564 ;  Stay-  2  Wend.  555. 

ner  v.  Joyce,  120  Ind.  99 ;  Hartley  v.  5  Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  §  790 ;  Wilde  v. 

Carboy,  150  Pa.  St.  23;  Newcome  v.  Armsby,  6  Cush.  314;  Comstock  v. 

Presbury,    8    Met.    406;    Nesbitt    v.  Smith,    26    Mich.    306;     Knight    v. 

Turner,  155  Pa.  St.   429.     As  to  ex-  Clement,  8   A.   &  E.   215 ;    Herrick 

pert  evidence  to  explain  alterations,  v.  Maliu,  22  Wend.   388 ;  Beaman  v. 

see  §  141.  Russell,  20  Vt.  205 ;  Bailey  v.  Taylor, 

3  In  re  Carver,  23  N.   Y.   S.   753;  11  Conn.  531;  Hunting  v.  Finch,  3 


182 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  129. 


and  leave  it  for  the  jury  to  decide  where  and  when  the  altera- 
tion occurred.1 

A  will,  unlike  a  deed,  is  subject  to  change  until  the  death 
of  the  testator.  It  is  also  customary  for  persons  to  alter  their 
wills  after  execution ;  and  for  this  reason,  unattested  altera- 
tions are,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  showing  when  they  were 
made,  presumed  to  have  been  made  subsequent  to  execution 
of  the  will2  or  codicil,  if  the  latter  does  not  expressly  refer  to 
them.3  >*r*1  '*"  -( 

In  regard  to  alterations  in  other  instruments,  no  presump- 
tions as  to  their  date  are  generally  recognized.  But  where  it 
is  shown  that  a  note  has  been  altered  after  execution,  it  will 
be  presumed  to  have  been  done  fraudulently  4  and  without 
the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the  maker ; 5  and  a  party  pro- 
ducing and  claiming  under  such  an  instrument  will  have  the 
burden  of  proof  cast  upon  him  to  explain  every  material  al- 
teration that  would  be  in  his  favor.6 


Ohio,  445 ;  Jordan  v.  Stewart,  23  Pa. 
St  244. 

iMcCormick  v.  Fitzmorris,  39  Mo. 
34  "  In  the  absence  of  proof  the  pre- 
sumption is  that  a  correction  by 
erasure  in  a  deed  was  made  before 
execution.  This  doctrine  rests  upon 
principle ;  and  a  deed  cannot  be 
altered  after  it  is  executed  without 
fraud  or  wrong.  The  cases  are  not 
uniform,  but  the  most  stringent  ones 
leave  the  question  to  the  jury."  Lit- 
tle v.  Herndon,  10  Wall.  31. 

2  Wetrhore'  v.  Curry,  5  Redf.  544; 
Wright  v.  Wright,  5  Ind.  389 ;  Dyer 
v.  Irving,  2  Dem.  160;  Wheeler  v. 
Bent.  7  Pick.  61. 

» Rowley  v.  Merlin,  6  Jur.  (N.  S.) 
1165.  A  will  found  mutilated  is  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  torn  after  its 
execution.  Christmas  v.  Whingates, 
32  L.  J.  Prob.  73.  "  To  draw  cross- 
lines  over  the  face  of  an  instrument 
is  a  common  mode  of  showing  an 
intention  thereby  to  make  an  end  of 
it.  In  earlier  times,  when  few  per- 
sons could  write,  the  mass  of  men 


could  manifest  their  intention  with 
pen  and  ink  only  by  unlettered  marks. 
When  the  instrument  is  so  marked 
by  the  maker  as  to  show  clearly  that 
the  act  was  designed  to  be  a  can- 
celing, that  act  becomes  effectual  as 
a  revocation."  Warner  v.  Warner's 
Estate,  37  Vt.  362-63. 

4  Robinson  v.  Reed,  46  Iowa,  220; 
Shroeder  v.  Webster  (Iowa,  1893),  55 
N.  W.  Rep.  569. 

5 See  cases  in  last  note;  Soaks  v. 
Eichberg,  42  111.  App.  375 ;  Croswell 
v.  Labree,  81  Me.  44. 

6  Hill  v.  Nelmes,  86  Ala.  442 ;  Wilde 
v.  Armsby,  6  Cush.  (Mass.)  314; 
Knight  v.  Clements,  8  A.  &  El.  215; 
Hartley  v.  Carboy,  150  Pa.  St.  23; 
Hills  v.  Barnes,  11  N.  H.  395 ;  Nesbitt 
v.  Turner,  155  Pa.  St.  429;  Hum- 
phreys v.  Guillow,  13  N.  H.  385; 
Clark  v.  Eckstein,  22  Pa.  St.  507; 
Printup  v.  Mitchell,  17  Ga.  558; 
Mathews  v.  Coalter,  9  Mo.  705 ;  Bar- 
ringer  v.  Bank,  14  S.  &  R.  405; 
Beaman  v.  Russell,  20  Vt.  205. 


§  130.] 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


183 


Substantial  identity  of  name  as  a  rule  creates  a  presumption 
of  identity  of  person,1  which  is  rebuttable  by  slight  circum- 
stances, as  by  a  difference  of  a  single  letter,2  or  where  to  sup- 
port the  presumption  it  is  necessary  to  impeach  the  presump- 
tive correctness  of  records  of  a  court  of  law.3 

§  130.  Private  writings  lost  or  destroyed. —  Where  a 
party's  right  or  title  is  founded  upon  a  private  writing,  in- 
cluding under  that  term  deeds  of  release  and  conveyances, 
bonds,  promissory  notes  and  other  evidences  of  indebtedness, 
he  will  be  required  to  produce  it  in  evidence  or  to  account 
satisfactorily  for  its  absence.4  In  case  it  is  alleged  to  be  lost 
or  destroyed,  the  party  will  be  required  to  show  by  clear 
proof  that  the  paper  once  existed,5  and  that  a  careful  and 
bona  fide  search  has  been  made  for  it  without  success.  The 
circumstances  of  the  search  having  been  thus  shown  prima 
facie,  the  oath  of  the  party  that  the  instrument  is  lost  or 
destroyed  is  admissible  and  must  be  introduced.6 


1  Stallings  v.  Whitaker,  55  Ark. 
404;  Tausig  v.  Glenn,  51  Fed.  Rep. 
409 ;  Simonsen  v.  Dolan  (Mo.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  510;  Guestin  v.  Mom- 
bleu  (111.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  49; 
Galv.  etc.  Co.  v.  Daniels,  1  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  695 ;  State  v.  McGuire,  87  Mo. 
642;  People  v.  Rolfe,  61  Cal.  541; 
Hatcher  v.  Rochelaw,  18  N.  Y.  87 ; 
Grindle  v.  Stone,  78  Me.  176 ;  Bell  v. 
Brewster,  44  Ohio  St.  690.  Parties 
named  in  deeds  constituting  a  chain 
of  title  are  presumed  to  be  the  same 
pei-sons  who  claim  under  it.  Cross 
v.  Martin,  46  Vt.  14;  Chamble  v. 
Martin,  27  Tex.  139.  Of  two  persons 
of  the  same  name  mentioned  it  is 
presumed  that  the  elder  is  meant. 
Bennett  v.  Libhart,  27  Mich.  489; 
Brown  v.  Metz,  33  111.  339 ;  Getts  v. 
Watson,  18  Mo.  274 ;  Cates  v.  Lof  tus, 
3  A.  K  Marsh.  202. 

2Burford  v.  McCue,  53  Pa.  St.  427 ; 
Gonzalia  v.  Bartelman  (111.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  532 ;  Bennett  v.  Libhart, 
27  Mich.  489 ;  Howard  v.  Lock  (Ky., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  332. 


3  Bryan  v.  Kales  (Ariz.,  1893),  31 
Pac.  Rep.  517.  The  middle  name  or 
its  initial  is  no  part  of  a  person's 
name.  Long  v.  Campbell,  37  W.  Va. 
665 ;  Johnson  v.  Day,  2  N.  D.  295. 

*  §§  30-34. 

5  Gorgas  v.  Hertz,  150  Pa.  St.  538. 
So  it  has  been  said  that  the  lost  in- 
strument must  be  proved  to  have 
been  executed,  though  strict  proof  of 
the  act  of  execution  would  perhaps 
be  dispensed  with  if  its  existence  as 
a  valid  and  binding  obligation  was 
shown.  Gillis  v.  Wilmington  R.  Co., 
13  S.  E.  Rep.  11 ;  Johnson  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  90  Ala.  505 ;  Kelsey  v. 
Hanmer,  18  Conn.  311 ;  Porter  v. 
Ferguson,  4  Fla.  102;  Wakefield  v. 
Day,  41  Minn.  344 ;  Irving  v.  Camp- 
bell, 56  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  224. 

6  Patterson  v.  Winn,  5  Pet.  240; 
Bingham  v.  Hyland,  6  N.  Y.  S.  75 ; 
Lynn  v.  Morse,  76  Iowa,  665;  Du- 
lany  v.  Walsh,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  131 ; 
Riggs  v.  Tayloe,  9  Wheat.  486 ;  Page 
v.  Page,  15  Pick.  368;  Shirley  v. 
Dewey,  17  Ohio,   156 ;  Chamberlain 


184 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  130. 


"Whether  the  loss  or  destruction  of  the  instrument  is  satis- 
factorily shown  is  a  preliminary  question  for  the  court.  The 
amount  of  diligence  required  depends  largely,  if  not  wholly, 
upon  the  circumstances  of  each  case  as  it  arises,  less  diligence 
being  demanded  where  the  document  is  old  or  where  it  was 
presumed  to  be  of  little  value.1  As  a  rule  it  is  necessary  that 
the  loss  or  destruction  of  the  instrument  should  be  shown 
before  parol  proof  can  be  received  of  its  contents.2 

This  rule  should  be  taken  with  some  modification,  as  it  is 
usually  necessary  to  state,  though  not  precisely,  some  of  the 
contents  of  the  instrument  as  descriptive  of  it.3  Where  the 
lost  instrument  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder  would  be 
valid  against  the  maker  though  he  had  been  compelled  to  pay 
its  amount,  the  proof  of  its  loss  or  destruction  must  be  of 
sufficient  cogency  to  convince  the  court  and  jury  upon  all  the 
circumstances  that  the  maker  will  not  be  compelled  to  pay  it 
again.4  But  in  modern  practice  the  requirement  that  the 
plaintiff  shall  give  security  to  reimburse  the  defendant  in  case 


v.  Gorham,  20  Johns.  144;  Bigelow 
v.  Summers,  28  Fla.  759.  Of.  Over- 
and  v.  Menczer,  83  Tex.  122;  An- 
thony v.  Beale,  111  Mo.  637. 

1  Jameson  v.  Snyder  (Wis.,  1890), 
48  N.  W.  Rep.  261 ;  Glassell  v.  Mason, 
32  Ala.  719 ;  Page  v.  Page,  15  Pick. 
368 ;  Blalock  v.  Miland,  87  Ga.  573 ; 
Bachelder  v.  Nutting,  16  N.  H.  261 ; 
Woodworth  v.  Barker,  1  Hill,  176; 
Kelsey  v.  Hanmei',  18  Conn.  311 ; 
Bruns  v.  Close,  9  Colo.  225 ;  Bohart  v. 
Chamberlain,  99  Mo.  622. 

^McClure  v.  Campbell  (Neb.,  1888), 
40  N.  W.  Rep.  595;  Roehl  v.  Han- 
messer,  114  Ind.  311 ;  Georgia,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Strickland,  80  Ga.  776  ;  6  S.  E.  Rep. 
27:  Woods  v.  Burke,  67  Mich.  674; 
35  N.  W.  Rep.  768 ;  Columbus,  etc.  v. 
Tillman,  79  Ga.  607 ;  5  S.  E.  Rep.  135 ; 
Smith  v.  Lindsay,  89  Mo.  76 ;  Cham- 
berlain v.  Boon,  74  Tex.  659 ;  Nichols 
v.  Howe,  43  Minn.  181 ;  Mugge  v. 
Adams,  76  Tex,  448 ;  Brown  v.  Grif- 
fith, 70  Cal.  14 ;  Ross  v.  Goodwin,  88 
Ala.  390 ;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brown, 


44  Kan.  384 ;  Simpson  v.  Walby,  63 
Mich.  439;  Terpening  v.  Holton,  9 
Colo.  306 ;  Wolff  v.  Mathews,  39  Mo. 
App.  376;  Phillips  v.  Trow.  Fur.  Co.. 
86  Ga.  699;  Kilgore  v.  Stanley,  90 
Ala.  523;  Ebersole  v.  Rankin,  102 
Mo.  488 ;  Rush  v.  French,  1  Ariz.  99 ; 
Ford  v.  Cunningham,  87  Cal.  209.  A 
careful  search  in  the  place  where  the 
document  was  last  seen,  was  usually 
kept  or  is  most  likely  to  be  found  is 
sufficient.  Bruns  v.  Close,  9  Colo.  225  ; 
Henry  v.  Diviney,  101  Mo.  378 ;  Foot 
v.  Silliman,  77  Tex.  268. 

3Flinn  v.  McGonigle,  9  W.  &  S. 
(Pa.)  75  ;  Bouldin  v.  Massie,  7  Wheat. 
122, 154, 155 ;  Tetes  v.  Volmer,  58  Hun, 
1 ;  Crain  v.  Huntington,  81  Tex.  614; 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  243. 

4Anderson  v.  Roleson,  2  Bay,  495 ; 
Rowley  v.  Ball,  3  Cowen,  303 ;  Du- 
laney  v.  Walsh,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  131 ; 
Swift  v.  Stevens,  8  Conn.  431 ;  Lan- 
bach  v.  Mires,  141  Pa.  St.  447 ;  Boteler 
v.  Dexter,  20  D.  C.  26 ;  Hill  v.  Bub, 
35  Neb.  524. 


131.] 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


1S5 


an  instrument  lost  before  maturity  shall  be  found  would  per- 
haps dispense  with  this  requirement.1 
§131.  Handwriting  defined  —  Signature  by  mark. —  By 

the  term  "  handwriting"  is  meant  not  only  handwriting  com- 
monly so  called,  but  every  mark  made  upon  paper,  parchment 
or  similar  substance  by  which  the  mental  state  of  the  person 
writing  is  revealed  to  others.2  It  is  well  settled  that  a  mark 
is  equivalent  to  a  signature  for  all  purposes  for  which  the  latter 
may  be  required,3  even  though  the  marksman  is  able  to  write.* 
And  generally,  where  a  mark  is  affixed  to  a  writing  not  re- 
quiring attestation  or  subscription  by  witnesses,  its  execution 
may  be  proved  by  the  evidence  of  one  who  saw  the  party 
write  his  mark  or  by  the  admission  of  the  party  himself.5 

Though  a  subscribing  witness  may  prove  his  own  signature 
by  mark,6  ordinarily  it  is  necessary  that  his  signature  should 
be  written  by  himself  or  some  one  for  him ;  for  while  the 
handwriting  of  a  subscribing  witness  may  be  proved  in  his 
absence  by  ordinary  methods,7  his  mark  alone  cannot  be  thus 


i  Means  v.  Kimball,  35  Neb.  G93 ; 
Bloomingtou  v.  Smith,  23  N.  E.  Rep. 
972. 

2  Lyon  v.  Lyman,  9  Conn.  55  ;  Com. 
v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  (Mass.)  305 ;  Rex 
v.  Cator,  4  Esp.  117. 

STiedeman  on  R.  P.  876;  Wil- 
loughby  v.  Moulton,  47  N.  H.  205; 
Worden  v.  Van  Gieston,  6  Dem.  (N. 
Y.  Sur.)  237 ;  State  v.  Byrd,  93  N.  C. 
624 ;  Paisley  v.  Snipes,  2  Brev.  (S.  C.) 
200;  Osborne  v.  Cook,  11  Cush.  532; 
Lord  v.  Lord,  58  N.  H.  7  ;  Chappee  v. 
Baptist  Miss.  Con.,  10  Paige,  85.  The 
seal  of  a  corporation  is  at  common 
law  its  signature,  and,  in  the  absence 
of  statute,  it  is  not  necessary  that  its 
deed  should  be  signed  with  the  cor- 
porate name.  Sealing  and  delivery 
are  the  only  indispensable  require- 
ments to  the  valid  execution  of  a 
conveyance  by  a  corporation.  Ang. 
&  Ames,  Corp.,  §  225  ;  City  v.  Shaw- 
han,  9  Am.  &  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  556 ; 
Flint  v.  Clinton,  12  N.  H.  430 ;  Gor- 
don v.  Preston,  1  Watts  (Pa.),  385 ; 


Osborne  v.  Tunis,  1  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  633 ; 
Tenney  v.  East  Warren,  etc.  Co.,  43 
N.  H.  343;  Frankfort  v.  Anderson, 
3  A.  K.  Marsh.  932;  Beckwith  v. 
Windsor  Co.,  14  Conn.  594. 

*  Baker  v.  Denning,  8  A.  &  E.  94; 
Barnard  v.  Heydrick,  49  Barb.  68 ;  1 
Whart.  Evid.,  §  696. 

5  State  v.  Byrd,  93  N.  C.  624; 
Thompson  v.  Davitt,  59  Ga.  472; 
Jones  v.  Hough,  77  Ala.  437 ;  Eichel- 
berger  v.  Sifford,  27  Md.  320 ;  Robin- 
son v.  Robinson,  20  S.  C.  567 ;  Fogg 
v.  Dennis,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.)  47; 
Shank  v.  Butsch,  28  Ind.  19;  Bal- 
linger  v.  Davis,  29  Iowa,  512;  San- 
born v.  Cole,  63  Vt.  590. 

«  Thompson  v.  Davitte,  59  Ga.  472. 

7  McDermott  v.  McCormack,  4 
Harr.  (Del.)  543;  Engles  v.  Bruing- 
ton,  4  Yeates  (Pa.).  345 ;  Lyons  v. 
Holmes,  11  S.  C.  429;  Devereux  v. 
McMahan,  102  N.  C.  284;  Bussy  v. 
Whitaker,  2  Nott  &  McC.  (S.  C.)  374; 
Maine  v.  Ryder,  84  Pa.  St.  217. 


ISO  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  [§§  132,  133. 

proved,1  and  is  only  valid  as  a  signature  when,  after  having 
made  his  mark,  his  name  is  affixed  by  some  one  in  his  presence 
with  his  assent  or  by  his  request.2 

§  132.  Production  of  writing,  when  necessary. —  The 
character  of  the  evidence  required  in  the  proof  of  handwrit- 
ing, the  principles  which  govern  its  production  and  the  com- 
petency of  the  witnesses  are  essentially  the  same  in  criminal 
and  civil  cases.3  But  this  rule  is  to  be  considered  in  the  light 
of  the  doctrine  that  while  a  preponderance  of  evidence  may 
suffice  in  a  civil  cause  in  a  prosecution  for  a  crime,  the  pre- 
sumption of  innocence  obtains  and  the  prisoner  must  be  given 
the  benefit  of  every  reasonable  doubt.4  Under  ordinary  cir- 
cumstances the  document  whose  handwriting  is  in  question 
must  be  produced;  but  where  its  production  is  impossible  for 
any  valid  reason,  it  will  be  dispensed  with,  and  if  its  existence 
is  satisfactorily  proved  and  its  absence  is  accounted  for,  the 
handwriting  may  be  proved  by  a  witness  who  saw  the  party 
write,  or  who  being  familiar  with  his  writing  has  seen  the  lost 
instrument.5 

§  133,  Proof  by  admissions  of  party. —  That  mode  of  prov- 
ing handwriting  which  is  the  most  simple  and  convincing  is 
by  the  testimony  of  the  writer  himself  upon  the  witness  stand, 
after  he  has  inspected  the  writing.6     If  the  execution  of  the 

i  Watts   v.   Kilburn,    7    Ga.    356 ;  60    Tex.   506.     Where    the    original 

Carrier  v.  Hampton,  11  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.)  writing  is  procurable  it  is  error  to 

307 ;  Gilliam  v.  Parkinson,  4  Rand,  admit  a  photograph    of    it.     Crane 

(Va.)  325;  Stevens  v.   Van  Cleve,  4  v.  Dexter,   5   Wash.    St.   479.      This 

Wash.  C.  C.  262;  Allen  v.  Mass,  27  rule  was  applied   in  the  trial  of  an 

Mo.  354.  indictment  for    forgery   where    the 

2  Jesse  v.  Parker,  6  Gratt.  57;  Up-  prosecution  was  unable  to  produce 
church  v.  Upchurch,  16  B.  Mon.  102 ;  the  writing  alleged  to  have  been 
Lord  v.  Lord,  58  N.  H.  7.  forged.     State    v.   Brackenridge,   67 

3  De  La  Motte's  Case,  21  How.  St.  Iowa,  204 ;  State  v.  Shinbone,  46 
Tr.  810 ;  Hammond's  Case,  2  Greenl.  N.  H.  497 ;  Hahn  v.  State,  13  Tex. 
33;  11  Am.  Dec.  39.  App.  383. 

4  See  §§  5-7.  6  McCaskle  v.  Amarine,  12  Ala.  17 ; 
s  Abbot  v.  Coleman,  22  Kan.  250 ;     Smith  v.  Prescott,  17  Me.  277 ;  Mc- 

Bigham    v.    Coleman,    71   Ga.    176 ;  Cully  v.  Malcolm,  9  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

Bradley's  Adm'r  v.  Long,  2  Strobh.  187;  Royce  v.  Gazan,  76  Ga.  79;  Lef- 

(S.  C.)   100;  Bruce  v.  Crews,  39   Ga.  ferts  v.   State,  49  N.  J.  Law,  26.     A 

544;  Porter  v.  Wilson  et  at,  13  Pa.  witness  will  not  be  allowed  to  testify 

St.  641 ;  Nuckols'  Adm'r  v.  Jones,  8  that  the  party  admitted  the  genuine- 

Gratt.  (Va.)  267 ;  Houston  v.  Blythe,  ness  of  his  signature  to  another  writ- 


131.] 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


187 


instrument  is  not  denied,  evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  the 
handwriting  is  not  required,  and  an  objection  not  taken  at 
the  time  is  deemed  waived  and  unavailable  on  appeal.1  So  in 
some  of  the  states  the  denial  of  the  authenticity  of  the  instru- 
ment is  required  to  be  in  writing2  verified  by  affidavit  of  the 
party.3  If  he  denies  that  he  wrote  or  executed  the  instru- 
ment, its  genuineness  may  be  proved  by  the  testimony  of  any 
competent  witness  who  was  present  and  saw  him  write  it,4  or 
by  evidence  of  his  extra-judicial  admissions  made  verbally  or 
by  conduct  that  he  executed  it,5  whether  made  before  or  per- 
haps after  the  action  was  begun."  Such  an  admission  is  never 
conclusive  unless  fraudulently  made,  or  unless  it  was  relied 
and  acted  upon  to  the  extent  that  it  will  constitute  an  estop- 
pel in  pais.1 

§  131.  When  proof  of  handwriting  may  be  dispensed 
with  — Acknowledgments. —  If,  as  is  the  case  in  many  states, 
deeds  or  other  instruments  are  made  by  statute  prima  facie 
evidence  when  duly  acknowledged  or  recorded,  proof  of  hand- 
writing or  execution  by  subscribing  witnesses  or  others  is 
unnecessary.8 


iug  aud  that  such  signature  is  pre- 
cisely similar  to  the  one  disputed. 
Second  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wentzel,  151 
Pa.  St.  142. 

1  Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Cochran,  3  Mart. 
(La.)  353,  360 ;  National  Union  Bank 
of  Swanton  v.  Marsh,  46  Vt.  443. 
This  is  the  statute  law  in  many  states. 
Coler  v.  County  (N.  M.,  1892),  27  Pac. 
Rep.  619. 

2  Smith  v.  King  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N. 
W.  Rep.  88 ;  Clark's  Ex'rs  v.  Coch- 
ran, 3  Mart.  (La.)  353,  360 ;  National 
Union  Bank  of  Swanton  v.  Marsh,  46 
Vt.  443. 

3Bestor  v.  Roberts,  58  Ala.  331; 
Duncan  v.  Brown,  15  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
186 ;  Smith  v.  Elmert,  47  Wis.  479. 

4  Bayly  v.  Fourchy,  32  La.  Ann. 
136 ;  Robinson  v.  Arnet,  15  La.  262 ; 
Com.  v.  Nefus,  135  Mass.  533;  Bank 
v.  Marsh,  46  Vt.  443;  Bowman  v. 
Sanborn,  25  N.  H.  87. 


5  Shaver  v.  Ehle,  16  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
201;  State  v.  Byrd,  93  N.  C.  624; 
Glazier  v.  Streamer,  57  111.  91. 

6  Philadelphia,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hickman, 
28  Pa.  St.  318.  • 

i  See  ante,  §§  82-84;  Salem  Bank 
v.  Gloucester  Bank,  17  Mass.  1,  27 ; 
Helmsley  v.  Loader,  2  Campb.  450; 
Bell  v.  Shields,  4  Hair.  (19  N.  J.)  93 ; 
Cohen  v.  Teller,  93  Pa.  St.  123 ;  Dow's 
Ex'rs  v.  Spinney's  Ex'rs,  29  Mo.  386 ; 
Weed  et  al.  v.  Carpenter,  4  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  219;  Hammond  v.  Varian,  54 
N.  Y.  398. 

8  "An  acknowledgment  regular  on 
its  face  makes  the  instrument  evi- 
dence without  further  proof.  The 
exact  words  of  the  statute  need  not 
be  followed;  it  is  sufficient  if  the 
meaning  be  clearly  and  fully  ex- 
pressed." Wickersham  v.  Reeves,  1 
Iowa,  417;  Fenton  v.  Miller,  94  Mich. 
204;  Parroski  v.  Goldberg,  80  Wis. 


188 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  135. 


If,  as  is  the  case  in  this  country,  a  deed  must  be  properly 
acknowledged  to  obtain  record,  one  which  is  not  so  acknowl- 
edged will  not  be  valid  as  against  bona  fide  purchasers  for 
value  and  without  notice.  But  an  unrecorded  deed,  or  one 
improperly  acknowledged,  is  always  valid,  as  between  the 
parties  and  all  others  having  actual  or  constructive  notice 
thereof,1  and  may  be  read  in  evidence  in  any  action  between 
the  parties  or  their  privies  on  proof  by  witnesses.2 

§  135.  Who  may  take  acknowledgments. —  Acknowledg- 
ments are  generally  taken  by  notaries  public,  commissioners 
or  other  officials  designated  by  statute.  A  de  facto  official,3 
or  a  deputy  acting  for  and  signing  in  the  name  of  his  princi- 
pal,4 and  sometimes  where  he  signs  in  his  own  name,5  may 
take  an  acknowledgment.  So  it  has  been  held  the  fact  that 
an  official  who  possesses  statutory  authority  to  take  acknowl- 
edgments is  also  an  attesting  witness,6  a  relative  of7  or  attor- 
ney  for  the  grantor,8  or  is  himself   the  grantee,9  does  not 

399;  Holbrook  v.  New  Jersey  Zinc  2 Shaffer  v.  Halm,  111  N.  C.  l-t 
Co.,  57  N.  Y.  624;  N.  Y.  Phar.  Ass'n  Trenwith  v.  Smallwood,  111  N.  C. 
v.  Tilden,  14  Fed.  Rep.  740 ;  Hough-  132 ;  Beaman  v.  Whitney,  20  Me.  413. 
ton  v.  Jones,  1  Wall.  (U.  S.)  702.  Of.  3  Woodruff  v.  McHarry,  56  111.  218; 
Blackman  v.  Riley,  63  Hun,  521 ;  28  Hamilton  v.  Pitcher,  53  Mo.  354. 
Abb.  N.  C.  126.  A  state  grant  under  4  Cook  v.  Knott,  28  Tex.  85 ;  Gib- 
seal  is  admissible  as  evidence  with- 
out acknowledgment  where  no  stat- 
ute requires  it.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Keegan,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  550.  In  the  ab- 
sence of  statute  an  acknowledgment 
does  not  dispense  with  proof  of  exe- 
cution (Mullis  v.  Cairns,  5  Blackf. 
(Ind.)  77),  which  may  be  shown  by 
the  testimony  of  the  party  before 
whom  the  acknowledgment  was 
made.  Kidd's  Adm'r  v.  Alexander, 
1  Rand.  (Va.)  456;  Eichelberger  v. 
Sifford,  27  Md.  320. 

i  Bacon  v.  Railroad  Co.,  131  U.  S. 
258 ;  Shotwell  v.  Harrison,  22  Mich. 
410 ;  Banbury  v.  Sheerin  (S.  D.,  1893), 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  723;  Mankin  v.  Era- 
mons,  47  Mo.  306 ;  Ellison  v.  Wilson, 
36  Vt.  67;  Cable  v.  Cable,  146  Pa. 
St.  451 ;  Sicard  v.  Peters,  6  Pet.  136; 
Forrester  v.  Parker,  14  Daly,  208; 
Maun  v,  State,  46  Ind.  383, 


bons  v.  Gentry,  20  Mo.  468 ;  Hope  v. 
Sawyer,  14  111.  254  ;  Gordon  v.  Leech, 
81  Ky.  229;  Emmal  v.  Webb,  36  Cal. 
203;  Lynch  v.  Livingston,  8  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  463. 

s  Talbot  v.  Houser,  12  Bush  (Ky.), 
408;  Touchard  v.  Crow,  20  Cal.  150; 
McCraven  v.  McGuire,  23  Miss.  100 ; 
Herndon  v.  Reed,  82  Tex.  647;  Sum- 
mer v.  Mitchell,  29  Fla.  179 ;  Coltrane 
v.  Lamb,  109  N.  C.  209. 

e  Baird  v.  Evans,  58  Ga.  350. 

■  Lynch  v.  Livingston,  6  N.  Y.  433 ; 
Remington  Co.  v.  Dougherty,  81  id. 
474. 

s  Romanes  v.  Frazier,  16  Grant 
(U.  C),  97. 

9  Bennett  v.  Shipley,  82  Mo.  448. 
Contra,  Jones  v.  Porter,  59  Miss.  628 ; 
Tavener  v.  Barrett,  21  W.  Va.  658. 


§  136.] 


PKIVATE    WRITINGS. 


189 


Invalidate  the  acknowledgment.  The  majority  of  the  cases 
hold,  however,  that  an  acknowledgment  taken  by  an  official 
who  is  personally  interested  is  invalid.1  An  acknowledgment 
received  by  a  notary  or  other  official  act  done  out  of  his  ter- 
ritorial jurisdiction,2  or  after  his  term  of  office  has  expired/ 
is  invalid. 

The  venue  should  always  appear  in  the  bod}r  of  the  certifi- 
cate,4 or  in  its  caption  or  notarial  seal,5  though  if  it  is  not 
stated  the  defect  may  be  remedied  by  a  reference  to  the  in- 
strument itself;6  and  where  no  place  is  given,  if  the  certificate 
is  otherwise  regular  and  the  power  of  the  notary  to  take 
acknowledgments  is  not  disputed,  it  may  be  presumed  that 
he  acted  within  his  jurisdiction.7 

§  136.  The  certificate. —  This,  in  the  absence  of  fraud,  duress 
or  a  failure  to  obey  some  express  statutory  requirement,  is 
usually  conclusive  as  to  all  facts  stated  in  it,8  and  fraud,  if 
alleged,  must  be  clearly  shown.9    The  body  of  the  certificate,10 

i  Bank  v.  Radtke  (Iowa,  1393),  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  435 ;  Davis  v.  Beazley,  75 
Va.  491 ;  Green  v.  Abraham,  43  Ark. 
420 ;  Hogans  v.  Caruth,  18  Fla.  587 ; 
Hammers  v.  Dole,  61  111.  307 ;  Was- 
son  v.  Connor,  54  Miss.  352 ;  Brown 
v.  Moore,  38  Tex.  645 ;  Dail  v.  Moore, 
51  Mo.  589.  The  grantor  cannot  take 
his  own  acknowledgment.  Beaman 
v.  Whitney,  22  Me.  413;  Davis  v. 
Beazley,  supra;  Freeman  v.  Person, 
106  N.  C.  251. 

2  Thurman  v.  Cameron,  24  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  91 ;  Mut  Ins.  Co.  v.  Carey,  54 
Hun,  493;  Hedges  v.  Ward,  15  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  106 ;  Jones  v.  Reardon,  3 
Md.  Ch.  57 ;  Hughes  v.  Wilkinson,  37 
Miss.  482 ;  Harris  v.  Burton,  4  Harr. 
(Del.)  66. 

a  Carlisle  v.  Carlisle,  78  Ala.  542; 
Quimby  v.  Boyd,  8  Cal.  194;  Gal- 
braith  v.  Gallivan,  78  Mo.  452 ;  Goody- 
koontz  v.  Olsen,  54  Iowa,  174. 

«  Willard  v.  Cramer,  36  Iowa,  22 ; 
Dunlap  v.  Dougherty,  20  111.  397. 

5  Chiniquy  v.  Catholic  Bishop,  41 
111.  148;  Adams  v.  Medsker,  25  W. 
Va.  128;  Sidwell  v.  Birney,  69  Mo. 
144;  Wright  v.  Wilson,  17  Mich.  192. 


STrulick  v.  Peeples,  1  Ga.  3; 
Brooks  v.  Chaplin,  3  Vt.  281 ;  Fuhr- 
man  v.  Loudon,  13  S.  &  R  386. 

"Seejwst,  §§  231,  232;  Morrison  v. 
White,  16  La.  Ann.  100;  Sidwell  v. 
Birney,  69  Mo.  144;  Carpenter  v. 
Dexter,  8  Wall.  (IT.  S.)  513;  Douglas 
v.  Carmean,  49  Kan.  674 ;  Chamber- 
lain v.  Pybas,  81  Tex.  511. 

8  Oppenheimer  v.  Wright,  106  Pa. 
St.  569;  Hill  v.  Bacon,  43  111.  477; 
Smith  v.  McGuire,  67  Ala.  34 ;  Allen 
v.  Lenoir,  53  Miss.  321 ;  Cox  v.  Gill, 
83  Ky.  669 ;  Tooker  v.  Sloan,  30  N.  J. 
Eq.  94 ;  Hitt  v.  Jenks,  123  U.  S.  301 ; 
Young  v.  Duval,  109  U.  S.  573.  Cf. 
Jackson  v.  Cairns,  20  Johns.  (X.  Y.) 
300;  Davis  v.  Agnew,  67  Tex.  210; 
Liiosley  v.  Brown,  13  Conn.  192 ; 
Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  26  N.  J.  Eq.  497 ; 
Russell  v.  Seminary,  75  111.  337 ; 
Cover  v.  Manaway,  115  Pa.  St.  345; 
Greene  v.  Godfrey,  44  Me.  25. 

9  Stevens  v.  Hampton,  46  Mo.  104  ; 
Meyer  v.  Gassett,  38  Ark.  377,  and 
cases  in  last  note. 

^  Trustees  v.  McKecbnie,  90  N.  Y. 
618;  Brown  v.  Farrar,  3  Ohio,  140; 
Wright  v.  Bundy,  11  Ind.  398;  Evans 


190 


TRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  136. 


its  official  seal1  or  signature2  must  show  the  character  of  the 
official  certifying  to  the  acknowledgment,  and  where  this  ap- 
pears he  will  be  presumed 'to  have  possessed  adequate  author- 
ity and  to  have  acted  within  his  jurisdiction.  But  when  his 
official  character  does  not  appear  it  may  be  shown  by  extrinsic 
evidence.3  But  generally  if  a  form  or  mode  of  acknowledg- 
ment is  prescribed  by  statute,  a  substantial,  if  not  a  strict, 
compliance  will  be  required  to  be  observed  both  by  the  notary 
and  by  the  party  executing  the  conveyance,4  though  the  omis- 
sion of  the  date,5  or  of  immaterial  words,6  the  insertion  of 
those  which  are  vague  and  equivocal,7  redundant  and  super- 
fluous8 or  ungrammatical9  will  not  vitiate  a  certificate  other- 


v.  Lee,  11  Nev.  194 ;  Baze  v.  Arper, 
6  Minn.  220 ;  Carpenter  v.  Dexter,  8 
"Wall.  513 ;  Belo  v.  Mayer,  79  Mo.  67. 
i  Harding  v.  Curtis,  45  111.  252. 
Where  a  statute  prescribes  the  form 
of  the  official  seal  it  must  be  strictly 
followed  (Holbrook  v.  Nichol,  36  111. 
161;  Dail  v.  Moore,  51  Mo.  589; 
Hewitt  v.  Morgan  (Iowa,  1893),  55 
N.  W.  Rep.  478 ;  Fleming  v.  Richard- 
son, 13  La.  Ann.  414 ;  Buel  v.  Irvin, 
24  Mich.  145 ;  Pitts  v.  Seavey  (Iowa, 
1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  480 ;  Meskimen 
v.  Day,  35  Kan.  46),  or  the  deed  will 
not  be  received  in  evidence.     Where 


4McDaniel  v.  Needham,  61  Tex- 
269 ;  Knighton  v.  Smith,  1  Oreg.  276  ; 
Buell  v.  Irwin,  24  Mich.  145 ;  Jaco- 
way  v.  Gault,  20  Ark.  190 ;  Rogers  v. 
Adams,  66  Ala.  600 ;  Dewey  v.  Cam- 
pau,  4  Mich.  565;  Wickersham  v. 
Reeves,  1  Iowa,  413;  Trammel  v. 
Thurmond,  17  Ark.  203. 

5  Huxley  v.  Harrold,  62  Mo.  616 
Rackleff    v.    Norton,    19    Me.    274 
Kelly   v.    Rosenstock,   45    Md.   389 
Yorty  v.  Paine,  62  Wis.  154 ;  Brooks 
v.  Chaplin,  3  Vt.  281. 

e  Todd  v.  Jones,  22  Iowa,  146 ;  Hiles 
v.  La  Flesh,  59  Wis.  465 ;  Magness  v. 


no  special  form  of  sealing  is  required,     Arnold,   31  Ark.    103 ;  Wilcoxon  v. 


its  omission  or  the  use  of  a  scroll  or 
other  informal  device  is  not  mate- 
rial. Limberger  v.  Tidwell,  104  N.  C. 
506;  Harrison  v.  Simmons,  55  Ala. 
510;    Equitable    M.    Co.    v.    Kemp- 


Osborn,  77  Mo.  621 ;  Solyer  v.  Rom- 
anet,  52  Tex.  562 ;  Harrington  v.  Fish, 
10  Mich.  415 ;  Hartshorn  v.  Dawson, 
79  111.  108;  Gorman  v.  Stanton,  5 
Mo.  App.  585 ;  Gordon  v.  Leech,  81 


ner,  84  Tex.  102 ;  Cole  v.  Wright,  70     Ky.  229 ;  Donahue  v.  Mills,  41  Ark. 
Ind.  179;  Commissioners  v.  Glass,  17    421. 


Ohio,  342;  Summer  v.  Mitchell,  29 
Fla.  179 ;  Mitchmer  v.  Holmes  (Mo., 
1893),  20  N.  W.  Rep.  1070. 

2  Summer  v.  Mitchell,  29  Fla.  179 ; 
Cassell  v.  Cooke,  8  Serg.  &  R.  368 ; 
Johnson  v.  Haines,  2  Ohio,  278 ;  Car- 
lisle v.  Carlisle,  78  Ala.  542. 

3  Shults  v.  Moore,  1  McLean  (U.  S.), 
520 ;  Bennet  v.  Paine,  7  Watts,  334 ; 
Vanness  v.  Bank,  13  Pet.  21 ;  Scott 
v.  Gallagher,  11  S.  &  R  347.  See 
post,  %  220. 


'Gray  v.  Kauffman,  82  Tex.  65 
Hurt  v.  McCartney,  18  111.  129 ;  Bel 
cher  v.  Weaver,  46  Tex.  293. 

s  Tourville  v.  Pierson,  39  111.  446 
Bradford    v.    Dawson,   2    Ala.    203 
Thompson  v.  Johnson,  84  Tex.  548 
Gray  v.  Kauffman,  82  id.  65 ;  Nelson 
v.  Graff,  44  Mich.  433;  Whitney  v. 
Arnold,  10  Cal.  531. 

9  Frostburg,  etc.  v.  Brace,  51  Md. 
508. 


§  13C]  PKIVATE    WRITINGS.  191 

wise  complete  and  regular.1  A  notary  public  may  amend  his 
incorrect  certificate,  and  the  amendment  will  operate  as  of 
the  date  of  the  acknowledgment. 

The  taking  of  an  acknowledgment  is  a  ministerial  act,  and 
in  a  proper  case  a  mandamus  will  lie  to  compel  any  official 
to  correct  his  clerical  mistakes,2  though  it  seems  that  he  will 
not  be  allowed  to  do  so  after  he  is  out  of  office.3  If  the  offi- 
cial is  dead  or  cannot  be  found,  or  if  his  term  Of  office  has  ex- 
pired, the  aid  of  equity  may  be  invoked  to  correct  the  mistake 
by  reforming  the  certificate  of  acknowledgment  so  that  it  will 
conform  to  the  facts  in  the  case.4 

The  omission  of  recitals  of  essential  facts,  such  as  the  per- 
sonal appearance  of  the  grantor,  or  his  name,  or  the  personal 
acquaintance  of  the  notary  with  him,  as  tending  to  identify 
him,  or  the  fact  that  he  acknowledges  or  executes  the  deed, 
may  invalidate  the  certificate  as  evidence  of  execution,  for 
these  data  cannot  be  supplied  by  parol  evidence.5  But  an  in- 
valid certificate  of  acknowledgment  does  not  necessarily  de- 
stroy the  value  of  the  writing  as  evidence,  for  the  defective 
acknowledgment  will  then  be  regarded  as  an  attestation,  and 
the  officer  may  prove  the  deed  as  a  subscribing  witness.6     On 

1  See,  also,  Chouteau  v.  Allen,  70  Ark.  865 ;  Gilbraith  v.  Gallivan,  78 
Mo.  290 ;  Durst  v.  Daugherty,  81  Tex.  Mo.  452 ;  Johnson  v.  Taylor,  60  Tex. 
650 ;  Sharp  v.  Hamilton,  12  N.  J.  L.  360.  Contra,  Miller  v.  Powell,  53  Mo. 
109 ;  Smith  v.  Williams,  38  Miss.  48 ;  352 ;  Hand  v.  Weidner,  151  Pa.  St. 
Dundas  v.  Hitchcock,  12  How.  (U.  S.)  362  ;  Stodolka  v.  Novotus  (111.,  1893), 
256 ;    Coombes  v.   Thomas,   57  Tex.  33  N.  E.  Rep.  534.        ~ 

321;  Ives  v.  Kimball,  1  Mich.    308.        5  Frost  v.  Cattle  Co.,  81  Tex.  505; 

So  the  fact  that  the  certificate  prop-  Ennor  v.  Thompson,  46  111.  215;  Rol- 

erly  executed  is  on  a  separate  piece  lins  v.  Menager,  22  W.  Va.  461 ;  Will- 

of  paper  and  pasted  to  the  convey-  iams  v.  Baker,  71  Pa.  St.  476 ;  Leck- 

ance    is    not    material.     Schrani  v.  man  v.  Harding,  65  III.  505;  Ridgely 

Gentry,  63  Tex.  283.  v.  Howard,    3  Har.    &    McH.    (Md.) 

2  Hutchinson  v.  Ains worth,  63  Cal.  321;  Hayden  v.  Westcott,  11  Conn. 
286;  Fall  v.  Roper,  3  Head  (Tenn.),  129:  Newman  v.  Samuels,  17  Iowa, 
285 ;  Ralston  v.  Moore,  83  Ky.  571 ;  528 ;  Jacoway  v.  Gault,  20  Ark.  190 ; 
Skinner  v.  Fulton,  39  III.  484;  Jordan.  Gaines  t.  Catron,  1  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
v.  Corey,  2  Ind.  385 ;  Elliott  v.  Peir-  514 ;  Fryer  v.  Rockefeller,  63  N.  Y. 
sol,  1  Pet  328 ;  Miller  v.  Powell,  53  268.     And  see  §§  205,  209. 

Mo.  252.  6  Hewitt  v.  Morgan  (Iowa,  1893),  55 

s  Gilbraith  v.  Gallivan,  78  Mo.  452.  N.  W.  Rep.  478;  Carlisle  v.  Carlisle, 

*  Cressena  v.  Sowers,  26  W.  N.  C.  78  Ala.  542 ;  Torrey  v.  Forbes,  94  id. 

133;    Simpson    v.    Montgomery,    25  135;    Merch.   Bank  v.   Harrison,   39 


102  FEIVATE    WETTINGS.  [§§  137,  13S. 

the  other  hand,  a  valid  certificate  is  intended  merely  to  evi- 
dence the  due  execution  of  the  deed,  and  if  the  deed  is  inop- 
erative because  of  some  material  deficiency,  it  will  not  be 
validated  by  statements  or  admissions  in  the  certificate.1 

§  137.  Impeaching  the  certificate. —  The  certificate  of  ac- 
knowledgment is  a  constituent  part  of  the  deed,  and  its  recitals 
are  notice  to  and  are  conclusively  binding  upon  all  who  may 
have  actual  or  constructive  notice  of  the  deed  itself.2  Between 
the  immediate  parties  the  recitals  in  the  certificate  may  be 
impeached  for  fraud.3  So  if  the  recitals  that  the  notary  was 
personally  acquainted  with  the  grantor,  that  the  latter  person- 
ally appeared  before  him  and  acknowledged  the  deed,  or,  in 
the  case  of  a  married  woman's  acknowledgment,  that  she  was 
privily  examined,'*  are  false,  actual  fraud  exists  which  will  in- 
validate the  certificate  as  evidence  in  behalf  of  the  original 
grantor  or  grantee  or  any  subsequent  party  having  knowledge 
of  the  fraud.5  When,  however,  the  grantor  has  ratified  the 
deed  by  the  acceptance  of  the  purchase-money,  or  the  grantee 
has  entered  into  possession,  either  would  be  estopped  to  plead 
the  invalidity  of  the  acknowledgment  against  the  other  or 
against  some  third  person  who  had  no  notice  of  the  fraud  and 
had  parted  with  value  relying  on  the  recitals  in  the  acknowl- 
edgment.6 

§  138.  Proof*  by  subscribing  witnesses. —  The  execution  of 
the  instrument  which  has  been  attested  only  must  be  proved 

Mo.  433 ;  Hutton  v.  Weber,  17  N.  Y.  stitutes  neither  record  nor  notice." 

S.  463;  Sharp  v.  Hamilton,  12  N.J.  See  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  under  "Ac- 

L.  109;  Grant  v.  Oliver,  91  Gal.  158.  knowledgment."  Paxton  v.  Marshall, 

Seej'ost,  §  138.  18  Fed.  Rep.  301;  Young  v.  Duvill, 

i  White  v.  Connelly,  105  N.  C.  65 ;  109  U.  S.  577 ;  McMullen  v.  Eagan, 

Turner  v.  Connelly,  105  N.  C.  72.  21  W.  Va.  244. 

-'Tiedeman  on  R.  P.  810;    Singer  5  Davis  v.  Jenkins  (Ky.,   1893),  20 

Mfg.    Co.    v.    Rook,  84  Pa.  St.  442 ;  S.  W.  Rep.  283 ;  Eyster  v.  Hathaway, 

Smith  v.  McGuire,  67  Ala.  34.  50  111.  522;  Williams  v.  Baker,  71  Pa. 

3  See  post,  §  208.  St.  482 ;  Hartley  v.  Fresh,  6  Tex.  208 ; 

4  "  In  the  case  of  a  wife  the  certifi-  Grider  v.  Mortgage  Co.  (Ala.,  1893), 
■cate  must  show  she  was  examined  12  S.  Rep.  775 ;  Holt  v.  Moore,  37  Ark. 
separate  and  apart  from  her  husband;  148;  Johnson  v.  Wallace,  53  Miss, 
that  she  was  of  full  age ;  that  the  331 ;  Marsh  v.  Mitchell,  26  N.  J.  Eq. 
contents  of  the  deed  were  first  made  497;  White  v.  Graves,  107  Mass.  325. 
known  to  her,  and  that  she  acted  of  6Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Corey,  135  N.  Y. 
her  own  free  will.   Otherwise,  though  326. 

.recorded,  her  acknowledgment  con- 


§  138.]  PKIVATK    WRITINGS.  193 

by  the  production  of  the  subscribing  witnesses  or  of  one  of 
them  in  case  he  can  testify  to  the  circumstances  of  the  attesta- 
tion and  prove  all  necessary  facts  concerning  execution.1 

A  subscribing'  witness  is  a  witness  who  either  was  present 
and  saw  the  act  of  execution  or  to  whom  the  party  subse- 
quently acknowledged  the  execution,  and  who  in  either  case, 
at  the  party's  request,  express  or  implied,  attached  his  signa- 
ture to  attest  the  genuineness  of  the  party's  signature.2 

This  rule  is  not  only  applicable  to  such  writings  as  deeds  and 
wills  which  are  required  by  statute  to  be  acknowledged  and 
attested,3  but  is  also  extended  to  every  writing  that  has  act- 
ually been  attested.4  So  though  a  party  is  now  a  competent 
witness  and  may  testify  to  the  genuineness  of  his  own  signa- 
ture, the  production  of  the  subscribing  witnesses  is  not,  it 
seems,  thereby  dispensed  with,5  even  where  the  party  is  shown 
to  have  admitted  out  of  court  that  he  executed  the  instru- 
ment.6 

The  exceptions  to  the  rule  which  requires  the  proof  of  an 
attested  writing  by  the  production  of  subscribing  witness 
must  now  be  considered.  In  the  first  place,  all  attested  writ- 
ings over  thirty  years  old,  which  are  free  from  alterations 
and  come  from  proper  custody,  are  said,  because  of  their  an- 
tiquity, to  prove  themselves,  and  the  witnesses  need  not  be 
produced,  though  living.7 

Jackson  v.  La  Grange.  19  Johns,  ardson,  etc.  Co.  v.  Jones  (Ala.,  1891). 

336 ;  Turnipseed  v.  Hawkins,  1  Mo  9  S.  Rep.  276. 

Cord,   272;  Dan    v.    Brown,  4  Cow.        5Brighana    v.     Palmer,     3     Allen. 

433.  (Mass.),  450. 

2  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  569a;  Mel-  «  Abbot  v.  Plumbe,  1  Dong.  216; 
cher  v.  Flanders,  40  N.  H.  139;  Hus-  Rex  v.  Harrington,  4  M.  &  S.  353; 
ton  v.  Ticknor,  99  Pa.  St.  238 ;  Henry  v.  Bishop,  2  Wend.  575 ;  Fox 
Chaplain  v.  Briscoe,  19  Miss.  272;  v.  Reid,  3  Johns.  477.  But  where 
Marable  v.  Me3rer,  78  Ga.  60 ;  Hollen-  the  execution  of  the  writing  is  only- 
back  v.  Fleming,  6  Hill,  304;  Paw-  collaterally  and  not  directly  in- 
tucket  v.  Ballou,  15  R  I.  58;  volved,  proof  by  subscribing  wit- 
Gallagher  v.  Kilkeary,  29  111.  App.  nesses  will  not  be  required.  Curtis 
415.  v.  Belknap,  6  Washb.  433;  Skinner 

8  Post,  §  269.  v.  Brigham,  126  Mass.  132 ;  Com.  v. 

4  Warner  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  R,  31  Ohio  Castles,  9  Gray,  121. 
St.  265 ;  Hudson  v.  Puett,  86  Ga.  341 ;        7  See  §  105 ;  Jackson  v.  Christman, 

Barber  v.  Terrell,  54  Ga.  146;  Leibe  4  Wend.  277,  282,  283.     Where  both 

v.  Hebersmith,  3  S.  Rep.  283 ;  Rich-  subscribing  witnesses  are  dead,  proof 
13 


li>4 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  13S. 


The  second  class  of  exceptions  comprises  those  cases  where, 
on  account  ol  physical  causes  or  mental  incapacity  or  subse- 
quently-acquired interest,  the  subscribing  witness  is  unable  or 
incompetent  to  testify.  The  proof  by  producing  a  subscribing 
witness  may  be  dispensed  with  if  the  subscribing  witness  has 
become  insane,1  or  has  died,2  or  is  shown  to  have  left  the  state,3 
or  has  become  disqualified  because  of  interest4  or  infamy,5  or 
the  party  is  unable  to  find  him  after  a  diligent  search,6  or  he 
was  incompetent  when  he  signed  as  a  witness.7  Other  proof  is 
admissible  where  the  witness  denies  or  forgets  that  he  was 
present  at  the  execution.8 

If  it  is  sought  to  dispense  with  proof  by  subscribing  wit- 
nesses because  they  cannot  be  found,  the  party  must  satisfy 
the  court  that  he  has  made  an  honest  and  diligent  search  for 
them  in  places  where  they  would  probably  be  found  and  has 
inquired  as  to  their  whereabouts  of  acquaintances  and  rel- 
atives who  would  most  likely  be  best  informed.9    Where  a 


of  execution  raises  a  presumption 
that  all  proper  details  were  strictly- 
complied  with.  Dupree  v.  Dupree, 
45.  Ga.  415-442;  E!a  v.  Edwards, 
supra;  Chaffee  v.  Baptist  Miss.  Con., 
10  Paige,  25 ;  Fathere  v.  Lawrence, 
33  Miss.  622 ;  Eliot  v.  Eliot,  10  Allen, 
357 ;  Barnes  v.  Barnes,  66  Me.  286 ; 
Clark  v.  Dounorant,  10  Leigh,  22. 

1  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Met.  (Mass.) 
349. 

2  Martin  v.  Bowie  (S.  C,  1893),  15 
S.  E.  Rep.  736. 

3  Troeder  v.  Hyams,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
775;  Homer  v.  Wallis,  11  Mass.  309; 
Sluby  v.  Chaplin,  4  Johns.  461 ;  Dun- 
bar v.  Marden,  13  N.  H.  311. 

*  Hamilton  v.  Marsden,  6  Binn.  45. 

5  Jones  v.  Mason,  2  Stra.  833. 

6 Jackson  v.  Birton,  11  Johns.  64; 
CJ-allegher  v.  Association  (Pa,  1892), 
24  Atl.  Rep.  115. 

7  Bank  v.  Root,  2  Met.  522;  Nelins 
v.  Buckell,  1  Hayw.  19.  See,  also,  1 
Greenl.  on  Evid..  §  572,  and  cases 
cited ;  1  Whart.  Evid.,  §§  705-40,  and 
cases;  Smith  v.  Junes,  6  Rand.  32; 


Hawes  v.  Humphrey,  9  Pick.  357; 
Jauncy  v.  Thorne,  2  Barb.  Ch.  40; 
Dean  v.  Deau,  1  Will.  (Vt.)  746; 
Greenough  v.  Greenough,  11  Pa.  St 
489 ;  Vernon  v.  Kirk,  30  Pa.  St.  218 ; 
Hopkins  v.  Albertson,  2  Bay,  484; 
Hopkins  v.  De  Graffenreid,  2  Bay, 
187 ;  Collins  v.  Elliot,  1  Harr.  &  J.  2; 
Jackson  v.  La  Grange,  19  Johns.  288, 
289;  Sears  v.  Dillingham,  12  Mass. 
358,  361,  363 ;  Miller  v.  Miller,  2  Bing. 
N.  C.  76 ;  Jones  v.  Arterborn,  11 
Humph.  97;  Patten  v.  Tallman,  27 
Me.  29;  Verdier  v.  Verdier,  8  Rich. 
(S.  O.)  135;  Barker  v.  McFerran,  26 
Pa.  St.  211 ;  Jackson  v.  Luquere,  5 
Cow.  221. 

sWhitakcr  v.  Salisbury,  15  Pick. 
534;  Dewey  v.  Dewey,  1  Met.  349; 
New  Haven  Co.  Bank  v.  Mitchell,  15 
Conn.  206;  Wynn  v.  Small,  102  N.  C 
133 ;  Baeder  v.  Jennings,  40  Fed.  Rep. 
199. 

9  Miller  v.  Miller,  2  Bing.  N.  C.  76; 
James  v.  Farnell,  1  Turn.  &  R.  417; 
Troeder  v.  Hyams  (Mass..  1890),  27 
N.  E.  Rep.  775.    Where  there  are  sev- 


§  139.]  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  195 

writing  which  is  alleged  to  have  been  executed  by  one  party 
is  introduced  in  evidence  by  his  adversary  upon  notice,  proof 
by  the  subscribing  witnesses  may  be  dispensed  with  where  the 
execution  is  not  denied  by  the  other,  upon  the  ground  that 
the  party  demanding  its  introduction  admits  its  execution  and 
validity  by  claiming  an  interest  or  title  under  it.1  Witnesses 
to  deeds  are  intended  merely  to  attest  their  execution,  and 
cannot,  like  witnesses  to  wills,  express  opinions  upon  the  men- 
tal capacity  of  the  grantor.2 

§  139.  Proof  by  witnesses  acquainted  with  party's  hand- 
writing.—  A  person,  even  though  he  can  neither  read  nor 
write,3  who  is  personally  acquainted  with  the  handwriting  in 
question,  is  a  competent  witness  for  or  against  its  authentic- 
ity.4 In  case  the  knowledge  was  acquired  solely  for  the  pur- 
pose of  testifying,  then  he  is  not  a  competent  witness.  The 
testimony  of  such  a  person  is  not  secondary  evidence  as 
compared  with  the  evidence  of  the  alleged  writer,  nor  is  it 
rendered  inadmissible  because  the  latter,  being  in  court,  denies 
the  handwriting;5  though  it  is  clear  that  such  testimony, 
unless  positive  and  uncontradictory,  would  not  carry  much 
weight  in  a  reasonable  mind  against  the  declaration  of  the 
party  himself  that  the  writing  in  dispute  is  not  his. 

The  witness'  acquaintance  and  familiarity  with  the  writing 
may  have  been  acquired  by  seeing  the  party  write  in  circum- 
stances where  he  had  an  opportunity  of  observing  his  hand- 
writing and  becoming  acquainted  with  the  peculiarities  of  his 
penmanship.     Where  a  witness  believes  he  can  identify  the 

eral  subscribing  witnesses,   the    ab-  Bruyn  v.  Russell,  52  Hun,  17 ;  Salazar 

sence  of  all  must  be  accounted  for.  v.  Taylor  (Col.,  1893),  33  Pac.   Rep. 

Kelsey  v.  Hanmer,  18  Conn.  311.  369;  Succession  of  Marivant,  45  La. 

iBradshaw    v.    Bennett,    1    M.    &  Ann.  207;  Stoddard  v.  Hill  (S.C.,  1893), 

Rob.    143 ;    Benton    v.   Baxley   (Ga.,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  138 ;  Board  of  Trustees 

1893),  15   S.  E.  Rep.  820 ;   Hanna  v.  v.  Misenheimer,  78  111.  22 ;  Tome  v. 

Davis,  112  Mo.  599;  Bell  v.  Chaytor,  Parkersburgh  R  R  Co.,  39  Md.  36; 

1  C.  &  K.  162.     If  the  party  alleged  Herrick  v.  Svvomby,  56  Md.  439,  460; 

the  deed  to  be  a  forgery,  its  execution  Mudd  v.  Suckermore,  5  A.  &  E.  703 

must  be  proved  by  the  one  claiming  (31  E.  C.  L.) ;  Snyder  v.  McKeever, 

under  it.     Vaugh  v.  McElroy,  82  Ga.  10  Bradw.  (111.)  188;  Hynes  v.  McDer- 

687.  mott,  82  N.  Y.  41. 

2  Dean  v.  Fuller,  40  Pa.  St.  474.  »  Williams  v.  Deen  (Tex.,  1894),  24 

3  Foye  v.  Patch,  132  Mass.  105.  S.  W.  Rep.  536. 
*  Wilson  v.  Van  Leer,  127  Pa.  St,  371 ; 


196 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS, 


[§  139. 


writing  lie  may  testify  to  its  character,  though  he  may  have 
seen  the  party  write  once  only,1  and  that  subsequent  to  the 
date  of  the  disputed  writing.2  Doubtless  the  circumstance 
that  a  witness  has  often  seen  the  party  write  will  add  to  the 
value  of  his  evidence;  but  this  fact  and  the  character  of  the 
occasion  or  period  when  he  saw  him  write,  though  they  may 
affect  the  credibility  and  weight  of  his  evidence,  are  wholly 
immaterial  as  respects  his  competency  as  a  witness.3 

A  witness  familiar  with  the  penmanship  of  a  party's  surname 
may  testify  to  his  full  name,4  while  one  unacquainted  with  the 
individual  signatures  of  the  members  of  a  firm  may  testify  to 
the  firm  signature  if  acquainted  with  it.5  In  the  second  place, 
personal  acquaintance  with  the  party's  handwriting  may  be 
acquired  by  having  carried  on  a  correspondence  with  him.6 


>Egan  v.  Murray  (Iowa,  1890),  45 
N.  W.  Rep.  563 ;  Hopper'3  Adnvr  v. 
Ashley,  15  Ala.  457;  Woodford  v. 
McClenahan,  4  Gilm.  (9  111.)  85; 
Smith  v.  Walton,  8  Gill  (Md.),  77; 
Com.  v.  Nefus.  135  Mass.  533 ;  North 
v.  McConnell,  42  Mich.  473;  Rideout 
v.  Newton,  17  N.  H  71 ;  Jackson  v. 
Van  Dusen,  5  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  144; 
McNair  v.  Com.,  26  Pa.  St.  388; 
Means  v.  Means,  7  Rich.  (S.  C.)  533 ; 
Demouheun  v.  Walker,  4  Baxfc. 
(Term.)  199;  Pepper  v.  Barnett,  22 
Gratt.  (Va.)  405 ;  Succession  of  Mar- 
vant,  45  La.  Ann.  207. 

2  Keith  v.  Lathrop,  10  Cush.  (Mass.) 
553 :  Railroad  Co.  v.  Hickman,  28  Pa. 
St  318. 

3  In  these  rases  the  witness  often 
saw  the  party  write :  Royce  v.  Cazan, 
7G  Ga.  79 ;  Bruyn  v.  Russell,  52  Hun. 
17;  Long  v.  Little,  119  111.  600; 
Haynes  v.  Thomas,  7  Ind.  38 ;  State 
v.  Stair,  87  Mo.  268 ;  State  v.  Gay,  94 
N.  C.  814 ;  Cook  v.  Smith,  1  Vroom 
(30  N.  J.),  387 ;  State  v.  Hooper,  2 
Bailey  (S.  C),  37 ;  Hopkins  v.  Meg- 
guire,  35  Me.  78;  Lachance  v.  Loeb- 
lein,  15  Mo.  App.  460 ;  Hoitt  v.  Moul- 
ton,  21  N.  H.  586 ;  Donoghue  v.  Peo- 
ple, 6  Park.  C.  C.  (N.  Y.)  120 ;  State  v. 


Anderson,  2  Bailey  (S.  C),  567 ;  Pear- 
son v.  McDaniel,  62  Ga.  100;  Sill  v. 
Reese,  47  Cal.  294 ;  Salazar  v.  Taylor 
(Col.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  839 ;  Bevan  v. 
Atlanta  Bank,  39  111.  577 ;  Williams 
v.  Dean  (Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep. 
536. 
*  Lewis  v.  Sapio,  1  M.  &  W.  39. 

5  Gordon  v.  Price,  10  Ired.  (N.  C.) 
385;  Brigham  v.  Peters,  1  Gray 
(Mass.),  385. 

6  Gould  v.  Jones,  1  W.  Bl.  384,  by 
Lord  Mansfield,  in  1761 ;  Ferrers  v. 
Shirley,  Fitzgibbon,  195  (in  1763).  In 
Wade  v.  Boughton,  3  V.  &  B.,  Lord 
Eldon,  while  confirming  the  doctrine, 
says  the  comparison  of  a  single  let- 
ter will  never  do  for  commitment. 
See  McKeon  v.  Barnes,  108  Mass. 
344;  Campbell  v.  Woodstock  Iron 
Co.,  83  Ala.  351;  Pearson  &  Co.  v. 
McDaniel,  62  Ga.  100;  Russell  v. 
Coffin,  8  Pick.  (Mass.)  143;  Empire 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Stuart,  46  Mich.  482 ; 
Gartrell  v.  Stafford,  12  Neb.  545; 
Com.  v.  Smith,  6  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  567; 
Clark  v.  Freeman,  25  Pa.  St  133; 
Atlantic  Ins.  Co.  v.  Manning,  3  Col. 
224;  Thomas  v.  State,- 103  Ind.  419; 
Chaffee  v.  Taylor,  3  Allen  (Mass.), 
5i>8 ;  Southern  Exp.  Co.  v.  Thornton, 


§  139.] 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


1U7 


The  ground  upon  which  evidence  of  familiarity  with  hand- 
writing acquired  by  a  correspondence  with  the  party  is  ad- 
mitted is  that  the  conduct  of  the  party  is  equivalent  to  the 
admission  that  the  letters  introduced  were  written  by  him. 
If  the  party  made  statements  or  gave  instructions  in  his  letter 
which  were  intended  prima  facie  to  be  acted  upon,  and  if  it 
is  shown  that  the  recipient  relied  upon  and  was  induced  to 
act,  and  particularly  if  his  action  consists  of  further  communi- 
cations or  of  business  transactions  with  him,  and  which  are 
subsequently  referred  to  in  other  letters,  it  will  be  very  rea- 
sonable to  presume  that  the  documents  were  in  the  hand- 
writing of  the  party.1  The  personal  acquaintance  may  have 
been  gained  by  the  witness  having  seen2  documents  which  the 
party  admits  to  have  been  written  by  him;  as  when  he  holds 
deeds  of  conveyances  in  which  the  party  is  a  grantor.3 

Again,  the  acquaintance  with  the  writing  may  have  been 
acquired  by  the  witness  from  actual  personal  contact  with 


41  Miss.  216;  Whitley  v.  Gaylord,  1 
Jones'  L.  (N.  C.)  94;  United  States 
v.  Simpson,  3  P.  &  W.  (Pa.)  437; 
Parker  v.  Amazon  Ins.  Co.,  34  Wis. 
363;  Com.  v.  Coe,  115  Mass.  481; 
Blair  v.  Pelham,  118  Mass.  420; 
Rumph  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E. 
Rep.  104 ;  Rogers  v.  Tyley  (111.,  1893), 
32  N.  E.  Rep.  693. 

1  Murieta  v.  Wolfhagen,  2  C.  &  K. 
744  (61  E.  C.  L.);  Greaves  v.  Hunter, 
2  C.  &  P.  477  (12  E.  C.  L.) ;  Tharpe  v. 
Gisburne,  2  C.  &  P.  21  (12  E.  C.  L.); 
Rex  v.  Slaney,  5  C.  &  P.  213  (24 
EC.L  1832),  Drew  v.  Prior,  5  M.  & 
G.  264;  Putnam  v.  Wadley,  40  111. 
346;  Mines  v.  Perry,  113  Mass.  274; 
Gibson  v.  Trowbridge  Co.  (Ala.,  1893), 
11  S.  Rep.  365. 


445;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Hovell,  24 
111.  App.  594;  Durnell  v.  Sowden 
(Utah,  1887),  14  Pac.  Rep.  334;  Smith 
v.  Caswell  (Tex.,  1887),  4  S.  W.  Rep. 
848;  Gordon  v.  Price,  10  Ired.  L. 
(N.  C.)  385;  Hopper  v.  Ashley,  15 
Ala.  457  ;  Gibson  v.  Trowbridge  (Ala., 
1893),  11  S.  Rep.  365.  Where  the 
document  has  not  been  acknowl- 
edged, the  circumstances  should  be 
such  that  the  party  is  estopped  by  it. 
Allen  v.  State,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
367 ;  Hammond  v.  Varian,  54  N.  Y. 
398;  Talbott  v.  Hines,  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
788;  Tucker  v.  Kellogg  (Utah,  1892), 
28  Pac.  Rep.  870 ;  Berg  v.  Petersorj. 
52  N.  W.  Rep.  37 ;  49  Minn.  420.  The 
burden  of  proving  the  acknowledg- 
ment or  estoppel  is  upon  the  party 


2  It  is  necessary  that  the  witness    introducing  the  writing.    Putnam  v. 


should  have  seen  the  papers  long 
enough  to  have  become  familiar 
with  the  penmanship.  United  States 
v.  Johnson,  1  Cranch  (U.  S.),  371 ; 
Stone  v.  Thomas,  12  Pa.  St.  269. 

3  Woodman  v.  Dana,  52  Me.  9 ; 
Johnson  v.  Daverne,  19  Johns.  Ch. 
134;  Ennor  v.   Hodson,  28  111.  App. 


Wadley,  40  111.  346 ;  Bank  v.  Marsh, 
46  Vt  443;  Brigham  v.  Peters,  1 
Gray,  139;  Bank  v.  Wenzel.  151  Pa. 
St.  142.  The  acknowledgment  of  an 
attorney  for  the  party  will  not  suffice. 
Goldsmith  v.  Bane,  8  N.  J.  L.  87; 
Greaves  v.  Hunter,  2  C.  &  P.  477. 


198  PEIVATE    WRITINGS.  [§  139tf. 

I-  , 

him  in  commercial,  social  or  professional  relations.  Thus,  a 
corresponding  clerk  or  a  book-keeper  may  testify  to  the  hand- 
writing- of  one  whose  letters  or  books  pass  through  his  hands,1 
but  in  the  ordinary  course  of  business  only.2  One  member  of  a 
family  is  a  competent  witness  in  the  case  of  family  correspond- 
ence.3 An  executor  may  testify  to  the  handwriting  of  his 
testator,4  or  an  attorney  to  that  of  his  client.5 

So  where  the  authenticity  of  official  records  and  documents 
or  the  handwriting  of  officials  is  in  question,  any  person  who 
has  been  in  the  habit  of  examining  them  while  they  were  in 
official  custody  and  through  whose  hands  they  have  passed  in 
the  performance  of  private  or  official  duty  may  testify  to  the 
genuineness  of  the  handwriting.6 

§  139a.  Mode  of  examining  witnesses  as  to  handwriting. — 
A  witness  to  handwriting  may  be  cross-examined  as  to  the 
source  of  his  knowledge,  and  if  he  has  any  knowledge  ac- 
quired under  the  circumstances  above  outlined  its  deficiency 
or  inexactness,  though  detracting  from  the  weight  of  his  evi- 
dence, is  no  objection  to  his  competency.  Thus,  though  his 
actual  belief  that  the  writing  in  dispute  is  genuine  may  be  a 
material  element  in  the  credibility  of  his  testimony,  yet  the 
fact  that  he  cannot  swear  from  his  own  knowledge  that  he 
believes  it  to  be  the  handwriting  of  the  party  is  not  an  ob- 
jection.7    If  he  is  not  cross-examined  he  need  not  state  the 

1  Smith  v.  Sainsbury,  5  C.  &  B.  196  6  Armstrong  v.  Fargo,  8  Hun,  175; 
(24  E.  C.  L.);  Reid  v.  Hodgson,  1  Rogers  v.  State,  11  Tex.  App.  608; 
Cranch  (U.  S.),  491;  Titford  v.  Knott,     Finch  v.  Gridley's  Ex'rs,  25  Wend. 

2  Johns.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  211 ;  Murieta  v.  (N.  Y.)  469 ;  Rogers  v.  Ritter,  12  Wall. 
Wolfhagen,  2  C.  & K.  744 (61  E.  C.  L.) ;  (U.  S.)  317 ;  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush. 
Bruyn  v.  Russell,  52  Hun,  217.  (Mass.)  295-301 ;  Sill  v.  Reese,  47  Cal. 

2  Assignees  of  Desbrow  v.  Farrow,  294 ;  Board  v.  Misenheimer,  78  111.  22 ; 

3  Rich.  (S.  C.)  382.  Brown  v.  Lincoln,  47  N.  H.  468 ;  Doe  v. 

3  Robinson  Consolidated  Mining  Roe,  31  Ga.  593-599 ;  Ducan  v.  Beard, 
Co.  v.  Craig,  4  N.  Y.  St.  Rep.  478;  2  N.  &  McC.  (&  C.)  400;  Goddard  v. 
Tuthill  v.  Rainy,  98  N.  C.  513 ;  Moody  Gloninger,  5  Watts  (Pa.),  209 ;  Swei- 
v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.)  490 ;  Slay-  gart,  8  Pa.  St  436 ;  Taylor  v.  Cook,  8 
maker  v.  Wilson,  1  P.  &  W.  (Pa.)  216.  Price,  650 ;  Jones  v.  Huggius,  1  Dev. 

4  Sharp  v.  Sharp  et  al.,  2  Leigh  L  (N.  C.)  223;  Vickroy  v.  Skelly, 
(Va.),  249.  14  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  372;  Turnipseed  v. 

SFitzwater  Peerage  Case,  10  CI.  &  Hawkins,  1  McC.  (S.  C.)272;  Thomas 

Fin.    193;   Costello    v.    Crowell,  139  v.  Horlocker,  1  Dall.  (Pa.)  14. 
Mass.  588;  Riggs  v.  Powell  (111.,  1893),         'Foster   v,   Jenkins,   30    Ga.   476; 

32  N.  E.  Rep.  482.  Bernheim  v.  Ayer,  36  N.  H.  183 ;  Hop- 


§  139a.] 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


199 


source  of  his  knowledge;  for  if  he  actually  swears  that  he  is 
acquainted  with  the  handwriting  it  will  be  presumed  that  he 
is  competent  to  testify.1  Merely  to  testify  that  the  writing  is 
that  of  the  party  is  not  enough.  He  must  testify  that  he 
knows  the  handwriting  of  the  party,2  and  if  he  does  not  know 
it,  it  is  within  the  province  of  the  judge  to  reject  him  as  incom- 
petent.3 

A  person  disqualified  to  testify  because  of  interest  against 
the  representative  of  a  decedent  may  be  a  witness  to  the  hand- 
writing of  the  deceased,  though  he  cannot  testify  that  he  saw 
deceased  sign  a  paper  which  has  been  destroyed.4  On  the 
other  hand,  the  fact  that  a  witness  is  interested  has  been  held 
to  render  him  wholly  incompetent  as  a  witness  to  handwrit- 
ing.5 

The  witness,  if  competent,  will  be  permitted  to  refresh  his 
memory  before  the  trial,  by  referring  to  the  writings  from 
which  his  knowledge  has  been  acquired.6    On  the  other  hand, 


per  v.  Ashley,  1")  Ala.  457;  Johnson 
v.  Daverne,  19  Johos.  134;  Talbott  v. 
Hedges  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
788 ;  Massey  v.  Farmers'  Bank,  104  111. 
327 ;  Smy  the  v.  Caswell.  G7  Tex.  567 ; 
Lyon  v.  Lyman,  9  Conn.  55 ;  Holmes 
v.  Goldsmith,  147  U.  S.  150;  Guyette 
v.  Bolton,  46  Vt.  228;  Com.  v.  An- 
drews, 143  Mass.  23;  Nagee  v.  Os- 
borne, 32  N.  Y.  669;  Rumph  v.  State 
(Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  104;  Smith 
v.  Walton,  8  Gill  (Md.),  77;  State  v. 
Stair,  87  Mo.  268 ;  Clark  v.  Freeman, 
25  Pa  St.  413. 

1  Henderson  v.  Bank,  11  Ala.  855; 
Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.) 
490 ;  Salazar  v.  Taylor,  33  Pac.  Rep. 
369  (Colo.,  1893):  Empire  Co.  v. 
Stuart,  46  Mich.  482 ;  Wittier  v.  Gould, 
8  Watts  (Pa.),  485 ;  Bank  v.  Lierman, 
5  Neb.  247 ;  Bulen  v.  Granger,  29  N. 
W.  Rep.  718 ;  Goodhue  v.  Bartlett,  5 
McLean,  185;  Sartor  v.  .Bullinger, 
59  Tex.  411 ;  Stoddard  v.  Hill  (S.  C, 
1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  138. 

2  Boyle  v.  Coleman,  13  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
42 ;  Richardson  v.  Stringfellow  (Ala, 


1894),  14  S.  Rep.  283;  Bate  v.  Peo- 
ple, 8  111.  644 ;  Kinney  v.  Flynn,  2  R. 
I.  319 ;  Watson  v.  McAllister,  7  Mart 
368;  Carrier  v.  Hampton,  11  Ired.  L 
(N.  C.)  307 ;  Mapes  v.  Seales,  27  Tex. 
345;  Hann  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App. 
383 ;  Slaymaker  v.  Wilson,  1  T.  &  W. 
216. 

3  See  cases  supra,  and  Talbott  v. 
Hedges,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  788  (Ind.,  1893). 

4  Daniels  v.  Foster,  26  Wis.  686; 
Hussey  v.  Kirkwood,  95  N.  C.  63. 

SRideout  v.  Newton,  17  N.  H.  71  ; 
Robinson  v.  Robinson,  20  S.  C.  567 ; 
Kirksey  v.  Kirksey,  41  Ala.  626 ; 
Truitt's  Estate.  10  Phila.  (Pa.)  16. 

6 See  post,  g§  337,  338 ;  United  States 
v.  Larned,  4  Cranch,  312  ;  Redford  v. 
Peggy,  6  Rand.  (Va.)  316;  McNair  v. 
Com.,  26  Pa.  St.  28S ;  Thomas  v.  State, 
103  Ind.  419 ;  Chester  v.  Armstrong. 
66  Md.  113;  Massey  v.  Bank,  104  111. 
327 ;  Worth  v.  McConnell,  42  Mich. 
473;  Smith  v.  Walton,  8  Gill  (Md.), 
77;  Bank  v.  Jacobs,  1  P.  &  W.  (Pa.) 
161,  179. 


200  PKIVATE    WRITINGS.  [§  140. 

other  writings  not  relevant  to  the  issue  may  be  shown  him, 
and  he  may  be  asked,  to  test  the  extent  and  accuracy  of  his 
knowledge,  if  they  are  genuine  or  spurious.1  The  party  cross- 
examining  the  expert  by  questioning  him  as  to  the  genuineness 
of  irrelevant  writings  will  be  bound  by  his  answer,  as  that  is 
a  collateral  and  irrelevant  fact.2  A  person  who  on  the  stand 
denies  the  genuineness  of  a  writing  alleged  to  be  his  may,  on 
cross-examination,  be  asked  to  write  his  name  or  other  word 
for  use  as  a  standard  of  comparison.3  While  a  party  should 
not  be  permitted. to  fabricate  evidence  by  being  asked  to  write 
his  name  on  his  direct  examination  when  he  disputes  the  au- 
thenticity of  a  writing,4  if  he  does  so,  another  person  who 
has  only  the  knowledge  of  his  writing  which  he  has  gained  by 
seeing  him  write  in  court  is  not  competent  as  a  witness.5 
Where  a  witness,  on  an  issue  of  forgery,  testifies  that  he  wrote 
certain  words  in  a  genuine  instrument  not  produced,  he  may 
be  asked  to  write  those  words  for  comparison  with  the  writ- 
ing said  to  be  forged.6 

§  140.  Comparison  of  handwriting. —  The  distinction  be- 
tween evidence  of  the  genuineness  of  handwriting  founded 
upon  the  knowledge  of  the  witness  and  that  furnished  by  a 
comparison  of  papers  or  writings  is  important  and  well 
marked.  "  Comparison  of  handwriting  occurs  when  other  wit- 
nesses prove  a  paper  to  be  in  the  handwriting  of  a  party  and  the 
witness  desires  to  take  the  papers  in  his  hand,  compare  them, 
and  determine  whether  they  are  or  are  not  the  same  hand- 
writing. There  the  witness  collects  all  his  knowledge  from 
comparison  only ;  he  knows  nothing  of  himself ;  he  has  not 
seen  the  party  write  nor  held  any  correspondence  with  him."  7 

1  Armstrong  v.  Thurston,  11  Md.  derson  v.  Osgood,  53  Vt.  309.  But 
148;  Fogg  v.  Dennis,  3  Humph,  see,  contra.  Bank  v.  Robert,  41  Mich. 
(Tenn.)  47;  Howard  v.  Patrick,  42  709;  Gilbert  v.  Simpson,  6  Daly,  34. 
Mich.  121 ;  Bank  v.  Mudgett,  44  N.  Y.  4  Williams  v.  State,  6  Ala.  33 ;  King 
514;  Massey  v.  Bank,.  104  111.  327;  v.  Donahue,  110  Mass.  155;  United 
Bacon  v.  Williams,  13  Gray  (Mass.),  States  v.  Jones,  10  Fed.  Rep.  469. 
527 ;  Rose  v.  Bank,  91  Mo.  399 ;  Pierce  Cf.  State  v.  Koontz,  5  S.  E.  Rep.  328. 
v.  Northey,  14  Wis.  9;  Griffiths  v.  5  Reese  v.  Reese,  90  Pa.  St.  89. 
Avery,  11  A.  &  E.  322.  6  Huff  v.  Nims,  11  Neb.  363. 

2  People  v.  Murphy,  135  N.  Y.  450;  ?  Duncan,  J.,  in   Com.   v.  Smith,  6 
32  N.  E.  Rep.  138.  S.  &  R  (Pa.)  568,  571.     See  Mudd  v. 

3  Chandler  v.  Barron,  45  Me.  534;  Suckennore,  5  A.  &  E  703,  730; 
Roe  v.  Roe,  40  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  1 ;  San-  Bouv.  Diet,  p.  351 ;  Burdick  v.  Hunt, 


§  140.]  PKIVATE    WKITINGS.  201 

The  proof  of  handwriting  by  comparison  has  been  a  much 
litigated  subject.  In  the  eighteenth  century  this  method  of 
proof  was  recognized  in  the  English  ecclesiastical  courts,  the 
judges  adopting  the  rule  as  it  existed  and  was  observed  in  the 
Roman  law.1  The  doctrine  met  with  strenuous  resistance 
when  its  introduction  was  attempted  in  the  courts  of  common 
law.  It  was  argued  that  it  would  be  useless  to  submit  writ- 
ings for  comparison  to  jurors  who  could  neither  read  nor 
write;  that  fraud  might  be  practiced  both  in  the  writings  in 
dispute  and  in  the  standards  with  which  they  would  be  com- 
pared;  that  handwriting  is  variable,  adapting  itself  to  the 
age,  habits,  education  and  mental  state  of  the  writer,  to  the 
condition  of  his  writing  materials  and  to  the  haste  with  which 
they  are  used.  So  the  genuineness  of  the  specimens  offered 
for  comparison  might  be  impeached,  causing  the  introduction 
of  others  with  a  consequential  indefinite  increase  of  collateral 
issues.  But  jurors  are  no  longer  illiterate,  and,  so  far  as  fraud 
is  concerned,  either  party  may  offer  specimens  for  comparison. 
Nor  will  the  adverse  party  be  subject  to  unfair  surprise,  for 
he  ought  certainly  to  know  what  writings  he  has  signed  and 
to  be  able  to  recognize  and  explain  any  and  all  alterations 
in  them.2 

This  matter  is  now  settled  in  England  by  statute,3  and  a 
similar  statute  has  been  enacted  in  many  of  the  states  of  the 
Union.  By  these  statutes,  in  the  states  of  New  York,  New 
Jersey,  Wisconsin,  Iowa,  Georgia,  Louisiana  and  California, 
it  is  substantially  provided  that  where  the  genuineness  of  any 
writing  is  in  dispute  it  may  be  compared  with  any  writing 
whatever  proved  or  acknowledged  to  be  genuine.  The  com- 
parison is  to  be  made  by  witnesses,  who  shall  give  their  opin- 

43  Ind.  381,  386;  Travis  v.  Brown,  43  Rex  v.    Crosby,    12    Mod.,    No.    72; 

Pa,  St  9,  12.  Seven  Bishops'  Case,  12  How.  St.  Tr. 

l  Wharton  on  Evld.,  vol.  1,   §  711,  183,  306;  More  v.  Wood,  14  East,  327; 

and  authorities  cited ;  Spear  v.  Bone,  Brune  v.  Rawlings,  7   id.  279,  282; 

cited  Mudd  v.  Suckerrnore,  5  A.  &  E.  Revett  v.  Braham,  4  T.  R.  497 ;  Til- 

703;  Beaumont  v.  Perkins,  1   Phil-  man  v.  Traver,  Moody  &  Ryan,  141; 

lim.  78.  Allport  v.  Meek,  4  C.  &  P.  267 ;  Grif- 

2 See  the  remarks  of  Patteson,  J.,  fith  v.  Williams,  1   M.  &  R.  133,  for 

in   Mudd   v.  Suckerrnore,  5  A.  &  E,  the  earlier  cases. 

703,  709.     See,  also,  Hayes'   Case,  10  « 17  and  18  Vict,  ch.  125,  §  27. 
How.  St  Tr.  312 ;  Buller's  Nisi,  p.  236 ; 


202 


PKIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  140. 


ion,  which,  together  with  the  document,  shall  then  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  jury.1 

In  other  states  the  common-law  rule  is  adhered  to,  and 
while  comparison,  both  by  expert  witnesses  and  by  the  jur}7, 
is  permitted,  it  must  be  made  with  writings  which  are  rele- 
vant to  the  case,  or,  if  with  other  writings,  their  authenticity 
must  have  been  admitted  either  expressly  or  by  conduct  suf- 
ficient to  estop  the  party.2 

In  the  courts  of  other  states,  and  in  the  United  States  su- 
preme court,  no  irrelevant  writing  can  be  selected  as  a 
standard  of  comparison.  Comparison  can  only  be  made  with 
some  writing  properly  constituting  a  part  of  the  evidence  or 
record  and  the  genuineness  of  which  is  acknowledged.3 


i  Mortimer  v.  Chambers,  17  N.  Y.  S. 
552;  Durnell  v.  Sowden  (Utah),  14 
Pac.  Rep.  335 ;  State  v.  Henderson, 
29  W.  Va.  147 ;  Smith  v.  Caswell,  67 
Tex.  567;  Clay  v.  Alderson,  10  id.  49; 
Boggus  v.  State,  34  Ga.  375 ;  Ham- 
mond v.  Wolf  (Iowa,  1893),  42  N.  W. 
Rep.  778 ;  Baker  v.  Mygatt,  14  Iowa, 
131 ;  Le  Carpentier  v.  Delery,  4 
Mart.  (La.)  454;  State  v.  Zimmer- 
man, 47  Kan.  242 ;  Yeomans  v.  Petty, 
40  N.  J.  Eq.  495 ;  Peck  v.  Callahan, 
95  N.  Y.  73;  McKay  v.  Lasher,  42 
Hun,  270;  Winnie  v.  Tousley,  36 
Hun,  190 ;  State  v.  Miller,  47  Wis.  530  ; 
Smith  v.  Elmert,  47  Wis.  479 ;  Hall 
v.  Van  Vranken,  64  How.  Pr.  407; 
Marshall  v.  Hancock,  80  Cal.  82; 
Holmes  v.  Goldsmith,  145  U.  S.  150. 

2  Hazzard  v.  Vickory,  78  Ind.  64 ; 
Short  v.  Kinzie,  80  Ind.  500 ;  Thomas 
v.  State,  103  Ind.  419;  Rogers  v. 
Tyley  (111.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  393; 
Morrison  v.  Porter,  35  Minn.  425; 
Springer  v.  Hall,  83  Mo.  93;  Bank  v. 
Robert,  41  Mich.  709;  Dietz  v. 
Fourth  Nat.  Bank  (Mich.),  37  N.  W. 
Rep.  220 ;  People  v.  Parker,  34  N.  W. 
Rep.  720 :  State  v.  Henderson,  29  W. 
Va.  147 ;  Yates  v.  Yates,  76  N.  C.  142 ; 
Lachauce  v.  Loblein,  15  Mo.  App. 
460;  Rose  v.  Bank,  91  Mo.  399;  Wag- 


oner v.  Ruply,  69  Tex.  700 ;  Walker 
v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  609;  Chester 
v.  State,  23  Tex.  App.  577 ;  State  v. 
De  Grofif  (N.  C,  1893),  18  S.  E.  Rep. 
507;  Andrews  v.  Hayden  (Ky.),  11 
S.  W.  Rep.  428.  If  the  writing  in 
dispute  has  been  lost,  an  expert  who 
has  seen  it  may  compare  it  with  a 
relevant  writing.  Abbott  v.  Cole- 
man, 22  Kan.  250.  Cf.  Collins  v. 
Ball,  82  Tex.  259. 

3  Snyder  v.  Berkes  (Ala.),  4  S.  W. 
Rep.  225 ;  Bestor  v.  Roberts,  58  Ala. 
331 ;  Clark  v.  Rhoades,  2  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
20G;  Wilbur  v.  Eicholtz,  5  Col.  240; 
Bank  v.  Lierman,  5  Neb.  247;  Miller 
v.  Jones,  32  Ark.  337;  Bi'obston  v. 
Cahill,  64  111.  356;  Woodard  v.  Spil- 
ler,  1  Dana  (Ky.),  180;  McCafferty 
v.  Heritage,  5  Houst,  (Del.)  220 ;  Mil- 
ler v.  Johnston,  27  Md.  6 ;  Moore  v. 
United  States,  91  U.  S.  270 ;  Merritt 
v.  Straw,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  657 ;  Bank  v. 
Houghton,  41  Mich.  709;  Himrod  v. 
Bolton.  44  111.  App.  516.  It  has  been 
recently  held  that  haudwritiug  can- 
not be  proved  by  comparison,  in 
Gibson  v.  Trowbridge  (Ala.,  1893),  11 
S.  Rep.  365;  Riggs  v.  Powell  (Ga., 
1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  482;  Bevan  v. 
Bank,  31  N.  E.  Rep.  679;  39  111.  App. 
577. 


§  140.]  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  203 

A  writing  intended  to  be  used  as  a  standard  must  be  proved 
or  admitted  to  be  genuine  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  judge. 
The  matter  is  one  lying-  largely  in  his  discretion,  and  his  ac- 
tion should  not  be  reversed  unless  he  has  committed  some 
manifest  error  of  law  or  unless  his  finding  is  totally  unsup- 
ported by  the  evidence  adduced.1  Where  the  standard  of 
comparison  is  an  irrelevant  writing  and  its  genuineness  is  dis- 
puted, it  must  be  proved  directly  by  the  evidence  of  witnesses 
who  can  testify  of  their  own  knowledge  that  it  is  genuine/ 

In  those  courts  which  permit  a  comparison  with  irrelevant 
writings,  expert  testimon}'  is  always  admissible.  So  attor- 
neys at  law,3  business  men  with  extensive  correspondence,4 
bank  officials,5  conveyancers,6  book-keepers,7  public  officials,8 
writing  teachers,9  and  other  persons  who  from  their  position 
or  profession  have  a  peculiar  knowledge  of  the  subject,  may 
testify.1 

In  many  cases,  particularly  in  those  states  where  compari- 
son is  not  permitted  with  irrelevant  writings,  it  has  been  held 
that  the  testimony  of  experts  upon  handwriting  is  not  ad- 

1  State  v.  De  Graff  (N.  O,  1894),  18  bois  v.  Baker,  30  N.  Y.  355 ;  Walker 

S.  E.  Rep.  507 ;  Hyde  v.  Woolfolk,  1  v.  State,  14  Tex.  App.  G09. 

Iowa,    159;  Wilson   v.   Irish,   62  id.  6  Vinton  v.  Peck,  14  Mich.  287. 

260;  Tyler  v.  Todd,  36  Conn.   218;  » State  v.  De  Graff  (N.  C,  1894),  18 

Thompson  v.  State  (Me.),  13  Atl.  Rep.  S.  E.  Rep.  507 ;  State  v.  Ward,  39  Vt. 

892;    Com.   v.   Coe,    115  Mass.   481;  225;  Viuton  v.  Peck,  supra. 

People  v.  Cline,  44  Mich.  290 ;  Con-  &  Eisfield  v.    Dill   et  al.,  71   Iowa, 

rad  v.  Bank,   10   Mart.  700;  Hall  v.  442;  State  v.  De  Graff  (N.  C,  1894), 

Van  Vranken,   64    How.     Pr.    407 ,  18  S.  E.  Rep.  507 ;  State  v.  Phair,  48 

Depue  v.  Place,  7  Pa.  St.  428 ;  Rowell  Vt.  366. 

v.  Fuller,  59  Vt   68a     Cf.  Carter  v.  9  Eisfield    v.    Dill,    7    Iowa,    442 ; 

Jackson,  58  N.  H.  156 ;  State  v.  Hast-  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  450 ;  Bacon 

iugs,  53  N.  H.  452.  v.  Williams,  13  Gray,  525. 

2Pavey  v.  Pavey,  30  Ohio  St.  600;  i  Edmonston  v.  Henry,  45  Mo.  App. 

Baker  v.  Haines,  6  Whart.  (Pa.)   284.  346;  Com.  v.  Williams,  105  Mass.  62; 

Cf.  Bell  v.Brewster,  44  Ohio,  690,  and  Sweetzer  v.  Lowell,  33,  Me.  446,  450; 

Sweigart   v.    Richard,  8   Barr   (Pa.),  Goldstein  v.  Black,  50  Cal.  462,465; 

436,  where  comparison  is  to  be  made  Hyde    v.    Woolfolk,    1    Iowa,    159; 

with  writings  over  thirty  years  old.  Murphy  v.  Hagerman,  Wright  (Ohio), 

*  State  v.  Phair,  48  Vt.  366.  293,  297 ;  Winch  v.  Norman,  65  Iowa, 

4Ort  v.  Fowler,  31  Kan.  478 ;  Ken-  186;    Ort   v.   Fowler,   31    Kan.   478; 

nedy  v.  Upshaw,  66  Tex.  442,  446.  Mallory  v.  Ohio  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.,  90 

&Lyon  v.  Lyman,  9  Conn.  55;  Du-  Mich.  112;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  18a 


204 


PRIVATE    WRITINGS. 


[§  Hi; 


missible  and  comparison  is  generally  to  be  made  by  the  court 
or  jury.1 

§141.  To  what  expert  may  give  evidence. —  An  expert 
may  testify  to  the  characteristics  of  the  handwriting;  as,  for 
example,  that  it  is  cramped  or  crowded,2  or  natural  and  free 
as  distinguished  from  stiff,  artificial  and  seemingly  copied,3  as 
to  the  condition  of  the  paper,4  whether  two  writings  are  by 
the  same  person,5  or  as  to  the  slant6  or  other  peculiarity  of  the 
letters,7  as  to  the  size,  length  and  position  of  signatures;8  and 
he  may  give  his  opinion  upon  the  question  whether  writings 
were  or  were  not  written  at  the  same  time  by  the  same  per- 
son and  with  the  same  writing  materials.9 

An  expert  may  testify  to  the  character  of  alterations  and 
erasures  and  may  give  his  opinion  as  to  their  date  and  the 
means  by  which  they  were  effected.10 


1  Hawkins  v.  Grimes,  13  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  257,  264;  Kernin  v.  Hill,  37 
111.  209 ;  Fee  v.  Taylor,  83  Ky.  259 ; 
Tome  v.  Railroad  Co.,  39  Md.  37; 
Gitchell  v.  Ryan,  24  111.  App.  372; 
In  re  Rockey's  Estate,  155  Pa.  St. 
453;  26  Atl.  Rep.  656;  32  W.  N.  C. 
434;  Tucker  v.  Kellogg  (Utah,  1892), 
28  Pac.  Rep.  870 ;  State  v.  Zimmer- 
man, 47  Kan.  242. 

2  Dubois  v.  Baker,  30  N.  Y.  355. 

3  Moody  v.  Rovvell,  17  Pick.  (Mass.) 
490 ;  Ludlow  v.  Warshing,  108  N.  Y. 
520;  Cox  v.  Dill,  85  lud.  334;  Good- 
year v.  Vosburgh,  63  Barb.  154; 
Wither  v.  Roe,  45  Me.  571. 

*  Hancock  v.  O'Rourke,  6  N.  Y.  S. 
549. 

5  Rogers  v.  Tyler  (111.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  393.  See  upon  the  subject 
of  expert  evidence,  post,  §§  185-198. 

6  Goodyear  v.  Vosburgh,  63  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  154. 

7  Taylor  v.  Crowninshield,  5  N.  Y. 
Leg.  Obs.  209,  22:5. 

SRiordau  v.  Guggerty,  39  N.  W. 
Rep.  107. 

9  Bank  v.  Holls,  11  Gray  (Mass.), 
250;  Vinton  v.  Peck,  14  Mich.  287; 


Bank  v.  Young,  36  Iowa,  44 ;  Sheldon 
v.  Warner,  45  Mich.  638;  Reese  v. 
Reese,  90  Pa  St.  89;  Ellingwood  v. 
Bragg,  52  N.  H.  488;  Clark  v.  Bruce, 
12  Hun,  271;  Dubois  v.  Baker,  30 
N.  Y.  355 ;  Fulton  v.  Hood,  34  Pa.  St. 
365.  An  expert  may  be  permitted  to 
use  a  black-board  (Dryer  v.  Brown, 
52  Hun,  391),  and  as  the  correctness 
of  his  opinion  may  usually  be  thus 
ocularly  demonstrated,  his  evidence 
is  of  little  weight,  it  seems,  if  he 
neglects  to  do  so.  In  re  Gordon 
(N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  268.  See 
§  197. 

lOKruse  v.  Chester,  66  Cal.  353; 
Dubois  v.  Baker,  30  N.  Y.  355 ;  Han- 
kins  v.  Grimes,  13  B.  Mon.  (Ky.) 
257-264;  Balleutine  v.  White,  77  Pa. 
St.  20-22;  Eisfield  v.  Dill,  71  Iowa, 
442;  Pate  v.  People,  8  111.  644;  Moye 
v.  Hoydun,  30  Miss.  110;  Vinton  v. 
Peck,  14  Mich.  287:  Edelin  v.  Sand- 
ers, 8  Md.  118.  See  as  to  alteration, 
§§  128,  129.  If  the  date  stated  in  the 
writing  is  obscure  an  expert  may 
give  an  opinion  as  to  the  real  date 
(Stone  v.  Hubbard.  7  Cush.  595),  or 
he  may  testify  to  the  age  of  the  in- 


§  142.]  PRIVATE    WRITINGS.  205 

In  a  prosecution  for  homicide,  where  the  identity  of  tho 
prisoner  is  in  issue,  the  signature  of  the  accused  may  be  com- 
pared with  writings  proved  to  have  been  written  by  the  slayer, 
or  various  writings  alleged  to  have  been  written  by  him  may  be 
compared  with  each  other  by  an  expert  or  in  some  cases  by 
the  jury.1 

§  142.  Proof  of  exhibits  in  equity. —  An  exhibit,  using  the 
word  in  its  general  sense,  means  a  document  produced  and 
identified  for  use  as  evidence.1  In  its  restricted  sense  it  sig- 
nifies writings  which  are  proved  in  chancery  either  by  the  ex- 
press admissions  of  the  parties  in  the  pleadings,  or  by  failing 
to  deny  their  existence  when  alleged,  or  by  viva  voce  examina- 
tion of  witnesses  at  the  hearing.2  So  also  when  writings  are 
put  in  evidence  before  a  referee,  before  a  jury  in  open  court, 
or  before  a  commissioner  or  examiner  appointed  to  take  testi- 
mony in  chancery,  they  should  be  exhibited  to  the  witness  and 
examiner  or  referee  to  be  identified  b}^  the  witness,  after  which 
they  should  be  marked  as  exhibits  by  the  proper  official.3  In 
modern  chancery  practice  certain  classes  of  documents,  among 
which  are  included  ancient  records  and  deeds,  public  records, 
and  deeds,  bonds,  notes,  bills  of  exchange,  letters  and  receipts, 
may  be  proved  as  exhibits  at  the  hearing  after  answer  before 
the  chancellor,4  by  any  witness  who  can  testify  to  their  execu- 
tion, identity  or  their  accuracy  as  copies  of  an  original. 

Usually  a  party  who  wishes  to  prove  an  exhibit  on  a  hear- 
ing must  obtain  an  order  to  that  effect,5  though  his  adversary 
has  no  right  to  an  inspection  of  the  writing  prior  to  the  hear- 
ing.6 

strument     Eisfield  v.  Dill,  71  Iowa,  Bank  of  State  of  N.  Y,  4  Hill  (N.  Y), 

442;  Clark  v.  Bruce,    12   Hud,   171.  516. 

Contra,  Cheney  v.  Dunlap,  20  Neb.  4  Daniell's  Ch.   Pr.   (5th  Am.    ed.) 

265.  881,882;  Chalk  v.  Raine,  7  Hare,  893 : 

i Crist  v.  State,  21  Ala.  137;  Early  Gtesley,  Eq.  Evid.,  188. 

v.   State,  9  Tex.   App.   476;  Bell  v.  5 Barrow  v.  Rhinelander,  1  Johns. 

Brewster,  44  Ohio  St.  690 ;  10  N.  E.  Ch.  (N.  Y.)  559 ;  Miller  v.  Avery,  2 

Rep.  679.  Barb.  Ch.  582. 

1  Abb.  Law  Diet  6  Lord  v.  Colvin,  2  Do  G.,  M.  &  G. 

*Gresley,  Eq.  Evid.,  146.  47. 

*  Abb.  Law  Diet. ;   Com.  Bank  v. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

JUDICIAL  AND  OTHER  PUBLIC  RECORDS. 


§  1505.  The  effect  of  judicial  records 
as  evidence.  , 

Effect  of  judgments  on  those 
in  privity  with  the  par- 
ties. 

Judgment  must  have  been 
final  and  on  the  merits. 

Judgments  conclusive  only 
as  to  material  facts  in  issue. 

Identity  of  cause  of  action 
required. 

Persons  affected  by  judg- 
ments in  rem  and  actions 
fixing  personal  status. 

Criminal  judgments. 

Proof  of  judgments  as  facts 
and  their  use  as  proving 
ulterior  facts  distinguished. 

Validity  and  effect  of  for- 
eign judgments. 

Judgments  of  sister  states. 

Judgments  in  bar  need  not 
be  pleaded. 

§  142a.  Inspection  of  public  records, —  From  early  times, 
both  at  common  law  and  by  statute,  the  right  of  the  individ- 
ual to  inspect  public  records  in  so  far  as  he  had  personal 
interest  in  them  has  been  admitted.1  In  respect  to  judicial 
records  of  courts  of  a  superior  jurisdiction,  an  inspection 
may  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  be  compelled  by  mandamus, 
though  the  official  having  the  custody  of  the  papers  is  a  party 
to  the  suit  in  which  they  are  to  be  used.2  But  where  a  man- 
damus is  desired  to  inspect  the  books  of  an  inferior  tribunal 
or  official,  it  will  generally  be  necessary  for  the  applicant  to 
show  affirmatively  that  he  has  some  personal  interest  in  the 

(  i  Scribner  v.  Chase.  27  111.  App.  36.     Fox  v.   Jones,  7  B.  &  C.   732.     Cf. 
a  Rex  v.  Brangen,  1  Leach  Cr.  Cas.     Colnen  v.  Orr,  71  Cal.  43. 
32;  Stone   v.   Crocker,  24  Pick.  88; 


142«. 

Inspection  of  public  records. 

§  1501 

1426. 

Proof  of  executive  and  legis- 

lative acts  and  writings. 

151. 

142c. 

Proof  of  public  non-judicial 
records. 

143. 

Proof  of  foreign  laws. 

152. 

143a. 

Proof    of     municipal     ordi- 

nances. 

153. 

144. 

Effect  of   public  documents 

as  evidence. 

154. 

145. 

Historical  and  scientific  pub- 

lications —  Almanacs   and 

155. 

newspapers. 

140. 

Proof  of   judicial  records  — 

General  rule. 

15G. 

147. 

Proof  of   records  of  courts 
of  equity  and  of    inferior 
courts. 

157. 

148. 

Proof  of  records  of  courts  of 
other  states. 

158. 

149. 

Proof  of  foreign  judgments. 

159. 

150. 

Records  of  surrogate  courts. 

160. 

150a. 

Proof  of  returns  on  writs. 

§  142,7.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


L"7 


document  and  that  he  intends  to  copy  it  for  a  proper  pur- 
pose.1 

When,  in  order  to  give  the  right  of  appeal,  officials  must 
make  a  record  of  their  action,  they  may  be  compelled  to  do  so 
by  mandamus?  and  an  official  may  be  thus  compelled  to  re- 
cord a  deed  or  file  a  paper,3  or  to  correct  his  records,4  o.r  to 
affix  a  seal  to  a  document.5  A  public  official  may  exercise 
reasonable  discretion  in  making  rules  to  be  observed  by  those 
desiring  to  inspect  the  records  of  his  office.6 

In  respect  to  the  records  of  a  private  corporation,  the  same 
general  principles  are  applicable.  Such  records,  while  public 
so  far  as  its  officials  and  stockholders7  are  concerned,  are  pri- 
vate as  regards  other  persons.  A  stranger  having  no  interest 
in  the  corporation  cannot  obtain  mandamus  to  compel  an  in- 
spection of  them.8  But  a  stockholder  has  a  constitutional 
right  to  inspect  the  books  of  the  corporation,  though  a  refusal 
to  permit  him  to  do  so  is  not  ground  for  an  action  for  dam- 
ages;9 and  a  stockholder  who  is  also  a  debtor  to  the  corpo- 
ration cannot  obtain  a  mandamus  to  inspect  its  books  as  a 
stockholder  to  aid  him  in  his  capacity  of  debtor.10 


1  Hayes  v.  White,  66  Me.  305  ;  State 
v.  Hoblitzelle,  83  Me.  620;  Stockman 
v.  Brooks,  27  Pac.  Rep.  746 ;  Diamond 
M.  Co.  v.  Powers,  51  Mich.  145 ;  O'Hara 
v.  King,  53  III.  303;  Cormack  v. 
Walcott,  17  Am.  &  Eug.  Corp.  Cases, 
309 ;  State  v.  Rachac,  37  Minn.  372. 

2  People  v.  Murray.  23  N.  Y.  S.  160 ; 
Bennett  v.  McCaffery,  28  Mo.  App. 
220 ;  State  v.  Field,  37  id.  83 ;  Warren 
Co.  v.  State,  15  Ind.  250. 

3  Trinity  v.  Lane,  79  Tex.  643; 
United  States  v.  Hall,  7  Mackey,  14; 
Willflange  v.  McCollom,  83  Ky.  361 ; 
People  v.  Collins,  7  Johns.  549;  In  re 
Goodell,  14  id.  325;  Strong's  Case, 
Kirby  (Conn.),  345. 

*  People  v.  Brooklyn,  7  N.  Y.  S. 
327;  State  v.  Clayton,  34  Mo.  App. 
563;  Ellis  v.  Bristol,  2  Gray  (Mass.), 
370;  Bovver  v.  O'Brien,  2  Ind.  423; 
People  v.  Matterson,  17  111.  167. 

5  Prescott  v.  Ganser,  34  Iowa,  175. 
See,  also,  Crew   v.  Saunders,  2  Str. 


1005;  Atherton  v.  Beard,  2  T.  R  610; 
Iasigi  v.  Brown,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  401. 

«*  Upton  v.  Catlin,  17  Colo.  546; 
State  v.  Long,  37  W.  Va.  266 ;  Atche- 
son  v.  Huebner,  90  Mich.  643. 

'State  v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co., 
29  Mo.  App.  301 ;  State  v.  Sportsman 
P.  &  C.  Ass'n,  28  id.  326 ;  People  v. 
United  States  Merc.  Rep.,  20  Abb. 
N.  C.  192 ;  People  v.  Pa  ton,  20  id.  195. 
But  cf.  Appeal  of  Em  p.  Pass.  R  R. 
Co.,  19  Atl.  Rep.  629 ;  26  W.  N.  C.  26. 

estate  v.  Bank,  1  Rob.  (La.)  470: 
State  v.  May,  106  Mo.  488 ;  Bank  v. 
Hilliard,  5  Cowen,  419 ;  6  id.  62 ;  State 
v.  St.  Louis  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.,  29  Mo. 
App.  301 ;  Union  Bank  v.  Kuapp,  3 
Pick.  96.  Cf.  United  States  v.  Hull, 
7  Mackey,  14. 

9  Legend  re  v.  New  Orleans  Brew. 
Co.  (La..  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  837. 

^Investment  Co.  v.  Eldridge,  2  Pa, 
Dis.  Ct.  R.  304. 


208  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.       [§§  1425,  142(?. 

§  142b.  Proof  of  executive  and  legislative  acts  by  docu- 
ments.—  The  extent  to  which  the  public  acts,  seals,  statutes, 
etc.,  of  the  various  departments  of  the  supreme  government 
will  be  noticed  having  been  fully  explained  elsewhere  in  this 
work,1  no  extended  reference  to  the  subject  is  necessary. 
When,  however,  it  is  deemed  necessary  to  prove  any  public 
executive  or  other  official  act,  it  may  be  done  prima  facie  by 
the  production  of  a  printed  copy  of  a  proclamation,  or  public 
notice  or  announcement,  or  by  a  newspaper,  official  gazette 
or  other  printed  document  containing  an  account  thereof  * 
which  was  printed  according  to  law  under  governmental  con- 
trol or  authorization.2 

The  court  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the  public  statutory 
and  common  law  prevalent  in  its  own  jurisdiction,3  though 
private  statutes  or  resolutions  must  be  proved.  The  custom 
of  printing  the  legislative  acts  of  congress  and  of  the  various 
state  legislatures  is  now  almost  universal,  and  as  the  printing 
is  done  by  persons  under  statutory  authorization  and  subject 
to  governmental  control  and  supervision,  no  objection  can  be 
urged  to  admitting  these  printed  statutes  in  evidence. 

It  is  now  the  general  rule,  usually  by  judicial  decision  but 
frequently  by  express  legislative  enactment,  that  a  book  pur- 
porting to  be  printed  by  authority  and  to  contain  the  stat- 
utory law  may,  if  duly  attested  as  prescribed  by  law,  be  read 
as  the  best  evidence  of  any  statutory  law,  public  or  private, 
domestic  or  foreign.4 

§  142c.  Proof  of  public  non-judicial  records. —  The  entries 
in  public  registers  or  books  of  public  record  are  entitled  to  a 

i  See  post,  §§  240,  242.  3  See  §  242. 

sWhiton  v.  Albany,  etc.  Co.,  109  4  Watkins  v.  Holman,  16  Pet.  25; 

Mass.  24;  Fulham  v.  Howe,  14  Atl.  Pease  v.  Peck,  18  How.  595;  Tennant 

Rep.  652;  60  Vt.  351;  Larten  v.  Gil-  v.  Tennant,  110  Pa.  St  484;  Falls  v. 

ham,  2  111.  577 ;  Young  v.  Bank,  4  United  States  Sav.  S.  &  B.  Co.  (Ala., 

Cranch,   388;  People   v.   Wilson,   62  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  25;  Leach  v.  Linde, 

Hun,  618;  Eld  v.  Gorham,  20  Conn.  24  N.  Y.  S.  176;  Chicago  v.  Tuite,  44 

8;Larkin    v.    Burlington,    etc.    Co.  111.  App.  535 ;  Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala. 

(Iowa,    1892),    52  N.   W.   Rep.    480;  37 ;  Cochran  v.  Ward  (Ind.,  1892),  29 

Clemens  v.  Myer,.  44  La  390 ;  10  S.  N.  E.  Rep.  795.     Cf.  Laidley  v.  Cum- 

Rep.   797 ;  Lycett  v.  Wolff,  45  Mo.  mings,  83  Ky.  806 ;  Fulham  v.  Howe, 

App.  480  (printed  copy  of  census).  60  Vt  351. 


§  1I2<?.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  209 

high  degree  of  credibility  as  evidence  though  unauthenticated 
in  court  by  the  oath  of  the  party  who  made  them  or  in  whose 
custody  the  books  are  kept.  The  general  notoriety  of  the 
matters  to  which  such  entries  relate,  the  public  and  official 
character  of  the  books  and  of  those  who  keep  them,  the  fact 
that  the  entries  are  made  by  an  officer  who  is  under  oath, 
that  they  are  required  or  authorized  to  be  made  by  law,  or 
else  are  made  in  the  usual  course  of  official  duty  without  any 
present  motive  to  misrepresent,  combine  to  give  the  evidence 
obtained  from  such  sources  peculiar  force  and  value. 

To  give  an  official  character  to  a  public  record  or  register 
it  is  not  essential  that  it  should  have  been  authorized  or  or- 
dered to  be  kept  by  statute.1  It  is  the  duty,  if  not  the  right, 
of  every  official  to  keep  a  record  of  his  public  transactions 
whenever  such  a  practice  is  an  appropriate  and  common 
mode  of  evidencing  them.  This  record,  whether  required  to 
be  kept  by  statute  or  not,  is  a  public  record.2  The  books 
themselves,  being  produced  from  the  proper  custody,  should 
be  received  in  evidence  without  authentication,3  unless  it  is 
affirmatively  shown  that  they  have  been  negligently  or  ille- 
gally kept.4 

It  is  obvious,  however,  that  the  actual  production  of  public 
records  in  court  will  be  very  inconvenient,  if  not  impossible, 
on  account  of  their  bulky  character  and  of  the  constant  use 
to  which  they  are  subjected.  So  their  proper  and  legal  cus- 
todian is  the  party  who  has  made  the  entries.5  Upon  these 
grounds,  at  common  law  and  now  generally  by  statute,  the 
contents  of  books  of  public  record,  such  as  the  records  of  the 

1  United  States  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  3  pulley  v.  Hilton,  12  Price,  625 ; 
365 ;  Grafton  v.  Reed,  34  W.  Va.  172 ;  Oglesby  v.  Forman,  77  Tex.  647 ; 
Downing  v.  Diaz,  80  Tex.  436 ;  16  S.  Baillie  v.  Jackson,  17  Eng.  L.  &  Eq. 
W.  Rep.  49;  Simmons  v.  Spratt,  20  131. 

Fla.  495.     But  cf.  contra,  Hatchett  *  Walker  v.  Wingfield,  18  Ves.  443 

v.  Conner,   30  Tex.    104;    Jacobi  v.  Loving  v.  Warren  Co.,  14  Bush  (Ky.) 

Order  of  Germania,  26  N.  Y.  S.  318.  316 ;  Sanger  v.  Merritt,  120  N.  Y.  114 

2  Succession  of  Short  (La.,  1894),  14  Chamberlain  v.  Baily,  101  Mass.  188 
S.  Rep.  184;  Coleman  v.  Com.,  25  Butler  v.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  45  Iowa,  93 
Gratt.  (Va.)  865 ;  Kyburg  v.  Perkins,  Springs  v.  Schenck,  106  N.  C.  153. 

6  Cal.  674 ;  Miller  v.  Indianapolis,  123  5  "  The  carrying  of  original  papers 

Ind.  196 ;  24  N.  E.  Rep.  228 ;  Burton  from  one  court  to  another  is  to  be 

v.  Tuite,  80  Mich.  218 ;  44  N.  W.  Rep.  disapproved."     Rogers  v.  Tillman,  72 

282.  Ga.  479. 
14 


210 


JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


[§  149«. 


navy  1  or  treasury  department,2  county  records  and  parish 
registers,3  public  assessment  rolls,4  postoffice,  custom-house* 
and  land-office  records,6  registers  of  vital  statistics,7  registers 
of  deeds,8  of  mechanics'  liens 9  and  of  leases  of  public  lands,10 
may  be  proved  by  an  examined  copy  properly  sworn  to  by 
the  party  making  it,  or  by  a  transcript  properly  verified  and 
certified  by  the  official  whose  duty  it  is  to  keep  the  original.11 
If  the  form  of  the  certificate  is  prescribed  by  statute,  the 
legal  requirements  must  be  substantially  complied  with,  though 
immaterial  inaccuracies  or  informalities  may  be  disregarded.12 
Thus,  where  the  official  character  of  the  certificate  is  apparent 
upon  its  face,  it  is  not  required  that  it  shall  state  that  it  is  a 


1  Maurice  v.  Warden,  57  Md.  510. 
2Mott  v.   Ramsay,   92  N.  C.  152; 
United  States  v.  Bell,  111  U.  S.  477. 
3  Hall  v.  Aitkin,  25  Neb.  360. 
*  Clark  v.  Fairly,  30  Mo.  App.  335. 
s  State  v.  Loughlin,  20  Atl.  Rep.  88. 

6  Stevenson  v.  Reeves,  8  S.  Rep. 
695;  Niche  v.  Earle,  117  Ind.  270. 

7  Shutesbury  v.  Hadley,  133  Mass. 
242;  Tucker  v.  People,  117  111.  91. 

8  Chamberlain  v.  Brasley,  101  Mr.ss. 
88. 

9  Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247. 
lOEmmett  v.  Lee  (Ohio,  1894),  35  N. 

E.  Rep.  794. 

n  Stone  Cattle  &  Past.  Co.  v.  Boon, 
73  Tex.  158 ;  Buck  v.  Gage,  27  Neb. 
306 ;  43  N.  W.  Rep.  110 ;  New  Eng- 
land, etc.  Co.  v.  Farmington,  etc.  Co., 
8  U.  S.  229 ;  Simmons  v.  Spratt,  20 
Fla.  495  ;  Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb. 
247;  Bryan  v.  Wear,  4  Mo.  106; 
Owings  v.  Speed,  5  Wheat.  420; 
Ronkendorf  v.  Taylor,  4  Pet.  349, 
360;  Sawyer  v.  Baldwin,  11  Pick. 
494 ;  United  States  v.  Johns,  4  Dall. 
412,  415;  Jackson  v.  Boneham,  15 
Johns.  226 ;  Ray  v.  Stewart,  105  N. 
C.  472 ;  Fruin-Bambrick  Co.  v.  Geist, 
37  Mo.  App.  509 ;  Wiley  v.  Inhabit- 
ants, 150  Mass.  426 ;  Thrasher  v.  Bal- 
lard, 33  W.  Va.  285 ;  Thurston  v.  Luce, 
61  Mich.  292 ;  Bell  v.  Kendrick  (Fla, 


1890),  6  S.  Rep.  868 ;  Liddon  v.  Hod- 
nett,  22  Fla.  442 ;  Lagow  v.  Glover, 
77  Tex.  448;  Emanuel  v.  Gates,  53 
Fed.  Rep.  772;  Tillotson  v.  Weber 
(Mich.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  837; 
Lamar  v.  Pearse  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  92.  Cf.  State  v.  Cake,  24  N.  J. 
L.  516. 

i-'Mackey  v.  Bait.  etc.  Co.,  19  D.  C. 
282;  Collins  v.  Ball,  82  Tex.  259; 
Dawson  v.  Parham,  55  Ark.  286 ;  Sax- 
ton  v.  Nimms,  14  Mass.  320 ;  Sanger 
v.  Merritt,  120  N.  Y.  114;  Good- 
win v.  Jack,  62  Me.  416;  Cofer  v. 
Schening  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  123; 
State  v.  Hendrix,  98  Mo.  374 ;  Gunn 
v.  Peakes,  36  Minn.  177 ;  Bean  v.  Lor- 
yea,  81  Cal.  51.  A  deputy  may  cer- 
tify in  the  name  of  the  legal  custodian 
of  the  record  (Hague  v.  Porter,  45  111. 
318 ;  Triplett  v.  Gill,  7  J.  J.  Marsh. 
433 ;  Grant  v.  Levan,  4  Pa.  St.  393 ; 
Greasons  v.  Davies,  9  Iowa,  219), 
though  not  in  his  own  name.  Snyder 
v.  Brown,  4  Watts  (Pa.),  132.  The 
signature  of  the  keeper  of  the  record 
certifying  thereto  need  not  be  proved. 
Floyd  v.  Ricks,  14  Ark.  286.  But  its 
forgery  may,  on  the  other  hand,  be 
shown.  Prather  v.  Johnson,  3  Har. 
&  J.  (Md.)  487 ;  Bryan  v.  Wear,  4  Mo. 
106. 


§  143.]  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER   PUBLIC   RECORDS.  211 

true  copy  of  an  official  document  or  record.1  "Where  by  statute 
it  is  required  that  certain  private  writings  must  be  recorded, 
they  are  then  regarded  as  public  records,  and  it  is  often  en- 
acted that  such  records  or  exemplified  or  certified  copies 
thereof  may  be  introduced  as  original  evidence  without  fur- 
ther proof.2  A  copy  of  a  record  of  a  conveyance  made  when 
deeds  were  required  to  be  stamped  is  not  inadmissible  as  evi- 
dence because  it  does  not  show  that  the  original  was  stamped.3 
But  a  deed  is  not  admissible  without  proof  under  such  a  stat- 
ute where  the  fact  in  issue  is  the  forgery  of  the  original.4 

§  143.  Proof  of  foreign  laws. —  As  the  courts  refuse  to 
take  judicial  notice  of  foreign  laws5  it  is  always  necessary  to 
prove  them  as  facts  before  they  can  be  applied  to  the  facts  in 
issue.  This  is  now  customarily  done  in  the  case  of  a  statute 
by  reading  it  from  a  printed  book  or  copy  purporting  to  con- 
tain the  statute  in  question,  and  duly  attested  as  a  true  copy 
by  the  supreme  authority  of  the  foreign  government,  usually 
under  its  seal,  or  otherwise  proved  to  have  been  published  by 
or  under  proper  authority  or  to  have  been  received  as  proof 
of  the  law  in  the  courts  of  the  foreign  state.6  "Whether  the 
foreign  statute  has  been  satisfactorily  proved  is  a  question  for 
the  jury  alone;  but  where  the  proof  of  a  foreign  law  consists 
wholl}7  of  documentary  evidence,  the  construction  and  legal 
effect  of  this  evidence  are  wholly  within  the  exclusive  province 
of  the  court.7    It  has  been  held  that  a  consul's  certificate  under 

i  Darcy  v.  McCarthy,  35  Kan.  722;  426 ;  Pierce  v.  Indseth,  106  U.  S.  551 ; 

Collins   v.  Valleau   (Iowa,   1889),  43  Spaulding  v.   Vincent,   24  Vt.   501: 

N.  W.  Rep.  284.  Church  v.  Hubbard,  2  Cranch,  238; 

*  See  ante,  §§  134-136 ;  How.  Stat  Lincoln  v.   Battelle,   6  Wend.    475 ; 

Mich.,  §  5685;  Iowa  Code,  §  3702;  Packard  v.  Hill,  2  id.  411;  Charlotte 

Gen.  Stat.  Ind.  1881,  §  462 ;  Bradley  v.  Chouteau,   33  Mo.    194 ;  Owen  v. 

v.  Silsbee,  33  Mich.  328 ;  Cox  v.  Jones,  Boyle,  15  Me.  147. 
52  Ga.  438.     Cf.  contra,  as  to  a  cer-        ^Ennis  v.  Smith,  14  How.  (U.  S.) 

tificate  of  adoption,   McCollister  v.  400  (Code  Civil  of  France) ;  Gibson  v. 

Yard  (Iowa,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  447.  Manuf.  Co.,  144  Mass.  83 ;  McCormick 

»  Collins  v.  Valleau  (Iowa,  1889),  43  v.  Garrett,  5  De  G,  M.  &  G.  278 ;  Uf- 

N.  W.  Rep.  284.  ford  v.  Spaulding,  156  Mass.  65 ;  Ken- 

«  People  v.  Swetland,  77  Mich.  33 ;  nard  v.  Kennard,  63  N.  H.  308 ;  In- 

43  N.  W.  Rep.  779.  surance  Co.  v.  Wright,  60  Vt.  522 ; 

bSee  post,  §  242.  Alexander  v.  Penn.  etc.  Co.,  48  Ohio 

«  See  §1 t3a;  Ennis  v.  Smith,  14  How.  St.  623 ;  Hawes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  37. 


212 


JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


[§  143. 


seal  that  the  book  was  authorized  or  recognized  as  an  author- 
ity is  not  enough  as  proof.1 

Under  the  rule  that  the  evidence  of  experts  is  admissible  in 
matters  concerning  which  they  have  peculiar  knowledge  or 
skill,2  witnesses  who  are  learned  in  the  statutory3  and  com- 
mon law  of  a  country  will  be  permitted  to  testify  to  their 
knowledge  or  opinion  of  what  that  law  is.4  Foreign  unwrit- 
ten laws,  usages  and  customs  may  be  ordinarily,  and  neces- 
sarily must  be  from  the  circumstances  of  the  case  often  proved 
by  such  evidence.5  And  such  persons  may  refresh  their  memory 
by  reading  from  text-books  of  authorit}^  and  from  reports  of 
the  decisions  of  foreign  courts,  and  may  perhaps  read  these 
authorities  to  the  jury,6  provided  the  witness  is  willing  to 
swear  that  the  books  are  admitted  as  authorities  by  the  courts 
of  the  country  in  question.7 

The  witness  will  be  required  to  be  an  advocate  or  official 
who  has  had  actual  practice  in  the  courts  of  the  country 


i  Church  v.  Hubbart,  2  Cranch,  187, 
236. 

2  See  post,  §§  185-198. 

3  Church  v.  Hubbard,  2  Cranch, 
237. 

4Ennis  v.  Smith,  14  How.  426; 
Baron  De  Bode  v.  Reginam,  10  Jur 
217;  The  Poweshiek,  2  Low.  142; 
Barrows  v.  Dowris,  9  R.  I.  446 ;  Holls 
v.  Van  Alstyne,  20  111.  202 ;  Roberts' 
Will,  8  Paige,  446 ;  Pierce  v.  Indseth, 
106  U.  S.  555. 

5  Dalrymples  v.  Dalrymple,  2  Hagg. 
115-144;  Dickerson  v.  Matheson,  50 
Fed.  Rep.  78;  Talbot  v.  Seaman,  1 
Cranch,  12-38;  Denison  v.  Hyde,  6 
Conn.  508;  Brackett  v.  Norton,  4 
Conn.  517 ;  Kline  v.  Baker,  99  Mass. 
253;  Carnegie  v.  Morrison,  2  Met. 
404 ;  Haven  v.  Foster,  9  Pick.  130 ; 
Bagley  v.  Francis,  14  Mass.  453 ;  Lin- 
coln v.  Battell,  6  Wend.  482 ;  Francis 
v.  Ocean  Ins.  Co.,  6  Cowen,  429 ;  Dyer 
v.  Smithy  12  Conn.  384;  Brush  v. 
Wilkins,  4  Johns.  Ch.  520 ;  State  v. 
May  Look,  7  Oreg.  54 ;  Hall  v.  Cos- 
tello,  48  N.  H.  176 ;  Kennard  v.  Ken- 


narcl,  63  id.  308 ;  Amer.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Rosenagle,  77  Pa.  St.  507. 

6  See  post,  §  145. 

7  Barrows  v.  Downs,  9  R.  I.  4461; 
Crogin  v.  Lamkin,  7  Allen,  395 ; 
Penobscot  Co.  v.  Bartlett,  12  Gray, 
244;  Arne  v.  McCamber,  124  Mass. 
90 ;  Raymont  v.  Colter,  3  Pick.  293, 
296 ;  Brush  v.  Scribner,  11  Conn.  407 ; 
Lattimer  v.  Eglin,  4  Desauss.  26,  32. 
Chancellor  Kent,  in  speaking  of  the 
sources  of  knowledge  of  the  common 
law,  uses  the  following  language : 
"  The  best  evidence  of  the  common 
law  is  to  be  found  in  the  decisions  of 
the  courts  of  justice  contained  in  the 
numerous  volumes  of  reports  which 
crowd  the  lawyer's  library,  and  in  the 
treatises  and  digests  of  learned  men, 
which  have  been  multiplying  from 
the  earliest  periods  of  English  history 
down  to  the  present  time.  The  re- 
ports of  judicial  decisions  contain 
the  most  certain  evidence,  and  the 
most  authoritative  and  precise  appli- 
cation of  the  rules  of  the  common 
law,"     1  Com.  440. 


§  143a.]  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


213 


whose  law  he  is  called  upon  to  prove.1  Thus,  a  Eoman  Cath- 
olic bishop  may  testify  to  the  law  of  his  church,2  a  student  in 
a  university  to  the  law  of  Germany,3  and  a  French  consul  to 
the  law  of  France.4 

The  states  of  the  Union  are  so  far  foreign  to  each  other 
that  the  rule  stated  as  defining  the  mode  of  proving  foreign 
laws,  both  statute  and  unwritten,  is  generally  applicable  to 
them.  In  man}7  of  them  by  statute,  the  statute  law  of  an- 
other state  may  now  be  proved  by  reading  the  same  from  a 
printed  volume  which  upon  its  face  purports  to  contain  the 
law  of  that  state.5 

§  143a.  Municipal  ordinances. —  In  the  absence  of  statutory 
provision  regulating  the  proof  of  ordinances,  the  proper  evi- 
dence of  their  existence  and  contents  is  the  original  record 
containing  the  ordinance  itself,6  or  a  copy  properly  certified 
or  otherwise  authenticated  by  the  official  having  charge  of 
them.7    Usually,  however,  it  is  enacted  by  the  charter  or  a 


1  See  post,  §  185,  as  to  experts ;  In 
re  Bonelli,  L  R  1  Prob.  Div.  69; 
Cartwright  v.  Cartwright,  26  W.  R 
684 ;  Kennard  v.  Kennard,  63  N.  H. 
308.  Cf.  Donkt  v.  Thelluson,  8  C.  B. 
812. 

'^  Sussex  Peerage  Case,  11  C.  &  F. 
134. 

3  Bristow  v.  Sequeville,  L.  R  5  Exch. 
275. 

4Lacon  v.  Higgins,  3  Stark.  178. 
See  Story  on  Conf.  of  Laws,  §§  641, 
642,  aud  the  earlier  cases  there  cited. 

5  Mullen  v.  Morris,  2  Pa.  St.  85; 
Hempstead  v.  Read,  6  Conn.  480 ; 
Hawes  v.  State,  7  S.  Rep.  302;  88 
Ala.  37 ;  Falls  v.  United  States  Sav., 
Loan  &  Bldg.  Soc.  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S. 
Rep.  25;  Tennant  v.  Tennant,  110 
Pa.  St.  478 ;  1  Atl.  Rep.  532 ;  Leach  v. 
Linde,  24  N.  Y.  S.  176;  Kean  v.  Rice, 
12  S.  &  R  203;  Greasens  v.  Davis,  9 
Iowa,  219 ;  Raynham  v.  Canton,  3 
Pick.  293.  Under  a  statute  rendering 
admissible  printed  decisions  of  the 
courts  of  a  foreign  state,  dissenting 


opinions  are  not  admissible.  Chicago, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Tuite,  44  111.  App.  535. 

6  Railroad  Co.  v.  Johnson  (Ga., 
1893),  16  S.  E  Rep.  49. 

1  See  post,  §  242 ;  City  v.  Dunn,  1 
McCord  (S.  C),  333;  Metrop.  St.  R 
Co.  v.  Johnson  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E. 
Rep.  49 ;  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Shires, 
108  111.  617;  Baily  v.  State  (Neb., 
1890),  47  N.  W.  Rep.  208;  Pugh  v. 
Little  Rock,  35  Ark.  75;  Black  v. 
Jacksonville,  36  111.  301;  Fitch  v. 
Pinckard,  5  111.  78 ;  Chicago  v.  Engle, 
76  id.  317.  The  written  records  of 
the  corporation  purporting  to  con- 
tain the  ordinances,  coming  from  the 
custody  of  the  town  clerk  and  prop- 
erly identified  as  a  municipal  record, 
have  been  received  to  prove  ordi- 
nances. People  v.  Wilson,  62  Hun, 
612;  Barnes  v.  City,  89  Ala.  602; 
Tipton  v.  Norman,  72  Mo.  380 ;  Ot- 
tumwa  v.  Schaub,  52  Iowa,  515 ; 
Stewart  v.  Clinton,  79  Mo.  604 ;  Eich- 
enlaub  v.  St.  Joseph  (Mo.,  1893),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  8. 


214:  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§  14:3(1. 

general  statute  that  an  ordinance  may  be  proved  by  reading 
it  from  a  printed  volume  published  under  municipal  authority 
and  purporting  to  contain  the  municipal  by-laws.  Where 
this  is  the  case,  the  method  of  proving  ordinances  assimilates 
closel3r  to  that  employed  in  proving  foreign  or  private  stat- 
utes and  the  same  principles  of  law  are  applicable.1 

Proof  of  the  power  to  enact  the  ordinance  may  be  re- 
quired ;2  and  if  by  statute  certain  formalities,  such  as  an  adop- 
tion by  a  majority  vote,  recording  in  books  kept  for  the  pur- 
pose, signature  by  the  mayor  or  publication  are  prescribed  as 
necessary  to  its  validity,  strict  compliance  therewith  must  be 
shown.3  Where  objection  is  not  made  prior  to  the  reception 
of  the  ordinance  in  evidence,  it  will  be  presumed  that  it  was 
properly  enacted.4  A  compliance  with  such  statutory  require- 
ments must  ordinarily  be  proved  by  the  journal  of  the  mu- 
nicipal council,5  though  it  has  been  held  that,  where  the  record 
was  silent,  the  fact  that  an  ordinance  had  been  signed  could  be 
proved  by  the  parol  evidence  of  the  official  whose  duty  it 
was  to  sign  ordinances.6 

A  sworn  certificate  of  the  publisher  of  a  newspaper  in 
which  an  ordinance  was  published  is  satisfactory  evidence  of 
publication,7  though  it  has  been  held,  in  the  absence  of  statute, 

i  Barr  v.  Auburn,  89  111.  361 ;  State  48  Fed.  Rep.  278 ;  54  Fed.  Rep.  100 ; 

v.  King,  37   Iowa,   462 ;  Napman   v.  Heller  v.  City  of  Alvarado,  20  S.  W. 

People,  19  Mich.  352 ;  Independence  Rep.    1003 ;    1   Tex.    Civ.   App.   409 ; 

v.  Trouvalle,  15  Kan.  70 ;  Lindsay  v.  Seattle  v.  Doran,  5   Wash.   St.  482 ; 

Chicago,    115  111.    120;  Prell  v.  Mc-  Whitney  v.   Port  Huron,  50   N.  W. 

Donald,  7  Kan.  446 ;  Holly  v.    Ben-  Rep.  316 ;  88   Mich.  268 ;  Hutchison 

nett,   46  Minn.  386.     See,  also,   ante,  v.  Mount  Vernon,  40  111.  App.  19. 

§  143.     Where  a  written  or  printed  *  Flora  v.  Lee,  5  111.  App.  629. 

copy  of   an  ordinance  is   known  to  5  Lexington  v.    Headley,   5    Bush 

exist,  the  ordinance  cannot  be  proved  (Ky.),  508 ;  Bank  v.  Grenada,  54  Fed. 

by  parol  evidence,    but  the  writing  Rep.  100 ;  Ball  v.  Fagg,  67  Mo.  481 ; 

itself  must  be  produced  as  the  best  Covington  v.  Ludlow,  1  Mete.  (Ky.) 

evidence.     Stewart  v.  Clinton,  79  Mo.  295 ;  People  v.  Murray,  57  Mich,  396  ; 

604;  Baker  v.  Scofield,  58  Ga.  182.  Solomon  v.  Hughes,  24  Kan.  211. 

-Elizabethtown  v.  Lefler,23  111.  90.  6  Knight  v.  Kans.  etc.  Co.,  70  Mo. 

'Schott  v.  People,  89  111.  195  ;  Lar-  231. 
kin  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Iowa,  1892),  52  7  See  post,  §  145 ;  Albia  v.  G'Hara, 
N.  W.  Rep.  480;  Willard  v.  Killing-  64  Iowa,  297;  Kettering  v.  Jackson- 
worth,   8   Conn.   247;  Raker  v.  Ma-  ville,  50  111.  39 ;  Schwartz  v.  Oshkosh, 
quon,  9  111.  App.  155 ;  National  Bank  55  Wis.  490. 
of  Commerce  v.  Town  of  Grenada, 


§  144.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  215 

that  publication  may  be  shown  by  the  evidence  of  a  person 
who  saw  a  cop}7,  of  the  ordinance  posted  in  some  conspicuous 
public  place.1  But  such  a  method  of  publication  will  not  bo 
valid  if  publication  in  a  newspaper  is  required  by  statute,  or 
if  a  newspaper  is  published  in  the  town  and  publication  could 
have  readily  been  made  therein.2 

In  conformity  with  the  rule  of  construction  that  a  statute 
or  written  law  has  no  legal  existence  except  in  the  language 
in  which  it  was  enacted,  an  ordinance  which  is  required  to  be 
published  in  a  German  paper  must  be  printed  in  English 
where  there  is  no  express  statutory  provision  to  the  contrary.3 

§  144.  Effect  of  public  documents  as  evidence. —  The  prin- 
ciples upon  which  a  certified  copy  of  a  public  writing  is  ad- 
missible as  primary  evidence  of  the  record  are  identical  with 
those  which  have  been  explained4  as  regulating  the  admission 
of  the  entries  of  third  parties  when  constituting  a  part  of  the 
res  gestae.  The  credibility  of  private  and  public  entries  is  based 
upon  the  same  considerations,  namely,  that  they  were  made 
by  a  party  whose  duty  it  was  to  make  them,  who  had  compe- 
tent knowledge  of  the  subject-matter,  that  they  are  relevant, 
and  are  within  the  scope  of  official,  professional  or  private 
employment.  The  production  of  the  books  themselves  is  nec- 
essary as  the  best  evidence  of  private  entries.  They  do  not 
purport  prima  facie  to  be  authentic,5  but  their  original  char- 
acter and  correctness  must  be  proved  by  an  oath  of  the  person 
who  made  them,  or,  if  he  cannot  be  produced,  by  the  evidence 
of  some  other  competent  witness.6 

As  respects  copies  of  public  writings  certified  to  by  public 
officials,  it  may  be  said  that  they  are  evidence  of  all  the  facts 
they   contain.7    But   a  record  is   not  evidence   of  any   fact 

iNewhan  v.   Aurora,  14  111.  364;  v.  Keen,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.)342;  Whitcher 

Teft  v.  Size,   10  id.  432;   Eldora  v.  v.  McLaughlin,  115  Mass.  167;  Erwin 

Burlingame,  62  Iowa,  33.  v.  English,  61  Conn.  502 ;  Hancock 

2  Raker  v.  Maquon,  9  111.  App.  155.  v.  Flynn,  8  N.  Y.  S.   133 ;  White  v. 

3  State  v.  City  of  Orange,  22  Atl.  Whitney,  83  Cal.  163. 

Rep.  804;  54  N.  J.  L.  111.  t  Falls  Ld.   Co.  v.   Chisolm  (Tex., 

4  §§  58-61.  1888),  9  S.  W.  Rep.  479 ;  Bingham  v. 
&  Bradley  v.  Silsbee,  33  Mich.  328.  Cabot,  3  Dall.  19,  23,  39-41 ;  Radcliff 
6  Chenango  Bank  v.  Lewis,  63  Barb.  v.    Insurance  Co.,   7   Johns.   38,  51; 

111 ;  State  v.  Phair,  48  Vt.  366;  Cul-  Spangler  v.  Jacoby,  14  111.  299;  Root 
ver  v.  Marks,  122  Ind.  554 ;  Mulhall    v.  King,  7  Cowen,  617 ;  Darcy  v.  Mc- 


216 


JUDICIAL    AND    OTIIER    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


[§  144. 


not  required  to  be  recorded  by  the  officer  who  has  made  the 
entry.1  Thus,  a  marriage  register,  while  admissible  to  prove 
the  fact  and  date  of  the  marriage,  cannot  be  used  to  show  the 
age  of  either  contracting  party.2  Nor  is  a  certificate  of  bap- 
tism admissible  to  prove  a  person's  age  or  place  of  birth, 
though  his  age  may  be  mentioned  in  it.3  The  date  and  fact 
of  the  commitment  or  discharge  of  a  prisoner  may  be  shown 
by  the  prison  records,4  and  records  of  municipal  corporations 
and  official  boards  are  generally  admissible  to  prove  official 
and  municipal  acts  required  to  be  recorded.5  The  registry  of 
a  ship,  being  a  local  and  municipal  requirement,  is  not  recog- 
nized by  international  law  as  evidence  of  the  facts  which 
it  contains.  It  is  only  admissible  as  evidence  of  ownership 
when  corroborated  by  circumstances  which  will  render  it 
equivalent  to  an  admission,6  for  a  legal  and  nominal  owner- 
ship is  consistent  with  one  equitable  and  real  in  some  other 
person.  For  this  reason  a  register  is  never  evidence  in  favor 
of  a  person  claiming  ownership.7     Log-books  when  required 


Carthy,  35  Kan.  722  (copy  of  letter 
of  receiver  of  land  office).  The  writ- 
ing, whether  public  or  private,  should 
be  confined  to  those  facts  which  are 
desired  to  be  proved  by  the  part}7, 
and  his  adversary  cannot  be  allowed 
to  treat  the  documents  as  evidence 
for  all  purposes  and  use  them  on 
cross-examination  for  other  objects. 
Close  v.  Stuyvesant  (111.,  1890),  24  N. 
E.  Rep.  868 ;  Erie  &  Pac.  Des.  v.  Stan- 
ley, 123  111.  158;  14  N.  E.  Rep.  212; 
Murray  v.  Suen,  41  La.  Ann.  1109;  7 
S.  Rep.  126. 

1  McGuirk  v.  Mut.  Ben.  Life  Ins. 
Co.,  20  N.  Y.  S.  908;  66  Hun,  628; 
Berry  v.  Hull  (N.  M.,  1893),  30  Pac. 
Rep.  36 ;  Durfee  v.  Abbott.  61  Mich. 
471 ;  Lavin  v.  Mutual  Aid  Society, 
74  Wis.  349 ;  Hunt  v.  Chosen  Friends, 
64  Mich.  671 ;  Carrington  v.  Potter, 
37  Fed.  Rep.  767;  Hall  v.  Aitken,  25 
Neb.  360 ;  Brundred  v.  Del  Hoyo,  20 
N.  J.  L.  328;  Fitler  v.  Shotwell,  7 
Watts  &  S.  14 ;  Evanston  v.  Gunn,  99 


U.  S.  660  (signal  service  record) ;  The 
Maria,  32  L.  J.  Adm.  163. 

2  Doe  v.  Barnes,  1  M.  &  R.  386,  389. 

3  Clark  v.  Trinity  Church,  5  Watts 
&  Serg.  266 ;  Blackburn  v.  Crawford, 
3  Wall.  189;  Morrisey  v.  Ferry  Co., 
47  Mo.  521  ;  Derby  v.  Salem,  30  Vt. 
722. 

4  Rex  v.  Aickles,  1  Lead.  Cr.  Cas. 
435 ;  Salte  v.  Thomas,  3  B.  &  P.  188. 
See  post,  §§341-345. 

5  See  ante,  §  143a;  Worcester  v. 
Northborough,  140  Mass.  400;  Ron- 
kendorf  v.  Taylor,  4  Pet.  349 ;  Halleck 
v.  Boylston,  117  Mass.  469.  Contra, 
Buffalo  L.  T.  &  S.  D.  Co.  v.  Associa- 
tion (N.  Y.,  1891),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  942. 

6  Merchants'  N.  Co.  v.  Amsden,  25 
111.  App.  607. 

7  Bixby  v.  Franklin  Ins.  Co.,  8  Pick. 
86 ;  Rexford  v.  Snow,  46  Hun,  570 ; 
Tinkler  v.  Walpole,  14  East,  226; 
Weston  v.  Penniman,  1  Mason,  306, 
318;  Colsen  v.  Benzey,  6  Greenl. 
(Me.)  474;  Mclver  v.  Humble,  16  East, 
169,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  494. 


§  145.] 


JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    rUBLIO    RECORDS. 


217 


by  statute  are  admissible  as  public  records  to  show  prima 
facie  the  facts  required  to  be  recorded  in  them.  Otherwise 
entries  in  log-books  are  mere  private  entries,  depending  for 
admissibility  upon  their  character  as  admissions  or  as  a  part 
of  the  res  gestce} 

§  145.  Historical  and  scientific  books  and  publications  — 
Almanacs  and  newspapers. —  While  the  decisions  are  some- 
what at  variance,  it  may  be  said  that  books,  maps  or  plans, 
or  publications  relating  to  historical  or  scientific  subjects  of 
widespread  and  general  interest  and  notoriety  which  have, 
from  long  public  and  general  use,  become  recognized  au- 
thorities, will  be  received  to  prove  facts  treated  therein.2 
Maps  made  by  surveyors  or  published  by  governmental  au- 
thority have  sometimes  been  admitted  as  relevant  evidence  in 
case  of  disputed  boundaries,  or  where  distances  between  places 
are  in  question.  If  the  map  was  published  by  legislative  au- 
thority, it  should  be  certified  as  authentic  by  the  secretary  of 
state  or  other  proper  official.3  Private  maps  and  plats  should 
be  verified  by  the  testimony  of  the  surveyor  who  made  them 


1  The  Hercules,  1  Sprague,  534 
Orne  v.  Townsend,  4  Mason,  544 
United  States  v.  Gibert,  2  Surnn.  19 
Abbott  on  Shipping,  p.  46S. 

2  Roderiquez  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893), 
22  S.  W.  Eep.  97S ;  Com.  v.  King,  150 
Mass.  233 ;  Polhill  v.  Brown,  84  Ga. 
342  (Map) ;  Washburn  v.  Cuddihy,  8 
Gray,  430;  Morris  v.  Hanner,  7  Pet. 
504.  Cf.  Vaux  Peerage.  5  C.  &  F.  538 ; 
Schell  v.  Plumb  55  N  Y.  592 ;  Com. 
v.  Wilson,  1  Gray,  337  ;  Quackenbush 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  35  N.  W.  Rep.  523; 
73  Iowa,  45S ;  Ashworth  v.  Kittredge, 
12  Cush.  93;  Smith  v.  Navasota,  72 
Tex.  422 ;  Worcester  v.  Northborough, 
140  Mass.  397;  Ming  v.  Foote,  23 
Pac.  Rep.  515.  See  article  in  26  Am. 
Law  Rev.  390.  "  Historical  facts  of 
general  and  public  notoriety  may  be 
proved  by  reputation ;  and  that  may 
be  established  by  historical  works  of 
known  character  and  accuracy.  But 
evidence  of  this  sort  is  confined  in  a 


great  measure  to  ancient  facts  which 
do  not  presuppose  better  evidence, 
and  where  from  the  nature  of  the 
transaction,  or  the  remoteness  of  the 
period,  or  the  public  and  general  re- 
ception of  the  facts,  a  just  founda- 
tion is  laid  for  general  confidence. 
The  work  of  a  living  author  who  is 
within  reach  of  process  is  not  of  this 
nature.  He  may  be  called  as  a  wit- 
ness and  examined  as  to  the  sources 
and  accuracy  of  his  information." 
Story,  J.,  in  Morris  v.  Lessee  of 
Harmcr's  Heirs,  7  Pet.  558 ;  1  Greenl. 
Evid.,  §  497 ;  1  Whart.  Evid.,  gg  338, 
664. 

3  Nosier  v.  Railroad  Co.,  73  Iowa, 
268;  Armendiaz  v.  Stillman,  67  Tex. 
458 ;  3  S.  W.  Rep.  678 ;  Com.  v.  King, 
150  Mass.  221;  22  N.  E.  Rep.  205; 
Polhill  v.  Brown,  84  Ga.  338 ;  10  S.  E 
Rep.  921 ;  Donohue  v.  Whitney,  133 
N.  Y.  178;  Ming  v.  Foote  (Mont, 
1890),  23  Pac.  Rep.  513. 


21S 


JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


[§  146. 


or  by  some  other  competent  witness  who  will  swear  to  their 
correctness.1 

In  an  action  to  recover  for  personal  injuries  or  a  wrongful 
death,  life  and  mortality  tables  in  general  use  are,  if  identified, 
admissible  to  show  the  expectation  of  life.2  A  newspaper 
may  be  received  in  evidence  to  prove  facts  which  a  statute 
provides  shall  be  published  in  it,  such,  for  example,  as  laws 
passed  by  the  legislature,  notices  in  legal  proceedings,  the 
formation  and  dissolution  of  a  partnership,  and  the  like.3  An 
almanac  is  admissible  to  show  facts  recorded  therein,  not 
strictly  as  evidence  of  such  facts,  but  rather  to  refresh  the 
memory  of  the  court  and  jury,  where  they  are  such  (e.  g.,  the 
rising  and  setting  of  the  sun  and  moon)  as  courts  are  bound 
to  notice  judicially.4 

§  146.  Proof  of  judicial  records. —  A  judicial  record  is  an 
accurate  history  of  a  suit  from  its  origin  to  its  termination, 
including  the  conclusion  of  law  thereon,  drawn  up  by  the 


i  Roe  v.  Strong,  107  N.  Y.  356; 
Com.  v.  Lurtzer,  19  Atl.  Rep.  681 ; 
26  W.  N.  C.  46 ;  Donohue  v.  Whitney, 
133  N.  Y.  178.  As  to  the  admissi- 
bility of  field-notes  of  surveyors 
where  questions  of  boundaries  are 
involved,  see  Holliday  v.  Maddox,  39 
Kan.  359;  18  Pac.  Rep.  99;  Dugger 
v.  Nickerson,  100  N.  C.  1 ;  6  S.  E.  Rep. 
746.  A  map  showing  an  ancient 
survey  on  which  a  more  recent  sur- 
vey is  based  is  not  itself  admissible 
to  corroborate  the  later  survey, 
though  it  may  be  relevant  as  evi- 
dence of  reputation  to  contradict  it. 
Wyatt  v.  Duncan  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  665.  To  prove  the  accuracy 
of  a  private  survey,  evidence  that 
other  surveys  made  by  the  same  sur- 
veyor had  been  found  correct  is  ad- 
missible. Schunior  v.  Russell,  83 
Tex.  83.  But  where  the  accuracy  of 
the  map  is  not  shown  affirmatively, 
still  it  may  be  used  by  a  surveyor  in 
giving  evidence  to  explain  his  testi- 
mony to  the  jury.  Griffith  v.  Rife, 
72  Tex.  185 ;  12  S.  W.  Rep.  168 ;  Dob- 


son  v.  Whisivant,  101  N.  C.  645 ;  8  S. 
E.  Rep.  126. 

2  Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hissong 
(Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  209 ;  13  id.  130 ; 
Morrison  v.  McAfee  (Oreg.,  1893),  32 
Pac.  Rep.  400 ;  Greer  v.  Louisville, 
etc.  Co.  (Ky.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  649 ; 
Seagel  v.  Railroad  Co.,  83  Iowa,  380; 
Steinbrunner  v.  Railroad  Co.,  146  Pa. 
St  504. 

3  See  ante,  §§  141a,  143a,  150a. 
Price-currents  have  also  been  ad- 
mitted to  show  the  market  value  of 
merchandise.  1  Whart.  Evid.,  §§  671- 
675. 

*  See  §§  237,  241 ;  Mobile,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Ladd,  9  S.    Rep.    169;   92  Ala.  287 
Munshower    v.    State,    55    Md.    11 
Sisson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  14  Mich.  497 
Kilgour  v.  Miles,  6  G.  &  J.  (Md.)  274 
People  v.  Cheekee,  61  Cal.  404 ;  Reed 
v.  Wilson,  41  N.  J.  L.  29 ;  Finney  v. 
Callendar,   8   Minn.   41 ;    Brough  v. 
Perkins,  6  Mod.  81 ;  Sprowl  v.  Law- 
rence. 33  Ala.  674 ;  Sascer  v.  Bank,  4 
Md.  420. 


§  146.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER   PUBLIC    RECORDS.  219 

proper  officer,  for  the  purpose  of  perpetuating  the  exact  state 
of  the  facts.1  "  Records  are  memorials  or  remembrances,  in 
rolls  of  parchment,  now  paper,  of  the  proceedings  and  acts  of 
a  court  of  justice,  which  hath  power  to  hold  pleas."2  At 
common  law  a  judicial  record  might  be  proved  by  the  record 
itself,  and  this  originally  was  the  only  manner  of  proof  in  a 
plea  of  mil  tiel  record?  Records  might  also  be  proved  by 
exemplified  copies,  or  by  duly  authenticated  copies  certified 
by  an  officer  of  the  court,  or  by  an  examined  copy  sworn  to 
by  a  person  who  has  made  it  or  compared  it  with  the  original. 

Exemplified  copies  are  copies  under  the  great  seal  attached  in 
chancery  to  which  the  record  was  brought  up  by  a  writ  of  certio- 
rari or  under  the  seal  of  the  court  to  which  the  record  belonged.4 
In  America  a  copy  exemplified  under  the  seal  of  the  court  in 
which  the  record  belongs  has  been  from  an  early  date  ad- 
missible as  evidence  both  at  common  law  and  by  statute. 
Such  a  copy  is  conclusive  as  proof  even  on  the  issue  of  nul 
tiel  record? 

An  office  copy  of  a  record  is  a  copy  authenticated  by  a  cer- 
tificate of  an  officer  authorized  to  furnish  copies,6  and  at  com- 
mon law  it  will  be  received  upon  his  credit  in  the  court  where 
the  record  belongs  as  of  equal  value  to  the  original.  If,  as  is 
usually  the  rule  throughout  the  United  States,  the  court  offi- 
cer is  authorized  or  directed  by  statute  to  furnish  copies  to  all 
applicants,  and  if  his  certified  copy  has  been  made  primary 
evidence  of  the  original,  then  the .  certified  or  office  copy  will 
be  received  in  any  court  under  the  same  supreme  jurisdiction.7 

An  examined  copy  is  one  which  the  witness  has  compared 

1  Davidson  v.  Murphy,  13  Conn,  seems  that  if  the  court  has  no  seal 
317.  none    need    be    affixed.      Com.    v. 

2  Coke  Lit.  260a.  Phillips,  11  Pick.  30;  Com.  v.  Down- 
it  Co.  Lit.  260a;  3  Bl.  Com.  24,  331.     ing,  4  Gray,  29.     The  records  of  the 

4  Bull.  N.  P.  226,  227 ;  3  Inst.  173.     Confederate  courts  are  not  provable 

5  Boyce  v.  Auditor,  51  N.  W.  Rep.  by  copies.  Schaben's  Estate,  6  Ct  of 
457 ;  90  Mich.  314 ;  Gunn  v.  Howell,     CI.  230. 

35  Ala.  144;  Ladd  v.  Blunt,  4  Mass.  6  Bull.  N.  P.  229. 

402;  Vance  v.   Reardon,  2   Nott   &  7  See  §243;  Flack  v.  Andrews,  86 

McC.  299 ;  Com.  v.  Phillips,  11  Pick.  Ala.  395.     In  the  absence  of  statute 

28 ;  Watrous  v.  Cunningham,  71  Cal.  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  clerk 

30 ;  Mackey  v.  B.  &  P.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  has  authority  to  furnish  exemplified 

282 ;  Halluni  v.  Dickisou,  47  Ark.  copies.  Gunn  v.  Peakes,  36  Minn.  177. 
126;  Vail  v.  Smith,  4  Cow.  71.     It 


220 


JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER   PUBLIC   RECORDS. 


[§  146. 


Avith  the  contents  of  the  original  record  or  with  what  the 
officer  or  other  person  has  read  as  such  and  which  he  is  ready 
to  swear  is  a  true  copy.  It  is  necessary,  however,  in  proving 
a  record  by  an  examined  copy  to  show  that  the  original  record 
was  complete 1  and  was  found  in  the  proper  custody  and 
place,2  though  it  is  not  absolutely  essential  for  the  persons 
comparing  the  copies  with  the  record  to  read  them  alternately.3 

The  record  itself  is  always  admissible  where  a  copy  of  it 
would  be  received.4  If  the  record  would  be  inadmissible,  of 
course  the  copy  is  also  inadmissible.5  As  a  matter  of  practice, 
however,  at  least  in  modern  times,  the  production  of  the 
records  is  usually  dispensed  with,  the  court  being  satisfied 
with  a  literally  exact  copy  of  the  record  certified  by  the  clerk 
or  exemplified  by  the  court  seal.6 

Where  the  court  has  power  to  set  aside  a  verdict  it  is  nec- 
essary, in  proving  the  verdict  by  a  copy  of  the  record,  to  show 
what  judgment  was  docketed  by  the  clerk,  for  it  may  be  that 
the  verdict  was  set  aside.7  This  is  not  required  where  the 
court  has  no  power  to  set  the  verdict  aside,8  or  in  the  trial  of 


i  Heath  v.  Page,  60  Pa.  St.  108. 

2  Woods  v.  Banks,  14  N.  H.  101 ; 
Goodrich  v.  Weston,  102  Mass.  363. 

3  Rolfe  v.  Dart,  2  Taunt.  52 :  Lynde 
v.  Judd,  3  Day  (Conn.),  499 ;  Hill  v. 
Packard,  5  Wend.  387;  Reed  v. 
Lamb,  6  Jur.  828.  Cf.  1  Whart. 
Evid.,  §  94;  Dodge  v.  Gallatin,  130 
N.  Y.  117.  A  judgment  of  a  court  of 
record  cannot  be  proven  by  the 
judge's  minutes.  Moore  v.  Bruner,  31 
111.  App.  400. 

4  See  §  142c;  State  v.  Bartlett,  47 
Ind.  396;  Folsom  v.  Cressy,  73  Me. 
270;  Gray  v.  Davis,  27  Conn.  447; 
Johnson  v.  Wakulla,  9  S.  Rep.  690; 
28  Fla.  720. 

5  Meegan  v.  Boyle,  19  How.  (U.  S.) 
130;  Lamberton  v.  Windom.  18 
Minn.  506 ;  State  v.  Wells,  11  Ohio, 
261. 

6  Davenport  v.  Mahon  (Pa.,  1892), 
6  Kulp,  350 ;  State  v.  Orrick,  106  Mo. 
Ill ;  Cofer  v.  Schening(Ala.,  1893),  13 
S.  Rep.  123 ;  Mackey  v.  B.  &  P.  Co.,  19 


D.  C.  282.  Where  an  issue  is  raised 
upon  the  existence  of  a  domestic  ju- 
dicial record,  the  question,  though 
one  of  fact,  is  for  the  court  alone,  on 
the  theory  that  the  judge  can  exam- 
ine the  very  record  itself.  Currier  v. 
Richardson,  63  Vt.  617;  Hall  v.  Will- 
iams, 6  Pick.  237 ;  Carter  v.  Wilson, 
1  Dev.  &  Bat  362.  As  respects  for- 
eign records  provable  only  by  copy, 
the  question,  turning  on  the  authen- 
ticity of  a  paper,  is  for  the  jury. 
Kentzer  v.  Kentzer,  3  Wash.  St.  166; 
Adams  v.  Betz,  1  Watts  (Pa.),  425 ; 
State  v.  Isham,  3  Hawks  (S.  C),  185; 
Baldwin  v.  Hale,  17  Johns.  (N.  Y.) 
272  ;  Trotter  v.  Mills,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
512 ;  De  Sobry  v.  De  Laistre,  2  Har. 
&  J.  (Md.)  191. 

7  Ayrey  v.  Davenport,  2  N.  R.  474 ; 
Donaldson  v.  Jude,  2  Bibb,  60.  Cf. 
Baldridge  v.  Foust  (Neb.),  44  N.  W. 
Rep.  110. 

SFelter  v.  Mulliner,  2  Johns.  181. 


§147.]  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER   PUBLIC    BEGOBDS.  221 

an  issue  of  fact  out  of  a  court  of  equity,1  or  where  the  only 
fact  to  be  shown  is  that  a  verdict  was  rendered.2 

§  147.  Proof  of  records  of  court  of  equity  and  of  courts 
of  inferior  jurisdiction.— The  rules  applicable  to  the  proof 
of  records  of  a  court  of  common  law  are  generally  recognized 
in  proving  the  decrees  and  orders  of  courts  of  equity.3  If 
it  is  only  sought  to  prove  the  fact  that  a  decree  was  ren- 
dered, copies  of  the  pleadings  upon  which  it  was  based  need 
not  be  furnished,  though,  if  the  decree  is  pleaded  in  bar,  it 
will  be  necessary  to  show  the  whole  record  as  respects  the 
matter  in  question.4 

An  answer  in  equity  may,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  be 
proved  in  civil  cases  by  an  examined  copy,5  though  in  a  pros- 
ecution for  perjury  committed  in  an  answer  it  is  required  to 
produce  the  original  with  proof  that  the  party  was  sworn.6 
In  either  case  the  identity  of  the  party  must  be  shown,  and 
this  may  be  done  by  proof  of  his  handwriting  or  otherwise.7 

In  consequence  of  the  looseness  and  lack  of  system  with 
which  the  records  of  inferior  courts  are  so  often  kept,  the 
rigid  requirements  of  the  common  law  respecting  the  proof 
of  judicial  records  are  relaxed  as  concerns  them.8  If  the  in- 
ferior court  is  of  record  (and  that  it  is  will  be  presumed),  the 
record  may  be  proved  at  common  law  by  an  exemplified  or 
certified  copy.9 

1  Pitton  v.  Walter,  1  Stra.  162.  The  clerk    must    of  necessity   take 

2  Barlow  v.  Dupuy,  1  Mart.  442.  down  the  doings  of  the  court  iu  brief 

3  See  ante,  §  146;  Blower  v.  Hollis,  notes.  This  he  usually  does  in  a 
1  Cromp.  &  Mees.  396;  4  Com.  Dig.  minute-book  called  the 'docket,' from 
97,  tit.  "Evidence,"  c.  1;  Cofer  v.  which  a  full,  extended  and  intelligi- 
Schening  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  123.  ble  record  is  afterwards  to  be  made 

4Wiuans  v.  Dunham,  5  Wend.  47;  up.    Until  they  can  be  so  made,  these 

Wilson  v.  Conine,  2  Johns.  280.     Cf.  short  notes  must  stand  as  the  rec- 

Thomas  v.  Stewart,  92  Ind.  246.  ord."     Pruden  v.  Alden.  23  Pick.  187 ; 

5 1  Story's  Eq.  PI.,  §§  870-876.  1  Greenl.  on   EvkL,  §  513;   Holt  v. 

6  Rex  v.  Morris,  2  Burr.  1189;  Rex  Maverick  (Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep. 

v.  Rensen,  2  Campb.  508.  532 ;  Holcomb  v.   Cornish,  8  Conn. 

"Rex  v.  Morris,  5  Burr.  1189;  Hen-  375;  Todd  v.  Johnson  (Minn.,  1892), 

nell  v.  Lyon,  1  B.  &  Aid.  182.    See  52  N.  W.  Rep.  864 ;  Baldwin  v.  Prouty, 

§  129,  "  Identity."  13  Johns.   430 ;  Com.   v.  Balkom,  3 

8  Miller  v.  Knapp,  26  W.  N.  C.  29.  Pick.  281;  State  v.  Bartlett,  47   Me. 

9  "The  courts  are  to  take  notice  how  396;  Goldstone  v.  Davidson,  19  Cal. 
the  records  of  their  own  and  of  other  41;  Lancaster  v.  Lane,  19  III.  242. 
courts  are  in  fact   made  and  kept.  See  cases  in  note  3,  infra,  p.  227. 


222  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§  148. 

Where  the  court  has  no  seal,  an  exemplification  may  be 
dispensed  with,1  and  if  there  is  no  clerk  the  judge  may  act  as 
such.2  Unless  a  strict  compliance  with  a  statutory  form  of 
certification  is  required,  any  authentication  affixed  to  a  tran- 
script of  the  record  substantially  identifying  and  authenticat- 
ing it  will  suffice.3  But  where  no  record  is  kept,  or  where  it 
is  incomplete  or  fragmentary,  the  proceeding  in  inferior  courts 
may  be  proven  by  the  production  of  the  justice's  docket,4  of 
■the  original  writ  and  pleadings,  supplemented  by  the  oath  of 
the  justice  or  clerk  or  of  some  other  competent  witness.5 

The  certification  of  the  records  of  courts  of  justices  of  the 
peace  is  now  largely  regulated  by  statute,  which  should  in- 
variably be  consulted.  As  respects  the  authentication  of  for- 
eign judgments  of  justices'  courts,  the  prevalent  requirement 
is  that  the  transcript  of  the  record  or  the  certificate  of  the 
judgment  or  other  judicial  act  shall  be  signed  by  the  justice 
and  his  clerk,  if  there  be  any,  and  that  to  this  authentication 
shall  be  attached  a  certificate  of  a  clerk  of  some  superior  court 
of  record. certifying  to  the  capacity  of  the  justice  himself.5 

§  148.  Proof  of  records  of  the  courts  of  other  states. — 
By  the  federal  constitution  it  is  enacted  that  "full  faith  and 
credit  shall  be  given,  in  each  state,  to  the  public  acts,  records 
and  judicial  proceedings  of  every  other  state.  And  the  con- 
gress may,  by  general  laws,  prescribe  the  manner  in  which 

1  Cora.  v.  Downing,  4  Gray,  29,  30.  W.  Rep.  532 ;  Dyson  v.  Wood,  3  B.  &  C. 

2  Statement  v.  Hinchman,  27  Pa.  449,  451;  Strong  v.  Bradley,  13  Vt  9; 
St  479 ;  Case  v.  Huey,  26  Kan.  353.  Carpenter  v.  Willett,  18  How.  Pr.  400 ; 

3  Shea  v.  Man.  R,  Co.,  8  N.  Y.  S.  332 ;  Shea  v.  Man.  Ry.  Co.,  8  N.  Y.  S.  332. 
Am.  Emi.  Co.  v.  Fuller  (Iowa,  1892),  A  recital  in  a  transcript  of  a  record 
50  N.  W.  Rep.  48 ;  Mackey  v.  B.  &  of  a  justice's  court  that  a  party  was 
P.  R.  Co.,  19  D.  C.  282 ;  Swope  v.  duly  served  is  conclusive  of  that  fact 
Paul  (Ind.,  1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  42;  (Payne  v.  Taylor,  34  111.  App.  491),  and 
English  v.  Sprague,  33  Me.  440;  Com.  service  may  be  shown  by  parol.  Wil- 
v.  Ford,  14  Gray,  399 ;  McGrath  v.  kerson  v.  Schoonmaker,  77  Tex.  615. 
Seagrave,  4  Allen,  443;  Baur  v.  Beal  6  Trader  v.  McKee,  2  111.  558;  Dra- 
(Colo.,  1890),  23  Pac.  Rep.  345;  Stamper  goo  v.  Graham,  9  Ind.  212;  Bank  v. 
v.  Gay  (Wyo.,  1890),  23  Pac.  Rep.  69;  Evans,  32  Iowa,  202;  Gay  v.  Lloyd, 
Webster  v.  Daniel,  47  Ark.  131 ;  Mc-  1  Greene  (Iowa),  78 ;  Bank  v.  Hardin, 
Dermott  v.  Barnum,  19  Mo.  204.  1    Wright    (Ohio),    430 ;     Belton    v. 

*  Beardsley  v.  Brame,  85  Cal.  134.        Fisher,  44  111.  32 ;  N.  Y.  Code  C.  P. 
5  Holt  v.  Maverick  (Tex.,  1894),  24  S.     939 ;  Beirn  v.  Borst,  5  Wend.  292. 


§   148.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  223 

such  acts,  records  and  proceedings  shall  be  proved,  and  the 
effect  thereof."  l 

In  carrying  out  this  provision  congress  has  prescribed  that 
"  the  records  and  judicial  proceedings  of  the  courts  of  any 
state  shall  be  proved  or  admitted  in  any  other  court  within 
the  United  States  by  the  attestation  of  the  clerk  and  the  seal 
of  the  court  annexed,  if  there  be  a  seal,  together  with  a  cer- 
tificate of  the  judge,  chief  justice  or  presiding  magistrate,  as 
the  case  may  be,  that  the  said  attestation  is  in  due  form.  And 
the  said  records  and  judicial  proceedings,  authenticated  as 
aforesaid,  shall  have  such  faith  and  credit  given  to  them  in 
every  court  within  the  United  States  as  they  have  by  law  or 
usage  in  the  courts  of  the  state  from  whence  such  records  are 
or  shall  be  taken."  2 

In  construing  this  statute,  the  attestation  by  the  clerk  must 
be  in  the  form  regularly  employed  in  the  state  in  which  the 
record  belongs.  If,  as  is  essential,  it  is  so  certified  by  the 
judge  of  the  court,3  the  judge's  certificate,  which  is  the  only 
admissible  evidence  of  that  fact/  is  conclusive.5  ,  If  the  court 
has  a  seal  it  must  be  affixed  to  the  clerk's  attestation,6  while 
if  it  has  none,  this  fact  should  appear  in  the  attestation  or 
certificate.7 

In  conformity  with  the  requirement  that  the  copy  shall  be 
attested  by  the  clerk,  an  attestation  by  an  under  or  deputy 
clerk  will  cause  the  transcript  to  be  rejected,8  though  certified 

i  Const  U.  S.,  art.  IV,  §  1.  4  Smith  v.  Blagge,  1  Johns.  Cas.  238 ; 

2  Statute  U.  S.,  May  26,  1790  (U.  S.  Holdridge  v.  Marsh,  30  Mo.  App.  352. 

Stats,  at  Large,  L.  &  B.  Ed.,  122) :  &  Ferguson  v.  Harwood,  7  Cranch, 

Hall  v.  McKay,  78  Tex.  248 ;  Rand  v.  408;    Bean  v.  Loryea,   81  Cal.    151; 

Hanson  (Mass.,  1891),  28  N.  E.  Rep.  6 ;  Andrews  v.  Flack,  88  Ala.  294. 

Susenbach  v.  Wagner,  41  Minn.  108;  •>  Turner  v.  Waddington,  3  Wash. 

Rea  v.  Scully,  76  Iowa,  343.     The  pro-  126 ;  Allen  v.  Thaxter,  1  Blackf.  399 : 

ceedings  of  the  courts  of  the  Cher-  Dunlap  v.  Waldo,  6  N.  H.  450. 

okee  nation  and  of  the  territories  are  7Kirkland  v.  Smith,  2  Mart  (N.  S.) 

under  the  operation  of  this  provision.  497 ;  Craig  v.  Brown,  1  Pet.  352,  353  ; 

Mehlin  v.  Ice,  56  Fed.  Rep.  12.  Simons  v.  Cooks,  29  Iowa,  324 ;  Strode 

» Van  Storch  v.  Griffin,  71  Pa.  St  v.  Churchill,  2  Litt  (Ky.)  75. 

240 ;  Craig  v.  Brown,  1  Pet  C.  C.  352 ;  8  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  506 ;  Dono- 

Burnell  v.  Weld,  76  N.  Y.  103 ;  Drum-  hoo  v.  Brannon,  1  Overt  328 ;  Sam- 

mond  v.  Magruder,  9  Cranch,  122 ;  son  v.  Overton,  4  Bibb,  409 ;  Thomas 

Shown  v.  Barr,  29  Iowa,  296.  v.  Tanner,  6  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  152 ; 


224;  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§  148. 

by  the  judge  to  be  in  due  form,1  unless  the  court  has  no  clerk, 
the  judge  discharging  his  duties,  and  these  facts  are  stated  in 
the  certificate.2  The  certificate  of  the  judge  must  show  that 
he  is  the  chief  or  presiding  judge  of  the  court,3  and  that  he 
was  such  at  the  time  of  certifying  the  copy  of  the  records,4 
though  if  the  court  has  no  chief  judge,  a  certification  by  all 
the  judges  will  not  be  rejected.5  If  the  certificate  is  by  the 
"first  judge"  or  senior  judge  it  will  be  necessary  to  show 
aliunde  that  he  was  the  presiding  or  chief  judge.6  A  cer- 
tificate signed  by  a  chief  circuit  judge  of  a  certain  district 
must  show  on  its  face  that  the  court  from  which  the  record 
purports  to  issue  is  in  his  circuit  and  that  he  is  the  presiding 
judge  of  that  court.7  The  presiding  judge  must  state  that  at- 
testation is  in  due  form,8  and  that  the  clerk  certifying  was  at 
the  date  thereof  the  clerk  of  the  court.9  Where  the  court  no 
longer  exists,  the  clerk  and  presiding  judge  of  a  court  with 
which  its  records  and  powers  have  been  consolidated  may  fur- 
nish the  requisite  attestation.10 

This  statutory  mode  of  authenticating  records  is  not  exclu- 
sive of  any  other  mode  which  a  court  may  deem  proper.11    In- 

Schnertzell  v.  Young,  3  H.  &  McHen.  1  Elliott  v.  McClelland,  17  Ala.  206 ; 

(Md.)  502.  Randall  v.  Burtis,  57  Tex.  362 ;  Geron 

i  Morris  v.  Patchin,  24  N.  Y.  394  v.  Felder,  15  Ala.  304. 

Contra,  Young  v.  Glinzer,  1  Greene  8  Ordway  v.  Conroy,  4  Wis.  45. 

(Iowa),  196.  9  Johnson  v.  Howe's  Adm'r,  2  Stew. 

2  Cox  v.  Jones,  52  Ga.  438 ;  Low  v.  (Ala.)  27. 

Burrows,    12   Cal.    181;    Spencer  v.  10Darrah  v.  Watson,  36  Iowa,  116; 

Langdon.   21    111.    192;    Stewart    v.  Scott  v.  Blanchard,  8  Mart  303 ;  Craig 

Swazey,  23   Miss.   502.     The  official  v.  Brown,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  352 ;  Hunt  v. 

occupying  the  dual  capacity  must  at-  Lyle,  8  Yerg.  142  ;  Barbour  v.  Watts, 

test  as  clerk  and  certify  as  judge.  2  A.  K.  Marsh.  290,  293 ;  Balfour  v. 

Melius  v.  Houston,  41  Miss.  59,  cases  Chew,  5  Mart.   517;  Clarke  v.  Rice. 

supra.  15  R  I.  132;  Steere  v.  Tenney,  50  N. 

3Moyer  v.  Lyons,  38  Mo.  App.  635;  H.  461  (Confederate  court). 

Von  Storch  v.  Griffin,  71  Pa.  St.  240.  "  Thrasher   v-    Ballard,  33  W.  Va. 

4  Settle    v.    Allison,    8     Ga.    201 ;  285 ;  Kingman  v.  Cowles,  103  Mass. 

Stephenson  v.  Bannister,  3  Bibb,  369 ;  283 ;  Ex  parte  Povall,  3  Leigh,  816 ; 

Morris  v.  Patchin,  24  N.  Y.  394 ;  Pratt  Kean  v.  Rice,  12  S.   &  R,  203,  208 ; 

v.  King,  1  Oreg.  49 ;  Central  Bank  v.  Pepoon  v.  Jenkins,  2  Johns.  Cas.  119 ; 

Veasey,  14  Ark.  671.  Davis  v.  Furman,  21  Kan.  131 ;  State 

■■»  Arnold  v.Frazier,5Strobh.(S.C.)  3.  v.  Hunter,  94  N.  C.  829;  Louisville, 

e  Hudson  v.  Daily,  13  Ala.  722.  Cf.  etc.  Co.  v.  Parish  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E. 

Taylor  v.  Kilgore,  33  id.  214  Rep.  122. 


§  149.]       JUDIdAL  AND  OTHER  PUBLIC  RECORDS.  225 

asmuch  as  the  statute  by  its  terms  refers  only  to  courts  having 
seals,  clerks  and  a  presiding  judge,  it  is  inferred  that  courts 
of  limited  powers  and  jurisdiction,  as  courts  of  justices  of  the 
peace  and  municipal  courts,  whose  procedure  is  usually  regu- 
lated by  statute  or  local  usage,  and.  varies  greatly  in  different 
states,  are  not  included  in  it.  The  copies  of  proceedings  of 
such  courts  are  therefore  to  be  authenticated  in  the  manner 
prescribed  by  the  laws  of  the  state  into  whose  courts  they  are 
introduced.1 

The  statute  does  not  apply  to  the  authentication  of  copies 
of  the  record  of  a  state  court  for  use  in  a  federal  court  or 
vice  versa,2  or  of  copies  of  the  record  of  one  federal  court  to 
be  used  in  another,3  or  of  copies  or  exemplifications  of  the 
record  of  a  private  writing,  as  a  deed  or  will  recorded  under 
a  state  statute.4  In  such  case  a  common-law  exemplification 
under  the  seal  of  the  court  will  suffice.5 

If  the  requirements  of  the  statute  are  substantially  com- 
plied with,  a  properly  certified  copy  will  not  be  rendered  in- 
admissible because  of  mere  formal  and  verbal  irregularities,6 
or  because  it  does  not  show  the  identity  of  the  party,7  or  the 
grounds  on  which  the  judgment  was  based.8 

§  149.  Proof  of  foreign  judgments. —  At  common  law  the 
records  of  foreign  courts  could  be  proved  by  exemplified 
copies  under  seal  of  the  foreign  state,  by  sworn  and  examined 


i  Howard  v.  Coon,  93  Mich.  442 
Blackvvell  v.  Glass,  43  Ark.  209 
Bryan  v.  Farnsworth,  19  Minn.  239 
Mahurin  v.  Bickford.  6  N.  H.  567 
Silver  Lake  v.  Harding,  5  Ohio,  545 


v.  Hamilton,  90  Ala.  354 ;  Hallum  v. 
Dickinson,  54  Ariz.  311 ;  15  S.  W.  Rep. 
775. 

7  Missouri  Glass  Co.  v.  Gregg  (Tex., 
1890),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  174.     A  certified 


Blodgett  v.  Jordan,  6  Vt.  580 ;  Brown  copy  of  an  assignment  of  a  foreign 

v.  Edison,  23  Vt.  435.  judgment  constituting  a  part  of  the 

2Turnbull  v.  Payson,  95  U.  S.  218;  record  is  admissible  as  evidence  of 

Adams  v.  Way,  33  Conn.  419.     Con-  the  assignment.     Coughran   v.   Gil- 

tra,  Grant  v.  Levan,  4  Pa.  St  393.  man  (Iowa,  1891),  46  N.  W.  Rep.  1005. 

3  Mason   v.   Lawrason,    1   Cranch,  So  a  properly  authenticated  certifi- 
190.  cate  by  a  clerk  of  a  court  of  probate 

4  Russell   v.   Kearney,   27  Ga.  96 ;  that  a  person  is  an  administrator  is 
Carlisle  v.  Tuttle,  30  Ala.  613.  sufficient.     Abercrombie  v.  Stillman, 

5  Meuster  v.  Spalding,  6  McLean,  24.  77  Tex.  589. 

6  Bailey  v.  Martin,    119   Ind.  103;  s  Railroad  Co.  v.  Thornton,  12  La. 
Dwarak  v.  More,  25  Neb.  735,  741 ;  Ann.  736. 

Gunn  v.  Peakes,  36  Minn.  177;  Bogan 
15 


226  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC  KECOKDS.  [§  150. 

copies,  or  by  copies  duly  certified  by  an  official  authorized  by 
the  foreign  court.1  The  handwriting  of  certifying  officers 
must  be  proved  where  their  certificates  are  not  exemplified 
by  the  great  seal,2  but  the  certificate  of  a  notary  to  its  genu- 
ineness has  been  held  sufficient.3  The  seal  of  the  foreign  court 
must  be  proved,4  though  judicial  notice  will  be  taken  of  the 
great  seal  of  the  foreign  government  and  of  the  seals  of  courts 
of  admiralty.5  If  the  court  has  no  seal  a  seal  will  not  be  re- 
quired,6 but  a  stricter  degree  of  proof  of  the  clerk's  signature 
will  perhaps  be  necessary.7 

As  a  general  rule  in  the  proof  and  construction  of  foreign 
records,8  a  court  will  be  entitled  to  every  aid  which  will  place 
it  exactly  in  the  position  of  a  court  of  similar  jurisdiction  in 
the  foreign  state.  It  has  a  right,  therefore,  to  require  an  ex- 
planation of  technical  terms,  to  examine  the  certified  foreign 
copy,  and' to  require  a  translation  of  it  if  necessary,  and  proper 
information  bearing  upon  any  special  law9  or  peculiar  rule  of 
construction  which  obtains  in  the  foreign  state.10 

§  150.  Records  of  surrogates'  courts. —  A  will  is  not  ad- 
missible as  evidence  until  it  has  been  probated  in  due  form  in 
the  surrogates'  courts,11  or  in  some  court  having  power  and 

iGurm  v.   Peakes,   36  Minn.    177;  ling  v.  Herman,  17  Mich.  524;  Pick- 
Church  v.  Chibbart, 2 Cranch, 228;  But-  ard  v.  Bailey,  26  N.  H.  152;  Thomp- 
trick  v.  Allen,  8  Mass.  273 ;  Pickard  v.  son   v.   Mason,   4  Bradw.   (111.)  452  ,- 
Bailey,  6  Foster  (N.  H.),  152.    Cf.  Kop-  Delafield  v.  Hand,  3  Johns.  310. 
perl  v.  Nagy,  37  111.  App.  23.    It  seems  5  Lincoln  v.  Battelle,  6  Wend.  484 ; 
doubtful  whether  a  foreign  record  can  Thompson  v.  Stewart,  3  Conn.  171; 
be  proved  by  an  office  copy  or  by  a  cer-  Yeaton  v.  Fry,  5  Cranch,  335 ;  post, 
tified  copy  unless  the  certificate  it-  §§  243,  244. 
self  has  been   properly   exemplified  6  Packard  v.  Hill,  7  Cow.  434. 
under   the  seal   of   the    court  from  "Black  v.  Lord  Bray  brook,  2  Stark, 
which   it  proceeds  or  by  the  great  7 ;  Thompson  v.  Stewart,  3  Conn.  171. 
seal  of  the  state.     Griswold  v.  Pit-  8  United  States  v.  McRae,  L.  R.  3 
cairn,   2   Conn.   85;    Las   Caygas  v.  Ch.   86;   Dore  v.  Thornburgh  (Cal., 
Larionda,  4  Mart.  (La.)  283 ;  Packard  1891),  27  Pac.  Rep.  30. 
v.    Hill,   7   Cow.   434 ;    Peterman   v.  9  Arkansas  v.  Bowen,  20  D.  C.  291. 
Laws,  6  Leigh  (Va.),  523;  Catlett  v.  ">Di  Sora  v.  Phillips,  33  Law  J.  Ch. 
Insurance  Co.,  1  Paine  (U.  S.  C.  Ct.),  (H.  L  Cas.)  129 ;   In  re  Cliffs  Trusts 
594;  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Pet.  209;  (1892),  2  Ch.  229.     See  article  in  35 
Cavam  v.  Stewart,  1  Stark.  523.  Cent  L  J.  341. 

2  See  cases  in  last  note.  n  Kittredge  v.  Folsom,  8  N.  H.  Ill ; 

3  Yeaton  v.  Fry,  5  Cranch,  335.  Ochoa  v.  Miller,  59  Tex.  461 ;  Mour- 

4  See  post,  §  244;  Gardner  v.  Col.  sund  v.  Priess  (Tex.,  1892),  19  S.  W. 
Ins.  Co.,  7  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  511 ;  Cap-  Rep.  775. 


§  150^.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTI7ER    TUr.LTC   RECORDS. 


227 


jurisdiction  over  the  administration  of  the  estates  of  dece- 
dents; and  in  nearly  all  the  states  probate  is  conclusive  of  the 
validity  and  testamentary  character  of  the  writing  in  regard 
to  both  real  and  personal  property.1 

After  probate  the  will  itself,2  or  a  properly  authenticated 
copy,  may  be  read  in  proof  of  any  matter  of  fact  therein  to 
which  it  is  relevant.3  Where  the  fact  of  probate  is  in  issue 
the  decree  of  the  probate  court,  exemplified  in  the  form  which 
is  observed  by  courts  of  record  in  certifying  to  transcripts 
from  their  records,  is  admissible  as  conclusive  of  the  fact.4 

§  150a.  Proof  of  returns  on  writs.— A  return  is  a  written 
statement  or  certificate  of  a  sheriff  or  other  officer  servinsr  a 
writ  showing  what  he  did,  with  particulars  of  time  and  place, 
and  it  may  be  employed  as  primary  evidence  of  his  acts  and 
their  result  in  executing  the  writ.  The  return  should  show 
affirmatively  that  all  the  requirements  of  the  law  have  been 
strictly  pursued,5  and  should  state  briefly  the  course  pursued 
by  the  officer  in  order  that  the  court  may  be  placed  in  a  posi- 
tion to  decide  upon  its  admissibility  as  evidence  of  service.6 


1  Dublin  v.  Chadbourne,  16  Mass. 
433 ;  Patten  v.  Tallman,  27  Me.  17 ; 
Brown  v.  Wood,  17  Mass.  68,  72;  Jud- 
son  v.  Lake,  3  Day,  318;  Lewis  v. 
Lewis,  5  La.  388 ;  Bogardus  v.  Clark, 
4  Paige,  623;  Peeble's  Appeals,  15 
S.  &  R.  42 ;  Tompkins  v.  Tompkins, 
1  Stoiy,  547 ;  Harrison  v.  Rowan,  3 
Wash.  C.  C.  580 ;  Darby  v.  Mayer,  10 
Wheat  465.  See  post,  §  143.  See 
contra,  as  to  devises  of  real  property, 
Barker  v.  McFerran,  26  Pa.  St.  211  ; 
Harven  v.  Spring,  10  Ired.  80;  Ran- 
dall v.  Hodges,  3  Bland.  47 ;  Darbey 
v.  Mayer,  10  Wheat.  470;  Robertson 
v.  Barbour,  6  B.  Mon.  527. 

2  Manning  v.  Purcell,  24  L.  J.  Ch. 
523;  Compton  v.  Bloxham,  2  Coll. 
201;  Child  v,  Ellsworth,  2  D.  M. 
&  G.  683 ;  Oppenheim  v.  Henry,  9 
Hare,  802;  Gauntlett  v.  Carter,  17 
Beav.  590 ;  Turner  v.  Hellard,  30  Ch. 
D.  390. 

s  Hurst  v.  Mellinger,  73  Tex.  189 ; 
Dupeyster  v.  Gagoni,  84  Ky.  403; 
Lockwood  v.  Lockwood,  57  Hun,  337  ; 
Nelson   v.  Potter.  50  N.  J.  L  636;  15 


Atl.  Rep.  375.  See  §  1416.  In  the 
case  of  a  foreign  will  it  has  been  held 
that  it  should  be  accompanied  by  a 
copy  of  the  order  of  probate.  Green 
v.  Blair,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  256. 

4  See  §§  146,  148,  149;  Chase  v. 
Hathaway,  14  Mass.  222,  227 ;  Judge 
v.  Briggs,  3  N.  H.  309 ;  Farnsworth 
v.  Briggs,  6  N.  H.  561 ;  Lindsley  v. 
O'Reilly,  50  N.  J.  L.  636 ;  15  Atl.  Rep. 
879.  As  to  other  facts  in  probate 
courts,  see  Roberts  v.  Connell,  8  S.  W. 
Rep.  626;  Williams  v.  Mitchell,  112 
Mo.  300  (proof  of  order  of  a  probate 
court) ;  Sherwood  v.  Baker  (Mo.,  1891 ). 
16  S.  W.  Rep.  938 ;  Simmons  v.  Saul 
138  TJ.  S.  439. 

5  Walsh  v.  Anderson,  135  Mass.  65 ; 
Sweeney  v.  Girolo,  154  Pa.  St.  609; 
Glines  v.  Iron  Hall,  22  Civ.  Pro.  R. 
437. 

6  O'Leary  v.  Durant,  70  Tex.  409 ; 
Henry  v.  Tilton,  19  Vt.  447 ;  Merritt 
v.  White,  31  Mass.  438;  Philadelphia 
v.  Newkumet,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  504; 
Tallman  v.  B.  &  O.  R/  Co.,  45  Fed. 
Rep.   156;  Boyle  v.  Whitney,  8  Pa. 


228 


JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER   PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§  150#. 


In  accordance  with  the  presumption  that  an  official  has 
properly  performed  his  duty,1  the  courts  are  inclined  to  favor 
the  sufficiency  of  returns  and  to  admit  them  whenever  it  is 
possible  to  do  so.2 

The  signature  to  the  return  should  be  by  the  officer  or  in 
his  name  and  not  by  deputy.3  The  return  should  be  indorsed 
upon  the  writ,4  in  language  sufficiently  certain  and  definite  to 
enable  the  court  to  comprehend  the  subject-matter  described 
and  the  action  of  the  officer  in  regard  to  it.  Parol  evidence 
is  always  admissible  to  explain  the  language  of  the  return  or 
to  identify  the  subject-matter,  though  not  always  to  vary  or 
contradict  it,5  unless  fraud  is  alleged.15  A  return  which  is  not 
properly  filed  is  invalid  7  and  inadmissible  because  it  is  incom- 
plete. Until  filing,  however,  the  power  of  the  officer  over  the 
return  is  absolute  and  he  may  amend  it  without  leave  of  court.8 
After  filing,  the  power  to  permit  an  amendment  is  discretion- 
ary with  the  court,9  but  permission  to  amend  will  usually  be 
granted  where  the  actual  facts  in  the  case  require  it  on  appli- 
cation by  the  officer  before,10  or  even  after,11  his  official  term 
has  expired. 


Co.  Ct.  R.  501 ;  People  v.  Kent  Circ. 
Judge,  41  Mich.  722. 
•  See  post,  §'241. 

2  Verbal  irregularities  will  thus  be 
disregarded.  Galliano  v.  Kilfoy,  94 
Cal.  86 ;  Veazey  v.  Brigman,  93  Ala. 
548;  Forbes  v.  McEIaffle,  32  Neb. 
742 ;  Cheshire  v.  Wagon  Co.,  89  Ga. 
249  ;  Livar  v.  Livar,  26  Tex.  App.  115. 

3  Rowley  v.  Howard,  23  Cal.  401 ; 
Cox  v.  Montford,  66  Ga.  62  (signature 
by  mark);  Mitchell  v.  Com.  (Va., 
1893),  17.  S.  K  Rep.  480;  Simmes  v. 
Simmes,  88  Ky.  642;  Emley  v.  Drum, 
36  Pa.  St.  123 ;  Callender  v.  Olcott,  1 
Mich.  344 ;  Gibbons  v.  Pickett  (Fla., 
1893),  12  S.  Rep.  17;  Reinhart  v. 
Lugo,  86  Cal.  395.  Contra,  Kelly  v. 
Harrison,  69  Miss.  456. 

4  Dickson  v.  Peppers,  7  Ired.  (N.  C.) 
429. 


5  Payne  y.  Dillingham,  10  Iowa, 
360. 

6McComb  v.  Council  Bluffs,  infra; 
Cully  v.  Shirk,  infra. 

'i  State  v.  Melton,  8  Mo.  417 ;  Beall 
v.  Shattuck,  53  Miss.  358 ;  Nelson  v. 
Cook,  19  111.  440. 

8  Spencer  v.  Fuller,  68  Ga.  73 ;  Wil- 
cox v.  Monday,  89  Ind.  232;  Nelson 
v.  Cook,  19  111.  440;  Welch  v.  Joy,  13 
Pick.  477. 

9  Austin  v.  Day,  17  Pick.  (Mass.) 
208;  Miller  v.  Shackelford,  4  Dana 
(Ky.),  264;  Johnson  v.  Day,  17  Pick. 
(Mass.)  108;  Baker  v.  Davis,  22  N.  H. 
27 ;  Com.  Union  Ins.  Co.  v.  Everhart, 
88  Va.  952;  Mills  v.  Howland,  2 
N.  D.  30 ;  Turner  v.  Holden,  109  N.  C. 
182 ;  Shufeldt  v.  Barlass,  33  Neb.  785. 

io  Williams  v.  Moore,  68  Ga.  585; 
Hutchins   v.    Com'rs,    16  Minn.    13; 


UBentell    v.   Oliver,   89    Ga.    246;  Scrugs,  46  Mo.  271.     Cf.  Williamson 

Avery  v.    Bowman,   39   N.    H.  595;  v.  Wright,  75   Me.   35;   Foreman  v. 

Keen  v.  Briggs,  46  Me.  467 ;  Dwiggins  Carter,  9  Kan.  674. 
v.    Cook,   71    Ind.    579;     Scrugs    v. 


§  150«.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUT5LI0    RECORDS. 


229 


The  conclusiveness  of  the  return  as  to  all  facts  stated 
therein,  both  as  between  the  parties  to  the  writ  and  their 
privies,1  and  against  the  officer  himself,2  is  supported  by  a 
majority  of  the  decisions.  When,  however,  the  return  is 
sought  to  be  used  as  evidence  by  the  officer  in  his  own  behalf, 
the  principle  of  estoppel  does  not  apply,  and  its  invalidity  may 
be  shown  or  the  facts  stated  therein  may  be  contradicted  by 
any  proper  and  competent  evidence.3  The  same  rule  is  appli- 
cable where  the  return  is  introduced  as  evidence  in  an  action 
between  third  persons,  neither  parties  nor  privies  to  the  writ, 
and  where  the  facts  in  the  return  are  only  collateral  to  the 
main  issue.4 

Service  of  a  writ  by  publication  may  be  shown  by  the  pro- 
duction of  the  writ  as  published  in  the  newspaper,  together 
with  the  affidavit  of  the  publisher  setting  forth  that  the  same 
was  properly  published,  with  the  facts  of  the  times  and  places 
of  publication  as  the  same  may  be  required  under  the  statutes 
regulating"  this  matter.5 


Dunn  v.  Rogers,  43  111.  230 ;  Sawyer 
v.  Harmon,  136  Mass.  414 ;  McArthur 
v.  Currie,  32  Ala.  75;  Clayton  v. 
State,  24  Ark.  16 ;  Mahurin  v.  Brack- 
ets 5  N.  H.  9. 

i  Cully  v.  Shirk,  131  Ind.  76 ;  Philips 
v.  Elwell,  14  Ohio  St.  240 ;  Flanniken 
v.  Neal,  67  Tex.  629 ;  Ex  parte  Dur- 
bin,  102  Mo.  100 ;  Lowery  v.  Caldwell, 
139  Mass.  88 ;  Barrett  v.  Copeland,  18 
Vt.  67;  Hotchkiss  v.  Hunt,  56  Me. 
252  ;  In  re  Ah  Foy,  45  Fed.  Rep.  795  ; 
Cozine  v.  Walter,  55  N.  Y.  304 ;  United 
States  v.  Gayle,  45  Fed.  Rep.  107 ;  Hig- 
ley  v.  Pollock  (Nev.,  1892),  27  Pac.  Rep. 
895;  Ringold  v.  Edwards,  7  Ark.  86; 
Egery  v.  Buchanan,  5  Cal.  56 ;  Heath 
v.  Missouri  R  Co.,  83  Mo.  624.  Contra, 
Johnson  v.  Gregory,  4  Wash.  St.  109 ; 
Grady  v.  Gosline,  48  Ohio  St.  665; 
Wilson  v.  Shipman,  31  Neb.  573; 
McComb  v.  Insurance  Co.,  83  Iowa, 
247 ;  Wheeler  v.  McLaughlin,  8  N.Y.  S. 
95;  Godwin  v.  Monds,  106  N.  C.  448; 
Burton  v.  Schenck,  40  Minn.  52. 


2  State  v.  Ruff  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  K 
Rep.  124;  Hawey  v.  Foster.  64  Cal. 
296 ;  Walter  v..  Moore,  90  N.  C.  41 ; 
Shotwell  v.  Hamblen,  23  Miss.  156. 

s  Stanton  v.  Hodges,  6  Vt.  64 ;  Earl 
v.  Camp,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  562;  Car- 
nell  v.  Cook.  7  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  310 ;  Hal- 
comb  v.  Stubblefield,  76  Tex.  310. 

4Knutsen  v.  Davis  (Minn.,  1893),  53 
N.  W.  Rep.  646;  Allen  v.  Gray,  11 
Conn.  95;  Kendall  v.  White,  3  Me. 
245;  Field  v.  United  States,  9  Pet 
(U.  S.)  183 ;  Henderson  v.  Evans.  14 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  15;  Bolt  v.  Burnell,  9 
Mass.  96. 

b  See  ante,  §  145;  State  v.  Georgia 
Co.,  109  N.  C.  310 ;  Roberts  v.  Roberts 
(Colo.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  941 ;  Lane 
v.  Iunes,  43  Minn.  137;  Frisk  v. 
Reigelman,  43  id.  137 ;  Wilkinson  v. 
Conaty,  65  Mich.  614 ;  White  v.  Hin- 
ton,  3  Wyo.  753 ;  Taylor  v.  Coots,  32 
Neb.  30 ;  Michael  v.  Michael,  137  111. 
485. 


230  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC   RECORDS.  [§  150&. 

§  150b.  The  effect  of  judicial  records  as  evidence. —  Tho 

conclusiveness  of  a  judgment  in  a  prior  suit  as  evidence  in  a 
suit  between  the  same  parties  for  the  same  cause  of  action  is 
based  upon  the  legal  principle  that  public  policy  demands 
that  unnecessary  and  perhaps  endless  litigation  should  bo 
avoided,  and  that  a  cause  once  fairly  tried  and  determined  by 
a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  should  be  considered  forever 
closed  and  settled.  The  judgment  of  a  court  having  jurisdic- 
tion is  binding  upon  all  the  parties  and  upon  all  those  in. 
privity  with  them,  whether  in  estate,  in  law  or  in  blood,  and 
whether  this  identity  of  interest  is  successive  or  mutual  and 
concurrent.1  But  a  stranger  to  the  record,  i.  e.,  a  person  who 
is  not  interested  in  the  original  litigation  directly  or  indirectly, 
and  who  could  neither  prosecute  nor  defend,  offer  evidence, 
cross-examine  the  witnesses,  or  appeal  from  the  result,  and 
who  does  not  occupy  the  position  of  a  privy,  is  not  estopped. 
He  may  therefore,  when  in  a  subsequent  suit  his  rights  or 
title  is  collaterally  affected  by  the  judgment,  show  that  it  is 
invalid  and  void  as  to  him.2  The  party  in  whose  favor  the 
judgment  has  been  rendered  and  his  privies  are  bound  by  it 
to  the  same  extent  as  the  party  against  whom  it  was  ren- 

i  Michaels  v.  Post,  21  Wall.  426 ;  Jones  v.  Ludlow,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct  Rep. 

Carter  v.  Bennett,  4  Fla.  052;  Chapin  57;  Guaranty  T.  &  Safe  Dep.  Co.  v. 

v.  Curtis,  23  Conn.  388;  Key  v.  Dent,  Green  Cove  Spring  &  M.  R.  Co.,  11 

14  Md.  86 ;  Emery  v.  Fowler,  39  Me.  S.  Ct.  512 ;  139  U.  S.  137 ;  Franz  Falk 

326;  Daily  v.  Sharkey,  29  Mo.  App.  Brew.  Co.  v.  Hirsch,   78  Tex.   192; 

518 ;  Hancock  v.   Flyun,  8  N.  Y.  S.  Griffith    v.    Happersberger,   86   Cal. 

133 ;  State  v.  Brook,  29  Mo.  App.  286 ;  605 ;    Trauerman    v.   Lippiucott,   39 

Averell  v.  Sec.  Nat.   Bank,  19  D.  C.  Mo.  App.  478 ;  Haywood  v.  Thacher, 

246 ;  Cook  v.  Rice,  91  Cal.  664 ;  Nor-  19  N.  Y.  S.  882 ;  Missouri  R.  R.  Co.  v. 

ton  v.  Doherty,  3  Gray  (Mass.),  372 ;  Heidenheimer,  82  Tex.  195.    "  When- 

Bigelow  v.  Winsor,  1  Gray  (Mass.),  ever  any  judgment  is  offered  as  evi- 

299,303;  Webber  v.  Mackey,  31  111.  dence,  the  party  against  whom  it  is 

App.   369;    Glass    v.    Blackwell,   48  so  offered  may  prove  that  the  court 

Ark.  55.  which  gave  it  had  no  jurisdiction,  or 

2  Vose  v.  Morton,  4  Cush.  (Mass.)  that  it  has  been   reversed,  or,  if  he  is 

27,  31 ;  Roman  Cath.  Archbishop  v.  a  stranger  to  it,  that  it  was  obtained 

Shipman,  11  Pac.  Rep.  343;  69  Cal.  by  any  fraud  or  collusion  to  which 

586 ;  Fidelity  I.  T.  &  S.  D.  Co.,  33  neither  he  nor  any  person  to  whom 

W.  Va.  761 ;  Franklin  Sav.  Bank  v.  he  is  privy  was  a  party."    Stephen's 

Taylor,  13  111.  376 ;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  397 ;  Digest,  art.  46. 
Masterson    v.    Little,   75    Tex.    682; 


§  151.]  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  231 

dered.  The  judgment  is  equally  conclusive  as  an  estoppel 
upon  both.1 

§  151.  The  effects  of  judgments  on  those  in  privity  with 
the  parties. —  The  doctrine  by  which  a  judgment  is  deemed, 
to  be  conclusive  upon  the  parties  and  those  who  are  in  privity 
with  them  is  based  on  the  principles  that  are  applicable  to  the 
admissions  of  parties  in  privity.2  Thus,  an  heir3  is  estopped 
by  a  judgment  against  the  ancestor,  and  generally  the  same 
rule  is  applicable  to  those  who  take  an  estate  in  dower,4  by 
the  curtesy,  or  as  a  legatee,  devisee,5  grantee  or  mortgagee.8 
A  judgment  of  ouster  on  a  writ  of  quo  v)arranto  is  conclusive 
evidence  against  subordinate  officials  whose  title  is  derived 
from  the  official  ousted.7  A  judgment  against  the  assignor, 
rendered  while  the  property  assigned  was  in  his  possession 
and  relating  to  it,  is  evidence  against  the  assignee,3  and  the 
same  principle  is  recognized  as  regards  an  executor  or  admin- 
istrator in  the  case  of  a  judgment  against  or  in  favor  of  the 
deceased  person  whom  he  represents.9 

Though  a  reversioner  is  not  bound  by  a  judgment  against 
his  tenant  unless  he  intervene  and  become  an  actual  party  to 
the  suit,10  yet,  as  remainder-men  derive  their  successive  estates 
from  a  common  source  of  title,  it  is  clear  that  a  judgment 
which  was  rendered  against  any  one  of  them  which  overthrew 
that  title  would  be  binding  on  all.11     So  a  judgment  rendered 

1  Wood  v.  Davis,  7  Cranch,  271 ;  8  Adams  v.  Barnes,  17  Mass.  365 ; 
Strayer  v.  Johnson,  1  Atl.  Rep.  222 ;  Chapin  v.  Curtis,  23  Conn.  388 ; 
110  Pa.  St.  21.  Hartje  v.  Vulcanized  Fiber  Co.,  44 

2  Kirk  v.  Kirk,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  552;  Fed.  Rep.  648;  Huntley  v.  Holt,  22 
137  N.  Y.  510 ;  KeDt  v.  Church,  136  Atl.  Rep.  34 ;  59  Conn.  102 ;  Carlyle 
N.  Y.  10;  32  N.  E.  Rep.  704;  Howes  v.  Carlyle  W.  L.  &  Power  Co.,  36  111. 
v.  Rucker,   94  Ala.   166;  Lawson  v.  App.  28. 

Kelly,  82  Tex.  497.  «  Clapp  v.  Herrick,  129  Mass.  292 ; 

3  See  cases  in  preceding  note.  Emery  v.  Fowler,  39  Me.  326 ;  Park- 
4Tanquey  v.  OTonnel,  132  Ind.  62.  hurst  v.  Berdell,  110  N.  Y.  392;  Key 
'Outram  v.  Sherwood,  3  East,  353 ;  v.  Dent,  14  Md.  86 ;  Ballou  v.  Ballou, 

Turner  v.  Cate  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  HON.  Y.  402;  Carver  v.  Jackson,  4 

Rep.  971.  Peters,  85,  86;    Case  v.    Reeve,    14 

eSatterwhite  v.  Shirley,  25  N.  E.  Johns.  81. 

Rep.  1100 ;  Amer.  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Boyd,  10  Thompson    v.    McCormick    (I1L, 

92  Ala.  139 ;  Brown  v.  Bocquin  (Ark.,  1891),  26  N.  E.  Rep.  373. 

1893),  20  N.  W.  Rep.  813.  U  pyke  v.  Crouch,  1  Ld.  Raym.  730. 

"  Rex  v.  Mayor,  5  T.  R.  66,  72,  76 ; 
Rex  v.  Hebron,  2  Stra.  1109. 


232  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER    FUBLIC    RECORDS  [§  152. 

against  a  trustee  during  the  existence  of  the  trust  binds  the 
beneficiaries l  and  their  next  of  kin 2  or  personal  representa- 
tives. 

§  152.  Must  be  final  and  on  the  merits. —  A  judgment  is 
conclusive  on  the  parties  only  in  case  it  is  final;  that  is, 
"  where  it  puts  an  end  to  the  action  by  declaring  that  the 
plaintiff  has  or  has  not  entitled  himself  to  the  remedy  for 
which  he  sues."  3  Where  the  plaintiff  is  nonsuited  or  the  suit 
is  remanded  or  discontinued  by  plaintiff,  or  where  the  suit  has 
not  been  prosecuted  to  a  determination,  the  judgment  is  not 
conclusive.4  So  also  the  judgment  must  have  been  rendered 
on  the  merits;  for  if  it  be  based  on  a  mere  technical  defect,5 
or  lack  of  legal  capacity  of  either  party  to  sue,6  or  of  jurisdic- 
tion by  the  court,  it  will  not  be  a  bar.7  Thus,  where  the  de- 
fendant interposes  an  equitable  defense  which  he  subsequently 
withdraws,  he  is  not  precluded  from  employing  that  defense 
in  another  suit.8  But  the  filing  of  an  appeal  or  the  giving  of 
a  stay  bond  pending  an  appeal  from  the  judgment  does  not,  so 
long  as  the  judgment  is  final  and  upon  the  merits,  operate  to 
render  the  judgment  inadmissible  as  evidence  in  a  subsequent 
action  at  any  time  during  the  pendency  of  the  appeal.9 

1  Pollitz  v.  Frust  Co.  53  Fed.  Rep.  55  Fed.  Rep.  49 ;  Sanford  v.  Oberlin 
210 ;  Robertson  v.  Van  Cleave  (Ind.  College,  31  Pac.  Rep.  1088 ;  50  Kan. 
1891),  26  N.  E.  Rep.  899.  342.    Cf.  Pilcher  v.  Ligon  (Ky.,  1890), 

2  In  re  Strant,  5  N.  Y.  S.  127 ;  126  N.  15  S.  W.  Rep.  513. 

Y.  201 ;  27  N.  E.  Rep.  259.  5  Kern  v.   Wilson,  48  N.  W.  Rep. 

3  Anderson's  Law  Diet.  919;  McDonald  v.  Rainor,  8  Johns. 
^McGourkey  v.  Railroad  Co.,  146    442. 

U.  S.  536;  Hull  v.  Blake,   13  Mass.  6jonesv.  Hunter,  32  111.  App.  445; 

155 ;  Holbert's  Estate,   57  Cal.    257 ;  Rudolph  v.  Underwood,  15  S.  E.  Rep. 

Dunham  v.  Carson  (S.  C,  1893),  15  S.  55 ;  88  Ga.  664 ;  Hemminge  v.  Heald 

E.  Rep.  960;  Sivers  v.  Sivers  (Cal.,  (N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  449;  Rodg- 

1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  571 ;  Stedman  v.  ers   v.  Levy  (Neb.,  1893),  54   N.  W. 

Potterie,  139  Pa.  St.   100;  Gapen  v.  Rep.  1080;  Hendricks  v.  Clouts  (Ga., 

Bretlernitz  (Neb.,  1890),  47  N.  W.  Rep.  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  119. 

918;  Louisville,  N.  A.  &C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  i  Gilmer  v.   Morris,  46  Fed.   Rep. 

Wylie   (Ind.,    1890),  27    N.    E.   Rep.  333 ;  Estil  v.  Taul,  2  Yerger,  467, 470 ; 

122;  Parks  v.  Dunlap,  86  Cal.   189;  Bank  v.  Lewis,  8  Pick.  113;  Dixon  v. 

State  v.  Anderson  (Fla.,  1890),  8  S.  Sinclair,  4  Vt.  354;  Davie  v.  Davis 

Rep.  1 ;  Hallum  v.  Dickinson,  47  Ark.  (N.  C,  1890),  13  S.  E.  Rep.  240. 

126;  Kaufman  v.  Schneider,  35  111.  scockerill  v.  Stafford,  102  Mo.  57. 

App.  256  (ruling  on  appealable  order) ;  9  Willard  v.  Ostrauder  (Kan.,  1893), 

Da nielson  v.  Northwestern  Fuel  Co.,  32  Pac.  Rep.   1092;  Stevens   v.  Ste- 


§  153.] 


JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER   PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


233 


§  153.  Judgments  only  conclusive  as  to  material  facts  in 
issue, —  A  judgment  is  conclusive  as  an  estoppel  in  a  subse- 
quent suit  only  so  far  as  it  determines  those  particular  facts 
which  were  directly  in  issue.1  A  part}7  is  called  upon  to  affirm 
or  deny  facts  material  to  the  issue  only,  and  for  this  reason 
the  judgment  record  is  not  binding  upon  the  parties  in  respect 
to  those  matters  which  are  neither  material  nor  relevant  to 
the  controversy.  So  the  judgment  is  not  evidence  of  any 
matter  of  fact  which  was  merely  collateral  to  the  issue  or  re- 
motely or  incidentally  involved,  or  which  can  only  be  inferred 
by  argument,  or  the  decision  of  which  was  not  necessary  to 
the  issue.2 

But  while  it  is  necessary  that  the  fact  which  the  judgment 
is  introduced  to  prove  should  have  been  material  in  the  prior 
cause  and  the  issue  should  be  substantially  identical,  it  is  not 
essential  that  the  issue  in  the  earlier  case  should  have  been 
joined  upon  the  precise  point  which  is  in  issue  in  the  later  pro- 
ceedings, if  the  proof  of  the  existence  of  the  fact  in  issue  in 
the  latter  was  necessary  to  the  rendition  of  the  judgment.3 


vens.  23  N.  Y.  S.  520 ;  69  Hun,  332 ; 
Westmoreland  v.  Richardson  Co. 
(Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  167; 
O'Malia  v.  Glynn,  42  111.  App.  51; 
Harris  v.  Barnhart  (Cal.,  1893),  32 
Pac.  Rep.  589.  Contra,  Texas  I.  R. 
Co.  v.  Jackson,  22  S.  W.  Rep.  1030. 

1,4  Every  judgment  is  conclusive 
proof,  as  against  parties  and  privies, 
of  facts  directly  in  issue  in  the  case 
actually  decided  by  the  court  and 
appearing  from  the  judgment  itself 
to  be  the  ground  on  which  it  was 
based,  unless  evidence  was  admitted 
in  the  action  in  which  the  judgment 
was  delivered  which  is  excluded  in 
the  action  in  which  that  judgment  is 
intended  to  be  proved."  Stephen's 
Digest,  art.  41. 

2  De  Grey,  J.,  in  Duchess  of  King- 
ston's Case,  20  How.  St.  Tr.  538.  The 
court  in  this  case  says  further :  "  The 
judgment  of  a  court  of  concurrent 
jurisdiction  directly  upon  the  point 
is  a  bar,  or  as  evidence  conclusive 


upon  the  same  parties,  upon  the  same 
matter  directly  in  question  in  an- 
other court ;  secondly,  that  a  judg- 
ment of  a  court  of  exclusive  juris- 
diction, directly  upon  the  point,  is,  in 
like  manner,  conclusive  upon  the 
same  matter,  between  the  same  par- 
ties, coming  incidentally  in  question 
in  another  court,  for  a  different  pur- 
pose." Rice  v.  Aiken  (Tex.,  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  101;  Gillim  v.  Daviess 
Co.  (Ky.,  1890),  14  S.  W.  Rep.  838 ; 
Walker  v.  Leslie  (Ky.,  1890),  14  S.  W. 
Rep.  682;  Miller  v.  Union  Switch 
Sig.  Co.,  59  Hun,  624 ;  In  re  Holmes, 
131  N.  Y.  80;  Springer  v.  Bien,  10 
N.  Y.  S.  530;  27  N.  E.  Rep.  1076; 
Dodd  v.  Scott,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  1057  \ 
Rhoads  v.  Metropolis,  36  111.  App. 
123. 

3  Adams  v.  Pearson,  7  Pick.  341 
Duden  v.  Maley,  43  Fed.  Rep.  407 
Hudson  v.  Yost,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  836 
Shepherd  v.  Stockham,  45  Kan.  244 
Pierson   v.   Conley  (Mich.,  1893),  55 


234 


JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER   PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


[§  154. 


§  154.  Identity  of  cause  of  action  required. —  There  must, 
however,  be  a  real  and  substantial  identity  between  the  prior 
cause  of  action  and  the  present.  So  a  judgment  rendered  in 
an  action,  in  order  to  be  a  bar  in  a  subsequent  suit  between 
the  same  parties,  must  not  only  relate  to  the  same  general  sub- 
ject-matter but  to  the  same  cause  of  action.1  In  this  connec- 
tion it  should  be  said  that  a  party  must  present  to  the  court  all 
the  grounds  on  which  he  expects  a  judgment.  Otherwise 
there  would  be  no  end  to  litigation.2  He  will  not  be  allowed 
to  split  up  a  single  cause  of  action  which  in  its  nature  is  in- 
divisible—  as,  for  example,  a  right  to  recover  for  a  total 
breach  of  an  entire  contract — and  bring  a  number  of  suits 
thereon.3  But  where  one  has  two  causes  of  action  for  which 
he  seeks  redress  in  a  single  action,  a  judgment  rendered  after 


N.  W.  Rep.  387;  Christy  v.  Spring 
(Cal.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  110;  Henry 
v.  Samson  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
69 ;  Fidelity  Ins.  F.  &'  S.  D.  Co.  v. 
Gazzam,  2  Pa.  Dist.  R.  569.  The 
rules  governing  the  conclusiveness 
of  judgments  are  thus  summed  up  by 
the  court  in  Packet  Co.  v.  Sickles,  5 
Wall.  592:  "When  the  judgment 
rendered  in  the  former  trial  is  used 
as  a  technical  estoppel,  or  is  relied 
upon  as  conclusive  per  se,  it  must  ap- 
pear by  the  record  of  the  prior  suit 
that  the  particular  controversy 
sought  to  be  concluded  was  neces- 
sarily tried  and  determined.  That 
is,  if  the  record  of  the  former  trial 
shows  that  the  verdict  could  not  have 
been  rendered  without  deciding  the 
particular  matter,  it  will  be  con- 
sidered as  having  settled  that  matter 
as  between  the  parties;  and  where 
the  record  does  not  show  that  the 
matter  was  necessarily  and  directly 
found  by  the  jury,  evidence  aliunde 
consistent  with  the  record  may  be 
received  to  prove  the  fact.  But  even 
where  it  appears  extrinsically  that 
the  matter  was  properly  within  the 
issue  in  the  former  suit,  if  it  be  not 
shown  that  the  verdict  and  judgment 


necessarily  involved  its  determina- 
tion it  will  not  be  concluded."  See, 
also,  Dutton  v.  Woodman,  9  Cush. 
225 ;  Eastman  v.  Cooper,  15  Pick. 
276. 

iLume  v.  Scott,  44  Minn.  110; 
Dulin  v.  Prince,  29  111.  A  pp.  209;  Mc- 
Vight  v.  Bell,  26  W.  N.  C.  281 ;  Cor- 
nell v.  Donovan,  14  Daly,  295 ;  Mer- 
scheim  v.  Mus.  M.  P.  Union,  24 
Abb.  N.  C.  252;  Humason  v.  Lobe, 
76  Tex.  512 ;  Parks  v.  Richardson,  35 
Mo.  App.  192 ;  Illinois  Cent.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Slater,  39  111.  App.  69;  Davis  v. 
Sexton,  35  111.  App.  307 ;  Montrose  v. 
Wanamaker,  57  Hun,  590. 

2  Stark  v.  Starr,  94  U.  S.  485. 

SLorrillard  v.  Clyde,  55  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  308 ;  122  N.  Y.  41 ;  Skeen 
v.  Springfield  Eng.  &  T.  Co.,  42  Mo. 
App.  158;  Beronio  v.  So.  Pac.  R.  Co., 
80  Cal.  415 ;  Bowe  v.  Minn.  Milk  Co., 
44  Minn.  460 ;  Pilcher  v".  Ligon  (Ky., 
1890),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  513 ;  Macdougall 
v.  Knight.  25  Q.  B.  Div.  1 ;  Busch  v. 
Jones,  94  Mich.  223 ;  McCain  v.  Louis- 
ville, etc.  Co.  (Ky.,  1893),  22  S.  W. 
Rep.  325 ;  Parmentery  v.  State,  105 
N.  Y.  154;  Olmstead  v.  Bael  (Md., 
1893),  25  Atl.  Rep.  343. 


§  154.]  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHER   PUBLIC    RECORDS.  235 

litigation  on  one  cause  only  does  not  preclude  a  subsequent 
action  on  the  other.1 

It  is  a  general  rule  that  where  two  actions  are  brought  be- 
tween the  same  parties  for  the  same  cause,  the  prior  judgment 
is  conclusive  as  to  every  point  directly  involved  which  was  or 
might  have  been  litigated,2  though  if  the  second  suit  is  be- 
tween the  same  parties  for  a  different  cause  of  action,  the 
judgment  is  conclusive  only  on  such  questions  directly  in- 
volved as  were  actually  litigated.3 

In  considering  the  identity  of  the  questions  or  causes  of 
action  involved  in  the  two  suits,  it  is  immaterial  that  the  sub- 
ject of  the  earlier  suit  was  more  extensive  than  that  involved  in 
the  latter  if  the  present  cause  of  action  which  is  in  contro- 
versy was  actually  embraced  in  the  judgment  or  verdict  ren- 
dered. The  law  requires  a  substantial  identity  in  the  nature 
of  the  causes  of  action  —  not  merely  a  formal,  artificial  and 
technical  identity  arising  solely  from  the  fact  that  the  two 
transactions  are  co-extensive.  If  on  an  inspection  of  the  rec- 
ord there  is  any  doubt  whether  the  precise  question  now  at 
issue  was  involved  or  was  decided  in  the  prior  suit,  extrinsic 
evidence  will  be  received  to  ascertain  this  point  and  effectuate 
the  prior  adjudication.4 

iBontin  v.  Linsley  (Wis.,  1893),  54  H.),  299;  Wolverton  v.  Baker,  86  Cal. 
N.  W.  Rep.  1017.  591 ;  Parker  v.  Straat,  39  Mo.  App. 


Rareshide  v.  Enterprise  Ginning    616. 


&  Mfg.  Co.  (La.,  1890),  9  S.  Rep.  642 
Taylor  v.  Taylor,  26  Abb.  N.  C.  360 
Nichols  v.  Murphy,  36  111.  App.  205 
Helfenstein's  Estate,  135  Pa.  St.  293 


4  "  A  judgment  of  a  court  of  com- 
petent jurisdiction  upon  a  question 
directly  involved  in  one  suit  is  con- 
clusive as  to  that  question  in  another 


Fidelity  Ins.  &  S.  D.  Co.  v.  Gazzam,  suit  between  the  same  parties.     But 

2  Pa.  Dist.  R.  569 ;  Pennock  v.  Ken-  it  must  appear  from  the  face  of  the 

nedy,  153  Pa.  St.  179 ;  Butler  v.  Suf.  record  or  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evi- 

Glass  Co.,  126  Mass.  512.  dence  that  the  precise  question  was 

3  Cromwell  v.  Sac  Co.,  94  U.  S.  351 ;  raised  and  determined  in  the  former 

Nesbit  v.  Ind.  District  of  Riverside,  suit     If  there  be  any  uncertainty  — 

144  U.  S.  610 ;  12  S.  Ct.  746 ;  New-  for  example,  if  it  appears  that  sev- 

berry  v.  Sheffy  (Va.,  1892),  15  S.  E.  eral  distinct  matters  may  have  been 

Rep.  548 ;  Robinson  v.  Parks,  76  Md.  litigated,  upon  one  or  more  of  which 

118;    24  Atl.  Rep.  417;  Smeaton  v.  the  judgment  may  have  passed  with- 

Austin,  82  "Wis.  76 ;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  out  indicating  which   was  litigated 

1090;  Gilbert  v.  Thompson,  9  Cush.  and  upon  which  the  judgment  was 

348,350;  Potter  v.   Baker,  19  N.  H.  rendered  —  the  whole  subject-matter 

166 ;  Lamprey  v.  Nudd,  9  Foster  (N.  will  be  at  large  and  open  to  new  con- 


236  JUDICIAL    AND    OTITER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§'  15.K 

As  regards  the  identity  of  the  party,  it  may  be  said  that, 
in  the  case  of  a  joint  and  several  contractual  liability,  a  prior 
judgment  against  all  the  co-obligors  jointly  is  not  admissible 
in  a  subsequent  action  against  one.  On  the  other  hand,  a 
former  several  judgment  cannot  be  pleaded  in  bar  in  an  action 
afterwards  brought  against  all  jointly. 

Any  individual  by  entering  into  a  joint  and  several  contract 
agrees,  by  implication,  that  he  will  be  liable  in  a  quasi-double 
capacity.  He  enters  into  two  distinct  agreements,  and  gives 
his  obligee  two  different  causes  of  action  and  two  different 
remedies  at  law  against  himself.  He  cannot,  therefore,  be 
heard  to  claim,  when  he  is  sued  in  one  capacity  or  by  one 
remedy,  that  the  matter  has  been  already  adjudicated  by  or 
in  another.1  But  where  a  party  has  only  one  cause  of  action, 
either  joint  or  several,  though  he  may  have  several  remedies, 
the  judgment  obtained  by  the  employment  of  one  of  them 
will  be  a  bar  to  his  employment  of  the  others.2 

§  155.  Persons  affected  by  judgments  in  rem  and  judg- 
ments regulating  personal  status. —  The  general  rule  is  that 
a  judgment  is  not  binding  upon  persons  who  are  not  parties 
to  it  or  who  are  not  in  privity  with  either  of  those  who  are.3 
An  exception  to  this  rule  is  recognized  in  proceedings  in  rem, 
including  under  that  term  all  suits  in  admiralty  for  the  en- 
forcement of  maritime  liens  and  contracts,  and  similar  suits  in 
other  courts  for  the  violation  of  revenue  laws.  Judgments 
in  rem  are  conclusive  on  all  persons  upon  the  assumption  that 
the  publicity  attendant  upon  the  seizure  of  the  res  and  the  issue 
of  the  monition  is  notice  to  all  persons  who  have  any  interest 
in  the  property  to  appear  and  assert  their  rights.4     But  the 

tention   unless   this    uncertainty   be  2  Weill  v.  Fontanel,  31  111.  App.  G15; 

removed  by  extrinsic  evidence  show-  Taylor  v.  Taylor,  26  Abb.  N.  C.  360. 

ing  the   precise  point  involved  and  In  an  action  to  recover  for  trespass, 

determined."     Russell   v.    Place,    94  a  judgment  rendered  in  a  previous 

U.  S.  608.  court  to  enjoin  the  trespass  is  com- 

1  Mason  v.  Eld  red,  6  Wall.  235-241 ;  petent  evidence.     Beach  v.  Elmira, 

United  States  v.  Cushman.  2  Sumn.  58  Hun,  606. 

426,437-441;    Sheehy  v.  Mandeville,  3  See  ante,  §§  153-155. 

6  Cranch,  253,  265.     Contra,  Mann  v.  *The  Olive  Mount,  50   Fed.   Rep. 

Edwards,  34  111.  App.  473  ;  Wilson  v.  563 ;  Oldham  v.  Stevens  (Kan.,  1890;, 

Casey  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  118;  25  Pac.  Rep.  863;  Baily  v.  Sundberg, 

Beals  v.  Judge,  91  Mich.  146.  43  Fed.  Rep.  81 ;  49  Fed.  Rep.  583. 


§§  150,  157.]       JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    EPXORDS.  237 

res  must  have  been  actually  seized  to  confer  jurisdiction,' 
though  if  jurisdiction  has  once  been  obtained  it  will  continue 
until  final  judgment,  even  though  the  res  has  been  removed.2 

§156.  Criminal  judgments. —  A  judgment  in  a  prosecu- 
tion for  crime  may  be  shown  by  the  record  to  prove  the  fact 
that  it  was  rendered.  Such  a  judgment  is  not  admissible  as 
evidence  in  a  civil  suit  to  prove  any  fact  or  circumstance 
which  was  found  by  the  jury  in  the  criminal  trial.3  Aside 
from  the  rule  of  evidence  that,  in  a  criminal  trial,  the  jury 
must  be  convinced  of  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt,  while  in  a  civil  action  they  may  decide  accord- 
ing to  the  weight  of  evidence,4  the  absence  of  any  identity  of 
the  parties  in  the  two  transactions  precludes  the  employment 
of  the  criminal  judgment  as  evidence  in  a  subsequent  civil 
action.  On  the  other  hand,  a  civil  judgment  is  upon  like 
principles  inadmissible  in  a  criminal  trial.5  A  judgment  ren- 
dered iu  a  criminal  action  is  competent  evidence  of  the  facts 
determined  in  another  prosecution  of  the  same  person  for  an- 
other or  for  the  same  crime.6 

§  157.  Proof  of  judgments  as  facts  and  their  use  in  prov- 
ing ulterior  facts  distinguished. —  As  already  explained,  a 
judicial  record  is  admissible  to  prove  those  matters  of  fact 
recited  in  it  only  in  subsequent  proceedings  between  the  same 
parties  or  their  representatives  in  privity  But  where  only 
the  fact  of  the  rendition  of  a  judgment  is  to  be  proved,  a 
different  rule  is  recognized.  The  record  of  a  judgment  is  the 
evidence  of  a  public  transaction,  and  it  is  conclusive  evidence 
in  any  subsequent  proceedings  between  any  persons  whatso- 
ever where  the  point  in  issue  is,  was  a  certain  judgment  rendered 
or  not.7     So  the  record  of  the  plaintiff's  acquittal  or  convic- 

1  Taylor  v.  Carryl,  20  How.  (U.  S.)  v.  Beetle  (Mass.,  1890),  26  N.  E.  Rep. 
883.  429. 

2  The  Rio  Grande,  23  Wall.  (U.  S.)  «  Com.  v.  Evans,  101  Mass.  25 ;  Den- 
348;  Cooper  v.    Reynolds,   10   Wall,  nis'  Case,  110  id.  18. 

317.  •  Bensimer  v.  Fell  (W.  Va.,  1891),  12 

3  Landa  v.  Obert,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  297 ;  S.  E.  Rep.  1078.  A  judgment  may 
78  Tex.  33 ;  Schreiner  v.  Order  of  be  considered  in  evidence,  though  not 
Foresters,  35  111.  App.  576.  formally  introduced  and  read,  where 

4  See  ante,  §§  5,  6.  counsel  admit  its  existence  and  wit- 

5  Com.  v.  Horton,  9  Pick.  206 ;  Brad-  nesses  testify  to  the  facts  therein 
ley  v.  Bradley,  2  Fairf.  367 ;  Bradley  without  objection    by  either  party. 


238  JUDICIAL    AND   OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§   15S. 

tion  is  admissible  to  show  these  facts  in  a  subsequent  suit 
brought  by  him  to  recover  for  false  imprisonment  though  the 
parties  are  not  identical.1  Again,  where  the  party  against 
whom  the  judgment  was  rendered  is  suing  to  be  exonerated,2 
or  when  the  judgment,  as  in  the  case  of  a  certain  decree  in 
chancery,  partakes  of  the  nature  of  a  muniment  of  title,3  or 
furnishes  the  source  of  one's  title  acquired  under  a  sheriff's 
deed,4  or  the  basis  of  a  claim  against  an  official  for  negligence 
in  enforcing  it,5  the  existence  of  the  judgment  may  be  shown 
res  inter  alios  acta,  neither  the  parties  nor  the  cause  of  action 
being  the  same.6 

§  158.  Validity  and  ciFect  of  foreign  judgments. —  The 
judgment  in  rem  of  a  foreign  court  having  jurisdiction  of  the 
subject-matter  is  universally  conclusive  and  binding  if  the  land 
or  other  property,  movable  or  immovable,  is  located  in  its  juris- 
diction.7 Its  decision,  whatever  may  be  its  nature,  will  be  held 
binding  in  every  county  whether  the  same  question  is  directly 
or  only  incidentally  involved.8 

The  English  rule  is  followed  in  some  of  the  states,  and  the 
judgment  is  binding  as  to  all  facts  whether  directly  or  inci- 
dentally decided.  In  others  the  judgment  is  not  conclusive 
except  as  to  the  property  directly  involved,  and  other  facts 
adjudicated  may  be  relitigated.9  Of  course  the  rule  as  thus 
stated  is  to  be  taken  with  the  limitations  that  the  cause  in 
rem  has  been  tried  and  the  judgment  rendered  bonajide,10  that 
the  foreign  judge  was  impartial,11  that  the  decision  is  consist- 

Zieverink  v.  Kempner  (Ohio,  1893),  3   Sumn.  600 ;  The  Mary,  9  Cranch, 

34  N.  E.  Rep.  250.  126 ;   Peters  v.   Warren   Ins.    Co.,  3 

i  Barhyt  v.  Valk,  12  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  Sumn.  389 ;  Propellor  Commerce,  1 

145 ;  Garvey  v.  Wayson,  22  Md.  178.  Black,   5S0 ;   Crodson   v.  Leonard,  4 

2  Kip   v.    Brigham,   6  Johns.  158;  Cranch, 433;  Averill  v.  Smith,  17  Wall. 
Weld  v.  Nichols,  17  Pick.  538.  95:  Cooper  v.  Reynolds,  10  Wall.  316- 

3  Barr  v.  Gratz,  4  Wheat.  213.  321,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  541. 
*  Jackson  v.  Wood,  3  Wend.  27,  34;        9  Graham   v.  Whitely,  2   Dutcher, 

Witmer  v.  Schlatter,  2  Rawle,  359;  254;  Robinson  v.  Jones,  8  Mass.  536: 

Fowler  v.  Savage,  3  Conn.  90,  96.  Maley  v.  Shattuck,  8  Cranch,  488 ; 

5  Adams  v.  Balch.  5  Greenl.  188.  Gelston  v.  Hoyt,  3  Wheat.  246. 

«Fiscusv.  Guthrie,  125  Ind.  598.  1°  White  v.  Read,  24  N.  Y.  S.  290; 

'  See  ante,  §  155.  Bradstreet  v.  Insurance  Co.,  3  Sumn. 

s  Freeman   v.  Alderson,  119  U.S.  600 ;  Magoun  v.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.,  1  Story, 

187 ;  Williams  v.  Armroyd,  7  Cranch,  157. 

423;  Bradstreet  v.  Neptune  Ins.  Co.,  u  Price  v.  Dewhurst,  8  Sim.  279. 


§  158.]  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  239 

ent  with  the  law  of  nations,  and  that  all  parties  having  any 
interest  in  rem  had  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  appear  and 
to  be  heard  personally  or  by  a  proper  representative.1 

In  regard  to  that  class  of  judgments  which  are  analogous 
to  judgments  in  rem  in  that  they  are  binding  upon  all  persons 
within  the  jurisdiction,  that  is  to  say,  judgments  or  decrees 
fixing  the  personal  status  of  an  individual,  it  has  been  held 
that  where  a  judgment  of  this  sort  has  been  rendered  in  a 
foreign  court  or  in  the  court  of  one  state  of  the  United  States, 
it  ought  to  be  binding,  so  far  as  the  person  is  concerned,  in 
every  country  and  in  all  the  states  of  the  Union. 

So  far  as  guardians,  executors,  administrators  and  others 
occupying  similar  positions  are  concerned,  the  decree  of  the 
court  appointing  them  has  in  the  United  States  no  extraterri- 
torial efficacy,  and  these  ^a^-fiduciaries  are  regarded  as 
purely  local  matters.  For  this  reason  a  judgment  appointing 
a  person  an  executor,  administrator,  guardian  or  trustee  in  one 
state  is  not  evidence  in  the  courts  of  another  to  show  that  he 
possesses  any  power  as  such  over  property  in  the  latter  state.'- 

The  judgment  of  a  court  of  competent  jurisdiction  confirm, 
ing  or  annulling  a  marriage  which  had  been  contracted  within 
its  jurisdiction  by  residents  or  non-residents,  or  which  had 
been  contracted  outside  of  its  jurisdiction  by  persons  who 
were  at  the  time  of  the  marriage  or  of  the  suit  domiciled 
within  its  jurisdiction,  is  valid  everywhere.  The  same  rule  is 
applied  to  a  valid  foreign  decree  granting  a  divorce  in  a  suit 
conducted  oona  fide  by  persons  actually  domiciled  in  the  juris- 
diction of  the  court.3 

The  effect  as  evidence  of  foreign  judgments  in  personam 
has  been  much  discussed  from  early  times  by  the  authorities 
and  in  the  decided  cases.  In  spite  of  the  contrariety  of  the 
cases,  it  may  be  safely  said,  in  the  first  place,  that  a  foreign 
judgment  regular  on  its  face,  rendered  in  an  action  in  2>er- 

iGelstcra  v.  Hoyt,  3   Wheat.  246;  s  James    v.    James,   81    Tex.   373; 

Williams  v.  Armroyd,  7  Cranch,  423.  Glaude  v.  Post,  8  S.  Rep.  884;  43  La. 

2  Kraft  v.  Wickey,  4  Cr.  &  J.  332;  Ann.  861 ;  Davis  v.  Davis,  22  N.  Y.  S. 
Dixon  v.  Ramsay,  3  Cranch,  319;  In  191;  2Misc.R549;  Hammond  v.  Ham- 
re  Mintzer's  Estate,  2  Pa.  Dist.  R.  584 ;  mond  (Ga»,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  265. 
In  re  Johnson  (Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  69. 


210  JUDICIAL   AND    OTHEB    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§  158. 

sonam  in  a  foreign  court,  is  conclusive  evidence  between  the 
parties  or  their  privies  of  all  facts  which  are  directly  or  in- 
directly involved.  This  proposition,  it  will  be  seen,  leaves 
the  foreign  judgment  to  be  impeached  and  set  aside  if  upon 
the  face  of  the  record  of  the  foreign  court  its  decision  ap- 
pears to  be  grossly  repugnant  to  natural  justice,1  or  was  ob- 
tained by  fraud,  or  if  it  appears  that  the  court  had  no  juris- 
diction,2 or  misapprehended  or  refused  to  recognize  the  law  of 
the  country  in  which  the  subject-matter  is  situated.3  Thus,  if 
a  French  court,  construing  a  contract  made  in  England,  decides 
a  question  of  English  law  which  is  an  essential  element  in  the 
ultimate  judgment  rendered,  the  judgment  itself  will  be  in- 
valid as  evidence  in  an  English  court  if  the  foreign  court  mis- 
apprehends  the  true  import  of  the  English  rule  of  law.4  If 
the  foreign  court  has  no  jurisdiction,  then  its  judgment  is  of 
course  invalid.5 

In  some  proceedings  in  personam  the  decree  of  the  foreign 
court  is  effectual  to  transfer  the  title  of  the  property  not  only 
as  against  the  parties  but  against  all  persons,  and  this  conclu- 
sively. Such  proceeding  are  analogous  to  proceedings  in  rem, 
and  a  party  who  accepts  the  express  or  implied  permission  or 
invitation  to  intervene  and  submits  his  claim  to  the  court  will 
not  be  permitted  to  have  the  judgment  re-opened  in  another 
court  on  the  plea  that  he  only  intervened  to  save  his  prop- 
erty from  forfeiture.6 

1  Boston  I.  R.  Co.  v.  Hoit,  14  Vt.  92.  Fogo,  6  Jur.  403 ;  Woodruff  v.  ray- 
s'Goulding  v.  Hoyt,  34  N.  H.  143.  lor,  20  Vt    65.    In   Holmes  v.  Gratz 

3  Scott  v.  Pilkington,  2  B.  &  S.  11 ;  (U.  S.  C.  C,  1892),  50  Fed.  Rep.  869, 
8  Jur.  557 ;  Crispin  v.  Daglioni,  9  id.  the  court  in  refusing  to  allow  defend- 
653 ;  Simpson  v.  Fogo,  9  id.  403 ;  ant  to  plead  a  foreign  judgment  as  a 
Bank  of  Australasia  v.  Nias,  16  Q.  B.  bar  in  a  suit  for  an  injunction  held 
717 ;  Ricardo  v.  Garcias,  12  CI.  &  Fin.  that  foreign  adjudications  as  re- 
368 ;  Dunstan  v.  Higgins,  63  Hun,  spects  torts  are  not  conclusive,  and 
031, cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid,  §  546.  that,  as  granting  an  injunction  de- 

4  Novelli  v.  Rossi,  2  B.  &  Aid.  757.     pends    largely   upon    circumstances 
5 Vanquelin   v.    Bouard,   9    L.   T.     which  differ  in  each   case,   neither 

(N.  S.)  582.     Cf.  Wood  v.  Watkinson,  public  policy  nor  international  com- 

17  Conn.  500.  ity  requires  that  the  right  to  the  pro- 

6  De  Casse  Brissac  v.  Rathbone,  6  tection  of  a  court  of  equity  against 

H.  &   Nor.  301 ;  Imrie  v.  Castrique,  fraud  should  depend  on  the  law  of  a 

8  C.  B.  (N.  S.)  406 ;  Frayes  v.  Worms,  foreign  tribunal. 
10  C.  B.    (N.  S.)   149;    Simpson    v. 


§  159.] 


JUDICIAL    AND    OTIIKR    PUBLIC    RECORDS. 


241 


§  159.  Judgments  of  sister  states. —  By  virtue  of  the  con- 
stitutional provision  that  full  faith  and  credit  shall  be  given  to 
the  judicial  proceedings  of  each  state  in  the  courts  of  every 
other  state,  a  judgment  rendered  in  any  state  or  territory  will, 
when  duly  authenticated,  have  exactly  the  same  effect  and 
operation  as  a  domestic  judgment.1  Still  it  is  competent  for 
the  court,  in  such  a  case,  to  inquire  whether  the  judgment  is 
tainted  with  fraud  or  whether  the  court  had  jurisdiction  of 
the  subject-matter  or  of  the  parties.2  So  a  court  of  one  state 
may  inquire  whether  a  federal  court  situated  in  another  state 
had  jurisdiction  to  render  a  judgment  offered  as  evidence  in 
its  courts;3  and  in  New  York  it  has  been  held  that  the  va- 
lidity of  a  judgment  rendered  in  another  state  may  be  attacked 
upon  the  sole  ground  that  the  cause  of  action  was  based  on  a 
contract  without  consideration  and  obtained  under  duress,4  or 
that  the  judgment  has  been  allowed  to  become  dormant  in  the 
other  state.5  On  the  other  hand,  the  validity  of  a  judgment 
of  another  state  cannot  be  impeached  by  showing  that  the 
cause  of  action  was  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitation,8  or 
that  the  parties  were  not  legally  served.7 


i  Bright  v.  Smitten.  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 
647  ;  Fitzsimons  v.  Johnson,  90  Tenn. 
416  (probate  court);  Caughran  v. 
Gilman,  81  Iowa,  442;  46  N.  W.  Rep. 
1005;  Semple  v.  Glenn,  91  Ala.  245; 
9  S.  Rep.  235  ;  Hall  v.  McKay,  78  Tex. 
248;  Carpenter  v.  Strange,  141  U.  S. 
87 ;  Chicago  &  A.  B.  Co.  v.  Anglo- 
American  Packing  Co.,  46  Fed.  Rep. 
584;  McGarvey  v.  Darnall,  134  III. 
367 ;  25  N.  E.  Rep.  1005 ;  Kingman  v. 
Paulsen,  126  Ind.  507;  Bowersox  v. 
Gitt,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  81 ;  San n is  v. 
Wightman  (Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep. 
526;  Hammond  v.  Hammond  (Ga., 
1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  365.  See,  also, 
ante,  §  148. 

2  Taylor  v.  Bryden,  8  Johns.  173; 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cunningham,  48 
Fed.  Rep.  515 ;  Teel  v.  Yost,  128  N.  Y. 
387;  Renier  v.  Hurlhurt  (Wis.,  1892), 
50  N.  W.  Rep.  783 ;  Henry  v.  Allen, 
82  Tex.  35;  Rand  v.  Hansen,  154 
16 


Mass.  87 ;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  6 ;  Caughran 
v.  Gilman,  81  Iowa,  442;  46  N.  W. 
Rep.  1005;  Bogan  v.  Hamilton,  90 
Ala.  54;  New  York  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Aitkin,  125  N.  Y.  560;  Huntington  v. 
Attrill,  146  U.  S.  657;  Morgan  v, 
Morgan.  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  315. 

3  Hovey  v.  Elliott,  21  N.  Y.  S.  108; 
Southern  Ins.  Co.  v.  Wolverton  Hd. 
Co.  (Tex.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  615. 

*Trebilcox  v.  McAlpine,  62  Hun, 
317.  But  cf.  contra,  Ambler  v. 
Whipple,  139  111.  811;  28  N.  E.  Rep. 
841. 

5  Chapman  v.  Chapman,  48  Kan. 
636 ;  29  Pac.  Rep.  1074. 

6  Fitzsimons  v.  Johnson,  90  Tenn. 
416;  Reed  v.  Chilson,  61  Hun,  623. 

'Hail  v.  McKay,  78  Tex.  248; 
Semple  v.  Glenn,  9  S.  Rep.  265;  91 
Ala.  245.  But  cf.  N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v 
Aitkin,  125  N.  Y.  660;  Hoffman  v. 
Newell,  20  N.  Y.  S.  432 ;  21  id.  913. 


242  JUDICIAL    AND    OTHER    PUBLIC    RECORDS.  [§   160. 

§  160.  Judgment  in  bar  need  not  be  pleaded. —  An  estoppel 
in  pais  or  by  deed  should  be  specially  pleaded  in  order  to  be 
admissible  and  conclusive  as  evidence,  though  where  there  is 
no  opportunity  to  plead  it  it  may  be  proved  under  the  general 
denial.1  A  former  judgment,  when  specially  pleaded  in  bar, 
will  operate  as  an  estoppel  in  law  and  be  binding  alike  on 
court  and  jury.  But  it  has  been  considered  doubtful  whether 
a  judgment  not  pleaded  as  an  estoppel  but  given  in  evidence 
under  a  general  denial  or  under  the  general  issue  was  binding 
on  the  jury.  The  weight  of  the  decisions,  however,  supports 
the  proposition  that  if  a  former  judgment  is  relied  upon  and 
is  given  in  evidence  as  determining  the  whole  question  in- 
volved in  the  pending  action,  it  need  not  be  pleaded  but  is 
conclusive  as  an  estoppel,  and  so  binding  as  a  matter  of  law 
upon  the  jury.2 

1  Outram  v.  Morewood,  5  East,  346 ;  Harvey,  2  H.  &  Mun.  55 ;  Shafer  v. 

Adams  v.  Barnes,  17  Mass.  365 ;  Dows  Stonebraker.   4  G.  &   J.  345 ;  Betts 

v.  McMichael,  6  Paige,   139;  Cham-  v.  Starr,  5  Conn.  550,  553;  King  v. 

berlain  v.    Carlisle,   26   N.    H.    540;  Chase,  15  N.  H.  9;  Lawrence  v.  Hunt, 

Meiss  v.  Gill,  44  Ohio  St.  258.  10  Wend.  83,  84  ;  1  Greenl.  on  Evid., 

*  Krekeler  v.  Ritter,  62  N.  Y.  372 ;  §  531.      Contra,    Josephi    v.    Mady 

Marsh  v.   Pier,   4   Rawle,   288,   289;  Clothing  Co.  (Mont.,  1893),   33  Pac. 

Gray  v.  Pingry,   17  Vt.  419;  Cist  v.  Rep.  10.    Cf.  Dunklee  v.  Goodenough 

Ziegler,  16  S.  &;  R  282;  Preston  v.  (Vt,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  9S8. 


CHAPTER  XIY. 


PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS. 


§  165.  Foundation  of  the  doctrine. 

166.  Husband  and  wife,  when  com- 

petent witnesses. 

167.  Statutory  legislation  —  Confi- 

dential communications. 

168.  Confidential  communications 

between  husband  and  wife. 

169.  Communications  to  attorneys. 

170.  Character    and    time    of   the 

communications. 

171.  Attorney  employed  by  both 

parties. 


172.  Permanent   character  of  the 

privilege  —  Its  waiver. 

173.  Privileges  as  to  documents. 

174.  What     communications    are 

within  the  privilege. 

175.  Privilege  of  police  —  Judicial 

and  executive  officials. 

176.  Privilege  as  relating  to  jurors. 

177.  Confidential   communications 

to  clergymen. 

178.  Communications    to    physi- 

cians. 


§  165.  Foundation  of  the  doctrine. —  Public  policy,  the 
welfare  of  the  whole  community,  and  indeed  the  best  inter- 
ests of  the  litigant  parties  themselves,  demand  that  certain 
evidence,  or  rather  the  evidence  of  certain  witnesses,  shall  be 
absolutely  inadmissible,  because  any  advantage  which  might 
be  gained  in  the  particular  case  in  ascertaining  the  truth 
would  be  more  than  counterbalanced  by  the  injury  to  society 
as  a  whole.  *  This  restriction  upon  the  capacity  of  certain 
classes  of  witnesses  as  regards  the  evidence  which  they  will 
be  permitted  to  give  is  not  based  upon  any  peculiar  respect 
which  the  law  has  for  their  calling  or  character.  Its  design 
is  to  advance  the  pure  and  unembarrassed  administration  of 
law,  subserve  justice  and  to  protect  the  innocent  while  pun- 
ishing the  guilty.1 


1  "The  principle  of  the  rule  which 
applies  to  attorneys  and  counsel  is 
that  so  numerous  and  complex  are 
the  laws  by  which  the  rights  and  du- 
ties of  citizens  are  governed,  so  im- 
portant is  it  they  should  be  permitted 
to  avail  themselves  of  the  superior 
skill  and  learning  of  those  who  are 
sanctioned  by  the  law  as  its  minis- 


ters and  exponents,  both  in  ascertain- 
ing their  rights  in  the  country  and 
maintaining  them  most  safely  in 
courts,  without  publishing  those  facts 
which  they  have  a  right  to  keep  se- 
cret, but  which  must  be  disclosed  to 
a  legal  adviser  and  advocate  to  ena- 
ble him  successfully  to  perform  the 
duties  of  his  office,  that  the  law  has 


244 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


[§   10°- 


§  166.  Husband  and  wife,  when  competent  witnesses.—  A 
husband  or  wife  was  not  at  common  law  (with  a  few  excep- 
tions) a  competent  witness  for  or  against  each  other  in  any 
action  to  which  the  other  was  a  party  or  had  any  pecuniary 
interest.1  The  absolute  prohibition  thus  placed  upon  the  hus- 
band and  wife  was  largely  the  logical  result  of  the  legal 
identity  of  the  parties  to  the  marriage.  The  rule  that  the 
party  was  not  a  competent  witness  for  or  against  himself  re- 
quired the  exclusion  of  the  testimony  of  another  person  who 
was  simply  the  alter  ego  of  the  party  and  equally  concerned 
in  the  suit.2  It  was  considered  also  that  to  permit  a  husband 
or  wife  to  testify  for  the  other  would  put  a  premium  on  per- 
jury, while,  if  either  were  to  be  recognized  as  a  competent 
witness  against  the  other,  the  harmony  between  them  and 
the  unbounded  confidence  properly  accompanying  the  mar- 
riage relation  would  be  imperiled.3 

So  far  as  the  rule  was  intended  to  protect  confidential  com- 
munications between  husband  and  wife,  it  was  analogous  to 
the  rule  which  at  common  law  affixed  a  privileged  character 


considered  it  the  wisest  policy  to  en- 
courage and  sustain  the  confidence 
by  requiring  that  on  such  facts  the 
mouth  of  the  attorney  should  be 
forever  closed."  Chief  Justice  Shaw, 
in  Hatton  v.  Robinson,  14  Pick.  422. 

1  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  334 ;  Bank  v. 
Mandeville,  1  Cranch,  575;  Gilleland 
v.  Martin,  3  McLean,  490 ;  Farrell  v. 
Ladwell,  21  Wis.  183;  Pry  or  v.  Ro- 
burn,  16  Ark.  671;  Moore  v.  McKee, 
13  Miss.  238;  Wilson  v.  Sheppard.  28 
Ala.  623;  Dawley  v.  Ayers,  23  Cal. 
108;  Manchester  v.  Manchester,  24 
Vt.  649;  Kemp  v.  Donhan,  5  Har. 
(Del.)  417 ;  Cameron  v.  Fay,  55  Tex. 
38;  Waddams  v.  Humphreys,  22  III. 
061 ;  Karney  v.  Paisley,  13  Iowa,  89; 
Smead  v.  Williamson,  16  B.  Mon. 
(Ky.)  492;  Gee  v.  Scott,  48  Tex.  510; 
Kyle  v.  Frost,  29  Ind.  398;  Keaton 
v.  McGivier,  24  Ga.  217;  Tully  v. 
Alexander,  11  La.  Ann.  628;  State  v. 
Armstrong,  4  Minn.  33o;  Tomlinson 
v.  Lynch,  82  Mo.  160 ;  Kelly  v.  Proc- 


tor, 41  N.  EL  139;  Rice  v.  Keith,  63 
N.  C.  319;  Den  v.  Johnson,  18  N.  J. 
L.  87;  Birdv.  Husten,  10  Ohio  St. 
418;  Donnelly  v.  Smith,  7  R  I.  12; 
Gross  v.  Reddy.  45  Pa,  St.  406 ;  Foot- 
man v.  Prendergass,  2  Strob.  Eq. 
(S.  C.)317. 

2  Turner  v.  State,  50  Miss.  351,  354. 

3  Lucas  v.  Brooks,  18  Wall.  (U.  S.) 
436,  452;  In  re  Alcock,  12  Eng.  L  & 
Eq.  354,  355;  Stapleton  v.  Crofts,  18 
Ad.  &  E.  307,  369;  Tully  v.  Alexan- 
der, 11  La.  Ann.  628;  Mitchiuson  v. 
Cross,  58  III.  366,  369;  In  re  Dwelly, 
46  Me.  477,  480;  Blake  v.  Graves,  18 
Iowa,  312,  317 ;  Bradford  v.  Williams. 
2  Md.  Ch.  1 ;  Turner  v.  State,  50  Miss. 
351  ;  Den  v.  Johnson,  18  N.  J.  L.  87, 
98;  Marsh  v.  Potter,  30  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
506;  Gibson  v.  Com.,  87  Pa.  St.  253; 
State  v.  Workman,  15  S.  C.  540,  546; 
Cram  v.  Cram,  33  Vt  15,  40;  Dun- 
lap  v.  Hearn,  37  Miss.  471,  474;  Bow- 
man v.  Patrick,  32  Fed.  Rep.  308. 


§  167.]  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  245 

to  the  communications  between  client  and  attorney,  and 
which,  by  statute,  now  regulates  the  relation  of  priest  and 
penitent  or  physician  and  patient.  Thus  it  is  said  that  the 
incompetency  of  the  husband  or  wife  to  testify  for  or  against 
the  other  in  a  criminal  prosecution  arose,  not  from  any  iden- 
tity of  interest,  but  solely  from  principles  of  public  policy 
growing  out  of  respect  for  the  confidential  nature  of  the 
marital  relation.1  When,  therefore,  the  interest  of  justice  de- 
manded that  the  mouth  of  the  husband  or  wife  should  be 
opened,  as  in  prosecutions  of  either  for  a  crime  committed  on 
the  other,  an  exception  was  recognized  2  from  the  necessity  of 
the  case,  and  the  husband  or  wife  was  competent.3 

A  woman  against  whose  husband  an  indictment  has  been 
found  may  testify  for  the  state  on  the  trial  of  another  person 
for  the  crime;4  and  the  same  rule  has  been  applied  where  the 
husband  was  tried  jointly  with  another,  though  it  is  the  duty 
of  the  jury  to  consider  her  testimony  only  so  far  as  it  applies 
to  the  other  defendant.5 

§  167.  Statutory  legislation  —  Confidential  communica- 
tions.—  The  competency  of  a  wife  or  husband  as  a  witness 

iTurpin  v.  State,  55  Md.  477;  Stein  »  Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Pet  221 ;  1 

v.  Bowman,  13  Pet.  (U.  S.)  223 ;  Tur-  BI.  Com.    413;  Bentley  v.    Cooke,  3 

ner  v.  State,  50  Miss.  351 ;  In  re  Ran-  Dong.  (Eng.)  422;    Whipp  v.  State, 

dall,    5    City    Hall    Rec.    141,    153;  34  Ohio  St.  87,  89;  State   v.   Neil,  6 

United  States  v.  Jones,  32  Fed.  Rep.  Ala.  685;  State  v.  Parrott,  79  N.  C. 

569;  State   v.  Wright,  41   La.    Ann.  615;  People  v.  Chegaray,  18   Wend. 

600;  Hussey   v.    State,  87   Ala.  121;  (N.  Y.)642;  Goodwin  v.  State,  60  Ga. 

Ex  parte  Hendrickson  (Utah,  1889),  509;  State  v.  Bennett,  31  Iowa,  24; 

21  Pac.  Rep.  396 ;  Johnson  v.  State,  State  v.  Dyer,  59  Me.  503 ;  Turner  v. 

27  Tex.  A  pp.  135;  State  v.Adams,  40  State,   50  Miss.   351,   354.     A   wife's 

La.  Ann.  213.  dying  declarations  are  admissible  on 

2Bramlette  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  a  trial  of  her  husband  for  her  mur- 

611;  2  S.   W.    Rep.   875;   People   v.  der.     State  v.  Belcher,  13  S.  C.  459 

Sebriug,  66  Mich.  705 ;  33  N.  W.  Rep.  Rex    v.    Woodcock,   2    Leach,   563 

808.     In  a  trial  of  the  husband  for  People  v.  Green,  1  Denio  (N.  Y.),614 

bigamy,  his  letters  to  his  lawful  wife  People  v.  Murphy,  45  Cal.  143. 

are  inadmissible  (State  v.  Ulrich,  110  4  State    v.   Rainsbarger,   71    Iowa, 

Mo.  350;  Com.  v.  Caponi,  155  Mass.  746:  31   N.   W.    Rep.    865;   State  v. 

534;    Bassett  v.   United  States,    137  Wright,  41  La.  Ann.  600. 

U.  S.  496),  though  it  is  held  elsewhere  5  State  v.  Adams,  40  La.  Ann.  213; 

that  she  is  herself  competent  as  a  3  S.  Rep.  733. 
witness.     United  States  v.  Cutler,  19 
Pac.  Rep.  145 ;  5  Utah,  608. 


24G  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  [§  167. 

for  or  against  the  other  is  to  a  large  degree,  if  not  altogether, 
regulated  by  statutes  in  the  United  States.  These  differ 
somewhat  in  details  and  should  be  consulted  in  every  instance 
where  this  question  arises.  The  general  effect  of  this  legisla- 
tion has  been  to  render  the  husband  or  wife  competent  as  a 
witness  for  or  against  the  other  by  removing  any  disqualifica- 
tion that  either  may  have  been  under  on  account  of  the 
common-law  merger  of  the  legal  personality  of  the  wife  into 
that  of  the  husband  because  of  the  incompetency  of  a  party 
to  be  a  witness.1  In  civil  cases,  therefore,  a  husband  or  wife 
is  a  competent  witness  for  or  against  the  other  to  the  same 
extent  and  with  the  same  effect  as  any  other  person,  with  the 
exception  (and  this  exception  is  recognized  in  all  the  states 
which  have  legislated  upon  this  subject)  that  neither  can 
be  permitted  to  disclose  confidential  communications  which 
passed  between  them  during  coverture.  But  statutes  merely 
intended  to  render  interested  persons  competent  as  witnesses 
do  not  affect  the  competency  of  husband  and  wife,  as  their 
incompetency  is  founded  on  other  grounds  than  interest.2 

The  common-law  incompetency  of  the  husband  or  wife  as 
a  witness  in  the  prosecution  of  either  for  a  crime  committed 
against  a  third  party  is  confirmed  by  statute  in  many  states; 3 
and  where  the  statute  in  general  terms  declares  that  husbands 
and  wives  are  competent  and  compellable  to  give  evidence, 
it  has  been  held  to  apply  only  to  civil  suits  and  never  to  crim- 
inal proceedings.4     The  credibility  of  a  husband  or  wife  who 

>  Collins    v.    Mack,   31    Ark.   684;  v.  State  (Tex.,  1889),   11  S.  W.  Eep. 

Watkins    v.   Turner,    34    Ark.   603;  667;  Lowther  v.  State,  4  Ohio  Cir. 

Spitz's  Estate,  56   Conn.  185;    Beit-  Ct.   R.   522.     This  privilege   may  be 

man  v.  Hopkins,  109  Ind.  178;  Park-  claimed  by  the  defendant  instead  of 

hurst    v.    Berdell,    110    N.    Y.    388;  by  the  witness.     People  v.  Wood,  126 

Warren   v.  Press   Pub.  Co.,   132   id.  N.  Y.  249 ;  27  N.  E.  Rep.  382. 

181;  Nilan  v.  Kalish  (Neb.,  1893),  55  *  Turpin  v.  State,  55  Md.  462,  478; 

N.  W.   Rep.  295;    Briggs   v.  Briggs  Wilke  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  525 ;  Steen 

(R.  L,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  198;  Beale  v.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  333.     Of.  People 

v.  Brown,  6  Mackey,  574.  v.  Murphy,  45  Cal.  143;  Miner  v.  Peo- 

2  Turpin  v.  State,  55  Md.  462,  477.  pie.  58  111.  A  pp.  59;  State  v.  Sloan, 

3  State  v.  McCord,  8  Kan.  161;  55  Iowa,  217.  The  statutory  pro- 
United  States  v.  Bassett,  5  Utah,  131 ;  visions  of  the  several  states  regulat- 
13  Pac.  Rep.  237 ;  Meriwether  v.  State,  ing  the  competency  of  a  husband  and 
81  Ala.  74;  1  S.  Rep.  500;  Stickney  wife  as  witnesses  for  or  against  each 
v.  Stickney,  131  U.  S.  227 ;  Johnson  other  are  cited,  and  the  subject  of 


§  168.] 


PKIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


247 


has  been  made  competent  to  testify  for  or  against  the  other 
is  to  be  tested  precisely  by  the  same  rules  as  any  other  wit- 
ness.1 
§  168.  Confidential  communication  between  husband  and 

wife. —  Where  a  statute  expressly  enacts  that  a  husband  or 
wife  is  not  compellable  to  divulge  their  communications,  either 
may  be  permitted  with  the  consent  of  the  other  to  make  a 
voluntary  statement,2  though  the  contrary  is  the  rule  where 
they  are  declared  incompetent  to  testify.3  Where  the  communi- 
cation is  not  confidential,  and  this  will  be  presumed  where  it 
is  made  to  a  third  person  by  the  wife  or  husband  in  the  other's 
presence,4  or  where  a  third  person  is  present,  it  will  not  be 
privileged,5  and  the  third  party  may  testify  to  what  he  has 
heard,  but  sometimes  it  has  been  held  that  a  communication 
need   not  be  expressly  confidential;6  as,  for  example,  where 


confidential  communication  between 
them  is  very  thoroughly  discussed 
by  the  editors  of  the  fourteenth 
edition  of  Greenleaf  on  Evidence  in 
a  note  to  section  334  in  volume  1. 
The  list  here  appended  is  condensed 
from  that  note.  The  following  stat- 
utes may  be  consulted:  Arkansas 
Code,  £  2»59,  cl.  4;  California  Code, 
§  1881 ;  Crim.  Code,  g  1322 :  Colorado 
Gen.  Laws,  §  3649;  Connecticut 
Statutes,  §  1097;  Florida  Laws,  ch. 
101 ;  §  23,  Act  1891 ;  §  4029 ;  Georgia 
Code,  §  3854;  Illinois  R.  S.,  ch.  51, 
§  5 ;  Indiana  R  S.,  §  501 ;  Iowa  Code, 
§§  3641,  3642;  Kansas  Gen.  Stat, 
§  5280 ;  Maine  R  S..  ch.  134,  §  19,  ch. 
82,  §  93 ;  Maryland  Gen.  Laws,  art. 
35,  §  1 ;  Massachusetts  Pub.  Stat.,  ch. 
169,  §  18 ;  Minnesota  Statutes.  §  5094 ; 
Mississippi  Rev.  Code,  §  1601;  Mis- 
souri R  S.,  §  8922;  Montana  Code 
Civ.  Pro.,  §  649 ;  Nebraska  Code  Civ. 
Pro.  328  ;  Nevada  Gen.  Stat.,  §  3403  ; 
New  Jersey  Rev.,  vol.  1,  p.  378,  §  5; 
New  York  Code  Civ.  Pro..  §  828; 
OhioR.  S.,§  5241,  ch.  3;  Pennsyl- 
vania Laws  1887,  ch.  89,  §  2,  cl.  b ; 
Texas  R  S.,  art.  2247:  Vermont  R 
S.,  §  1005 ;  Virginia  Rev.  Civ.  Code, 


2281 ;  West  Virginia  Code,  ch.  150, 
§  22;  Wisconsin  Anuot.,  §  7072. 

'State  v.  Collins,  20  Iowa,  85; 
State  v.  Guyer,  6  id.  263;  State  v. 
Bernard,  45  id.  234. 

-Southwick  v.  South  wick,  2 
Sweeny,  234 ;  Stickuey  v.  Stickney, 
131  U.  S.  237. 

3  Baldwin  v.  Parker,  99  Mass.  79; 
Brown  v.  Wood,  121  id.  137;  Jacobs 
v.  Hesler,  113  id.  157  ;  Head  v.  Thomp- 
son, 77  Iowa,  263;  Smith  v.  Turley, 
32  W.  Va.  14;  Com.  v.  Cleary,  152 
Mass.  491. 

4  Griffin  v.  Smith,  45  Ind.  366; 
Mainard  v.  Beider,  2  Ind.  App.  115; 
28  N.  E.  Rep.  196. 

5  Day  v.  Gidjum,  131  Mass.  31; 
Com.  v.  Griffin,  110  Mass.  181 ;  State 
v.  Carter,  35  Vt.  378:  Howard  v. 
Brewer,  37  Ohio  St.  £02;  People  v. 
Lewis,  62  Hun,  622 ;  Lyon  v.  Prouty, 
154  Mass.  488;  Buckman's  Will,  04 
Vt.  313. 

6  Dexter  v.  Booth,  2  Allen  (Mass.), 
559;  Raynes  v.  Bennett,  114  Mass. 
425;  Com.  v.  Haynes,  145  id.  293; 
Lepla  v.  Minn.  Tribune  Co,  35  Minu. 
311 ;  Norris  v.  Stewart,  105  N.  C.  455. 


248 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


[§  168. 


the  statute  in  terms  refers  to  all  communications  made  during 
marriage.1 

A  conversation  between  husband  and  wife  is  no  less  con- 
fidential and  private  because  children  were  present  who  took 
no  part  in  it.2  The  fact  that  husband  and  wife  sue  or  are  sued 
jointly  does  not  remove  the  privilege  as  respects  confiden- 
tial communications,3  nor  will  the  husband  or  wife  be  permit- 
ted to  testify  to  any  communications  made  while  the  marriage 
relation  existed  after  its  dissolution,  whether  by  annulment, 
divorce  or  death.4  But  either  after  the  death  of  the  other  may 
now  testify  to  any  facts  which  he  or  she  learned  from  other 
sources  and  not  by  reason  of  the  marital  relation,  even  though 
relative  to  a  transaction  of  the  decedent.5  If,  however,  the 
evidence  of  the  other  party  to  the  suit  is  inadmissible  because 
referring  to  a  transaction  with  a  decedent,  the  testimony  of  a 
wife  is  also  inadmissible.6 

It  is  sometimes  provided  by  statute  that,  in  the  trial  of  any 
allegation  founded  upon  adultery,  neither  husband  nor  wife 
shall  be  competent  to  testify  against  the  other  except  to 
prove  the  fact  of  marriage  or  to  disprove  the  adultery.7  So 
in  an  action  to  recover  for  criminal  conversation,  neither  hus- 
band nor  wife  can  testify  for  the  other,8  though  either  being 


•  Low's  Estate.  My  rick's  Prob.  (Cat) 
143;  Campbell  v.  Chase,  12  R  I.  333; 
Bird  v.  Hueston,  10  Ohio  St.  418; 
Westerman  v.  Westerman,  25  id.  500 ; 
King  v.  King,  42  Mo.  App.  454. 

2  Jacobs  v.  Hesler,  113  Mass.  157. 
So  business  communications  are  priv- 
ileged. Com.  v.  Hayes  (Mass.,  1887), 
14  N.  E.  Rep.  151 ;  Mitchell  v.  Mitch- 
eli.  15  S.  W.  Rep.  705. 

a  Buck  v.  Ashbrook,  51  Mo.  539; 
Tingley  v.  Couzill,  48  id.  291. 

*  Hitchcock  v.  Moore,  70  Mich.  112 ; 
Stanley  v.  Montgomery,  102  Ind.  102  ; 
Stein  v.  Bowman,  13  Pick.  209,  223; 
French  v.  Ware  (Vt.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  1090 ;  Coffin  v.  Jones,  13  Pick. 
441;  Robin  v.  King,  2  Leigh,  142; 
Bigelow  v.  Sickles,  75  Wis.  528 ;  Pat- 
ton  v.  Wilson,  2  Lea  (Term.),  10 1  ;  Es- 
tate of  Lord.  Myrick's  Prob.  (Cal.)  143 ; 
State   v.  Jolly,  3   Dev.   &   BaL    110; 


Crose  v.  Rufcledge,  81  111.  266 ;  Barnes 
v.  Camack,  1  Barb.  392 ;  Cook  v. 
Grange,  18  Ohio,  526  ;  Brock  v.  Brock, 
116  Pa.  St.  113.  When  either  party 
is  deceased  his  written  communica- 
tion to  the  other  cannot  be  used  by  a 
third  person  in  a  suit  against  the  sur- 
vivor. Mitchell  v.  Mitchell,  15  S.  W. 
Rep.  705;  80*  Tex.  101. 

5  Coffin  v.  Jones,  13  Pick.  445 ;  Wells 
v.  Tucker,  3  Binn.  366 ;  Williams  v. 
Baldwin,  7  Vt.  506 ;  Saunders  v.  Hen- 
drix.  5  Ala.  224 ;  Galbraith  v.  McLain, 
84  111.  379 ;  Romans  v.  Hay,  12  Iowa, 
270,  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  337. 

fcHarriman  v.  Sampson,  23  111.  App. 
161 ;  Trileavan  v.  Dixon,  119  111.  551 ; 
Barry  v.  Stevens,  69  Me.  290. 

"Michigan  Annot.  Stat.,  §  7543; 
Code  N.  C.  588;  R.  S.  Ind.  1881,  §501. 

"  Cross  v.  Cross,  55  Mich.  280 ;  De 
Meli  v.  De  Meli,  120  N.  Y.  492. 


§  169.] 


rKTVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


219 


a  party  may  testify  in  his  or  her  own  behalf.1  So  a  married 
woman  has  been  permitted  to  testify  in  her  own  behalf  to  the 
fact  of  the  non-access  of  her  husband,-  or  that  her  husband 
had  made  certain  representations  to  her  unon  the  strength  of 
which  she  had  conveyed  property  to  him,3  or  that  her  hus- 
band had  been  intoxicated  in  her  presence,4  or  had  communi- 
cated to  her  a  venereal  disease.5 

§100.  Communications  to  attorneys.— At  common  law 
an  attorney  cannot  be  compelled  or  allowed  to  disclose  com- 
munications made  by  his  client  to  him  or  his  advice  mven  in 
return  in  the  course  of  his  employment  as  an  attorney.6  In 
nearly  all  the  states  this  rule  has  been  confirmed  by  statute, 
and  it  is  sometimes  provided  that  the  privilege  may  be  waived 
by  the  client. 

A  client  may  waive  the  privilege  by  conduct  and  by  impli- 
cation as  well  as  by  express  declaration.7  Thus,  if  he  request 
his  attorney  to  act  as  a  subscribing  witness  to  his  will  ho 
waives  his  -privilege  to  that  extent,  and  the  attorney  is  then 
compellable  to  testify  to  the  same  facts  as  other  subscribing 
witnesses.9  Such  a  request  is  tantamount  to  a  declaration 
that  he  wishes  to  release  the  attorney  from  the  professional 


i  Smith  v.  Brien,  6  N.  Y.  S.  174. 

2  State  v.  McDowell  (N.  C),  7  S.  E. 
Rep.  785. 

3  Spitz's  Appeal,  56  Conn.  1S4 ;  14 
Atl.  Rep.  776. 

4  Stanley  v.  Stanley  (Iud.,  1888),  13 
N.  E.  Rep.  201. 

5 Poison  v.  State  (Iud,  1893),  35  N. 
E.  Rep.  907. 

6  Carter  v.  West  (Ky.,  1893),  19  S. 
W.  Rep.  592;  Aultman  v.  Ritter,  81 
Wis.  395 ;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  569 :  Koontz 
v.  Owens,  109  Mo.  1 ;  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
928 ;  Wadd  v.  Hazletoo,  62  Hun,  602 ; 
Swain  v.  Humphreys,  42  III.  A  pp. 
370;  Loder  v.  Whelpley,  111  N.  Y. 
220;  In  re  Coleman.  11  N.  Y.  220; 
In  re  McCarthy,  65  Hud,  624;  Chirac 
v.  ReinecL-er,  11  Wheat.  295;  Fos- 
ter v.  Hall,  12  Pick.  89;  Mathews  v. 
Hoagland  (N.  J..  1890).  21  Atl.  Rep. 
1054;    Alexander   v.    United  States, 


138  U.  S.  353.  In  Pearse  v.  Pears?.  1 
De  Gex  &  Sm.  28,  29,  the  court  says  : 
"Truth,  like  all  other  things,  may 
have  loved  unwisely;  may  be  pur- 
sued too  keenly  ;  may  cost  too  much  ; 
and  surely  the  meanness  and  the  mis- 
chief of  prying  into  a  man's  confi- 
dential consultation  with  his  legal 
adviser,  the  general  evil  of  infusing 
reserve,  dissimulation,  meanness,  sus- 
picion and  fear  into  those  communi- 
cations which  must  take  place,  and 
which,  unless  in  a  condition  of  per- 
fect security,  must  take  place  use- 
lessly or  worse,  are  too  great  a  price 
for  truth  itself." 

'Willis  v.  West.  60  Ga.  613. 

8  lure  Lumb's  Will,  21  Civ.  Pro. 
334;  Rousseau  v.  Blen.  31  N.  Y.  177: 
Iu  re  Pitts  (Wis.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep. 
149;  McMaster's  Appeal,  55  id.  149; 
In  re  Coleman,  111  N.  Y.  220. 


250 


TKIVILEGKD    COMMUNICATIONS. 


[§  169. 


privilege,  and  is  equivalent  to  calling  upon  him  to  take  the 
witness  stand  in  his  behalf.1 

The  communication,  to  bo  privileged,  must  have  been  made 
to  one  who  was  actually  occupying  the  position  of  legal  ad- 
viser; but  where  a  communication  is  made  to  an  attorney 
who  has  been  requested  to  act,  it  will  be  privileged  though 
he  subsequently  refuses  to  do  so.2  The  rule  does  not  require 
any  regular  retainer,  or  any  particular  form  of  application 
or  payment  of  a  fee,3  provided  the  attorney  is  consulted  with 
the  actual  intention  of  obtaining  his  professional  services.4 

A  communication  made  to  or  advice  received  from  the 
agent  of  the  attorney  is  no  less  privileged  than  where  the 
client  communicates,  with  the  attorney  directly.  Thus,  a 
clerk,5  interpreter/'  or  other  agent7  of  the  attorney  will  not 
be  allowed  to  testify  to  communications  made  to  him  in  a 
professional  capacity  by  a  client  of  his  employer.  But  a  third 
person  present  at  a  consultation  between  attorney  and  client, 
and  who  is  not  the  medium  of  communication,  may  testify  to 
what  was  said;8  and  so  generally  any  person  who  has  been 
consulted  either  in  a  private  or  professional  capacity  in  regard 
to  any  transaction  may  be  compelled  to  testify  if,  at  that  time 
and  in  reference  to  that  particular  matter,  he  did  not  occupy 
the  position  of  an  attorney  at  law.9 


>  McKinney  v.  Grand  St.  etc.  R.  R. 
Co.,  104  N.  Y.  352. 

■i  Peek  v.  Boone  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S. 
W.  Rep.  66 ;  Sargent  v.  Hampden,  38 
Me.  581 ;  McClellan  \.  Longfellow, 
32  id.  594. 

3 1  Greenl.  Evid.,  §  241.  Cf.  In  re 
Monroe's  Will,  20  N.  Y.  S.  82  ;  2  Con. 
Sur.  395. 

4  Sargent  v.  Hampden,  supra. 

&  Sibley  v.  Waffle,  16  N.  Y.  180: 
Jackson  v.  French,  3  Wend.  337; 
Havves  v.  State..  88  Ala.  68;  Taylor  v. 
Forster,  2  C.  R  195  ;  Bowman  v.  Nor- 
ton, 5  C.  &  P.  177;  Jarcline  v.  Sheri- 
dan, 2  C.  &  K.  24;  Landsberger  v. 
Gorham,  5  Cal.  450. 

e  Parker  v.  Carter.  4  Munf.  273; 
Andrews  v.  Solomon,  1  Pet.  C.  C. 
356. 


7  Parkins  v.  Hawkshaw,  2  Stark. 
1239;  Steele  v.  Stuart,  1  Phil.  Oh. 
471 ;  Fenner  v.  London  &  S.  E.  Ry. 
Co.,  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  767. 

s  Greer  v.  Greer,  5S  Hun,  251 ;  Ty- 
ler v.  Hall,  106  Mo.  313;  Goddard  v. 
Gardner,  28  Conn.  172 ;  Hoy  v.  Mor- 
ris, 13  Gray,  519. 

9  In  re  Monroe's  Will,  20  N.  Y.  S. 
182;  Matthews'  Estate,  4  Am.  Law 
Jour.  356  (conveyancer);  Schubkagel 
v.  Dierstein,  131  Pa.  St.  53;  Mc- 
Laughlin v.  Gilmore,  1  111.  App.  563; 
Bruuger  v.  Smith,  49  Fed.  Rep.  124; 
Holman  v.  Kimball.  22  Vt.  555;  De 
Wolf  v.  Strader,  26  111.  225;  Coon 
v.  Swan.  30  Vt.  6;  Borum  v.  Fonts, 
15  Ind.  50;  Sample  v.  Frost,  10  Iowa, 
266.  So  communications  to  one's 
confidential    clerk    or  banker   (Mc- 


§  no.] 


riilVILEGKD    COMMUNICATIONS. 


251 


§170.  Character  and  time  of  the  communications. —  In 

all  classes  of  privileged  communications  claimed  to  be  con- 
fidential certain  elements  must  be  present.  It  is  only  neces- 
sary to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that,  as  the  communication 
must  have  been  made  during  the  existence  of  the  confidential 
relation,  anything  said  before  or  after  is  not  within  the  rule. 
So  the  communication  must  have  been  made  to  the  attorney, 
doctor  or  priest,  not  only  during  the  existence  of  the  connec- 
tion but  while  he  was  acting  in  a  professional  capacity,  and 
must  have  had  relation  to  his  professional  employment.1  So 
an  attorney  will  be  allowed  to  divulge  the  name  of  a  person 
who  retained  him2  and  the  date  when  he  received  a  certain 
instrument ; 3  that  he  drew  a  deed 4  for  his  client  or  paid  money 
to  his  client5  or  to  a  third  person  on  his  client's  account. 

So  it  has  bean  held  that  whenever  an  attorney,  though  acting 
as  such,  obtains  knowledge  of  any  fact,  not  by  reason  of  his  pro- 
fessional character,  but  by  his  power  of  observation  as  a  man 
or  by  means  which  any  man  in  a  like  situation  would  employ, 
the  information  is  not  privileged.6 


Manus  v.  Freeman,  2  Pa.  Dist.  R. 
144)  or  steward  are  never  privileged. 
1  Greenl.  Evid.,  §  248,  citing  Hof- 
man  v.  Smith,  1  Caines,  157;  Vallaint 
v.  Dodemead,  2  Atk.  524.  "Where  a 
person,  though  not  admitted  to  the 
bar,  lias  been  accustomed  fur  years 
to  practice  before  justices  of  the 
peace,  confidential  statements  made 
to  him  by  an  accused  are  under  the 
rule.  Benedict  v.  State,  11  N.  E. 
Rep.  125;  44  Ohio,  679.  But  the 
mere  presence  of  a  third  person  will 
not  make  the  attorney  a  competent 
witness.  Blount  v.  Kempton,  155 
M  i:  s.  378. 

i  Grant  v.  Hughes,  98  N.  0.  177 ;  2 
S.  E.  Rep.  339;  Piano  Mfg.  Co.  v. 
Frawley,  68  Wis.  577 ;  32  N.  W.  Rep. 
768 ;  Caldwell  v.  Davis,  10  Colo.  481 ; 
15  Pac.  Rep.  696 ;  Sharon  v.  Sharon, 
79  Cal.  633;  Skellie  v.  James,  81  Ga. 
419;  Rogers  v.  Moore,  88  id.  88. 

2  Brown   v.  Payson,  6  N.  H.  443 ; 


Gower  v.  Emery,  6  Shepl.  79;  Chirac 
v.  Reinecker,  11  Wheat.  280. 

3  Wheatley  v.  Williams.  1M.&W. 
533.  But  cf.  contra,  Ex  pirte  Trustee, 
9  Morrell's  Bank.  Cas.  116. 

4  Barry  v.  Coville,  7  N.  Y.  S.  36; 
Rundle  v.  Foster,  3  Tenn.  Ch.  658; 
Robsou  v.  Kemp,  4  Esp.  235. 

5  Chapman  v.  Peebles,  84  Ala.  283; 
4  S.  Rep.  273. 

e  Wadd  v.  Hazelton,  62  Hun,  602; 
Swaine  v.  Humphreys,  42  111.  App. 
370  ;  Harris  v.  Dougherty,  74  Tex.  1 ; 
11  S.  W.  Rep.  921 ;  Breunan  v.  Hall, 
14  N.  Y.  S.  864;  Sheldon  v.  Sheldon, 
58  Hun,  601 ;  In  re  Smith,  61  Hun, 
101 ;  Weaver's  Estate,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 
516 ;  Theisen  v.  Dayton,  82  Iowa,  74 ; 
47  N.  W.  Rep.  891.  As  a  corporation 
acts  only  by  agent,  a  confidential  com- 
munication by  the  latter  to  the  at- 
torney of  the  corporation  is  within 
the  rule  (Fire  Ass'n  v.  Fleming  (Ga., 
),  3  S.  E.  Rep.  420),  though  per- 


252 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  [§§  171,  172. 


§  171.  Attorney  employed  by  both  parties. —  When  an  at- 
torney is  engaged  by  several  parties  to  act  or  to  advise  in  a 
transaction  in  which  all  are  interested,  communications  made 
to  him  by  any  of  them  are  not  within  the  rule.  lie  may  be 
called  to  testify  by  any  one  of  the  parties  in  a  subsequent 
suit  between  them  as  to  such  professional  communications.1 
Some  of  the  cases  seem  to  confine  the  operation  of  this  excep- 
tion to  communications  made  where  the  other  parties  to  the 
transaction  or  suit  were  present,2  and  in  such  a  case  the  at- 
torney may  testify,  though  at  the  time  he  was  only  acting  for 
one  party  to  the  suit.3 

§  172.  Permanent  character  of  the  privilege  —  Its  waiver. 
The  termination  of  the  pending  litigation  or  the  severance  of 
the  relation  of  attorney  and  client  by  the  death  of  the  client 
or  for  any  cause  does  not  unseal  the  lips  of  the  former  as  to, 
communications  passing  between  them  while  the  connection 
existed.4  The  privilege  is  designed  to  protect  the  client,  and 
he  may  consequently  waive  it.  So  it  has  been  held  that  this 
may  be  done  after  the  death  of  the  client  by  his  representative, 
but  only  when  an  application  of  the  rule  would  be  to  the  dis- 
advantage of  his  estate.5     While  the  client  is  living  the  priv- 


haps  this  would  not  be  so  in  the  case  of 
an  agent  acting  for  a  natural  person. 
So  the  regularly  appointed  attorney 
for  a  municipal  corporation  will  not 
be  compelled  to  divulge  communica- 
tions made  to  him  professionally  by 
a  municipal  board  or  officer.  People 
v.  Gilon,  18  Civ.  Pro.  R.  109. 

1  Sparks  v.  Sparks  (Kan.,  1893),  32 
Pac.  Rep.  892 :  Michael  v.  Foil,  100 
N.  C.  189;  In  re  Bauer,  79  Cal.  312; 
Gulick  v.  Gulick,  39  N.  J.  L.  516; 
Cady  v.  Walker,  62  Mich.  157:  Lynn 
v.  Lyerle,  113  111.  134;  Hurlbut  v. 
Hurlbut,  128  N.  Y.  420:  Hanlon  v. 
Doherty,  109  Ind.  37;  Tyler  v.  Tyler, 
126  III.  525. 

2  Hurlbut  v.  Hurlbut,  128  N.  Y.  420 ; 
Colt  v.  McConnell,  1 16  Ind.  256  ;  Good- 
win Company's  Appeal,  117  Pa.  St. 
537 ;  Hanlon  v.  Doherty,  109  Ind.  37 ; 
Smith  v.  Crego,  7  N.  Y.  S.  86 ;  Hughes 


v.  Boone,  102  N.  C.  137;  Hard  v.  Ash- 
ley, 63  Hun,  634 ;  Greer  v.  Greer,  58 
Hun,  251. 

» Carey  v.  Carey,  108  N.  C.  267; 
Deuser  v.  Walkup,  43  Mo.  App.  625; 
Greer  v.  Greer,  supra;  In  re  Smith, 
61  Hun,  101;  15  N.  Y.  S.  425;  In  re 
McCarthy,  65  Hun,  624.  But  in  a 
suit  between  strangers  such  com- 
munications would  doubtless  be  priv- 
ileged. 

••Wilson  v.  Rastall,  4  T.  R.  759; 
Morris  v.  Cain,  39  La.  Ann.  712;  I  S. 
Rep.  879 ;  Kant  v.  Kessler,  114  Pa.  St. 
603;  Walter  v.  Fail-child,  4  N.  Y  S. 
559;  Barry  v.  Coville,  7  id.  36;  1 
Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §  243. 

5  Layman's  Wills,  40  Minn.  372 ;  Mor- 
ris v.  Morris,  119  Ind.  343 ;  Blackburn 
v.  Crawfords,  3  Wall.  175;  Russell  v. 
Jackson,  15  Jur.  1117.  Contra,  Loder 
v.  Whelpley,  111  N.  Y.  245 ;  Westover 


§  H3. j 


rRIVII.EC.KD    COMMUNICATIONS. 


253 


ilege  is  wholly  personal  and  cannot  be  waived  by  any  other 
person  merely  because  he  stands  in  privity  with  the  client:1 
on  the  other  hand,  while  he  is  living  his  agent,  or  after  his 
decease  his  personal  representative,  may,  it  seems,  claim  the 
privilege  by  which  the  attorney  is  prohibited  from  testifying.2 
The  privilege  is  forever  waived  if  immediate  objection  is  not 
taken  when  the  attorney  or  other  professional  person  is  ex- 
amined5 as  a  witness,  or  where  the  client  has  disclaimed  the 
existence  of  the  relationship,4  or  has  called  the  attorney  to 
testify  to  the  tenor  of  such  communications,5  or  upon  the  stand 
himself  discloses  voluntarily  the  facts  contained  in  his  commu- 
nications.6 

§  173.  Privilege  as  to  documents. —  The  attorney  cannot 
be  compelled  to  produce  or  disclose  the  nature  of  any  writing 
which  he  has  seen7  or  which  is  in  his  possession  belonging  to 
his  client.8  He  will  be  permitted  to  testify  that  such  docu- 
ments exist,  that  he  has  searched  for  them,  and  that  they  are 
or  are  not  in  his  custody,  when  it  is  sought  to  prove  their  con- 
tents by  secondary  evidence."  A  communication  to  an  at- 
torney acting  in  the  capacity  of  conveyancer  is  privileged,10 


v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  99  id.  56.  Cf.  Valen- 
sin  v.  Valensin,  14  Pac.  Rep.  397 ;  73 
Cat  106. 

i  State  v.  Jones,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  325; 
Bouman  v.  Norton,  5  C.  &  P.  177. 

2Edington  v.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  67 
N.  Y.  185.  Cf.  Pierson  v.  People,  79 
N.  Y.  424. 

»  Hoyt  v.  Hoyt,  112  N.  Y.  513. 

*  In  re  Mellen,  63  Hun,  623. 

5  Masterson  v.  Boyce,  6  N.  Y.  S.  65 ; 
McKinney  v.  Grand  St.  etc.  R.  R.  Co., 
104  N.  Y.  355 ;  Smith  v.  Crego,  7  N.  Y. 
S.  86. 

estate  v. Tall,  43  Minn.  276 ;  People 
v.  Gallagher,  75  Mich.  515 ;  Hunt  v. 
Blackburn,  9  S.  Ct.  125 ;  128  U.  S.  464. 
The  tact  that  the  client  denies  on  the 
witness  stand  that  he  made  a  certain 
statement  to  his  attorney  will  not 
authorize  proof  thereof  by  the  latter's 
evidenca  State  v.  James,  34  S.  C. 
579. 


7Arbuckle  v.  Templeton,  25  Atl. 
Rep.  1093. 

8  Volant  v.  Soyer,  13  Q.  B.  231  ; 
Mathews  v.  Hoagland,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
455;  21  Atl.  Rep.  1054;  Liggett  v. 
Glenn,  51  Fed.  Rep.  381. 

9  Dale  v.  Livingstone,  4  Wend.  558 ; 
Jackson  v.  McVey,  18  Johns.  330; 
Brandt  v.  Klein.  17  id.  335;  Mills  v. 
Oddy,  6  C.  &  P.  728 ;  Stokoe  v.  St. 
Paul  M.  &  M.  R.  Co.,  40  Minn.  546 ; 
Coveney  v.  Tannahill,  1  Hill,  33; 
Allen  v.  Root,  39  Tex.  589 ;  Harris- 
burg  Car  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Sloan  (Ind., 
1889),  21  N.  E.  Rep.  1088. 

io  Bingham  v.  Walk,  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
483;  128  Ind.  164;  Crane  v.  Barkdoll, 
59  Md.  534 ;  Wilson  v.  Troup,  7  Johns. 
Ch.  25 ;  Getzlaff  v.  Seliger,  43  Wis. 
297 ;  Mathews'  Estate,  5  Pa.  L.  J.  Rep. 
149 ;  O'Neill  v.  Murray,  6  Dak.  107. 
But  contra,  In  re  Smith,  61  Hun,  101 ; 
Brazel  v.  Fair,  26  S.  C.  370;  Caldwell 


254 


PKIVILKGKD    COMMUNICATIONS. 


[§  174. 


though  he  acts    for   both  parties   to   the   deed    of    convey- 


ance 


§  174.  What  communications  are  within  the  privilege. — 

In  order  that  a  communication  to  an  attorney  may  be  privi- 
leged it  is  not  essential  that  an}'-  particular  litigation,  suit  or 
other  legal  proceeding  should  be  pending.  If  the  relation  of 
client  and  attorney  exists  it  is  sufficient;  for,  whatever  the 
transaction  may  be,  and  whether  or  not  it  is  likely  to  be  sub- 
sequently litigated,  the  attorney  will  not  be  permitted  to  dis- 
close the  confidential  communication  or  advice.2  But  a  com- 
munication made  by  a  client  to  his  attorney  in  regard  to  a 
future  infraction  of  the  criminal  law  by  the  former,  or  advice 
given  as  to  the  means  of  evading  the  consequence  of  a  crimi- 
nal or  fraudulent  act  which  he  intends  to  commit,  is  not  privi- 
leged;3 nor  is  the  mouth  of  the  attorney  closed  as  to  commu- 
nications or  acts  arising  out  of  a  conspiracy  to  defraud  in 
which  both  attorney  and  client4  are  participants.  And  the 
fact  that  the  attorney  is  innocent  of  fraud,  and  ignorant  of 
he  wrongful  use  which  his  client  intends  to  make  of  his  ad- 


r.   Davis,    10    Colo.   481;    O'Neill  v. 

ilurray,  6  Dak.  107;  Thomas  v. 
iJriffen  (Inch,  1890),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  754. 
Though  it  must  be  clearly  shown 
that  he  acted  as  a  scrivener  only. 

i  Clay  v.  Williams,  2  Munf.  105, 122. 
It  is  for  the  court  to  determine  in  what 
capacity  and  for  what  purpose  docu- 
ments were  deposited  with  an  attor- 
ney (Reg.  v.  Jones,  1  Denio  Cr.  Cas. 
166),  and  whether  they  are  confiden- 
tial and  thus  inadmissible.  Amey  v. 
Long,  9  East,  473 ;  Rey  uolds  v.  Rowley, 

3  Rob.  (La.)  261 ;  Batesen  v.  Hartsink, 

4  Esp.  43 ;  Hughes  v.  Boone,  102  N.  C. 
43.  A  client  cannot  avoid  the  pro- 
duction of  papers  not  themselves 
privileged  by  depositing  them  with 
his  attorney.  Edison  El.  Co.  v.  U.  S. 
Elec.  Co.,  44  Fed.  Rep.  294 

2 Minet  v.  Morgan,  LR8Ch.  361 ; 
Penruddock  v.  Hammond,  11  Beav. 
59 ;  Belzhover  v.  Blackstock,  3  Watts, 
20;  Foster  v.  Hall,   12  Pick.  89,92; 


Pearse  v.  Pearse,  16  L.  J.  Ch.  153; 
Bingham  v.  Walk,  128  Ind.  164;  27 
N.  E.  Rep.  483 ;  In  re  McCarthy,  59 
Hun,  626.  The  question  whether  an 
opinion  rendered  before  a  litigation 
was  begun  or  after  it  was  in  contem- 
plation, but  without  direct  reference 
to  it,  or  after  it  had  been  terminated 
and  while  no  particular  action  was 
pending  or  contemplated,  though 
much  discussed  in  the  early  cases  is 
now  settled,  and  the  privilege  ex- 
tends to  all  advice  whenever  given. 
For  a  full  consideration  on  the  point 
see  1  Greenl.  on  Evid.,  §§  240,  240a. 

t'Heckman  v.  Green  (Mo.,  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  455 ;  Russell  v.  Jackson, 
15  Jur.  1117;  Everett  v.  State  (Tex., 
1892),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  674;  Bank  of 
Utica  v.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch.  528 ; 
Orman  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App.  604. 

"People  v.  Sheriff,  29  Barb.  622; 
Mathews  v.  Hoagland,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
458 ;  21  Atl.  Rep.  1054. 


§  175.]  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  255 

vice,1  will  deprive  the  interview  of  its  professional  charac- 
ter, as  full  confidence  is  withheld  by  the  client.  To  destroy 
the  privilege  fraud  must  be  clearly  shown,'2  and  the  test  of 
fraud  in  a  civil  suit  is  the  issue  arising  from  the  pleadings.3 
An  attorney  may  testify  that  one  alleged  to  be  his  client  made 
no  communication  to  him  or  received  no  advice,4  and  he  may 
repeat  a  statement  made  to  him  (though  made  while  he  was 
acting  in  a  professional  capacity)  by  a  third  person  to  whom 
he  was  referred  by  his  client,5  or  communications  by  the  client 
which  were  intended  to  be  imparted  to  other  persons  through 
the  attorney,"  or  a  conversation  between  two  persons  in  his 
presence,  though  both  were  his  clients.7 

As  this  privilege  is  designed  for  the  client's  protection,  he 
cannot  be  compelled  to  disclose  anything  that  passed  between 
him  and  his  attorney  when,  being  a  party  to  an  action,  he 
takes  the  witness  stand  in  his  own  behalf.8  But  an  accom- 
plice turning  state's  evidence  may  be  compelled  to  disclose 
information  which  is  contained  in  a  communication  to  an 
attorney,  as  he  is  conclusively  presumed  to  have  waived  all 
privileges.9 

§  175.  Privilege  of  police,  judicial  and  executive  officials. 
The  administration  of  justice  and  the  interest  of  society  de- 
mand that  information  obtained  by  judicial  or  police  officials 
in  the  detection  or  prosecution  of  crime  should  remain  un- 
divulged.10    This  principle  was  recognized  at  common  law,  and 

iThe  Queen  v.  Cox,  L.  R  14  Q.  B.  Bigler  v.  Reyher,  48  Iud.  112;  Hem- 

D.  153 ;  Greenough  v.  Guskell,  1  My.  enway  v.  Smith,  28  Vt.  701 ;  State  v. 

&  K.  98:  Gartside  v.  Outram,  26  L,  White,  19  Kan.  445;  Duttenhofer  v. 

J.  Ch.   113;    Follett  v.  Jeffereyes,  1  State,  34  Ohio  St.  91.     Contra,  Wo- 

Sim.  (N.  S.)  3;    Orman  v.  State,  22  burn    v.   Henshaw,    101    Mass.    193; 

Tex.  App.  604;   Mathews  v.   Hoag-  Montgomery  v.  Pickering,  116  id.  227. 

land,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  455.  Of.  Durkee  v.  Leland,  4  Vt  612. 

2  Higbee  v.  Dresser,  103  Mass.  523.  3  Jones  v.  State,  65  Miss.  179 ;  3  S. 

3  Mathews  v.  Hoagland,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  Rep.  379, 

455 ;  21  Atl.  Rep.  1054  io  "  Courts  of  justice,  therefore,  will 

4  Daniel  v.  Daniel,  39  Pa.  St.  191.  not  compel  or  allow  the  discovery  of 
8  In  re  Meller,  63  Hun,  632.  such  information  either  by  the  sub- 
6  Ferguson  v.  McBean,  91  Cal.  63;  ordinate  officer  to  whom  it  is  given, 

Lloyd  v.  Davis,  2  Ind.  App.  170;  In  by  the  informer  himself  or  by  any 

re  Meller,  63  Hun,  632;  Galle  v.  Tode,  other  person  without  the  permission 

26  N.  Y.  S.  633.  of  the  government"     Per  Gray,  J., 

'In  re  Weaver,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.    R  in  Worthington  v. Scribner,  109  Mass. 

516.  487. 

s  Barker  v.   Kuhn,  38  Iowa,  895; 


250  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  [§  1  75. 

no  witness  was  compellable  to  disclose  the  name  of  an  in- 
former '  or  any  communications  which  were  made  or  act  done 
relating  to  the  detection  of  a  crime,  any  farther  than  was 
needed  to  ascertain  fairly  and  justly  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  accused.2  But  the  necessity  or  desirability  of  the  dis- 
closure of  the  information,  in  order  to  establish  the  innocence 
of  the  prisoner,3  or  because  public  interest  would  suffer  or  be 
benefited,  is  one  for  the  court  to  determine  on  all  the  circum- 
stances of  each  particular  case.4 

Official  communications,  consultations  and  transactions  be- 
tween superior  and  subordinate  executive  or  legislative  offi- 
cials are  also  within  the  rule  of  privilege.5  So  an  assessor  of 
taxes  will  not  be  permitted  to  disclose  as  a  witness  in  a  suit 
between  third  persons  the  sworn  statements  made  to  him  by 
the  owners  of  property;6  nor  will  a  witness  be  permitted  to 
divulge  a  communication  between  the  attorney-general  and  a 
United  States  district  attorney,7  or  between  a  military  officer 
and  his  commander-in-chief,3  or  between  the  president  of  the 
United  States  and  the  governor  of  a  state  commonwealth.9 

Whether  a  member  of  a  legislative  body  can  be  compelled 
to  testify  to  what  took  place  therein  has  been  differently  de- 
cided. In  England  it  is  held  he  cannot,1"  though  it  was  held 
that  a  senator  of  the  United  States  may  be  compelled  to  tes- 
tify to  what  took  place  in  secret  session  when  the  senate  re- 
fused to  remove  the  bar  of  secrecy  therefrom.11 

1  Attorney-General    v.    Briant,    15  7  United    States    v.    Six    Lots     of 

L.  J.  Exch.  265.  Ground,  1  Woods,  C.  C.  234. 

2Vogel   v.  Gruaz,  110   U.   S.    811;  8Home  v.  Bentinck,2Bro<l.  &Bing. 

Rex  v.  Hardy,  24  How.  St.   Tr.   753,  133;  Cooke  v.  Maxwell.  2  Stark.  183. 

808;  Rex  v.   Watson,  2  Stark.  136;  9  Gray  v.  Pentland,  2  S.  &  R.  23; 

United   States  v.  Moses,  4  Wash.  C.  1  Burr's  Trial,  pp.  186,  187. 

C.  726.  10  Chubb  v.  Salomons,  3  C.  &  K.  75  ; 

3  Marks  v.  Beifus,  25  Q.  B.  Div.  494.  Pluukett  v.  Cobbett,  29  How.  St.  Tr. 

4  Reg.  v.  Richardson,  5F.&F,  693.  71,  72. 

This  matter  is  now  sometimes  regu-  u  Law   v.   Scott,  5   Har.   &  J.   438. 

lated    by   statute.      Cal.    Civ.    Code,  The  rule  in  England  is  thus  stated  by 

§1881;  Colo.  Act  1883, p.  289;  Minn.  Sir  James  Stephen :  "No  one  can  be 

Stats.,  §  5094.  compelled  to  give  evidence   relating 

5Totten  v.  United  States,  93  U.  S.  to  any  affair  of  state  or  as  to  official 

105.  communications  between  public  offi- 

6  Witters  v.  Sovvles,  82  Fed.  Rep.  cers  upon  public  affairs,  except  with 

130.  the  permission  of  the  officer  at  the 


§  176.] 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


257 


§  176.  Privilege  as  relating  to  jurors. —  In  order  to  obtain 
freedom  of  discussion  and  to  prevent  the  flight  of  suspected 
persons,  the  law  requires  that  the  proceedings  of  grand  juries 
should  be  kept  secret,  though  the  jurors  are  not  sworn  to 
secrecy.1  In  the  absence  of  statute  prescribing  when  a  grand 
juror  may  testify,  unless  his  evidence  is  absolutely  essential 
to  protect  private  rights  or  advance  public  justice,  he  is  not 
compellable  to  give  evidence  as  to  what  passed  in  the  jur}T- 
room.2  It  has  been  held  that  a  grand  juror  may  be  compelled 
to  testify  to  the  number  concurring  in  the  indictment,3  or  he 
may  be  called  to  show  that  the  evidence  of  a  witness  on  the 
trial  is  inconsistent  with  that  given  by  him  before  the  grand 
jury;4  to  confirm  the  evidence  of  a  witness,5  to  point  out 
irregularities  in  the  indictment  which  are  not  due  to  miscon- 
duct of  the  grand  jurors,6  or  to  show  that  the  defendant  was 
not  examined  as  a  witness  before  the  grand  jury.7  If  the 
statute  enumerates  the  cases  in  which  a  grand  juror  may  tes- 
tify he  will  not  be  permitted  to  do  so  in  others.8 


head  of  the  department  concerned, 
or  to  give  evidence  of  what  took 
place  in  either  house  of  parliament, 
without  the  leave  of  the  house, 
though  he  may  state  that  a  particu- 
lar person  acted  as  speaker."  Ste- 
phen's Dig.  Evid.,  art  112. 

1  People  v.  Reggel  (Utah,  1892),  28 
Pac.  Rep.  935;  Little  v.  Com.,  25 
Gratt  (Va.)  921 ;  United  States  v. 
Reed,  2  Blatch.  (U.  S.)  435;  Com.  v. 
Hall,  65  Mass.  137. 

-'State  v.  Oxford,  30  Tex.  428; 
State  v.  Hamlin,  47  Conn.  114;  State 
v.  Mewherter,  47  Iowa,  88 ;  Kennedy 
v.  Holladay,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  688 ;  105 
Mo.  24;  Creek  v.  State,  24  Ind.  151; 
Watts  v.  Territory,  1  Wash.  Ter.  409 ; 
State  v.  Broughton,  7  Ired.  L.  (N.  C.) 
96;  Jones  v.  Turpin,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 
181,  and  cases  infra.  The  secrecy  of 
grand  jury  proceedings  is  due  to  the 
public  alone,  and  is  not  a  privilege 
of  the  witnesses  who  testify  before 
it  (People  v.  Young,  31  Cal.  568),  or 

17 


of  a  person  indicted.    People  v.  Reg- 
gel  (Utah,  1893),  28  Pac.  Rep.  955. 

3  Low's  Case,  4  Me.  439 ;  Sparren- 
berger  v.  State,  53  Ala.  481  ;  Cherry 
v.  State,  6  Fla.  679 ;  Com.  v.  Smith, 
9  Mass.  109 ;  People  v.  Shattuck,  6 
Abb.  N.  C.  33. 

4  Jones  v.  Turpin,  6  Heisk.  (Tenn.)- 
181 ;  Little  v.  Com.,  25  Gratt.  (Va.) 
921 ;  Com.  v.  Mead,  12  Gray  (Mass.),. 
167;  State  v.  Fassett.  16  Conn.  468; 
United  States  v.  Reid,  2  Blatchf. 
435;  State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H.  484; 
People  v.  Hulbut,  4  Denio  (N.  Y.\ 
133. 

s  Pellum  v.  State,  89  Ala.  28 ;  Per- 
kins v.  State,  4  Ind.  222. 

6  People  v.  Briggs,  60  How.  Pr.  17. 

'  Com.  v.  Hill,  65  Mass.  137. 

8  Com.  v.  Snowden  (Ky.,  1892),  17 
S.  W.  Rep.  205;  Burnham  v.  Hat- 
field, 5  Black.  (Ind.)  21 ;  Way  v.  But- 
terworth,  106  Mass.  75;  Burdick  v. 
Hunt,  43  Ind.  381;  Heidekoper  v. 
Cotton,  3  Watts  (Pa.),  56;  Ex  parte 


258 


PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS. 


[§  177. 


In  regard  to  traverse  jurors,  the  general  principle  seems  to 
be  that  they  may  testify  to  facts  or  communications  referring 
to  their  individual  acts  while  separated  from  their  associates.1 
So  they  may  testify  to  what  third  persons  said  or  did  to  them 
as  jurors.  But  the  motives  and  reasons  of  the  jurors  and 
the  transactions  and  communications  between  them  relating 
to  the  subject-matter  under  their  consideration  as  an  official 
body  and  which  were  made  in  their  capacity  as  jurors,  whether 
in  the  jury-room  or  elsewhere,2  are  privileged,  and  to  these 
the  testimony  of  a  juror  is  neither  compellable  nor  allowable.3 

§  177.  Confidential  communications  to  clergymen. —  The 
common  law,  while  permitting  the  penitent  to  confess  his 
shortcomings  to  his  spiritual  adviser,  protected  the  former 
only  to  the  extent  that  the  clergyman  was  excused  from  re- 


Sontag,  64  Cal.  525 ;  Sands  v.  Robi- 
son,  12  Smed.  &  M.  (Miss.)  854;  State 
v.  Grady,  84  Mo.  220.  A  state  stat- 
ute allowing  grand  jurors  to  testify 
is  binding  on  federal  courts  sitting 
in  that  state.  Fotheringham  v. 
Adams  Ex.  Co.,  34  Fed.  Rep.  646. 

1  Harrington,  etc.  Co.  v.  Railroad 
Co.  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  955. 

2  Com.  v.  White,  147  Mass.  76. 

3  State  v.  Freeman,  5  Conn.  318 ; 
Heffron  v.  Gallupe,  55  Me.  563; 
Woodward  v.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  455 ; 
Rowe  v.  Canney,  139  Mass.  41.  Cf. 
Tucker  v.  So.  Kingston,  5  R.  I.  558; 
Boston,  etc.  Corp.  v.  Dana,  1  Grey,  83, 
105;  Paige  v.  Chedsey,  20  N.  Y.  S. 
899 ;  Tenney  v.  Evans,  13  N.  H.  462 ; 
Dane  v.  Tucker,  4  Johns.  487 ;  War- 
ren v.  Spencer  Water  Co.,  143  Mass. 
155.  So  evidence  by  members  of  the 
jury  that  they  agreed  upon  a  verdict 
through  ill-will  toward  a  party  (John- 
son v.  Parrotte,  34  Neb.  26 ;  51  N.  W. 
Rep.  290),  that  third  persons  had  con- 
versed with  them  in  the  jury-room 
(Gardner  v.  Minea,  47  Minn.  295),  or 
that  a  chance  or  quotient  verdict  was 
agreed  on  (Moss  v.  Cen.  Park  R.  R 
Co.,  23  N.  Y.  S.  23;  Crossdale  v.  Tan- 


tum,  6  Houst.  (Del.)  218),  is  inadmis- 
sible. Cf.  Pawnee  Ditch  Co.  v. 
Adams  (Colo.,  1892),  28  Pac.  Rep.  662; 
Lift  v.  Lingane,  17  R.  I.  420 ;  22  Atl. 
Rep.  942;  State  v.  Dusenberry,  112 
Mo.  277;  State  v.  Plum,  49  Kan.  279; 
Mattox  v.  United  States,  146  U.  S. 
140;  State  v.  Best,  111  N.  C.  638; 
Weatherford  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim. 
Rep.  530 ;  Flood  v.  McClure  (Idaho, 
1883),  32  Pac.  Rep.  254  In  Wood- 
ward v.  Leavitt,  107  Mass.  453,  the 
court  says:  "  The  proper  evidence  of 
the  decision  of  the  jury  is  their  ver- 
dict returned  by  them  upon  oath  and 
affirmed  in  court,  and  it  is  essential 
to  the  freedom  and  independence  of 
their  deliberations  that  their  discus- 
sions should  be  secret  and  inviola- 
ble. .  .  .  The  decisive  reasons  for 
excluding  the  testimony  of  jurors  to 
the  motives  and  influences  which  af- 
fected their  deliberations  are  equally 
strong  whether  the  evidence  is  offered 
to  impeach  or  sustain  their  verdict" 
But  a  juror  may  testify  that  there 
were  blood-stains  on  an  article  wdiich 
was  shown  to  the  jury  at  a  former 
trial   Woolfolk  v.  State,  85  Ga.  69. 


§  178.]  FKIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  259 

porting  the  delinquent  to  the  magistrate.1  A  communication 
or  confession  to  a  minister  or  priest  was  otherwise  on  a  par 
with  one  to  a  layman,  and  the  former  might  at  common  law 
be  compelled  to  divulge  any  admission  or  confession2  made  to 
him  in  his  professional  capacity.3 

At  the  present  time  in  many  states  statutory  provision  has 
been  made  by  which  a  clergyman  or  minister  of  any  religion 
is  prohibited  from  disclosing  a  confession  made  to  him  in  his 
professional  character,  in  the  course  of  discipline  enjoined 
by  the  rules  or  practice  of  the  religious  body  to  which  he  be- 
longs.4 So,  too,  it  is  often  provided  by  statute  that  no  person 
authorized  to  practice  physic  or  surgery  shall  be  allowed 
to  disclose  any  information  which  he  may  have  acquired  in 
attending  any  patient  in  a  professional  capacity  and  which 
was  necessary  to  enable  him  to  prescribe  for  him  as  a  physi- 
cian or  treat  him  as  a  surgeon.5 

§178.  Communications  to  physicians. —  At  common  law 
a  communication  to  a  physician  is  not  privileged,  and  how- 
ever indiscreet  a  medical  man  may  be  in  disclosing  volun- 
tary professional  secrets,  in  a  court  of  law  he  may  be  com- 
pelled involuntarily  to  do  so.6  But  this  rule  was  never 
regarded  with  favor,  and  it  was  strongly  intimated  in  a  lead- 
ing case7  that  instances  might  arise  when  the  fact  that  these 
matters  were  not  privileged  would  be  much  lamented. 

Every  consideration  of  public  policy  that  furnishes  a  basis 

1  Butler  v.  Moore,  cited  in  McNally,  braska  Code,  p.  672 ;  Wisconsin  Ann. 

Evid.  253,  254.  Stat.,   §  4074;    Ohio    R   S.,  §   5241, 

-'In  Broad  v.  Pitt,  3  C.  &  B.  518,  ch.    1.      Similar  statutes  have  been 

the  court  says,  obiter:  "  I,   for  one,  passed  in  Arizona,  Arkansas,  Idaho, 

will  never  compel  a  clergyman  to  Montana,     Nevada,    Oregon,    Utah, 

disclose    communications    made    to  Washington  and  Wyoming.     In  the 

him  by  a  prisoner,  but  if  he  chooses  other  states  the  common   law  still 

to  disclose  them  I  shall  receive  them  prevails, 

in  evidence."  5  See  supra. 

3  Com.  v.  Drake,  15  Mass.  161.  6  Duchess  of  Kingston's   Case,  11 

*N.  Y.  Code  Civ.  Pro.  833 :  Calif  or-  Harg.  St.  Tr.  243 ;  20  Howell's  St.  Tr. 

nia  Civ.  Code,  §  1881 ;  Indiana  R  S.,  643 ;  Rex  v.  Gibbons,  1  C.  &  P.  97 ; 

§  497 ;  Colorado  Acts  of  1883,  p.  289 ;  Broad  v.  Pitt,  3  C.  &  P.  578 ;  Steageld 

Michigan,  Howell's  Ann.  St.,  g  7515 ;  v.  State,  24  Tex.  287 ;  3  S.  W.  Rep. 

Kansas  Gen.  Stat.,  §  4418 ;  Iowa  Rev.  771. 

Code,  §  3643;  Minnesota  Stat,  §  5094,  *  Wilson  v.  Rastall,  4  Term  R  756. 
ch.   3;  Missouri  R  S.,  §  8925;   Ne- 


2G0  PKIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  [§  178. 

for  the  privileged  character  of  a  communication  by  a  client 
to  an  attorney  is  applicable  in  the  relation  of  physician  and 
patient.  Aside  from  the  protection  thrown  around  the  pa- 
tient himself,  the  danger  that  truth  will  be  perverted  or  con- 
cealed by  the  physician,  perhaps  unconsciously,  in  the  struggle 
between  professional  honor  and  legal  duty  is  entirely  ob- 
viated.1 

As  by  the  terms  of  the  statute  only  such  information  or 
communications  are  privileged  as  the  physician  receives  pro- 
fessionally, he  will  be  allowed  to  testify  to  facts  with  which 
he  has  become  acquainted  in  anon-professional  capacity.2  On 
the  other  hand,  by  the  term  "  matter  communicated  to  them 
in  the  course  of  their  professional  duties"  is  included  all 
knowledge  whether  gained  by  the  physician  from  his  obser- 
vation or  the  examination  of  the  patient  or  from  the  latter's 
declarations.3  So  the  statute  cannot  be  construed  to  prevent 
a  physician  from  testifying  to  information  which  was  not  nec- 
essary to  enable  him  to  prescribe  for  the  patient;4  as,  for  ex- 
ample, to  the  fact  that  he  attended  a  person,  the  number  of 
times  he  called,5  and  the  persons  who  were  present  when  he 
called.6  The  privilege  is  so  far  personal  that  it  can  only  be 
waived  by  the  patient7  or  by  his  agent  authorized  to  do  so. 

i  Patten  v.  U.  L  &  Ace.  Ins.  Co.,  133  N.  Y.  450 ;  Brown  v.  L.  Ins.  Co., 

61   Hun,   637;    Freel   v.    Market  St.  65  Mich.  306;  Numrich  v.  Supreme 

etc.  Co.  (Cal.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  730.  Lodge,  3  N.  Y.  S.  552 ;  Cooley  v.  Foltz, 

A   partner  of    a   physician   who  is  85  Mich.  47 ;  48  N.  W.  Rep.  176. 

present  at  a    consultation   between  6Pandjiris  v.    McQueen,   59  Hun, 

the  former  and  a  patient  will  not  be  625. 

permitted    to     divulge    information  7  Carrington  v.   St.  Louis,  89  Mo. 

thus  acquired   by  him.     JEtna  Ins,  208:  Blair  v.  Railroad  Co.,  89  id.  334 ; 

Co.  v.  Deming,  123  Ind.  415.  Valensin  v.   Valensin,   73  Cal.   106 ; 

2  In  re  Sliney,  137  N.  Y.  570 ;  Fisher  McKinney  v.  Railroad  Co.,  104  N.  Y. 
v.Fisher,  129  N.  Y.  654 ;  In  re  Lowen-  352;  118  id.  77;  Record  v.  Village, 
stein,  2  Misc.  Rep.  323 ;  People  v.  46  Huu,  448 ;  Jones  v.  Brooklyn,  3  N. 
Schuyler,  106  N.  Y.  303 ;  Viel  v.  Y.  S.  353.  A  waiver  by  the  insured 
Cowles,  45  Hun,  307 ;  Brown  v.  Rome,  binds  the  beneficiary.  Andrews  v. 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.,  45  Hun,  439.  Mut.  R.  L.  F.  Ass'n,  34  Fed.  Rep.  870. 

3  Heuston  y.  Simpson,  17  N.  E.  Rep.  As  to  waiver  by  implication,  see  State 
261;  115  Ind.  162;  Kling  v.  Kansas  v.  Depoister  (Nev.,  1891),  25  Pac.  Rep. 
City,  27  Mo.  App.  231.  1000.     A  certificate   of  death  made 

*Campau  v.  North,  39  Mich.  606;     out  by  the  attending  physician  and 

Cooley  v.  Foltz,  48  N.  W.  Rep.    176.       furnished  as  proof  of  death  to  an  in- 

6Pattou  v.  Un.  L.  &  Ace.  Ass'n,    surance  company  is  not  privileged. 


§  ITS.] 


PI4IVILEGKD    COMMUNICATIONS. 


201 


After  his  death,  in  an  action  brought  by  or  against  his  repre- 
sentative, the  privilege  may  be  invoked  by  the  latter  and  a 
physician  be  prohibited  from  disclosing  communications  made 
to  him  while  attending  the  deceased.1  On  the  other  hand,  it 
has  been  held  that  the  personal  representative  cannot  waive 
the  privilege  and  place  the  physician  upon  the  stand  to  testify 
as  regards  communications  made  to  him  by  the  deceased.2  The 
courts  in  laying  down  the  rule  that  the  privilege  is  absolute 
and  cannot  be  waived  by  a  representative  of  a  deceased  pa- 
tient have  proceeded  on  the  supposition  that  the  communica- 
tion, if  divulged,  might  tend  to  disgrace  the  memory  of  the 
deceased.3  But  it  has  been  held  that  communications  made 
by  the  deceased  to  his  physician  were  admissible  in  a  trial 
for  the  murder  of  the  patient,  the  disclosure  in  these  cases 
being  demanded  to  protect  the  community  from  the  perpetra- 
tion of  secret  crime4  and  the  communications  containing  noth- 
ing  to  disgrace  the  deceased's  memory.5     So  in  probate  cases, 


Buffalo,  etc.  Co.  v.  Association,  126  N. 
Y.  450. 

1  Breisenmeister  v.  Sup.  Lodge,  81 
Mich.  525;  Grattan  v.  Life  Ins.  Co., 
80  N.  Y.  281 ;  Dilleber  v.  Mut  Life 
Ins.  Co.,  69  N.  Y.  256 ;  Cohen  v.  Cont 
L  Ins.  Co.,  69  id.  308 ;  Com.  Life  Ins. 
Co.  v.  Union  Trust  Co.,  112  U.  S.  254; 
Edington  v.  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  67  N. 
Y.  185 ;  Staunton  v.  Parker,  19  Hun, 
55. 

2  Westover  v.  ^tna  L.  I.  Co.,  99  N. 
Y.  57 ;  In  re  Flint's  Estate  (CaL,  1893), 
34  Pac.  Rep.  863.  See,  also,  the  re- 
marks of  Ruger,  C.  J.,  in  McKinney 
v.  Grand  St  R  R  Co.,  104  N.  Y.  352. 
Contra,  Morris  v.  Morris,  119  Ind. 
343;  Thompson  v.  Ish,  99  Mo.  160; 
12  S.  W.  Rep.  810.  Where  two  physi- 
cians attend  a  patient,  the  fact  that 
the  latter  puts  one  ou  the  stand  does 
not  waive  the  privilege  as  to  the 
other.  Mellor  v.  Missouri  P.  R.  Co., 
105  Mo.  455 ;  16  S.  W.  Rep.  849.  In 
New  York  the  representative  may 
now  by  statute  waive  the  privilege 
except  so  far  as  communications  ex- 


pressly confidential  are  concerned 
and  facts  which  would  disgrace  the 
memory  of  deceased.  Laws  1891, 
ch.  381.  p.  736.  Of.  Gurley  v.  Park 
(Ind.,  1893),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  279.  If  the 
privilege  is  waived  at  the  first  trial  it 
may  be  claimed  on  a  subsequent  trial 
of  the  same  issue.  Breisenmeister  v. 
Lodge,  81  Mich.  525. 

3  Judge  Earl  in  Pierson  v.  People, 
79  N.  Y.  434. 

*  People  v.  Harris,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  65 ; 
136  N.  Y.  423. 

8  Pierson  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424 ; 
People  v.  Harris,  136  N.  Y  423.  But 
ef.  contra,  People  v.  Brewer,  53  Hun, 
217.  But  it  has  recently  been  held 
that  as  the  statute  was  not  designed 
to  protect  murderers,  a  physician 
might  testify  to  the  fact  that  he  re- 
moved a  dead  foetus  from  the  de- 
ceased, and  that  at  that  time  the 
defendant  stated  to  him  that  he  had 
performed  an  operation  on  her,  she 
being  his  wife  and  he  being  on  trial 
for  her  subsequent  homicide.  It  may 
be  observed  that  this  testimony  was 


2G2  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  [§  178a. 

where  a  question  arises  as  to  the  capacity  of  the  testator, 
neither  the  proponent  nor  contestant  of  the  will  is  permitted 
to  examine  a  physician  who  attended  him  professionally  as 
regards  information  thus  acquired.1 

While  the  statute  should  receive  a  liberal  construction,  it  is 
nevertheless  the  true  rule  that  any  objection  to  the  testimony 
of  the  physician  should  be  promptly  interposed  before  his 
reply  has  been  elicited.2  Where  the  relation  of  physician  and 
patient  exists,  it  is  immaterial  that  the  former  was  not  sum- 
moned by  the  patient  but  by  some  relative,  friend  or  by- 
stander.3 So,  usually,  it  will  be  presumed  that  any  informa 
tion  imparted  was  given  for  the  purpose  of  aiding  the  physi- 
cian in  subscribing  for  the  patient.4  Where  a  physician  is 
sent  to  examine  the  mental  or  physical  condition  of  a  person 
with  a  view  to  determining  his  sanity,  the  information  thus 
gained,  exclusive  of  all  information  which  he  may  have  ac- 
quired of  the  prisoner  personally,  is  not  privileged.  The  plry- 
sician  may  testify  to  the  condition  of  mind  or  body  in  which 
he  found  the  prisoner.5 

§  178a.  Telegrams  are  not  privileged. —  Eeasoning  from 
the  privileged  character  which  has  been  conferred  by  act  of 
congress  upon  letters  and  other  communications  which  are 
carried  in  the  mails,  it  has  been  suggested  to  and  urged  upon 
the  courts  that  a  telegraph  company  and  its  employees  occupy 
a  confidential  relation  towards  the  sender  of  the  telegram, 

obviously  calculated  to  disgrace  the  witness  to  practice  medicine  is  not 

memory  of  the   patient.     People  v.  objected  to  at  the  trial  it  will  be  pre- 

Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423.  sumed  by  the  appellate  court  that  he 

1  Renihan    v.    Dennin,    103  N.    Y.  was  properly  licensed.     Village  v. 

577;  Loder  v.  Whelpley,  111  id.  245;  Record,  46  Hun,  448. 

Coleman's  Will,  111  id.  225;  Heuston  2Hoyt  v.  Hoyt,  112  N.  Y.  513. 

v.  Simpson,  115  Ind.  62.     Cf.  In  re  3  Renihan  v.  Dennin,  103  N.  Y.  577. 

Neill's  Estate,  7  N.  Y.   S.  197 ;  Hoyt  <Feeney  v.  L,  I.  R  R.  Co.,  116  N.  Y. 

v.  Hoyt,  112  N.  Y.  493 ;  Herrington  380 ;  Grattan  v.  Metropolitan  L.  Ins. 

v.  Winn,  14  N.  Y.   S.  612 ;  Brigham  Co.,  80  N.  Y.  281,  297 ;  Renihan  v. 

v.  Gott,  3  N.  Y.  S.  518,  as  regards  tes-  Dennin,  103  id.  573 ;  Kling  v.  Kansas 

timony  of  physician  as  to  declara-  City,  27  Mo.  App.  231. 

tions  of  testator  not  made  to  him  5  People  v.  Kimmler,  119  N.  Y.  585; 

professionally.     An  objection  to  the  People  v.  Schuyler,  12  N.  E.  Rep.  783 ; 

evidence  of  a  physician  must  be  made  7  N.  Y.  Crim.  R.  262 ;  People  v.  Sliney, 

prior  to  its  reception   or  it  will  be  137  N.  Y.  570.     Cf.  In  re  Benson,  16 

waived.     Broisenmeister  v.  Lodge,  81  N.  Y.  S.  111. 
Mich.  525,     If  the  qualification  of  the 


§  178«.]  PRIVILEGED    COMMUNICATIONS.  263 

and  that  they  should  not  be  permitted  or  compelled  to  divulge 
any  information  which  is  contained  in  any  message  delivered 
to  them  for  the  purpose  of  transmission.  The  statute  referred 
to  is  limited  in  its  operation  to  mail  matter  alone,  and  could 
not,  by  the  most  liberal  construction,  be  held  to  include  tele- 
graphic dispatches.  In  the  absence  of  any  statutory  provision 
creating  a  different  rule,  the  operator  or  other  agent  of  the 
telegraph  company  will  be  compelled  by  a  subpoena  duces  tecum 
to  produce  the  telegrams  in  his  possession ; l  or  he  may  be 
compelled  to  testify  orally  to  the  contents  of  a  dispatch  where 
the  absence  of  the  writing  itself  is  satisfactorily  accounted  for.2 

»  Ex  parte  Brown,  72  Mo.  83;  Na-       *  State  v#  Litchfield,  58  Me.  267. 
tional  Bank  v.  National  Bank,  7  W. 
Va.  544 


CHAPTER  XV. 


EXPERT  AND  OPINION  EVIDENCE. 


185.  Definition. 

186.  Matter    of    common    knowl- 

edge —  Opinions    of    non- 
experts, when  admissible. 

187.  Expert    evidence,    when    ad- 

missible. 

188.  Competency  and  examination 

of  experts. 

189.  Cross  -  examination    of    ex- 

perts —  Use    of     scientific 
books  as  evidence. 

190.  The  weight  and  credibility  of 

expert    and     opinion    evi- 
dence. 

191.  Compensation  of  expert  wit- 

nesses. 

192.  Physicians  as  experts  —  Cause 

of  death. 


§193. 


194. 

195. 
196. 


197. 

198. 
199. 
200. 
201. 

202. 


Evidence  of  medical  experts 
to  show  character  of  disease 
and  blood-stains  —  Expert 
evidence  as  to  autopsies  and 
malpractice. 

Non-expert  evidence  upon  a 
person's  physical  condition. 

Chemists  as  experts  — Poisons. 

Expert  evidence  where  sexual 
crimes  have  been  commit- 
ted —  Abortion. 

Expert  and  non-expert  evi- 
dence upon  insanity. 

Mechanical  experts. 

Expert  evidence  as  to  value. 

Underwriters  as  experts. 

Experiments  in  and  out  of 
court. 

Physical  examination  of  the 
party  by  experts. 


§  185.  Definition. — "An  expert  is  a  person  who  possesses 
peculiar  skill  and  knowledge  upon  the  subject-matter  on  which 
he  is  called  to  testify ; " x  and  expert  evidence  is  evidence  which 


i  State  v.  Phair,  48  Vt.  366.  For 
other  cases  defining  the  word,  see 
Dole  v.  Johnson,  50  N.  H.  454; 
Overby  v.  Chesa.  &  Ohio  Ry.  Co.,  37 
W.  Va.  524;  Nelson  v.  Sun  Ins.  Co., 
71  N.  Y.  453;  Bird  v.  State,  21  Gratt. 
(Va.)  800;  Dickenson  v.  Fitchberg, 
13  Gray,  546 ;  Mobile  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Walker,  58  Ala.  290 ;  Hyde  v.  Wool- 
folk,  1  Iowa,  166;  Heald  v.  Thwing, 
45  Me.  394;  Toomes'  Estate,  54  Cal. 
514;  Travis  v.  Brown,  43  Pa.  St.  12; 
Buff  urn  v.  Harris,  5  R.  I.  250 ;  Con- 
gress, etc.  Co.  v.  Edgar,  99  U.  S.  657. 
Whether  study  and  experience  are 


both  required,  or  whether  either 
alone  is  sufficient  to  constitute  an 
expert,  depends  upon  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case.  Ardesco  Oil  Co. 
v.  Gilson,  63  Pa.  St.  146.  In  some 
cases  it  has  been  held  that  a  witness 
whose  knowledge  was  gained  by 
study  alone  or  by  conversation  with 
persons  familiar  with  the  subject 
was  not  an  expert.  Railroad  v. 
Finlay  (Kan.,  1888),  16  Pac.  Rep.  951 ; 
Hass  v.  Marshall  (Pa.,  1888),  14  Atl. 
Rep.  421;  Wickes  v.  Light  Co.,  70 
Mich.  322.  Contra,  Fort  Wayne  v. 
Coombs,   107    Ind.    75;    Fordyce  v. 


§  180.]  EXPERT   AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  265 

is  given  by  such  a  person  upon  matters  that  are  not  within 
the  range  of  men  of  ordinary  knowledge  and  observation. 
"Witnesses,  as  a  general  rule,  must  testify  to  facts.  To  permit 
them  to  state  their  opinions,  or  their  conclusions  or  inferences 
drawn  from  facts,  is  to  invade  the  province  of  the  jury.  Many 
exceptions  to  the  rule  are  recognized  where  the  facts,  from, 
their  peculiar  nature,  cannot  be  properly  described  to  the  jury 
or  understood  or  appreciated  by  them. 

§186.  Matter  of  common  knowledge  —  Opinions  of  non- 
experts, when  admissible. —  Where  the  matter  or  transaction 
under  consideration  is  such  that  all  the  facts  can  be  intelligibly 
ascertained  by  men  of  average  mental  training  or  intelligence, 
where  no  peculiar  skill,  experience  or  knowledge  is  required 
to  form  an  opinion, —  in  other  words,  where  the  facts  are  such 
as  come  within  the  knowledge,  observation  and  judgment  of 
ordinary  men, —  opinion  evidence  is  not  admissible.1  In  such 
case  a  witness  who  is  called  to  testify  to  facts  within  his  own 
knowledge  should  not  be  allowed  to  state  his  inferences,  his 
beliefs  or  his  mental  impressions  which  are  not  recollections 
of  facts,  or  to  give  his  conclusions  as  to  the  legal  consequence 
of  facts.2    If,  however,  the  witness,  in  testifying  to  a  conclu- 

Moore  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  793;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Yar- 
235.  On  the  other  hand,  experience  borough,  56  Ark.  612;  Stowe  v. 
in  many  cases  being  necessarily  all  Bishop,  58  Vt.  498;  Penn.  R.  R.  Co. 
that  can  be  had,  is  enough  to  make  v.  Conlan,  101  111.  93;  Brinkley  v. 
one  an  expert.  But  the  court  may  State,  89  Ala.  34;  Milw.  etc.  Co. 
refuse  to  hear  an  expert  witness  v.  Kellogg,  94  U.  S.  469;  Avery  v. 
where,  though  experienced  in  his  Railroad  Co.,  121  N.  Y.  31. 
profession  or  trade,  his  general  in-  2  Richardson  v.  Stringfellow  (Ala., 
telligence  is  of  a  low  order.  Broquet  1894),  14  S.  Rep.  283;  Lovejoy  v. 
v.  Tripp,  36  Kan.  700;  14  Pac.  Rep.  Hart  (Minn.,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  57: 
227.  Dove  v.  Royal  Insurance  Co.  (Mich. . 
i  Overby  v.  C.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  37  W.  1894),  57  id.  30;  Shifflet  v.  Morell,  4 
Va.  524;  Bergquist  v.  Iron  Co.,  49  S.  W.  Rep.  483;  68  Tex.  382;  John- 
Minn.  511;  52  N.  W.  Rep.  136;  son  v.  Glover,  121  111.  483;  10  N.  E. 
Man.  Ace.  Ind.  Co.  v.  Dorgan,  58  Rep.  214;  12  id.  257:  Half  v.  Curtis, 
Fed.  Rep.  .945;  Reeves  v.  State  5  S.  W.  Rep.  451;  68  Tex.  640;  Tait 
(Ala.,  1892),  11  S.  Rep.  296;  Kauff-  v.  Hall,  12  Pac.  Rep.  391;  71  Cal. 
man  v.  Maier,  94  Cal.  269 ;  Sappen-  449 ;  Meade  v.  Carolina  Bank,  26  S. 
field  v.  Main  St.  etc.  Co.,  91  Cal.  48 ;  C.  608;  Barre  v.  Reading  City  Pass. 
111.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  People  (111.,  Ry.  Co.,  26  Atl.  Rep.  99;  155  Pa.  St. 
1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  173;  Toledo,  etc.  170;  Lyts  v.  Keevey,  5  Wash.  St. 
Co.    v.  Jackson  (Ind..   1893),  32  id.  606;   32  Pac.    Rep.    534;  Larson   v. 


2(jQ  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  186. 

sion  of  law,  also  states  facts  which  are  sufficient  to  enable  the 
jury  to  draw  their  own  conclusion,  if  they  believe  his  state- 
ments of  fact  to  be  true,  the  error  in  permitting  the  admission 
of  the  conclusion  is  cured.1 

"Where  the  question  at  issue  is  whether  a  person  exercised 
reasonable  diligence,  care  or  skill,  or  whether  machinery  or  a 
building  was  in  a  safe  condition,  and  the  facts  are  such  that 
any  man  having  common  knowledge,  experience  or  education 
is  capable  of  forming  a  just  conclusion  upon  the  facts  as  they 
are  narrated,  the  opinion  of  a  witness,  whether  expert  or  non- 
expert, is  inadmissible,  as  the  question  of  negligence  is  for  the 
jury  alone.2 

On  the  other  hand,  if  negligence  is  alleged  in  the  use 
of  any  implement,  article  or  thing  which  is  so  far  outside  of 
the  knowledge  of  persons  of  ordinary  intelligence  that  they 
are  incompetent  to  draw  correct  inferences  from  the  facts,  or 
if  the  facts  are  such  that  they  cannot  properly  be  described 
unless  the  opinion  of  the  witness  is  also  stated,  then  an  expert 
or  non-expert  witness,  respectively,  may  give  an  opinion  as  to 
a  person's  care,  diligence  or  skill.3 

Lombard  Inv.  Co.  (Minn.,   1893),  53  Girard  v.  Kalamazoo  (Mich.,  1893), 

N.  W.  Eep.  179;  Frezinski  v.  New-  52  N.   W.  Rep.   1021;   Johnston   v. 

borg,  43  III.  App.  406.     As  sustain-  Oregon  S.  L.  &  U.  N.  Co.  (1893),  31 

ing  the  proposition  that  conclusions  Pac.  Rep.  283;  Kendrick  v.  Central 

of  law  are  not  admissible  as  evi-  R.  R.  Co.,  89  Ga.  782;  Butler  v.  Chi- 

dence,    see    Thompson    v.    Brannin  cago,  etc.  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W. 

(Ky.,    1893),    21    S.    W.    Rep.    1057;  Rep.  208;  Illinois,  etc.  Co.  v.  Blye, 

Huntsville  v.  L.   S.  &  M.  S.  R.  Co.  43  111.  App.  612;  Fisher  v.  Railroad 

(Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  295;  Wolf  v.  Co.,  22  Oreg.  533;  Brunker  v.  Cum- 

Arthur  (N.  C,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  mins  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  732; 

843;  Stepp   v.   Nat.   L.  &   Maturity  Helton  v.  Alabama  Midland  Ry.  Co. 

Ass'n  (S.  C,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  134;  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  276;  Nosier  v. 

Johnson  v.  Crotty,  22  N.  Y.  S.  753 ;  Chicago,  B.  &  Q.  R.  Co.,  73  Iowa,  268 ; 

Cogshall  v.    Roller    Miller    Co.,    48  Louisville,    etc.    Co.    v.   Chaffin,  84 

Kan.  480;  Tenney  v.  Harvey,  63  Vt.  Ga.  519;  Louisville,  E.  &  St.  L.  Cent. 

520.  R.  Co.  v.  Berry  (Ind.,  1894),  35  N.  E. 

1  Adams  v.  Main,  3  Ind.  App.  232;  Rep.  565;  Mauer  v.  Ferguson,  17  N. 

Langworthy  v.  Green,  88  Mich.  207;  Y.  S.  349;  Bergquist  v.  Iron  Co.,  49 

Penn.  Coal  Co.  v.  Friend  (Ind.,  1892),  Minn.  511. 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  1116.  3  See  post,  §§  189,  194.     See,  also, 

2Yeaw  v.  Williams,   15  R.  I.   20;  Pullman  Pal.  Car  Co.  v.  Hawkins, 

Ft.  Worth  &  D.  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Thomp-  55  Fed.  Rep.  932;  Weber  Wagon  Co. 

son  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  137;  v.  Kehl,  139  111.  644. 
Cross  v.  Railroad  Co.,  69  Mich.  303; 


§  186.]  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  267 

It  is  difficult  at  times  to  distinguish  clearly  whether  a  ques- 
tion calls  for  an  expression  of  opinion  or  for  a  statement  of 
fact  from  the  witness.  The  form  of  the  question  or  of  the 
answer  is  not  always  a  reliable  test.  Thus,  a  witness  may  be 
asked  if  he  has  any  doubts  concerning  the  facts  of  a  transac- 
tion to  which  lie  has  testified,  this  question  not  calling  for  an 
expression  of  opinion,  but  merely  seeking  to  ascertain  the 
certainty  of  his  knowledge.1  So,  where  a  witness  is  unwilling 
or  unable  to  swear  positively  what  any  article  was  which  he 
has  examined  or  tested  —  that  is,  if  he  cannot  readily  identify 
it  or  classify  it  from  a  physical  perception  of  its  qualities, — 
he  may  be  asked  what  he  thinks  it  was.2  If  the  witness, 
through  excess  of  caution,  qualifies  his  replies  by  expressions 
such  as  "it  appears  tome,"3  "I  think,"  "I  believe,"  or  "should 
judge,"  his  testimony,  though  perhaps  weakened  thereby,  is 
not  rendered  incompetent.  So  far  as  his  evidence  contains 
statements  of  relevant  facts,  it  is  admissible  though  thus  qual- 
ified.* On  the  other  hand,  a  witness'  statement  that  he  does 
not  think  a  fact  is  true  is  not  an  opinion,  for  witnesses  are 
not  always  required  to  state  facts  with  positiveness.5  Testi- 
mony showing  the  ownership6  or  size  of  the  subject  of  litiga- 
tion,7 or  the  time  which  elapsed  between  two  events,8  or  the 
opinion  of  the  witness  that  a  writing  read  by  him  is  true,9  is 
not  objectionable  as  an  expression  of  opinion.     But  the  opin- 

1  State  v.  Duncan  (Mo.,  1893),  22  ?Oslin  v.  Jerome,  98  Mich.  186; 
S.  "W.  Rep.  699;  King  v.  Railroad  Bass  Fur.  Co.  v.  Glasscock,  82  Ala. 
Co.,  72  Mo.  607.  452:  Roraack  v.  Hobbs  (Ind.,  1893), 

2  Com.  v.  Moinehan,  140  Mass.  463.     32  N.  E.  Rep.  307.     "Duration,  di- 
speople v.  Fanshawe,  19  N.  Y.  S.     mension,    size,    velocity,    etc.,    are 

865.  often  to  be  proved  only  by  the  opin- 

4  Abb.  Brief  on  Facts,  §  192,  citing  ion  of  witnesses,  depending  as  they 

Guiterman  v.  Steamship  Co.,  9  Daly  do  on  minute  circumstances  which 

(N.  Y.),  119;  Bradley  v.  Second  Ave.  cannot    fully   be    detailed   by    wit- 

R.  R.  Co.,  8  id.  289;  Callahan  v.  N.  nesses."    State  v.  Folwell,  14  Kan. 

Y.,  Lake  Erie  &  W.  R.  R.,  102  N.  Y.  205. 

194;  People  v.   Rolfe,  61   Cal.   540;  » Campbell  v.    State,   23  Ala.  41; 

State  v.  Babb,  76  Mo.  501 ;  Rich  v.  State  v.  Casey,  44  La.  Ann.  969. 

Jones,  9  Cush.  (Mass. )  326 ;  Prior  v.  9  Furton  v.  N.  Y.  Recorder,  22  N. 

Diggs(Cal.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  155.  Y.  S.  766;  3  Misc.   Rep.    314:   Lis- 

*  Prior  v.    Diggs  (Cal.,    1893),    31  comb  v.  Agate,  22  N.  Y.  S.  126;  67 

Pac.  Rep.  155.  Hun,  688, 
6Sleuier  v.   Tranum,   13  S.  Rep. 

365. 


208 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


e  136. 


ion  of  the  witness  who  is  not  an  expert  as  to  the  meaning 
of  a  sign,  as  the  shaking  of  the  head,1  or  of  an  outcry,2  or 
generally  as  to  the  probable  cause  or  effect  of  a  certain  rele- 
vant act,:1  or  as  to  the  probable  amount  of  time  required  for 
its  performance,4  whether  a  witness  could  have  heard  a  con- 
versation,5 or  a  certain  signal  if  it  had  been  given,6  whether 
an  accident  was  more  likely  to  occur  in  one  place  than  in  an- 
other,7 or  whether  a  certain  act  was  prudent,8  is  inadmissible. 
Though  non-expert  witnesses  are  usually  confined  to  testi- 
f}Ting  to  facts,  there  are  some  cases  where,  from  necessity, 
their  opinions  are  admissible  upon  matters  of  common  knowl- 
edge.9 If  the  facts  to  which  the  witness  is  called  to  testify 
are  so  numerous  and  of  so  peculiar  a  nature  that  they  are 
incapable  of  being  specifically  described  so  as  to  bring  out 
clearly  their  proper  force  and  significance  before  the  jury,  the 
witness  may  state  his  opinion  as  a  short-hand  characteriza- 
tion of  the  facts.10     So  where  a  witness  had  adequate  means 


1Roll\vagen  v.  Rollwagen,  3  Hun, 
121 ;  63  N.  Y.  504. 

2Mesner  v.  People,  45  N.  Y.  1. 

3  Gardner  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  86;  Friedenwalcl  v.  Balti- 
more, 74  Md.  116;  21  Atl.  Rep.  555; 
Kendrick  v.  Central  R.  R.  Co.,  89 
Ga.  782;  Middlebrook  v.  Zapp,  79 
Tex.  321 ;  Ireland  v.  Cincinnati,  etc. 
Co.  (Mich.,  1890),  44  N.  W.  Rep.  426; 
People  v.  Rector,  19  Wend.  569; 
Kansas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Scott,  1  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  1. 

*  Dowdy  v.  Georgia  R.  R.  Co.,  88 
Ga.  726;  Parrott  v.  Swaini,  29  111. 
App.  266. 

5  People  v.  Holfelder,  5  N.  Y.  Crim. 
R.  179. 

6  Eskridge  v.  Railroad  Co.,  89  Ky. 
387;  12  S.  W.  Rep.  580;  East  Tenn. 
etc.  Co.  v.  Watson,  90  Ala.  41;  7  S. 
Rep.  813. 

7  Toledo  S.  &  S.  etc.  Co.  v.  Jackson 
(111.,  1893),  32  N.  W.  Rep.  793;  Ivory 
v.  Town  of  Deer  Park,  116  N.  Y. 
476;  Betts  v.  Gloversville,  8  N.  Y. 
S.  795. 


SMurtaugh  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H. 
R.  R.  Co.,  49  Hun,  456. 

9  Elliott  v.  Van  Buren,  33  Mich. 
49;  People  v.  Monteith,  73  Cal.  7; 
Davis  v.  State.  78  Ind.  15 ;  Blake  v. 
People,  73  N.  Y.  586 ;  Yahn  v.  Ot- 
tumwa,  22  Am.  Law  Reg.  644;  Knoll 
v.  State,  55  Wis.  249;  Baltimore  v. 
Lib.  Turnp.  Co.,  66  Md.  419;  7  Atl. 
Rep.  805;  Whittier  v.  Franklyn,  46 
N.  H.  23. 

10  Welch  v.  Miller,  32  111.  App.  110; 
State  v.  Miller,  53  Iowa,  84;  Living- 
ston v.  Metro.  R.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  S. 
203;  Pike  v.  State,  49  N.  H.  399; 
Adams  v.  People,  63  N.  Y.  621;  Car- 
ter v.  Carter,  37  111.  App.  -,'19;  23  N. 
E.  Rep.  948;  Com.  v.  Cunningham, 
104  Mass.  545;  Fulcher  v.  State,  28 
Tex.  App.  465;  East  Tenn.  R.  Co.  v. 
Watson,  90  Ala.  41 ;  7  S.  Rep.  813; 
Atchison  R.  Co.  v.  Miller,  18  Pac. 
Rep.  486;  39  Kan.  419;  B.  &  O.  R. 
R.  Co.  v.  Rambo;  59  Fed.  Rep.  75; 
Indianapolis  v.  Huffer,  30  Ind.  235; 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  George,  19  111. 
510 ;  Irish  v.  Smith,  8  S.  &  R.  573 ; 


ISC] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


260 


of  observing  a  transaction,  but  where  it  is  impossible  for  him 
so  to  reproduce  it  as  to  enable  any  one  hearing  his  descrip- 
tion to  form  an  intelligent  conclusion  from  what  he  is  able 
t»  relate,  the  witness  may,  after  stating  the  facts,  be  allowed 
to  state  his  own  opinion  or  the  conclusion  he  has  formed  from 
the  facts  within  his  knowledge.1  Thus,  a  witness  may  testify 
to  his  understanding  of  a  conversation;2  that,  in  his  opinion, 
a  certain  noise  which  was  made  by  running  water  frightened 
a  horse;3  that  a  horse  was  gentle,4  or  appeared  frightened5 
or  tired;6  that  a  person's  manner  in  answering  questions  was 
short;7  that  a  man  was  at  a  certain  date  intoxicated8  or  was 
a  person  of  intemperate  habits;9  that  a  person  looked  like  a 
white  woman;10  that  a  man  was  destitute,11  or  that  he  was 
sober.12  So  any  witness  may  testify  in  court  to  the  apparent 
age 13  or  to  the  identity  of  a  person  or  thing  seen  by  him  out  of 
court.14 


State  v.  Babb,  76  Mo.  501;  Alexan- 
der v.  Jonquil,  71  111.  366;  Porter  v. 
Pequonnoc,  17  Conn.  249. 

Baylor  v.  B.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  10  S. 
E.  Rep.  29 ;  33  W.  Va.  39 ;  Caven- 
dish v.  Troy,  41  Vt.  99.  "A  variety 
of  circumstances  that  could  only  be 
perceived,  but  not  detailed,  would 
constitute  the  aggregate  from  which 
the  opinion  might  be  formed.  The 
person  who  had  witnessed  the  trans- 
action could  alone  form  any  idea  of 
the  subject  that  could  be  relied  on 
with  safety."  Stewart  v.  State,  19 
Ohio,  302. 

2  Garvin  v.  Gates,  73  Wis.  513;  41 
N.  W.  Rep.  621 ;  Printup  v.  Mitchell, 
17  Ga.  558.  But  he  cannot  testify 
to  the  legal  effect  of  what  was  said. 
Ives  v.  Hamlen,  59  Mass.  534. 

»  Yahn  v.  Ottumwa,  60  Iowa,  429; 
Whittier  v.  Franklin,  46  N.  H.  23. 

4  State  v.  Avery,  44  N.  H.  392; 
Sydenham  v.  Beckwith,  43  Conn.  9. 

5  Com.  v.  Sturtivant,  117  Mass. 
132. 

«State  v.  Ward,  17  Atl.  Rep.  483 
(Vt.,  1889). 
'  Carroll  v.  State,  23  Ala.  28. 


8  McKillop  v.  Duluth  St.  Ry.  Co. 
(Minn.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  739; 
Cole  v.  Bean,  1  Ariz.  377 ;  People  v. 
Monteith,  73  Cal.  7 ;  People  v.  East- 
wood, 14  N.  Y.  562;  Bradley  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  8  Daly  (N.  Y.j,  289;  Mc- 
Carthy v.  Wells,  51  Hun,  171 ;  Hamp- 
son  v.  Taylor,  15  R.  I.  83 ;  State  v. 
Pierce,  65  Iowa,  85 ;  People  v.  O'Neil, 
113  N.  Y.  355. 

o  Gallagher  v.  People,  120  111.  179; 
United  Breth.  M.  Aid  Ins.  Co.  v. 
O'Hara,  120  Pa.  St.  256;  13  Atl.  Rep. 
932;  Gahagan  v.  Railroad  Co.,  1 
Allen,  187;  Smith  v.  State,  55  Ala. 
1 ;  Tatuni  v.  State,  63  id.  150. 

10  Hopkins  v.  Bowers,  111  N.  C. 
175 ;  Moore  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  608. 

11  Antanger  v.  Davis,  32  Ala.  70:!. 

12  People  v.  Packenham,  115  N.  Y. 
200. 

13  Jones  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22 
W.  Rep.  349 ;  Carr  v.  State,  24  Tex. 
App.  562;  State  v.  Douglas,  48  Mo. 
App.  39. 

i4Com.  v.  Sturtivant,  117  Mass. 
112;  State  v.  Horr  (W.  Va.,  1893).  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  794;  Brotherton  v.  Peo- 
ple, 73  N.  Y.  159 ;  State  v.  Dickson, 


270  EXPERT    AND   OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  187. 

Again,  a  non-expert  witness  may  testify  to  the  disposition  of 
a  person,  i.  e.,  that  he  is  unreliable;1  that  on  certain  occa- 
sions he  manifested  hatred  or  anger,2  or  affection,3  towards 
himself  or  some  other  person,  or  looked  wild  and  excited,4  or 
sad,5  or  was  happy  and  in  good  spirits.6  So,  also,  it  is  allow- 
able for  a  non-expert  to  testify  that  in  his  opinion  a  culvert7 
or  a  highway8  was  or  was  not  in  good  repair;  that  a  trespass 
was  committed  in  an  insulting  manner;9  that  a  blow,  which 
caused  a  physical  injury,  came  from  a  certain  direction; 10  that 
the  weather  was  very  cold;11  that  ill-feeling  existed  between 
certain  persons;12  that  a  train  was  running  at  a  specific  rate  of 
speed,13  and  that  liquor  which  he  had  examined  was  intoxicat- 
ing.14 

§  187.  Expert  evidence,  when  admissible. —  Where  the 
subject  of  investigation  is  such  that  persons  who  have  not 
made  it  a  special  study,  or  who  have  had  no  peculiar  training 
or  experience  in  it,  are  incompetent  to  form  accurate  conclu- 
sions or  opinions  regarding  it,  experts  mi»y  be  called  to  state 
their  opinions  to  the  jury.  Where  the  relation  of  facts  to  each 
other,  their  connection  with  each  other,  and  their  results  or 
the  conclusions  which  may  be  drawn  from  them,  can  be  de- 
termined without  any  prior  special  experience,  study  or  skill, 
the  opinions  of  experts  are  inadmissible.  So  expert  evidence 
will  not  be  received  to  show  that  a  road  is  necessary;15  that 

78  Mo.  438;  People  v.  Rolfe,  61  Cal.       10Hopt  v.  Utah,  120  U.  S.  430. 
540;  State  v.  Babb,  76  Mo.  501.  "Curtis  v.   Chicago,   etc.  Co.,  18 

i  Mills  v.  Winter,  94  Ind.  329.  Wis.  312. 

2  State  v.  Edwards  (N.  C,  1893),  17       U  Polk  v.  State,  62  Ala.  237. 

S.  E.  Rep.  521 ;  State  v.  Shelton,  64  13  Pence  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Ry. 

Iowa,  3', 3.  Co.  (Iowa,  1890),  44  N.  W.  Rep.  686; 

3  McKee  v.  Nelson,  4  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  Com.  v.  Malone,  114  Mass.  295;  State 
355.  v.  Folwell,  14  Kan.  105.     So  it  may 

4  Trav.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sheppard,  85  be  shown  by  one  witness  that  a  train 
Ga.  751.  was  running  rapidly  at  a  place  not 

8  Culver  v.  Dwight,  6  Gray,  444.  too  remote  from  the  point  in  issue, 

6  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  1.  and  byanother  witness  that  its  speed 

7  Lund  v.  Lynsborough,  9  C'ush.  was  not  subsequently  reduced. 
(Mass.)  33.  Louisville,  New  Albany,  etc.  Co.  v. 

8  Clinton  v.  Howard,  42  Conn.  294 ;  Jones,  108  Ind.  55. 

Bait.  &  Lib.  Turnp.  Co.  v.  Cassell,  "Com.  v.  Donlican,  114  Mass.  257; 

66  Md.  419;  Alexander  v.  Mt.  Ster-  State  v.  Miller,  53  Iowa,  84. 

ling,  71  111.  366.  u  Burwell  v.  Speed,  104  N.  C.  118; 

9  Raisler  v.  Springer,  38  Ala.  703.  10  S.  E.  Rep.  152. 


188.]  EXPERT    A.ND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  271 


the  condition  of  machinery  might  necessitate  an  examination ; 
how  much  bark  or  wood  will  shrink;2  or  to  explain  the  injury 
which  has  been  done  to  property  by  smoke,  noise  and  stench 
caused  by  the  running  of  a  railroad,3  as  such  matters  are 
usually  within  common  experience. 

The  expert  witness  need  not  know  personally  anything  of 
the  facts  of  the  particular  case,  though  perhaps  his  evidence 
would  be  of  higher  value  if  he  could  testify  of  his  own  knowl- 
edge as  well  as  state  his  opinion  upon  facts  in  a  hypothetical 
question  which  are  assumed  to  be  proved.  It  must  appear, 
however,  from  his  previous  experience  and  study,  or  from  his 
business  or  professional  avocation,  that  he  is  qualified  to  an- 
swer the  question  more  accurately  than  is  a  person  who  may 
not  have  been  called  upon  to  study  the  subject  or  to  obtain  or 
exercise  any  skill  in  it.4 

§  188.  Competency  and  examination  of  experts. —  Whether 
a  witness  is  qualified  to  testify  as  an  expert  is  always  a  ques- 
tion for  the  court,5  and  his  competency  and  title  to  act  as  an 
expert  must  be  shown  before  his  opinion  is  admissible.6     It  is 

1  Goodsell  v.  Taylor,  41  Minn.  207.  Nelson  v.    M.   Ins.    Co.,    71    N.    Y. 

2  Brown  v.  Doubleday,  61  Vt.  523;  453;  Broquet  v.  Tripp,  36  Kan.  700; 
7  Atl.  Rep.  135.  Wright  v.  Williams,  47  Vt.  222 ;  Dole 

3  Thompson  v.  Penn.  R.  Co.,  15  v.  Johnson,  50  N.  Y.  452;  Flynt  v. 
Atl.  Rep.  833;  51  N.  J.  L.  42.  Bodenhamer,   80   N.    C.  205;  Santa 

4  0verby  v.  C.  &  O.  R.  R.  Co.,  37  Clara  v.  Enright,  95  Cal.  105;  Per- 
W.  Va.  524 ;  Lawrence  v.  Myrieman  kins  v.  Stickney,  132  Mass.  217; 
Marble  Co.,  1  Misc.  Rep.  105;  St.  Gates  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  44  Mo. 
Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Co.  v.  Lyman  (Ark.,  App.  488;  People  v.  Levy,  71  Cal. 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  170;  Alabama  618;  Chateaugay  O.  &  I.  Co.  v. 
Coal  Co.  v.  Pitts  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Blake,  144  U.  S.  476.  See  ante, 
Rep.  35;  Muldowney  v.  111.  Cent.  R.  §§  11,  13. 

Co.,   36   Iowa,   472;   American  En.  6 People    v.    Millard,    5  Crim.    L. 

Tile  Co.  v.  Reich,  12  N.   Y.   S.  927;  Mag.  588;  Russell  v.  Crittenden,  53 

Litton  v.  Wright,  1  Ind.  App.  92;  Conn.  564;  Half  v.  Curtis,   68  Tex. 

27  N.  E.  Rep.  329;  In  re  Thompson,  640;  5  S.  W.  Rep.   541;  Stennett  v. 

58  Hun,  608;   Perry  v.  Jensen,   21  Penn.    Ins.    Co.,    68  Iowa,   674;  Ft. 

Atl.   Rep.    866;    28  W.    N.    C.    126;  Wayne  v.    Coombs,    107    Ind.    75; 

People  v.  McQuaid,  85  Mich.  123;  48  Forbes  v.  Howard,  4  R.  I.  364 ;  Penn- 

N.  W.  Rep.  161 ;  Rochester,  etc.  Co.  sylvania  Co.  v.    Swan,  37  111.  App. 

v.  Budlong,  10  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  289;  83;  McCormick  M.  Co.  v.  Burandt, 

Kennedy  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  245.  37  id.  588.     Cf.  Taft  v.  Com.  (Mass., 

5  McEwen  v.  Biglow,  40  Mich.  215;  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  1046. 


272 


EXPERT    AND   OriNION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  188. 


not  always  essential  that  the  witness  should  expressly  claim 
to  be  an  expert.1  It  is  usually  enough  if  his  competency  ap- 
pears prima  facie,  and  if,  on  cross-examination,  his  utter  lack 
of  qualification  as  an  expert  is  shown,  the  jury  should  be  in- 
structed to  reject  his  evidence  altogether.2 

A  hypothetical  question  in  which  are  contained  the  facts 
which  are  proved  or  claimed  to  be  proved  by  either  side  may 
be  put  to  the  expert  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  his  opinion.* 
The  facts  embodied  in  the  hypothetical  question  need  not  be 
absolutely  proved  or  admitted.4  If  there  is  any  evidence 
which  tends  to  prove  the  facts,  it  is  proper  to  allow  the  coun- 
sel for  either  party  to  base  a  hypothetical  question  upon  them, 
leaving  it  to  the  jury  to  decide  ultimately  whether  the  facts 
as  stated  are  true. 

The  term  "hypothetical"  implies  that  the  truth  of  some 
statement  of  fact  is  assumed  for  a  particular  purpose;  and  if 
such  a  question  could  be  based  upon  undisputed  facts  alone, 
it  would  never  be  asked  in  any  case  where  an  issue  of  fact 


1  Mercer  v.  Vose,  40  N.  Y.  Super. 
Ct.  218. 

2  Davis  v.  State,  35  Ind.  496;  Peo- 
ple v.  Marseilles,  70  Cal.  98 ;  Redell  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  44  N.  Y.  367 ;  Washing- 
ton v.  Cole,  6  Ala.  212;  Perkins  v. 
State,  132  Mass.  217;  Sarle  v.  Ar- 
nold, 7  R.  I.  582.  If  a  witness  is 
competent  as  an  expert  on  a  ques- 
tion relating  to  a  particular  business 
or  profession,  the  fact  that  lie  has 
abandoned  it  and  is  now  engaged  in 
something  else  is  not  a  valid  objec- 
tion to  his  competency.  Abbott, 
Brief  on  the  Facts,  §  580 ;  Bearss  v. 
Copley,  10  N.  Y.  93;  Robertson  v. 
Knapp,  35  N.  Y.  91;  33  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  309.  In  deciding  upon  the 
competency  of  a  witness  to  speak  as 
an  expert,  the  court  may  examine 
other  witnesses  for  the  purpose  of 
aiding  it  in  determining  whether  the 
alleged  expert  has  the  proper  qualifi- 
cations from  experience  or  otherwise 


to  give  an  opinion  as  to  the  matter, 
or  in  the  trade  or  profession  in  rela- 
tion to  which  he  was  examined. 
Rogers,  Exp.  Test.,  $  17;  Lawson, 
Exp.  Ev.  236.  In  such  a  case  the 
witness  who  is  examined  as  to  the 
qualification  of  the  expert  does  not 
give  an  opinion  as  to  the  value  of 
the  testimony,  i.  e.,  its  credibility 
and  weight,  which  are  for  the  jury 
exclusively,  but  merely  testifies  that 
the  expert  posseses,  in  his  opinion, 
sufficient  experience  and  knowledge 
to  entitle  him  to  testify  as  such. 
Laras  v.  Com.,  84  Pa.  St.  208;  Bueh- 
ler  v.  Reich,  18  N.  Y.  S.  115.  Cf.  con- 
tra, Association  v.  Cronin,  4  Allen, 
141. 

3  People  v.  Harris,  136  N.  Y.  423; 
Strong  v.  Stevens,  62  Wis.  255;  Dex- 
ter v.  Hall,  15  Wall.  9. 

«  Hall  v.  Rankin  (Iowa,  1893),  ]54 
N.  W.  Rep.  217. 


§  188.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION'    KVIDKNOK. 


273 


arose.1  The  question  should  not  be  based  on  conjecture,2  or 
upon  the  opinions  of  other  experts  who  have  testified,3  nor 
should  it  contain  conclusions  and  inferences,  which  are  for  the 
jury;4  but  if  it  state  and  assume  the  material  facts,5  the  hypo- 
thetical question  need  not  state  all  facts  of  which  any  evidence 
has  been  given."  It  is  always  objectionable  to  put  lengthy 
hypothetical  questions,  containing  numerous  facts  which  re- 
quire the  witness  to  determine  whether  they  have  or  have 
not  been  proved,7  or  which  are  so  prolix  that  neither  he  nor 
the  jury  can  remember  or  consider  what  they  contain.8 


i  Cowley  v.  People,  82  N.  Y.  464; 
Dilleber  v.  Home  L.  Ins.  Co.,  87 
N.  Y.  79;  Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind. 
550;  Page  v.  State,  61  Ala.  16; 
Yardley  v.  Cuthbertson,  108  Pa.  St. 
395;  Quinn  v.  Higgins,  63  Wis.  664; 
Deigv.  Morehead,  110  Ind.  451;  11 
N.  E.  Rep.  458 ;  Boardnaan  v.  Wood- 
man, 47  N.  H.  120;  Dexter  v.  Hall, 
15  Wall.  9;  State  v.  Cross,  68  Iowa, 
180;  People  v.  Augsburg,  97  N.  Y. 
501;  Forsyth  v.  Doolittle,  120  U.  S. 
73;  Morrill  v.  Tegarden,  19  Neb. 
534;  Ray  v.  Ray,  98  N.  C.  566;  Fos- 
ters Ex'r  v.  Dickerson  (Vt.,  1892),  24 
Atl.  Rep.  253 ;  Serin  v.  Southern  Ry. 
Co.,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  1007;  Carpenter 
v.  Bailey,  94  Cal.  406 ;  Russ  v.  Wa- 
bash W.  Ry.  Co.,  112  Mo.  45;  Will- 
iams v.  Brown,  28  Ohio  St.  158. 

2Prentis  v.  Bates,  88  Mich.  567; 
Higbie  v.  Guardian,  etc.  Co.,  53 
N.  Y.  63. 

3  Link  v.  Sheldon,  136  N.  Y.  1; 
In  re  Lyddy's  Will,  3  N.  Y.  S.  636. 

4  Haish  v.  Payson,  107  111.  365. 

5  State  v.  Hanley,  34  Minn.  430; 
Vosburgh  v.  Putney,  80  Wis.  523; 
Thompson  v.  Knickerbocker  Ice  Co., 
6  N.  Y.  S.  7 ;  Covey  v.  Campbell,  52 
Ind.  158.  He  should  be  asked  to 
express  his  opinion  upon  certain 
facts  specifically  stated  and  assumed 
to  be  established,  leaving  it  to  the 
jury  to  find  whether  the  facts  thus 
assumed    are    true.     Woodbury    v. 

18 


Obear,  7  Gray  (Mass.),  467.  "An 
expert  may  be  asked  his  opinion 
upon  a  case  hypothetically  stated,  or 
upon  a  case  in  which  the  facts  have 
been  established ;  but  he  may  not 
determine  from  the  evidence  what 
the  facts  are  to  give  an'  opinion 
upon  them."  Dexter  v.  Hall,  15 
Wall.  9,  26. 

6  Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind.  550; 
Baker  v.  State,  30  Fla.  41 ;  Bowen 
v.  Huntington,  35  W.  Va.  682;  Fort 
Worth,  etc.  Co.  v.  Greathouse,  82 
Tex.  104. 

7  Stoddard  v.  Town,  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
948. 

8  People  v.  Brown,  53  Mich.  531; 
Briggs  v.  Minn.  S.  R.  Co.  (Minn., 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1019;  Prentis 
v.  Bates,  88  Mich.  567.  An  objection 
to  the  length  of  a  question  may  be 
avoided  by  putting  it  to  the  expert 
in  writing  (Jones  v.  President,  etc. 
Portland,  88  Mich.  598.  See  Barton 
v.  Govan,  116  N.  Y.  658),  and  the 
court  may,  in  its  discretion,  require 
this  to  be  done.  Mayo  v.  Wright, 
63  Mich.  32.  The  length  of  a  hypo- 
thetical question  is  never  ground 
for  its  exclusion,  being  a  matter 
discretionary  with  tha  court,  unless 
it  is  shown  the  jurors  were  con- 
fused and  that  they  failed  to  under- 
stand it.  Forsyth  v.  Doolittle,  120 
U.  S.  73 ;  Mayo  v.  Wright,  supra. 


27± 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  18& 


Though  hypothetical  questions  constitute  the  best,  and  in 
some  states  the  only,1  method  of  ascertaining  the  opinion  of 
an  expert,  it  has  been  held  that  he  may  be  asked  to  give  an 
opinion  upon  the  evidence  if  he  has  heard  or  read  it,2  and  as- 
suming it  to  be  true,3  or  he  may  give  an  opinion  based  upon  his 
own  personal  knowledge  gained  by  observation  and  examina- 
tion of  an  injured  person  or  of  the  subject-matter  of  the  ac- 
tion.4 If,  however,  the  evidence  is  very  voluminous,5  or  con- 
flicting,6 this  method  would  be  objectionable,  if  not  improper, 
as  usurping  the  office  of  the  jury.7 

In  the  cross-examination  of  experts  much  latitude  is  al- 
lowed. So  while,  on  the  direct  examination,  no  hypothetical 
question  is  admissible  which  is  not  within  the  general  range 
of  the  evidence,  or  which  assumes  the  truth  of  facts  which 
are  wholly  unsupported  by  any  evidence,8  when  the  expert  is 
cross-examined  he  may  be  questioned  to  ascertain  his  skill  or 
experience  on  subjects  material  to  the  inquiry,  though  the 
facts  which  are  assumed  in  the  questions  may  not  have  been 
contained  in  the  evidence.9 


1  McCarthy  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20 
S.  W.  Eep.  229 ;  State  v.  Maier,  36 
W.  Va.  757;  Reynolds  v.  Robinson, 
64  N.  Y.  389;  In  re  Snelling,  136 
N.  Y.  515. 

2  Gilman  v.  Stafford,  50  Vt.  723. 
3Sillar  v.   Brown,  9  C.  &  P.  601; 

Com.  v.  Rogers,  7  Met.  (Mass.)  500; 
Jones  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  43  Minn. 
279;  Hunt  v.  Lowell  Gas  Co.,  8 
Allen  (Mass.),  170. 

*  State  v.  Leabo,  89  Mo.  247; 
Coyne  v.  Man.  R.  Co.,  62  Hun,  620. 
Contra,  Fuller  v.  Jackson,  92  Mich. 
197.     See  post,  §  189. 

5  Bennett  v.  State,  57  Wis.  69. 

6Guiterman  v.  Liverpool,  etc.  Co., 
83  N.  Y.  358 ;  Bait.  &  Lift.  Co.  v. 
Cassell,  66  Md.  419;  Yardley  v. 
Cuthbertson,  108  Pa.  St.  395;  Fair- 
child  v.  Bascomb,  35  Vt.  308,415; 
Page  v.  State,  61  Ala.  16. 

7  Gregory  v.  New  York,  L.  E.  etc. 
Co.,  55  Hun,  303. 


8  State  v.  Cross,  68  Iowa,  180;  Peo- 
ple v.  Augsburg,  97  N.  Y.  501. 

SDilleber  v.  Home  L.  Ins.  Co.,  87 
N.  Y.  79;  People  v.  Augsburg,  97 
N.  Y.  501;  Louisville  R.  Co.  v. 
Falvey,  104  Ind.  409 ;  Kelly  v.  Erie 
Tel.  Co.,  34  Minn.  321 ;  Epps  v.  State, 
102  Ind.  539;  Brown  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  70  Iowa,  390;  Hart  v.  Hudson 
R.  B.  Co.,  84  N.  Y.  56;  Foster's  Ex'r 
v.  'Dickerson,  64  Vt.  233;  24  Atl. 
Rep.  353.  An  expert  may  give  an 
opinion  upon  the  skill  of  another  ex- 
pert who  has  testified  to  show  the 
value  of  his  evidence.  Thompson  v. 
Ish  (Mo.,  1889),  12  S.  W.  Rep.  510. 
As  to  the  extent  and  efficacy  of  cross- 
examination  to  test  the  knowledge 
of  a  witness  and  the  credibility  of 
his  evidence,  see  post,  §§  339-342. 
The  court  should  not  permit  the  ex- 
pert to  be  asked  on  cross-examina- 
tion what  is  the  amount  of  his  an- 
nual   professional    income   with    a 


§  ISO.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


275 


§  189.  Cross-examination  of  experts  —  Use  of  scientific 
books. —  While  the  current  of  the  most  recent  decisions,  in 
the  absence  of  statute  permitting  it,1  is  against  allowing  scien- 
tific treatises  to  be  read  as  furnishing  direct  evidence  them- 
selves of  the  opinions  and  facts  which  they  contain,  or  as 
supplementary  to  and  illustrating  the  oral  evidence  of  the  ex- 
pert,2 yet  a  particular  scientific  publication  rmxy  be  read  to 
contradict  the  evidence  of  an  expert  where  his  opinion,  as  it 
was  given  on  his  direct-examination,  is  stated  to  be  based  upon 
that  work;3  or  it  may  be  read  to  impeach  him  by  showing 
that  he  quoted  it  incorrectly.4  The  rule  that  scientific  publi- 
cations are  not  admissible  in  evidence  does  not  of  course  pre- 
vent their  use  as  a  means  of  ascertaining  the  learning  and 
competency  of  the  expert.  They  may  be  referred  to  on  cross- 
examination,  and  the  expert  may  be  asked  if  he  has  read 
them;  if  he  agrees  with  the  conclusions  of  their  authors;  and 
questions  based  upon  their  contents  may  be  asked  him.5 


view  to  ascertaining  his  pi-ofessional 
standing.  Harland  v.  Lilienthal,  53 
N.  Y.  438. 

i  Code  Iowa,  §  3653.  See,  also, 
Burg  v.  Chicago,  R.  I.  &  P.  Co. 
(Iowa,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  680. 

2  People  v.  Goldenson,  76  Cal.  328 ; 
Com.  v.  Brown,  121  Mass.  70;  In  re 
Sheldon,  18  N.  Y.  S.  15;  State  v. 
O'Brien,  7  R.  I.  336;  Bloomington 
v.  Schrock,  110  111.  221;  Mix  v. 
Staples,  63  Hun,  631;  Huffman  v. 
Click,  77  N.  C.  55.  See,  also,  §  145. 
"The  reasons  for  not  admitting  sci- 
entific works  to  prove  the  statements 
which  they  contain  are  that  the  au- 
thors did  not  write  under  oath,  and 
their  grounds  of  belief  and  process 
of  reasoning  cannot  be  tested  by 
cross-examination.  But  an  expert's 
opinion,  formed  in  part  from  read- 
ing treatises  written  by  persons  of 
acknowledged  ability,  may  be  given 
in  evidence,  and  he  (the  expert)  may 
refresh  his  own  recollection  by  ref- 
erence to  such  authorities."     By  the 


court,  in  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan. 
17,  18.  See,  also,  Marshall  v.  Brown, 
50  Mich.  148;  Boyle  v.  State,  57  Wis. 
472,  478;  People  v.  Vanderhoof 
(Mich.,  1888),  39  N.  W.  Rep.  28. 
Thus,  herd-books  will  be  rejected 
where  the  question  of  the  breed  of 
animals  is  in  issue  (Crawford  v. 
Williams,  48  Iowa,  249),  unless  thejr 
are  shown  to  be  accepted  and  re- 
ceived as  standard  and  well-recog- 
nized authorities.  In  such  a  case 
they  may  perhaps  be  used  to  refresh 
the  memory  of  an  expert  on  the 
witness  stand.  Kuhns  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  Co.,  65  Iowa,  528;  22  N.  W.  Rep 
661 ;  Townley  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R 
Co.,  89  Mo.  31. 

3  Pinney  v.  Cahill,  48  Mich.  584 
People  v.  Goldenson,  76  Cal.  328 
Conn.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ellis,  89  111.  516 

4  Ripon  v.  Bittel,  30  Wis.  614. 

5  Hess  v.  Lowrey,  122  Ind.  233 
State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H.  484;  Tomp 
kins  v.  West,  56  Conn.  585. 


276  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  190. 

§  190.  The  weight  and  credibility  of  expert  and  opinion 
evidence. —  The  credibility  and  weight  of  expert  and  opinion 
evidence  are  for  the  jury  exclusively,1  and  they  are  not  re- 
quired to  give  any  greater  weight  to  it  than  to  other  evi- 
dence,2 and  of  course  are  not  bound  by  it  if  they  disbelieve  it.3 
It  has  been  held  error  for  the  court  to  discredit  expert  evi- 
dence4 by  instructing  a  jury  that  it  should  be  regarded  with 
caution,5  that  its  value  was  not  great,6  or  that  less  weight 
should  be  given  to  the  evidence  of  an  expert  whose  experience 
was  limited7  than  to  that  of  one  of  greater  experience.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  has  been  held  not  improper  for  the  court  to  de- 
clare that  this  evidence  is  of  the  lowest  order;  that  it  is  the 
least  satisfactory,  and  should  not  be  permitted  to  overthrow 
positive  and  credible  evidence  of  credible  witnesses  who  testify 
of  their  own  knowledge.8  These  diverse  views  may  perhaps 
be  reconciled  by  remembering  that  expert  evidence  has  for 
its  peculiar  province  matter  of  opinion,  and  facts  pertaining 
to  subjects  not  within  the  scope  of  common  knowledge.  Within 
these  limits  the  evidence  of  an  expert  possesses  very  great 
weight.  If  while  testifying  to  such  facts  and  opinions  he 
shall  also  testify  to  matters  of  common  knowledge,  his  char- 
acter as  an  expert  does  not  render  his  testimon}''  as  to  those 
matters  more  credible  than  the  testimony  of  any  other  person, 
while  the  fact  that  he  is  paid  to  testify  casts  a  certain  amount 
of  discredit  upon  whatever  he  may  sa}r.9 

1Head  v.  Hargrave,  105  U.  S.  45;  It  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  omit 

Gregor  v.  Annell,  2  Iowa,  30;    Epps  to  inform  the  jury  that  a  witness  is 

v.  State,  102  Ind.  529;  State  v.  Cole,  an  expert  where  it  has  charged  them 

63  Iowa,  695.  See  ante,  %%  11,  13.    A  as    to    what    is    expert  testimony, 

physician's  neglect  to  call  a  surgeon  Faulkner  v.  Faulkner,  84  Ga.  73. 

to  perform   an  operation    which  he  5  Stone  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (Mich.), 

was    himself    unable  to  undertake  33  N.  W.  Rep.  24. 

should   not  be   permitted  to  affect  6  Eggers  v.  Eggers,  57  Ind.  461. 

his  credibility  as  an  expert  witness.  7  Cuneo  v.  Bessoni,  63  Ind.  524. 

Alabama  G.  S.   R.   Co.   v.    Hill,    93  8  United  States  v.  Pendergast,  32 

Ala.  514.  Fed.   Rep.  198;  Winans  v.  Railroad 

2  Sanders  v.  State,  94  Ind.  147;  Co.,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  101;  Tracy 
Turnbull  v.  Richardson,  37  N.  W.  Peerage  Case,  10  C.  &  F.  191 ;  People 
Rep.  499;  69  Mich.  400.  v.  Perry  man  (Mich.,  1888),  40  N.  W. 

3  State  v.  Malloy,  31  Fed.  Rep.  19;  Rep.  425;  Whitaker  v.  Parks,  42 
Humphries  v.  Johnson,  20  Ind.  190;  Iowa,  586. 

Olson  v.  Gyertsen,  42  Minn.  407.  !)  St.  Louis  Gas   Co.  v.  American 

4  Langford  v.  Jones,  18  Oieg.  307.     F.  I.  Co.,  33  Mo.  App.  348. 


§  191.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


277 


§191.  Compensation  of  experts. —  An  expert  witness, 
called  to  testify  to  his  opinion,  is  entitled  to  compensation 
over  and  above  the  fees  allowed  other  witnesses  by  law;  and 
it  has  been  held  that  a  district  attorney,  in  employing  expert 
witnesses  to  testify  at  a  criminal  trial,  has,  by  implication, 
the  authority  to  bind  the  county  to  pay  a  stipulated  and  spe- 
cific sum  as  fees.1  If  he  refuse  to  testify  unless  his  fee  is  paid, 
he  cannot  be  committed  for  contempt.  But  he  may  be  in  con- 
tempt where  he  refuses  to  answer  questions  which  call  for 
knowledge  which  he  has  acquired,  not  by  his  professional 
reading  or  experience,  but  by  means  open  to  any  one  —  that 
is,  by  personal  observation.2  The  compensation  of  an  expert 
cannot,  in  the  absence  of  statute,  be  taxed  as  costs.3 


1  People  v.  Board  of  Supervisors  of 
Cortland*  Co.,  15  N.  Y.  S.  748;  Peo- 
ple v.  Board  of  Columbia  Co.,  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  322;  134  N.  Y.  1. 

2  State  v.  Teipner,  36  Minn.  535; 
Buchman  v.  State,  59  Ind.  1 ;  United 
States  v.  Howe,  12  Cent.  L.  J.  193: 
People  v.  Montgomery,  13  Abb.  Pr. 
(N.  S.)  207,  240;  Parkinson  v.  Atkin- 
son, 31  L.  J.  (N.  S.)  C.  P.  199;  Dills 
v.  State,  59  Ind.  15.  In  Ex  parte 
Dement,  53  Ala.  389,  and  Summer 
v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  365,  the  right 
to  extra  compensation  was  denied. 
See,  also,  the  remarks  of  Marie,  J., 
in  Webb  v.  Page,  1  Carr.  &  K.  23. 

3  Mask  v.  Buffalo  (N.  Y„  1893),  13 
N.  E.  Rep.  251 ;  Haynes  v.  Mosher, 
15  How.  Pr.  216;  Branfoot  v.  Ham- 
ilton, 52  Fed.  Rep.  390;  3  C.  C.  A. 
155.  Upon  the  controverted  ques- 
tion whether  a  witness  called  as 
an  expert  can  be  punished  for  con- 
tempt in  refusing  to  testify  until  his 
fees  as  a  professional  expert  witness 
are  paid,  the  following  considera- 
tions have  been  urged : 

As  sustaining  the  proposition  that 
experts  can  be  coerced  into  testify- 
ing without  extra  compensation,  it 
is  said  that  it  is  a  duty  that  an  ex- 
pert, particularly  if  he  belong  to  one 


of  the  learned  professions,  owes  to 
the  law  which  protects  him  in  the 
practice  of  his  calling;  that  he, 
equally  with  all  citizens,  ought  to 
contribute  his  aid  from  the  necessity 
of  the  case  and  to  secure  and  ad- 
vance the  proper  administration  of 
justice ;  and  that  the  receipt  of  large 
sums  as  compensation  is  likely  to 
bias  the  witness  and  to  lessen,  if  not 
wholly  to  destroy,  the  value  of  his 
testimony  as  a  guide  to  truth. 

In  answer  to  these  arguments  it  is 
urged  that,  while  a  physician  or 
other  expert  ought  to  testify  to  those 
facts  within  his  knowledge  which 
he  has  acquired  by  the  means  that 
are  open  to  the  ordinary  witness 
without  extra  pay,  yet,  when  giving 
a  professional  opinion  on  the  witness 
stand,  he  is  employing  professional 
qualifications  which  it  has  taken 
him  years  of  study  to  obtain,  and 
that  to  compel  him  to  divulge  his 
opinion  gratis  is  an  unjust  appro- 
priation of  his  property  without  com- 
pensation. 

Speaking  of  medical  experts  —  and 
the  same  principles  will  apply  to  ex- 
perts of  any  sort —  Mr.  John  Ordro- 
naux,  in  Medical  Jurisprudence,  par. 
114,  115,  says:  "But  once  put  upon 


278 


EXPERT    AND   OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  192. 


§  192.  Physicians  as  experts — Cause  of  death. —  A  med- 
ical witness  may,  if  called  as  an  expert,  express  his  opinion  as 
to  the  health  of  a  person  founded  on  an  examination,1  or  upon 
the  facts  as  stated  in  a  hypothetical  question  put  to  him  in 
court.  But  a  physician  called  to  testify,  not  as  an  expert,  but 
in  the  capacity  of  an  ordinary  witness  testifying  to  facts  ob- 
vious to  all,  cannot  on  cross-examination  testify  as  an  expert.2 
If  his  opinion  is  founded  upon  a  physical  examination  of  the 
person,  he  may  be  guided  in  part  by  statements  made  to  him 
by  the  patient  so  far  as  they  are  not  merely  narrative  of  past 
symptoms  or  transactions.3  The  opinion  of  a  physician  or  a 
surgeon  upon  the  cause,  nature  and  effect  of  wounds  or  other 
physical  injuries  is  always  admissible.4    He  may  testify  to  the 


the  stand  as  a  skilled  witness,  his 
obligations  to  the  public  now  cease, 
and  he  stands  in  the  position  of  any 
professional  man  consulted  in  rela- 
tion to  a  subject  on  which  his  opin- 
ion is  sought.  It  is  evident  that  the 
skill  and  professional  experience  of 
a  man  are  so  far  his  individual  cap- 
ital and  property  that  he  cannot  be 
compelled  to  bestow  them  gratui- 
tously on  any  party  ;  neither  the  pub- 
lic any  more  than  any  private  person 
have  a  right  to  extort  services  from 
him  in  the  line  of  his  profession 
without  adequate  compensation.  On 
the  witness  stand,  precisely  as  in  his 
office,  his  opinion  may  be  given  or 
withheld  at  pleasure;  for  a  skilled 
witness  cannot  be  compelled  to  give 
an  opinion,  nor  be  committed  for 
contempt  if  he  refuses  to  do  so." 

1  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104 
Ind.  409. 

2  Enos  v.  St.  Paul  Fire  &  Mar.  Ins. 
Co.  (S.  D.,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  9*19. 

3  Johnson  v.  N.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  47 
Minn.  430;  Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Stoner,  51  Fed.  Rep.  649 ;  2  C.  C.  A. 
437;  Barber  v.  Merriam,  11  Allen 
(Mass.),  322;  Towle  v.  Blake,  48 
N.  H.  92;  Coyne  v.  Railroad  Co.,  62 
Hun,   620;  Quaife  v.  Chicago,  etc. 


Co.,  48  Wis.  513;  Eckles  v.  Bates,  26 
Ala.  655 ;  State  v.  Gedicke,  43  N.  J. 
L.  86 ;  Illinois  C.  R.  Co.  v.  Sutton, 
42  111.  438.  "  A  physician  cannot  be 
permitted  to  decide  on  the  credibil- 
ity of  witnesses  nor  to  take  into  con- 
sideration facts  known  to  him  and 
not  to  the  jury;  but,  after  having 
communicated  such  facts  in  his  tes- 
timony, he  may  take  them  into  con- 
sideration in  forming  his  opinion." 
Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Falvey,  104 
Ind.  409. 

4  Fay  v.  Swan,  44  Mich.  544 ;  Rob- 
inson v.  Marino,  3  Wash.  St.  434; 
Bowen  v.  Huntington,  35  W.  Va. 
682;  Atchison,  etc.  Co.  v.  Brassfield 
(Kan.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  814; 
Graves  v.  Battle  Creek  (Mich.,  1893), 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  757;  Reed  v.  Renn. 
R.  Co.,  56  Fed.  Rep.  184.  But  an 
opinion  that  on  an  unusual  exposure 
or  a  change  in  the  weather  some 
pain  may  be  suffered  is  inadmissi- 
ble, as  too  speculative.  Elsas  v. 
Second  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  56  Hun,  161. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  Bliss  v.  New 
York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.  Co.  (Mass., 
1S94),  36  N.  E.  Rep.  65,  it  was  held 
that  a  medical  expert  might  testify 
not  only  to  the  probable  but  to 
the  "  possible  "  immediate  effect  of 


192.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


270 


manner  in  which  in  his  opinion  the  injury  was  inflicted,1  and 
where  he  has  stated  that  it  was  caused  by  a  certain  weapon 
or  implement,  he  may  in  a  criminal  trial  be  shown  an  instru- 
ment which  has  been  proved  to  have  been  in  the  defendant's 
hand,  and  may  be  asked  if  it  would  have  caused  the  wound 
or  injury.2  An  expert  physician  may  be  asked  what  would 
be  the  effect  of  a  certain  blow  or  other  injury  and  whether  a 
person  would  be  likely  to  recover  therefrom,3  the  length  of 
time  the  injured  person  may  live,4  and  whether  death  would 
ensue.5  A  physician,  after  having  described  the  symptoms 
which  have  been  observed  by  him,  may  give  an  opinion  as  to 
their  probable  cause6  and  as  to  the  nature  and  curability7  of 
the  disease  from  which  the  person  is  suffering.8  A  physician 
is  a  qualified  witness  upon  the  probable  cause   producing 


a    nervous    shock    which    plaintiff 
claimed  he  had  received. 

1  Texas  Cent.  R.  Co.  v.  Burnett 
(Tex.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  320;  State 
v.  Ginger,  80  Iowa,  574;  Rash  v. 
State,  61  Ala.  89;  Doolittle  v.  State, 
93  Ind.  272 ;  Boyle  v.  State,  61  Wis. 
349.  Cf.  Wabash  W.  R.  Co.  v. 
Friedman,  41  111.  App.  270;  Egler  v. 
People,  56  N.  Y.  642;  Gas  Co.  v. 
O'Brien,  118  111.  174;  Boyd  v.  State, 
14  Lea  (Tenn.),  161 ;  Comin  v.  Piper, 
120  Mass.  188;  State  v.  Clark,  15 
a  C.  103;  Chicago  R.  R.  v.  Lambert, 
119  111.  255. 

2  Kennedy  v.  People,  39  N.  Y.  245 ; 
People  v.  Carpenter,  102  id.  238. 

3Ney  v.  Troy,  3  N.  Y.  S.  679; 
Strohm  v.  Railroad  Co.,  96  N.  Y. 
305;  Cunningham  v.  Railroad  Co., 
49  Fed.  Rep.  39 ;  Reed  v.  Penn.  R. 
R.  Co.,  56  Fed.  Rep.  184;  Denver 
Tramway  Co.  v.  Reid  (Colo.,  1894), 
35  Pac.  Rep.  269;  King  v.  Second 
Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  S.  973. 

^Alberti  v.  N.  Y.,  L.  E.  &  N.  R. 
R.  Co.,  118  N.  Y.  77;  Armstrong  v. 
Ackley,  71  Iowa,  76;  32  N.  W.  Rep. 
180;  People  v.  Wilson,  109  N.  Y.  345. 


5  Coyne  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  62 
Hun,  620;  Reed  v.  Penn.  Ry.  Co., 
56  Fed.  Rep.  184;  Davis  v  State,  38 
Md.  15;  State  v.  Crenshaw,  32  La. 
Ann.  406;  Armstrong  v.  Ackley,  71 
Iowa,  76;  Manufac.  Ace.  Ind.  Co.  v. 
Dorgan,  58  Fed.  Rep.  94;  Griswold 
v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  115  N.  Y. 
61 ;  Johnson  v.  Broadway  R.  R.  Co., 
6  N.  Y.  S.  112. 

6  Van  Deusen  v.  Newcomer,  40 
Mich.  120;  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Falvey,  104  Ind.  409;  Robinson  v. 
Marino,  3  Wash.  434;  Bowen  v. 
Huntington,  35  W.  Va.  682. 

7Matteson  v.  N.  Y.  etc.  R.  Co., 
35  N.  Y.  487.     See  cases  in  note  3. 

8  Jones  v.  White,  11  Humph. 
(Tenn.)  268;  Flynt  v.  Bodenhamer, 
80  N.  C.  205 ;  Polk  v.  State,  36  Ark. 
117;  Hook  v.  Stovell,  26  Ga.  704; 
Baltimore  &  Lib.  Turn.  Co.  v.  Cas- 
sell,  66  Md.  419;  Cooper  v.  State,  23 
Tex.  336;  Linton  v.  Hurley,  14  Gray 
(Mass.),  191;  Pidcock  v.  Potter,  68 
Pa.  St.  342;  Burns  v.  Barenfeld,  84 
Ind.  43. 


280  EXPERT   AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  193. 

i 

death,1  and  he  may  state  when,  in  his  opinion,  death  took 
place 2  and  by  what  weapons  or  instruments  it  was  caused.3 

§  193.  Evidence  of  medical  experts  to  show  character  of 
disease  and  blood-stains  —  Expert  evidence  as  to  autopsies 
and  malpractice. —  Medical  testimony  is  generally  admissible 
to  show  the  ordinal  duration  and  character  of  a  disease,4  its 
cause  and  the  proper  remedy,5  whether  it  is  contagious,6  and 
whether  its  recurrence  is  probable.7  So  a  physician  may  give 
his  opinion  that  the  party  is  not  simulating  disease.8  The 
testimony  of  a  physician  otherwise  competent  who  conducted 
an  autopsy  is  not  inadmissible  because  minor  statutory  de- 
tails were  not  observed  b}^  him.9  He  may  give  his  opinion  as 
to  what  tests  were  needed  to  ascertain  the  cause  of  death. 
"Where  several  physicians  hold  an  autopsy,  the  evidence  of 
any  one  of  them  is  competent  to  show  a  fact  observed  by  any 
of  the  others  at  the  autopsy.10  But  an  expert  witness,  it  has 
been  held,  cannot  be  permitted  to  testify  merely  from  hearing 
the  evidence  that  an  autopsy  was  or  was  not  so  conducted 
that  the  cause  of  death  could  be  stated  with  any  degree  of 
certainty.11  So  a  physician  may  give  his  opinion  of  the  sex 
of  a  person,  based  upon  an  examination  which  he  has  made 
of  a  skeleton,12  and  he  may  testify  generally  as  to  the  cause  of 

1  Boyle  v.  State,  61  Wis.  349;  Com.  N.  C.  205;  Baltimore  v.  Lib.  Turn' 
v.  Thompson  (Mass.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Co.,  66  Md.  419;  Pidcock  v.  Potter, 
Rep.  1111 ;  Eggle  v.  People,  56  N.  Y.  68  Pa.  St.  344 ;  Matteson  v.  Railroad 
64;  People  v.  Sessions,  58  Mich.  594.  Co.,  62  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  364;  Armstrong 

2  State  v.  Clark,  15  S.  C.  403.  v.  Ackley,   71  Iowa,  76 ;  Cooper  v. 

3  Waite  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  169;  State,  23  Tex.  336;  Jones  v.  Tucker, 
Banks  v.   State,    id.    182;    Manufg.  41  N.  H.  546. 

Ace.   Indemnity  Co.   v.   Dorgan,  58        6  Moore  v.  State,  17  Ohio  St.  321. 
Fed.  Rep.  945.  'Filer  v.   N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  49 

4  Finnegan  v.  Fall  Riv.  Gas  Works    N.  Y.  42. 

(Mass.,    1893),    34    N.    E.    Rep.    523;  8 Railroad   v.  Martin,  112    111.  16. 

Linton  v.  Hurley,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  Contra,    Cole  v.    Lake   Shore,   etc. 

191;  Washington  v.Cole,  6  Ala.  212;  Co.    (Mich.,   1893),    54   N.   W.    Rep. 

Jones  v.  White,  11  Humph.  (Tenn.)  638. 

268;  Powell  v.  Railroad  Co.,  77  Ga.  9 Com.  v.  Taylor,  132  Mass.  261. 

192;  Willey  v.  Portsmouth,  35  N.  H.  ™  People  v.  Wilson,  109  N.  Y.  345. 

303.  n  Manufacturers'  Ace.  Ind.  Co.  v. 

8  Anthony  v.  Smith,  4  Bosw.  (N.  Dorgan,  58  Fed.  Rep.  945. 

Y.)  503;   Flynt  v.    Bodenhamer,  80  ^Wilson  v.  State,  41  Tex.  320. 


§  103.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION*    EVIDENCE. 


281 


the  condition  in  which  a  body  is  found  after  death1  or  burial.2 
As  all  persons  are  more  or  less  familiar  with  the  appearance 
of  stains  caused  by  human  blood,  it  has  been  repeatedly  held 
that  an  ordinary  witness  may  testify  that  certain  stains  re- 
semble those  made  by  human  and  animal  blood.  No  peculiar 
skill  or  experience  is  necessary  to  be  possessed  by  the  witness,3 
though  if  he  is  an  expert  physician  or  microscopist  his  testi- 
mony upon  this  subject  may  be  more  worthy  of  consideration 
and  belief  by  the  jury.4 

The  opinions  of  medical  experts  are  admissible  in  actions 
to  recover  damages  for  malpractice  committed  by  physicians 
and  surgeons  to  show  whether  the  plaintiff  was  or  was  not 
properly  treated.5  But  such  evidence  is  not  received  to  show 
the  general  reputation  of  the  defendant  for  skill,6  or  that  he 
procured  his  diploma  by  irregular  methods/  or  to  show  the 


1  State  v.  Pike,  65  Me.  Ill ;  O'Mara 
v.  Com.,  75  Pa.  St.  424. 

2  State  v.  Secrest,  SO  N.  C.  450. 

3  People  v.  Gonzalez,  35  N.  Y.  49 ; 
Thomas  v.  State,  67  Ga.  460;  Mc- 
Lain  v.  Com.,  99  Pa.  St.  86;  Wool- 
folk  v.  State,  85  Ga.  69;  People  v. 
Greenfield,  30  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  462;  85 
N.  Y.  75,  83;  Dillard  v.  State,  58 
Miss.  368;  People  v.  Deacons,  109 
N.  Y.  374. 

•  4Com.  v.  Sturtivant,  117  Mass. 
122;  Knoll  v.  State,  55  Wis.  249; 
State  v.  Knight,  43  Me.  1.  Only  ex- 
perts should  be  allowed  to  testify 
whether  a  certain  stain  was  caused 
by  animal  or  human  blood.  Lindsay 
v.  People,  6  N.  Y.  143.  It  is  af- 
firmed by  many  microscopists  that 
it  is  an  easy  matter  to  distinguish 
human  blood  by  the  size  and  shape 
of  the  corpuscles.  The  more  recent 
and  perhaps  better  opinion  is  that 
"  while  a  skilful  expert  can  with  cer- 
tainty distinguish  between  human 
blood  corpuscles  and  those  of  the 
blood  of  a  cow,  pig  or  other  domestic 
animals  with  which  it  would  be 
likely  to  be  confounded,  still  in  a 


murder  trial,  where  human  life  is  at 
stake,  the  expert  is  hardly  warranted 
to  swear  that  the  blood-stain  is  any- 
thing more  than  that  of  a  mammal." 
Citing  Communication  of  John  J. 
Reese  in  Med.  Leg.  Jour.,  Sept.. 
1892.  See  Reese,  Med.  Jurisprudence, 
p.  132  (2d  ed.),  1889. 

5Spaulding  v.  Bliss,  83  Mich.  311; 
Boyston  v.  Giltner,  3  Oreg.  118: 
Wright  v.  Hardy,  22  Wis.  348;  Quinn 
v.  Higgins,  63  Wis.  664;  Reber  v. 
Herring,  115  Pa.  St.  599;  8  Atl.  Rep. 
800;  Mertz  v.  Detweiler,  8  W.  &  S. 
(Pa.)  376;  Kay  v.  Thomson,  10  Am. 
L.  Reg.  (N.  B.)  594;  Bennison  v. 
Walbank,  38  Minn.  313;  Gates  v. 
Fleischer,  67  Wis.  504 ;  30  N.  W.  Rep. 
674;  Williams  v.  Poppleton,  3  Oreg. 
139;  Van  Hoover  v.  Berghoff.  90 
Mo.  487;  Roberts  v.  Johnson,  58  N. 
Y.  613. 

6  Stevenson  v.  Gelsthorpe,  10  Mont. 
503;  Boydston  v.  Giltner,  supra; 
Gramm  v.  Boener,  56  Ind.  497; 
Leighton  v.  Sargent,  11  Fost.  (N.  H.) 
120. 

"Bute  v.  Potts,  18Pac.  Rep.  329; 
76  Cal.  304. 


282 


EXPERT   AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  li>±. 


professional  standing  of  the  medical  college  at  which  he  stud- 
ied.1 The  witness  may  be  asked  if  the  death  of  the  patient 
could  be  attributed  to  the  unskilfulness  or  negligence  of  the 
defendant,2  and  he  may  give  his  opinion  upon  the  properties 
and  effect  of  the  medicine  or  other  means  employed,3  or  may 
state  the  customary  and  proper  practice  in  similar  cases.4 

§  194.  Non-expert  evidence  upon  a  person's  physical  con- 
dition.—  A  witness  who,  though  he  is  not  an  expert,  has  had 
adequate  opportunities  for  observation,  may  testify  to  all 
facts  within  his  knowledge  concerning  the  physical  condition 
of  a  person,  where  such  facts  do  not  presuppose  the  possession 
of  any  special  scientific  or  medical  experience  or  training  on 
his  part;5  as,  for  example,  to  the  fact  that  a  person's  leg  was 
broken,6  or  that  he  was  unconscious  on  a  certain  date.7  So 
the  evidence  of  a  non-expert  witness  is  admissible,  though  it 
may  consist  merely  of  an  opinion,  that  a  person  seemed  to  be 
in  good  health  or  suffering  from  illness,8  as  to  the  extent  of 
the  illness,9  or  that  a  person  who  had  been  ill  had  grown 
better  or  worse.10    But  where  a  witness  has  testified  that  a 


1  Leighton  v.  Sargent,  11  Fost.  (N. 
H.)  120. 

2  Wright  v.  Hardy,  22  Wis.  348. 

s  Barber  v.  Merriam,  11  Allen,  322 ; 
Mertz  v.  Detweiler,  8  W.  &  S.  (Pa.) 
376. 

*Twombly  v.  Leach,  11  Cush. 
(Mass.)  405;  Doyle  v.  Eye  &  Ear  In- 
firmary, 80  N.  Y.  601.  Cf.  Link  v. 
Sheldon,  18  N.  Y.  S.  815 ;  Gates  v. 
Fleischer,  67  Wis.  504;  30  N.  W. 
Rep.  674. 

5  Fox  v.  Penin.  W.  L.  &  Color 
Works,  92  Mich.  243;  Rawls  v.  Am. 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  27  N.  Y.  282;  Rash 
v.  State,  61  Ala.  89;  Smalley  v.  Ap- 
pleton,  70  Wis.  349;  25  N.  W.  Rep. 
729 ;  Navarro  v.  State.  24  Tex.  App. 
578;  Com.  v.  Sturtivant,  117  Mass. 
122;  B.  &  O.  Turn.  Co.  v.  Cassell, 
66  Md.  419;  Higbie  v.  Guardian  L. 
I.  Co.,  52  N.  Y.  603;  Tierney  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  24  Am.  L.  Reg.  669; 
Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.  v.  Rambo,  59 


Fed.  Rep.  75;  People  v.  Millard,  53 
Mich.  63. 

6  Montgomery  v.  Scott,  34  Wis. 
338. 

'  Chicago  City  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Van 
Vleck  (111.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  262; 
Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Newmeyer.  129 
Ind.  401 ;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  860. 

8  Chicago  City  Ry.  Co.  v.  Van 
Vleck  (111.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  462; 
Lawson  v.  Conaway,  37  W.  Va.  159; 
Doyle  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  59 
Hun,  625;  Baltimore  &  O.  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Rambo,  59  Fed.  Rep.  75;  Hardy 
v.  Merrill,  56  N.  H.  227;  United 
Breth.  M.  A.  I.  Co.  v.  O'Hara,  120 
Pa.  St.  256;  Wilkinson  v.  Moseley, 
30  Ala.  562;  Barker  v.  Coleman,  35 
Ala.  221 ;  Evans  v.  People,  12  Mich. 
27 ;  Elliott  v.  Van  Buren,  33  Mich.  49. 

9  Heddles  v.  Chicago  &  N.  W.  R. 
Co.,  46  N.  W.  Rep.  115;  71  Wis.  288. 

10  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wood,  12 
N.  E.  Rep.  572 ;  King  v.  Second  Ave. 


§  195.]  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  2S3 

person  never  had  any  trouble  with  his  hearing,  he  will  not  be 
permitted  to  give  an  opinion  that  the  person's  sight  and  hear- 
ing are  ordinary  in  character.1 

Where  the  symptoms  of  a  disease  are  such  that  they  are 
perceptible  and  recognizable  by  a  person  of  ordinary  knowl- 
elge,  a  non-expert  witness  may  testify,  after  stating  the  facts, 
that  certain  symptoms  manifested  themselves.2  But  no  wit- 
ness except  an  expert  should  be  permitted  to  give  an  opinion 
(except  perhaps  where  the  symptoms  are  indicative  of  a  dis- 
ease to  the  most  casual  inspection) 3  as  to  the  specific  medical 
character  of  a  disease  or  injury  from  which  a  person  is  suf- 
fering.4 

§  195.  Chemists  as  experts  —  Poisons. —  Chemists  and 
toxicologists  are  frequently  called  as  expert  witnesses.  Thus, 
a  chemist  w.ho  is  properly  qualified  may  testify  to  the  result 
of  an  analysis  of  the  contents  of  the  stomach  or  other  bodily 
organs,  made  to  ascertain  the  presence  of  poison.5  But  a 
physician,  though  he  may  give  an  opinion  that  death  resulted 
from  the  administration  of  a  certain  poison,6  or  may  describe 
the  symptoms  which  are  present  when  poison  has  been  given,7 

R.    Co.,  26  N.  Y.    S.    973.     A  non-  » Duntzy  v.  Van   Buren,    5   Hun, 

expert  witness  may  give  his  opinion  648;  Owens  v.  Kansas  City,  95  Mo. 

upon  the  nature  of  an  injury  where  169. 

he  has  adequate  knowledge  of  the  4  Where  the  defendant  is  sued  to 

circumstances.    Goshen  v.  England,  recover  the  value  of  a  bust  which 

21  N.  E.  Rep.  977;  119  Ind.  368.  he  refuses  to  accept,  claiming  that 

1  Barrelle  v.  Penn.  Ry.  Co.,  4  N.  it  is  not  a  good  likeness,  a  witness 
Y.  S.  127.  "Any  witness  of  ordi-  who  has  for  many  years  been  well 
nary  intelligence  may  be  able  to  acquainted  with  the  person  whose 
state  that  a  sick  or  wounded  person  bust  is  in  dispute  may  testify  upon 
has  grown  worse,  or  has  improved,  the  question  of  resemblance  or  like- 
without  being  able  to  give  an  accu-  ness.  Schwartz  v.  Wood,  21  N.  Y. 
rate  description  of  his  condition.  S.  1053;  67  Hun,  638. 
Undoubtedly  the  facts  on  which  the  5  State  v.  Bowman,  78  N.  C.  509; 
conclusion  rests  may  be  asked  for  Hass  v.  Marshall  (Pa.,  1888),  14  Atl. 
on  cross-examination ;  but  the  opin-  Rep.  421 ;  State  v.  Cook,  17  Kan. 
ion  is  not  incompetent  merely  be-  394;  State  v.  Slagle,  83  N.  C.  630; 
cause  the  witness  cannot  state  the  State  v.  Hinkle,  6  Iowa,  3S0 ;  Joe  v. 
ground  on  which  it  rests,  although  State,  6  Fla.  591. 

the  failure  to  do  so  may,  perhaps,  6  Mitchell  v.  State,  58  Ala.  418. 

weaken  its  probative  force."    Louis-  7  State  v.  Terrell,  12  Rich.  (S.  C.) 

ville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Wood,  12  N.  E.  321;    Polk   v.    State,    36    Ark.    117; 

Rep.  572.  People  v.  Robinson,  2  Park.  Cr.  Cas. 

2  See  cases  cited  stqjra.  236. 


284 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  196. 


will  not  be  permitted  to  state  the  result  of  a  chemical  analysis, 
unless  it  is  shown  that  he  is  experienced  in  chemical  research.1 
So  the  identity  of  the  subject  analyzed  with  that  involved  in 
the  case,  and  the  fact  that  it  has  not  been  tampered  with, 
must  be  shown.2  The  expert  testimony  of  a  chemist  is  ad- 
missible upon  the  effect  of  poisons 3  and  noxious  gases,4  to  show 
that  one  man  can  safely  inhale  more  gas  than  another;5  that 
certain  particular  gases  are  the  result  of  a  certain  process;6 
as  to  the  ingredients  and  nature  of  writing  or  other  inks;7  to 
the  safety  of  oil  lamps,3  or  to  the  quality  of  milk.9 

§  196.  Expert  evidence  where  sexual  crimes  have  been 
committed  —  Abortion. —  A  physician  may  testify,  after  an 
examination  of  the  person,  that  there  has  baen  actual  pene- 
tration in  a  prosecution  for  rape,10  and  may  give  an  opinion 
upon  the  question  whether  sexual  intercourse  was  possible,11 
and  whether  pregnancy  would  be  likely  to  ensue  where  a 
rape  was  committed.1-'  So  expert  testimony  is  admissible  to 
show  the  physical  strength  and  condition  of  the  prosecuting 
witness  in  a  prosecution  for  rape  where  her  ability  to  resist 


i  State  v.  Cook,  17  Kau.  394.  Con- 
tra, Siebert  v.  People,  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
431. 

2  State  v.  Cook,  17  Kan.  394;  State 
v.  Hinkle,  6  Iowa,  380. 

3  Fox  v.  Penin.  W.  L.  Co.,  92  Mich. 
243. 

••Lincoln  v.  Taunton  Co.,  9  Allen 
(Mass.),  122. 

5  Birmingham  F.  &  N.  Co.  v.  Gross 
(Ark.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  36. 

6  Citizens'  G.  L.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  118 
111.  174;  Turner  v.  Black  Warrior,  1 
McCall,  181,  Cf.  Emerson  v.  Lowell 
G.  L.  Co.,  6  Allen  (Mass.),  146. 

7  Sheldon  v.  Warner,  45  Mich.  638; 
Goodyear  v.  Vosburgh,  G3  Barb.  (N. 
Y.)  154;  In  re  Monroe's  Estate,  23 
Abb.  N.  C.  83 ;  5  N.  Y.  S.  552 ;  People 
v.  Brotherton,  47  Cal.  388;  Elling- 
wood  v.  Brogg,  52  N.  H.  448;  Clark 
v.  Bruce,  12  Hun,  271;  Allen  v. 
Hunter,  6  McLean,  303. 

8Bierce  v.  Stocking,  11  Gray,  174. 


9  Com.  v.  Holt,  146  Mass.  38.  A 
witness  to  be  qualified  to  testify  to 
the  nature  and  quality  of  food  or 
drink  need  not  always  be  a  profes- 
sional chemist  or  analyst.  If  the 
witness  possess  adequate  knowledge 
of  the  articles  in  question,  his  tes- 
timony is  not  incompetent  because 
he  has  not  submitted  them  to  a  chem- 
ical analysis.  So  a  farmer  or  dairy- 
man may  testify  whether  milk  was 
diluted  and  whether  it  tasted  like 
milk  and  water.  Lane  v.  Wilcox, 
55  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  615.  And  an  habit- 
ual drinker  of  beer  may  be  allowed 
to  state  that  a  certain  liquor  was 
lager  beer.  Com.  v.  Moinelian,  140 
Mass.  463;  1  N.  E.  Rep.  59. 

io  State  v.  Smith,  4  Phill.  (N.  C.) 
302 ;  Woodin  v.  People,  1  Park.  C. 
C.  (N.  Y.)  464.  Cf.  Com.  v.  Lynes, 
142  Mass.  577. 

ii  People  v.  Clark,  33  Mich.  112. 

12  Young  v.  Johnson,  123  N.  Y.  226. 


§  197.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


2S5 


the  prisoner  is  in  issue.1  A  physician  may  testify  to  the  time 
required  to  commit  an  abortion;2  that  an  abortion  has  been 
performed,3  and  that  certain  drugs4  or  instruments5  which 
have  been  found  in  the  possession  of  the  accused  were  adapted 
to  produce  an  abortion.  So  a  physician  may  be  asked  if, 
under  certain  circumstances,  any  traces  of  an  abortion  would 
remain  after  one  had  been  committed  or  attempted.6 

§  197.  Expert  evidence  upon  insanity. —  According  to 
the  weight  of  authority,  a  non-expert  witness  who  has  had 
adequate  means  of  becoming  acquainted  with  the  mental  state 
of  a  person  whose  sanity  is  in  issue  may  give  his  opinion 
upon  the  sanity  or  insanity  of  the  individual.7  In  doing  so, 
however,  he  will  be  required  to  state  all  the  facts  and  cir- 
cumstances within  his  knowledge  bearing  on  the  question 
and  on  which  his  opinion  is   based.8     The  opinion  of  a  non- 


1  State  v.  Knapp,  45  N.  H.  148. 

2  People  v.  McGonegal,  136  N.  Y. 
62. 

3 Com.  v.  Thompson  (Mass.,  1893), 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  1111;  State  v.  Smith, 
32  Mo.  370 ;  State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H. 
484;  Com.  v.  Brown,  14  Gray  (Mass.), 
411. 

4  Regina  v.  Still,  30  U.  C.  C.  P.  30 ; 
Williams  v.  State  (Tex.,  1892),  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  897. 

5  Com.  v.  Brown,  121  Mass.  69; 
People  v.  Vedder,  98  N.  Y.  630. 

6Bathrick  v.  Detroit,  etc.  Co.,  50 
Mich.  629. 

"  Mull  v.  Carr  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E. 
Rep.  591 ;  State  v.  Maier,  36  W,  Va. 
757;  Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  170; 
State  v.  Lehman  (S.  D.,  1891),  49  N. 
W.  Rep.  31 ;  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Lathrop,  111  U.  S.  612;  Cram  v. 
Cram,  33  Vt.  15;  Wheelock  v.  God- 
frey (Cal.,  1S94),  35  Pac.  Rep.  317; 
Charter  Oak  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Rodel, 
95  U.  S.  232;  Powell  v.  State,  25 
Ala.  28;  Norton  v.  Moore,  3  Head 
(Tenn.),  482;  McClackey  v.  State,  5 
Tex.  App.  320;  Wood  v.  State,  58 
Miss.  741 ;  Hardy  v.  Merrill,  56  N.  Y. 


227;  State  v.  Klinger,  46  Mo.  229; 
Rutherford  v.  Morris,  77  111.  397 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Levy,  71  Cal.  618;  Butler  v. 
Insurance  Co.,  45  Iowa,  93;  Brooke 
v.  Townsend,  7  Gill  (Md.),  10;  Peo- 
ple v.  Wreden,  59  Cal.  392;  State  v. 
Hayden,  51  Vt.  296 ;  Clary  v.  Clary, 
2  Ired.  (N.  C.)  78;  State  "v.  Erb,  74 
Mo.  199;  Woodcock  v.  Woodcock, 
36  Minn.  217;  Pidcock  v.  Potter,  68 
Pa.  St.  342 ;  Clark  v.  State,  12  Ohio 
St.  483;  Pinney's  Will,  27  Minn.  280; 
People  v.  Packenham,  115  N.  Y.  200; 
Schlencker  v.  State,  9  Neb.  241. 

8  Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  170; 
Ellis  v.  State  (Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W. 
Rep.  894;  White  v.  Davis,  17  N.  Y. 
S.  548;  62  Hun,  622;  Sharp  v.  Kan- 
sas, etc.  Co.  (Bio.,  1892),  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  93 ;  Carpenter  v.  Bailey,  29  Pac. 
Rep.  101;  94  Cal.  406.  But  some 
courts  will  not  receive  non-expert 
evidence  as  to  insanity  except  to 
describe  the  acts  or  conversations  of 
the  alleged  insane  person,  though 
the  witness  may  further  give  his 
opinion  that  such  acts  and  conver- 
sations are  those  of  a  rational  or  ir- 
rational man.     Paine  v.  Aldrich,  133 


2S6  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  197. 

professional  witness  as  to  insanity  upon  facts  related  to  him 
by  others  is  not  admissible.  But  where  he  has  knowledge  of 
the  circumstances,  where  he  has  seen  the  actions  of  the  per- 
son and  conversed  with  him,  the  law  considers  it  a  matter 
easily  within  the  mental  capacity  of  any  ordinary  man  to  dis- 
tinguish and  characterize  the  mental  condition  or  the  ap- 
pearance and  conduct  of  an  insane  person.  The  influence 
which  his  opinions  may  have  upon  the  jury  will  depend  on 
the  intelligence  he  shows  on  his  examination  and  upon  his  op- 
portunities for  acquiring  the  knowledge  upon  which  he  bases 
his  conclusion.  So  his  experience  and  personal  acquaintance 
with  the  alleged  lunatic,  his  freedom  from  bias  or  interest,  the 
absence  of  any  finely-spun  theories  from  his  mental  conception 
of  the  whole  matter,  the  fullness  of  the  facts  on  which  his 
opinion  is  based,  and  the  accuracy  with  which  he  recollects 
these  facts,  are  all  elements  to  be  regarded  in  estimating  the 
worth  of  his  evidence.1  The  person  whose  insanity  is  involved 
may  have  been  so  deranged,  his  mental  unsoundness  may  have 
been  so  palpably  apparent  from  his  actions,  that  an  ordinary 
person  possessing  but  slight  powers  of  observation  may  be  as 
well  fitted  to  express  an  opinion  as  the  most  skilful  and 
learned  expert.  Here  the  insanity  is  a  fact,  and  the  testimony 
of  the  witness,  though  in  form  an  expression  of  opinion, 
}'et  if  when  giving  it  he  narrates  the  minor  facts  from  which 
it  is  deduced,  and  after  showing  that  he  has  personally  known 
the  party  for  a  long  time,  he  details  the  furious  acts  and 
gestures,  the  foolish  and  incoherent  conversations,  or  the  wild 
and  unnatural  conduct  of  the  party,  there  can  be  small  objec- 
tion to  his  testifying  to  the  further  fact  which  any  man  would 
infer  from  them,  i.  e.,  that  the  party  was  insane.2     But  as  to 

N.  Y.  544 ;  30  N.  E.  Rep.   725 ;  Fay-  stances  within  his  personal  knowl- 

ette  v.  Chesterville,  77  Me.  28 ;  Hick-  edge  upon  which   that   opinion    is 

man  v.  State,  38  Tex.   191 ;  State  v.  formed,  is  competent  evidence.    In  a 

Geddis,  42  Iowa,  268.  substantial  sense,  and  for  every  pur- 

1  Cf.  Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  pose  essential  to  a  safe  conclusion, 
170;  McLeod  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  the  mental  condition  of  an  individ- 
Rep.  331.  ual  as  sane  or  insane  is  a  fact,  and 

2  "The  opinion  of  a  non-profes-  the  expressed  opinion  of  one  who  had 
sional  witness  as  to  the  mental  con-  adequate  opportunities  to  observe 
dition  of  a  person,  in  connection  with  his  conduct  and  appearance  is  but  the 
a  statement  of  the  facts  and  circuui-  statement  of  a  fact.     Insanity  is  a 


197.] 


EXPERT    AND    OriNION    EVIDENCE. 


287 


the  amount  of  knowledge  which  the  witness  must  have,  no 
definite  rule  can  be  laid  down.  While  the  opinion  of  a  wit- 
ness who  has  a  full  knowledge  of  the  life  and  surroundings  of 
the  person  would  naturally  possess  more  weight  than  that  of 
one  who  had  only  a  meager  knowledge,  the  question  what 
weight  the  opinion  shall  have  is  for  the  jury  alone.1  Whether 
the  non-expert  witness  is  competent  is  for  the  court;  and  if  it 
shall  appear  that  a  witness  did  not  have  sufficient  opportuni- 
ties for  observation,  his  evidence  should  be  pronounced  incom- 
petent. The  court's  decision  on  this  point,  it  seems,  will  not  be 
questioned  on  appeal;2  nor  is  it  error  to  charge  that  the  evi- 
dence of  a  physician  who  has  examined  the  party  may  be 
given  more  weight  than  that  of  a  non-expert  witness.3 

Where  the  insanity  of  a  person  is  a  question  in  issue,  the 
opinions  of  competent  physicians  or  of  expert  alienists  are  al- 
ways admissible.  The}7-  may  have  obtained  their  opinions 
from  the  consideration  of  facts  observed  by  them  in  treating 
or  examining  the  party,  or  they  may  base  them  upon  the 
facts  contained  in  a  hypothetical  question,  or  upon  all  the 
evidence  in  the  case,  if  they  have  heard  it  and  if  it  is  not  con- 
tradictory.4    If  a  personal  examination  has  been  made  by  the 


condition  which  impresses  itself  as 
an  aggregate  on  the  observer."  Con- 
necticut Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  La- 
throp,  111  U.  S.  618-620. 

i  Com.  v.  Buccieri,  153  Pa.  St.  535 ; 
26  Atl.  Rep.  228;  McLeod  v.  State, 
31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  331;  Armstrong 
v.  State,  30  Fla.  170;  11  S.  Rep.  618; 
Coles  v.  State,  75  Ind.  511;  Sage  v. 
State,  91  Ind.  141;  Choice  v.  State, 
31  Ga.  424;  McClackey  v.  State,  5 
Tex.  App.  320. 

2Hite  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S. 
W.  Rep.  217;  Carpenter  v.  Hatch 
(N.  H.,  1888),  15  Atl.  Rep.  219. 

3  Blake  v.  Rourke,  74  Iowa,  519 ;  38 
N.  W.  Rep.  392. 

4  Prentis  v.  Bates,  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
153;  93  Mich.  234;  Com.  v.  Buccieri, 
153  Pa.  St.  535;  26  Atl.  Rep.  228; 
Quaife  v.  Chicago  Co.,  48  Wis.  513; 
Goodwin  v.  State,  96  Ind.  550 ;  Board- 


man  v.  Woodman,  47  N.  H.  120; 
State  v.  Feltes,  51  Iowa,  495;  Fair- 
child  v.  Bascomb,  35  Vt.  398 ;  People 
v.  Barber,  115  N.  Y.  475;  Rambler 
v.  Tryson,  7  S.  &  R.  90 ;  State  v. 
Baber,  74  Mo.  292 ;  Grant  v.  Thomp- 
son, 4  Conn.  203 ;  Dejarnetto  v.  Com., 
75  Va.  867;  Conn.  L.  I.  Co.  v. 
Lathrop,  111  U.  S.  612;  United  States 
v.  Guiteau,  3  Crim.  L.  Mag.  347 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Schuyler,  106  N.  Y.  298;  Dex- 
ter v.  Hall,  15  Wall.  (U.  S.)9;  Tules 
v.  Kidd,  12  Ala.  648.  "The  witness 
who  claims  to  be  an  expert  on  insan- 
ity must  have  made  mental  unsound- 
ness a  subject  of  special  study,  and 
must  have  such  a  practical  experi- 
ence in  the  care  and  treatment  of 
insane  persons  as  to  render  him  con- 
versant with  the  subject  and  able  to 
recognize  its  peculiar  subtle  mani- 
festations."     Reese,      Med.     Juris. 


288  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  198. 

expert,  he  will  be  required  to  describe  the  circumstances  and 
symptoms  which  he  observed  to  aid  the  jury  in  forming  a 
conclusion;1  but  not  what  the  attendants  said;2  and  besides 
this,  a  hypothetical  question  may  be  asked  him.3  The  opin- 
ions of  the  subscribing  witnesses  to  a  will  are  always  admissible 
concerning:  the  mental  condition  of  the  testator  at  the  date  of 
executing  the  will,  the  law  having  placed  them  at  his  side 
partly  for  that  purpose,  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  they 
are  expert  or  non-expert  witnesses,  or  whether  they  were 
previously  acquainted  with  the  testator  or  not.4 

§  198.  Mechanical  experts. —  Opinion  evidence  is  always 
admissible  upon  matters  of  trade  or  transportation  where  the 
subject  of  inquiry  is  one  out  of  the  cognizance  of  all  those 
not  engaged  in  that  particular  calling.5  Thus,  a  person  who 
has  been  connected  for  a  long  time  with  the  operation  of  rail- 
roads may  testify  as  to  the  speed  of  trains,6  how  they  are 
made  up  and  the  duty  of  conductors;7  within  what  dis- 
tance a  train  may  be  stopped;8  or  he  may  state  his  opinion 
why  it  was  derailed,9  or  as  to  the  proper  manner  of  stopping 
a  train  ; ,0  or  whether  brakemen  were  properly  placed.11  So  a 
railroad  builder  is  a  qualified  witness  to  give  an  opinion  upon 
the  quality  of  rolling-stock;12   whether  a  railroad  is  properly 

(1891),  p.  19.     An  exception  to  this  6  Grand  R.  etc.  Co.  v.  Huntley,  38 

rule  is  made  in  the  case  of  the  fam-  Mich.  537. 

ily  physician  of  the  alleged  lunatic.  7  Price  v.  Richmond  &  D.  R.  Co. 

Hastings  v.  Rider,  99  Mass.  625.  (S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  732. 

1  White   v.  Barley,  10  Mich.  155;  s  Grimmell  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  73 

Puyar  v.  Reese,  40  Tenn.  21.  Iowa,  93;  Freeman  v.  Travelers'  Ins. 

^Heald  v.  Thwing,  45  Me.  396.  Co.,   144  Mass.   572;  12  N.  E.   Rep. 

3  People   v.    Lake,  12  N.    Y.  358;  372. 

Meeker   v.  Meeker  (Iowa,  1888),  37  9  Fort  Worth  Ry.   Co.  v.  Thomp- 

N.  W.  Rep.  773.  son,  75  Tex.  501 ;  Seaver  v.  Boston, 

^Ekinton  v.  Brick,   44  N.  J.  Eq.  etc.  Co.,  14  Gray  (Mass.),  466. 

154;  15  Atl.  Rep.  391;  Van  Huss  v.  10  Mobile,   etc.   Co.   v.   Blakely,  59 

Rainbolt,    42   Tenn.    139;  Hardy    v.  Ala.   471.     Cf.   O'Neill   v.    Railway 

Merrill,  56  N.  H.  227;  Poole  v.  Rich-  Co.,  129  N.  Y.  125. 

ardson,  3  Mass.  330;  Deartt  v.  Bar-  uSchlaf  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ala.',  1893), 

ley,  9   N.  Y.  371;  Williams   v.  Lee,  14  S.   Rep.  105;  Cincinnati,  etc.  Co. 

47  Mo.  321;  Potts   v.   House,  6   Ga.  v.  Smith,  22  Ohio  St.  227;  Reifsny- 

324;  Grant   v.    Thompson,  4  Conn,  der  v.  Chic.  Meter  Co.  (Iowa,  1894), 

203;  Robinson  v.  Adams,  62  Me.  369.  57  N.  W.  Rep.  692. 

5  Ft.    Worth,    etc.    Co,    v.    Great-  12  Jeffersonville,   etc.   Co.    v.    Lan- 

house,  82  Tex.  104.  ham,  27  Ind.  171. 


§  198.] 


EXPERT    AND   OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


2S9 


built;1  whether  a  section  of  road  was  finished  upon  a  certain 
date,"  or  whether  a  culvert  was  in  good  repair.*  Hut  gener- 
ally a  witness  is  not  considered  an  expert,  though  possessing 
a  general  knowledge  of  the  management  of  railroads,  unless 
he  has  a  special  knowledge  of  that  branch  to  which  he  is 
called  to  speak.4  A  nautical  expert  may  give  an  opinion  that 
a  ship  was  properly  managed  5  or  the  cargo  properly  stowed  ;6 
that  a  vessel  was  seaworthy;7  as  to  the  cause  of  a  ship  being 
stranded;8  what  is  a  safe  cargo  for  a  ship;9  as  to  the  sound- 
ness of  a  cable,10  the  cause  of  a  leak,11  and  as  to  the  size  of 
waves  which  would  be  caused  by  the  wind.12  So  when  the 
issue  is  whether  a  collision  could  have  been  avoided,13  or  a 
ship  could  have  reached  port  if  properly  managed;14  what 
the  effect  of  a  storm  would  be  on  the  management  of  the  ves- 
sel ; 15  whether  a  jettison  was  necessary,1"  or  whether  a  deck- 
load  would  render  a  vessel  unsafe,17  the  evidence  of  an  expert 
is  admissible.18 


i  Colorado  Mid.  Ry.  v.  (TBrien,  16 
Colo.  219. 

2  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Donegan, 
111  Ind.  179. 

3  Bonner  v.  Mayfield,  82  Tex.  234. 
*  McKelvey  v.  Railway  Co.,  39  W. 

Va.  500;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Con- 
Ian,  101  111.  93;  Bixby  v.  Montpelier, 
etc.  Co.,  49  Yt.  125:  Ballard  v.  N. 
Y.,  L.  E.  etc.  Co.,  126  Pa.  St.  141; 
Hill  v.  Portland,  etc.  Co.,  55  Me. 
43S;  Baldwin  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co., 
50  Iowa,  680 ;  Ft.  Worth,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Thompson,  21  S.  W.  R?p.  737;  Ft. 
Worth  &  D.  C.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Wilson, 
24  S.  W.  Rep.  686;  3  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
583. 

6Gusterman  v.  Liverpool  Ins.  Co., 
83  N.  Y.  358;  Union  Ins.  Co.  v. 
Smith,  8  S.  Ct.  534;  Delaware,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Starrs,  69  Pa.  St.  36;  Eastern 
Trans.  Co.  v.  Hope.  95  U.  S.  297. 

6  Price  v.  Powell,  3  N.  Y.  322; 
Leitch  v.  At.  Mut.  Ins.  Co.,  66  N.  Y. 
100. 

"?Baird  v.  Daily,  68  N.  Y.  547; 
Western  Ins.  Co.  v.  Tobin,  32  Ohio 
19 


St.  277;  Perkins  v.  Augusta  Ins.  Co., 
10  Gray,  312. 

8  N.  E.  Glass  Co.  v.  Lovell,  7  Cush. 
319. 

11  Ogden  v.  Parsons,  23  How.  (U.  S.) 
167. 

10  Reed  v.  Dick,  8  Watts  (Pa.).  479. 

" Paddock  v.  Con.  Ins.  Co.,  104 
Mass.  521 ;  Parsons  v.  Man.  etc.  Co., 
16  Gray  (Mass.),  463. 

12  Smith  v.  Railroad  Co.,  76  Tex.  63. 

13  Jameson  v.  Drinkard,  12  Moore, 
148;  Fenwick  v.  Bel),  1  C.  &  K.  312; 
Carpenter  v.  Eastern  Trans.  Co.,  71 
N.  Y.  374 ;  67  Barb.  570. 

14  The  Alaska,  33  Fed.  Rep.  107; 
Dolz  v.  Morris,  17  N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  203. 

15Transp.  Line  v.  Hope,  95  U.  S. 
297;  Walsh  v.  Washington,  etc.  Co., 
32  N.  Y.  427. 

is  Price  v.  Hartson,  44  N.  Y.  94. 

17  Lapham  v.  Atlas  Ins.  Co.,  24 
Pick.  (Mass.)  1.  Contra,  Schurreger 
v.  Raymond,  105  N.  Y.  648. 

18  Cf.  East  Tennesee,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Wright,  76  Ga.  532. 


29 «) 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  1^8. 


Persons  who  have  had  experience  in  operating  certain 
machinery,  even  though  not  machinists  by  trade,1  may  give 
their  opinion  as  to  the  value2  of  similar  machinery,  or  that 
machinery  in  suit  is  not  well  constructed,3  or  is  the  best 
known,4  or  is  equal  to  the  best,5  or  has  a  capacity  for  doing 
certain  work.6  A  witness  who,  from  long  experience  in  using 
a  certain  machine,  is  qualified  to  speak  as  an  expert,  may 
testify  to  the  capacity  of  an  identical  machine,  though  he  may 
never  have  seen  the  machine  in  dispute.7  An  experienced 
mason  or  builder  may  testify  to  the  time  required  for  the 
walls  of  a  house  to  dry  in  order  to  render  it  habitable;8  as 
to  the  cause  of  the  dampness  of  walls;9  whether  the  defect- 
ive operation  of  a  mill  was  the  result  of  mismanagement  or 
faulty  construction;10  as  to  the  proper  mode  of  removing 
paint  from  the  walls  of  buildings;11  whether  a  building  is  a 
"<roocl  job;"12  as  to  the  meaning  of  the  term  "brick  build- 
ing;" 13  whether  a  house  is  worth  the  amount  alleged,14  and  the 
time  required  to  alter  or  repair  it.15  So  a  skilled  architect 
may  testify  to  the  strength,  construction  and  sufficiency  of  a 
building,16  and  whether  it  would  be  safe  to  run  up  a  building 
in  a  specified  time.17    When,  however,  the  facts  are  such  that 


i  Sheldon  v.  Booth,  50  Iowa,  209; 
Cole  v.  Clark,  3  Wis.  323.  Cf.  Fox 
v.  Peninsula  W.  L.  Co.  (Minn.,  1892), 

52  N.  W.  Rep.  623. 

-'Latham  v.  Shipley  (Iowa,  1893), 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  342. 

*  Sheldon  v.  Booth,  50  Iowa,  209 ; 
Curtis  v.  Gano,  26  N.  Y.  426. 

<  Great  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Haworth, 
39  111.  349. 

5Scattergood  v.  Wood,  79  N.  Y. 
263. 

6  Burns  v.  Welch,  8  Yerg.  (Tenn.) 
117;  Bemisv.  Vermont  R.  R.  Co.,  58 
Vt.  636. 

7Brierly  v.  Davol  Mills,  128  Mass. 
291 ;  National  Bank  v.  Dunn,  106 
Ind.  110. 

8  Smith  v.  Gugerty,  4  Barb.  619. 

9  Lotz  v.  Scott,  103  Ind.  155. 

">  cHindler  v.  Thompson,  30  Fed. 
Rep.  3ii.     Where  the  proper  method 


of  burning  tiles  is  in  issue,  a  brick  or 
tile  maker  is  a  competent  expert. 
Wiggins  v.  Wallace,  19  Barb.  338. 

11  Church  of  Holyoke  v.  Mut.  Fire 
Ins.  Co.  (Mass.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep. 
572. 

i2  Ward  v.  Kilpatrick,  85  N.  Y.  413. 

13  Mead  v.  N.  W.  Ins.  Co.,  3  Selden 
(7  N.  Y. ),  530. 

14Tebbetts  v.  Haskins,  16  Me.  283; 
Woodruff  v.  Inperial  F.  I.  Co.,  83  N. 
Y.  113. 

15Terre  Haute  v.  Hudnut,  18  Am. 
&  Eng.  Corp.  Cas.  302 ;  Lewis  v.  In- 
surance Co.,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  749; 
Campbell  v.  Russell,  139  Mass.  278. 

16Prendible  v.  Conn.  R.  R.  Co. 
(Mass.,  1893),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  675; 
Turner  v.  Hahr  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W. 
Rep.  737. 

17  Chamberlain  v.  Dunlap,  8  N.  Y. 
S.  125. 


199.] 


EXP1.UT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


231 


ordinary  persons  are  fully  capable  of  forming  an  opinion 
thereon,  and  there  is  at  the  same  time  direct  evidence  of  facts 
and  circumstances  from  which,  if  they  believe  them  to  be 
true,  the  jury  may  infer  negligence  in  the  construction  of 
buildings,  expert  evidence  should  be  dispensed  with  as  unnec- 
essary.1 The  opinion  of  a  surveyor  is  admissible  to  identify 
monuments  employed  as  boundaries,2  or  to  estimate  how 
much  land  would  be  flooded  on  a  certain  date.3  The  testi- 
mony of  an  expert  is  admissible  to  show  that  a  defect  exists 
in  a  sewer4  or  highway;  that  a  road  is  in  a  dangerous  condi- 
tion;5 but  not  that  an  old  road  has  been  abandoned,6  or  that 
a  new  road  would  be  of  use  to  the  public.7  So,  too,  a  miner 
of  long  experience  may  give  his  opinion  whether  the  width 
of  a  cross-section  in  a  mine  is  sufficient  to  secure  the  safety 
of  those  employed  therein.8 

§  H)9.  Expert  evidence  as  to  value. —  An  expert  may  tes- 
tify as  to  the  value  of  labor  or  services,9  merchandise,10  ani- 


i  Turner  v.  Hahr(Mo.,  1893),  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  737;  Gerbigv.  Railroad  Co., 
22  N.  Y.  S.  21 ;  Davis  v.  New  York, 
L.  E.  &  W.  R.  R.  Co.,  69  Hun,  174. 

2  McGaun  v.  Hamilton,  58  Conn. 
69 ;  Knox  v.  Clark,  123  Mass.  216. 

3  Phillips  v.  Terry,  3  Abb.  Dec. 
(N.  Y.)  607.  Cf.  Brantley  v.  Swift, 
21  Ala.  390;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Bradley,  54  Fed.  Rep.  630;  Schultz 
v.  Lindell,  30  Mo.  310;  Randolph  v. 
Adams,  2  W.  Va.  519;  Pasachane 
Water  Co.  v.  Standart  (Cal.,  1893), 
32  Pac.  Rep.  532. 

4  Stead  v.  Worcester,  150  Mass.  241. 
s  Harris  v.  Clinton,  31  N.  W.  Rep. 

425;  Stillwater  Co.  v.  Coover,  26 
Ohio  St.  520;  Laughlin  v.  Street  R. 
R.  Co.,  62  Mich.  220;  Baltimore,  etc. 


Co.  v.  Cassell,  66  Md.  419;  Fairbury 
v.  Rogers,  98  111.  554.  Contra,  Con- 
rad v.  Ithaca,  16  N.  Y.  158;  Yean  v. 
Williams,  15  R.  I.  20 ;  Crane  v.  North- 
field,  33  Vt.  126;  Montgomery  v. 
Scott,  34  Wis.  345. 

6  Pittsburgh,  etc.  Co.  v.  Reich,  101 
111.  157. 

7  Thompson  v.  Deprez,  96  Ind.  67. 
8McNamara  v.  Logan  (Ala.,  1891), 

14  S.  Rep.  175. 

9  Brown  v.  Prude  (Ala.,  1893),  11 
S.  Rep.  838 :  Head  v.  Hargrave,  105 
U.  S.  45 ;  Mercer  v.  Vose,  67  N.  Y. 
56;  Carruthers  v.  Town,  53  N.  W. 
Rep.  240;  Reynolds  v.  Robinson,  64 
N.  Y.  589.  The  witness  must  know 
the  usual  rate  of  compensation  for 
such  services  at  the  time  and  place 


if  Wheton  v.  Snider,  88  N.  Y.  299; 
Printz  v.  People,  42  Mich.  144:  State 
v.  Finch,  70  Iowa,  316;  Berney  v. 
Dinsmore.  141  Mass.  42;  Walker  v. 
Bernstein,  43  111.  App.  568;  Mc- 
Gowan  v.  Amei\  Press.  Tan  Bark, 
121  U.  S.  575;  Muckle  v.  Rendle,  16 
N.  Y.  S.  208;  Walker  v.  Collins,  50 


Fed.  Rep.  737;  Allen  v.  Carpenter, 
66  Tex.  13S;  Latham  v.  Brown,  48 
Kan.  190;  Redding  v.  Wright  (Minn., 
1892).  51  N.  W.  Rep.  1056;  Huber  v. 
Beck  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  985; 
Blagen  v.  Thompson  (Oreg.,  1893), 
31  Pac.  Rep.  647. 


292 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  199. 


mals1  or  land,2  where  he  has  peculiar  experience  or  informa- 
tion and  where  the  subject  of  inquiry  is  not  within  common 
knowledge.3  But  while  weight  should  be  given  to  his  evi- 
dence, his  opinion  is  only  conclusive  on  the  jury  as  far  as  it  is 
reasonable  and  consistent  with  general  knowledge  and  with 
the  facts  which  are  proved  in  the  case.4  The  question  of 
damages  is  for  the  jury.  Hence  the  opinion  of  a  witness  is 
not  receivable  upon  this  point;5  nor  can  an  expert  be  asked 


where  the  services  were  rendered. 
Schuhle  v.  Cunningham,  14  Daly, 
404;  Alt  v.  California  Fig  Syrup  Co., 
19  Nev.  118;  Stevens  v.  Minneapolis 
(Minn.,  18S9),  43  N.  W.  Rep.  84 i 
(services  of  attorney);  Kelly  v. 
Rowane,  33  Mo.  App.  440;  Lamoure 
v.  Caryl,  4  Den.  170.  The  expert 
who  testifies  to  the  value  of  personal 
services  should  possess  some  prac- 
tical knowledge  or  experience  in  the 
line  of  the  services  rendered,  either 
by  having  rendered  such  services 
himself  or  by  having  had  frequent 
occasion  to  pay  for  them.  Doster  v. 
Brown,  25  Ga.  24;  Walker  v.  Fields, 
28  id.  237;  Scott  v.  Lilienthal,  9 
Bosw.  224;  Tebbetts  v.  Haskins,  16 
Me.  283.  If  he  has  a  competent 
knowledge  of  the  business  in  which 
the  services  were  rendered,  it  is  not 
necessary  that  he  should  have  been 
himself  engaged  in  it.  Pullman  v. 
Corning,  14  Barb.  174;  9  N.  Y.  98; 
Carroll  v.  Welch,  26  Tex.  147; 
Barnes  v.  Ingalls,  39  Ala.  193.  So  a 
physician  may  testify  to  the  value 
of  a  nurse's  services.  Woodward  v. 
Bugsbee,  2  Hun,  128. 

1  Bowers  v.  Hogan,  93  Mich.  420; 
Conkling  v.  Hannibal,  etc.  Co.,  54 
Mo.  385;  Harris  v.  Railroad  Co.,  36 
N.  Y.  Sup.  Ct.  373. 

2Blass  v.  Copley,  10  N.  Y.  93; 
Patterson  v.  Boston,  20  Pick.  (Mass.) 
159;  Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Bowersox,  6 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  1;  Muighan  v.  Burns, 
26  Atl.  Rep.  5^3.     An  ordinary  real- 


estate  agent  is  not  competent  as  an 
expert  upon  land  values  (Laing  v. 
United,  etc.  Co.,  54  N.  J.  L.  576), 
unless  he  has  resided  in  the  place  for 
some  time  and  has  had  charge  of 
property  near  the  land  in  question. 
Ragan  v.  Kansas  City  &  S.  E.  R. 
Co.,  Ill  Mo.  456.  As  to  rental  value, 
see  Ives  v.  Quinn,  27  N.  Y.  S.  251. 

3  A  farmer  may  testify  as  to  the 
value  of  crops.  Chicago  R.  Co.  v. 
Mouriquand,  45  Kan.  170. 

4  Bramble  v.  Hunt,  68  Hun,  204 ; 
Head  v.  Hargrave,  105  TJ.  S.  45.  In 
regard  to  the  value  of  household 
furniture,  wearing  apparel,  etc.,  any 
person  may  testify,  as  all  persons 
are  presumed  to  know  the  value  of 
articles  in  common  use.  Parmelee 
v.  Raymond,  43  111.  App.  6^9 ;  Erick- 
son  v.  Draskowski,  94  Mich.  551. 
Cf.  Rodemacher  v.  Greenwich  Ins. 
Co.,  infra;  Murdock  v.  Summer,  22 
Pick.  158;  Randall  v.  Packard,  20 
N.  Y.  S.  716;  Bentley  v.  Brown,  37 
Kan.  14. 

5  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Wright,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  102;  Lo- 
gansport  v.  McMillen,  49  Ind.  495; 
Vandeusen  v.  Young,  26  N.  Y.  9; 
McReynolds  v.  Railroad  Co.,  106  111. 
152;  Trammed  v.  Ramage,  US.  Rep. 
916;  Crohen  v.  Ewers,  39  111.  App. 
34;  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  Co.  v. 
Wesch  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
957;  Sharon  v.  Morris,  18  Pac.  Rep. 
230;  89  Kan.  377;  Upcher  v.  Ober- 
lender,   81   Pac.  Rep.  1080;  50  Kan. 


§  199.]  EXPKET    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  293 

what  would  be  the  future  value  of  property1  or  the  effect  of 
an  injury  to  it.2  A  housekeeper  of  experience  is  a  competent 
expert  witness  to  the  value  of  board  and  lodging8  or  house- 
hold furniture  or  goods;4  and  one  who,  though  not  a  dealer, 
has  attended  man}'  sales  of  second-hand  furniture,  may  give 
an  opinion  as  to  the  value  of  such  merchandise.5  But  a  per- 
son is  not  an  expert  who  has  no  knowledge  of  the  market 
value  of  goods,6  or  who  has  acquired  his  knowledge  by  buying 
goods  from  parties  not  in  the  trade.7  The  fact  that  the  wit- 
ness bases  his  opinion  of  value  upon  an  exceptional  demand 
for  the  merchandise  in  question,  while  it  may  affect  the 
weight,  is  no  objection  to  the  admissibility  of  his  evidence.8 

Based  upon  the  grounds  of  the  speculative  character  of  any 
opinion  which  may  be  given  in  regard  to  their  value,  another 
exception  is  made  in  cases  where  the  value  of  choses  in  action 
is  concerned.  A  witness  will  not  be  allowed  to  give  an 
opinion  as  to  the  value  of  a  contract  or  the  possible  or  prob- 
able amount  of  profit  it  might  have  yielded  if  it  had  not  been 
broken.9  So  in  the  case  of  negotiable  instruments  which  are 
presumed  to  be  worth  their  face  value,10  opinions  are  not  ad- 
missible as  to  their  value,  the  proper  elements  of  which,  i.  e., 
the  solvency  of  the  parties  and  the  validity  of  the  instruments, 
are  for  the  consideration  of  the  court  and  jury.11     It  seems, 

315;  Chicago.  K.    &   W    R.   Co.  v.  603;  Allen  v.   Stout,  51   N.  Y.   668; 

Stewart,  31  Pac.  Rep.  668;  50  Kan.  Ranch  v.  N.  Y.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R  Co., 

33;  New  Mexican  R.  R.  Co.  v.  Hen-  2  N.  Y.  S.  108. 

dricks  (N.  Mex.,  1893),  30  Pac.  Rep.  3  Hook  V-  Kenyon,  55  Hun,  598. 

901;  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.  v.  Metropol-  4  Rodemacher  v.  Green.  Ins.  Co., 

itan  R.  Co.,  34  N.  E.   Rep.  400:  138  27  N.  Y.  S.  155. 

N.  Y.  548;  Blum  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  »  Phillips  v.  McNab,  9  N.  Y.  S.  526. 

Co.,  1  Misc.   Rep.  119;  20  N.   Y.  S.  6 Frederick  v.   Case,   28  111.  App. 

722.  215. 

'Devlin   v.    New  York,    4    Misc.  7 Campbell  v.  Campbell,  54  N.  Y. 

Rep.  106;  23  N.  Y.  S.  888;  Bookman  Super.  Ct.  381. 

v.  New  York  El.  R.  Co.,   137  N.  Y.  8  Western  Ry.  v.  Lazarus,  88  Ala. 

595;  Lazarus  v.  Metropolitan  El.  Ry.  453. 

Co.,  69  Hun,   190;  Little  v.   Lisch-  9 Devlin  v.  City  of  New  York,  4 

koff   (Ala.,    1893),    12   S.    Rep.   429;  Misc.  Rep.  106. 

Trammel]  v.  Raniage  (Ala.,  1893),  11  10Looinis  v.  Mowry,  8  Hun,  311. 

S.  Rep.  916.  "  Potter  v.  Merchants'  Bank,  28  N. 

2  Ferguson   v.   Hubbell,  97  N.  Y.  Y.  641 ;  Atkinson  v.  Roch  Printing 

507;  Bedell   v.    L.   I.   R.   R.   Co.,  44  Co.,  43  Hun,  167. 
N.  Y.  367;  Paige   v.  Kelly,    5  Hill, 


204:  EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE.  [§  200. 

however,  that  expert  evidence  may  be  received  of  the  value 
of  non-speculative  financial  securities  having  a  well-recognized 
market  value.1  It  is  no  objection  that  the  knowledge  of  the 
witness  was  acquired  wholly  from  an  inspection  of  bills  of  the 
goods,2  from  market  reports,3  or  from  personal  inquiries  made 
by  him.4  His  evidence  is  not  thereby  rendered  inadmissible 
if  the  witness  is  otherwise  qualified  by  experience  and  has 
examined  the  goods  or  premises  in  question.5  The  plaintiff 
has  been  permitted  to  give  his  opinion  of  the  value  of  his 
goods  which  were  damaged,  where  he  was  also  able  to  state 
the  facts  on  which  the  opinion  was  based.6  Where  the  pro- 
duction of  an  article  is  impossible  because  of  its  loss  or  de- 
struction, its  value  may  be  proved  by  comparison.  It  is  neces- 
sary first  to  prove  the  resemblance  of  the  lost  article  to  one 
which  can  be  produced,  and  this  can  be  done  by  a  witness 
who  is  not  an  expert.7  The  value  of  the  latter  article  may 
then  be  shown  by  expert  testimony,  and  on  the  evidence  of 
both  witnesses  thus  connected  the  jury  may  base  their  verdict 
as  to  the  value  of  the  missing  article.8 

§200.  Underwriters  as  experts. —  There  is  a  seeming 
confusion  in  the  decisions  upon  the  question  of  the  admissibility 
of  expert  evidence  in  actions  which  are  brought  upon  policies 
of  insurance.  Where  the  increase  of  risk  or  breach  of  con- 
dition is  such  that  any  ordinary  person  would  be  able  to  form 
a  conclusion;  as,  for  example,  whether  leaving  a  dwelling- 
house  unoccupied  for  a  considerable  length  of  time  is  an  in- 

iSistare  v.  Olcott,  15  N.  Y.  State  130  U.  S.  520;  Harris  v.  Schuttler 

Rep.  248.  (Tex.,    1894),    24  S.    W.    Rep.    989; 

2Enos   v.  St.   Paul  F.    &   Marine  Bischoff  v.  Schmetz,  5  N.  Y.  S.  757; 

Ins.  Co.  (S.  D.,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  Roberts   v.    Boston,   149  Mass.  346; 

919.  Michael  v.  Crescent  Pipe   Line  Co. 

3  Rodee  v.  Detroit  Fire  &  Mar.  Ins.  (Pa.,  1893),  28  Atl.  Rep.  204. 

Co.,  26  N.  Y.  S.  242;  Hoxsie  v.  Em-  6  Rodee  v.  Detroit  F.  &M.  Ins.  Co., 

pire  Lumber  Co.,  41  Minn.  548 ;  Gulf,  26  N.  Y.  S.  242.     As  to  the  necessity 

C.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v.  Patterson  (Tex.,  of  experts  stating  their    means  of 

1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  349.  knowledge,  see  Ft.  Worth,  etc.  Co. 

4  Jones  v.  Snyder,  117  Ind.  229;  v.  Hurd(Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep. 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.  v.  Copeland.  86  Ala.  995. 

551 ;  Griswold  v.  Gebbie,  126  Pa.  St.  "  B'erney  v.  Dinsmore,  141  Mass.  42. 
353;  Forbes  v.  Howard,  4  R.  I.  301.        8  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Weide,  11  Wall. 

5  Still  well  &  B.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Phelps,    (U.  S.)  438. 


§  200.] 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


295 


crease  of  risk,  the  evidence  of  an  expert  is  not  admissible.1 
Bat  where  the  question  is  whether  in  a  certain  case  a  higher 
premium  would  have  been  charged,  the  evidence  of  an  insur- 
ance expert  is  admissible  to  show  that  fact,  under  the  rule 
which  permits  the  introduction  of  evidence  of  usage.  Here  the 
evidence  of  the  expert  is  not  his  opinion,  but  evidence  as  to 
the  fact  or  usage,  and  the  inferences  therefrom  are  for  the 
jury.2  So  expert  evidence  is  inadmissible  as  to  the  quantity 
of  goods  burned,  based  upon  the  amount  of  the  debris,3  as  to 
the  origin  of  a  fire,4  or  whether  the  use  of  an  engine  without 
a  spark-arrester  is  likely  to  cause  fires.5  A  physician  may 
testify  in  an  action  on  a  life  insurance  policy  that  a  certain 
habit,  disease  or  injury  may  cause  death;6  but,  generally, 
where  the  question  is,  Was  the  person  a  good  risk  or  insurable, 
or  were  there  material  misrepresentations?  the  opinion  of  an 
expert  will  not  be  received.7 


1  Halinv. Guardian  Assur.  Co. (Or., 
1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  683;  Milwaukee 
v.  Kellogg,  94  U.  S.  649;  Anthony 
v.  German  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  48  Mo.  App. 
65;  Walradt  v.  Phoenix  Ins.  Co.,  136 
N.  Y.  375;  Carmell  v.  Phenix  Ins. 
Co.,  59  Me.  582;  Luce  v.  Dorch.  M. 
F.  I.  Co.,  105  Mass.  497;  Jefferson 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Cotheal,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
72;  Hill  v.  Lafayette  Ins.  Co.,  2  Md. 
476;  Hartford  Pro.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Har- 
mer,  2  Ohio  St.  452. 

2Rawls  v.  Araer.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co., 
27  N.  Y.  282;  First  Church  v.  Hol- 
yoke  M.  Ins.  Co.,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  572 
(Mass.,  1893);  Hawes  v.  N.  E.  Ins. 
Co.,  2  Curt.  C.  C.  229;  Luce  v.  In- 
surance Co.,  105  Mass.  297;  Hartman 
v.  Keystone  Ins.  Co.,  21  Pa.  St.  466; 
Loomis  v.  Insurance  Co.,  81  Wis.  366; 
51  N.  W.  Rep.  564;  Lyman  v.  State 
Ins.  Co.,  14  Allen  (Mass.),  329;  Pelzer 
Manuf.  Co.  v.  Sun  Fire  Office  of 
London,  36  S.  C.  213;  15  S,  E.  Rep. 
562;  Cornish  v.  Farm  Bid.  Ins.  Co., 
74  N.  Y.  275;  Hobby  v.  Dana,  17 
Barb.  Ill:  Keen  v.  South  St.  Louis 
Co.,  40  Mo.   19.     A  witness  cannot 


be  asked,  where  the  question  in  issue 
is,  Was  a  misrepresentation  or  con- 
cealment material?  whether  he  con- 
sidered it  so,  or  would  he  have  taken 
the  risk  if  the  fact  concealed  had 
been  made  known,  or  what  influ- 
ence the  fact  concealed  would  have 
had  if  known.  But  he  may  be  asked 
what  effect  it  actually  had.  Ab- 
bott's Trial  Ev.,  494,  citing  Walsh  v. 
Mtna  L.  Ins.  Co.,  30  Iowa,  133. 

3  Birmingham  F.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pul- 
ver,  27  III.  App.  17;  126  111.  329. 

4  Cook  v.  Johnston,  58  Mich.   437. 

5  Teal  v.  Barton,  40  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
137.  Of.  Hays  v.  Miller,  70  N.  Y. 
112;  Higgins  v.  Dewey,  107  Mass. 
494;  Frace  v.  N.  Y,  L.  E.  &  W.  R, 
Co.,  22  N.  Y.  S.  958. 

6 Miller  v.  Mut.  Ben.  L.  Ins.  Co., 
31  Iowa,  216. 

i  Rawls  v.  Am.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  36  Barb. 
357:  27  N.  Y.  282;  Wich  v.  Equitable 
F.  &  M.  Ins.  Co.  (Colo.,  1893),  31  Pac, 
Rep.  389;  Pelzer  Manuf.  Co.  v.  Ger- 
man Ins.  Co.  of  New  York,  36  S.  C. 
213. 


296 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  201. 


§  201.  Experiments  in  and  out  of  court. —  The  witness,  if 
he  is  not  an  expert,  will  not  be  permitted  to  testify  to  the  re- 
sult of  experiments  which  have  been  made  out  of  court.1  But 
where  the  circumstances  or  conditions  existing  or  alleged  to 
exist  in  the  case  at  trial  and  surrounding  the  subject-matter  are 
reproduced  at  the  time  of  the  experiment,  a  witness  who  is  an 
expert  may  state  his  opinion  together  with  the  result  of  an 
experiment  made  by  him  out  of  court.2  An  expert  may  bo 
allowed  to  conduct  an  experiment  in  court  to  illustrate  or 
emphasize  his  testimony,  provided  it  is  shown  by  independent 
evidence  that  the  exact  conditions  alleged  to  have  existed  are 
reproduced  before  the  jury.3  Thus,  where  a  machine  was 
alleged  to  be  defective,  the  defendant  was  allowed  to  operate 
it  before  the  jury  to  show  that  the  reason  of  its  defective 
operation  was  the  unskilfulness  or  physical  weakness  of  the 
plaintiff.4  So,  too,  an  expert  may  be  allowed  to  subject  a 
writing  purporting  to  be  a  will  to  a  test  with  chemicals  to 
ascertain  the  character  of  the  ink  and  whether  the  instrument 
had  been  tampered  with.5  Comparisons  may  also  be  made 
by  expert  witnesses  in  court.     So  where  the  quality  of  an  ar- 


1  State  v.  Justus,  11  Oreg.  170; 
Com.  v.  Fairchell,  1  Brewst.  (Pa.) 
566. 

2  Williams  v.  Taunton,  125  Mass. 
54;  Sullivan  v.  State,  93  Pa.  St.  285; 
Eidt  v.  Cutter,  127  Mass.  523 ;  Com.  v. 
Piper,  120  id.  188;  Burg  v.  Chicago, 
R.  I.  &  P.  Ry.  Co.  (Iowa,  1894),  57 
N.  W.  Rep.  680 ;  Boyd  v.  State,  14 
Lea  (Tenn.),  161 ;  Brook  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  Co.  (Iowa.  1891),  47  N.  W.  Rep. 
74;  State  v.  Jones,  41  Kan.  309. 
That  the  adverse  party  was  not 
present  in  person  or  by  his  agent 
when  the  experiment  was  made  is 
immaterial.  Burg  v.  Chicago,  R.  I. 
&  Pac.  Ry.,  57  N.  W.  Rep.  680  (Iowa, 
181)4).  In  a  criminal  trial,  the  state 
being   permitted    to    prove    experi- 


3  State  v.  Smith,  49  Conn.  376; 
Siberry  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),,  33 
N.  E.  Rep.  (381;  State  v.  Fletcher 
(Oreg.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  575;  In  re 
Monroe's  Est.,  1  Con.  Sur.  496;  23 
Abb.  N.  C.  83;  Leonard  v.  Southern 
Pac.  R.  Co.,  21  Oreg.  555;  People  v. 
Hope,  62  Cal.  291 ;  Osborne  v.  De- 
troit, 32  Fed.  Rep.  36. 

4  Nat.  etc.  Co.  v.  Southern  Pac.  R. 
Co.,  85  Mich.  255;  Probert  v.  Phipps, 
149  Mass.  258.  As  to  articles  in 
court,  see  ante,  §§  38,  39.  Where 
the  experiment  will  consume  some 
time,  it  is  not  an  abuse  of  judicial 
discretion  for  which  a  Dew  trial 
will  be  granted  for  the  court  to  re- 
fuse to  permit  the  experiment  to 
be  made  in  open  court.     People  v. 


ments,  it  is  reveisible  error  to  refuse    Levire,  85  Cal.  39;  24  Pac.  Rep.  631. 
the  defendant  the  right  to  introduce        5  In  re  Monroe,  1  Con.  Sur.  496;  5 
the  same    sort  of    evidence  in   re-    N.  Y.  S.  552 ;  23  Abb.  N.  C.  83. 
buttal.     Smith  v.  State,  2  Obio  St. 
513. 


• 


§  202.] 


EXl'KRT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


297 


tide  or  its  adaptability  to  a  certain  purpose  is  in  issue,  a 
sample  of  the  article  in  question  may  be  shown  to  the  jury 
together  with  a  sample  of  a  similar  article  which  the  witness 
has  testified  was  of  good  quality  or  was  well  adapted  for  the 
purpose  required,  and  the  jury  may  be  allowed  to  compare 
thorn  to  ascertain  the  points  of  difference,  if  any.1 

§  202.  Physical  examination  of  the  party  by  experts. — 
The  question  whether  the  court  in  civil  cases  can  compel  the 
plaintiff  to  furnish  evidence  by  submitting  to  a  physical  ex- 
amination by  a  physician  has  been  differently  decided.  The 
affirmative  is  supported  by  a  majority  of  the  cases,  which 
maintain  that  the  courts  have  an  inherent  power  to  do  this, 
basing  their  reasoning  upon  the  necessity  for  the  inspection,2 
though  there  are  other  cases  sustaining  the  proposition  that, 
while  such  an  inspection  may  be  allowed,  it  cannot  in  the  ab- 
sence of  a  statute  be  compelled.3 

Where  the  annulment  of  a  marriage  is  asked  for  by  one  of 
the  parties  thereto  upon  the  ground  of  the  impotency  of  the 
other,  the  court  may  compel  him  or  her  to  submit  to  an  ex- 
amination by  a  competent  physician  or  midwife.'1     In  such  a 


1  People  v.  Buddensieek,  103  N.  Y. 
498;  5  N.  Y.  Crim.  Rep.  69. 

2 Graves  v.  Battle  Creek  (Mich., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  757;  Winner  v. 
Lathrop,  C7  Hun,  511;  International, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Underwood,  64  Tex.  4G4; 
Kinney  v.  Springfield,  35  Mo.  App. 
297;  White  v.  Milw.  etc.  Co.,  61 
Wis.  536;  A.,  T.  &  S.  F.  R.  Co.  v. 
Thul,  29  Kan.  466;  Walsh  v  Sayre, 
52  How.  Pr.  384 ;  Terre  Haute,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Brincker,  128  Ind.  542;  Miami, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Baily,  37  Ohio  St.  104; 
Shephard  v.  Railway  Co.,  85  Mo. 
629;  Schroeder  v.  Railway  Co.,  47 
Iowa,  375.  The  necessity  for  the  ex- 
amination must  be  affirmatively 
shown  (Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller  (III., 
1893),  28  N.  E.  Rep.  1091 ;  Joliet  R. 
Co.  v.  Caul,  42  111.  App.  41),  and  the 
selection  of  the  physician  is  within 
the  discretion  of  the  court  (Alabama, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Hill,  94  Ala.  514);  though 
if  the  plaintiff  is  willing  to  be  ex- 


amined by  any  disinterested  person, 
a  physician  need  not  be  appointed. 
Gulf,  etc.  Co.  v.  NorfleetfTex.,  1891), 
14  S.  W.  Rep.  703.  As  a  means  of 
exposing  malingering  and  of  ascer- 
taining the  exact  character  and  ex- 
tent of  a  local  physical  injury,  such 
an  examination,  if  properly  and 
fairly  conducted,  would  seem  unob- 
jectionable upon  either  ethical  or 
legal  grounds.  It  should  be  promptly 
applied  for  before  the  plaintiff  has 
testified,  unless  from  his  evidence  it 
appears  that  he  is  feigning.  Gales- 
burg  v.  Benedict,  22  111.  App.  111. 

3 Hess  v.  Lake  Shore  &  M.  Co.,  7 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  565 ;  Stuart  v.  New 
Haven,  17  Neb.  211;  Parker  v.  En- 
slow,  103  111.  272 ;  Shephard  v.  Rail- 
way Co.,  85  Mo.  629;  Peoria,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Rice  (111.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  951 ; 
St.  Louis  Bridge  Co.  v.  Miller,  138 
111.  4)5.- 

4  Anonymous  (Ala.,  1890),  7  S.  Rep. 


29S 


EXPERT    AND    OPINION    EVIDENCE. 


[§  202. 


delicate  matter  the  feelings  of  the  party  who  is  to  be  exam- 
ined ought  to  be  respected  so  far  as  is  consistent  with  a  due 
administration  of  justice.  So  a  physical  examination  in  the 
case  of  alleged  im potency  being  justified  solely  by  the  neces- 
sity of  the  case  should  only  be  ordered  when  the  need  for  it  is 
positively  and  affirmatively  shown.1  If  the  party  resists  the 
appointment  of  a  physician  or  refuses  to  be  examined,  a  re- 
buttable presumption  of  his  or  her  im  potency  will  be  created 
thereby,2  which  it  is  then  incumbent  on  him  or  her  to  over- 
come. 

Under  the  rule  that  an  accused  person  is  not  compellable  to 
furnish  evidence  against  himself,  a  court,  it  has  been  held,  has 
no  power  to  compel  a  prisoner  to  submit  to  an  examination 
by  an  expert.3  Accordingly,  evidence  which  has  been  pro- 
cured by  a  compulsory  comparison  of  the  shoes  of  the  defend- 
ant with  footprints  observed  near  the  locality  of  the  crime 
should  be  rejected.4  Where  the  mental  and  physical  condi- 
tion of  the  accused  is  voluntarily  put  in  issue  by  him  by  a  plea 
of  insanity,  no  injustice  will  result  in  his  being  compelled  by 
the  court  to  submit  to  a  physical  examination  b}7  a  competent 
physician,  and  this,  accordingly,  may  be  done.5  So  the  court 
may  compel  a  party  in  a  civil  suit  to  unveil  in  order  that  she 
may  be  identified  by  a  witness  in  court.6 


100;  Brown  v.  Brown,  1  Hagg.  523; 
Newell  v.  Newell,  9  Paige  (N.  Y.),  26 ; 
Dean  v.  Aveling,  1  Rob.  279;  Deven- 
baugh  v.  Devenbaugh,  5  Paige,  554; 
Wekle  v.  Welde,  2  Lee,  5S0 :  Briggs 

v.    Morgan,    3  Phil.    325;  H v, 

P ,  L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  126;  G 

v.  G ,  L.  R,  2  P.  &  D.  287. 

l  Newell  v.  Newell,  9  Paige,  26. 

-  Harrison   v.    Harrison,   4   Moore 

P.  C.   96;  H v.   P ,   L.   R.  3 

P.  &  D.  126;  Pollard  v.  Seybourn,  1 
Hagg.  75. 

» State  v.  Johnson,  67  N.  C.  58; 
People  v.  McCoy,  45  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
210. 


4  Day  v.  State,  63  Ga.  667 ;  Stokes 
v.  State,  5  Baxt.  (Tenn.)619;  People 
v.  Mead,  50  Mich.  228.  Contra, 
State  v.  Graham,  74  N.  C.  646; 
"Walker  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  245. 
In  State  v.  Garrett,  71  N.  C.  85.  and 
Spicer  v.  State,  69  Ala.  159,  physi- 
cians were  permitted  to  testify  to 
the  result  of  the  examination  of  the 
accused. 

^Pierson  v.  People,  79  N.  Y.  424; 
People  v.  Taylor,  138  N.  Y.  398. 
See  ante,  §  178;  post,  §  351. 

«Rice  v.  Rice  (N.  Y.,  1891),  19 
Atl.  Rep.  736. 


CHAPTER  XVI. 

PAROL  OR  EXTRINSIC  EVIDENCE  AS  RELATED  TO  WRITINGS. 


205. 
206. 
207. 
208. 

209. 
210. 


211. 
212. 

213. 


Parol  evidence,  when  inad- 
missible. 

Interpretation  and  construc- 
tion of  writings. 

Rule  applies  between  parties 
only. 

Invalidity  of  writings  —  Evi- 
dence to  vary  or  explain  or 
show  real  consideration. 

Incomplete  and  collateral 
writings. 

Parol  evidence  to  connect  and 
explain  contemporaneous 
writings. 

Receipts. 

Independent  parol  contracts 
and   conditions    precedent. 

To  establish  implied,  result- 
ing or  constructive  trusts. 


§  214.  Discharge,  modification  or 
extension  of  contract  may 
be  shown. 

215.  To  rebut  presumptions. 

216.  To  show  usage. 

217.  To  explain   technical  terms. 

218.  Abbreviations. 

219.  The  relations  of  the  parties. 

220.  To  ascertain  or  explain  sub- 

ject-matter. 

221.  Ambiguities  defined  and  dis- 

tinguished —  Parol  evi- 
dence to  explain. 

222.  Parol  evidence  as  applicable 

to  wills. 

223.  Parol  evidence  to  show  abso- 

lute deed  a  mortgage  and 
in  suits  for  specific  perform- 
ance and  reformation  or 
cancellation. 


§  205.  Parol  evidence,  when  inadmissible. —  Parol  evi- 
dence is  not  admissible  to  control,  add  to,  vary  or  contradict 
the  language  of  a  valid  written  instrument.1  The  words 
"  written  instrument,"  thus  used,  do  not  refer  to  or  include 
everything  which  has  been  committed  to  writing  and  which 
has  passed  between  the  parties.  The  rule  is  designed  to  pro- 
tect the  honest,  careful  and  prudent  in  their  contracts  and 
business  transactions  against  the  results  of  fraud  and  perjury, 
carelessness  and   inaccuracy.     By  it  evidence  of  the  intention 


U  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  275.  By 
parol  evidence  is  meant  oral  evi- 
dence or  the  statements  of  witnesses 
made  viva  voce,  as  distinguished 
from  documentary  evidence.  Its 
meaning  is,  however,  sometimes  ex- 
tended so  as  to  include  preliminary 


or  unexecuted  memoranda  or  notes 
in  writing  which  have  passed  be- 
tween the  parties  prior  to  the  execu- 
tion of  the  deed  or  final  written 
contract  which  is  in  question.  An- 
derson's Diet. 


300 


PAROL    OK    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  205. 


of  the  parties  is  furnished,  which  can  always  be  produced 
without  fear  of  change  or  liability  to  misconstruction.1  Such 
documents  only  are  within  the  rule  which  represent  and  con- 
tain the  deliberate  intention  of  the  parties;  and  the  existence 
of  deliberation  in  making  the  agreement  may  usually  and 
justlv  be  inferred  from  the  use  of  language  which  creates  a 
valid  contractual  obligation,  the  subject  and  extent  of  which 
must  be  ascertained  from  the  writing  alone.2  This  rule  doubt- 
less had  its  origin  in  the  once  universal  custom  of  the  parties 
to  a  written  agreement  affixing  their  seals,  and  this  solemn 
and  formal  act.  as  it  was  regarded  from  the  common-law 
standpoint,3  impressed  a  fixed  and  unchangeable  character  on 
the  instrument,  which  demanded  the  exclusion  not  only  of  all 
verbal  modifications  of  it,  but  of  unsealed  writings  as  well.4 
With  the  increase  in  the  use  of  writing  attendant  upon  the 
increase  of  education  and  the  spread  of  commerce  and  manu- 
facture in  recent  times,  the  operation  of  the  rule  was  extended 
to  simple  or  unsealed  writings.  The  rule  has  been  applied  to 
court  records5  and  public  records  generally;6  to  the  written 
awards  of  arbitrators;7  to  deeds  of  conveyance,8  mortgages,9 
minutes  of  private  corporations,10  leases,11  assignments,12  con- 


1  Union  M.  Ins,  Co.  v.  Wilkinson, 
13  Wall.  231. 

2  See  post,  §  209. 

3  2  Bl.  Com,  305-6. 

4  See  the  remarks  of  Parker,  J.,  in 
Stack  pole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass.  31. 

5  Armstrong  v.  St.  Louis,  69  Mo. 
309;  Roche  v.  Beldam,  119  111.  320; 
Dagger  v.  Taylor,  46  Ala.  320;  Royce 
v.  Burt,  42  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  339;  Bays 
v.  Trulson  (Oreg.,  1894),  35  Pac.  Rep. 
26;  Ney  v.  Dubuque,  etc.  Co.,  20 
Iowa,  347. 

(-Williams  v.  Ingell,  21  Pick. 
(Mass.)  288;  McMicken  v.  Com.,  58 
Pa.  St.  213;  Crommett  v.  Pearson, 
18  Me.  344;  Vogler  v.  Spaugh,  4  Biss. 
(U.  S.)  288;  Carroll  v.  O'Conner 
(Ind.,  1894),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  1006. 

7  Jones  v.  Perkins,  54  Me.  393. 

8Kelley  v.  Saltmarsh,  146  Mass. 
585;  Hancock  v.  McAvoy  (Pa.,  1893), 


25  Atl.  Rep.  48;  Lowdermilk  v.  Bos- 
tick,  98  N.  C.  299;  Sage  v.  Jones,  47 
Ind.  122;  Lear  v.  Durgin,  64  N.  H. 
618;  Miller  v.  Fletcher,  27  Gratt. 
(Va.)  403;  Warren  v.  Miller,  38  Me. 
108;  Richards  v.  Crocker,  66  Hun, 
629;  Ritchie  v.  Pease,  114  111.  353. 

9  Union  Nat.  Bank  v.  Int.  Bank, 
22  111.  App.  652 ;  Beall  v.  Fisher,  95 
Cal.  568;  Whitney  v.  Phelps,  33  Me. 
318:  Lindsay  v.  Garvin,  31  S.  C. 
259;  Van  Evera  v.  Davis,  51  Iowa, 
637. 

10  San  Joaquin  v.  Beecher  (Cal., 
1894),  35  Pac.  Rep.  349. 

n  Welch  v.  Horton,  73  Iowa,  250 ; 
Tracy  v.  Iron  Works,  29  Mo.  App. 
342;  Howard  v.  Thompson,  12  Ohio 
St.  201 ;  Knapp  v.  Marlboro,  29  Vt. 
282;  Pickett  v.  Ferguson,  45  Ark. 
177. 

12  Osgood  v.    Davis,   18   Me.    146; 


20C] 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


501 


tracts  to  sell  real1  or  personal  propert}7,2  bonds.3  charter-par- 
ties,4 insurance  policies,8  negotiable  instruments,6  the  indorse- 
ments thereon,7  guaranties,8  licenses,9  releases,10  and  contracts 
in  general.11 

§  200.  Interpretation  and  construction.— If  the  parties 
to  a  commercial  transaction  have  committed  the  whole  of 
their  agreement  to  writing,  it  may  be  presumed,  according  to 
well-known  commercial  and  social  usages,  that  the  writing 
embodies  their  final  contract,  and  that  all  prior  or  contempo- 
raneous oral  stipulations  or  negotiations  are  merged  in  it  and 
superseded  by  it.12     The  language  of  the  writing  is  conclusive, 


Moore  v.  Yoss,  1  Cranch  (C.  C),  179; 
Taylor  v.  Sayre,  24  N.  J.  L.  617;  Gil- 
more  v.  Bangs,  55  Ga.  403. 

1  Mickelson  v.  lteves,  94  N.  C.  559 ; 
Hubbard  v.  Marshall,  50  Wis.  322; 
Lloyd  v.  Farrell.  43  Pa.  St.  73;  Rip- 
ley v.  Paige,  12  Vt.  353. 

2  Union  Stock  Yards  Co.  v.  Cattle 
Co.,  59  Fed.  Rep.  49;  Davis  v. 
Moody,  15  Ga.  175:  Belcher  v.  Mul- 
hall,  57  Tex.  17;  Procter  v.  Cole,  66 
Ind.  576;  Cushing  v.  Rice,  46  Me. 
303;  Epping  v.  Mockler,  55  Ga.  376. 

SBarnett  v.  Barnett,  83  Va.  504; 
McGooney  v.  State,  20  Ohio  St.  93. 

4  The  Augustine  Kobbe,  37  Fed. 
Rep.  696. 

5M.  B.  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Ruse,  8  Ga. 
536;  Russell  v.  Russell,  61  Ala.  500; 
Lewis  v.  Thatcher,  15  Mass.  431; 
Mayor  v.  Brooklyn  F.  I.  Co.,  3  Abb. 
App.  Dec.  251 ;  Giddings  v.  Phcenix 
Ins.  Co.,  90  Mo.  272. 

"Burns  v.  Scott,  117  U.  S.  582; 
Foy  v.  Blackstone,  31  111.  538;  Cat- 
lin  v.  Harris  (Wash.,  1894),  35  Pac. 
Rep.  385;  Anspach  v.  Bast,  52  Pa. 
St.  356;  Clark  v.  Hart,  49  Ala.  86; 
McPherson  v.  Weston,  85  Cal.  90; 
Goddard  v.  Hill,  33  Me.  582;  Camp- 
bell v.  Upshur,  3  Humph.  (Tenn.) 
185;  Trustees  v.  Stetson,  5  Pick. 
(Mass.)  506;  Youngberg  v.  Nelson 
(Minn.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  629; 
Long  v.  Johnson,  24  N.  H.  302. 


7HalIaday  v.  Hart,  30  N.  Y.  474; 
Bartlett  v.  Lee,  33  Ga.  491 ;  Kern  v. 
Van  Phul,  7  Minn.  426;  Buckley  v. 
Bentley,  48  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  283. 

8  Lazear  v.  Union  Bank,  52  Md.  78. 

9  Ives  v.  Williams,  50  Mich.  100. 

10  Leddy  v.  Barney,  139  Mass.  394. 

uAmer.  S.  Co.  v.  Thurber,  121 
N.  Y.  655;  24  N.  E.  Rep.  1129;  Mitt- 
nacht  v.  Slevin,  67  Hun,  315;  Davis 
v.  Stout  (Ind.,  1890).  25  N.  E.  Rep. 
.862;  Stillings  v.  Tinmis  (Mass., 
1890),  25  N.  E.  Rep.  569;  Jennings 
v.  Moore  (Mich.,  1890),  47  N.  W.  Rep. 
127;  Tarbell  v.  Farmers'  Ins.  Co. 
(Minn.,  1890),  47  N.  W.  Rep.  152; 
Van  Horn  v.  Van  Horn  (N.  J.,  1892), 
23  Atl.  Rep.  1079;  Watson  v.  Miller, 
82  Tex.  279;  Dexter  v.  Ohlander,  93 
Ala.  441 ;  Van  Fleet  v.  Sledge,  45 
Fed.  Rep.  743;  Chase  v.  Jewett,  37 
Me.  351 ;  Lyon  v.  Miller,  24  Pa.  St. 
392;  Atkins  v.  Tompkins,  155  Mass. 
256 ;  Vance  v.  Wood,  22  Oreg.  77. 

12  Pirson  v.  Arkenbergh,  59  N.  Y. 
Super.  Ct.  574;  Hardin  v.  Kelly  (Va,, 
1893).  15  S.  E.  Rep.  894;  Taylor  v. 
Davis,  82  Wis.  455;  Elevator  Co.  v. 
Towboat  Co.,  155  Mass.  211;  Shel- 
mire  v.  Williams,  etc.  Co.,  68  Hun, 
196;  Stull  v.  Thompson,  154  Pa.  St. 
43;  Societe  v.  Sulzer,  138  N.  Y.  468; 
Beall  v.  Fisher,  95  Cal.  568 ;  Rich- 
mond, etc.  Co.  v.  Shomo(Ga.,  1893), 
16  S.  E.  Rep.  220.     Negotiations  are 


302  TAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§  206. 

and  the  only  office  of  the  court  is  to  interpret  and  construe 
it  so  that  its  actual  meaning  may  be  effectuated.1  Nor  does 
it  lie  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  ascertain  what  secret 
meaning  rmvy  have  been  intended,  or  whether  the  parties  had 
any  meaning  which  is  not  expressed  by  the  language  of  the 
writing  itself,  unless  upon  its  face  it  is  incomplete  and  silent 
as  to  some  material  fact.2 

The  terms  "interpretation"  and  "  construction"  are  some- 
times used  interchangeably.  The  process  of  interpretation 
usually  precedes  that  of  construction,  and  may  be  defined 
with  accuracy  as  the  act  of  finding  out  the  true  sense  of  any 
form  of  words,  i.  e.,  the  meaning  their  author  intended,  and 
of  enabling  others  to  derive  from  them  the  same  idea  that  he 
entertained.3  By  construction  is  meant  the  process  of  draw- 
ing conclusions  respecting  subjects  that  lie  beyond  the  direct 
expressions  of  the  text,  from  elements  known  from  and  given 
in  the  text,  i.  e.,  conclusions  within  the  spirit,  though  not' 
always  within  the  strict  letter,  of  the  text4  of  the  writing. 

Construction  may  be  liberal,  enlarging  or  restricting  the 
meaning  of  the  literal  language  of  the  writing  which  is  con- 
strued, or  strict,  i.  e.,  confining  the  application  of  the  words 
to  such  cases  or  objects  as  are  clearly  described  by  the  terms 
employed.  But  a  liberal  construction  should  not  be  such  as 
by  the  aid  of  extrinsic  evidence  forces  words  out  of  their 
natural  signification,  or  affixes  a  meaning  to  them  which  was 
never  intended  by  their  author,  but  only  such  a  fair,  just  and 
reasonable  construction  as  will  fully  effectuate  the  instrument 
and  carry  out  the  intention  of  the  parties  thereto.5  A  reason- 
able construction  of  an  instrument,  as  opposed  to  one  which  is 
forced,  artificial  or  strained,  is  such  a  construction  as  will 

merged  in  the  writing  the  moment  Hardin  v.  Kelly  (Va.,  1893),  15  S.  E. 
a  stamped   letter  assenting  to   the  Rep.  894. 
terms  is  mailed.     Darlington  I.  W.  -  See  post,  §  209. 
v.  Foote,  16  Fed.  Rep.  645;  Blake  v.  3  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  citing  Lie- 
Hamburg-Bremen   F.   Ins.    Co.,    67  ber,  Herm.  23;  1  Bl.  Com.  59;  2  Par- 
Tex.  163.     See  ante,  %%  30-39.  son's  Cont.  (7th  ed.)  491. 

Culver  v.   Wilkinson,   145  U.  S.  4  Anderson's    Law    Diet.,    Lieber, 

205;    National  G.    L.  Co.    v.  Bixby  Herm.  44,  11. 

(Minn.,    1892),   57   N.  W.    Rep.   217;  5  Lawrence  v.  McCalmont,  2  How. 

Stover  v.  Rogers,  3  Wash.  St.  603;  449;  Crist  v.  Burliugame,  62  Barb. 

355. 


§  206.]  PAEOL    OS    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  303 

most  effectually  favor  and  bring  about  the  apparent  intention. 
If  any  word  or  clause  has  two  meanings,  the  meaning  which  is 
most  consonant  with  the  intention  of  the  parties  as  gathered 
from  the  whole  instrument,  considered  in  its  entirety,  should 
be  permitted  to  prevail.1  When,  however,  the  language  is 
reasonably  clear,  so  that  the  jury  can  readily  understand  the 
meaning  of  the  instrument,  there  is  no  room  for  construction. 
"  There  should  be  no  construction  where  there  is  nothing  to 
construe."2 

The  interpretation  and  construction  of  writings  are  gov- 
erned by  legal  rules  and  are  exclusively  within  the  province 
of  the  judge.3  So  far,  however,  as  the  whole  contract  is 
incapable  of  intelligible  construction  by  the  court  from  an 
exclusive  consideration  of  its  language,  that  is,  so  far  as  ex- 
trinsic evidence  is  necessary  to  explain  its  terms  or  its  subject- 
matter,  to  identify  the  parties,  or  to  show  their  relations  to 
each  other  and  the  circumstances  surrounding  them,  the  mat- 
ter is  for  the  jury,  who  are  of  course  to  be  guided  in  their 
determination  by  the  principles  of  law  governing  the  construc- 
tion of  contracts  laid  down  by  the  court,  so  far  as  these  prin- 
ciples are  applicable  to  the  actual  state  of  facts  found  by  the 
jury.4  A  writing  should  be  construed  in  its  entirety  to  ascer- 
tain its  meaning  and  effect.  If  the  meaning  of  written  and 
printed  clauses  is  contradictory,  the  meaning  of  the  former 
will  prevail  over  that  of  the  latter,  on  the  presumption  that, 
being  more  deliberately  framed,  they  represent  more  accu- 
rately the  meaning  of  the  parties.5 

In  the  construction  of  a  contract  the  courts  will  follow  the 
construction  which  the  parties  to  the  contract  have  them- 
selves put  upon  the  particular  agreement  or  upon  others  of  a 
similar  description.  If,  therefore,  a  contract  is  doubtful  in  its 
meaning,  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  how  the  contracting 
parties  regarded  or  construed  the  writing  by  pointing  out  their 

12   Bl.   Com.    296-309,    379-381;  2  « Cosper  v.  Nesbit,  45   Kan.  457; 

Kent,     422;    Tiedeman     on    Wills,  Spragins  v.  White,    108  N.   C.  449; 

§§  171  et  seq.,    205-211.  Deutman  v.  Kilpatrick,  46  Mo.  App. 

2  Lewis  v.  United  States,  92  U.  S.  624. 

621 ;  Benn  v   Hatcher,  81  Va.  34.  sBoorman  v.  Johnston,  12  Wend. 

3  People's  Nat.  Gas  Co.  v.  Fidelity  573 ;  Webb  v.  Webb,  29  Ala.  605 ; 
Tit.  &  Trust  Co.,  24  Atl.  Rep.  339;  DufiVld  v.  Hue,  129  Pa.  St.  94;  Mc- 
150  Pa.  St.  8.  Near  v.  McComber,  18  Iowa,  7. 


304 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§§  207,  20S. 


actions  in  relation  to  the  subject-matter.  "Where,  by  such  ex- 
trinsic evidence,  a  continued  course  of  dealing  or  acting  prior 
to  the  execution  of  the  contract  under  consideration  is  es- 
tablished, it  is  very  fair  to  presume  that  the  intention  of  the 
parties  was  to  adhere  to  their  usual  and  ordinary  method  of 
transacting  business.1 

§  207.  Rule  applies  only  between  parties. —  "Where  a  writ- 
ing is  offered  in  evidence  in  an  action  between  persons  who 
are  not  parties  or  privies  to  it,  the  rule  excluding  parol  evi- 
dence does  not  apply;  and.  because  it  would  be  extremely  un- 
just to  consider  a  person  bound  by  language  in  whose  selec- 
tion he  took  no  part,  they  are  not  prevented  from  showing 
the  true  meaning  of  a  writing  by  contradictory  oral  evidence.2 
In  a  suit  between  a  party  and  a  stranger  to  a  writing,  the 
former  may,  unless  estopped  by  his  conduct,  contradict  the 
writing  by  parol.3 

§  208.  Invalidity  of  writing  —  Evidence  to  explain  or  vary 
consideration. —  The  invalidity  or  legal  insufficiency  of  an  in- 
strument or  of  a  part  of  it  may  be  shown  by  a  party  b}'  parol.4 


1  Procter  v.  Snodgrass,  6  Ohio  Cir. 
Ct.  Rep.  547;  Goneding  v.  Ham- 
mond, 49  Fed.  Rep.  443;  Bement  v. 
Clay  brook  (Ind.,  1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep. 
556;  Davis  v.  Shafer,  50  Fed.  Rep. 
764;  Hosmer  v.  McDonald  (Ark., 
1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  963;  Leavitt  v. 
Windsor  Land   &   Investment   Co., 

54  Fed.  Rep.  459;  People's  Nat.  Gas 
Co.  v.  Braddock  Wire  Co.  (Pa., 
1893),  25  Atl.  Rep.  749;  155  Pa.  St, 
22;  Hammerquist  v.  Swenson,  44 
111.  App.  627;  Cavazos  v.  Trevino,  6 
Wall.  (U.  S.)  773. 

2  Randolph  v.  Junker,  1  Tex.  Civ. 
App.  517;  Burns  v.  Thompson,  91 
Ind.  146 ;  McMaster  v.  Insurance  Co., 

55  N.  Y.  222;  Sheehy  v.  Fulton  (Neb., 
1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  395 ;  Bareda  v. 
Silsby,  21  How.  (U.  S.)  146:  Finley 
v.  Bogan,  20  La.  Ann.  443;  Fant  v. 
Sprig,  50  Md.  551 ;  Furbush  v.  God- 
win, 25  N.  H.  425;  Russell  v.  Carr, 
38  Ga.   459;  Cunningham  v.  Minor, 

56  Ala.    522;  Fonda   v.  Burton,    63 


Vt.  355;  Bruce  v.  Lumber  Co.,  87 
Va.  381 ;  Fox  v.  McComb,  63  Hun, 
633:  Kellogg  v.  Thompson,  142  Mass. 
76;  Reynolds  v.  Magness,  2  lied.  26; 
Talbot  v.  Wilkins,  31  Ark.  411; 
Hnssman  v.  Wilkie,  50  Cal.  250; 
Bell  v.  Woodman,  60  Me.  465. 

3Venable  v.  Thompson,  11  Ala. 
147.  So  in  a  suit  for  contribution 
between  sureties  either  of  them 
may  vary  the  terms  of  a  writing  to 
which  the  principal  is  a  party. 
Thomas  v.  Truscotc,  53  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
200;  Barry  v.  Raison,  1  Kernan 
(N.  Y.),  462. 

* Hamburg  v.  Wood,  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
623  (Tex.,  1892);  Blythe  v.  Gibbons 
(Ind.,  1894),  35  N.  E.  Rep.  557;  Lun- 
day  v.  Thomas,  26  Ga.  538;  Benecia 
Works  v.  Estes  (Cal.,  1892),  32  Pac. 
Rep.  938 ;  Snyder  v.  Jennings,  15  Neb. 
372;  Corbin  v.  Sistrunk,  19  Ala.  203; 
Grayson  v.  Brooks,  64  Miss.  410; 
Cummings  v.  Powell  (Mo.,  1893),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  1079;  Sherman  v.  Buick, 


§  208.] 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


305 


So  it  may  be  shown  by  parol  that  the  execution  of  the  instru- 
ment, whether  record,  deed  or  simple  contract,  was  procured 
by  fraud  or  duress  practiced  upon  the  party,1  or  that  he  had 
been  made  intoxicated  so  that  he  did  not  fully  comprehend 
the  nature  of  his  act.2 

At  common  law  a  seal  created  a  conclusive  presumption  of 
a  due  and  valuable  consideration,  and  the  parties  were  es- 
topped from  denying  this,  though  no  consideration  was  men- 
tioned in  the  instrument.3  Where  a  writing  is  not  under  seal, 
and  in  equity  when  under  seal,4  parol  evidence  is  admissible 
to  vary  the  consideration,  except  in  the  case  of  negotiable 
paper  which  is  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder  for  value.5 


93  U.  S.  209 ;  Davis  v.  Stern,  15  La. 
Ann.  177 ;  Farrell  v.  Bean,  10  Md.  217 ; 
Dana  v.  Sessions  (Vt.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  585 ;  Holbrook  v.  Burt,  22  Pick. 
(Mass.)  546.  A  judgment  may  thus 
be  impeached  by  parol  proof  that  a 
party  was  not  served.  Norton  v. 
Atchison,  30  Pac.  Rep.  585. 

1  Kranich  v.  Sherwood,  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  741;  92  Mich.  397;  Wharton  v. 
Douglass,  76  Pa.  St.  273 ;  McKesson 
v.  Sherman,  51  Wis.  303;  N.  J.  Mut. 
L.  I.  Co.  v.  Baker,  94  U.  S.  610; 
Cooper  v.  Finke,  38  Minn.  2 ;  Thomp- 
son v.  Bell,  37  Ala.  438;  Officer  v. 
Howe,  32  Iowa,  142;  Vicknair  v. 
Trosher  (La.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  486; 
Thorne  v.  Trav.  Ins.  Co.,  80  Pa.  St. 
15;  Univ.  Fash.  Co.  v.  Skinner,  64 
Hun,  293;  Childs  v.  Dobbins,  61 
Iowa,  109;  Plant  v.  Condit,  22  Ark. 
454;  Evving  v.  Smith,  132  Ind.  205; 
Willis  v.  Kern,  21  La.  Ann.  749  Bald- 
win v.  Burrows,  95  Ind.  81 ;  Gross  v. 
Drager,  66  Wis.  150 ;  Depue  v.  Sar- 
geant,  21  W.  Va.  326.  Parol  evi- 
dence is  received  to  show  that  a  deed 
was  delivered  and  whether  the  de- 
livery was  absolute  or  in  escrow. 
Adams  v.  Morgan,  150  Mass.  148. 

2  Johnson  v.  Phifer,  6  Neb.  401; 
Lavette  v.  Sage,  29  Conn.  577 ;  Fet- 
rill  v.  Fetrill,  5  Jones'  Eq.  61; 
Schramm  v.  O'Conner,  98   111.  539; 

20 


Harbison  v.  Lemon,  3  Blatchf.  51 
Dunn  v.  Amos,  14  Wis.  106;  Loftus 
v.  Maloney  (Va.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep, 
749;   Rottenburgh  v.    Fowl  (N.   J. 
1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  338. 

STiedeman  on  R.  P.,  §801;  Wil 
kinson  v.  Scott,  17  Mass.  257;  Good 
speed   v.   Fuller,  46   Me.  141 ;  Rock 
well  v.  Brown,  54  N.  Y.  213;  Men 
denhall   v.  Parish,  8  Jones'   L.  108 
Kimball  v.  Walker,  30  111.  511 ;  Wing 
v.    Peck,    54    Vt.    245;  Trafton    v 
Hawes,  102  Mass.  541 ;  State  v.  Gott 
44  Md.  341 ;  Storm  v.  United  States; 
94    U.    S.    84;    Erickson    v.    Brant 
(Minn.,    1893),    55   N.    W.    Rep.  62 
Harris  v.  Harris,  23  Gratt.  737 ;  Lake 
v.  Gray,  35  Iowa,  462 ;  Rhine  v.  El 
len,  36  Cal.  362. 

4  Levi  v.  Welsh,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  867 
Fechheimer  v.  Trounstine,  13  Colo, 
386;  Lanier  v.  Faust,  16  S.  W.  Rep 
994;  Ewing  v.  Wilson  (Ind.,  1892) 
31  N.  E.  Rep.  64;  132  Ind.  600. 

sVolkenan  v.  Drum,  154  Pa.  St 
616;  Stackpole  v.  Arnold,  11  Mass 
27;  Terry  v.  Danville,  etc.  Co.,  91 
N.  C.  236 ;  Silvers  v.  Potter,  48  N.  J. 
Eq.  539;  Rabsuhl  v.  Lack,  35  Mo. 
316;  Tutwiler  v.  Munford,  68  Ala. 
124;  Rhine  v.  Ellen,  36  Cal.  362; 
King  v.  Woodruff,  23  Conn.  56; 
Howell  v.  Moores,  127  111.  86;  Bragg 
v.  Standford,  82  Ind.  324;  Wheeler 


30C 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE 


[§  20S. 


Where  the  validity  of  an  instrument  is  impeached  upon  the 
ground  of  fraud,  the  courts  are  disposed  to  grant  a  wide  lati- 
tude in  this  respect.1  Thus,  the  invalidity,2  illegality  3  or  im- 
morality4 of  the  consideration  may  be  shown  by  parol  in  an 
action  between  the  immediate  parties  to  the  contract.  So  in 
a  proceeding  by  the  grantor  to  recover  the  purchase-money, 
the  real  consideration  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence/' 
Parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show  an  additional  or  further 
consideration  to  that  expressed,6  and  the  additional  considera- 
tion which  is  thus  shown  need  not  alwa}Ts  be  consistent  in 
character  with  the  consideration  which  is  recited  in  the  writ- 
ing.7 Where  the  writing  is  silent  as  to  consideration,  oral 
evidence  is  admissible  to  prove  that  a  consideration  passed 
and  to  show  its  character  and  extent.8 


v.  Billings,  38  N.  Y.  263;  Fraley  v. 
Bentley,  1  Dak.  25;  Bailey  v.  Corn- 
well,  66  Mich.  107 ;  Leach  v.  Shelby, 
58  Miss.  681 ;  Sayre  v.  Burdick,  47 
Minn.  367;  Kidder  v.  Vandersloat, 
114  111.  130;  Pomeroy  v.  Bailey,  43 
N.  H.  118;  Bar  bee  v.  Bar  bee,  109 
N.  C.  299;  Cake  v.  Bank,  116  Pa.  St. 
264;  Fechheimer  v.  Trounstine,  13 
Colo.  386;  Louisville  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Neafus  (Ky.,  1892),  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
1030;  Bruce  v.  Slemp,  82  Va.  357; 
Pierce  v.  Brew,  43  Vt.  292 ;  Wooster 
v.  Simonson,  20  Fed.  Rep.  316 ;  Stiles 
v.  Giddens,  21  Tex.  783;  Green  v. 
Batson,  71  Wis.  57;  Hall  v.  Solo- 
mon, 61  Conn.  476;  Hunter  v.  La- 
nius,  82  Tex.  677.  "A  considera- 
tion is  something  esteemed  in  law 
as  of  value  in  exchange  for  which  a 
promise  is  made."  Bishop,  Cont., 
§38. 

i  Clinton  v.  Estes,  20  Ark.  216; 
Cunningham  v.  Dyer,  23  Md.  219; 
Fall  v.  Glover,  34  Neb.  522 ;  52  N. 
W.  Rep.  168. 

2  See  cases  in  last  note. 

3Fenwick  v.  Ratcliffe,  6  T.  B. 
Mon.  (Ky.)  154;  Cozard  v.  Hinman, 
6  Bo#sw.  8 ;  N.  E.  Mortg.  Co.  v.  Gay, 
33  Fed.  Rep.  636;  Martin  v.  Clarke, 
8  R.  I.  389;  Russell  v.  De  Grand,  15 


Mass.  35;  Ross  v.  Sagbeer,  21  "Wend. 
106. 

4  Lazare  v.  Jacques,  15  La.  Ann. 
599. 

5  McCrea  v.  Purmort,  16  Wend. 
465 ;  Rhine  v.  Ellen,  36  Cal.  362. 

6Penn.  Co.  v.  Dolan  (Ind.,  1890), 
32  N.  E.  Rep.  S02 ;  Hill  v.  Whidden 
(Mass.,  1S93),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  526;  Fer- 
ris v.  Hard,  135  N.  Y.  354;  Pierce  v. 
Brew,  43  Vt.  295 ;  Parker  v.  Foy,  43 
Miss.  260 ;  Harper  v.  Perry,  28  Iowa, 
63;  Paige  v.  Sherman,  6  Gray,  511; 
Rabsuhl  v.  Lack,  35  Mo.  316;  Castor 
v.  Fry,  33  W.  Va.  449 ;  Tiedeman  on 
R.  P.,  §  801. 

7  Bristol  Sav.  Bank  v.  Stiger  (Iowa, 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  265;  Penn.  Co. 
v.  Dolan  (Ind.,  1893),  52  N.  E.  Rep. 
802;  Hill  v.  Whidden,  siqwa;  Mo- 
bile Sav.  Bank  v.  McDonnell  (Ala., 
1891),  8  S.  Rep.  137;  Martin  v.  Stub- 
bings,  126  111.  387;  Diven  v.  John- 
son, 117  Ind.  512.  Where  evidence 
of  a  different  consideration  would 
make  a  new  contract  for  the  parties 
it  should  be  excluded.  Stillings  v. 
Timmins,  152  Mass.  147;  25  N.  E. 
Rep.  50 ;  Langan  v.  Langan,  89  Cal. 
186;  26Pac.  Rep.  794. 

8  Trustees  v.  Saunders  (Wis.,  1893), 


§  209.] 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


507 


§  209.  Incomplete  and  collateral  writings. —  Where  on 
inspecting  a  written  contract  it  appears  incomplete,  so  that  it 
does  not  represent  the  final  intention  of  the  parties  in  lan- 
guage chosen  by  them,  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  supply 
omissions  and  ascertain  the  actual  intention  on  those  particu- 
lar points  regarding  which  the  written  agreement  is  silent.1 
So  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  supply  a  date  in  an  ac- 
knowledgment of  a  debt;2  to  show  the  purpose  of  certain 
minor  stipulations;3  to  fix  the  time  of  performance,4  or  to 
show  a  parol  contract  or  a  conversation  referred  to  in  the 
writing.5  But  an  omission  cannot  be  supplied  in  a  writing 
which  is  required  by  the  statute  of  frauds.6     And  the  opera- 


54  N.  W.  Rep.  1094;  Guidery  v. 
Green,  95  Cal.  630;  Dorsey  v.  Ha- 
gard,  5  Mo.  420;  Miller  v.  Fecht- 
born,  31  Pa.  St.  252;  Macomb  v. 
Wilkinson  (Mich.,  1890),  47  N.  W. 
Rep.  336 ;  Finlayson  v.  Finlayson, 
17  Oreg.  347;  Goodwin  v.  Fox,  129 
U.  S.  601 ;  Bruce  v.  Slemp,  82  Va. 
352;  Rankin  v.  Wallace  (Ky.,  1890), 
14  S.  W.  Rep.  79;  Halpin  v.  Stone, 
78  Wis.  183;  47  N.  W.  Rep.  177; 
Nichols  v.  Burcb,  128  Ind.  324;  27 
N.  E.  Rep.  737.  In  McCrea  v.  Pur- 
mort,  16  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  473;  30  Am. 
Dec.  103,  Justice  Cowan  thus  ex- 
pounds the  true  rule  on  this  subject : 
"  A  party  is  estopped  by  his  deed. 
He  is  not  permitted  to  contradict  it 
so  far  as  the  deed  is  intended  to  pass 
a  right,  or  to  be  the  exclusive  evi- 
dence of  a  contract.  The  principle 
goes  no  further.  A  deed  is  not  con- 
clusive evidence  of  everything  it 
may  contain.  For  instance,  it  is  not 
the  only  evidence  of  the  date  of  its 
execution,  nor  is  its  omission  of  a 
consideration  conclusive  evidence 
that  none  passed;  nor  is  its  acknowl- 
edgment of  a  particular  considera- 
tion an  objection  to  other  proof  of 
another  and  consistent  considera- 
tion." 

i Smith  v.  Wood  (Ind.,   1833),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  921 ;  Woolworth  v.   Mc- 


Pherson,  55  Fed.  Rep.  558;  Mc- 
Grath  v.  Mongels,  20  N.  Y.  S.  869 ; 
Kreuzberger  v.  Wingfield,  96  Cal. 
251 ;  Chapin  v.  Cambria  S.  Co.,  145 Pa. 
St.  578 ;  Ostrander  v.  Snyder,  26  N. 
Y.  S.  263;  Edwards  Co.  v.  Baker,  2 
N.  D.  289;  Bretts  v.  Levine  (Minn., 
1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  525;  Work  v. 
Beach,  129  N.  Y.  651;  Crane  v.  Li- 
brary Ass'n,  29  N.  J.  L.  302 ;  Barclay 
v.  Hopkins,  59  Ga.  562;  Bank  v. 
Cooper,  137  U.  S.  473;  Brown  v. 
Bowen,  90  Mo.  184;  Webster  v.  Hodg- 
kins,  25  N.  H.  128;  Winn  v.  Cham- 
berlain, 32  Vt.  318:  Equator  M.  &  S. 
Co.  v.  Gunella  (Colo.,  1893),  33  Pac. 
Rep.  613;  Holmes  v.  Anderson,  59 
Tex.  481 ;  Donlin  v.  Daeglin,  80  111. 
608;  Sivers  v.  Sivers  (Cal.,  1S93),  33 
Pac.  Rep.  571 ;  Hawkins  v.  Lee,  8 
Lea  (Tenn.),  42.  The  question 
whether  the  contract  is  complete  is 
for  the  jury.  Thomas  v.  Barnes,  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  683;  56  Mass.  581. 

2  Manchester  v.  Brodner,  107  N.  Y. 
349. 

3  Equator  Co.  v.  Gunella  (Colo., 
1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  613. 

*  Sivers  v.  Sivers  (Cal.,  1893),  32 
Pac.  Rep.  571. 

sNork  v.  Beach,  129  N.  Y.  621. 

HRunger  v.  Holtzclaw,  112  Mo. 
519.     See  post,  §  214. 


308  PAROL   OK   EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§  210. 

tion  of  this  rule  is  strictly  confined  to  unintentional  omissions, 
and  does  not  permit  the  introduction  of  parol  evidence  to  ef- 
fectuate a  writing  which  is  wholly  void  because  of  uncer- 
tainty.1 JSTor  is  parol  evidence  admissible  if  the  writing  can 
by  construction  be  given  a  reasonable  meaning  though  some 
words  have  been  omitted.2  So  it  has  been  held  that  the  oral  por- 
tion of  the  contract  is  only  admissible  if  the  writing  describes 
the  subject-matter  with  binding  force,  and  the  oral  part  re- 
fers to  collateral  matters  alone.3  The  existence  of  a  memo- 
randum of  a  transaction,  as  a  bill  of  parcels,  will  not  exclude 
parol  evidence  of  the  real  contract  where  the  memorandum 
is  not  meant  to  be  regarded  as  a  contract  containing  the  com- 
plete intention  of  the  parties.4 

§  210.  Parol  evidence  to  connect  and  explain  contempo- 
raneous writings. —  Two  or  more  instruments  evidencing  the 
same  transaction  should  be  construed  together.  To  enable 
the  court  to  do  this,  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show 
which  was  adopted  as  binding  by  the  parties,5  or  to  connect 
them  if  the  connection  does  not  appear  upon  their  face;6  and 
particularly  if  they  are  contradictory  in  terms,7  or  if  on  com- 
parison of  the  instruments  certain  clauses  are  found  to  be 
omitted8  from  either.  If  a  writing  clearly  refers  to  another, 
the  latter  will  be  admissible  to  explain  it.  The  earlier  deed 
or  instrument  by  such  reference  becomes  incorporated  in  the 
later  to  the  same  extent  as  though  inserted  in  the  subsequent 

1  McGuire  v.  Stevens,  42  Miss.  474;  5  Hill  v.  Miller,  76  N.  Y.  32;  Nor. 
Walrathv.  Whitlekind,  26  Kan.  482;  M.  Co.  v.  McAlister,  40  Mich.  84. 
Harvey  v.  Lumber  Co.,  39  Mo.  App.  6  1    Greenl.    Ew,   §283;    Wichita 
214.  University   v.    Schweiter,    50   Kan. 

2  Looney  v.  Eankin,  15  Oreg.  617.  672 ;  Thomson  v.  Beal,  48  Fed.  Rep. 
3Chapin  v.  Dobson,  78  N.  Y.  74.  614;  Myers  v.  Munson,  65  Iowa,  423; 
4  Deshon  v.  Insurance  Co.,  11  Met.     Tuley  v.  Barton,  79  Va.  3S7;  Lee  v. 

(Mass.)  199 ;  Perrine  v.  Cooley,  39  N.  Church,  52  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  116;  Gilbert 

J.   L.    449;    Kreuzberger  v.    Wing-  v.    Duncan,    29    N.  J.  L.  133,    521; 

field,  96  Cal.  251 ;  Thomas  v.  Barnes,  Eager  v.    Crawford,    76  N.   Y.    97; 

156  Mass.  581;  Robinson  v.  Mulder,  Cullen  v.  Benim,  37  Ohio  St.  326. 
81   Mich.    75;    Chapin   v.    Cambria        7Payson  v.    Lampson,    134    Mass. 

Iron  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  478;  Millet  v.  593. 

Marston,  62  Me.  477;  Cone  v.  Cone,        « Holt   v.    Pie,    120    Pa.    St.    425 

107  Mass.  285;  Smith  v.  Coleman,  77  Deery  v.  Cray,  10  Wall.  (U.  S.)  263 

Wis.  343.  Wilson    v.    Tucker,    10    R.    I.    578 

Maxted  v.  Seymour,  56  Mich.  129. 


§  211.] 


PAROL  OR  EXTRINSIC  EVIDENCE. 


309 


deed.1  The  same  principle  is  applicable  to  a  deed  containing 
references  to  maps  or  plats,  which  must  be  consulted  and  are 
admissible  to  ascertain  the  location  of  the  monuments  which 
constitute  the  boundaries  of  the  land  conve3red.2  In  the  case 
of  documents  referred  to  in  wills,  which  are  required  to  be 
attested,  it  has  been  held  that  to  admit  their  incorporation  in 
the  will  they  must  be  referred  to  as  in  existence  when  the  will 
is  executed?  and  the  document  may  then  be  shown  by  parol 
evidence  to  be  identical  with  that  referred  to.4 

■§  211.  Receipts. —  "A  receipt  may  be  defined  as  such  a 
written  acknowledgment  by  one  person  of  his  having  received 
money  or  goods  from  another  as  will  be  prima  facie  evidence 
of  that  fact  in  a  court  of  law." 5  Parol  evidence  is  generally 
admissible  to  explain  or  vary  the  meaning  or  purpose  of  a 
simple  written  receipt.6     If  the  writing,  however,  constitutes 


i Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  g  841 ;  White- 
head v.  Rogers,  106  Mo.  231 ;  Camp- 
bell v.  Morgan,  68  Hun,  490;  Perry 
v.  Binney,  103  Mass.  153;  Vance  v. 
Fare,  24  Cal.  444;  Overend  v. 
Menezer,  83  Tex.  152;  McAfee  v. 
Arline,  83  Ga.  645;  Knight  v.  Dyer, 
57  Me.  176;  Lippitt  v.  Kelly,  46  Vt. 
523 ;  Rupert  v.  Penner,  35  Neb.  587. 
The  deed  referred  to  need  not  be  re- 
corded. Simmons  v.  Johnson,  14 
Wis.  526;  Caldwell  v.  Center,  30  Cal. 
543. 

2  Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  §  841 ;  Cham- 
berlain v.  Bradley,  101  Mass.  191 ; 
St.  Louis  v.  Miss.  P.  R.  Co.  (Mo., 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  203;  Fox  v. 
Union  Co.,  109  Mass.  292;  Bohier  v. 
Lange,  44  Minn.  281 ;  Redd  v.  Murry, 
24  Fae.  Rep.  341;  93  Cal.  48:  White- 
head v.  Ragan,  106  Mo.  231;  Bir- 
mingham v.  Anderson,  48  Pa.  St. 
253;  Plummer  v.  Gould,  92  Mich.  1 ; 
Spiller  v.  Scribner,  36  Vt.  247:  Chap- 
man v.  Polack,  70  Cal.  487 ;  Frost  v. 
Cattle  Co.,  81  Tex.  505. 

3  Newton  v.  Seamen's  Fr.  Soc,  130 
Mass.  91 ;  Brown  v.  Clark,  77  N.  Y. 
360 ;  Baker's  Appeal,  107  Pa.  St.  381 ; 


Tonnele,  etc.  v.  Hall,  4  Comst.  145; 
In  re  Soher,  78  Cal.  477;  Chambers 
v.  McDaniel,  3  Rich.  Eq.  305 ;  Harvey 
v.  Chouteau,  14  Mo.  587;  Johnson  v. 
Clarkson,  3  Rich.  Eq.  305 ;  Thayer  v. 
Wellington,  9  Allen,  283;  In  re  Lam- 
bert's Estate,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  10; 
In  re  Sunderland,  1  P.  &  D.  198; 
Allen  v.  Maddock,  11  Moore  P.  C. 
427,  454 ;  Von  Stanbenzee  v.  Monck, 
32  L.  J.  Prob.  21 ;  In  re  Barber,  W. 
N.  1879,  p.  141. 

4  Pollock  v.  Glassell,  2  Gratt.  439; 
Barley  v.  Barley,  7  Jones,  44;  Zim- 
merman v.  Zimmerman,  23  Pa.  St. 
375;  Crosby  v.  Mason,  32  Conn.  482; 
Fesler  v.  Simpson,  58  Ind.  83. 
■  5Grimke,  J.,  in  Kegg  v.  State,  7 
Ohio  St.  79.  As  to  the  conclusive- 
ness of  receipts  per  se  as  evidence, 
see  State  v.  Branch,  112  Mo.  661. 

GSchwersenski  v.  Vineberg,  19  Can. 
S.  C.  R.  243;  Osborn  v.  Stringham 
(S.  D.,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  776; 
Oakley  v.  State,  40  Ala.  392;  Han- 
cock v.  Moody,  39  111.  App.  17 ;  State 
v.  McDonald,  43  N.  J.  L.  591 :  Bus- 
well  v.  Pioneer,  37  N.  Y.  312;  Fire 
Ass'n  v.  Wickham,  141  TJ.  S.  564; 


310 


TAKOL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§21! 


or  contains  a  complete  contract,  as  when  it  contains  stipula- 
tions prescribing  how  the  money  is  to  be  expended,  parol  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible  to  vary  its  terms,  so  far  as  it  is  a  con- 
tract,1 though  it  may  assume  the  form  of  a  receipt.2 

§212.  Independent  parol  contracts  and  conditions  pre- 
cedent.—  These  generally  may  be  shown  by  parol  when  con- 
temporaneous and  consistent  with  the  writing,  and  founded 
on  a  distinct  consideration,3  or  when  the  consideration  of  the 
oral  collateral  contract  is  the  performance  of  the  written  one.4 


Richardson  v.  Beede,  43  Me.  161 ; 
Lane  v.  Johnson,  59  Vt.  237;  Hill  v. 
Durand,  53  Wis.  160;  Prairie  Sch. 
Twp.  v.  Haselen  (N.  D.,  1893),  55  N. 
W.  Rep.  938;  Bell  v.  Utley,  17  Mich. 
508;  Chapman  v.  Sutton,  68  Wis. 
657;  Catoe  v.  Catoe,  32  S.  C.  595; 
Lowe  v.'  Thompson,  86  Ind.  503; 
Texas  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Davidge,  51 
Tex.  214;  McKinnie  v.  Harvey,  38 
Minn.  18;  Dunn  v.  Pipes,  20  La. 
Ann.  276;  Badger  v.  Jones,  12  Pick. 
(Mass.)  371;  McFadden  v.  Railway 
Co.,  92  Mo.  343;  Chapin  v.  Chicago, 
etc.  Co.  (Iowa,  1890),  44  N.  W.  Rep. 
820;  Marse  v.  Rice  (Neb.,  1893),  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  308 ;  Dunagan  v.  Duna- 
gan,  38  Ga.  554;  Calhoun  v.  Rich- 
ardson, 30  Conn.  210;  Knox  v.  Bar- 
bee,  3  Bibb  (Ky.),  526;  Edgerly  v. 
Emerson,  23  N.  H.  555.  Whether 
the  receipt  is  an  official  acknowledg- 
ment or  a  receipt  under  seal,  as  in  a 
deed  of  conveyance,  is  immaterial. 
Brown  v.  Cabalin,  3  Oreg.  45. 

1  Smith  v.  Holland,  61  N.  Y.  635. 

2Fossack  v.  Moody,  39  111.  App. 
17;  Thompson  v.  Williams,  30  Kan. 
114;  Carpenter  v.  Jamieson,  75  Mo. 
285;  Alcorn  v.  Morgan,  77  Ind.  184; 
Tarbell  v.  Farmers'  Mut.  El.  Co.,  44 
Minn.  471;  Goodwin  v.  Goodwin,  59 
N.  H.  548;  Van  Etten  v.  Newton,  8 
N.  Y.  S.  478;  Young  v.  Cook,  15  La. 
Ann.  126;  James  v.  Bligh,  11  Allen 
(Mass.),  4;  Fowler  v.  Richardson,  32 


111.  App.  252;  Harrison  v.  Bank,  17 
Wis.  340;  Wood  v.  Whiting.  21 
Barb.  190;  Egleston  v.  Knicker- 
bocker, G  Barb.  458 ;  Graves  v.  Dud- 
ley, 20  N.  Y.  76;  Querry  v.  White,  1 
Bibb  (Ky.),  271 ;  Sessions  v.  Gilbert, 
1  Vt.  75.  Thus,  for  example,  a  re- 
ceipt for  goods  on  storage  or  depos- 
ited as  collateral  for  a  loan,  consti- 
tuting a  contract  of  bailment,  cannot 
be  varied  by  parol.  Wads  worth  v. 
Alcott,  6  N.  Y.  64;  Stapleton  v.  King, 
33  Iowa,  28. 

3  Michigan  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Will- 
iams, 155  Pa.  St.  405;  Bagley  & 
Sewall  Co.  v.  Saranac  R.  P.  Co.,  135 
N.  Y.  626 ;  Guidery  v.  Green,  95  Cal. 
630;  Babcock  v.  Deford,  14  Kan. 
408 ;  Whitney  v.  Shippen,  89  Pa.  St. 
22;  Andrews  v.  Brewster,  124  N.  Y. 
433;  Buzzell  v.  Willard,  44  Vt.  44; 
Lamphire  v.  Slaughter,  61  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  36;  Snow  v.  Allen,  151  Mass. 
51.  This  exception  is  thus  stated  by 
Sir  James  Stephen:  "The  existence 
of  any  separate  oral  agreement  as  to 
any  matter  on  which  a  document  is 
silent,  and  which  is  not  inconsistent 
with  its  terms,  may  be  shown,  if 
from  the  circumstances  of  the  cate 
the  court  infers  that  the  parties  did 
not  intend  the  document  to  be  a 
complete  and  final  statement  of  the 
whole  of  the  transaction  between 
them."    See  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  90. 

*  Kelly  v.  Carter,  55  Ark.  112. 


§  212.] 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


Ill 


Thus,  a  verbal  warranty  in  connection  with  a  sale  in  writing; l 
an  agreement  to  pay  a  commission  for  procuring  a  sale  of 
land,2  or  for  obtaining  a  charter  for  a  vessel;3  or  a  condition 
that  a  written  agreement  shall  not  go  into  effect  unless  a  cer- 
tain event  shall  happen,4  or  that  a  policy  taken  in  a  party's 
name  was  only  a  security  for  a  debt ; 5  a  verbal  contract  to  re- 
build in  connection  with  a  written  lease;6  an  agreement  that 
a  mortgagor  ma)7  continue  in  possession  under  a  chattel  mort- 
gage,7 or  an  agreement  by  the  obligee  in  a  deed  to  receive  in 
payment  a  note  of  a  third  party,8  or  an  agreement  by  a  grantor 
to  grade  a  street,9  may  all  be  shown  by  parol  where  such  in- 
dependent oral  contract  does  not  contradict  the  language  of 
the  written  agreement.  But  where  the  effect  of  the  collateral 
parol  agreement  is  to  make  an  entirely  new  contract  out  of 
the  written  contract,  parol  evidence  is  not  admissible.10  But 
a  contemporaneous  independent  parol  contract,  the  perform- 
ance of  which  is  a  condition  precedent  to  the  creation  of  a 
binding  obligation  under  a  written  agreement,  may  be  shown.11 


i  Collette  v.  Weed,  68  Wis.  428. 
2Huckabee  v.  Shepherd,  75  Ala. 
342. 

3  Weber  v.  Kingsland,  8  Bosw.  415. 

4  Humphreys  v.  Railroad  Co.,  88 
Va.  431. 

a  Zabel  v.  Nyenhuis,  83  Iowa,  750. 
6  Curmning   v.    Barber,   99   N.  C. 
332. 

•  Pierce  v.  Stevens,  30  Me.  184. 

8  Murchie  v.  Cook,  1  Ala.  41. 

9  Durkin  v.  Cobleigh,  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
474. 

10  Miller  Ins.  Co.  v.  Kinneard,  35 
111.  App.  105 ;  Blair  v.  Buttolph,  72 
Iowa.  31 ;  Timms  v.  Sherman,  19 
Md.  296;  Keeley  v.  Oliver  (N.  C, 
1893),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  698 ;  Hubbard  v. 
Greeley,  84  Me.  340 ;  Gerard  v.  Cow- 
perthwait,  21  N.  Y.  S.  1092;  Lathrop 
v.  Foster,  51  Me.  367 ;  Still  v.  Tomp- 
kins, 154  Pa.  St.  43;  Richards  v. 
Day,  63  Hun,  635 ;  Haworth  v.  Nor- 
ris,  28  Fla.  763;  Frost  v.  Blanchard, 
97  Mass.  155 ;  Woodward  v.  Foster, 
18  N.  Y.  S.  827;  McLeod  v.  Skiles, 


81  Mo.  595;  Trent  v.  Fletcher,  100 
Ind.  105;  Bishop  v.  Dillard,  49  Ark. 
285;  Barclay  v.  Pursley,  110  Pa.  St. 
13.  So  oral  evidence  will  not  be  re- 
ceived to  attach  a  condition  to  an 
absolute  promise  to  pay  in  writing. 
Allen  v.  Furbish,  4  Gray,  504 ;  Bil- 
lings v.  Billings,  10  Cush.  178,  182; 
Ridgway  v.  Bowman,  7  Cush.  268. 
ii  Corn  v.  Rosenthal  (N.  Y.,  1893), 
1  Misc.  Rep.  168 ;  Black  v.  Shreve,  13 
N.  J.  Eq.  455;  Badcock  v.  Steadman, 
1  Root  (Conn.),  87;  Ilnmphreys  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  13  S.  E.  Rep.  985;  Ben- 
ton v.  Martin,  52  N.  Y.  570 ;  Juillard 
v.  Chaffee,  92  N.  Y.  535 ;  Michels  v. 
Olmstead,  14  Fed.  Rep.  219;  Pierce 
v.  Ted  well,  81  Ala.  299;  Jordan  v. 
Loftin,  13  Ala.  547;  Minchin  v. 
Minchin  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
164;  Watkins  v.  Bowers,  119  Mass. 
383;  Wilson  v.  Powers.  131  id.  539; 
Westman  v.  Krumweide,  30  Minn. 
313;  Sweet  v.  Stevens,  7  R.  I.  375; 
Cuthrell  v.  Cuthrell,  101  Ind.  375; 
Robinson    v.    Evans,    3    S.    C.    335; 


312  PAROL   OR   EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§§  213,  214. 

§  213.  To  establish  implied,  resulting  or  constructive 
trust. —  By  statute  it  is  a  universal  rule  that  express  trusts 
in  real  property  must  be  evidenced  by  some  writing,1  though 
it  should  not  be  understood  that  the  trust  must  be  created  by 
a  written  instrument.  The  writing  is  only  needed  for  its 
proof,  and  is  regarded  simply  as  an  admission  of  its  existence. 
Parol  evidence  will  not  be  received  to  supply  what  has  been 
omitted  from  the  writing.  This  rule,  however,  applies  only 
to  express  trusts.  Implied,  constructive  and  resulting  trusts 
in  real  property  may  be  created  by  parol.2  So  where  a  deed 
is  absolute  upon  its  face,  parol  evidence  is  admissible,  though 
it  should  be  clear  and  satisfactory,3  to  show  that  the  consid- 
eration was  paid  by  a  person  other  than  the  grantee,  and  to 
establish  a  resulting  trust  in  favor  of  the  party  paying  the 
consideration.4  But  a  grantor  in  an  absolute  deed  will  not  be 
permitted  to  show  that  a  trust  was  intended  in  his  favor, 
though  a  third  party  paying  the  consideration  may  do  so.5 

§  214.  Discharge,  modification  or  extension  of  contract 
may  he  shown. —  A  writing  under  seal  cannot  be  discharged 
or  satisfied  by  an  instrument  of  an  inferior  character.6  But 
a  simple  contract  may  be  orally  rescinded  or  dissolved  if  no 
breach  of  its  conditions  has  occurred,  and  this  oral  discharge 
or  rescission  may  be  shown  by  extrinsic  evidence,7  even  where 

Wencllinger  v.    Smith,  75  Va.   309.  v.  Brison,   75  Cal.    525.     In  a  few 

But  the  evidence  of  such  parol  agree-  cases   parol  evidence  has  been  ad- 

ment  must  be  clear,  precise  and  sat-  mitted  to  establish  an  active  result- 

isfactory.    Thomas  v.  Loose,  114  Pa.  ing  trust.  Barker  v.  Prentiss,  GMass. 

St.  45;  114  id.   170;  Cake  v.  Potts  430;  Brown  v.  Isbell,  11  Ala.  1009. 

Bank,  116  id.  270.  5  Lawson  v.   Lawson,   117  111.98; 

1  See  post,  §  264.  Gerry    v.    Stimpson,    60    Me.    186; 

2  Tiedeman  on  Equity,  §§  308-312,  Whyte  v.  Arthur,  17  N.  J.  Eq.  521. 
and  post,  §  264.  6  As  to  what  constitutes  a  seal  and 

3  Green  v.  Dietrich,  114  111.  636;  its  necessity,  see  Tiedeman  on  R.  P., 
Woodward  v.  Sibert,  82  Va.  441 ;  §  808,  where  the  authorities  are  fully 
Catoe  v.  Catoe,  32  S.  C.  595;  10  S.  E.  cited;  2  Bl.  Com.  305-6. 

Rep.  1078;  Hoover  v.  Hoover,  129  7  Brownfield's  Ex'r  v.  Brownfield, 
Pa.  St.  201.  151  Pa.  St.  565;  Whitcher  v.  Shat- 
*Borst  v.  Nalle,  28  Gratt.  (Va.)  tuck,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  545;  Marsh  v. 
423;  Von  Trotha  v.  Bamberger,  15  Bellew,  45  Wis.  39;  Davis  v.  Good- 
Colo.  1;  Leakey  v.  Gunter,  25  Tex.  rich,  45  Vt.  36;  Page  v.  Einstein,  7 
400;  Hudson  v.  White,  17  R.  I.  519:  Jones  (N.  C).  147;  Tucker  v.  Tucker 
Larman  v.  Knight,  140  111.  132;  (Ind.,  1887),  13  N.  E.  Rep.  710;  Estes 
Rank  v.  Grote,  110  N.  Y.  12;  Brison  v.  Fry,  94  Mo.  260;  Sessions  v.  Peay, 


§  214.]  PAROL   OR   EXTRINSIC   EVIDENCE.  313 

t 

'<• 

a  writing  is  by  the  statute  of  frauds  made  essential  to  the 
validity  of  the  original  agreement.1  Not  on\y  may  the  express 
annulment  or  abandonment  of  a  written  contract  be  thus 
orally  shown,  but  a  subsequent  oral  contract  founded  on  a  fresh 
consideration,  operating  either  as  a  modification  or  limitation 
of  the  former  written  contract  or  as  a  substitute  for  it,  may 
be  shown  by  parol.2  Under  this  rule  parol  evidence  has  been 
received  to  show  that  the  parties  have  consented  to  a  change 
in  the  time,  place  and  manner  of  performance;  that  a  new 
or  different  consideration  has  been  agreed  upon,  and  that  the 
promisor  has  agreed  to  do  something  wholly  different  from 
what  was  mentioned  in  the  writing.3  If  a  written  contract 
has  been  lost  its  contents  ma}7,  be  proved  by  parol  when  a 
new  and  different  parol  contract  has  been  made  in  its  place.* 
An  oral  extension  of  the  time  of  performance  made  prior  to  a 
breach  of  the  contract  may  be  shown,  and  it  is  immaterial 
whether  the  writing  was  sealed5  or  not,  or  whether  it  wras  a 
contract  within  the  statute  of  frauds.6  But  oral  evidence  is 
never  admissible  to  show  a  subsequent  material  verbal  modi- 
fication of  the  terms  of  any  agreement  which  under  the  stat- 

21  Ark.  400;  Harrington  v.  Samples  Cobb  v.    O'Neal,    2    Sneed   (Tenn.), 

36  Minn.  200-  Arnold  v.  Arnold,  20  438;  Holloway  v.  Frick  (Pa.,   1893), 

Iowa,  273;   Medomack  v.  Curtis,  24  24  Atl.  Rep.  201;  Worrell  v.  Forsyth 

Me.  36;  Fowler  v.  Smith,  153  Pa.  St.  (111.,  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep.  673;  Flan- 

639  (satisfaction  of  judgment).  ders  v.  Fay,  40  Vt.   316;   Thompson 

iBuell    v.    Miller     4   N.    II.    196;  v.  Locke,   65  Iowa,  429 ;  Bannon  v. 

Cummings  v.  Arnold,   3  Mete.  486;  Aultman,  80  Wis.   307;   Cartwright 

Vanderlin  v.  Hovis,  152  Pa.   St.   11.  v.  Clopton,  25  Ga.  85. 

2 Frick  v.  Mill  Co.  (Kan.,  1893),  32  3Shapt  v.  Wyckoff,  39  N.   J.   Eq. 

Pac.  Rep.  1103;  Richardson  v.  Hooper,  376;  Mead  v.  Parker,  111  N.  Y.  259; 

13  Pick.  446 ;  Delacroix  v.  Bulkley,  Walker    v.    Camp,    63    Iowa,    627; 

13  Wend.   71;    Nashua,  etc.   Co.   v.  Cummings  v.  Putnam,  19  N.  H.  569; 

Boston,   etc.   Corp.,   31    N.  E.   Rep.  Danforth  v.  Mclntire,  11  111.   App. 

1060  (Mass.,  1893);  Munroe  v.  Perk-  417,  and  cases  supra. 

ins,  9  Pick.  298;  Raymond  v.  Kraus-  4  Walker  v.   B.  Wilmington,  etc. 

kopf  (Iowa,    1893),  54  N.   W.   Rep.  Co.,  26  S.  C.  80. 

432;  Vanderlin  v.  Hovis,  152  Pa.  St.  5  Branch  v.  Wilson,  12  Fla.  543. 

11;  Strauss  v.   Gross  (Tex.,  1893),  21  6 steams  v.  Hall,  9  CuSh.  (Mass.) 

S.  W.  Rep.    305;   Stallings  v.  Gotts-  31;  Mead  v.  Parker,  HI  N.  Y.  259; 

chalk  (Md..  1893),  26  Atl.   Rep.   524;  Grace  v.  Lynch,  80  Wis.    166;  Bige- 

Janney  v.  Brown,  36  La.  Ann.  118;  low  v.  Capen,  145  Mass.  273 (renewal 

Piatt  v.  United  States,  22  Wall.  490;  of  note). 
Creamer  v.  Stevenson,  15  Md.    Ill; 


314  PAROL    OK    EXTEINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§  215. 

ute  of  frauds  is  required  to  be  in  writing,  as  a  new  verbal 
contract  under  such  conditions  would  be  inoperative.1  The 
date  of  the  execution  of  an  instrument  when  inserted  in  the 
writing  is  always  open  to  explanation,  unless  the  date  of  exe- 
cution is  an  essential  element  of  the  contract  itself,  when  to 
show  a  different  date  would  be  to  make  a  new  parol  contract 
for  the  parties.2  The  date  as  given  is  presumed  to  be  correct3 
until  the  contrary  is  shown.4  So,  too,  a  date  which  has  been 
omitted  may  be  supplied  by  parol.5 

§  2 1 5.  To  rebut  presumptions. —  If  a  presumption  of  law  is 
customarily  drawn  from  certain  language  employed  in  a  writ- 
ten instrument,  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  rebut  this  pre- 
sumption by  showing  that  in  this  particular  instance  the  inten- 
tion of  the  party  was  that  the  usual  inference  should  not  follow. 
So  it  is  presumed  where  two  legacies  of  the  same  amount  are 
bequeathed  to  one  person  for  the  same  purpose  that  the  tes- 
tator does  not  intend  that  they  shall  be  cumulative.  Under 
such  circumstances  parol  evidence  is  admissible,  not  to  vary 
the  will,  but  to  show  that  the  testator  intended  that  the  earlier 
legacy  should  not  be  satisfied  by  the  later,  and  that  the  ben- 
eficiary should  take  both.  In  other  words,  extrinsic  evidence 
is  admitted  to  show  that  the  will  as  it  stands  speaks  the  true 
intent  of  the  testator.6  So  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to 
rebut  a  resulting  trust  which  arises  in  favor  of  the  heirs  of 
the  testator,  on   the  failure   or   lapse   of   a   devise,7  and  to 

xDana  v.    Hancock,    30  Vt.    616;  John  v.   Am.   Mut.    L.    Ins.    Co.,  2 

Low  v.  Treadwell,  12  Me.   441 ;  Hill  Duer  (N.  Y.),  415. 

v.  Blake,  97  N.  Y.  216;  Whittier  v.  ^Burditt  v.  Hunt,  25  Me.  419. 

Dana,    10    Allen,    326;    Jamison   v.  6  Clendouning  v.  Clyrner,  17  Ind. 

Ludlow,  3  La.   Ann.  492;  Adler  v.  155;  Paine  v.  Parsons,  14  Pick.  313; 

Friedman,  16  Cal.  138;  Marsh  v.  Bel-  Dewitt  v.  Yates,  10  Johns.  156;  Cecil 

lew,  41  Wis.  39;    Hill  v.   Blake,   97  v.  Cecil,  20  Md.   153;  Hine  v.  Hine, 

N.    Y.    216.      Thus,  parol  evidence  39  Barb.  507 ;  Russell  v.  Stanbyn,  16 

of  a  general  warranty  is  not  admis-  Moak's  Eng.  818;  Sims  v.  Sims,    2 

sible  to  vary  the  terms  of  a  deed  Stockton   Ch.  152;  Jones  v.  Mason, 

containing  a  limited  warranty  only.  5   Rand.    (Va.)   577;    Timberlake   v. 

Raymond    v.    Raymond,    10    Cush.  Parish,  5  Dana,  348. 

(Mass.)  134.  ?McCure  v.  Evans,  29  Beav.  422; 

2  Draper  v.  Snow,  20  N.  Y.  331;  Powell  v.  Manson,  3  Mason,  347; 
Ellis  v.  Bank,  7  How.  (U.  S.)  294 ;  Bar-  Stark  v.  Canady,  3  Litt.  399 ;  Mann 
low  v.  Buckingham,  68  Iowa,  169.  v.  Mann,  14  Johns.    1 ;  Reynolds  v. 

3  Cowing  v.  Altman,  71  N.  Y.  433.  Robinson,    82   N.   Y.    103;  Sture   v. 

4  Foster  v.  Beals,  21  N.  Y.  247 ;  St.  Sture,  5  Johns.  Ch.  1. 


§  215.]  TAKOL   OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  315 

show  that  a  legacy  by  a  parent  to  a  child  is  not  in  satisfac- 
tion of  a  portion  due  him.1  Where  a  parent  or  other  person 
standing  in  loco  parentis  makes  a  pecuniary  provision  for  a 
child  either  in  land  or  money,  which  is  not  made  for  the  pur- 
pose of  providing  for  the  education  of  the  latter  or  which  is 
not  a  mere  gift  to  him,  the  law  will  presume  that  it  was  in- 
tended as  an  advancement  pro  tanto  of  what  the  child  would 
take  on  the  death  of  the  person  either  by  the  statutes  of  de- 
scent or  distribution  or  by  devise  from  the  latter.  If  the  ad- 
vancement is  to  be  deducted  from  a  devise  by  will,  then  parol 
evidence  is  admissible,  including  the  declarations  of  the  tes- 
tator, to  rebut  the  presumption  that  the  gift  was  an  advance- 
ment and  that  the  devise  is  thereby  satisfied.'2  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  person  in  loco  parentis  dies  intestate,  parol 
evidence  may  be  received  to  rebut  this  presumption  where 
the  gift  or  advancement  consisted  of  land  the  transfer  of 
which  is  evidenced  by  a  writing,3  or  where  a  note  or  other 
evidence  of  indebtedness  is  given  by  the  child  to  the  parent,4 
or  where  the  advancement  to  the  child  is  entered  in  the  books 
of  the  parent  in  the  form  of  a  charge  against  the  former. 
The  presumption  of  delivery  5  by  the  grantor  or  of  accept- 
ance by  the  grantee6  which  arises  when  a  properly  executed 
deed  is  found  in  the  latter's  possession  may  be  rebutted  bv 
parol  evidence  that  the  deed  was  not  intended  to  be  deliv- 
ered or  that  the  grantee  was  ignorant  of  the  conveyance.7 

i  Smith  v.  Condor,  9  Ch.   D.   170;  Lamb,    12   N.    J.    Eq.  116;  Little  v. 

Lacon  v.  Lacon.  W.   N.  1891,  p.  25;  Gilson,  39  N.  H.  505:  Morris  v.  Hen- 

Hine  v.  Hine,  39  Barb.  507    May  v.  derson,    37   Miss.    501 ;  Faulkner    v. 

May,  28  Ala.  141 ;  Rogers  v.  French,  Adams,  126  Ind.  459 ;  Mayor  v.  Todd, 

19  Ga.  316;  Nolan  v.  Bolton,  25  id.  84  Mich.  85;  Ford  v.  James,  2  Abb. 

352;  Langdon  v.  Astor,  16  N.  Y.  34;  Pr.    162;  Wolverton   v.    Collins,    34 

Richard  v.  Humphreys,  15  Pick.  139 ;  Iowa,  238. 
Miner  v.  Atherton,  35  Pa.  St.  528.  6  Peavey  v.    Tilton,  18  N.  H.    152; 

2  See  cases  in  last  note.  Tompkins  v.  Wheeler,  16  Pet.   119; 

3  Phillips  v.  Chappell,  16  Ga.  16;  Fonda  v.  Sage,  46  Barb.  109;  St. 
Sayles  v.  Baker,  5  R.  I.  457 ;  Miller's  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ruddell  (Ark., 
Appeal,  31  Pa.  St.  337;  Scott  v.  Scott,  1890),  13  S.  W.  Rep.  418;  Dikeman 
1  Mass.  527.  v.  Arnold,   78  Mich.  455 ;  44  N.  W. 

4Tillotson  v.  Race,  22  N.  Y.  127.  Rep.  407. 

5  Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  g  812;  Adams  '  See  Tiedeman  on  Real  Property, 

v.    Frye,  5    Mete.  109;    Roberts    v.  §g  812,  813. 
Jackson,    1    Wend.    478;   Black    v. 


316 


PAKOL   OR   EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  210. 


§  216.  To  show  usage. —  The  general  and  uniform  doing 
of  a  certain  act  is  denominated  usage.  Though  the  word  is 
sometimes  employed  as  synonymous  with  "custom,"  a  distinc- 
tion in  meaning  mav  be  noted.  "  Usa^e  is  the  fact:  custom 
the  law.  There  may  be  usage  without  custom ;  there  can  be 
no  custom  without  usage  to  precede  it.  Usage  consists  in  a 
repetition  of  acts;  custom  arises  out  of  this  repetition."1 
Well-recognized,  long-established  usages  and  customs  preva- 
lent in  the  locality  where  a  contract  is  made  or  a  will  or  deed 
executed  are  presumed  to  be  known  to  the  parties  and  to  be 
present  in  their  minds  when  the  instrument  is  executed.2 
Where  no  express  direction  to  the  contrary  exists,  parol  evi- 
dence of  usage  is  admissible  to  ascertain  the  intention  of  the 
parties  or  explain  the  nature  and  subject-matter  of  the  instru- 
ment or  the  meaning  of  its  terms,  wherever  ambiguity  or  obscu- 
rity exists  upon  these  subjects.3  On  the  other  hand,  where  the 
language  is  clear  and  free  from  doubt,  and  no  ambiguity  or 
uncertainty  is  found,  parol  evidence  of  custom  is  not  to  be 
received  to  control  or  vary  the  stipulations  of  the  instrument.4 


1  Cutter  v.  Waddingham,  22  Mo. 
284:  Power  v.  Bowdle  (N.  D.,  1893), 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  410,  citing  Wharton 
on  Evid.,  410. 

2 Howard  v.  Walker  (Term.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  897;  Austrian  v.  Sprin- 
ger, 91  Mich.  343 ;  Pennell  v.  Delta 
Co.,  94  Mich.  247;  McManus  v.  Lon- 
don (Minn.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  139; 
McCullough  v.  Ashbridge,  155  Pa. 
St.  160.  In  the  case  of  a  particular 
custom  not  of  general  observance 
and  notoriety,  actual  knowledge  must 
be  brought  home  to  the  parties. 
Milw.  etc.  Co.  v.  Johnson,  35  Neb. 
554. 

a  Brown  v.  Baldwin  Co.,  13  N.  Y. 
S.  893;  McClusky  v.  Klosterman,  20 
Oreg.  108;  25  Pac.  Rep.  366;  Atkin- 
son v.  Truesdell,  127  N.  Y.  230 ;  27  N. 
E.  Rep.  844;  Long  v.  Armsby  Co., 
43  Mo.  App.  253 ;  Thompson  v.  Bran- 
nin  (Ky.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  1057; 
Pucci  v.  Barney,  21  N.  Y.  S.  1099; 
Destrehan  v.  Louisiana  Cypress  Co. 


(La.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  230;  Merchant 
v.  Howell  (Minn.,  1S93),  55  N.  W. 
Rep.  131 ;  Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Webb  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S.  Rep.  888; 
Harrell  v.  Zimpleman,  66  Tex.  292; 
Sahlien  v.  Bank,  90  Tenn.  221.  See 
also,  Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  §  611.  "A 
general  usage  may  be  proved  in 
proper  cases  to  remove  ambiguities 
and  uncertainties  in  a  contract  or  to 
annex  incidents,  but  it  cannot  de- 
stroy, contradict  or  modify  what  is 
otherwise  manifest.  Where  the  intent 
and  meaning  are  clear,  evidence  of 
usage  to  the  contrary  is  irrelevant. 
Usage  cannot  make  a  contract  where 
there  is  none."  First  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Burkhardt,  100  U.  S.  692.  The  cus- 
tom need  not  be  pleaded.  Breen  v. 
Moran,  53  N.  W.  Rep.  755. 

•»The  Reeside,  2  Sumn.  567;  Cook 
v.  Hawkins,  16  S.  W.  Rep.  8 ;  54  Ark. 
423 ;  Van  Camp  v.  Hartman,  126  Ind. 
177;  Larrowe  v.  Lewis,  58  Hun,  601 ; 
De  Cemea  v.  Cornell,  20  N.  Y.  S.  895 ; 


§  216.]  PAROL   OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  317 

But  a  custom  must  be  generally  known  and  uniformly  and 
continuously  observed  where  the  contract  is  made,  or  in  the 
profession  or  trade  to  which  the  parties  belong;  for  if  it  be 
conlined  to  a  limited  class  of  persons,  it  is  not  presumptively 
binding,  and  parol  evidence  of  its  existence  is  inadmissible.1 
The  courts  have  adverted  to  the  danger  of  allowing  the  in- 
troduction of  parol  evidence  of  custom  to  modify  or  limit  the 
general  application  of  the  common  law  and  the  law  merchant 
to  the  liabilities  and  obligations  of  parties.  The  present  trend 
of  the  cases  is  perhaps  restrictive  in  this  respect;  and  while 
evidence  of  general  and  notorious  customs  is  always  admis- 
sible to  explain  a  writing,  evidence  of  customs  which  are  lim- 
ited in  their  operations  should  only  be  received  after  it  is 
shown  that  the  parties  contracted  with  express  reference 
thereto.2  So,  though  parol  evidence  of  general  usage  is  ad- 
missible whether  the  instrument  under  consideration  be  a  cor- 
porative charter,  or  other  statute  or  deed  or  simple  contract,3 
yet  proof  of  custom  will  not  be  admissible  to  enlarge  the 
statutory  authority  of  officials,4  or  to  establish  a  different  rule 
of  law  from  that  laid  down  by  a  statute.5 

1  Misc.  Rep.  399;  Dobson  v.  Kuhula,  2See  remarks  of  Justice  Story  in 

66  Hun,  627;  Iasigi  v.  Rosenstein,  65  Schooner  Reeside,  2  Sumn.  567;  Nor- 

id.  591;  Sitnis  v.  Railway  Co.,  20  N.  dans  v.  Hubbard,  48  Fed.  Rep.  921. 

Y.  S.  179;  Gilbert  v.  McGinnis,  114  3Farrar    v.    Stackpole,    6   Greenl. 

111.  48;  Newhall  v.  Appleton,  114  N.  154;.  Meriam  v.  Harsen,  2  Barb.  233. 

Y.  143;  De  Witt  v.  Berry,  134  U.  S.  *  Walters  v.  Senf  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 

314;  Emery  v.  Bos.  Marine  Ins.  Co.,  W.  Rep.  311. 

138  Mass.  398;  Bigelow  v.  Legg,  102  5Gore  v.  Lewis,  109  N.  C.  539; 
N.  Y.  654.  Corn  Exch.  Bank  v.  Nassau  Bank, 
i  Pennell  v.  Delta  Co.,  94  Mich.  247 ;  91  N.  Y.  74.  The  evidence  of  a  sin- 
Martin  v.  Ashland  Mill  Co.,  49  Mo. — ;  gle  witness  is,  if  unimpeached,  suf- 
Larson  v.  Johnson,  42  111.  App.  198;  ficient  to  prove  usage.  Miller  v.  In- 
Greenwich  Ins.  Co.  v.  Waterman,  surance  Co.,  1  Abb.  N.  C.  470;  Vail 
54  Fed.  Rep.  839 ;  McCullough  v.  v.  Rice,  5  N.  Y.  155 ;  Robinson  v. 
Ashbridge,  155  Pa.  St.  166;  Oregon  United  States,  13  Wall.  363.  See, 
Short,  etc.  Co.  v.  N.  P.  Ry.  Co.,  51  also,  Abbott's  Brief  on  Facts,  §3  727- 
Fed.  Rep.  465 ;  McKeefrey  v.  Con-  735.  He  need  not  be  an  expert  if  he 
nellsville  Coke  Co.,  56  Fed.  Rep.  470;  knows  the  usage.  Griffin  v.  Rice,  1 
Dobson  v.  Kuhula,  66  Hun,  627;  Hilt.  (N.  Y.)  184.  But  his  testimony 
Bard  well  v.  Ziegler,  3  Wash.  St.  34;  to  specific  acts  is  incompetent  as 
Chateaugay,  etc.  Co.  v.  Blake,  144  U.  proof  of  a  usage.  Springfield  v. 
S.  476.  The  custom  need  not  be  co-  Vivian,  63  Mich.  681 ;  Abbott,  Brief 
extensive  with  the  state.  Lane  v.  on  Facts,  §  732. 
Union  Bank,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  613. 


318 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  217. 


§  2 1 7.  Technical  terms. —  Where  language  has  an  accepted 
popular,1  commercial  or  scientific  meaning,2  the  court  will 
take  notice  of  its  significance  and  will  not  receive  evidence  to 
affix  a  different  meaning,3  upon  the  presumption  that  the 
parties  employed  the  words  in  their  accustomed  sense.4  But 
where  commercial  or  scientific  terms  which  are  peculiarly 
technical  are  used,  or  where  ordinary  words  are  used  in  a 
technical  sense,  i,  e.,  a  sense  peculiar  to  a  particular  locality  or 
trade,  a  latent  ambiguity  arises  where  these  words  are  viewed 
in  relation  to  the  subject-matter  or  to  extrinsic  circumstances, 
and.  under  such  circumstances,  where  their  meaning  is  not 
clear,  parol  evidence  is  always  admissible.5     But  the  witness 


iKemble  v.  Lull,  3  McLean,  272; 
Sexton  v.  Windell,  23  Gratt.  534; 
Brawley  v.  United  States,  96  U.  S. 
168;  Bradish  v.  Yocum,  130  111.  386. 

2  Hart  man  v.  Camman,  10  N.  J. 
Eq.  128. 

3  "  When  parties  engaged  in  a  par- 
ticular   business    use   terms   which 


(Shickle  v.  Chouteau  Ry.,  84  Mo. 
161)  "  payment "  (Van  Fleet  v. 
Sledge,  45  Fed.  Rep.  743),  "  a  reason- 
able time "  (Jenkins  v.  Lykes,  19 
Fla.  148),  "timber"  (Pillsbury  v. 
Locke,  33  N.  H.  96),  "lumber" 
(Williams  v.  Stevens,  72  Wis.  487), 
"store  goods"  (Taylor  v.   Sayre,   4 


have  acquired  a  well-defined  mean-    Zab.  647),  will  be  rejected. 


ing  in  that  business,  the  supposition 
is  that  they  intended  the  terms  to 
have  their  ordinary  technical  mean- 
ing." South  Bend  Iron  Works  v. 
Cottrell,  31  Fed.  Rep.  256;  Chilberg 
v.  Jones,  3  Wash.  St.  530;  Cole  v. 
Lake,  54  N.  H.  278 ;  Caldwell  v.  Ful- 


5  Bryan  v.  Harrison,  76  N.  C.  360; 
Silberman  v.  Clark,  90  N.  Y.  524; 
Clark  v.  Coffin  Co.,  125  Ind.  277; 
Hall  v.  Davis,  36  N.  H.  569;  Charles 
v.  Patch,  87  Mo.  450;  Mack  v.  Bens- 
ley,  63  Wis.  80;  Estman  v.  St.  An- 
thony, etc.  Co.,  43  Minn.   60;  44  N. 


ton,  31  Pa.  St.  849;  Cross  v.  Thorn p-    W.  Rep.  882;  Highton  v.  Dessau,  19 


son,  50  Kan.  627;  Gardt  v.  Brown, 
113  111.  475;  Holcomb  v.  Mooney,  13 
Oreg.  513 ;  Bradish  v.  Yocum,  130  111. 
386;  Van  Fleet  v.  Sledge,  45  Fed. 
Rep.  743;  Matley  v.  Long,  71  Md. 
585;  Lippett  v.   Kelly,   46  Vt.    516; 


N.  Y.  S.  395 ;  Putnam  v.  Bond,  100 
Mass.  58;  Wabash,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Dougal,  113  111.  603;  Atlanta  v. 
Schmelzer,  89  Ga.  609;  Westmore- 
land v.  Carson,  76  Tex.  619 ;  Bollinger 
Co.   v.   McDowell,  99   Mo.   632.     So 


Fruin  v.  Railroad,  89  Mo.  397;  In-    parol  evidence  has  been  received  to 
surance  Co.  v.  Throop,  22  Mich.  146 ;    explain  the  meaning  of  such  terms 


Willmering  v.  McGauhey,  30  Iowa, 
205. 

4  So  parol  evidence  to  explain  well- 
known     words,    as     "lower"     and 


as  "fur"  (Astor  v.  Insurance  Co.,  7 
Cow.  202),  "  barrel "  (Mill*  v. 
Stevens,  100  Mass.  518),  "  terms,  two 
months"  (Hurd  v.  Bovee,  134  N.  Y. 


"south"    (Farley    v.   Deslonde,    69    596;   31   N.    E.    Rep.    624),    "mason 


Tex.  458),  "  breeder  and  foal-getter  " 
(Cross  v.  Thompson,  supra),  "  present 
and  future "  (Swain  v.  Grangers' 
Union,  69  Cal.  176),  "  more  or  less" 


work  "  (Highton  v.  Dessau,  19  N.  Y. 
S.  395).  "horn  chains"  (Swett  v. 
Shumway,  102  Mass.  365),  "  head- 
right "  (Minor  v.  Powers  (Tex.  Civ. 


§  218.] 


PAROL    OK    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


119 


who  is  called  to  explain  the  meaning  of  the  terms  should  be 
confined  to  his  legitimate  office  and  should  not  be  allowed  to 
affix  a  construction  to  the  instrument.1 

§218.  Abbreviations. —  These  may,  where  they  occur  in 
writing,  be  explained  by  parol  evidence2  of  usage,  if  consist- 
ent with  the  language  of  the  contract,3  though  if  they  have 
acquired  a  recognized  legal  or  popular  meaning  parol  evidence 
to  show  they  are  used  in  another  sense  will  be  rejected.4  The 
letters  "  I.  O.  IT."  constitute  a  valid  acknowledgment  of  a 
debt  due,5  and  a  written  "I.  O.  U."  is  presumptive  evidence 
of  an  account  stated.6  The  meaning  of  the  letters  "C."  and 
"J.  P."  after  the  signatures  on  a  writ  may  be  explained  by 
parol  as  meaning  "  constable"  and  "justice  of  the  peace."  7 


App.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  710), 
"  homestead  farm  "  (Locke  v.  Row- 
ell,  47 N.  H.  46),  "on  margin" (Hatch 
v.  Douglas,  48  Conn.  116),  "un- 
settled "  (Auzeriaz  v,  Neglee,  74  Cal. 
60),  "equal  to  Corliss"  (Wickes  v. 
Swift  Co.,  70  Mich.  322),  "product" 
(Stewart  v.  Smith,  23  111.  397),  "reg- 
ular turn  of  loading  "  (Leideinan  v. 
Schultz,  24  Eng.  L.  &  Eq.  305), 
"  care  of  R.  R.  Ag't"  (Saw,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Collins,  77  Ga.  376),  "season" 
(Wachterhaus  v.  Smith.  10  N.  Y.  S. 
535),  "  crop  of  flax  "  (5  Lans.  (N.  Y.) 
230),  "  cold  storage "  (Behrman  v. 
Lind,  47  Hun,  530),  "  payable  in 
trade  "  (Dudley  v.  Vose,  1 14  Mass. 
34),  "spitting  of  blood"  (Singleton 
v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.,  66  Mo.  63), 
"proposition"  (Lamb  v.  State,  66 
Md.  285),  "flood-dams  cribbed, 
sparred,  etc."  (Quigley  v.  De  Hass, 
98  Pa.  St.  292),  "  bought  12J,  6  mos." 
(Dana  v.  Fiedler,  12  N.  Y.  40), 
"good  custom  cowhide"  (Wait  v. 
Fairbanks,  Brayt.  (Vt.)  77),  "good 
breeder"  (Connable  v.  Clark,  26  Mo. 
App.  192),  "merchantable  hay" 
(Fitch  v.  Carpenter,  43  Barb.  40), 
"advertising  chart  when  published" 
(Stoops  v.  Smith,  100  Mass.  63). 
1  Reynolds  v.  Jordan,  6  Cal.  109 ; 


State  v.  Lefaivre,  53  Mo.  470;  Arthur 
v.  Roberts,  60  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  580; 
Reynolds  v.  Jordan,  6  Cal.  109; 
Sanford  v.  Rawlings,  43  III.  92. 

2  Hill  v.  State,  9  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  357 ; 
Converse  v.  Weed  (111.,  1892),  31  N. 
E.  Rep.  314;  Jacqua  v.  Witham,  106 
Ind.  515;  Griffin  v.  Salmon,  6  Daly, 
531;  Sheldon  v.  Benham,  4  Hill 
(N.  Y.),  129;  Datum  v.  Gow,  88 
Mich.  99 ;  Taylor  v.  Beavers,  4  E.  D. 
Smith,  215;  Collender  v.  Dinsmore, 
55  N.  Y.  200.  In  wills,  Chambers 
v.  Watson,  60  Iowa,  339 ;  Goblet  v. 
Beechy,  3  Sim.  24;  Norman  v.  Mor- 
rell,  4  Ves.  769;  Clayton  v.  Nugent, 
13  M.  &  W.  206;  Kell  v.  Charmer, 
23  Beav.  195;  Barton  v.  Anderson, 
104  Ind.  578;  Smith  v.  Insurance  Co., 
89  Pa.  St.  287. 

3  Collender  v.  Dinsmore,  55  N.  Y. 
202;  Dana  v.  Fiedler,  12  N.  Y.  40. 

4  Silberman  v.  Clark,  96  N.  Y.  522. 

5  Kinney  v.  Flynn,  2  R.  I.  319. 
6Fesenmyer  v.   Adcock,   16  M.  & 

W.  449;  Curtis  v.  Richards,  1  Scott 
N.  R.  155 ;  Gould  v.  Combs,  1  C.  B. 
543. 

~  Davis  v.  Ham  bell  (Tex.,  1894),  24 
S.  W.  Rep.  972.  "In  declaring  on 
an  instrument  containing  abbrevi- 
ated terms,  extrinsic  averments  may 


320 


PAROL    OB    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§§  219,  220. 


§  211).  The  relations  of  the  parties. —  Parol  evidence  is 
inadmissible  to  show  that  a  person  who  signs  as  principal  was 
an  agent,1  or  that  one  who  signs  as  indorser  was  a  surety.2 
But  parol  evidence  is  often  admissible  to  identify  the  parties,3 
or  to  show  the  relations  of  the  parties,  as  that  a  person  who 
signed  a  note  as  payer  did  so  as  a  surety,4  or  in  his  represent- 
ative capacity,5  or  that  an  indorser  is  not  the  assignee  but  the 
payee  of  a  note,6  or  that  a  person  who  writes  his  name  on  the 
back  of  a  note  did  so  as  a  witness  and  not  as  an  indorser.7 

§  220.  To  ascertain  or  explain  subject-matter. —  The 
term  "subject,"  as  here  used,  may  be  defined  as  the  persons 
or  things  to  which  the  writing  relates.  Parol  evidence  will 
be  admitted  to  identify  or  ascertain  the  subject  of  the  instru- 
ment or  to  explain  its  nature  when,  from  the  circumstances  of 
the  case,  no  light  is  obtainable  from  a  careful  consideration  of 
the  context.8     Thus,  where  property,  whether  real  or  personal, 


be  used  to  make  them  intelligible; 
and  evidence  of  the  sense  in  which 
the  parties  were  in  the  habit  of  using 
the  abbreviations  and  of  their  con- 
ventional meaning  is  admissible,  but 
not  to  show  the  intention  of  one 
party  in  using  them.  Gener-ally,  in 
indictments,  common  words  are  to 
be  used.  Abbreviations  of  terms 
employed  by  men  of  science  or  in 
the  arts  will  not  answer  without  full 
explanation  of  their  meaning  in  com- 
mon language.  The  use  of  '  A.  D.,' 
because  of  its  universality,  consti- 
tutes an  exception.  Arabic  figures 
and  Roman  letters  have  also  become 
indicative  of  numbers  as  fully  as 
words.  Their  general  use  makes 
them  known  to  all.  But  unexplained 
initials,  referring  to  public  land  sur- 
veys, etc.,  may  not  be  employed  in 
an  indictment."  Jacqua  v.  Witham 
&  Co.,  106  Ind.  547-48. 

iSteirle  v.  Kaiser,  12  S.  Rep.  839; 
Hunt  v.  Adams,  7  Mass.  518;  Cream 
City  G.  Co.  v.  Friedlander,  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  28. 

*  Riley  v.  Gerrish,  9  Cush.  104. 


3  Parsons  v.  Thornton,  82  Ala.  308. 

4  Riley  v.  Gregg,  16  Wis.  666; 
Trustees  v.  Southard,  31  111.  App. 
359 ;  Otis  v.  Storch,  15  R.  I.  41 ;  Brad- 
ley v.  Caswell  (Vt.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  956. 

5  Russell  v.  Irwin,  41  Ala.  292; 
Northern  Bank  v.  Lewis,  78  Wis. 
475;  Keidom  v.  Winegar  (Mich., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  901. 

6  Holmes  v.  Goldsmith,  147  U.  S. 
150. 

fTombler  v.  Reitz  (Ind.,  1893),  33 
N.  E.  Rep.  789.  Parol  evidence  is 
not  admissible  to  show  that  one  who 
indorses  "without  recourse"  is  a 
surety.  Young  v.  Nelson  (Minn., 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  629. 

8  "  In  order  to  ascertain  the  relation 
of  the  words  of  a  document  to  facts, 
every  fact  may  be  proved  to  which 
it  refers  or  may  probably  have  been 
intended  to  refer,  or  which  identifies 
any  person  or  thing  mentioned  in  it. 
Such  facts  are  called  the  circum- 
stances of  the  case."  Stephen's  Dig. 
of  Ev.,  art.  91. 


§  220.] 


TAROL    OK    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


321 


is  conveyed,  its  condition  or  extent  at  that  time  is  usually  re- 
ferred to,  and  any  evidence  necessary  to  place  the  court  in 
the  position  of  the  parties  themselves  in  order  to  ascertain 
the  sense  of  the  words  employed  is  admissible.1  Where  a 
description  is  ambiguous  parol  evidence  is  admissible  to  show 
the  extent  and  character  of  a  grantor's  possession.2  Thus, 
where  a  farm  or  house  is  conveyed,  parol  evidence,  while  not 
admissible  to  vary  or  contradict  the  boundaries  stated  in  the 
deed,3  is  admissible  to  ascertain  the  identit}7  or  the  location  of 
the  monuments  where  they  are  lost  or  have  been  moved,  or 
where  doubt  exists  concerning  what  objects  are  intended  as 
monuments.4 

Whenever  something  extrinsic  is  referred  to  as  the  subject- 
matter  of  a  writing,  as  the  family  or  property  of  a  grantor  or 
a  testator,  evidence  of  the  facts  and  circumstances  is  necessary 
to  identify  it  unless,  as  rarely  happens,  the  writing  itself  fur- 
nishes a  means  of  identification.  Thus,  where  a  testator  or 
grantor  refers  to  his  estate  in  Westchester,  or  known  as  B.', 


•Schneider  v.  Patterson  (Neb., 
1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  398;  In  re  Gil- 
more,  154  Pa.  St.  523;  Mounett  v. 
Mounett,  46  Ohio  St.  30;  Richardson 
v.  Palmer,  38  N.  H.  218;  Hughes  v. 
Wilkinson,  35  Ala.  453;  Welch  v. 
Eduaiston,  46  Mo.  App.  282;  Abbot: 
v.  Abbott,  51  Me.  581 ;  Peart  v.  Price, 
152  Pa.  St.  277;  Long  v.  Long,  44 
Mo.  App.  141;  Baker  v.  Hall  (Mass., 
1893;,  33  N.  E.  Rep.  612;  Roberts  v. 
Roberts,  55  N.  Y.  275;  Thompson  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  82  Cal.  497;  Clark 
v.  Coffin  Co.,  125  Ind.  277 ;  Ft.  Worth 
R.  R.  Co.  v.  Bank,  84  Tex.  369; 
Perry  v.  Scott,  109  N.  C.  374 ;  Paugh 
v.  Paugh,  40  111.  App.  143;  Minor 
v.  Powers  (Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep. 
710. 

'-'  Bell  v.  Woodward,  46  N.  H.  327; 
Baker  v.  Hall  (Mass.,  1893),  33  N.  E. 
Rep.  612;  Booth  v.  Palte,  L.  R.  15 
App.  Cas.  188;  Tinsley  v.  Dowell 
(Tex.,  1894),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  928. 

:i  Pride  v.  Lunt,  19  Me.  115?  Par- 
ker v.  Kane,  22  How.  1;  McCoy  v. 
21 


Galloway,  3  Ohio,  283;  Thayer  v. 
Finton,  108  N.  Y.  397 ;  Segar  v.  Bab- 
cock  (R.  I.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  257; 
Drew  v.  Swift,  46  N.  Y.  209;  Dean 
v.  F-skine,  18  N.  H.  83-  Spiller  v. 
Scribner,  36  Vt.  247;  Hall  v.  Eaton, 
139  Mass.  217:  Kernarn  v.  Baham, 
13  S.  Rep.  155;  Beardsley  v.  Crane 
(Minn..  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  740. 

4  Waterman  v.  Johnson,  13  Pick. 
20 1;  Segar  v.  Babcock  (R.  I.,  1893), 
26  Atl.  Rep.  257 ;  Beardsley  v.  Crane 
(Minn.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  740; 
Minor  v.  Kirkland  (Tex.,  1S93),  20  S.- 
W.  Rep.  932;  Campbell  v.  Wood 
(Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  796;  Wead 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  64  Vt.  52;  Sheetz  v. 
Sweeney,  136  111.  336;  Flagg  v. 
Mason  141  Mass.  64;  Converse 
v.  Lamghshow,  81  Tex.  275;  Pickett 
v.  Nelson,  79  Wis.  9;  Rapley  v. 
Klugh  (S.  C,  1894),  18  S.  E.  Rep. 
680;  Wells  v.  Leveridge,  20  Oreg. 
168;  Baldwin  v.  Shannon,  43  N.  J. 
L.  96;  Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  §  832. 


322  TAROL   OR   EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§  220. 

or  occupied  b}'  a  certain  person,  parol  evidence  is  immediately 
required  to  show  that  he  owned  an  estate  such  as  is  described.1 
Again,  suppose  the  testator  bequeathes  his  "  money  "  or  "  house- 
hold furniture,"  or  all  "  his  property  "  or  "estate,"  using  words 
which  have  a  common  and  well-recognized  meaning  in  a  pe- 
culiar, vague  and  confusing  manner.  No  ambiguity,  latent 
or  patent,  can  be  said  to  exist  until  evidence  has  been  received 
which  would  tend  to  ascertain  or  identify  the  subject-matter. 
For  the  words,  while  not  technical  or  unusual,  are  employed 
by  the  writer  in  a  general  and  vague  sense,  and  the  meaning 
which  he  wishes  to  convey  cannot  possibly  be  apprehended 
on  an  inspection  of  the  instrument  alone.  If  extrinsic  evidence 
were  not  receivable  in  such  a  case,  the  intention  of  the  person 
executing  the  instrument  could  not  be  effectuated.2  In  such 
cases  of  doubt  and  uncertainty,  "when  the  language  in  its 
primary  meaning  is  insensible  with  reference  to  extrinsic  cir- 
cumstances,"3  extrinsic  evidence  is  admissible  of  all  facts  and 
circumstances  appertaining  to  the  persons  or  things  which 
are  mentioned  that  will  make  the  intention  of  the  testator 
more  clearly  appear.  But  the  rule  should  not  be  carried  too 
far.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  wills  or  other  transactions  which 
the  law  requires  to  be  in  writing,  parol  evidence  of  the  decla- 
rations of  the  intention  of  the  testator  either  prior  or  sub- 
sequent to  or  contemporaneous  with  the  execution  of  the 
instrument  is  not  admissible,  unless  in  the  case  of  a  latent 
ambiguity  arising  from  the  fact  that  there  are  two  or  more 
persons  or  things  answering  substantially  to  the  description 
of  the  writing.4 

JMead  v.  Parker,   115  Mass.  413;  ham    v.    Gannett,    124    Mass.    151; 

Aldrich  v.   Aldrich,   135  Mass.  153;  Raymond  v.  Coffey,  5  Oreg.  132. 

Knick  v.  Knick,  75  Va.   12;  War-  2  Where    a    testator    devises    the 

field  v.  Booth,  33  Md.  63;  Willis  v.  house  he  lives  in,  parol  evidence  is 

Fernald,  33  N.  J.  L.  20G;  Collender  admissible  to  identify  it.     Beham  v. 

v.   Dins-more,  55  N.  Y.  200;  Collins  Hendrickson,    32    N.    J.    Eq.    441; 

v.   Drisooll,  34  Conn.  43;   Rugg  v.  Chambers  v.  Watson,  60  Iowa,  339. 

Ward,  23  Atl.   Rep.   726;  Riggs  v.  » Taylor,  Ev.,  §  1109;  Wigrarn  on 

Myers,  20  Mo.  239 ;  Austee  v.  Nelmes,  Wills,  67-70. 

1  H.  &  M.  225 ;  Cleverly  v.  Cleverly,  4  Mosely  v.   Martin,   37  Ala.   216; 

124  Mass.  314;  Maguire  v.  Baker,  57  Morse  v.    Stearns,    131    Mass.    389; 

Ga.    109;    Tuxbury   v.    French,   41  Lovejoy  v.  Lovett,  124  id.  270 ;  Hall 

Mich.  7 ;  Black  v.  Hill,  32  Ohio  St.  v.  Davis,  36  N.   H.  569 ;  Morgan  v. 

313;  Cox  v.  Cox,  91  N.  C.  256;  Dun-  Burrows,  45  Wis.  211 ;  Mittnacht  v. 


§  221.]  PAROL   OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  323 

§221.  Ambiguities  defined  and  distinguished  —  Parol  evi- 
dence to  explain. —  An  ambiguity  in  a  written  instrument  is 
any  indistinctness,  duplicity  or  uncertainty  of  meaning  aris- 
ing from  the  word?  having  no  definite  sense  or  a  double  mean- 
ing.1 A  writing  is  not  ambiguous  merely  because  the  court 
cannot  understand  its  meaning  on  account  of  the  technical 
language  in  which  it  is  couched.2  So  language  may  be  in- 
accurate without  being  ambiguous,  and  ambiguous  though 
strictly  accurate.  So  where  by  rejecting  that  portion  of  a 
description  which  is  inaccurate  as  surplusage  the  intention  of 
the  writer  can  be  ascertained,  no  ambiguity  can  be  said  to  exist.3 
On  the  other  hand,  the  words  "  indistinctness,"  "uncertainty  ;' 
and  "  obscurity "  are  much  broader  in  meaning.  They  in- 
clude ambiguities,  but  they  also  include  all  cases  of  language 
which  is  devoid  of  sense  or  which  does  not  have  any  clear  or 
precise  meaning. 

Ambiguities  are  divided  into  those  which  are  patent  and 
those  which  are  latent.4  The  former  class  includes  those 
which  appear  upon  the  face  of  the  writing  itself,  whether  will 
or  deed,  before  the  words  are  applied  to  any  extrinsic  subject 

Slevin,  67  Hun,  615;  Bullock  v.  ambiguous  merely  because  the  court 
Consumers'  Lumber  Co.  (Gal.,  1893),  which  is  called  upon  to  explain 
31  Pac.  Rep.  367 ;  Todd  v.  Roberts,  them  may  be  ignorant  of  a  particu- 
1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  8 ;  Forbes  v.  Dar-  lar  art,  fact  or  science  which  was  fa- 
ling,  94  Mich.  621;  Tompkins  v.  miliar  to  the  person  who  used  the 
Merriman,  155  Pa.  St.  440;  Scraggs  words,  and  a  knowledge  of  which 
v.  Hill  (W.  Va.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  is  necessary  to  a  right  understand- 
185.  ing  of  the  words  he  has  used.     If 

1  Bouvier,  Law.  Diet. ;  Ellmaker  v.  this  be  not  a  just  conclusion  it  must 
Ellmaker,  4  Watts  (Pa.),  89.  follow  that  the  question  whether  a 

2  Wigram,  in  his  treatise  on  Ex-  will  is  ambiguous  might  be  depend- 
trinsic  Evidence,  sections  200  and  ent  not  upon  the  propriety  of  the 
201,  says  in  a  passage  which  has  been  language  the  testator  has  used,  but 
repeatedly  cited  with  approbation:  upon  the  degree  of  knowledge,  gen- 
"  A  written  instrument  is  not  am-  eral  or  even  local,  which  a  particular 
biguous  because  an  ignorant  and  un-  judge  might  happen  to  possess;  nay, 
informed  person  is  unable  to  inter-  the  technical  precision  and  accuracy 
pret  it.  It  is  ambiguous  only  if  of  a  scientific  man  might  occasion  his 
found  to  be  of  uncertain  meaning  intestacy  —  a  proposition  too  absurd 
when  persons  of  competent  skill  and  for  an  argument." 

information  are    unable   to  do    so.  3  Wigram,  §§  200-205. 

Words  cannot  be  ambiguous  because  *  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  297:  Bacon's 

they  are  unintelligible  to  a  man  who  Maxims,  Reg.  23;  Tiedeman,  R.  P., 

is  unable  to  read ;  nor  can  they  be  §  386. 


324: 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  221. 


or  object,  as  when  a  sum  of  money  or  the  name  of  a  person 
is  differently  stated  in  different  parts  of  the  writing.1  Latent 
ambiguities  occur  where  the  writing  itself  is  clear  and  con- 
sistent, but  where,  in  the  language  of  Lord  .Bacon,  "  some 
collateral  matter  out  of  the  deed  breedeth  the  ambiguity." 
Thus,  in  a  devise  of  a  house  at  A.,  a  latent  ambiguity  will 
occur  if  the  testator  owned  two  or  more  houses  in  that  place. 

The  general  rule  is  that  parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to 
explain  a  patent  ambiguity,  and  the  writing  is,  to  the  extent 
it  is  ambiguous,  void  and  inoperative.2  But  the  court  has  a 
right  to  every  aid  which  is  within  its  power  in  construing  any 
instrument.3  And  so  in  the  case  of  a  patent  ambiguity,  some 
exceptions  have  been  made  to  the  general  rule.4 

Latent  ambiguities,  which  arise  when  the  language  of  the 
instrument  is  ambiguous  or  meaningless  as  applicable  to  ex- 
trinsic circumstances,  may  always  be  explained  by  extrinsic 
evidence.5   They  may  be  divided  into  two  classes:  First,  where 


1  Thus,  a  devise  "  to  one  of  the 
sons  of  A."  is  a  good  example  of  a 
patent  ambiguity.  Strode  v.  Rus- 
sell, 2  Vera.  624. 

2Brauns  v.  Stearns,  1  Oreg.  367; 
Brown  v.  Brown,  43  N.  H.  25; 
Scraggs  v.  Hill  (W.  Va.,  1893),  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  185;  Pickering  v.  Pickering, 
50  N.  H.  349;  Pitts  v.  Brown,  49  Vt. 
86 ;  Patch  v.  White,  1  Mackey  (D.  C), 
468 ;  Mann  v.  Mann,  1  Johns.  Ch.  231 ; 
Griffith  v.  Furry,  30  111.  251 ;  Hyatt 
v.  Pugsley,  23  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  285; 
Waldron  v.  Waldron,  45  Mich.  350; 
Hollen  v.  Davis,  59  Iowa,  444 ;  Tucker 
v.  Seamen's  Aid  Society,  7  Mete. 
(Mass.)  188;  Ayres  v.  Weed,  16  Conn. 
291 ;  Horner  v.  Stillwell,  35  N.  J.  L. 
307;  McDermot  v.  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.,  3 
S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  604;  Richmond,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Farquar,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)  89; 
Clark  v.  Lancaster,  36  Md.  196;  Bow- 
yer  v.  Martin,  6  Rand.  (Va.)  525; 
Campbell  v.  Johnson,  44  Mo.  247; 
Harris  v.  Dinkins,  4  Desnus.  (S.  C.) 
60;  Chambers  v.  Ringslaff,  69  Ala. 
140;   Duncan  v.  Duncan,  2  Yeates 


(Pa.),  302 :  2  id.  295 ;  Weston  v.  White, 
5  Md.  297 ;  Mithoff  v.  Byrne,  20  La. 
Ann.  363 ;  Peacher  v.  Strauss,  47  Miss. 
358 ;  Nashville  L.  I.  Co.  v.  Mathews, 
8  Lea  (Tenn.),  299;  Breckinridge  v. 
Duncan,  2  A.  K.  Marsh,  50;  Brennan 
v.  Winkler  (S.  C,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep. 
190.  But  parol  evidence  is  always 
admissible  to  explain  illegible  words 
or  symbols.  Taylor  v.  Beavers,  4 
E.  D.  Smith,  215;  Arthur  v.  Roberts, 
60  Barb.  5,0. 

3  Abbott,  Brief  on  Facts,  §§  148, 149. 

*  Collison  v.  Curling,  9  CI.  &  Fin. 
88.  "  The  rule  forbidding  extrinsic 
evidence  to  cure  a  patent  ambiguity 
is  not  applicable  except  the  writing 
is  required'  by  a  statute  which  the 
ambiguity  prevents  the  writing  from 
satisfying."  Abbott,  Brief  on  Facts, 
§  152. 

&Hildebrand  v.  Fogle,  20  Ohio,  147 ; 
Mason  v.  Ryus,  26  Kan.  464;  How- 
ard v.  American,  etc.  Soc,  49  Me. 
288;  Wheelwright  v.  Akin  (Ga., 
1893),  17  S.  E.- Rep.  610;  Bell  v. 
Woodward,  46  N.  H.  315;  McAnulty 


§221.] 


PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


325 


the  description  of  the  subject-matter,  i.  e.,  the  property  or 
person  mentioned,  is  clear  and  certain  upon  the  face  of  the 
instrument  itself,  but  it  is  found  by  extrinsic  evidence  that 
there  is  more  than  one  estate  or  subject-matter  or  more  than 
one  person  whose  description  corresponds  with  legal  certain ty 
to  the  terms  of  the  instrument.  Thus,  when  the  testator  de- 
vises land  to  a  person  by  name  or  description  and  the  land  is 
claimed  by  more  than  one  person,  all  of  whom  answer  to  the 
name  or  other  description,  parol  evidence,  including  the  testa- 
tor's declarations  of  intention,  is  admissible  to  identify  the  per- 
son whom  the  testator  intended  to  benefit.1     Second,  where 


v.  Urban,  25  N.  Y.  S.  274;  Wolfert 
v.  Pittsburg  R.  Co.,  44  Mo.  App. 
330;  Bovee  v.  Hurd,  134  N.  Y.  456; 
Knapp  v.  Warner,  57  id.  668;  Clark 
v.  Woodruff,  83  id.  218;  Neal  v. 
Reams,  88  Ga.  298 ;  Bell  v.  Boyd,  53 
id.  643:  Coals  v.  Sulan,  46  Kan.  341 ; 
McDonald  v.  Dana,  154  Mass.  152; 
Simpson  v.  Dix,  131  id.  179;  Love- 
joy  v.  Lovett,  124  id.  270;  Goff  v. 
Roberts,  72  Mo.  570;  Brewster  v. 
McCall,  15  Conn.  274;  Altschul  v. 
San  Francisco,  etc.  Co.,  43  Cal.  171: 
Begg  v.  Beggs,  56  Wis.  534;  Peters 
v.  Porter,  60  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  422; 
Thomas  v.  Truscott,  53  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
200 ;  Sandford  v.  Newark,  37  N.  J.  L. 
1;  Wilson  v.  Home,  65  Ala.  448; 
Warfield  v.  Booth,  33  Md.  63 ;  Fryer 
v.  Patrick,  42  Md.  51;  Hawkins  v. 
Garland,  76  Va.  149;  Piper  v.  True, 
36  Cal.  606 ;  Moore  v.  United  States, 
17  Ct.  of  CI.  17;  Pratt  v.  California 
M.  Co.,  24  Fed.  Rep.  869;  United 
States  v.  Peck,  102  U.  S.  64;  Lumey 
v.  Wood,  66  Tex.  22 ;  Lego  v.  Med- 
ley, 79  Wis.  211;  Euless  v.  Mc- 
Adams,  108  N.  C.  507.  A  devise  to 
"my  children"  raises  a  latent  am- 
biguity when  the  testator  has  illegit- 
imate or  adopted  children,  and  parol 
evidence  will  be  received  to  explain 
whom  should  be  included  by  the 
term.  Ellis  v.  Houston,  L.  R.  10 
Ch.   Div.  236;  Brower  v.   Bowers,  1 


Abb.  App.  Dec.  214;  In  re  Cahn,  3 
Redf.  (N.  Y.)31.  "The  distinction 
between  latent  and  patent  ambiguity 
as  respects  the  admissibility  of  parol 
evidence  lies  in  the  rule  that  the  in- 
tention must  be  gathered  from  the 
will  itself.  If  it  is  a  patent  ambi- 
guity the  will  does  not  express  any 
certain  intention  and  it  is  therefore 
void  for  uncertainty.  But  if  the 
ambiguity  is  latent,  i.  e.,  discovered 
dehors  the  will,  there  would  be  no 
ambiguity  as  to  intention  if  the  in- 
vestigation was  confined  to  the  will 
itself.  The  ambiguity  arising  from 
extraneous  facts  may  be  explained 
away."    Tiedeman,  R.  P.,  §  884. 

i  Patch   v.  White,  117  U.  S.  210 
Connolly  v.  Pardon,  1   Paige,  291 
Gilmer  v.  Stone,  120  U.  S.  586;  Dun 
ham  v.    Averill,    45   Conn.    61,    68 
Hawkins   v.    Garland,   76  Va.    149 
Goodhue  v.    Clark,    37   N.    H.    525 
Skinner  v.   Harrison,  116  Ind.    139 
Matter  of  Cahn,    3  Redf.  Sur.  31 
Beardsley  v.  Am.  Miss.  Soc,  45  Conn 
327 ;  Stokeley  v.  Gordon,  8  Md.  496 
Smith  v.  Smith,  4  Paige,  271 ;  Hall 
v.  Leonard,  1  Pick.  31 ;  Jackson  v. 
Boneham,  15  Johns.  296;  Pinson  v. 
Ivey,   1  Yerg.   296;  Button  v.  Am. 
Tract  Soc,  23  Vt.    338;  Haydon  v. 
Ewing,  1  B.  Mon.  113.     Cf.  Eckford 
v.    Eckford  (Iowa,    1S93),   53  N.  W. 
Rep.  345 ;  Hinckley  v.  Thatcher,  139 


326 


PAROL   OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  222. 


the  description  is  clear,  but  partly  applicable  and  partly  inap- 
plicable as  applied  to  some  property  or  person  that  is  al- 
leged to  be  intended;  as,  for  example,  in  cases  of  misnomer 
or  misdescription  of  property  or  persons.  In  such  cases,  where 
the  description  is  untrue  in  some  particular  (which  fact  can 
only  be  ascertained  by  extrinsic  evidence),  that  part  of  the 
description  which  is  false  will  be  repudiated,  and  the  re- 
mainder, if  sufficient  to  identify  the  person  or  thing,  will  be 
permitted  to  go  into  effect.1  If  the  description  is  wholly  in- 
applicable to  the  object  said  to  be  intended,  evidence  is  inad- 
missible to  show  what  its  author  really  intended  to  describe. 
§  222.  Parol  evidence  to  explain  wills. —  By  the  statute 
of  wills  which  has  been  enacted  in  all  the  states  of  the  Union, 
wills,  with  the  exception  of  those  termed  nuncupative,  are  re- 
quired to  be  in  writing,  properly  authenticated,  and  parol  evi- 
dence is  inadmissible  to  control,  vary  or  contradict  the  lan- 
guage used.2    The  principles  and  rules  of  law  applicable  to 


Mass.  477;  Lefevre  v.  Lefevre,  59 
N.  Y.  434;  Evans  v.  Giissom,  40  N. 
J.  L.  549. 

1  Bristol  v.  Ontario  Orp.  Asylum, 
60  Conn.  472;  Faulkner  v.  National 
S.  Home,  155  Mass.  458;  29  N.  E. 
Rep.  645;  Chappell  v.  Missionary 
Soc,  3  Ind.  App.  356;  29  id.  924; 
Kimball  v.  Chappell,  27  Abb.  N.  C. 
437;  Tallman  v.  Tallman,  3  Misc. 
Rep.  465;  In  re  Lennig's  Estate,  154 
Pa.  St.  209 ;  25  Atl.  Rep.  1069.  But 
in  such  cases  the  declarations  of  the 
writer  or  grantor  are  inadmissible. 

2  See  post,  §  269 ;  In  re  Gilmore,  81 
Cal.  240;  Vreeland  v.  Williams,  32 
N.  J.  Eq.  734;  Turner  v.  Sav.  Inst., 
76  Me.  527;  Greenough  v.  Cass,  64 
N.  H.  326;  Lee  v.  Shivers,  70  Ala. 
288;  Foster  v.  Dickinson,  64  Vt.  253; 
Graham  v.  Graham,  23  W.  Va.  36; 
Crooks  v.  Whitford,  47  Mich.  283; 
In  re  Gordon  (N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  268 ;  McDaniel  v.  King,  90  N.  C. 
597;  Senger  v.  Senger,  81  Va.  687; 
Hancock's  Appeal,  112  Pa.  St.  532; 
Robinson  v.  Brewster,  140  111.  649; 


Magee  v.  McNeal,  41  Miss.  17.  Thus, 
for  example,  a  blank  in  a  will  can- 
not, be  filled  b}r  parol  evidence  show- 
ing what  words  the  testator  meant 
to  have  inserted,  as  to  permit  this 
would  be  equivalent  to  making  an 
oral  disposition  of  property  where 
the  law  requires  a  writing.  Tuckers 
v.  Seamen's  Aid  Soc,  7  Mete.  (Mass.) 
205;  Clayton  v.  Nugent,  13  M.  &  W. 
200;  Baylis  v.  A.  G.,  2  Atk.  239; 
Hunt  v.  Hart,  3  Bro.  C.  C.  311,  cited 
8  Bing.  254.  On  this  subject  Vice- 
Chancellor  Wigram  says :  "  If,  then, 
a  testator's  words,  aided  by  the  light 
derived  from  the  circumstances  with 
reference  to  which  they  were  used, 
do  not  express  the  intention  ascribed 
to  him,  evidence  to  prove  the  sense 
in  which  he  intended  to  use  them 
is,  as  a  general  proposition,  inadmis- 
sible ;  in  other  words,  the  judgment 
of  a  court  in  expounding  a  will  must 
be  simply  declaratory  of  what  is  in 
the  will."  Wigram,  Extrinsic  Ev., 
§87. 


§  222.]  PAROL    OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  327 

the  interpretation  of  wills  are,  it  has  been  said,1  the  same  as 
where  other  writings  are  concerned.  It  is  evident,  however, 
that  certain  elements  enter  into  the  consideration  of  the  ques- 
tion how  far  is  extrinsic  evidence  admissible  in  relation  to 
wills  that  are  not  present  where  other  writings  are  under 
consideration.  In  reply  to  any  demand  for  an  assimilation 
of  contracts  and  wills  in  this  particular,  it  may  be  said  that 
the  former  instruments  possess  a  mutuality  of  character  and 
imply  a  reciprocity  of  benefits  or  disadvantages  which  furnish 
strong  reasons  for  refusing  to  allow  contracts  to  be  varied  by 
evidence  of  parol  declarations  of  intention.  But  the  benefit 
conveyed  by  a  will  is  voluntary  and  unilateral.  The  contents 
of  the  instrument  itself,  unlike  a  contract  or  writing  between 
parties,  are  usually  a  secret  in  the  keeping  of  the  testator  or  of 
his  confidential  adviser,  and  this  circumstance  alone  is  suffi- 
cient to  cast  some  suspicion  upon  any  public  oral  declara- 
tions of  the  testator  as  to  his  intention.  The  law  encourages 
this  secrecy,  and,  by  consistently  refusing  to  regard  the  secret 
testamentary  act  or  writing  as  other  than  revocable,  enables 
the  testator  "to  baffle  with  equivocation  or  misrepresentation 
the  importunities  of  the  expectant  and  the  inquisitiveness  of 
the  curious."2  So,  on  general  principles,  it  is  manifestly  ab- 
surd to  accept  hearsay  evidence,  which  must  often  necessarily 
be  given  by  persons  who  by  social  connections  or  by  ties  of 
kinship  have  or  imagine  they  have  some  moral  or  legal  claims 
upon  the  bounty  of  the  testator,  to  show  that  the  latter,  whose 
lips  are  now  forever  sealed  by  death,  meant  something  other 
than  his  intention  solemnly  and  formally  committed  to  writ- 
ing and  authenticated  in  the  express  mode  prescribed  by  stat- 
ute. So,  despite  the  fact  that  wills  are  frequently  executed 
under  circumstances  very  unfavorable  to  mental  clearness,  or 
to  the  lucid  expression  of  intention,  and  despite  the  tend- 
ency of  the  courts  to  favor,  so  far  as  is  possible,  the  exercise 
of  the  testamentary  power  so  that  it  may  with  truth  be  said 
that  the  law  prefers  that  a  man  should  not  die  intestate,  the 
modern  cases  construing  wills  restrict  to  a  greater  extent  than 
formerly  the  admission  of  parol  evidence  in  relation  thereto. 
At  the  outset  also  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  carefully  be- 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  287.  2  Abbott,  Trial  Ev.,  p.  131. 


328  PAROL   OK    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  [§  222. 

tween  extrinsic  evidence  to  show  or  establish  the  intention 
directly,  which  is  never  admissible,  and  extrinsic  evidence  to 
explain  the  intention  or  to  ascertain  what  it  was  as  expressed 
by  the  language  of  the  will,  or  to  show  that  the  will  does 
actually  express  the  testator's  intention  or  that  he  never  in- 
tended the  writing  as  testamentary. 

So  under  the  general  rule  that  the  invalidity  of  an  instru- 
ment may  be  shown,  parol  evidence  is  always  admitted  to 
show  that  a  paper  purporting  to  be  the  will  of  the  testator  is 
not  his  will  and  does  not  contain  his  testamentary  intention 
because  it  was  executed  by  mistake,1  in  order  to  effect  some 
non-testamentary  object,2  or  as  a  duplicate  of  an  earlier  writ- 
ing.3 So  parol  evidence  is  always  admissible  to  show  that  the 
testator  was  mentally  incapacitated  on  account  of  imbecility 
or  insanity.4  If  a  testamentary  gift  is  procured  by  a  promise 
to  hold  the  same  for  the  benefit  of  another  person,  this  prom- 
ise may  be  shown  by  parol  and  it  will  be  deemed  to  create  a 
constructive  parol  trust.5  Where  it  is  alleged  that  a  will  was 
executed  under  undue  influence,  extrinsic  evidence  is  admitted 
to  show  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  the  testator  at  the 
moment  of  execution,  his  private  history  and  that  of  his  fam- 
ily,6 and  other  facts  necessary  to  enable  the  court  to  ascertain 

i  In  re  Hunt,  L.  R.  3  P.  &  D.  250;  In  re  Spencer,  96  Cal.  448;  Morris  v. 

In  re  Gordon  (1892),  P.  228;  Covert  Morton  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  Rep.  287. 
v.   Sebern,  73   Iowa,   564;  Severson        5  Glass  v.   Hulbert,  102  Mass.  42 

v.  Severson,  68  id.  657.  Hooker  v.    Axford,    33  Mich.    453 

2  Lister  v.  Smith,  33  L.  J.  Prob.  29.  Headley  v.  Renner,  130  Pa.  St.  542 

3  Hubbard  v.  Alexander,  3  Ch.  D.  Church  v.  Ruland,  64  id.  432 ;  Dowd 
738.  v.  Tucker,  41   Conn.    197;  Hoge  v. 

4  Ross  v.  McQuiston,  45  Iowa,  145;  Hoge,  1  Watts,  163,  213:  "Williams 
Ellis  v.  Ellis,  133  Mass.  469;  Dyer  v.  v.  Vreeland,  29  N.  J.  Eq.  417. 
Dyer,  87  Ind.  13;  Rule  v.  Maupin,  6  Clark  v.  Stansbury,  49  Md.  346; 
84  Mo.  587;  In  re  Blakely,  48  Wis.  Reynolds  v.  Adams,  90  111.  134;  Pot- 
294;  Harrison's  Appeal,  100  Pa.  St.  ter's  Appeal,  53  Mich.  106;  Canada's 
458;  Frary  v.  Gusha,  59  Vt.  257;  9  Appeal,  47  Conn.  450.  Where  in- 
Atl.  Rep.  549;  Schneider  v.  Man-  sanity  is  alleged  it  may  be  shown  by 
ning,  121  111.  376;  12  N.  E.  Rep.  267;  parol  that  he  never  was  mentally  in- 
In  re  Norman,  33  N.  W.  Rep.  374 ;  capacitated  or  that  he  had  recovered 
72  Iowa,  84;  Prentis  v.  Bates,  93  or  that  the  will  was  executed  in  a 
Mich.  234;  Johnson  v.  Armstrong  lucid  interval.  In  re  Rapple,  66 
(Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  72;  Bulger  Hun,  558;  Shanley's  Appeal  (Conn., 
v.  Ross  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  803;  1893),  25  Atl.  Rep.  245;  In  re  Spen- 


§  223.]  IUROL   OR    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE.  329 

whether  or  not  such  influence  existed.  So,  generally,  where 
the  will  is  written  in  a  foreign  language,  or  where  it  contains 
technical  words,  or  common  words  used  in  a  peculiar  sense,  or 
technical,  scientific  or  legal  words  used  in  a  non-technical 
sense,  or  clerical  mistakes  obvious  on  its  face,  or  where  a 
devisee  is  ambiguously  described  or  inaccurately  named,  parol 
evidence  is  admissible  under  the  rules  and  principles  elabo- 
rated in  this  chapter,  not  to  show  the  intention,  but  to  enable 
the  court  to  place  itself  in  the  position  occupied  by  the  testator 
when  he  executed  the  will  and  to  ascertain  the  intention  from 
the  testamentary  writing  applied  to  extrinsic  objects  and 
read  in  the  light  thus  derived  from  surrounding  and  explana- 
tory circumstances.1 

§  223.  Parol  evidence  to  show  absolute  deed  a  mortgage  — 
In  suits  for  specific  performance,  reformation  and  cancella- 
tion.—  It  is  a  rule  of  general  acceptance  that  parol  evidence 
is  admissible  in  equity  to  show  that  a  deed  absolute  on  its 
face  was  intended  as  a  mortgage,  whenever  fraud,  accident 
or  mistake  is  alleged  in  its  execution  or  in  the  use  to  which 
it  is  put  by  the  grantee.2  The  tendency  at  the  present  day 
is  to  afford  relief  even  in  the  absence  of  actual  fraud  or  mis- 
take in  the  execution  of  the  deed,  whenever  the  circumstances 
are  such  that  the  use  of  the  writing  as  a  deed  would  be  in- 
equitable, or  where  the  intention  to  create  a  mortgage  is  shown.3 

cer,  96  Cal.  448;  Martin  v.  Thayer,  Beach,  115  Ind.  413;  Knapp  v.  Bailey, 

37  W.  Va.  38;  Preutis  v.   Bates,  93  79  Me.  195;  Biggars  v.  Byrd,  55  Ga. 

Mich.  234.  650;  Green  v.    Sherrod,    105    N.    C. 

1  For  a  very  clear  elucidation  of  197;  Price  v.  Grover,  40  Md.  202; 
the  somewhat  contradictory  rules  Hurst  v.  Beaver,  50  Mich.  612 ;  Mar- 
regulating  the  reception  of  parol  shal  v.  Thompson,  39  Minn.  137; 
evidence  in  connection  with  wills,  Weathersley  v.  Weathersley,  40 
the  reader  is  referred  to  Abbott's  Miss.  462;  Shradski  v.  Albright,  93 
Trial  Evidence,  pp.  129-150.  Mo.   42:  Pierce  v.    Traver,  13  Nev. 

2  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Kreig  (Nev.,  526;  Odell  v.  Montross,  68  N.  Y.  499; 
1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  641;  Locke  v.  Stephens  v.  Allen,  11  Oreg.  188; 
Moulton.  96  Cal.  21;  Peugh  v.  Davis,  Berbesick  v.  Fritz,  39  Iowa,  700; 
96  U.  S.  332;  Campbell  v.  Dearborn,  Kinports  v.  Boy  ton,  120  Pa.  St.  306; 
109  Mass.  150;  Harman  v.  May,  40  Kerr  v.  Hill,  27  W.  Va.  576;  Hick- 
Ark.  146;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Ash-  man  v.  Quinn,  6  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  96; 
mead,  23  Fla.  379;  Workman  v.  Edwards  v.  Wall,  79  Va.  321;  Nes- 
Greening,  115  111.  477-  Darst  v.  bitt  v.  Cavendar,  27  S.  C.  1. 
Murphy,  119  id.  343*  Moreland  v.  3  The  evidence  must  be  clear,  con- 
Bernhardt,  44  Tex.    275;  Rogers  v.  vincing  and  free  from  doubt  in  order 


530 


PAROL    OK    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  223. 


Under  this  rule  may  be  shown  the  existence  of  a  parol  agree- 
ment of  defeasance,  the  relation  of  the  parties  and  the  decla- 
rations of  either,  the  possession  of  the  premises  by  complainant, 
a  loan  to  him  by  the  grantee  and  his  payment  of  interest,  the 
value  of  the  property  as  compared  with  the  consideration  paid, 
the  needs  of  the  grantor  and  any  agreement  to  repay.1  The 
statute  of  frauds  does  not  prevent  the  reception  of  such  evi- 
dence, which  is  introduced  not  to  vary  but  to  invalidate  a  writ- 
ing.2    The  current  of  authority  is  decidedly  in  favor  of  the 


that  the  deed  may  be  deemed  a  mort- 
gage. Ganceart  v.  Henry  (Cal. ,  1893), 
33  Pac.  Rep.  92 ;  Parmer  v.  Parmer, 
88  Ala.  545;  Fisher's  Appeal,  132 
Pa.  St.  488;  Pollock  v.  Warwick, 
104  N.  C.  638 ;  Franklin  v.  Ayers,  22 
Fla.  644;  Langes  v.  Meservey,  45 
N.  W.  Rep.  732;  Armor  v.  Spalding 
(Colo.,  1890),  23  Pac.  Rep.  789;  Jame- 
son v.  Emerson,  82  Me.  309 ;  Strong 
v.  Strong,  126  111.  301;  Barton  v. 
Lynch,  69  Hun,  1 ;  Baird  v.  Rein- 
inghaus  (Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep. 
148.  "  In  considering  the  nature 
and  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  re- 
quired to  convert  a  deed  absolute  on 
its  face  into  a  mortgage,  we  should 
never  lose  sight  of  the  rules  and 
practice  of  the  court  of  equity  at  the 
time  it  was  established  by  that  court 
that  parol  evidence  could  be  received 
for  that  purpose.  .  .  .  The  same 
and  no  less  convincing  proofs  were 
required  that  are  necessary  to  au- 
thorize the  reformation  of  a  written 
contract  on  the  ground  of  mistake. 
If  the  proofs  are  doubtful  and  un- 
satisfactory and  the  mistake  is  not 
made  entirely  plain,  equity  will  with- 
hold relief  upon  the  ground  that  the 
written  paper  ought  to  be  treated  as 
a  full  and  correct  expression  of  the 
iutent  until  the  contrary  is  estab- 
lished beyond  reasonable  contro- 
versy." Kent  v.  Lasley,  24  Wis. 
651.  See,  also,  Clay  burgh  v.  Good- 
child,  19  Atl.  Rep.  1015;  135  Pa.  St. 


421.  And  compare  Poullain  v.  Poul- 
lain,  76  Ga.  420,  in  which  it  was 
held  that  proof  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  is  not  required  in  cases  of 
mistakes  alleged  to  exist  in  written 
instruments. 

1  Swett  v.  Parker,  22  N.  J.  Eq.  453; 
Farmer  v.  Grove,  24  Cal.  169. 

2  Walker  v.  Walker,  2  Atk.  98; 
Campbell  v.  Dearborn,  109  Mass.  130; 
Reigard  v.  O'Neill,  38  111.  400;  Sewell 
v.  Price,  32  AJa.  97;  Klein  v.  Mc- 
Namara,  54  Miss.  90;  CaiT  v.  Carr, 
52  N.  Y.  251 ;  Taylor  v.  Luther,  2 
Sumn.  (U.  S.)  238.  For  a  full  dis- 
cussion of  the  equitable  doctrine  on 
this  subject,  see  Tiedeman  on  Equity, 
§  199.  In  Campbell  v.  Dearborn,  109 
Mass.  130,  the  court,  by  Wells,  J., 
said  :  "  We  do  not  regard  the  stat- 
ute of  frauds  as  interposing  any  in- 
superable obstacles  to  the  granting 
of  relief  in  such  a  case,  because  re- 
lief, if  granted,  is  attained  by  setting 
aside  the  deed,  and  parol  evidence  is 
availed  of  to  establish  the  equitable 
grounds  for  impeaching  that  instru- 
ment and  not  for  the  purpose  of 
setting  up  some  other  or  different 
contract  to  be  substituted  in  its  place. 
If  proper  grounds  exist  and  are  shown 
for  defeating  the  deed,  the  equities 
between  the  parties  will  be  adjusted 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  trans- 
action and  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances of  the  case,  among  which 
may  be  included  the  real  agreement. 


§  223.] 


TAROL    OK    EXTRINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


331 


rule  that  such  evidence  is  not  admissible  at  law,  except  per- 
haps in  those  states  where  the  distinction  between  legal  and 
equitable  procedure  has  been  abrogated  by  the  modern  codes.1 
A  third  person  having  a  claim  against  the  grantor  may  show 
by  parol  that  the  deed  is  a  mortgage.2  But  when  the  grantee 
in  an  absolute  deed  has  reconveyed  to  an  innocent  purchaser 
without  notice  of  the  true  agreement  between  the  parties,  such 
parol  evidence  will  not  be  received.3 

Where  specific  performance  of  a  contract  is  asked,  the 
defendant  is  permitted  to  show  by  parol  evidence  that  the 
written  contract  does  not,  either  because  of  fraud  or  mistake, 
represent  the  real  intention  of  the  parties.4  On  the  other 
hand,  where  the  plaintiff  asks  for  a  reformation  of  the  con- 
tract on  the  grounds  of  mistake  and  its  specific  performance 
as  reformed,  the  cases  are  at  variance.  The  American  cases 
hold  that  reformation  and  specific  performance  may  be  ob- 
tained in  one  action  by  the  introduction  of  parol  evidence 
by  the  plaintiff,  irrespective  of  the  performance  by  him  of 
the  parol  portion  of  the  contract.5     The  English  cases  hold 


It  does  not  violate  the  statute  of 
frauds  to  admit  parol  evidence  of 
the  real  agreement  as  an  element  in 
the  proof  of  fraud  or  other  vice  in 
the  transaction  which  is  relied  on  to 
defeat  the  written  instrument." 

1  Brainerd  v.  Brainerd,  15  Conn. 
575;  Bragg  v.  Massie,  88  Ala.  89; 
Hogel  v.  Lindell,  10  Mo.  483;  Flint 
v.  Sheldon,  13  Mass.  443;  Brinkman 
v.  Jones,  44  Wis.  498 ;  Jackson  v. 
Lodge,  36  Cal.  28 ;  Webb  v.  Rice,  6 
Hill  (N.  Y.),  219;  Stinchfield  v.  Milli- 
ken,  71  Me.  507. 

-'Walter  v.  Cronly,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
63;  Allen  v.  Kemp,  29  Iowa,  452. 

SMaxfield  v.  Patchen,  29  111.  39; 
Baugher  v.  Merryman,  32  Md.  185; 
Rhines-v.  Baird,  41  Pa.  St.  356.  In 
Buckman  v.  Ahvood,  71  111.  155,  the 
court  said :  "  It  will  be  perceived 
that  in  none  of  these  cases  did  the 
court  attempt  to  range  the  jurisdic- 
tion to  turn  an  absolute  deed  into  a 
mortgage  by  parol  evidence  under 


any  specific  head  of  equity,  such  as 
fraud,  accident  or  mistake,  but  the 
rule  seems  to  have  grown  into  rec- 
ognition as  an  independent  head  of 
equity.  Still  it  must  have  its  founda- 
tion in  this:  that  where  the  transac- 
tion is  shown  to  have  been  meant  as 
a  security  for  a  loan,  the  deed  will 
have  the  character  of  a  mortgage 
without  other  proof  of  fraud  than  is 
implied  in  showing  that  a  convey- 
ance taken  for  the  mutual  benefit  of 
both  parties  has  been  appropriated 
solely  to  the  use  of  the  grantee." 

4Quinn  v.  Roath,  87  Conn.  16; 
Coles  v.  Brown,  10  Paige,  526;  Berry 
v.  Whitney,  40  Mich.  65;  Wood- 
worth  v.  Cook,  2  Blatchf.  151 ;  Ryno 
v.  Darby,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  31 ;  Cathcart 
v.  Robinson,  5  Pet.  263 ;  Mansfield  v. 
Sherwin,  81  Me.  365;  Ring  v.  Ash- 
worth,  3  Iowa.  452;  Caldwell  v.  De- 
pew,  40  Minn.  528.  See,  also,  Tiede- 
man  on  Equity,  §  198. 

3  Bellows  v.  Stone,   14  N.  H.  175; 


332 


PAROL   OK    EXTHINSIC    EVIDENCE. 


[§  223. 


that  this  cannot  be  done  unless  there  has  been  a  part  per- 
formance of  the  parol  portion.1  But  where  cancellation  or 
reformation  only  is  asked,  it  is  well  settled  that  parol  evi- 
dence is  admissible  to  establish  the  fraud  or  mistake  as  a 
basis  for  the  relief  demanded.2 


Grass  v.  Hurlbert,  102  Mass.  24,  41 ; 
Hunter  v.  Bilyeu,  30  111.  228;  Quinn 
v.  Roath,  37  Conn.  16;  Gillespie  v. 
Moon,  2  Johns.  Ch.  585;  Beardsley 
v.  Knight,  10  Vt.  185;  Gower  v. 
Sterner,  2  Whart.  75 ;  Moale  v.  Bu- 
chanan, 11  Gill  &  J.  314;  Newsom 
v.  Bufferton,  1  Dev.  Eq.  383;  Mur- 
phy v.  Rooney,  45  Cal.  78;  Mosby  v. 
Wall,  23  Miss.  81;  Hallam  v.  Corlett, 
71  Iowa,  446. 

iTiedeman  on  Equity,  §  108,  citing 
cases. 

2  McCloskey  v.  McCormick,  44  111. 
336;  Wurzburger  v.  Merie,  20  La. 
Ann.  415;  McCann  v.  Letcher,  8  B. 


Mon.  320;  Keyton  v.  Brawford,  5 
Gratt.  39;  Larkins  v.  Biddle,  21  Ala. 
252;  Peterson  v.  Grover,  20  Me.  463; 
Langdon  v.  Keith,  9  Vt.  299 ;  Vree- 
land  v.  Bramhall,  28  N.  J.  Eq.  85; 
Sylvius  v.  Kosek,  117  Pa.  St.  67; 
Jarrell  v.  Jarrell,  27  W.  Va.  743; 
Cox  v.  Woods,  67  Cal.  317 ;  Smith  v 
Butler,  11  Oreg.  46;  Crockett  v. 
Crockett,  73  Ga.  647;  Jackson  v. 
Maybee,  21  Fla.  622;  Bond  v.  Dorsey, 
65  Md.  310;  Giles  v.  Hunter,  103 
N.  C.  194;  Fritzler  v.  Robinson,  70 
Iowa,  500.  See,  also,  Tiedeman  on 
Equity,  §  193,  where  this  subject  is 
fully  discussed. 


CHAPTER  XVII. 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


?j  224.  Definition  and  classification. 

225.  Presumptions  of  law  and  fact 

distinguished. 

226.  Presumptions  of  fact. 

227.  Presumptions    from    adverse 

possession  and  prescription. 

228.  Presumptions  from   lapse  of 

time. 

229.  Presumptions    from    posses- 

sion. 


§  230.  Presumptions  from  the  usual 
course  of  trade. 

231.  Lawfulness  —  Continuity  — 

Sanity  —  Insanity. 

232.  Presumptions  as  to  jurisdic- 

tion. 

233.  Presumptions  of  life,   death 

and  survivorship. 

234.  Legitimacy  —  Innocence  — 

Malice. 


§224.  Definition  and  classification. —  Presumptions,  as 
they  are  employed  in  the  law  of  evidence,  are  divided  into 
presumptions  of  law  and  presumptions  of  fact,  while  the 
former  are  subdivided  into  those  which  are  conclusive  and 
those  which  are  rebuttable.  A  conclusive,  or,  as  it  is  some- 
times called,  an  absolute  or  imperative  presumption  of  law, 
may  be  defined  as  a  rule  of  law  by  which,  upon  the  produc- 
tion of  certain  evidence,  or  upon  the  proof  of  a  certain  fact, 
the  judge  is  bound  by  law  to  regard  some  other  fact  as  proved, 
to  instruct  the  jury  to  that  effect,  and  to  exclude  any  evidence 
to  the  contrary,  however  satisfactory  or  convincing  it  may  be. 

A  presumption  of  law  is  rebuttable  or  disputable  when  its 
effect  is  to  compel  the  court  to  draw  a  particular  inference 
from  a  particular  fact,  or  from  particular  evidence  (i.  e.,  to 
consider  some  other  fact  as  proved),  unless  and  until  the  cor- 
rectness of  such  inference  is  disproved.1  It  will  be  seen  that 
the  effect  of  the  operation  of  presumptions  of  law  is  to  take 
the  case  out  of  the  hands  of  the  jury  by  forbidding  or  dis- 
pensing with  evidence  to  controvert  or  disprove  the  facts 
which  are  presumed  to  be  true.  This  result  always  occurs  in 
the  case  of  conclusive  presumptions,  and   for  this  reason  this 

i  Sir  Fitz  James  Stephen,  in  his  v.  Guild,  5  Heisk.  (Tenn.)  182;  Ul- 
Digest  of  Evidence,  art.  1.  See  Lyon    rich  v.  Ulrich,  136  N.  Y.  120. 


334:  PRESUMPTIONS.  [§  225. 

class  of  presumptions,  for  all  practical  purposes,  is  hardly  dis- 
tinguishable from  positive  legal  rules.  Indeed  it  may  be  cor- 
rectly said  that  a  conclusive  presumption  of  law  is  only  a  rule 
of  substantive  law  stated  in  terms  of  the  law  of  evidence, 
which,  like  all  rules  of  law,  is  to  be  determined  and  ex- 
pounded by  the  court  alone,  the  judicial  exposition  and  in- 
struction being  in  every  case  obligatory  on  the  jnry.  Thus, 
the  presumption  of  law  that  a  boy  under  the  age  of  fourteen 
years  is  incapable  of  the  crime  of  rape  is  a  positive  maxim  of 
the  common  law,  and  would  apply  whenever  a  person  is  ac- 
cused of  that  crime,  even  though  no  evidence  is  introduced 
to  show  that  he  did  or  did  not  commit  it.1  So  generally  is 
this  recognized,  that  indisputable  or  conclusive  presumptions 
are  now  seldom  regarded  by  the  courts  solely  as  rules  of 
evidence. 

The  common-law  conclusive  presumptions  have  been  so  far 
superseded  by  statutes  of  limitation  that  in  the  modern  codes 
of  evidence  it  has  not  been  considered  necessary  to  recognize 
their  existence  as  rules  of  evidence.2 

§  225.  Presumptions  of  law  and  of  fact  distinguished. — 
A  presumption  of  fact  is  an  inference  or  a  deduction  which 
any  sensible  man  who  is  possessed  of  average  reasoning  pow- 
ers may  draw  from  certain  facts  coming  under  his  considera- 
tion, provided  those  facts  are  not  disproved  by  evidence  of  the 
same  sort  as  that  by  which  they  are  supported.3 

Direct  evidence  of  a  fact  in  issue  is  always  desirable.  But 
this  is  often  impossible  to  obtain.  So  if  some  other  fact  is 
proved  which  is  a  concomitant  circumstance  usually  attendant 
upon  the  fact  in  issue  according  to  the  experience  of  average 
men,  a  presumption  of  the  existence  of  the  latter  fact,  or,  to 
use  a  short  term,  a  "presumption  of  fact,"  arises  which  is 
valid  until  it  is  rebutted  by  proof  of  a  contradictory  fact. 

The  doctrine  regulating  presumptions  of  fact  is  largely  the 

1  McKinney  v.  State  (Fla.,  1892),  11  town,  34  N.  H.  365;  Oaks  v.  Weller, 
S.  Rep.  732.  16  Vt.  71;  Hilton  v.  Bender,  69  N. 

2  In  the  following  cases  presump-  Y.    75;  Cranan  v.   New  Orleans,  16 
tions  are  defined  and  discussed:     In-  La.  Ann.  374. 

surance  Co.    v.     Weide,     11    Wall.        3  Gardner  v.  Gardner,  L.  R.  2  App. 
(U.  S.)   441 ;  Jackson   v.  Marford,  7    Cases,  723,  734. 
Wend.  (N.  Y.)   62;   Bow   v.  Allen- 


§  225.]  tkesumptions.  335 

basis  for  the  rules  governing  the  admissibility  and  sufficiency 
of  circumstantial  evidence.  In  the  first  place,  it  may  be  said 
that  a  presumption  of  fact  derives  its  main,  if  not  its  only, 
value  and  force  from  its  probability  and  from  the  closeness 
and  clearness  of  the  logical  connection  which  exists  between 
the  fact  or  facts  which  have  been  proved  and  the  inference 
which  is  drawn.  In  other  words,  it  is  an  inference  "of  a  fact 
from  a  fact,"  and  the  test  is  the  relevancy  of  the  facts  proved 
which  constitute  the  premises  to  the  doubtful  but  probable 
fact  which  has  been  inferred  and  which  is  the  conclusion  of 
the  syllogism  thus  created.1 

It  should  not  be  considered,  however,  that  all  presumptions 
of  law  are  illogical  and  arbitrar}\  though  they  do  not  all  by 
any  means  possess  equal  logical  validity.  Thus,  it  is  clear  that 
many  which  are  conclusive  and  which  are  now  embodied  in 
statutes  of  limitation  were  originally  adopted  from  considera- 
tions of  expediency2  to  protect  vested  rights  and  prevent  the 
mischievous  stirring  up  of  controversies  supposed  to  be  settled.3 
So  also  rebuttable  presumptions  are  not  wholly  exempt  from 
the  criticism  that  they  are  improbable  and  illogical,  as  for 
examples  the  common  presumption  that  an  accused  person  is 
innocent  till  he  is  proved  guilty,  or  the  veiy  numerous  mod- 
ern class  of  rebuttable  presumptions  which  have  been  created 
by  statute.  Again,  the  two  classes  are  distinguished  by  the 
fact  that  presumptions  of  law,  both  rebuttable  and  conclusive, 
are  applied  to  classes  of  objects,  and  they  have  been  subjected 
to  and  are  governed  by  well-settled  rules,  thus  forming  a  part 
of  an  intricate  and  systematic  department  of  jurisprudence. 

Presumptions  of  fact  are  invariably  permissible,  never  ob- 
ligatory on  the  jury.  They  may  or  they  may  not  be  drawn 
by  the  jury  from  the  circumstances,  according  as  the  jurors 
believe  or  disbelieve  the  facts  which  are  produced  before 
them  and  which  are  claimed  to  be  proved  by  direct  evidence. 

1  In  Roberts  v.  People,  9  Colo.  474,  *  See  Welch  v.  Sackett,  12  Wis. 

the  court,  by  Beck,  C.  J.,  defines  a  257. 

presumption  of  fact  as  "an  infer-  3  "  Prescription  is  a  legal  fiction  to 

ence  of  the  existence  of  a  certain  quiet  ancient    possession."     Folsom 

fact  arising  from  its  necessary  and  v.  Freeborn,  18  R.  I.  205. 
usual  connection   with   other  facta 
which  are  known." 


336  PRESUMPTIONS.  [§  225. 

If,  therefore,  no  presumption  of  law  has  arisen  on  the  evidence 
as  introduced,  it  is  error  for  the  court  to  instruct  the  jur}'  that 
"a  presumption  arises  on  certain  evidence,"  meaning  thereby 
only  a  presumption  of  fact,  or  that  the  evidence  is  sufficient 
to  justify  a  presumption  of  fact;  for  whether  a  presumption 
of  fact  arises  or  not,  and  the  sufficiency  of  the  evidence  to 
support  it,  are  questions  for  the  jury  to  decide  upon  the  evi- 
dence before  them.1  When  made  they  do  not  arise  by  the 
direct  employment  of  legal  rules,  but  according  to  the  reason- 
ing process  and  experience  of  average  men,  being  the  most 
probable  inferences  from  the  facts  of  the  case.2 

A  presumption  of  law  is  binding  on  the  court  and  must  be 
drawn  by  it  whenever  certain  evidence  is  given,  and,  whether 
conclusive  or  not,  the  law,  regarding  it  as  law,  is  binding  on 
the  jury  if  they  believe  the  basic  facts  are  proved.  If  it  is 
a  conclusive  presumption  of  law  the  judge  has  no  power  to 
admit,  or  the  jury  to  consider,  any  evidence  to  the  contrary; 
but  if  it  is  rebuttable,  then  it  is  only  obligatory  upon  the 
jury,  provided  no  evidence  to  contradict  it  is  offered  sufficient 
to  remove  the  particular  case  under  consideration  out  of  the 
class  in  which  by  law  it  is  prima  facie  presumed  to  be  in- 
cluded. 

"Facts  which  are  presumed  by  the  jury  are  proved  as 
effectually  as  facts  of  which  direct  evidence  is  given."  3  But, 
as  has  been  elsewhere  explained  in  the  analogous  case  of  cir- 
cumstantial evidence,  the  foundation  fact  from  which  the 
inference  is  made  must  be  supported  by  some  direct  evidence 
sufficient  to  furnish  a  basis  in  the  minds  of  reasonable  and 
intelligent  men  for  the  presumption  of  fact.  In  some  depart- 
ments of  scientific  investigation  and  intellectual  activity  it  is 
permissible  to  infer  a  series  or  system  of  facts  in  a  logical 

1  Stone  v.  Geyser,  etc.  Co.,  52  Cal.  be  considered  imports  that  there 
315;  Allison  v.  State,  42  Ind.  354;  may  be  a  presumption  of  fact.  But 
Read  v.  Hurd,  7  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  408.  generally  it  must  be  left  to  the  jury 

2  In  Com.  v.  Briant,  142  Mass.  463,  to  say  whether  there  is  one,  and  in 
the  court  said:  "The  proposition  many  cases  that  is  the  main  ques- 
that  there  is  evidence  for  the  jury  tion  they  have  to  decide."  See, 
to  consider  is  not  identical  with  the  also,  Com.  v.  Stevenson,  142  Mass. 
proposition  that  evidence  if  believed  146. 

raises  a  presumption  of  fact.  The  3  Dickens  v.  Mahana,  21  How.  (U. 
proposition  that  there  is  evidence  to    S.)  283. 


§  226.]  PRESUMPTIONS.  337 

sequence  or  connection  based  upon  one  or  two  facts  of  which 
alone  direct  proof  has  been  given.  Inferences  are  deduced 
from  inferences;  the  intervening  facts,  which  should  be  proved 
to  secure  the  validity  of  the  hypothesis  or  final  inference,  being 
taken  for  granted,  upon  the  theory  of  the  experienced  invari- 
ability and  uniformity  of  the  laws  of  the  physical  universe.1 
JJut  where  the  springs  of  human  action  and  the  motives  which 
prompt  men  in  their  conduct  towards  their  fellows  are  con- 
cerned, no  inferences  are  allowed  to  be  drawn  from  other 
inferences,  and  any  presumption  of  fact  must  be  an  immediate 
inference  or  conclusion  from  facts  directly  proved.  So,  too, 
the  jury  should  not  be  allowed  to  presume  certain  material 
facts  of  which  no  evidence  has  been  given,  merely  from  a  re- 
buttable presumption  of  law  with  which  the  facts  have  only  a 
remote  connection  if  any.2  Thus,  if  money  is  alleged  to  have 
been  misappropriated  by  a  fiduciary  wbose  duty  it  was  to  pay 
the  money  to  some  third  person,  the  jury  have  no  right  to 
presume  that  the  money  has  been  properly  paid  over  where 
the  only  basis  for  this  presumption  of  fact  is  the  rule  that 
everyone  is  presumed  innocent  until  proved  guilty  and  that 
private  and  public  officials  are  presumed  to  have  done  their 
duty. 

The  legislature  has  the  power,  within  constitutional  limits, 
to  establish  statutory  presumptions  of  law  both  conclusive 
and  rebuttable.  This  power  has  been  repeatedly  exercised  in 
the  enactment  of  criminal  statutes,  and,  if  properly  executed, 
is  calculated  to  enlarge  the  scope  of  the  power  of  the  jury  by 
creating;  an  issue  of  fact  to  be  submitted  to  them  which,  were 
there  no  presumption,  would  probably  be  taken  from  them 
upon  the  ground  that  the  evidence  is  insufficient. 

§  226.  Presumptions  of  fact  —  Accomplices. —  Though  pre- 
sumptions of  fact  cannot  with  strictness  of  language  be  said 
to  form  a  part  of  the  law  of  evidence,3  }^et  it  is  an  almost  uni- 
versal custom  for  the  judge,  in  his  discretion,  to  suggest  to 
the  jury  certain  rules  which  they  may  employ  in  weighing- 
evidence,  and  to  point  out  certain   inferences  of  fact  which 

1  Sabariego  v.  Maverick,  124  U.  S.  Ins.  Co.,  100  U.  S.  69S ;  Grand  Trunk, 
295.  etc.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  91  U.  S.  470. 

2  United  States  v.  Ross,  92  U.  S.  31  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  44. 
283 ;  Manning  v.  Hancock  Mut.  Life 

22  •.. 


338  PRESUMPTIONS.  [§  227. 

they  may,  but  need  not  necessarily,1  draw  therefrom.  If  evi- 
dence is  submitted,  it  is  for  them  exclusively  to  say  whether 
they  will  draw  any  inference  therefrom,  and  this  they  may 
do  unaffected  by  motives  of  expediency  and  concerned  only 
to  ascertain  the  truth. 

]STo  presumption  of  law  exists  against  the  testimony  of  an 
accomplice,  and  the  jury  may,  in  the  absence  of  a  statute, 
convict  upon  his  uncorroborated  testimony  alone,  if  they  are 
satisfied  of  its  truth  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt.2  An  acces- 
sory after  the  fact  is  not  an  accomplice.3  But  judges  have 
been  so  long  accustomed  to  instruct  that  the  testimony  of  an 
accomplice  should  be  received  with  caution,  or  should  be  cor- 
roborated by  satisfactory  evidence  from  some  witness  not  im- 
plicated, that  a  failure  to  do  so  would  generally  be  reversible 
error.4 

§  227.  Presumptions  from  adverse  possession  and  pre- 
scription.—  A  common  class  of  presumptions  which  are  in 
many  cases  positive  rules  of  the  statute  law  is  that  which  in- 
cludes those  arising  from  the  adverse  possession  of  real  prop- 
erty or  from  the  fact  that  an  obligation  either  of  the  nature 

1  See  §  226.  be  had  upon  the  uncorroborated  tes- 

2  See  post,  %§  324,  325;  Jenkins  v.  timony  of  an  accomplice,  but  which, 
State  (Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  677;  at  the  same  time,  allows  the  court 
State  v.  Minor  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  to  charge  in  the  most  absolute  terms 
Rep.  1085 ;  State  v.  Jackson,  106  Mo.  that  his  testimony  must  be  corrob- 

174;  Rountree  v.  State,  88  Ga.  457;  orated,  the  court  in  Collins  v.  People, 

Woods  v.  Com.,  86  Va.  929;  United  98  111.   584,  said:  "In  many,  prob- 

States    v.    Lancaster,  44  Fed.   Rep.  ably  in  most,  cases  the  evidence  of 

896 ;  Robinson  v.  State,  84  Ga.  674 ;  an  accomplice,  uncorroborated,  .   .    . 

Cheatham  v.  State,  7  S.  Rep.  204.  will  not  satisfy  the  honest  judgment 

3  State  v.  Umble  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  and  then 
W.  Rep.  380.  it  is  clearly  insufficient  to  authorize 

*  United  States  v.  Ybanez,  53  Fed.  a  verdict  of  guilty.     But  there  may 

Rep.  536 ;  Martin  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  frequently  occur  other  cases,  where, 

1;    People  v.  "White,  62  Hun,  114;  from  all  the  circumstances,  the  hon- 

State  v.  Jackson,  106  Mo.  174;  State  est  judgment  will  be  as  thoroughly 

v.  Henderson,  50  N.  W.   Rep.  758;  satisfied  from   the  evidence  of  the 

Malachi  v.  State,  89  Ala.  134;  Peo-  accomplice  of  the  guilt  of  the  de- 

ple  v.  Chadwick,  25  Pac.  Rep.  737  ;  fendant  as  it  is  possible  it  could  be 

"Wicks  v.   State,  28  Tex.   App.  448;  satisfied  from  human  testimony ;  and 

Bernhard  v.  State,  76  Ga.  613.     In  in  such  case  it  would  be  an  outrage 

considering  the    rather    anomalous  upon  the  administration  of  justice  to 

rule  which  permits  a  conviction  to  acquit." 


§  227.]  PRESUMPTIONS.  339 

of  a  simple  contract  or  of  a  writing  under  seal  has  been  cre- 
ated and  the  disseizee  or  obligee  has  neglected  to  enforce  his 
right.  The  tortious  possession  of  a  disseizor  may  create  a 
conclusive  presumption  of  title  either  by  the  existence  of  the 
disseizin  for  the  period  required  by  the  statute  of  limitations 
or  by  estoppel.  By  the  statute  of  limitation  of  real  actions 
of  21  Jac.  1,  the  period  of  limitation  for  the  recovery  of  real 
property  was  fixed  at  twenty  years  from  the  date  that  the 
right  of  action  accrued.  In  the  United  States  the  same  period 
has  been  generally  adopted,  though  in  many  of  the  states  it 
has  been  reduced  to  ten.1  The  provisions  of  the  various  stat- 
utes of  limitation  should  in  each  case  be  consulted,  and  as 
these  statutes  vary  widely  it  is  impossible  to  discuss  them  at 
length  in  this  place.  It  may  be  said,  however,  that,  in  the 
absence  of  express  provision,  they  do  not  run  against  the 
United  States  or  against  a  state  commonwealth,2  or  against 
persons  who  are  under  the  disabilities  of  infancy  or  of  in- 
sanity when  the  right  of  action  accrues.3 

It  was  a  rule  of  the  common  law  that  the  continuous  and 
uninterrupted  enjoyment  of  an  incorporeal  hereditament  or 
easement  for  a  period  beyond  the  memory  of  man  would  create 
a  title  by  prescription,  upon  the  legal  fiction  that  a  valid  grant 
had  been  made  but  that  the  grant  had  been  lost.4  In  con- 
sequence of  the  adoption  of  statutes  of  limitation  the  courts 
now  apply  the  same  period  of  limitation  to  incorporeal  as  to 
corporeal  hereditaments;5  but  as  this  application  rests  solel}r 

1  Angell   on   Limitations,    1-6,    65  -  Lindsey   v.    Miller,    2   Pet.    660 

et  seq. ;  Tiedeman  on  Real  Property,  United  States  v.  Thompson,  98  U.  S 

ch.    XX,    §§  713-717;    Detweiler  v.  489;  Gardiner  v.  Miller,  47  Cal.  570 

Shultheis,   122  Ind.  155;  Charles  v.  Oaksmith  v.   Johnson,  92  U.   S.  343 

Morrow,  99  Mo.  638;  12  S.  W.  Rep.  Kingman  v.  Sparrow,  12  Barb.  201 

903;  Norris  v.  Moody,    84   Cal.  143.  United  States  v.  Beebe,  17  Fed.  Rep 

The  adverse  possession  and  disseizin  36 ;  Ward  v.  Bartholomew,  6   Pick 

must  have  been  continuous  and  un-  409. 

interrupted    during     the    statutory  3  Miller  v.  Texas,  132  U.    S.    662 ; 

period.     Malloy  v.  Bruden,  88  N.  C.  Gage  v.  Smith,   27  Conn.  74;  Little 

251 ;  Bradley  v.   West,    60   Mo.    33 ;  v.  Downing,  37  N.  H.  355 ;  Edso  v. 

Satterwhite  v.  Rosser,  61  Tex.    166 ;  Munsell,  10  Allen,  557. 

McName  v.  Morland,   26   Iowa,   96;  42  Bl.  Com.,  §§  263,  266. 

Unger  v.  Mooney,  63  Cal.  586 ;  Tiede-  5 Tiedeman  on  Real  Property,  §  599 ; 

man   on   Real   Property   and    cases  Richard   v.  Williams,  7  Wheat.  59; 

cited.  Stearns  v.  Jones,  12  Allen,  582 ;  Wat- 


340 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  227. 


upon  analogy,  the  lapse  of  the  period  has  been  held  by  some 
courts  in  the  case  of  easements  to  create  a  disputable  presump- 
tion, or  a  presumption  of  fact  which  can  be  rebutted  by  evi- 
dence that  there  never  had  been  any  grant.1  The  majority 
of  the  cases,  however,  sustains  the  proposition  that  the  presump- 
tion of  an  original  grant,  arising  from  the  uninterrupted  and 
continuous  enjoyment  of  an  incorporeal  hereditament,  is  con- 
clusive.2 


kins  v.  Peck,  13  N.  H.  360;  Burdell 
v.  Blain,  66  Ga.  170;  Jones  v.  Crow, 
32  Pa.  St.  398 ;  Carlisle  v.  Cooper,  19 
N.  J.  Eq.  256 ;  Nichols  v.  Wentworth, 
100  N.  Y.  455 ;  Folsoni  v.  Freeborn, 
13  R.  I.  205;  Smith  v.  Putnam,  62 
N.  H.  369 ;  Wallace  v.  Uni.  Pres.  Ch., 
Ill  Pa.  St.  164;  McKenzie  v.  Elliott 
(111.,  1890),  24  N.  E.  Rep.  965. 

xSee  cases  cited  supra;  Tinkham 
v.  Arnold,  3  Me.  120 ;  Parker  v.  Foote, 
19  Wend.  309;  Brookline  v.  Mackin- 
tosh, 133  Mass.  226;  Sherwood  v. 
Burr,  4  Day,  244 ;  Thomas  v.  Eng- 
land, 71  Cal.  458 ;  Tredwell  v.  Iuslee, 
120  N.  Y.  458. 

2  Ingraham  v.  Hutchison,  2  Conn. 
584;  Carter  v.  Tinicum  Co.,  77  Pa. 
St.  310  (right  of  fishery);  Whitney 
v.  Cotton  Mills  (Mass.,  1890),  24  N.  E. 
Rep.  774;  Rooker  v.  Perkins,  14  Wis. 
557;  McGeorge  v.  Hoffman  (Pa., 
1890),  19  Atl.  Rep.  413;  Bolivar  v. 
Nepensett,  16  Pick.  241;  Ricard  v. 
Williams,  7  Wheat.  109;  Corning  v. 
Gould,  16  Wend.  531;  Campbell  v. 
West,  44  Cal.  646;  Stevenson  v.  Wal- 
lace, 27  Gratt.  (Va.)  77 ;  Arimond  v. 
Green  Bay,  etc.,  35  Wis.  41 ;  Dowling 
v.  Hennings,  20  Md.  180 ;  Louisville, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Hays,  11  Tenn.  382 ;  Conklin 
v.  Boyd,  46  Mich.  56 ;  Smith  v.  Ben- 
nett, 1  Jones  (N.  C),  372 ;  Warren  v. 
Jacksonville,  15  111.  236;  Carlisle  v. 
Cooper,  19  N.  J.  Eq.  256;  Benton 
v.  Robbins,  71  N.  C.  388;  Tracy 
v.   Atherton,   36  Vt.    503.      In    the 


case  of  easements  no  presumption 
arises  in  favor  of  the  public  against 
a  private  owner  of  lands.  War- 
ren v.  Jacksonville,  15  111.  236; 
Pearsall  v.  Post,  20  Wend.  121;  22 
id.  440;  Curtis  v.  Kessler,  14  Barb. 
511:  Johnson  v.  Duer  (Mo.,  1S93),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  800.  "The  statutes  (of 
limitation)  confer  no  right  of  action. 
They  restrict  the  period  within  which 
the  right,  otherwise  unlimited,  might 
be  asserted.  They  are  founded  upon 
the  general  experience  that  claims 
which  are  valid  are  not  usually  al- 
lowed to  remain  neglected.  The 
lapse  of  years,  without  any  attempt  to 
enforce  a  demand,  creates,  therefore, 
a  pi-esumption  against  its  original 
validity  or  that  it  has  ceased  to  sub- 
sist. The  presumption  is  made  by 
these  statutes  a  positive  bar;  and 
they  thus  become  statutes  of  repose, 
protecting  parties  from  prosecution 
of  stale  claims,  when  by  loss  of  the 
evidence  by  the  death  of  some  wit- 
nesses and  the  imperfect  recollection 
of  others,  or  the  destruction  of  doc- 
uments, it  might  be  impossible  to  es- 
tablish the  truth.  Their  policy  is  to 
encourage  promptitude  in  the  pros- 
ecution of  remedies.  For  this  pur- 
pose they  prescribe  what  is  supposed 
to  be  a  reasonable  period."  Field,  J., 
in  Riddlesbarger  v.  Hartford  Ins. 
Co.,  7  Wall.  390,  cited  in  Anderson's 
Law  Diet.,  p.  629. 


§  228.]  PRESUMPTIONS.  341 

§  228.  Presumptions  from  the  lapse  of  time.— In  certain 

transactions  which  are  not  of  record,  a  presumption  of  regu- 
larity is  held  to  be  created  by  the  lapse  of  time  and  the  silence 
or  the  actions  of  the  parties.  The  presumption  thus  created 
is  largely  the  result  of  the  application  of  the  principles  of 
estoppel  in  pais  and  of  the  statute  of  limitations.  Accordingly, 
where  a  sale  of  land  is  authorized  either  by  statute1  or  by 
license  or  a  judgment  of  a  court,  it  will  be  presumed  'prima 
facie  from  the  lapse  of  time  that  all  the  required  formalities 
and  details  have  been  observed.  The  power  to  act  being 
proved  or  admitted,  it  will  be  inferred  that  all  the  usual  pre- 
cautions were  taken  necessary  to  a  valid  execution  of  the 
power.  And  this  inference  is  strengthened  by  the  silence  of 
the  parties  who  are  concerned  and  the  hardship  of  requiring 
the  production  of  written  proof  of  minute  details  of  transac- 
tions of  which  no  record  is  usually  made. 

The  length  of  time  which  will  create  this  presumption  varies 
according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case;  for  although  the 
lapse  of  thirty  years  has  been  required  in  some  cases,  other 
cases  hold  that  a  much  shorter  period  will  suffice.2 

Where  an  estate  was  vested  in  trustees  it  may  be  presumed 
that  they  have  faithfully  performed  their  duties  and  executed 
a  conveyance  or  surrender  to  the  beneficiary  on  the  termina- 
tion of  the  trust.3  Again,  where  possession  of  real  property 
has  been  long,  continuous  and  uninterrupted,  so  that  it  is  under 
the  statute  of  limitation  prima  facie  lawful,  and  the  things 
done  and  omitted  to  be  done  in  respect  thereto  by  the  parties 
for  long  periods  can  be  explained  satisfactorily  only  upon  the 
hypothesis  of  the  existence  of  a  deed,  the  execution  of  a  deed 
may  be  presumed.4 

1  Stead  v.  Corse,  4  Cranch,  403;  3Moore  v.  Jackson,  4  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
Hilton  v.  Bender,  69  N.  Y.  75,  apply-  59 ;  Church  v.  Mott,  7  Paige  (N.  Y.), 
ing  this  rule  to  tax  sales.  77;  Mathews  v.  Ward,  10  Gill  &  J. 

2  King  v.  Little,  1  Cush.  436;   Pe-  443. 

jepscot  v.  Ransom,  14  Mass.  145;  Em-  i  Fletcher  v.  Fuller,  120  U.  S.  534, 

mons  v.  Oldham,  12  Tex.  18 ;  Society  551,  552 ;  Valentine  v.  Piper,  22  Pick, 

v.  Young,  2  N.  H.  310;  Cobleigh  v.  85 ;  Van  Dyck  v.  Van  Buren,  1  Caines, 

Young,  15  id.  493;  Allegheny  v.  Wil-  84;  Knox  v.  Jenks,  7  Mass.  488.  Cf. 

son,   25  Pa.    St.    332;    Freeman    v.  House  v.  Montgomery,  19  Mo.  App. 

Thayer,  33  Me.  76.     Cf.  Hilton   v.  170. 
Bender,  supra. 


342  PRESUMPTIONS.  [§  229. 

§  229.  Presumptions  from  possession. —  As  respects  per- 
sonal property,  a  presumption  of  ownership  arises  from  evi- 
dence that  a  person  has  exercised  acts  of  possession  over  it.1 
This  presumption  is  slight,  and  is  rebutted  by  facts  tending 
to  show,  for  example,  that  the  goods  were  stolen.  A  contrary 
presumption  is  then  created  which,  if  not  rebutted  by  the 
party  in  whose  possession  the  stolen  goods  have  been  found, 
may  result  in  fastening  the  theft  upon  him.2 

Upon  the  general  question  whether  the  possession  of  the 
fruits  of  crime,  as  of  a  forged  writing,  of  counterfeit  money, 
or  goods  taken  from  a  house  where  a  burglary  had  been  com- 
mitted, causes  any  presumption  of  guilt  to  attach  to  their 
possessor,  the  courts  are  divided.  It  was  at  one  time  held, 
nor  is  this  rule  without  the  support  of  modern  cases,  that  a 
presumption  of  law  was  created  that  a  person  in  whose  pos- 
session the  results  of  crime  recently  committed  were  found 
was  prima  facie  concerned  in  the  crime  committed.3  The 
most  recent  decisions,  however,  repudiate  this  doctrine  that 
any  presumption  of  law  arises;  and  doubtless  the  true  mod- 
ern rule  is  that  the  presumption,  if  any,  is  one  of  fact.  In 
other  words,  the  fact  of  possession  is  now  considered  as  merely 
a  circumstance  to  be  submitted  to  and  weighed  by  the  jury 
in  determining  the  guilt  of  the  accused.4  "While  the  effect  of 
such  evidence  is  for  the  jury,  whether  it  is  admissible  depends 
largely  upon  the  shortness  of  the  time  which  has  elapsed 

1  Rankin  v.  Bell,  19  S.  W.  Rep.  S74 ;  3  state  v.  Kelly,  73  Mo.  608 ;  People 

National  Bank  v.  Richardson,  2  N.  Y.  v.   Weldon,    111   N.  Y.   5G9;  Rex  v. 

S.  804;    Powers  v.   Braley,   41   Mo.  Fuller,  Russ.   &  Ry.  308;  Stover  v. 

App.  556;  Gregg  v.  Mallett,  15  S.  E.  People,  56  N.  Y.  316;  State  v.  Ows- 

Rep.   936;    111  N.   C.  74;    Magee  v,  ley,  111    Mo.  450;  McLain  v.  State 

Scott,  9  Cush.  (Mass.)  150;  Millay  v.  (Neb.,  1885),  7  Crim.  L.  Mag.  199. 

]  Butts,  35  Me.  139;  Fish  v.  Scut,  21  i  State  v.    Rights,    82   N.    C.  675; 

Barb.    33;    Stoddard   v.    Buxton,  41  State   v.    Raymond,    46   Conn.  345; 

Iowa,  582.    The  possession  of  a  house  Ayres  v.   State,   21  Tex.   App.  399; 

raises  uo  presumption  of  ownership  Ryan   v.    State,    83    Wis.  486;  Sah- 

of  personalty  contained  in  but  not  linger  v.  People,   102  111.  241;  State 

annexed  to  it.     Caraher  v.  Insurance  v.    Hodge,    50  N.   H.  510;  State  v. 

Co.,  63  Hun,  82.  Bishop,  51  Vt.  287;  People  v.  Mitch- 

*  State    v.    Moore,    101    Mo.    316;  ell,  55  Cal.  236;  Stuart  v.  People,  42 

State  v.  Van  Winkle,   80  Iowa,  15;  Mich.  255;  Galvin  v.   State,  93  Ind. 

Reed  v.  State  (Ark.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  550. 
Rep.  819. 


§  229.]  TKESUMPTIONS.  343 

since  the  commission  of  the  crime  and  the  actual  knowledge 
of  the  prisoner  that  the  goods  were  in  his  possession.1 

While  the  wilful  mutilation  or  destruction  of  written  evidence 
raises  a  prima  facie  presumption  of  law  that  it  was  not  done 
innocently  and  that  its  production  intact  would  have  been 
injurious  to  the  interest  of  the  person  who  is  guilty  of  de- 
stroj'ing  or  mutilating  it,2  the  mere  invention  of  verbal  evi- 
dence or  false  testimony  on  the  witness  stand  creates  no  pre- 
sumption of  law,  but  is  a  circumstance  to  be  considered  by 
the  jury  3  bearing  on  the  credit  they  will  give  the  witness. 
If,  however,  the  perjury  is  deliberate  and  upon  material  facts, 
the  jury  may  infer,  under  the  maxim  falsus  in  uno  falsus  in 
omnibus*  that  the  testimony  of  the  witness  is  wholly  unworthy 
of  belief,  though  not  compelled  to  do  so  by  any  rule  of  law. 

Under  peculiar  and  special  circumstances  the  suppression 
of  evidence  or  a  refusal  to  produce  it  may  raise  a  presumption 
that  its  tenor  and  effect  would  be  unfavorable  to  the  persons 
in  whose  possession  it  is  known  to  be.5  So,  if  a  wrong  or  in- 
jury which  is  inflicted  not  only  substantially  damages  a  party, 
but  at  the  same  time  deprives  him  of  the  means  of  showing 
the  nature  and  extent  of  his  damage,  the  law  will  endeavor 
to  supply  the  loss  and  the  resulting  insufficiency  of  proof  by 
raising  all  reasonable  presumptions  against  the  evil  doer  and 
in  favor  of  the  injured  person.6     But  generally  the  fact  that 

i  Gablick  v.  People,  40  Mich.  292;  Co.   Ct.   Rep.   31;  Cross  v.   Bell,  34 

Com.  v.  Talbot,  2  Allen  (Mass.),  161 ;  N.   H.    85 ;  Carpenter  v.   Willy,  26 

Payne  v.  State,  21   Tex.  App.  184;  Atl.    Rep.    4S8;    Gulf,    etc.    Co.    v. 

State  v.  Scott  (Mo.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Ellis,  54  Fed.  Rep.  481 ;  Werner  v. 

Rep.  89;  State  v.    Owsley,  111  Mo.  Litzinger,  45  Mo.  App.  106;  Toomey 

450;  Smathers  v.  State,  46  Ind.  447;  v.   Lyman,   61  Hun,  623;  Atl.   Ins. 

Sahlinger  v.    People,    102    111.    241;  Co.  v.  Holcomb,  88  Ga.  9 ;  Wimer  v. 

State  v.  Jennett,  88  N.  C.  605.  Smith,  22  Oreg.  469;  Bagley  v.  Mc- 

2  See  ante,  %  129 ;  Blade  v.  Noland,  Mickle,  9  Cal.  430. 
12  Wend.    173;  1  Kent's  Com.   157;        6  Little  Pittsburg  Con.  Mining  Co. 

Mersman  v.  Werges,  112  U.  S.  141.  v.  Little  Chief  Cons.  Mining  Co.,  11 

See  §  129;  Tobin  v.  Shaw,  45  Me.  Colo.  223;  7  Am.  St.  Rep.  226;  Hart 

331.  v.  Ten  Eyck,  2  Johns.  Ch.  62,  108; 

»1  Greenl.    on    Ev.,    §37;    Wills  Clark  v.  Miller,  4  Wend.  628.     If  by 

on  Cir.  Ev.    113.      See,  also,    post,  statute  a  witness  is  precluded  from 

§  342a;  State  v.  Knapp,  45   N.  H.  testifying,  e.  g.,  a  wife  in  an  action 

148.  brougbt  by  the  husband  for  her  se- 

4  See  §  342a.  duction,    her  failure    to    testify  of 

5  Packer  v.  Vandevender,   13  Pa.  course     creates    no     presumption. 


344 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  229. 


a  party  produces  no  witnesses,  or,  having  produced  them,  fails 
to  examine  them,1  or  fails  to  produce  any  particular  witness,2 
will  not  justify  the  jury  in  drawing  any  inference  that  the 
evidence  of  his  opponent  is  true  if,  upon  the  facts  of  the  case, 
they  are  not  satisfied  with  its  credibility.3  So,  generally,  the 
non-production  of  books  or  papers  does  not  necessarily  create 
the  presumption  that  they  contain  entries  which  would  prove 
injurious  to  the  party  in  whose  possession  they  are  and  who 
has  been  notified  to  produce  them.4  But  where  certain  docu- 
ments of  a  series  constituting  muniments  of  title  were  sup- 
pressed b}r  their  admitted  holder,  it  was  held  that  an  inference 
of  fact  might  be  drawn  in  the  absence  of  clear  evidence  of 
their  contents  that,  had  they  been  produced,  they  would  have 
proved  unfavorable  to  him.5  If  a  note,  bond  or  similar  se- 
curity be  found  in  the  hands  of  the  maker  or  obligor  after 
maturity,  it  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  paid,6  and  this 


Adams  v.  Maine,  3  Ind.  App.  232; 
29  N.  E.  Rep.  792.  See  ante,  §  166. 
But  where  one  is  charged  -with 
fraud,  his  failure  to  testify  (Conn. 
Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Mo., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  623),  or  to  pro- 
duce documents  in  his  possession, 
creates  a  presumption  against  him. 
Clifton  v.  United  States,  4  How. 
(U.  S.)  242.  A  refusal  to  produce 
property  claimed  by  another  raises 
a  presumption  that  its  value  is  as 
stated  by  the  claimant.  Sutton  v. 
Davenport,  27  L.  J.  C.  P.  54. 

i  Haynes  v.  McRae  (Ala.,  1893),  11 
S.  Rep.  270. 

^Scovill  v.  Baldwin,  27  Conn.  316; 
Cramer  v.  Burlington,  49  Iowa,  213 ; 
Gardner  v.  Benedict,  27  N.  Y.  S.  3. 

3  Enos  v.  St.  Paul,  etc.  Co.  (S.  D. , 
1893),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  919;  Meagley 
v.  Hoyt,  125  N.  Y.  771;  Sauer  v. 
Union  Oil  Co.,  9  S.  Rep.  566;  Cross 
v.  Lake,  etc.  Co.,  69  Mich.  363;  37 
N.  W.  Rep.  361;  Mooney  v.  Hol- 
comb,  15  Oreg.  639;  16  Pac.  Rep. 
716;  Diel  v.  Railway  Co.,  37  Mo. 
App.  454. 


4  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  77  Ga. 
692;  Cartier  v.  Lumber  Co.,  35  111. 
App.  449 ;  Harrison  v.  Kiser,  79  Ga. 
588;  4  S.  E.  Rep.  320;  Jennings  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  97  N.  Y.  438;  Reavis 
v.  Overinshaw,  105  N.  C.  369. 

5  Jones  v.  Knauss,  31  N.  J.  Eq^ 
609 ;  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  9  Ind. 
323. 

«  Porter  v.  Nelson,  121  Pa.  St.  628; 
Lindsay  v.  McCormick,  5  S.  E.  Rep. 
834;  Turner  v.  Turner,  80  Cal.  141; 
Hollenberg  v.  Lane,  47  Ark.  394; 
Weidner  v.  Schweigert,  9  S.  &  R. 
385.  A  note  found  among  the  papers, 
of  the  maker  after  his  death  will  be 
presumed  to  have  been  in  his  pos- 
session during  his  life-time.  Potts  v. 
Coleman,  86  Ala.  94.  Though  the 
circumstance  of  the  debtor's  ability 
to  pay  does  not  alone  create  a  pre- 
sumption of  payment  (Morrison  v. 
Collins,  127  Pa.  St.  28),  it  may  be 
sufficient  in  connection  with  the 
fact  that  the  creditor  had  abundant 
opportunity  to  collect  his  debt.  Bank 
v.  Howes,  33  Mo.  App.  214. 


§  220.]  PRESUMPTIONS.  345 

presumption,  though  usually  rebuttable,1  has  been  held  con- 
clusive where  the  evidence  was  otherwise  irreconcilable.2 

A  prima  fade  presumption  of  payment  or  delivery  is  also 
created  by  the  possession  by  the  drawee  of  an  order  for  money 
or  for  the  delivery  of  personal  property.3  That  a  deed  has 
been  delivered  will  be  presumed  from  the  fact  that  it  is  found 
in  the  possession  of  the  grantee  or  of  one  claiming  under  him, 
properly  executed  and  acknowledged,4  although  this  presump- 
tion may  be  rebutted  by  the  fact  that  it  was  not  recorded 
until  after  the  death  of  the  grantor.5  So  a  deed  will  be  pre- 
sumed to  have  been  executed  and  delivered  on  its  date,6  though 
it  was  acknowledged7  or  recorded8  subsequent!}'.  "Where 
several  documents  are  of  even  date  they  will  be  presumed  to 
have  been  executed  in  the  order  that  will  effectuate  the  ob- 
ject intended.9  But  it  has  been  held  that  the  delivery  will  be 
presumed  to  have  been  made  on  the  day  the  deed  was  ac- 
knowledged,10 and  this  is  necessarily  the  rule  where  the  deed 
itself  is  undated.11  This  presumption  of  delivery  on  the  date 
of  execution  may  be  rebutted  by  showing  a  subsequent  act- 
ual delivery.12  ISTo  presumption  is  created  by  delivery  to  a 
stranger,  and  in  such  a  case  the  intention  to  deliver  must  be 

1  Hawkins  v.  Harding,  37  111.  App.  782 ;  Windom  v.  Schappel,  39  Minn. 
564.  But  see,  contra,  Emerson  v.  35;  38  N.  W.  Rep.  757;  Tuttle  v. 
Mills,  83  Tex.  3S5;  Halfin  v.  Wem-  Rainey,  98  N.  C.  513;  Ward  v. 
pieman,  83  id.  385;  Stephenson  v.  Dougherty,  75  Cal.  240;  17  Pac.  Rep. 
Richardson,  45  Mo.  App.  544.  193;  Crowder  v.  Searcy,  103  Mo.  97; 

2  Hawkins  v.  Harding,  37  111.  App.  Vreeland  v.  Vreeland,  48  N.  J.  Eq. 
564.  56. 

3  Lane  v.  Farmer,  13  Ark.  63 ;  Kin-  5  Scott  v.  Scott,  95  Mo.  300. 
caid  v.  Kincaid,  8   Humph.  (Tenn.)  6  See  cases  in  note  4,  supra. 

17 ;  Ramson   v.    Adams,    17  Johns.        7  People  v.  Snyder,  41  N.  Y.  397. 
(N.  Y.)  130.  8  Robinson  v.  Wheeler,  25  N.  Y.  252. 

*Gifford  v.  Corrigan  (N.  Y.),  11  9  Williams  v.  Woods,  16  Md.  220. 
N.  E.   Rep.  498;  Meech   v.    Fowler,       10  Fontaine  v.    Sav.    Inst.,  57    Mo. 

14   Ark.   29;  Lyerly  v.  Wheeler,  12  561;  Blanchard   v.  Tyler,   12  Mich, 

lied.  290;  Darst  v.  Bates,  51  111.  439;  339;  Loomis  v.  Pingree,  43  Me.  299, 

Billings- v.  Stark,  15  Fla.  297;  Tiede-  308;  Henry  v.  Bradshaw,  20   Iowa, 

man  on  R.  P.,  §  812 ;  Ward  v.  Lewis,  355. 

4  Pick.  518 ;  Dais'   Appeal,   128  Pa.       n  Bank  v.  Mersereau,  3  Barb.  Ch. 

St.    572;    Scobey  v.    Walker    (Ind.,  528. 

1S88),  15  N.  W.  Rep.  674;  Criffen  v.       12  Wyckoff  v.    Remsen,  11   Paige, 

Griffen,  125  111.  430;  17  N.  E.  Rep.  564;  Abb.  Tr.  Ev.  695. 


346 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  230. 


express.1  Delivery  and  acceptance  are  concurrent  acts,  and 
a  'prima  facie  presumption  of  acceptance  by  the  grantee  will 
usually  be  created  from  his  knowledge  of  the  delivery  and 
from  the  benefit  derived  by  him  thereby.2  And  in  the  case 
of  a  grantee  under  disabilities,  this  presumption  of  acceptance 
will  be  conclusive  even  if  the  grantee  is  ignorant  of  the  con- 
veyance and  delivery.3  The  ownership  of  goods  named  in  a 
bill  of  lading  is  prima  facie  presumed  to  be  in  the  consignee,4 
while  his  possession  of  that  document  creates  a  presumption 
that  the  merchandise  was  properly  delivered  to  the  carrier 
and  that  he  assented  to  its  terms.5 

§  230.  Presumptions  from  the  usual  course  of  trade. — 
Every  one  is  presumed  to  take  proper  care  of  his  own  affairs 
and  not  to  act  against  his  own  interests.  From  this  principle, 
and  keeping  in  view  th.3  care,  promptness  and  diligence  with 
which  men  pursue  the  objects  of  their  ambition,  various  prima 
facie  presumptions  have  been  recognized  growing  out  of  the 
course  of  trade.  So  a  check,  note  or  bond  properly  signed 
will,  in  the  hands  of  a  bona  fide  holder,  be  presumed  to  have 
been  delivered  completely  executed  to  the  payee,6  even  though 
in  the  case  of  a  bank-note  the  signature  has  been  obliterated.7 
So  it  is  a  general  rule  that  a  party  who  produces  a  note  will 
be  prima  facie  presumed  to  be  its  bona  fide  holder  and  to  have 


1  Maynard  v.  Maynard,  10  Mass. 
456 ;  Folk  v.  Vara,  9  Rich.  Eq.  303 ; 
Cecil  v.  Beaver,  28  Iowa,  240 ;  Lutes 
v.  Reed,  138  Pa.  St.  191;  Tiedeman 
on  R.  P.,  §  814. 

2Gifford  v.  Corrigan,  117  N.  Y. 
257;  Bowman  v.  Griffith,  35  Neb. 
361 ;  Robinson  v.  Gould,  26  Iowa, 
93 ;  Baker  v.  Haskell,  47  N.  H.  479. 

*  Tiedeman  on  R.  P.,  §  814;  Spen- 
cer v.  Carr,  45  N.  Y.  410;  Cecil  v. 
Beaver,  28  Iowa,  241 ;  Peavey  v. 
Tilton,  18  N.  H.  152;  Gregory  v. 
Walker,  38  Ala.  26 ;  Bank  v.  Bellis, 
10  Cush.  378;  Rivard  v.  Walker,  39 
111.  413;  Diefendorf  v.  Diefendorf,  8 
N.  Y.  S.  617. 


4  Lawrence  v.  Minturn,  17  How. 
(U.  S.)  100. 

5  Boorman  v.  Express  Co.,  21  Wis. 
152. 

6Hensel  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  37 
Minn.  87.  So,  too,  consideration  in 
such  a  case  will  be  presumed  and 
need  neither  be  expressed  in  the  in- 
strument, pleaded  or  given  in  evi- 
dence. Carnright  v.  Gray,  11  N.  Y. 
S.  278;  27  N.  E.  Rep.  835;  McClel- 
land v.  McClelland,  42  Mo.  App.  32 ; 
Benedict  v.  Driggs,  84  Hun,  94 ; 
Conger  v.  Armstrong,  3  John.  Cas. 
5;  Norton  v.  Norton,  17  N.  Y.  St. 
Rep.  487. 

7  Murdock  v.  Union  Bank.  2  Rob. 
112;  Smith  v.  Smith,  15  N.  H.  55. 


§  230.]  PBESUMPTTONS.  347 

obtained  it  before  maturity  and  for  full  value.1  Landlords 
being  usually  prompt  in  collecting  rent  due  them,  the  exist- 
ence of  a  rent  receipt  for  last  month  in  the  possession  of  the 
tenant  creates  a  prima  facie  presumption  that  all  prior  rent 
has  been  paid;2  and  a  settlement  between  parties  having  con- 
tinuous dealings  is  presumed  to  cover  all  accounts  between 
them.3  On  the  other  hand,  payment  by  check  or  in  money, 
unaccompanied  by  explanatory  circumstances,  will  raise  the 
presumption  not  that  a  loan  has  been  made,  but  that  the  payor 
has  liquidated  a  debt  or  paid  to  the  payee  funds  belonging  to 
the  latter.4  If,  however,  it  is  shown  that  no  debt  existed,  then 
a  loan  will  be  presumed,  as  the  law  will  not  in  such  a  case 
presume  a  gift.5 

Comprised  in  this  class  of  presumptions  from  the  usual  course 
of  business  are  those  created  by  the  well-recognized  regularity 
and  promptness  with  which  business  is  conducted  in  public 
offices.6  So  it  is  said  that  a  postmark  furnishes  a  presumption 
that  a  letter  was  in  the  mail  at  the  time  marked.7  A  pre- 
sumption which  is  sometimes  considered  merely  a  presumption 
of  fact,8  that  a  letter  has  promptly  reached  its  destination, 
arises  on  proof  that  it  was  duly  addressed  and  mailed,  post- 
paid, to  the  addressee  where  he  was  living  and  received  his 
mail.9     So  a  message  shown  to  have  been  delivered  to  a  tele- 

i  Collins  v.  Gilbert,  94  U.  S.  753;  i  Fletcher  v.  Braddyle,  3  Stark.  64; 

Kidder  v.  Horrobbin,  72  N.  Y.  169 ;  New  Haven  Co.  v.  Mitchell,  15  Conn. 

National  State  Bank  v.  Richardson,  206.     Cf.  Boon  v.    State,  37   Minn. 

2  N.  Y.  S.  804.  426. 

2  Hodgson  v.  Wight,  36  Me.  326;  8  Oregon  S.  S.  Co.   v.  Otis,  100  N. 

Brewer  v.  Knapp,  1  Pick.  332,  337.  Y.  45. 

3 Long  v.  Strauss.,  24  N.  E.   Rep.  9  Rosenthal  v.  Walker,  111   U.  S. 

664.     Payment  of  rent  by  a  tenant  185;  Van  Doren  v.  Liebman,  11  N. 

raises  a  presumption  that  he  occu-  Y.  S.  769 ;  Jensen  v.  McCorkle,  154 

pied  the  premises.     Bishop  v.  How-  Pa.  St.  353;  Briggs  v.   Hervey,   130 

ard,  2  B.  &  C.  100.  Mass.  187;  McCoy  v.  New  York,  46 

*  Patton  v.  Ash,  7  Serg.  &  R.  116,  Hun,  268 ;  Bank  v.  McManigle,  69  Pa. 

125;  Seiple  v.   Seiple,  25  W.  N.  C.  St.  156;  Steiner   v.    Ellis,  7  S.  Rep. 

488;  Gerding  v.  Walter,  29  Mo.  426;  803;  Loud   v.    Merrill,   45  Me.   516; 

Kuehler  v.    Adler,    78    N.    Y.    287;  Austin  v.  Holland,  69  N.  Y.-571, 576. 

Poucher  v.  State,  98  id.  422.  See  contra,  Home  Ins.  Co.  v.  Maple 

54Nay  v.   Curley,  113  N.    Y.  575;  (Iud.,  1890),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  633 ;  Hast- 

Grey  v.  Grey,  47  id.  552.  ings   v.  L.    I.    Co.,  138   N.    Y.    473. 

6  Worley  v.  Hineman  (Ind.,  1893),  This  presumption   is  confirmed  by 

33  N.  E.  Rep.  260.  proof  that  a  request  to  return  if  not 


JiS 


PKESUMFTIONS. 


[§  230. 


graph  company  will  be  prima  facie  presumed  to  have  been 
delivered  by  the  latter.1 

Though  the  courts  of  one  state  commonwealth  do  not  take 
judicial  notice  of  the  statutory  or  common  law  of  another 
state,  or  of  a  foreign  country,2  it  will  be  presumed,  till  the 
contrary  is  shown,  that  the  general  rules  of  the  common 
law  of  England  modified  by  statute  prevail  in  all  states  ex- 
cept in  those  such  as,  for  example,  Texas  and  Louisiana,3 
whose  jurisprudence  is  founded  upon  the  Eoman  civil  law;4 
while  so  far  as  the  statutory  law  is  concerned,  though  the  au- 
thorities are  not  harmonious,  the  weight  of  the  decisions  main- 
tains the  proposition  that  the  statute  law  of  any  state  will  be 
presumed  prima  facie  to  be  the  same  as  that  of  the  place  of 
trial.5 


delivered  was  attached.  Hedden  v. 
Roberts,  134  Mass.  38.  If  in  order 
to  obtain  a  record  a  deed  must  be 
properly  stamped,  it  will  be  pre- 
sumed that  a.  deed  recorded  was 
duly  stamped  though  the  record 
does  not  show  this  fact.  Collins  v. 
Valleau  (Iowa,  1889),  44  N.  W.  Rep. 
904.  See,  also,  as  to  certification  of 
judgments,  Bailey  v.  Winn  (Mo., 
1890),  12  S.  W.  Rep.  1045;  Woolery 
v.  Grayson,  110  Ind.  149.  See,  also, 
ante,  §§  146,  148,  149. 

1  Oregon  Co.  v.  Otis,  100  N.  Y. 
451 ;  Com.  v.  Jeffries,  89  Mass.  548. 

2  See  post,  §  242. 

3  Brown  v.  Wright  (Ark.,  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  1022. 

4  Cooper  v.  Reaney,  4  Minn.  528; 
Lipe  v.  McClery,  41  111.  App.  29; 
Sandidge  v.  Hunt,  5  S.  Rep.  55; 
Holmes  v.  Broughton,  10  Wend. 
(N.  Y.)  75 ;  Guardians  v.  Greene,  5 
Binn.  558 ;  Flato  v.  Mulhall,  72  Mo. 
522;  Reese  v.  Harris,  27  Ala.  301; 
Wheatop  v.  Peters,  8  Pet.  658 ;  Hyd- 
rick  v.  Burke,  30  Ark.  124;  Hickman 
v.  Alpaugh,  21  Cal.  225;  Bollinger 
v.  Gallagher,  142  Pa.  St.  205;  Cluff  v. 
Mut.  Ben.  Ins.  Co.,  13  Allen  (Mass.), 
308;    Mortimer  v.   Marder,  93  Cal. 


172;  Atkinson  v.  Atkinson,  75  La. 
Ann.  491 ;  Brown  v.  Philada.  etc. 
Co.,  9  Fed.  Rep.  185 ;  Com.  v.  Kenny, 
120  Mass.  387.  "The  common  law  of 
England  can  be  made  part  of  our  fed- 
eral system  only  by  legislative  adop- 
tion. The  United  States  has  no  com- 
mon law.  Each  state  may  have  its 
own  local  customs  and  common  law. 
The  power  of  the  United  States  is 
expressed  in  the  constitution,  laws 
and  treaties.  The  English  common 
law  was  adopted  by  the  original 
thirteen  colonies  only  so  far  as  it 
suited  their  conditions,  from  which 
circumstances  what  is  common  law 
in  one  state  is  not  so  considered 
in  another.  The  judicial  decisions, 
the  usage  and  customs  of  the  respect- 
ive states  determine  to  what  extent 
the  common  law  has  been  intro- 
duced into  each  state."  Wheaton  v. 
Peters,  8  Pet.  658-59. 

5  McDonald  v.  Mallory,  77  N.  Y. 
547;  Brumhall  v.  Van  Campen,  8 
Minn.  13;  Osborn  v.  Blackburn,  47 
N.  W.  Rep.  175;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Weaver,  35  Kan.  412;  Murphy  v. 
Collins,  121  Mass.  6 ;  Hewitt  v.  Mor- 
gan, 55  N.  W.  Rep.  478;  Atchison, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Betts,  10  Colo.  431.     Con- 


§  231.]  PRESUMPTIONS.  319 

"With  respect  to  foreign  law,  excepting  the  systems  of  juris- 
prudence of  those  countries  where  the  English  common  law 
prevails,  no  presumptions  are  recognized;  and  where  the  ques- 
tion of  extra-territorial  law  arises,  the  court  will  apply  the 
lex  fori  in  all  cases  where  the  foreign  law  is  not  pleaded  and 
proved  by  the  party.1 

As  the  principles  of  the  law  merchant  are  recognized  and 
prevail  in  all  civilized  states,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the  law 
of  a  foreign  state  on  any  matter  of  commerce  is  identical  with 
the  law  of  the  place  of  trial.2 

§  23 1.  Lawfulness  —  Continuity  —  Sanity  and  insanity. — 
It  is  generally  presumed  that  the  law  has  been  obeyed  and 
that  public  officials  have  done  their  duty.3  Not  only  are  offi- 
cials presumed  to  have  observed  the  law  which  they  have  been 
sworn  to  execute  or  interpret,  but  private  persons4  are  also 
presumed,  in  the  absence  of  contrary  proof,  in  their  business 
and  social  relations,  to  have  observed  the  rules  of  law  and 
equity  and  the  principles  of  moralit}r.5  So  where  a  written 
instrument  purports  to  be  executed  by  the  officers  of  a  private 
corporation,  it  will  be  presumed  that  they  possessed  the  power 
to  execute  it,  and  that  its  execution  was  actually  authorized 
by  the  corporation.6 

tra,  as  to  foreign  country.     West.  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  984.    This 

U.  T.  Co.  v.  Way,  83  Ala.   542.  See,  presumption   obtains  only  between 

supporting  text,  Amer.  Oak.  L.  Co.  third  parties.     It  cannot  be  invoked 

v.  Standard,  etc.   Co.    (Utah.,  1893),  in    behalf    of    the    officer    himself. 

33  Pac.  Rep.  246 ;  Haggin  v.  Haggin,  O'Brien  v.  McCann,  58  N.  Y.  373. 

85  Neb.   575 ;    Bierhaus  v.  W.  U.  T.  4  Arent  v.  Squire,  1  Daly,  347. 

Co.  (Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  5S1.  sr0ss  v.  Bedell,  5  Duer,  462;  Peo- 

i  Flato  v.    Mulhall,    72    Mo.    522 ;  pie  v.  Pease,  27  N.  Y.  45 ;  Thompson 

Savage  v.    O'Neill,   44    N.    Y.    298;  v.  Newlin,  8  Ired.  Eq.  32;  Roseville 

Norris  v.  Harris,  15  Cal.  226.     As  to  v.  Gilbert,  24  111.  App.  334;  Fenlon  v. 

the  proof  of  foreign  laws,  see  §  143.  Dempsey,  50  Hun,  131 ;  Wheeler   v. 

2  Dubois  v.  Mason,  127  Mass.  37.  Wheeler,  2  N.  Y.  S.  496.  It  seems, 
Cf.  §§  148,  149,  ante.  however,   that   no   presumption  ob- 

3  Sumner  v.  Peeble,  5  Wash.  St.  tains  that  a  physician  is  reasonably 
471 ;  Gridley  v.  College  of  St.  Fran-  skillful  (Columbus  v.  Strasner  (Ind., 
cis,  137  N.  Y.  327 ;  Broder  v.  Conklin  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  5),  or  that  a 
(Cal.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  211 ;  Eakins  mere  private  servant  has  performed 
v.  Eakins  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  his  duty.  Bigelow  v.  Metro.  Ry.  Co., 
285;  Brown  v.  Selby,  2  Biss.  457;  48  Mo.  App.  367.  Cf.  Turner  v.  Lord, 
Nat.  Harrow  Co.  v.  Hanby,  54  Fed.  92  Mo.  113. 

Rep.    493;    Francis    v.    Kirkpatrick        6  Gutzell   v.   Pennie,  95  Cal.  598; 
Co.,  52  Fed.  Rep.  824;  Saul  v.  Frame    N.  E.   E.   L.  etc.  Co.  v.  Farmington, 


350 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  231. 


Despite  the  extreme  liability  of  all  human  affairs  to  change, 
some  presumptions  exist  which  are  based  upon  the  relative 
permanency  or  continuit}'  which  is  frequently  observed  to 
exist  in  certain  lines  of  human  activity.  So  a  personal  con- 
nection, relationship  or  state  of  affairs,  or  a  person's  existence 
once  shown  in  evidence,  will  be  presumed  to  continue  un- 
changed as  long  as  it  is  usual  for  a  thing  of  its  peculiar  nat- 
ure to  endure,  unless  the  contrar}7  be  affirmatively  proved.1 
If  it  be  shown  that  a  corporation,2  partnership,3  agency,  mar- 
riage,4 an  adulterous  connection,5  or  a  similar  relation  existed, 
it  is  presumed  that  it  continued  to  exist  until  its  discontinu- 
ance is  shown.6  An  existing  agency  will  be  presumed  to  be 
a  general  agency.7  A  person  shown  to  have  resided  in  a  place 
will  be  presumed  to  have  continued  to  do  so,8  and  a  presump- 
tion of  the  continuance  of  a  lawful  seizin  in  one  will  obtain 
until  it  is  overthrown  by  proof  of  facts  inconsistent  there- 
with.9 

But  the  most  important  presumption  based  upon  the  con- 
tinuity of  human  conditions  is  the  presumption  that  all  men 


etc.  Co.,  84  Me.  284  ;  Gorder  v.  Platts- 
mouth,  etc.  Co.  (Neb.,  1893),  54  N. 
W.  Rep.  830.  A  recital  in  a  deed 
that  it  was  executed  under  seal  will 
be  presumed  to  be  true  though  the 
seal,  which  had  been  affixed,  has 
wholly  disappeared.  Rensens  v.  Sta- 
ples. 52  Fed.  Rep.  91 ;  Macey  v.  Stark, 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  1088  (Mo.,  1893). 

i  Scott  v.  Wood,  81  Cal.  398 ;  New- 
man v.  Greenville,  7  S.  Rep.  403; 
Breman  Bank  v.  Branch,  etc.  Co., 
16  S.  W.  Rep.  209;  Redding  v.  Good- 
win, 44  Minn.  355  (presumption  of 
bankruptcy);  Gernan  v.  Navigation 
Co..  66  Hun,  633;  Parkhurst  v. 
Ketcham,  6  Allen,  406;  Satchell  v. 
Doram,  4  Ohio  St.  542,  holding  that 
a  public  highway  shown  to  exist  is 
presumed  to  continue. 

2  People  v.  Man.  Co.  ,.9  Wend.  351. 

3  Eames  v.  Eames,  41  N.  H.  176. 

4  Gilinan  v.  Sheets,  43  N.  W.  Rep. 
299. 

ft  Smith  v.    Smith,    4  Paige,    432; 


Van  Epps  v.  Van  Epps,  6  Barb. 
320. 

6  1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  42;  Seaman  v. 
Ward.  1  Hilt.  52,  55;  Haltenhof  v. 
Haltenhof,  44  111.  App.  135  (desertion 
during  divorce  proceedings);  Eames 
v.  Eames,  41  N.  H.  177;  Leport  v. 
Todd,  32  N.  J.  L.  124;  Cooper  v. 
Dedrick,  22  Barb.  516;  Smith  v. 
Smith,  4  Paige,  432. 

7  Sharp  v.  Knox,  48  Mo.  App.  169. 
SRexford   v.    Miller,   49  Vt.  319; 

Nixon  v.  Palmer,  10  Barb.  175.  178 ; 
Kilburn  v.  Bennett,  3  Met.  (Mass.) 
199. 

9  Hollings worth  v.  Walker,  13  S. 
Rep.  6;  Long  v.  Mast,  11  Pa.  St. 
189;  Babcock  v.  Utter,  1  Abb.  App. 
27;  Stephens  v.  McCormick,  5  Bush. 
181;  Lind  v.  Lind  (Minn.,  1893),  54 
N.  W.  Rep.  934 ;  Alabama.  Land  Co. 
v.  Kyle  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  43; 
Balch  v.  Smith,  4  Wash.  St.  497; 
Elyton  L.  Co.  v.  McElrath,  53  Fed. 
Rep.  7G3. 


§  231.]  PRESUMPTIONS.  351 

are  of  sane  mind,  competent  to  manage  their  own  affairs,1  and 
responsible  for  their  criminal  acts.  If  acts  be  proved  suffi- 
cient to  establish  a  condition  either  of  imbecility  or  lunacy  as 
existing  at  any  particular  time,  it  will  be  presumed  that  the 
condition  has  continued.'2 

The  question  of  the  presumptions  of  sanity  and  insanity 
becomes  of  the  greatest  importance  in  the  trial  of  criminal 
causes,  and  especially  in  the  trial  of  those  accused  of  homi- 
cide where  insanity  is  urged  as  a  defense.  This  being  so,  it 
is  greatly  to  be  regretted  that  the  courts  are  not  altogether 
harmonious  as  respects  the  amount  or  quality  of  the  proof 
that  is  required  to  overcome  the  prima  facie  presumption  of 
sanity  which  is  said  to  exist  in  the  case  of  every  man.  The 
modern  tendency  of  the  cases  is  to  give  the  prisoner  who 
pleads  insanity  as  a  defense  to  crime  every  opportunity  to 
secure  his  acquittal  on  that  plea  if  he  can,  by  the  aid  of  the 
results  of  modern  scientific  investigation  into  the  domain  of 
mental  diseases,  prove  that  fact  to  the  jury.  He  need  not 
prove- his  insanity  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  for  if  he  but 
succeed  in  raising  a  doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  on  this 
point,  then  it  is  for  the  state  to  convince  them  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  that  he  is  sane  upon  all  the  evidence.3  The 
accused  must  prove,  however,  according  to  the  majority  of 
the  cases,  that  "  he  was  laboring  under  such  a  defect  of  reason 
from  disease  of  the  mind  as  not  to  know  (i.  e.,  as  not  to  have 
sufficient  mental  capacity  to  know)  the  nature  and  quality  of 
the  act  he  was  doing;  or,  if  he  did  know  it,  that  he  did  not 
know  he  was  doing  wrong."  4 

i  Baxter  v.  Abbott,  7  Gray,  71,  83;  rison  v.  Rowan,  3  Wasb.  C.  C.  586; 
Delafield  v.  Parish,  25  N.  Y.  9 ;  Aikin  Reiter  v.  Miller,  86  N.  Y.  507 ;  Grouse 
v.  Weckerly,  19  Mich.  482;  Day  v.  v.  Holman,  19  Ind.  30 ;  Lilly  v.  Wag- 
Day,  2  Green  Oh.  549 ;  Cotton  v.  Ul-  oner,  27  111.  395. 
mer,  45  Ala.  378 ;  Perkins  v.  Perkins,  3  See  post,  Burden  of  Proof  in 
39  N.  H.  163 ;  Blackburn  v.  State,  23  Criminal  Trials,  §  249,  and  the  cases 
Ohio  St.  146;  Herbert  v.  Berrier,  81  there  cited. 

Ind.  1;  Robinson  v.  Adams,  62  Me.  4  This  is  the  rule  laid  down  in  Mc- 

369;  Tingley  v.  Cowgill,  48  Mo.  291 ;  Naghten's  Case  in   1S43,  10  CI.  &  F. 

Williams  v.  Robinson,  42  Vt.  678.  200,  and  followed  by  many  cases  in 

2  Halley   v.  Webster,  21   Me.  461 ;  England  and  America.     In  that  case 

State  v.  Wilner,  40  Wis.  304;  Town-  the  court  said:  "The  jurors  ought 

send  v.   Townsend,  7  Gill,  10;  Har-  to  be  told  in  all  cases  that  every  man 


352 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  231. 


This  rule  has  been  followed  by  the  majority  of  the  cases  in 
America,  and  may  now  be  considered  to  be  the  law  as  re- 
gards the  amount  and  quality  of  the  mental  derangement 
which  must'be  shown  in  a  criminal  trial  to  rebut  the  presump- 
tion of  sanity.1  Sometimes,  however,  the  courts  have  de- 
parted from  this  test  of  the  capacity  to  know  the  nature  and 
moral  character  of  the  act  and  have  laid  down  the  broader 


is  presumed  to  bo  sane  and  to  pos- 
sess a  sufficient  degree  of  reason  to 
be  responsible  for  his  crimes  until 
the  contrary  be  proved  to  their 
satisfaction,  and  that  to  establish  a 
defense  on  the  ground  of  insanity  it 
must  be  clearly  proved  that  at  the 
time  of  the  commitment  of  the  act 
the  party  accused  was  laboring 
under  such  a  defect  of  reason  from 
■disease  of  the  mind  as  not  to. know 
the  nature  and  quality  of  the  act  he 
was  doing,  or  if  he  did  know  it  that 
he  did  not  know  he  was  doing  what 
was  wrong."  Again,  in  Moett  v. 
People,  85  N.  Y.  375,  380,  the  court, 
by  Earl,  J.,  said  :  "  The  laws  of  God 
and  the  land  are  the  measure  of 
every  man's  act,  and  make  it  right 
or  wrong,  and  it  is  right  or  wrong 
as  it  corresponds  with  these  laws. 
When  it  is  said  that  a  prisoner  must 
at  the  time  of  the  alleged  criminal 
act  have  sufficient  capacity  to  dis- 
tinguish between  right  and  wrong 
with  respect  to  such  act,  it  is  im- 
plied that  he  must  have  sufficient 
capacity  to  know  whether  such  act 
is  in  violation  of  the  law  of  God  or 
of  the  land  or  both.  It  is  not  the 
duty  of  the  trial  judge  to  present  the 
matter  to  the  jury  in  every  possible 
phase  and  in  every  form  of  lan- 
guage which  the  ingenuity  of  coun- 
sel can  devise." 

1  Parsons  v.  State,  2  S.  Rep.  854 ; 
81  Ala.  577;  State  v.  Hockett,  30 
N.  W.  Rep.  742;  70  Iowa,  442;  State 
v.  Pagels,  92  Mo.  300;  4  S.  W.  Rep. 
•931;  Leache  v.  State,  22  Tex.  App. 


279;  State  v.  Mowry,  15  Pac.  Rep. 
282;  37  Kan.  369;  Farris  v.  Com. 
(Ky.,  1890).  1  S.  W.  Rep.  729 ;  Giebel 
v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  151 ;  12  S.  W. 
Rep.  591 ;  State  v.  Zoun  (Oreg.,  1892), 
30  Pac.  Rep.  517;  Com.  v.  Gerade, 
145  Pa.  St.  289;  28  W.  N.  C.  261; 
State  v.  Alexander,  30  S.  C.  74; 
State  v.  Harrison,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  982; 
36  W.  Va.  729 ;  State  v.  Maier,  36 
W.  Va.  757;  Dunn  v.  People,  109 
111.  635;  Hornish  v.  People  (111., 
1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  677 ;  Maxwell 
v.  State,  89  Ala.  150;  People  v.  Foy, 
34  N.  E.  Rep.  396;  138  N.  Y.  664; 
Karney  v.  State  (Miss.,  1891),  8  S. 
Rep.  292.  For  cases  of  homicide 
in  which  this  presumption  of  sanity 
was  removed,  see  Reg.  v.  Layton,  4 
Cox  C.  C.  149-155 ;  Roswell  v.  State, 
63  Ala.  307;  State  v.  Hoyt,  46  Conn. 
330;  State  v.  Martin  (N.  J.),  3  Cr.  L. 
Mag.  44 ;  Com.  v.  Rogers,  48  Mass. 
(7  Mete.)  500;  Armstrong  v.  State, 
30  Fla.  170;  Boswell  v.  Com.,  20 
Gratt.  (Va.)  860;  State  v.  Starling,.  6 
Jones'  (N.  C.)  L.  366;  State  v.  Hur- 
ley, 1  Houst.  Cr.  Cas.  (Del.)  28; 
King  v.  State,  9  Fla.  617;  People  v. 
McDonell,  47  Cal.  134;  State  v. 
Stark,  1  Strobh.  (S.  C.)  L.  479;  Peo- 
ple v.  Finley,  38  Mich.  482;  Caset  v. 
State,  40  Ark.  511 ;  Kriel  v.  Com.,  5 
Bush  (Ky.),  362;  Baldwin  v.  State, 
12  Mo.  223;  Loeffner  v.  State,  10 
Ohio  St.  599;  Jamison  v.  People  (111., 
1894),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  48;  Com.  v. 
Lynch,  3  Pittsb.  (Pa.)  412;  Mont- 
gomery v.  Com.,  88  Ky.  509;  Flana- 
gan v.  People,  52  N.  Y.  467. 


§  232.] 


vKi-.srMi-rioNS. 


353 


rule  that  though  the  defendant  may  have  known  or  had  ca- 
pacity to  know  the  difference  between  right  and  wrong  in 
the  particular  case,  yet,  if  facts  are  shown  from  which  the 
jury  may  infer  that  he  was  acting  under  some  uncontrollable 
impulse  or  influence  which  prevented  him  from  making  :i 
choice  between  the  right  and  wrong,  the  presumption  of  his 
sanity  is  rebutted  and  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  jury  to  ac- 
quit the  ace  used.1 

The  presumption  of  the  continuance  of  a  given  condition 
of  mental  derangement  depends  entirely  upon  the  nature  of 
the  mental  malady  itself.  Thus  while  in  the  ca?e  of  congen- 
ital mental  infirmity  as  idiocy,  or  habitual  or  fixed  insanity,  it 
may  require  very  clear  evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption,  in 
the  case  of  a  delirium  which  is  the  result  of  physical  disease, 
it  is  doubtful  if  it  can  be  said  that  a  legal  presumption  of  con- 
tinued insanity  exists  at  all.2  There  is  no  presumption  of 
law  that  once  insane  always  so,  but  the  circumstances  of  each 
case  should  be  considered  to  ascertain  how  far  the  same  men- 
tal condition  may  be  presumed  to  exist  at  an  earlier  or  later 
period.3 

§  232.  Presumptions  as  to  jurisdiction. —  It  is  a  general 
rule  that  a  court  of  superior  or  general  jurisdiction  will  be 
presumed  to  have  acted  regularly  and  within  its  powers  where 


1  This  is  the  doctrine  of  moral  in- 
sanity as  distinguished  from  mere 
mental  disease  per  se,  or  from  hal- 
lucinations or  delusions  constituting 
mania.  See  3  Law  Quar.  Eev.  339; 
Taylor  v.  Com.,  109  Pa.  St.  270; 
Plake  v.  State,  121  Ind.  433;  People 
v.  Durfee,  62  Mich.  487;  People  v. 
Kerrigan,  14  Pac.  Rep.  566;  73  Cal. 
222.  rejecting  the  doctrine  of  moral 
insanity.  See,  also,  generally,  State 
v.  Reidel  (Del.,  1888),  14  Atl.  Rep. 
550;  Williams  v.  State,  50  Ark.  511 ; 
9  S.  W.  Rep.  5 ;  Burgo  v.  State  (Neb., 
1889),  42  N.  W.  Rep.  701;  People  v. 
Barber,  15  N.  Y.  475.  Cf.  State  v. 
Jones.  50  N.  H.  369 ;  Leache  v.  State, 
22  Tex.  Cr.  App.,  p.  279;  3  S.  W. 
Rep.  539;  Parsons  v.  State,  81  Ala. 
577;  2  S.  Rep.  851;  Dacey  v.  People, 
23 


116  111.  555;  6  N.  E.  Rep.  165,  in 
which  the  subject  of  emotional  or 
moral  insanity  is  further  considered. 

2  Johnson  v.  Armstrong  (Ala., 
1893),  12  S.  Rep.  72;  Manley  v. 
Staples  (Vt.,  1S93).  26  Atl.  Rep.  630; 
Prentice  v.  Bates,  93  Mich.  234. 

3Schouler  on  Wills,  §  187,  citing 
Goble  v.  Grant,  2  Green  Ch.  629;  Cart- 
wright  v.  Cartwright,  1  Phill.  100; 
Good  heart  v.  Ransley,  28  Wkly.  L. 
Bui.  227;  Hix  v.  Whittemore.  4  Met. 
545;  Halley  v.  Webster,  21  Me.  461; 
Staples  v.  Wellington,  58  Me.  453; 
McMasters  v.  Blair,  29  Pa.  St.  298; 
Taylor  v.  Cresswell,  45  Md.  422; 
Townsend  v.  Townsewi,  7  Gill,  10; 
Castor  v.  Davis  (Ind.,  1890),  20  N.  E. 
Rep.  110. 


351 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  232. 


the  record  is  silent  and  until  the  contrary  is  shown;1  and  for 
this  reason,  whenever  the  validity  of  its  judgment  is  attacked 
collaterally,  it  will  be  presumed,  where  the  record  of  the  judg- 
ment is  silent  on  these  points,  that  both  the  subject-matter 
and  the  parties  were  within  its  jurisdiction.2  If  jurisdiction 
has  once  been  acquired  it  will  be  presumed  to  continue  until 
final  judgment.3  When  any  fact  or  statement  appears  upon 
the  record  its  correctness  will  be  presumed,'1  and  all  the  nec- 
essary steps  which  are  requisite  to  give  the  court  jurisdiction 
will  be  presumed  to  have  been  taken  in  conformity  there- 
with, even  where  the  minor  details  appertaining  thereto  are 
not  set  forth  in  the  record.5  Thus  it  will  be  presumed  that 
pleadings  have  been  properly  amended  or  filed  where  amend- 
ment or  filinir  was  needed;6  that  the  rulings  of  the  trial  court 


1  State  v.  Trounce,  5  Wash.  St. 
804 ;  Ryder  v.  Roberts,  48  Mo.  App. 
132;  Cape  Girardeau  v.  Burrough, 
112  Mo.  559;  Gal-pin  v.  Page,  18 
Wall.  350;  Black  v.  Epperson,  40 
Tex.  178;  Nations  v.  Johnson,  24 
How.  (U.  S.)  195;  Slocum  v,  Prov. 
St.  etc.  Co.,  10  R.  I.  112.  By  some  of 
the  cases  this  presumption  is  based, 
not  on  the  superior  power  of  the  court 
at  common  law,  but  upon  the  fact 
that  a  court  has  a  record  on  which 
all  its  proceedings  are  inscribed. 
Davis  v.  Hudson,  29  Minn.  35. 

2 See  §§  152-155,  ante;  Pope  v. 
Harrison,  16  Lea  (Tenn.),  82;  Doe  v. 
Lindsey,  24  Ga.  225;  Huntington  v. 
Charlotte,  15  Vt.  46;  Taylor  v.  Brily 
(Ind.,  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep.  369;  Yaeger 
v.  Henry,  39  Bl.  App.  21 ;  Markel  v. 
Evans,  47  Bid.  326;  Linton  v.  Allen, 
154  Mass.  432;  Emeric  v.  Alvaredo, 
64  Cal.  529;  Knox  v.  Bowersox,  6 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  275;  Carter  v.  State, 
22  Fla.  553;  United  States  v.  Green, 
6  Mackey,  562 ;  People  v.  Kline,  83 
Cal.  374;  State  v.  Weaver,  101  N.  C. 
758. 

3Housch  v.  People,  66  111.  178; 
Osborn  v.  Sutton,  108  Ind.  443. 

4Kley  v.   Healy,    127  N.  Y.   555; 


Sickles  v.  Look,  93  Cal.  600;  Mc- 
Garvey  v.  Ford  (N.  M.),  27  Pac.  Rep. 
415;  Kent  v.  Insurance  Co.  (N.  D., 
1892),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  85;  Parish  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  28  Fla.  251  ;  Scott  v. 
Iron  Co.  (Ky.,  1892),  18  S.  W.  Rep. 
1012;  Traders'  Bank  v.  Parker,  130 
N.  Y.  415;  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Orr,  10  S.  Rep.  167:  94  Ala.  602; 
Duncan  v.  State,  88  Ala.  31 ;  Garn 
v.  Working  (Ind.,  1893),  31  N.  E. 
Rep.  821. 

sGridley  v.  College,  137  N.  Y.  527; 
Rogers  v.  Burns,  27  Pa,  St.  525;  2 
Head,  253;  Wright  v.  Douglass,  10 
Barb.  97;  Golden  Gate  Min.  Co.  v. 
Yuba  Co.,  65  Cal.  187;  Wetherill  v. 
Sullivan,  65  Pa.  St.  105;  Grignon's 
Lessee  v.  Astor,  2  How.  (U.  S.)  319. 
Where  the  party  appears  and  defends 
it  will  be  presumed  that  he  was 
legally  served.  Martin  v.  Mott,  12 
Wheat.  19 ;  Bissell  v.  Briggs,  9  Mass. 
462;Broder  v.  Conklin  (Cat.,  1893), 
33  Pac.  Rep.  211. 

6  Tipton  v.  Warner,  47  Kan.  606; 
Miss.  etc.  Co.  v.  Smith  (Tex.,  1892), 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  509:  Dove  v.  Com- 
monwealth, 82  Va.  301 ;  Evansville, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Maddox(Ind.,  1893),  34  N. 
E.  Rep.  511.  , 


§  232.] 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


are  correct  in  the  absence  of  exceptions  thereto  on  the  record,1 
and  that  the  verdict  was  justified  by  the  evidence  if  the  record 
is  silent.2  But  these  presumptions  are  not  conclusive.3  These 
presumptions  are  rebutted  where  the  record  shows  that  the 
court  did  not  obtain  jurisdiction  because  of  the  non-appear- 
ance, a  failure  to  serve  one  of  the  parties,  or  for  any  other  rea- 
son.4 Though  in  the  case  of  inferior  courts  jurisdictional  facts 
must  appear  of  record,  where  they  do  so  appear  the  court  will 
be  presumed  to  have  properly  acquired  jurisdiction,  and  all 
subsequent  proceedings  will  be  presumptively  regular.8 

The  rules  governing  the  presumptions  of  the  regularity  of 


1  Adams  v.  Main,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  792 ; 
3  Ind.  App.  232;  Dunton  v.  Keel 
(Ala.,  1892),  10  S.  Rep.  333;  Brown 
v.  Lehigh,  etc.  Co.,  40  111.  App.  602; 
Kelly  v.  Kelley,  80  Wis.  490;  Klink 
v.  People,  1G  Colo.  467;  Crawford  v. 
Neal,  144  U.  S.  585;  People  v.  Dur- 
fee,  62  Mich.  487;  Pool  v.  Gramling, 
88  Ga.  653 ;  Richardson  v.  Eureka, 
96  Cal.  443 ;  Wilson  v.  Nelson,  40  111. 
App.  209.     See  §  367  et  seq. 

2  Ohio  v.  Sweeney,  43  La.  Ann. 
1073;  Atchison,  etc.  Co.  v.  Howard, 
C.  C.  A.  229;  Daly  v.  Wise,  132  N.  Y. 
306. 

3  The  correct  view  is  not  that  the 
law  presumes  a  record  is  always  cor- 
rect, but  if  on  its  face  it  is  complete 
and  regular,  the  party  producing  it 
is  not  compelled  to  prove  it  until  its 
fa'sity  is  shown,  Whart.  on  Ev., 
§  1302. 

4  Gray  v.  Hawes,  8  Cal.  562 ;  Mur- 
ray v.  Murray,  6  Oreg.  17;  Baker  v. 
Chapline,  12  Iowa,  204;  Kilgour  v. 
Gockley,  83  111.  109.  The  correctness 
of  a  return  of  personal  service  may 
be  contradicted  by  parol.  Zepp  v. 
Hager,  70  111.  223. 

5Lemert  v.  Shafer(Ind.,  1893),  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  1128;  Church  v.  Cross- 
man,  49  Iowa,  444;  Brown  v.  Wood, 
17  Mass.  68;  Smith  v.  Engle,  44  Iowa, 
265;  Reeves  v.  Townsend.  2  Zab. 
(,N.  J.)  39.     "Presumptions  as  to  the 


judgments  of  superior  courts  only 
arise  with  respect  to  jurisdictional 
facts  concerning  which  the  record  is 
silent.  Presumptions  are  only  in- 
dulged to  supply  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence or  averments  respecting  the 
facts  presumed.  They  have  no  place 
for  consideration  when  the  evidence 
is  disclosed  or  the  averment  is  made. 
When,  therefore,  the  record  states 
the  evidence  or  makes  an  averment 
with  reference  to  a  jurisdictional 
fact,  it  will  be  understood  to  speak 
the  truth  on  that  point;  and  it  will 
not  be  presumed  that  there  was  other 
or  different  evidence  or  that  the  fact 
was  otherwise  than  as  averred.  Were 
this  not  so  it  would  never  be  pos- 
sible to  attack  collaterally  the  judg- 
ment of  a  superior  court,  although 
a  want  of  jurisdiction  might  be  ap- 
parent upon  its  face.  The  answer 
to  the  attack  would  always  be  that 
notwithstanding  the  evidence  or  the 
averment  the  necessary  facts  to  sup- 
port the  judgment  are  presumed. 
These  presumptions  are  also  limited 
to  jurisdiction  over  persons  within 
the  territorial  limits  of  the  courts, 
who  can  be  reached  by  their  process, 
and  also  to  proceedings  which  are  in 
accordance  with  the  course  of  the 
common  law."  Bank  of  United 
States  v.  Dandridge,  12  Wheat.  69. 
70. 


356 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  233. 


judicial  proceedings  as  above  stated  are  subject  to  some  limit- 
ations as  respects  superior  courts  exercising  special  statutory 
powers.  Where  the  statutory  or  extraordinary  judicial  pow- 
ers are  to  be  exercised  according1  to  the  usual  common-law  or 
chancery  proceedings,  the  above  prima  facie  presumptions  of 
jurisdiction  and  of  the  conclusiveness  of  the  judgment  will  ob- 
tain. When,  however,  judicial  powers  are  to  be  exercised 
summarily  or  in  a  special  manner  not  in  conformity  with  the 
common  law,  no  presumptions  will  be  created,  and  the  facts 
necessary  to  give  jurisdiction  must  be  shown  by  the  record 
before  a  judgment  or  decree  rendered  in  such  statutory  pro- 
ceedings can  be  sustained.1 

A  person  to  whom  a  matter  is  submitted  for  arbitration 
must  strictly  confine  himself  in  making  his  award  within  the 
limits  of  the  submission,  and  if  he  shall  exceed  the  authority 
delegated  to  him  the  award  will  be  void.  A  presumption  of 
law  always  exists  that  he  has  not  exceeded  his  authority  as 
arbitrator,  and  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  person  seeking 
to  set  aside  the  award.2 

§  233.  Presumptions  of  life,  death  and  survivorship. — 
A  man  is  presumed  to  be  alive  until  his  death  is  shown.3  If 
a  man  is  absent  and  is  not  heard  from  for  seven  years  by 
those  who  would  naturally  have  heard  from  him  if  he  were 
alive,  he  will  be  presumed  to  be  dead.4     A  failure  to  hear 

i  Haywood  v.  Collins,  60  III.  328;  Firman,  29  111.  90 :  Hodges  v.  Hodges. 
State  v.  Trounce  (Wash.,  189?.),  32  9  Mass.  320:  Lamphire  v.  Cowan,  39 
Pac.  Eep.  750;  Harvey  v.  Tyler,   2    Vt.  420;  Sheffield  v.  Clark,  73  Ga.  92. 


Wall.    (U.    S.)    328;    Umbarger    v. 
Chaboya,  49  Cal.  525;  Gray  v.  Steani- 


3  In  re  Hall,  1  Wall.  Jr.  (U.  S.)  85; 
Montgomery   v.    Beavans,   1    Sawy. 


boat,  6  Wis.  59;  Prentiss  v.   Parks,     (U.  S.)  G60:  Watson   v.  Tyndall.  24 


65  Me  559;  Galpin  v.  Page,  18  Wall. 
350;  Johnson  v.  Kettler,  84  III.  315: 


Ga.  494 ;  Whitesides'  Appeal,  23  Pa. 
St.  114;  Bradley  v.  Bradley,  4  Wheat. 


Thatcher  v.  Powell,  6  Wheat.   119;  173;  Eagle  v.  Emmett,  4  Brad.  Sur. 

Clark  v.  Thompson,  47  111.  25;  Wind-  (N.  Y.)  117;  Stinchfield  v.  Emerson, 

sor  v.  McVeigh,  93  U.  S.  274 ;  Kansas,  52    Me.    465;    Brown  v.  Jewett,    18 

etc.    Co.    v.   Campbell,   62   Mo.   585;  N.  H.   230;  Com.   v.   Thompson,   11 

Eaton  v.  Badger,  33  N.  H.  228.  Allen  (Mass.),  25 ;  Grey  v.  McDaniel, 

2  Hayes  v.    Foskoll,    31    Me.    112;  6  Bush  (Ky.),  480. 
Ebert  v.  Ebert,  5  Md.  353;  Burns  v.        *  In    re    Miller,    9    N.   Y.    S.    639; 

Hendrix,  54  Ala.   78;  Byers  v.  Van  Mathews  v.  Simmons,  49  Ark.  468; 

Deusen,  5  Wend.  268;  Richardson  v.  French  v.  McGinniss.  69  Tex.  129; 

Huggins,    23  N.    H.    106;    Blair   v.  Stockbridge     v.     Stockbridge,     145 

Wallace,  21  Cal.  317;   Hubbard   v.  Mass.   517;   Badeau  v.  McKenny,  7 


§  233.] 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


357 


from  a  person  who  is  absent  but  who  had  a  fixed  abode  is  not 
enough  to  raise  this  presumption  unless  inquiry  had  been 
made  for  him  in  the  place  where  he  was  known  to  be  located. 
In  some  cases  he  will  be  presumed  to  have  died  at  the  end  of 
the  seven-year  period,1  though  as  a  general  rule  the  date  of 
his  death  should  be  left  to  the  jury  to  decide  on  all  the  cir- 
cumstances.2 If  the  absence  is  accompanied  by  other  facts, 
a  person's  death  may  be  presumed  from  absence  lasting  a 
much  shorter  period.  Thus,  where  a  person  who  is  absent 
was  physically  infirm  from  old  age,3  or  if  he  had  attempted 
suicide,4  or  if  he  had  sailed  in  a  ship  which  was  long  overdue,5 
and  particularly  if,  the  vessel  not  having  been  spoken,  the 
insurance  had  been  paid,6  his  death  would  be  presumed  after 
a  shorter  period.7 

So  far  as  any  presumption  that  a  person  left  issue  is  con- 


Mackey,  268 ;  Crawford  v.  Elliott,  1 
iloust.  (.Del.)  4(57;  la  re  Spencely 
(1892),  Prob.  142;  Hoyt  v.  Newbold, 
4.1  N.  J.  L.  219;  Tilly  v.  Tilly,  2 
Bland  Oh.  (Md.)  444;  Adams  v. 
Jones,  39  Ga.  508;  Spears  v.  Burton, 
;J1  Miss.  547;  N.  C.  University  v. 
Harrison,  90  N.  C.  385 ;  Hancock  v. 
Am.  L.  I.  Co.,  02  Mo.  26;  Thomas 
v.  Thomas,  16  Neb.  555;  Winship  v. 
O'Conner,  42  N.  H.  341 ;  Holmes  v. 
Johnson,  42  Pa.  St.  149 ;  Wambaugh 
v.  Schenck,  1  Penn.  (N.  J.)  229; 
Stinchfield  v.  Emerson,  52  Me.  465; 
Whitney  v.  Nicoll,  46  111.  230. 

i  Smith  v.  Knowlton,  11  N.  H.  191 ; 
Montgomery  v.  Be  vans,  1  Sawy.  C. 
C.  G53;  Forsuith  v.  State,  21  N.  H. 
424;  Clarke  v.  Canfield,  2  McCart. 
(N.  J.)  119;  Davie  v.  Briggs,  7  Otto, 
0-28;  Eagle  v.  Emmett,  4  Bradf. 
(N.  Y.)  117;  Rockland  v.  Morrill,  71 
Me.  455;  Young  v.  Heffner,  36  Ohio 
St.  2o2;  Packet  v.  State,  1  Sneed 
(Tenn.),  355;  Hancock  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  62  Mo.  26. 

2  Johnson  v.  Merthen,  80  Me.  115; 
Smith  v.  Knowlton,  11  N.  H.  191; 
Burr  v.  Sim.  4  Whart.  150;  Bradley 
v.  Bradley,  4  id.  173;  Whiteley  v.  In- 


surance Co.,  72  Wis.  170;  39  N.  W. 
Rep.  309;  Henderson  v.  Benar  (Ky., 
1890),  11  S.  W.  Rep.  809;  In  re  To- 
bin,  4  N.  Y.  S.  59  •  Waite  v.  Coaracy, 
45  Minn.  159;  Cambrelingv.  Purton, 
58  Hun,  610;  125  N.  Y.  610;  Davie 
v.  Briggs,  97  U.  S.  628 ;  Hancock  v. 
Insurance  Co.,  62  Mo.  26. 

3  In  re  Bucknam's  Will,  5  N.  Y.  S. 
565.  In  this  case  the  party  was  ab- 
sent and  unheard  from  a  few  months 
only. 

4  In  re  Ketchum,  5  N.  Y.  S.  566. 

5  Johnson  v.  Merithew,  80  Me.  115; 
Stewart's  Will,  1  Con.  Sur.  83. 

6  Sprigg  v.  Moale,  28  Md.  497. 

'  Cox  v.  Ellsworth,  26  N.  W.  Rep. 
(Neb.)  460;  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  114 
111.  611;  Lancaster  v.  Wash.  I.  Co., 
62  Mo.  121;  Stouvenal  v.  Stephens, 
2  Daly  (N.  Y.),  319;  Sheldon  v.  Fer- 
ris, 45  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  124;  Gerry  v. 
Post,  13  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  118;  State 
v.  Moore,  11  lied.  L.  (N.  O.)  160; 
Tisdale  v.  Insurance  Co.,  26  Iowa, 
170;  Boyd  v.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.,  3  La. 
Ann.  848;  Davie  v.  Briggs,  7  Otto, 
628;  Loring  v.  Steineman,  1  Mete. 
(Mass.)  204. 


358  PRESUMPTIONS.  [§  233. 

cerned,  it  has  been  held  that  when  he  was  unmarried  when  last 
heard  from  no  presumption  will  arise  that  upon  his  death  he 
left  any  surviving  issue,1  widow 2  or  heirs.3  In  some  of  the  states 
statutory  provisions  exist  by  which  the  presumption  of  death 
after  seven  years'  absence  from  the  state  is  made  conclusive 
if  there  is  no  proof  that  the  absentee  is  alive.  Such  statutes 
do  not  exclude  presumption  of  death  in  a  case  where  it  is  un- 
known whether  the  person  has  left  the  state,  and  in  such  cases 
the  common-law  presumption  applies.4  The  presumption  of 
death  arising  from  absence  from  one's  domicile  may  be  rebut- 
ted by  evidence  of  a  general  report  that  the  missing  person  is 
alive  and  is  domiciled  at  some  foreign  place,5  and  a  fortiori 
by  direct  proof  that  he  is  alive.6  On  the  other  hand,  a  per- 
son's death  cannot  be  proved  by  evidence  of  a  general  report 
that  he  is  dead,  prevalent  in  the  neighborhood  where  he  was 
last  known  to  reside,  such  evidence  being  hearsay  and  incom- 
petent.7 

The  question  of  a  presumption  of  survivorship,  in  cases  in- 
volving the  succession  of  estates,  has  been  much  discussed.  In 
an  early  case  in  which  a  father,  having  bequeathed  legacies 
to  his  children,  perished  with  one  of  the  latter  in  a  shipwreck, 
the  court  denied  that  any  presumption  for  or  against  survivor- 
ship could  be  entertained,  and  directed  the  issue  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  a  jury.8  The  English  ecclesiastical  court  adopted 
the  presumption  that  both  parties  died  simultaneously,  and 
that  consequently  there  was  no  presumption  of  survivorship.9 

1  Sprigg  v.  Moale,  28  Md.  497 ;  Chap-  4  Louisville  v.  Board,  83  Ky.  219. 
man  v.  Kimball,  84  Me.  389;  In  re  ^Dovvd  v.  Watson,  105  N.  C.  476. 
Taylor,  66  Hun,  626;  In  re  Webb,  e  Flynn  v.  Coffee,  12  Allen  (Mass.), 
I.  R.  5  Eq.  235;  Mullaly  v.  Walsh,  133.  Cf.  Roderigues  v.  Bank,  63  N. 
I.  R.  6  C.  L.  314;  Doe  v.  Griffin,  15  Y.  460;  Wentworth  v.  Wentworth, 
East,  293;  In  re  Hanby,  25  W.  R.  71  Me.  72;  Bailey  v.  Bailey,  36  Mich. 
427.  185 ;  Norris  v.  Edwards,  90  N.  C.  383. 

2  In   re  Westbrooke,  W.  N.  1873,  ?  Johnson  v.  Johnson,  114  111.  611; 

p.  167;  Rowe   v.  Hasland,  1  W.  Bl.  Scott  v.  Ratcliffe,  5  Pet.  81;  State  v. 

404.  Wright,  70  Iowa,  152 ;  id.  759 ;  Mil- 
's Bank  v.  Board,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  735,  free  v.  State,  13  Tex.  App.  340. 

739,  742;  Ferry  v.  Sampson,  112  N.  «  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  30;  Mason  v. 

Y.  415.     But  a  presumption  of  issue  Mason,  1  Mer.  308. 

arises  where  the  absentee  was  mar-  9  Wright  v.  Samuda,  2  Phil.  266, 

ried  when  last  heard  from.     Faulk-  277 ;  Taylor  v.  Diplock,  2  id.  261,  278, 

ner  v.  Williman  (Ky.),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  280;  Selwyn's    Case,    3  Hagg.    748, 

352;  Harvey  v.  Thornton,  14  111.  217.  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  40. 


§  234.]  TKESUMPTIONS.  359 

The  modern  rule  seems  well  settled  that,  in  the  absence  of 
statutory  provision  regulating- this  matter,1  where  several  per- 
sons perish  in  the  same  calamity,  no  presumption  exists  from 
ago  or  sex  that  any  of  them  survived  the  others  or  that  all 
died  at  the  same  moment;2  but  that  in  any  event  the  ques- 
tion of  survivorship  is  to  be  decided,  like  any  other  question 
of  fact,  upon  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case;  as,  for  exam- 
ple, the  character  of  the  disaster  and  the  age,  physical  condi- 
tion, sex  and  manner  of  death  of  those  who  perished;3  the 
supposed  superior  strength  (from  sex  or  age)  being  a  circum- 
stance proper  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  but  not  enough 
alone  to  create  any  presumption.  The  burden  of  proof  of 
establishing  survivorship  is  said  to  be  on  him  who  claims 
through  a  survivorship.4 

§  234.  Legitimacy  —  Innocence  — Malice. —  InEnghmd  the 
issue  of  husband  and  wife  living  together  was  conclusively 
presumed  to  be  legitimate,  and  this  was  true  though  the  wife 
had  been  shown  to  be  unfaithful;5  though  where  the  parties 
did  not  cohabit  at  the  date  of  the  conception  the  presumption 
was  rebuttable.6  It  may  now  be  laid  down  as  a  general  rule 
that  the  presumption  of  legitimacy  of  a  child  born  during  the 
existence  of  a  marriage  is  not  conclusive,"  even  where. there 
is  a  valid  marriage  and  where  the  parties  continue  to  cohabit.8 

1  See  Civil  Code  of  Louisiana,  arts.  4  See,  also,  Russell  v.  Hallett,  23 
930-933;  California  Code  C.  P.,  Kan.  276;  Coye  v.  Leach,  8  Mete. 
§  1963;  Hollister  v.  Cordero,  76  Cal.  (Mass.)  371;  Smith  v.  Croon),  7  Fla. 
619;  18Pac.  Rep.  855.  144;  Newell  v.  Nichols,  12  Hun  (N. 

2  In   re   Alston   (1892),    Prob.   142;  Y.).  644;  75  N.  Y.  78. 
Underwood  v.  Wing,  19  Beav.  459;  5St.  George  v.  St.  Margaret,  1  Salk. 
4  De  G.,  M.  &  G.  633,  657;  Wing  v.  123;  Banbury  Peerage  Case,  1  Sim. 
Angrave,  8  H.  L.  Cas.  183,  198 ;  John-  &  Stu.  153. 

son  v.  Merrithew,  80  Me.  Ill ;  13  Atl.  6  Morris  v.  Davis,  5  C.  &  Fin.  163. 

Rep.    132;  Kans.  etc.   Co.  v.  Miller,  7Van  Aernam  v.  Van  Aernam,  1 

2  Colo.  Ter.  442;    Stinde    v.   Ridg-  Barb.    Ch.    375;    Cross   v.    Cross,    3 

way,   55    How.    Pr.    301;    Cowman  Paige  Ch.  139. 

v.    Rogers,    73  Md.   403;    Stinde    v.  8  Bullock  v.  Knox  (Ala.,  1893).  10 

Goodrich,  3  Redf.  Bur.  87;  Robinson  S.  Rep.  339;  Cross  v.  Cross,  3  Paige, 

v.  Gallier,  2  Wood  C.  C.  178;  Corye  139;    Sullivan     v.    Kelly,    3    Allen 

v.  Leach,  8  Met.  371 ;  In  re  Ridgway,  (Mass.),  148;  Dean  v.  State,  29  Ind. 

4  Redf.  226;  Fuller  v.   Linzee,  135  483;  Pittsford  v.  Chittenden,  58  Vt. 

Mass.  468.  51 ;   Strode  v.    MacGowan,    2   Bush 

» In  re  Ehle's  Will,  41   N.  W.  Rep.  (Ky.),  621;  Herring  v.  Goodson,  43 

627 ;  73  Wis.  445.  Miss.    392 ;    Caujolle    v.    Ferrie,   28 


360 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  234. 


A  fortiori  if  the  fact  of  non-access,  caused  by  the  prolonged 
absence  of  the  husband  from  the  country,  be  established,  the 
presumption  of  legitimacy  is  supplanted  by  an  irresistible  con- 
clusion that  a  child  born  to  the  wife  is  illegitimate.1  So, 
while  the  marriage  may  legitimatize  a  child,  there  is  no  pre- 
sumption that  a  man  who  marries  the  mother  of  a  bastard  is 
its  father.2  But  a  marriage  once  proved,  the  law  raises  a 
strong  presumption  that  it  is  a  legal  one,  which  can  only  be 
rebutted  by  the  clearest  proof.3 

The  rule  that  every  one  is  presumed  to  be  innocent 4  until 
his  guilt  is  shown  is  based  on  the  fact  that  men  generally  observe 
the  rules  of  the  criminal  law  and  upon  the  impossibility  of 
obtaining  and  the  injustice  of  requiring  affirmative  proof  that 
the  accused  has  done  so.  This  presumption,  which  is  always 
rebuttable,5  bat  which,  if  it  is  not  rebutted,  accompanies  the 
accused  through  the  trial,  is  merely  stating  in  a  concise  form 
the  well-recognized  rule  of  law  that  any  party,  whether  it  be 
the  state,  or  an  individual  seeking  redress  for  a  civil  injur\r, 


Barb.  177;  State  v.  Pettaway,  3 
Hawks  (S.  C),  523;  Tate  v.  Penne,  7 
Mart.  (La.)  548;  Dean  v.  State,  29 
Ind.  483. 

1  Pittsford  v.  Chittenden,  58  Vt.  51 ; 
Cross  v.  Cross,  3  Paige,  139;  In  re 
Say  and  Sele,  1  H.  L.  Cas.  507.  Sex- 
ual intercourse  is  presumed  from  ac- 
cess (Head  v.  Head.  1  Sim.  &  Stu.  150) ; 
and  if  access  is  shown  no  evidence  is 
admissible  to  rebut  the  presumption 
of  intercourse  except  direct  evidence 
that  it  did  not  take  place.  If  the 
husband  had  access,  evidence  of  an 
adulterous  intercourse  alone,  it  has 
been  held,  is  not  relevant  to  prove 
illegitimacy  in  view  of  the  strong 
presumption  of  legitimacy.  Abb, 
Trial  Evidence,  p.  89. 

2  McDonald's  Appeal,  30  W.  N.  C. 
170. 

3  Boulden  v.  Mclntire,  119  Ind. 
574;  Coal  R.  C.  Co.  v.  Jones,  127 
111.  379;  State  v.  Brecht,  41  Minn.  50. 

4  Case  v.  Case,  17  Cal.  598;  Mc- 
Eweu  v.  Portland,  1  Oreg.  300;  Gal- 


laher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  247; 
Edwards  v.  State,  21  Ark.  512; 
Johnson  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S. 
W.  Rep.  368;  People  v.  Graney,  91 
Mich.  646. 

5  Van  Peet  v.  McGraw,  4  N.  Y. 
110;  United  States  v.  Heath,  20  D.  C. 
372;  People  v.  Pallister,  38  N.  Y. 
601;  Gardner  v.  State  (N.  J.,  1893), 
26  Atl.  Rep.  30;  Woodruff  v.  State 
(Fla.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  053;  Reid  v. 
State,  50  Ga.  556;  Barcus  v.  State, 
49  Miss.  17;  McDaniell  v.  State,  76 
Ala.  1 ;  People  v.  Bush,  71  Cal.  602; 
Dixon  v.  State,  13  Fla.  636;  Murphy 
v.  People,  37  111.  447;  State  v.  Vin- 
cent, 24  Iowa,  570;  State  v.  Knight,' 
43  Me.  11 ;  Com.  v.  Webster,  59  Mass. 
(5  Cush.)  295;  State  v.  Alexander,  06 
Mo.  148;  State  v.  Byers,  100  N.  C. 
512;  Perry  v.  State,  44  Tex.  473; 
Hill's  Case,  2  Graft.  (Va.)  594;  Peo- 
ple v.  Coughlin  (Mich.),  32  N.  AV. 
Rep.  905;  Goodal  v.  State,  1  Oreg. 
333. 


§  234.]  presumptions.  8G1 

who  seeks  the  aid  of  a  court  of  law,  has  the  burden  of  proof 
to  show  affirmatively  the  existence  or  non-existence  of  the 
facts  he  affirms  or  denies.  Thus,  in  the  case  of  a  trial  for 
the  crime  of  seduction,  the  plaintiff's  previous  chastity,  being 
material,  must  be  proved.1  The  character  and  strength  of  the 
presumption  of  innocence  demand  that,  even  where  wrong- 
doing can  be  proved  by  negative  evidence  alone,  such  proof 
must  be  given  by  the  party  alleging  the  wrong,  contrary  to 
the  general  rule,  by  which  the  burden  of  proof  is  cast  on  the 
one  maintaining  the  affirmative.2 

So  where  both  the  presumption  of  the  continuance  of  life 
and  the  presumption  of  innocence  are  involved,  the  latter  will 
prevail  and  the  existence  of  the  person  will  have  to  be  shown.3 

Every  man  possessed  of  a  sound  mind  is  presumed  to  intend 
and  contemplate  the  necessary  and  even  the  probable  natural 
consequences  of  his  deliberate  acts.4  The  presumption  may 
in  some  cases  be  conclusive,  as  where  the  consequences  neces- 
sarily follow  the  act.  This  occurs,  for  example,  where  a  per- 
son deliberately  points  and  fires  a  pistol  at  a  vital  part,  of 
another  person's  body.  Here,  if  the  latter  is  killed,  the  former 
cannot  be  heard  to  say  that  he  did  not  intend  to  kill  him. 
The  intention  to  kill  is  conclusively  presumed.  If  the  conse- 
quences do  not  naturally  follow  the  act,  that  is  if  they  only 
probably  follow  it,  the  presumption  is  rebuttable.5  A  person 
who  knowingly  and  voluntarily  signs  an  instrument  is  prima 
facie  presumed  to  have  read  it  or  to  have  otherwise  informed 
himself  as  to  its  contents.6  But  this  presumption  is  always 
rebuttable  by  proving  that  the  party  was  deceived  through 

1  Com.  v.  Whitaker,  131  Mass.  224;  must  be  proven  guilty  beyond  a  rea- 

State  v.  Wells,  48  Iowa,  671.  sonable  doubt  is  not  enough  alone, 

2Quin  v.  State,  46  Ind.  459;  Piano  for  the  maxim  of  law  regarding  rea- 

Co.  v.  Root  (N.   D.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  sonable  doubt  is  by  no  means  syn- 

Rep.  924;  Cook   v.   Tavener,   41    111.  onymous  with  the  proposition  that  a 

App.  642.  man  is  presumed  innocent  until  his 

3  Com.  v.  McGrath,  140  Mass.  296;  guilt    is    shown.      People    v.    Van 

Spears    v.     Burton,    31     Miss.    547;  Houter,    38   Hun,    168;    Barker     v. 

Klein,  v.    Landman,    29    Mo.    259;  State,  48  Ind.  163. 

Sharp  v.  Johnson,  22   Ark.  75.     The  4  Reynolds    v.    United    States,    98 

accused  is  entitled  to  a  separate  and  U.  S.  167. 

distinct   instruction   that   his  inno-  5  In  re  Bringer,  7  Blatch.  268. 

cence  is  presumed  until  his  guilt  is  6  Harris  v.  Story,  2  E,  D.  Smith, 

proved.      An    instruction    that    he  — . 


362 


PRESUMPTIONS. 


[§  234. 


his  own  ignorance  or  the  fraud  of  others,  or  that  he  signed 
the  document  by  mistake  or  under  duress.1 

In  the  case  of  the  deliberate  use  of  a  deadly  weapon  caus- 
ing death,  when  it  is  shown  that  the  killing  was  done  by  the 
defendant  and  no  other  evidence  is  offered  on  either  side, 
malice  will  be  presumed,  and  the  act  will  constitute  murder.2 
If,  as  is  usually  the  case,  other  circumstances  are  presented  in 
the  evidence  in  connection  with  the  killing,  which  is  admitted 
or  proved  and  which  is  not  claimed  to  be  excusable,  then  it  is 
for  the  jury  to  say,  upon  all  the  evidence,  whether  malice  was 
present  or  not,  and  this  question  they  must  decide  upon  all  the 
facts  in  the  case.3  In  other  words,  a  rebuttable  presumption  of 
malice  arises  as  soon  as  the  homicide  is  proved.  This  may  be- 
come a  conclusive  presumption  binding  on  the  jury  in  case  no 
defense  is  made.  On  the  other  hand,  the  presumption  may  be 
rebutted  by  other  evidence  of  the  state,  while  if  such  is  not 
the  case  the  accused  may  offer  evidence  to  show  that  he  did 
the  killing  in  self-defense  or  while  insane  and  thus  remove  the 
presumption  of  malice. 

As  regards  minor  crimes  of  which  a  criminal  or  malicious 


i  Lake  v.  Ranney,  33  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
50,  68. 

2  Com.  v.  Hawkins,  3  Gray,  463; 
Lewis  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  15  S.  E. 
Rep.  697;  Fritch  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893), 

16  S.  E.  Rep.  102.  Implied  malice, 
i.  e.,  a  presumption  of  malice,  exists 
where  mischief  is  intentionally  done 
without  just  cause  or  excuse.  Darry 
v.  People,  10  N.  Y.  138. 

s State  v.  Patterson,  45  Vt.  308; 
State  v.  Ariel  (S.  C,  1893),  16  S.  E. 
Rep.  779;  Young  v.  State  (Ala., 
1892),  10  S.  Rep.  913;  Hart  v.  State, 

17  S.  W.  Rep.  421 ;  21  Tex.  App.  163; 
Hornsby  v.  State  (Ala.,  1892),  10  S. 
Rep.  522;  State  v.  Carver  (Oreg., 
1892),  30  Pac.  Rep.  315;  People  v. 
Knapp,  71  Cal.  1 ;  People  v.  Tidwell, 
4  Utah,  506;  Powell  v.  State,  28  Tex. 
App.  393;  People  v.  Odell,  46  N.  W. 
Rep.  601 ;  1  Dak.  197;  State  v.  Whit- 
son,   111  N.   C.    695;  Hawthorne  v. 


Sftate,  58  Miss.  778;  State  v.  Swayze, 
30  La.  Ann.  1323;  State  v.  Smith,  77 
N.  C.  488;  State  v.  Knight,  43  Me. 
12;  Stokes  v.  People,  53  N.  Y.  164; 
Thomas  v.  People,  67  id.  218.  Cf. 
Lovett  v.  State,  30Fla.  142.  "  When- 
ever a  homicide  is  shown  to  have 
been  committed  without  lawful  au- 
thority and  with  deliberate  intent, 
it  is  sufficiently  proved  to  have  been 
with  malice  aforethought.  It  is  not 
necessary  to  prove  that  any  special 
or  express  hatred  or  malice  was  en- 
tertained by  the  accused  toward  the 
deceased.  It  is  sufficient  to  prove 
that  the  act  was  done  with  deliber- 
ate intent  as  distinct  from  an  act 
done  under  the  sudden  impulse  of 
passion  in  the  heat  of  blood  and 
without  previous  malice."  United 
States  v.  Guiteau,  10  Fed.  Rep.  162, 
165. 


§  234.] 


TRESUMPTIONS. 


3C3 


motive  or  intent  is  a  constituent  part,  no  presumption  of  mal- 
ice is  created  where  no  statutory  provision  exists  making  the 
act  criminal  per  se.  If  a  malicious  intent  or  motive  is  neces- 
sary it  will  have  to  be  proved  by  the  party  on  whom  is  cast 
the  burden  of  proving  the  essential  elements  of  the  transac- 
tion in  litigation.  But  this  rule  does  not  of  course  require 
direct  evidence  of  malice,  though  such  evidence  may  often  be 
easy  to  procure  in  the  shape  of  the  express  declarations  of  the 
accused.  It  is  usually  sufficient  if  facts  are  shown  which 
evince  a  malevolent,  or  spiteful,  or  reckless  disposition,  and 
from  these  facts  the  jury  may  decide  as  a  presumption  or  in- 
ference of  fact  that  malice  existed  in  the  case.1 


1  "  Thus  in  malicious  prosecutions 
the  term  is  quite  comprehensive  and 
includes  many  phases  of  wrong  mo- 
tive and  conduct.  There  may  be  ill- 
will,  malevolence,  spite,  a  spirit  of 
revenge  or  a  purpose  to  injure  with- 
out cause,  but  it  is  not  necessary 
there  should  be.     If  the  prosecution 


is  wilful,  wanton  or  reckless,  or 
against  the  prosecutor's  sense  of  duty 
and  right,  or  for  ends  he  knows  or  is 
bound  to  know  are  wrong  and 
against  the  dictates  of  public  policy, 
it  is  malicious."  Hamilton  v.  Smith, 
30  Mich.  229. 


CHAPTER  XVIII. 


JUDICIAL  NOTICE. 


236.  Judicial  notice. 

237.  Mattex-    of    common    knowl- 

edge. 

238.  Historical  facts. 

239.  Geographical  facts. 

240.  Political  facts  — Elections. 

241.  Scientific  facts. 


§  2-42.  Common  and  statutory  law  — 
Municipal  ordinances  and 
local  and  foreign  laws. 

243.  Foreign    nations,    seals    and 

acts. 

244.  Terms  of  court,  records,  rules 

of  practice  and  judicial  pro- 
ceedings. 


§  236.  Judicial  notice. —  The  doctrine  of  judicial  notice, 
i.  e.,  the  knowledge  which  a  court  or  judge  will  take  officially 
of  the  truth  of  certain  classes  of  facts  without  requiring 
proof  thereof  to  be  offered,  is  based  upon  the  necessity  for  a 
speedy  and  inexpensive  administration  of  justice.  The  time 
of  the  courts  should  not  be  taken  up,  nor  should  the  parties  to 
litigation  be  put  to  needless  expense  in  taking  evidence  to 
prove  facts  which  are  merely  collateral  to  the  point  in  issue 
and  which  are  within  the  knowledge  of  all  persons  of  average 
education  and  intelligence.  Of  such  facts  the  courts  will  take 
judicial  notice.  The  primary  effect  of  judicial  notice  is  to 
dispense  with  the  proof  of  some  fact.  To  the  extent  that  this 
is  clone  the  power  of  the  jury  as  triers  of  fact  is  limited  and 
circumscribed,  and  the  power  of  the  court  to  decide  upon  the 
existence  of  a  fact  as  a  matter  of  law,  and  by  its  decision  to 
bind  the  jury,  is  correspondingly  enlarged.  To  permit  the 
court  to  take  judicial  notice  of  obvious  or  familiar  facts  is 
equivalent  to  enunciating  a  rule  of  law  that  such  facts  are  to 
be  considered  by  the  jury  as  conclusively  proved  and  as  obli- 
gatory on  them.  This  view  of  the  matter  is  confirmed  by  the 
consistent  practice  of  the  courts  in  refusing  not  only  to  per- 
mit the  introduction  of  evidence  to  prove  the  fact,  but  of  evi- 
dence to  disprove  its  truth  as  well. 

But  the  amount  of  information  which  is  required  to  consti- 
tute a  man  of  average  or  ordinar}7  education  and  intelligence 


§  237.] 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


305 


will  vary  greatly.  Many  facts  may  be  notorious  in  one  sec- 
tion of  a  large  country  which  would  not  be  known  to  well- 
informed  persons  in  another.  The  general  rules,  therefore,  in 
regard  to  the  facts  which  the  courts  will  notice  judicially  are 
sometimes  modified  by  the  circumstances  of  the  particular 
case  to  which  it  is  sought  to  apply  them.1 

§237.  Matter  of  common  knowledge. —  The  courts  will 
take  judicial  notice  of  the  meaning  of  English  words  and 
phrases,2  abbreviations,3  and  of  legal  expressions  in  common 
use.4  So,  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the  recurrence  of 
public  holidays;5  of  the  natural  and  artificial  subdivisions  of 
time ; 6  of  the  coincidence  of  the  days  of  the  month  and  week ; 7 
of  the  incidents  of  railroad  travel;8  of  the  use  of  the  telephone 
as  a  means  of  communication;9  of  billiard  tables  for  gaming 
purposes; 10  of  the  nature  and  value  of  the  circulating  medium 


1 "  Courts  should  exercise  this 
power  with  caution ;  care  must  be 
taken  that  the  requisite  notoriety 
exists,  and  every  reasonable  doubt 
should  be  promptly  resolved  in  the 
negative."  Swayne,  J.,  in  Browne  v. 
Piper,  91  U.  S.  37. 

2Lohman  v.  State,  81  Ind.  151-; 
Power  v.  Boudle  (N.  D.,  1893),  54  N. 
W.  Rep.  404;  Baily  v.  Kalamazoo  P. 
Co..  40  Mich.  251 ;  Elrod  v.  Alexanda, 
4  Heisk.  342  (meaning  of  "  contra- 
band ") ;  Barker  v.  State,  12  Tex.  273 ; 
Fullenwider  v.  Fullenwider,  53  Mo. 
439;  Hill  v.  State.  43  111.  177;  State 
v.  Kambleton,  22  Mo.  452;  Com.  v. 
Kneeland,  20  Pick.  (Mass.)  239. 

3  Brown  v.  Piper,  91  U.  S.  37 ;  Mose- 
ley  v.  Martin,  37  Ala.  216 ;  Wasson 
v.  Bank,  107  Ind.  206;  Weaver  v. 
McElbreuan,  13  Mo.  89 ;  Stephen  v. 
State,  11  Ga.  225;  United  States  v. 
Keefer,  59  Ind.  263  ("C.  O.  D."). 
Contra,  Johnston  v.  Roberts,  31  Md. 
476  (abbreviations  used  by  printers 
and  newspaper  publishers) ;  Ellis  v. 
Park,  8  Tex.  205;  Accola  v.  Railroad 
C,o.,  70  Iowa,  185 ;  Hulbert  v.  Carver, 
37  Barb.  62 ;  Collender  v.  Diusmore, 


55  N.  Y.  200;  Russell  v.  Martin,  15 
Tex.  238;  McNichoIs  v.  Pacific  Ex. 
Co.,  12  Mo.  App.  401.    See  ante,  §218. 

4  Eureka  Vinegar  Co.  v.  Gazette,  35 
Fed.  Rep.  570;  Com.  v.  Kneeland, 
20  Pick.  239;  Hoare  v.  Silverlock,  12 
Jur.  695 ;  Lenahan  v.  People,  5  T.  & 
C.  265 ;  South,  etc.  Co.  v.  Jeffries, 
40  Mo.  App.  360 ;  Slingman  v.  Fiedler, 
3  Mo.  App.  577;  Ward  v.  State,  22 
Ala.  16;  Sterne  v.  State,  20  Ala.  43. 

5  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Gibson,  7 
Wend.  460 ;  Rice  v.  Mead,  22  How. 
Pr.  440. 

6Upinton  v.  Carrington,  69  Hun, 
320. 

?  Swales  v.  Grubb,  126  Ind.  106; 
Brennan  v.  Voght  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S. 
Rep.  893;  Wilson  v.  Von  Leer,  137 
Pa.  St.  371 ;  Banks  v.  Kingsley,  84 
Me.  Ill ;  Ecker  v.  Bank,  64  Md.  292; 
Alman  v.  Owens,  31  Ala.  167;  Phila. 
R.  Co.  v.  Lehman,  56  Md,  209;  Mc- 
intosh v.  Lee,  57  Iowa,  356. 

8  Downey  v.  Hendrie,  46  Mich. 
498. 

9  Globe  Printing  Co.  v.  Stahle,  23 
Mo.  App.  451. 

io  State  v.  Price,  12  Gill  &  J.  260. 


3GG 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


[§  237. 


irrespective  of  its  legal-tender  character;1  of  legal  weights 
and  measures;2  and  that  a  litigant  is  an  alien  enemy.3  But 
the  value  of  foreign  currency  unless  fixed  by  act  of  congress,' 
of  a  particular  commodity,5  or  of  a  person's  services;6  the 
rates  of  exchange  between  cities;7  that  "policy"  is  a  game 
of  chance;8  local  rules  for  the  measurement  of  grain;9  the 
habitual  use10  and  location  of  city  streets  and  plats,11  and  other 
similar  matters  of  limited  and  local  notoriety,  must  be  affirma- 
tively shown.12 

It  has  been  held  that  though  courts  will  take  judicial  no- 
tice of  the  natural  expectation  of  life,  as  it  is  shown  by  mor- 
tality tables,13  they  will  not  notice  the  present  value  of  a  life 
insurance  policy  which  is  ascertainable  onW  after  an  intricate 
computation  and  the  consideration  of  extrinsic  circumstances.14 

Facts  of  natural  and  uniform  recurrence,  such  as  the  return 
of  the  seasons,15  the  planting,16  growth,  condition  17  and  matu- 


1  Larnpton  v.  Haggard,  3  Mon.  146; 
Gady  v.  State.  83  Ala.  51 ;  State  v. 
Grant,  55  Ala.  201  (coin);  Bank  v. 
Meagher,  33  Ala.  622;  Perritt  v. 
Couch,  5  Bush,  201  (value  of  United 
States  treasury  notes). 

2  Pecks  v.  Simis,  22  N.  E.  Rep.  313. 
3Ince  v.  Beekman,  16  La.    Ann. 

352.     The   federal  courts  will   take 
notice  of  the  organization   and   ex- 
istence of  national    banks.     United 
States  v.  Williams,  4  Biss.  302. 
4Kermott  v.  Ayer,  11  Mich.  181. 

5  Cook  v.  Decker,  63  Mo.  328. 

6  Pearson  v.  Darrington,  32  Ala. 
227. 

i  Lowe  v.  Bliss,  24  111.  168. 

8  State  v.  Seiner,  17  Mo.  App.  39. 

9  South,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wood,  74  Ala. 
449. 

10  Cleveland  v.  Newsom,  45  Mich. 
62. 

11  Pennsylvania  R.  Co.  v.  Frana,  13 
III.  App.  91 ;  Allen  v.  Scharring- 
hausen,  8  Mo.  App.  229;  Cicotte  v. 
Cruciaux,  52  Mich.  227. 

12Longes  v.  Kennedy,  2  Bibb(Ky.), 
607  (local  custom);  Russell  v.  Hoyt, 


4  Mont.  412;  Bell  v.  State,  1  Tex. 
App.  81  (location  of  hotels) ;  Tison  v. 
Smith,  8  Tex.  147 ;  Wilcox  v.  Jack- 
son, 109  111.  261 ;  Perkins  v.  Rogers, 
35  Ind.  124;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  In- 
surance Co.,  33  Mo.  App.  348 ;  Rich- 
ards v  Knight  (Iowa,  1892),  42  N.  W. 
Rep.  584  (maturity  of  crops) ;  Endere 
v.  McDonald  (Ind.,  1893),  31  N.  E. 
Rep.  1056;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Champion,  33  id.  874;  Bradford  v. 
Floyd.  80  Mo.  207. 

13Kans.  etc.  Co.  v.  Phillips  (Ala., 
1893),  13  S.  Rep.  65 ;  Abell  v.  Pa.  M. 
Ins.  Co.,  18  W.  Va.  400 ;  Gordon  v. 
Tweedy,  74  Ala.  232. 

14  Price  v.  Conn.  M.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  48 
Mo.  App.  281. 

15  Floyd  v.  Ricks,  14  Ark.  286,  292  ; 
58  Am.  Dec.  374;  Raridan  v.  Rail- 
road, 69  Iowa,  527;  Patterson  v.  Mc- 
Causland,  3  Bland  (Md.),  69;  Tom- 
linson  v.  Greenfield,  31  Ark.  557; 
Hunter  v.  New  York,  O.  &  W.  R  R. 
Co.,  116  N.  Y.  622. 

16  Wetzel  v.  Kelly,  83  Ala.  440; 
Loeb  v.  Richai'dson,  74  Ala.  311. 

i"  Ross  v.  Bos  well,  60  Ind.  235. 


§  233.] 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


JG7 


rity  of  crops,1  and  other  natural  phenomena  which  are  noto- 
rious and  with  which  the  majority  of  fairly  well  educated 
persons  are   presumed  to  be  conversant,  need  not  be  proved. 

§238.  Historical  facts.— Important  facts  of  history  of 
general  and  public  notoriety  which  have  exerted  an  influence 
on  the  development  of  affairs  affecting  either  the  welfare  of 
the  whole  people  or  reacting  upon  the  forms  of  the  constitu- 
tion and  government  will  be  noticed  judicially,2  though  it  has 
been  held  advisable,  if  not  actually  necessary,  to  call  the 
court's  attention  to  the  facts  involved.3  Thus,  in  America, 
the  courts  will  not  require  proof  that  at  a  given  period  the 
nation  was  engaged  in  foreign4  or  civil5  war,  or  that  the  latter 
was  widespread  and  involved  particular  states  or  sections.'5 
So,  too,  it  has  been  held  that  the  abolition  of  slavery,7  or  the 
nature8  or  extinguishment  of  Indian  titles,  need  not  be  shown.9 

As  a  part  of  the  sum  of  historical  knowledge  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  court,  notice  will  be  taken  that  during  and  after 
the  civil  war  the  operation  of  the  civil  law  was  suspended;10 
that  an  order  of  a  military  commander  was  law;11  that  gold 
was  not  in  circulation,  but  that  in  all  parts  of  the  country  a 
paper  currency  was  in  use,12  with  reference  to  which  contracts 
were  made,  and  whose  value  was  greatly  depreciated.13 


i  Garth  v.  Caldwell,  72  Mo.  622; 
Dixon  v.  Niccolls,  39  111.  373;  Tom- 
linson  v.  Greenfreed,  31  Ark.  557; 
Gordon  v.  Tweedy,  74  Ala.  232; 
Mahony  v.  Aurecocha,  51  Cal.  429. 
Contra,  Gove  v.  Downer,  59  Vt.  139. 

2  Foscue  v.  Lyon,  55  N.  Y.  621 ; 
Magie  v.  Chadoine,  30  Tex.  644; 
Smith  v.  Speed,  50  Ala.  276;  Payner 
v.  Treadwell,  16  Gal.  220;  Harris  v. 
Herman,  78  Mo.  623;  Simmons  v. 
Trumbo,  9  W.  Va.  358;  Prince  v. 
Skellin,  71  Me.  361;  Williams  v. 
State,  64  Ind.  553 ;  MeKinnon  v.  Bliss, 
21  N.  Y.  206;  Ashley  v.  Martin,  50 
Ala.  537 ;  Colloway  v.  Cassart,  45 
Ark.  41;  Yehn  Jim  v.  Territory,  1 
Wash.  63  (Indian  war). 

3  MeKinnon  v.  Bliss,  21  N.  Y.  206. 

4  Ogden  v.  Lund,  1 1  Tex.  688. 


5  Perkins  v.  Rogers,  35  Ind.  124; 
Brooke  v.  Filer,  35  Ind.  402;  Wor- 
cester v.  Cheney,  94  111.  430;  Swen- 
nerton  v.  Columbian,  37   N.  Y.  174. 

6  Jeffries  v.  Jeffries,  39  Ala.  655 
(martial  law);  Hix  v.  Hix,  25  W. 
Va.  481  (extent  of  Confederate  lines  l ; 
Dryden  v.  Stephens,  19  id.  1 ;  United 
States  v.  Greathonse,  2  Abb.  (U.  S.) 
364.  Contra,  Kelly  v.  Story,  6 
Heisk.  202. 

7  Ferdinand  v.  State,  39  Ala.  706. 

8  United  States  v.  Lucero,  1  N.  M. 
422. 

9  People  v.  Snyder,  41   N.  Y.  397. 
10Killebrew  v.   Murphy,   3  Heisk. 

546. 

"  Gates  v.  Johnson,  36  Tex.  144. 

12  Morris  v.  Morris,  58  Ala.  443; 
United  States  v.  American,  1  Woolw. 


13  Ashley  v.  Martin,  50  Ala.  537.     See  cases  in  last  note. 


308 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


[§  239. 


So,  generally,  any  minor  incident  which  forms  a  part  of 
some  greater  event,  or  which  is  a  factor  in  bringing  about  a 
condition  of  affairs  which  will  be  judicially  noticed,  need  not 
be  proved.1  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  the  agreement  of 
William  Penn  with  Lord  Baltimore,  fixing  the  boundaries 
between  the  provinces  of  Maryland  and  Pennsylvania,'2  and 
the  details  of  the  history  of  Indian  tribes  resident  in  New 
York,3  form  a  part  of  the  history  of  these  states  and  need  not 
be  shown  in  their  courts.4 

§231).  (Geographical  facts. —  Courts  are  bound  to  notice 
the  extent  and  subdivisions  of  the  territory  over  which  the 
government  of  which  they  are  a  part  exercises  its  functions. 
Thus,  courts  will  take  notice  of  the  existence  and  location  of 
the  legal  divisions  of  the  state,  as  towns  and  counties,5  and  of 
the  representative  districts  into  which  a  state  is  divided."    But 


217;  Hart  v.  State,  55  Ind.  599;  Sim- 
mons v.  Trurnbo,  9  W.  Va.  358; 
Keppel  v.  Petersburg  R  Co.,  Chase's 
Dec.  167 ;  Harvey  v.  Walden,  23  La. 
Ann.  163;  Riddle  v.  Hill,  51  Ala.  224. 

1  Schooner  Mersey,  Blatchf.  Prize 
Cas.  187 ;  Williams  v.  State,  67  Ga. 
230;  East  Tenn.  Iron  Co.  v.  Gaskell, 
2  Lea,  742  (suspension  of  statute  of 
limitation);  Turner  v.  Patton,  49 
Ala.  406;  Humphreys  v.  Burnside, 
4  Bush,  215;  Hix  v.  Hix,  25  W.  Va. 
481;  Rice  v.  Shook,  27  Ark.  137; 
Conger  v.  Weaver,  6  Cal.  548 :  Dob- 
bin v.  Bryan,  5  Tex.  267  (opening  of 
land  office) ;  Lamb  v.  Davenport,  1 
Sawy.  (IT.  S.)  609  (facts  pertaining 
to  the  settlement  of  Oregon);  De 
Celis  v.  United  States,  13  Ct.  CI.  117; 
Conger  v.  Weaver,  6  Cal.  548;  Irwin 
v.  Phillips,  5  Cal.  140;  Russell  v. 
Jackson,  22  Wend.  276  (facts  of  ped- 
igree in  Debrett's  Peerage). 

2  Thomas  v.  Stigers,  5  Pa.  St.  480. 

3  Howard  v.  Moot,  64  N.  Y.  282. 

4  The  court  may  refresh  its  mem- 
ory by  consulting  standard  and  well- 
known  historical  and  scientific 
works.     See  ante,  §  145. 

6  Campbell  v.  West,  86  Cal.  197; 
Casey    v.     Reeves,    46    Kan.     571 ; 


Adams  v.  Harrington,  114  Ind.  66; 
Forehand  v.  State,  53  Ark.  46 ;  3  S. 
W.  Rep.  728:  Borough  v.  Brown,  11 
Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  272 ;  People  v.  Wood, 
131  N.  Y.  617;  Linck  v.  Litchfield,  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  123:  Winn.  Lake  Co.  v. 
Young.  40  N.  H.  420;  Goodwin  v. 
Appleton,  22  Me.  453 ;  State  v.  Dun- 
nell,  3  R.  I.  127 ;  Com.  v.  Desmond, 
103  Mass.  445;  Overton  v.  State,  60 
Ala.  73;  State  v.  Reader,  60  Iowa, 
527;  Dexter  v.  Cranston,  41  Mich. 
448?  Schilling  v.  Territory,  2  Wash. 
Ter.  283;  Lewis  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893), 
24  S.  W.  Rep.  903;  People  v.  Sup- 
piger,  103  111.  434;  Terre  Haute,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Pierce,  95  Ind.  490;  Sullivan 
v.  People,  122  111.  385.  Contra, 
Grusenmeyer  v.  Logan  sport,  76  Ind. 
549.  The  area  of  counties  need  not 
be  proved  (Buckingdiouse  v.  Gregg, 
19  Ind.  401 ;  Wright  v.  Hawkins,  28 
Tex.  452),  though  the  date  of  their 
organization  must  be  shown.  Ells- 
worth v.  Nelson,  81  Iowa,  57 ;  Rousey 
v.  Wood,  47  Mo.  App.  465 ;  State  v. 
Cleveland,  80  Mo.  108. 

6  United  States  v.  Johnson,  2  Sawy. 
(U.  S.)  482 ;  United  States  v.  Beebe, 
2  Dak.  292. 


§  239.] 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


560 


it  has  been  held  that  the  courts  of  a  state  cannot  know  judi- 
cially of  the  existence  of  counties,  towns  or  cities  located  out  of 
that  state,  and  their  existence  and  location  will  have  to  be 
proved.1 

Judicial  notice  will  be  taken  of  the  general  natural  geo- 
graphical features  of  the  United  States;2  of  the  condition  and 
capacity  of  its  rivers  and  waters,  whether  navigable  or  not;3 
of  the  boundaries  of  the  states ; 4  that  a  portion  of  one  state 
had  been  separated  from s  or  ceded  to  another,"  or  to  the  federal 
government ; "  of  the  location  and  character  of  mountain  ranges,8 
the  distances  between  places,9  and  their  population  as  shown 
by  the  census.10 

Though  the  courts  are  not  bound  to  take  notice  of  the  time 
it  requires  for  the  mails  between  places,11  they  may  do  so.'2 


1  Richardson  v.  Williams.  2  Port. 
(Ala.)  239;  Woodward  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  21  Wis.  309;  Riggin  v.  Collier, 
C  Mo.  568;  Ellis  v.  Park,  8  Tex.  205; 
Whitlock  v.  Castro,  22  id.  108. 

2Mossman  v.  Forrest,  27  Ind.  233; 
Stroudsburg  v.  Brown,  11  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  R.  272. 

*  Brown  v.  Scofield,  8  Barb.  279; 
People  v.  Mining  Co.,  60  Cal.  138; 
Com.  v.  King,  150  Mass.  221;  Cash 
v.  Auditor,  7  Ind.  227;  Walker  v. 
Allen,  72  Ala.  456;  Ross  v.  Faust, 
54  Ind.  471 :  Tewksbury  v.  Schulen- 
berg,  41  Wis.  584;  Neaderheuser  v. 
State,  28  Ind.  257;  Thurman  v.  Mor- 
rison, 14  B.  Mon.  296. 

*The  Appollon,  9  Wheat.  374: 
Peyroud  v.  Howard,  7  Pet.  342; 
Thorson  v.  Peterson,  9  Fed.  Rep. 
517;  Ogden  v.  Lund,  11  Tex.  688; 
Harrold  v.  Ai  rington,  64  Tex.  233. 

5  Bank  v.  Machir,  18  W.  Vai  271. 

6  People  v.  Snyder,  41  N.  Y.  397. 

•  Hewthorn  v.  Doe,  1  Blackf.  (Ind.) 
159. 

8  Casey  v.  Reeves,  26  Pac.  Rep, 
951 ;  46  Kan.  571 ;  Price  v.  Page,  24 
Mo.  65. 

9  Pearce  v.  Langft,  101  Pa.  St.  511 ; 
Mut.   Ben.  L.  I.  Co.   v.  Robison,  58 

24 


Fed.  Rep.  723;  McConnell  v.  Boudry, 
4  T.  B.  Mon.  394;  Rice  v.  Mont- 
gomery, 4  Biss.  75;  Hegard  v.  In- 
surance Co.  (Colo.,  1890),  11  Pac.  Rep. 
594. 

10  Denair  v.  Brooklyn,  5  N.  Y.  S. 
585;  Forehand  v.  State,  13  S.  W. 
Rep.  728;  56  Ark.  46:  People  v. 
Williams,  64  Cal.  87;  State  v.  Bras- 
camp,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  532;  Welch  v.. 
County,  29  W.  Va.  63;  State  v. 
County,  89  Mo.  237;  Hawkins  v. 
Thomas,  3  Ind.  App.  399 ;  29  N.  E. 
Rep.  157;  Kalbrier  v.  Leonard,  34' 
Ind.  497.  A  court  will  notice  the 
fact  that  many  persons  of  foreign 
birth  reside  in  a  certain  locality. 
Kernitz  v.  L.  I.  City,  50  Hun,  428; 
3  N.  Y.  S.  144.  Courts  are  not 
bound  to  take  notice  of  the  loss  in- 
curred by  a  railroad  company  be- 
cause an  Indian  reservation  had  been 
located  within  the  boundaries  of  its 
land.  Elling  v.  JThexton,  16  Pac. 
Rep.  931. 

11  Wiggins  v.  Burkham,  10  Wall. 
129;  Rice  v.  Montgomery,  4  Biss.  75. 

•2  Pearce  v.  Langfit,  101  Pa.  St.  507. 
It  may  be  remarked  that  placing  a 
letter  in  a  street  letter-box  or  hand- 
ing it  to  a  carrier  or   collector  is 


370  JUDICIAL    NOTICE.  [§  240. 

§  240.  Political  facts  —  Elections. —  The  existence  and 
political  and  executive  acts  of  the  supreme  authority  to  which 
the  court  is  subordinate  will  be  judicially  noticed,  particularly 
if  its  existence  has  been  the  result  of  statutory  enactment  or 
where  its  acts  have  assumed  the  form  of  laws  regularly  pro- 
mulgated. Thus,  the  proclamations  of  the  president  of  the 
United  States,1  the  messages2  and  commissions  of  the  gov- 
ernor of  the  state,3  the  regulations  settled  by  the  heads  of  ex- 
ecutive departments  for  carrying  on  business,4  together  with 
the  authenticity  of  the  signatures  and  seals  attached  to  such 
documents,  need  not  be  shown  by  evidence.5  The  courts  will 
also  take  judicial  notice  of  the  date  of  the  appointment  or 
accession  to  office  of  an  executive  official,6  of  his  public  acts,7 
and  of  the  date  upon  which  his  term  expires  by  death  or  limita- 
tion.8 So  it  has  been  held  that  the  courts  will  notice  the  days 
of  holding  general  elections;9  that  an  election  has  been  held,10 
the  whole  number  of  votes  cast,  and  the  result  of  the  voting,11 
together  with  the  fact  that  the  result  is  contested  by  the  de- 
feated candidate.12 

Judicial  notice  will  be  taken,  in  all  collateral  proceedings 
not  involving  the  title  to  the  office,  that  certain  persons  are 

mailing.     Abb.  Brief  on  Facts,  g  517;  6  Heizer    v.    State,    12    Ind.    350; 

Pearce  v.  Langflt,  supra.  State  v.   Boyd,  31  Neb.  435;   51  N. 

i  The  Greathouse  Case,  2  Abb.  (U.  W.  Rep.  964. 

S.)  382;  Cuyler  v.  Ferrill,  1  Abb.  (U.  7  Jones  v.  United  States,  137  U.  S. 

S.)  169.  202;   Prince  v.  Skillen,    71   Me.  361 ; 

2Dowdell  v.    State,    58  Ind.  333;  State    v.  Gramelspacher,    126    Ind. 

Wells  v.  Railroad  Co.,  110  Mo.   286;  39S;  Campbell  v.  West,  86  Cal.  197. 

19  S.  W.    Rep.  530;  Jenkins  v.  Col-  8  Cincinnati,  etc.  Co.  v.   Jones,  21 

lard,  145  U.  S.  546.  S.  W.    Rep.    192;  Doe  v.    Riley,    28 

3  State  v.  Carroll,  38  Conn.  449.  Ala.    164;    Martin  v.    Aultman,    80 

4  Burke  v.  Miltenberger,  19  Wall.  Wis.  150;  Ragland  v.  Wynn,  37  Ala. 
519;  Garling  v.  Van  Allen,  55  N.  Y.  32. 

31;    Low   v.    Hanson,   72   Me.    104;  s>State  v.   Minnick,  15  Iowa,  123; 

United  States  v.  Williams,  6  Mont.  Himmelman  v.  Hoadley,  44  Cal.  213; 

379.     Contra,    Moore   v.    Worth,    2  Ellis  v.  Reddin,  12  Kan.  306. 

Duv.  (Ky.)  308.  10  Urnston   v.    State,    73  Ind.    175. 

5  Com.  v.  Dunlop  (Va.,  1893),  16  Contra,  Ex  parte  Reynolds,  87  Ala. 
S.  E.  Rep.  273 ;  Jones  v.  Gale's  Adm'r,  138. 

4  Martin,  635;  State  v.Boyd,  34  Neb.  "  Thomas  v.   Com.,   17  S.  E.  Rep. 

435;  57   N.  W.    Rep.    964;  State  v.  788;   State  v.    Swift,    69   Ind.    505; 

Barrett,  40  Minn.  65 ;  Davis  v.  Mc-  Savage's  Case,  84  Va.  582. 

Enany,  150  Mass.  451.  12  Lewis  v.  Bruton,  74  Ala.  317. 


§  241.] 


JUDICIAL   NOTICE. 


371 


actually  the  incumbents  of  the  various  subordinate  offices, 
state  and  federal,  which  they  purport  to  hold,  and  for  these 
reasons  their  official  character  need  not  be  affirmatively 
shown.1  So  courts  will  notice  the  place  and  time  established 
by  law  for  the  meeting2  and  adjournment  of  congress  and 
the  legislature,3  the  contents  of  their  journals,4  the  usual  mode 
of  proceeding  and  the  constitutional  and  statutory  privileges 
of  their  members. 

§  241.  Scientific  facts. —  Courts  will  take  notice  of  scien- 
tific facts  of  an  axiomatic  character,  but  not  of  those  upon 
which  there  is  a  disagreement  of  opinion  among  men  of  emi- 
nence in  that  line  of  research.5  Thus,  it  is  not  necessary  to  show 
that  kerosene 6  or  natural  gas  is  explosive;7  that  unoccupied 
buildings  are  exposed  to  damage  from  fire;8  that  whisky, gin,9 
rum,10  wine  u  and  beer  are  intoxicating  liquors ; 12  that  beer  is  a 
malt  liquor; 13  that  the  sun  14  or  moon  15  sets  or  rises  at  a  cer- 


1  Kellar  v.  Moore,  51  Ala.  340  (com- 
missioner of  deeds);  Thompson  v. 
Haskell,  21  111.  215  (sheriff);  Tim- 
berlake  v.  Brewer,  59  Ala.  108;  Cole- 
man v.  State,  63  id.  93  (justice  of 
the  peace);  Ede  v.  Johnson,  15  Cal. 
53 ;  Russell  v.  Sargent,  7  111.  App.  98. 
Cf.  Davis  v.  McEnaney,  150  Mass. 
451. 

2  Perkins  v.  Woodfolk,  8  Baxt.  411. 

3  Perkins  v.  Woodfolk,  8  Baxt.  411. 
*  McDonald  v.  State,  80  Wis.  407 ; 

id.  414;  Barnard  v.  Gall,  43  La.  Ann. 
959;  People  v.  Stewart,  97   111.    123. 

5  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Am.  T.  I. 
Co.,  33  Mo.  App.  348;  Com.  v. 
Marzynski,  149  Mass.  68;  Luke  v. 
Calhoun,  52  Ala.  115;  Lyon  v. 
Marine,  55  Fed.  Rep.  964;  Cozzens 
v.  Higgins,  1  Abb.  Ct.  App.  Dec. 
451 ;  Eureka,  etc.  Co.  v.  Gazette,  35 
Fed.  Rep.  570;  Trese  v.  State,  2  S. 
Rep.  390 ;  State  v.  Barber,  36  U.  S. 
313. 

6  Wood  v.  Insurance  Co.,  46  N.  Y. 
421. 


7  Jamieson  v.  Ind.  etc.  Co.,  46  N. 
Y.  421.  Contra,  as  to  the  inflam- 
mable nature  of  gin  and  turpentine, 
Mosley  v.  Insurance  Co.,  55  Vt.  142. 

8  White  v.  Insurance  Co.,  83  Me. 
279. 

9  Com.  v.  Peckham,  2  Gray,  514. 

w  United  States  v.  Angell,  11  Fed. 
Rep.  54. 

11  Kizer  v.  Randleman,  5  Jones'  L. 
428:  State  v.  Packer,  80  N.  C.  439. 

i2  State  v.  Effinger,  44  Mo.  App.  81 ; 
State  v.  Teissedre,  30  Kan.  484; 
Wetzler  v.  Keely,  83  Ala.  444; 
Thomas  v.  Com.  (Va.,  1893),  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  788;  Maier  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  974. 

13  United  States  v.  Ducournac,  54 
Fed.  Rep.  138.;  Aller  v.  State,  55  Ala. 
16 ;  State  v.  Gayette,  1 1  R.  1. 592 ;  Wat- 
son v.  State,  55  Ala.  158 ;  Fenton  v. 
State,  100  Ind.  90.  Whether  a  par- 
ticular sort  of  beer  is  an  intoxicating 
drink  was  left  to  the  jury  in  Com- 
monwealth v.  Bloss,  116  Mass.  56; 
State  v.  McCafferty,  63  Me.  233.     So 


14  Lake  Erie,  etc.  Co.  v.   Hatch,  6 
Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  230. 


15  Case  v.  Perew,  46  Hun,  57. 


372 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE,, 


[§  242. 


tain  hour;  that  a  railroad  is  a  common  carrier,1  or  that  its 
operation  on  a  city  street  increases  traffic;2  that  a  mule  is  a 
domestic  animal;3  that  a  fracture  of  the  skull  may  produce 
death;4  the  length  of  the  period  of  gestation;5  that  no  man 
was  ever  known  to  be  nine  feet  high,6  and  that  tobacco  is 
neither  a  drug  nor  medicine.7 

Courts  will  not  take  notice  of  facts  to  be  found  only  in  en- 
cyclopedias and  similar  works  or  of  facts  which  do  not  form 
a  part  of  the  general  stock  of  scientific  information.8  Thus, 
the  courts  will  not  take  notice  that  each  concentric  circle  in  a 
cross-section  of  timber  marks  a  year's  growth; 9  that  kerosene 
is  refined  coal  oil;10  that  oleomargarine  is  or  is  not  unwhole- 
some,11 or  that  a  certain  crime  is  physically  impossible  of  com- 
mission.12 

§242.  Common  and  statutory  law  —  Municipal  ordi- 
nances and  local  and  foreign  laws. —  The  rules,  maxims  and 
principles  of  the  common  law  which  prevail  in  any  jurisdic- 
tion need  not  be  shown  in  court.13     So  the  rules  of  the  law 


of  cider  or  ale  after  it  has  fermented. 
State  v.  Biddle,  54  N.  H.  379.  And 
whether  blackberry  wine  is  a  spirit- 
uous liquor  is  for  the  jury  to  decide. 
State  v.  Lowry,  74  N.  C.  121. 

1  Caldwell  v.  Richmond,  etc.  Co., 
89  Ga.  550. 

2  Bookman  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  R.  Co., 
137  N.  Y.  302. 

3  State  v.  Gould,  26  W.  Va.  258. 

4  McDaniel  v.  State,  76  Ala.  1. 
s  King  v.  Luff,  8  East,  193. 

6  Hunter  v.  Railway  Co.,  116  N.  Y. 
615. 

7  Com.  v.  Marzynski,  149  Mass.  68. 
In  this  case  the  court  said:  "Ordi- 
narily, whether  a  substance  or  arti- 
cle comes  within  a  given  description 
is  a  question  of  fact;  but  some  facts 
are  so  obvious  and  familiar  that  the 
law  takes  notice  of  them  and  receives 
them  into  its  domain.  If  the  proof 
had  been  that  the  shop  had  been 
kept  open  for  the  purpose  of  selling 
guns  or  pistols,  it  would  hardly  be 
contended  that  the  judge  might  not 


properly  have  ruled  that  the  sale  of 
these  articles  was  not  a  sale  of  drugs 
or  medicine.  The  court  has  judicial 
knowledge  of  the  meaning  of  com- 
mon words,  and  may  well  rule  that 
guns  and  pistols  are  not  drugs  or 
medicine,  and  may  exclude  the  opin- 
ions of  witnesses  who  offer  to  testify 
that  they  are." 

8  Engraving  Co.  v.  Hoke,  30  Fed. 
Rep.  444;  Culverhouse  v.  Wertz,  32 
Mo.  App.  24;  Fowler  v.  Park,  48 
Fed.  Rep.  789 ;  Meely  Hee  v.  Hudson, 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  175. 

9  Patterson  v.  McCausland,  3 
Bland,  69. 

10  Bennett  v.  Insurance  Co.,  8  Daly, 
471. 

ii  North.  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Chambers,  58 
Mich.  381. 

12  Ausman  v.  Veal,  10  Ind.  355. 

13  St.  Louis  Ry.  Co.  v.  Weaver, 
35  Kan.  412;  Wilson  v.  Bumstead,  12 
Neb.  1.  "The  authority  of  the  max- 
ims of  the  common  laws  rests  upon 
their  general  acceptance,  and   this 


§  242.] 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


373 


of  nations  regulating  the  intercourse  of  civilized  nations  need 
not  be  shown,1  as  the  courts  of  all  civilized  countries  will  take 
notice  of  the  principles  of  that  law.2  So  it  is  well  settled  that 
notice  will  be  taken  of  the  law  merchant3  and  of  the  customs 
of  persons  engaged  in  particular  avocations,  such  as  mer- 
chants;4 railway  companies,5  and  other  common  carriers;6  of 
bankers,7  mercantile  agencies,8  physicians,9  conveyancers  10  and 
public  officials.11  So  a  court  will  take  judicial  notice  of  the 
official  character,  signature  and  seal  of  a  foreign  or  domestic 
notary  public  attached  to  a  protest  for  non-payment  or  other 
instrument.12  Foreign  customs  forming  no  part  of  the  law 
merchant  must  be  proved  as  matter  of  fact.13 

la  America  the  federal  courts  will  take  notice  judicially  not 
only  of  the  constitution  and  public  statutes  of  the  United 
States,14  but  of  all  state  constitutions  and  statutes  applicable  to 
cases  pending  in  them,15  as  well  as  of  the  decisions  of  the  state 


connotes  their  general  notoriety. 
Thus,  as  the  courts  cannot  refuse  to 
know  what  is  presumed  to  be  within 
the  knowledge  of  all  men  —  for 
every  one  is  presumed  to  know  the 
law  —  it  is  said  that  the  doctrines, 
axioms  and  principles  of  the  com- 
mon law  are  deposited  in  the  breast 
of  the  judges,  to  be  applied  to  the 
facts  which  are  properly  ascertained 
or  proved  before  them."  3  Bl.  Com. 
379. 

1 1  Bl.  Com.  75,  76,  85 ;  Edie  v.  E. 
I.  Co.,  2  Burr.  1226;  The  Scotia,  14 
Wall.  170. 

2Croudson  v.  Leonard,  4  Cranch, 
434 ;  Ocean  Insurance  Co.  v.  Francis, 
2  Wend.  64. 

» Munn  v.  Burch,  25  111.  35 ;  Wig- 
gin  v.  Chicago,  5  Mo.  App.  347. 

*Almy  v.  Simonson,  52  Hun,  535; 
Bank  v.  Fitzhugh,  1  Har.  &  G.  (Md.) 
239;  Gibson  v.  Stevens,  9  How. 
(U.  S.)  384;  Watt  v.  Hoch,  25  Pa. 
St.  411 ;  Consequa  v.  Willings,  1  Pet. 
225 ;  Jewell  v.  Center,  25  Ala.  498 ; 
Reed  v.  Wilson,  41  N.  J.  L.  29. 

s  Lane  v.  L.  E.   R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y. 


Weekly  Dig.  267;  Isaacson  v.  N.  Y. 
Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  94  N.  Y.  278. 
6  State  v.  Liquor,  73  Me.  278. 
"'  Fleming  v.  McClure,  1  Brev.  428; 
Brandas  v.    Barnett,  3  M.  G.   &  S. 
519;  Bank  v.    Hall,    83   N.  Y.    338; 
Yerkes  v.  Bank,  69  id.  383. 
8  Eaton  v.  Avery,  83  N.  Y.  31. 
9Yeaton  v.    Fry,   5   Cranch,   335; 
Chamoise  v.  Fowler,  3  Wend.  173. 

io  Doe  v.  Hilder,  2  B.  &  Aid.  793. 

nBigelow  v.  Chatterton,  57  Fed. 
Rep.  614. 

i2  Pierce  v.  Indseth,  106  U.  S.  546; 
Denmead  v.  Maack,  2  MacArthur, 
475;  United  States  v.  Libby,  1  W.  & 
M.  221 ,  Stoddard  v.  Sloan,  65  Iowa, 
680. 

13  Dutch,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mooney,  12 
Cal.  585;  Munn  v.  Burch,  25  111.  21 ; 
Turner  v.  Fish,  28  Miss.  306;  Lewis 
v.  McClure,  8  Oreg.  273. 

UKessel  v.  Albetis,  56  Barb.  362; 
Murphy  v.  Hendricks,  57  Ind.  593; 
Morris  v.  Davidson,  49  Ga.  361 ; 
Laidley  v.  Cumniings,  83  Ky.  607; 
Minis  v.  Schwarz,  37  Tex.  13. 

I5ffinde    v.    Vattier,   5    Pet.   398; 


374 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


[§  242. 


courts  construing  them.1  On  the  other  hand,  the  federal  con- 
stitutions and  statutes  need  never  be  proved  in  the  state 
courts,  as  they  are  bound  to  take  judicial  notice  of  their  enact- 
ment and  contents,2  as  well  as  of  the  constitutions  and  public 
statutes  of  their  own  state.3  i 

In  conformity  with  the  rule  that  courts  will  take  judicial 
notice  of  public  statutes,  municipal  charters  and  acts  incorpo- 
rating public  or  quasi-public  corporations  need  not  be  shown.4 


Jones  v.  Hays,  4  McLean,  521; 
Course  v.  Head,  4  Dall.  22;  Elmen- 
dorf  v.  Taylor,  10  Wheat.  152 ;  Cov- 
ington B.  Co.  v.  Shepherd,  20  How. 
(U.  S.)  227;  Knower  v.  Haines,  31 
Fed.  Rep.  513;  Fourth  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Francklyn,  120  U.  S.  751 ;  Jasper  v. 
Porter,  2  McLean,  579;  Carpenter 
-v.  Dexter,  8  Wall.  515;  New  Jersey 
v.  Yard,  95  U.  S.  112;  Gormley  v. 
Bunyan,  138  U.  S.  623;  Gordon  v. 
Hobart,  2  Sumn.  401 ;  Newberry  v. 
Robinson,  36  Fed.  Rep.  811 ;  Hanley 
v.  Donoghue,  116  U.  S.  4.  The  federal 
courts  will  notice  state  laws  only 
so  far  as  the  state  courts  notice  them 
and  as  far  they  are  called  upon  to 
administer  them.  If  the  state  court 
is  required  to  notice  local  or  private 
laws,  a  federal  court  in  that  state 
must  also  do  so.  Abb.  Brief  on 
Facts,  §  383,  citing  Beaty  v.  Know- 
ler,  4  Pet.  (U.  S.)  152;  Renaud  v. 
Abbott,  116  U.  S.  277.  "  The  circuit 
courts  of  the  United  States  are 
created  by  congress,  not  for  the  pur- 
pose of  administering  the  local  law 
of  a  single  state  alone,  but  to  admin- 
ister the  laws  of  all  the  states  in  the 
Union  in  cases  to  which  they  re- 
spectively apply.  The  judicial  power 
conferred  on  the  general  government 
by  the  constitution  extends  to  many 
cases  arising  under  the  laws  of  the 
different  states,  and  this  court  is 
called  upon,  in  the  exercise  of  its 
appellate  jurisdiction,  constantly  to 
take  notice  of  and  administer   the 


jurisprudence  of  all  the  states.  That 
jurisprudence,  then,  is  in  no  sense  a 
foreign  jurisprudence  to  be  proved 
in  the  courts  of  the  United  States  by 
the  ordinary  modes  of  proof  by 
which  the  laws  of  a  foreign  country 
are  to  be  established,  but  it  is  to  be 
judicially  taken  notice  of  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  laws  of  the 
United  States  are  taken  notice  of  by 
these  courts."  The  court,  by  Story, 
J.,  in  O wings  v.  Hull,  9  Pet.  (U.  S.) 
624. 

iCheever  v.  Wilson,  9  Wall.  108; 
Pennington  v.  Gibson,  16  How.  65; 
Evans  v.  Railroad  Co.,  5  Phila.  512. 

2  Morris  v.  Davidson,  49  Ga.  331 ; 
Caughran  v.  Gilman,  81  Iowa,  442; 
46  N.  W.  Rep.  1005;  Laidley  v. 
Cummings,  83  Ky.  006;  Baylis  v. 
Chubb,  16  Giatt.  284;  Wetumpka 
v.  Wharf  Co.,  63  Ala.  611;  Dwyer 
v.  Brenham,  65  Tex.  526;  Durch  v. 
Chippewa,  60  Wis.  227;  Bird  v. 
Com.,  21  Gratt.  (Va.)  800;  State 
v.  Cooper,  101  N.  C.  684. 

3  Harpending  v.  Church,  16  Pet. 
455;  Van  Swarton  v.  Com.,  24  Pa. 
St.  131 ;  Bowen  v.  Missouri  P.  etc. 
Co.  (Mo.,  1893),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  436; 
Lane  v.  Harris,  16  Ga.  217;  Berliner 
v.  Waterloo,  14  Wis.  378;  State  v. 
Bailey,  16  Ind.  46;  Binkert  v.  Jen- 
sen, 94  111.  283. 

^Albritten  v.  Huntsville.  60  Ala. 
486;  Briggs  v.  Whipple,  7  Vt.  15; 
Washington  v.  Finley,  5  Eng.  (Ark  ) 
423;     State     v.     Murfreesboro,     11 


§  242.] 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


375 


The  same  rule  is  also  applicable  to  statutes  amending  or  re- 
pealing a  city  charter1  or  other  public  statute.2 

The  rule  that  public  laws  will  be  judicially  noticed  is  not 
violated  by  the  fact  that  municipal  ordinances  and  resolutions 
must,  independently  of  statute,  be  pleaded  and  proved,  as  these 
municipal  enactments,  like  the  by-laws  of  private  corporations,3 
are  not  public  statutes  within  the  meaning  of  the  rule.4  But 
municipal  courts  will  take  judicial  notice  of  ordinances.5 
Courts  will  not  take  notice  of  private  statutes  affecting  an  in- 
dividual or  small  number  of  persons  unless  authorized  by  stat- 
ute to  do  so;G  for  example,  of  a  special  act  creating  a  private 


Humph.  (Tenn.)  217;  Fayne  v. 
Treadvvell,  16  Cal.  220;  Stier  v.  Os- 
caloosa,  41  Towa,  353:  Selma  v.  Per- 
kins, 68  Ala.  145;  Potwin  v.  John- 
son, 108  111.  70  Solomon  v.  Hughes, 
24  Kan.  211 ;  State  v.  Sherman,  42 
Mo.  210;  Durcb  v.  Chippewa,  60 
Wis.  227;  Dwyer  v.  Brenham,  65 
Tex.  529;  Pasadena  v.  Stimson,  27 
Pac.  Eep.  604;  State  v.  Tosney,  26 
Minn.  2G2;  fcvmth  v  Janesville,  52 
Wis.  680;  Bui-penning  v.  Railroad 
Co.,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  444:  Many  v. 
Titcomb,  19  Ind.  136. 

iNew  Jersey  v.  Yard.  95  U.  S.  11?; 
State  v.  Bergen,  34  N.  J.  L.  439; 
Swain  v.  Comstock,  18  Wis.  463; 
Bow  v.  Allentown,  31  N.  H  351; 
Railroad  v.  Chenoa,  43  111.  209;  Vir- 
ginia City  v.  Manufacturing  Co.,  2 
Nev.  86;  Railroad  v.  Plumas  Co.,  37 
Cal.  354.  If  the  city  has  been  incor- 
porated under  a  general  law  its  in- 
corporation must  be  shown.  Temple 
v.  State,  15  Tex.  App.  405;  Morgan 
v.  Atlanta,  77  Ga.  662;  Ingle  v. 
Jones,  43  Iowa,  286.  Contra,  House 
v.  Greensburg,  93  Ind.  533. 

2  Belmont  v.  Warrell,  69  Me.  314: 
Parent  v.  Walmsley's  Adm'r,  20 
Ind.  82. 

3The  courts  do  not  notice  judicially 
the  by-laws  of  a  private  corporation 


(Benev.  Soc.  v.  Phillips,  36  Mich.  22), 
and  the  same  rule  is  recognized  in 
the  case  of  the  private  rules  for  the 
government  of  the  members  of  a 
board  of  brokers.  Goldsmith  v.  Saw- 
yer, 46  Cal.  209. 

4  Garvin  v.  Wells,  8  Iowa.  286; 
Central  Bank  v.  Baltimore,  20  Atl. 
Rep.  444;  Garland  v.  Denver,  11 
Colo.  534 ;  State  v.  Mayor,  1 1  Humph. 
217;  Young  v.  Bank,  4  Cranch,  384; 
Porter  v.  Waring,  69  N.  Y.  250; 
Clapp  v.  Hartford,  35  Conn.  66; 
Prell  v.  McDonald,  7  Kan.  426; 
Lucker  v.  Com.,  4  Bush  (Ky.),  440; 
Ingle  v.  Jones,  43  Iowa,  286 ;  Stier  v. 
Oscaloosa,  41  Iowa,  353;  Case  v.  Mo- 
bile, 30  Ala.  538;  Clarke  v.  Bank,  10 
Ark.  516;  Pettit  v.  May,  34  Wis.  666  ; 
People  v.  Potter,  35  Cal.  110 ;  Winona 
v.  Burke,  23  Minn.  254 ;  Briggs  v. 
Whipple,  7  Vt.  15 ;  Beaty  v.  Knowler, 
4  Pet.  152. 

5  Moundsville  v.  Velton,  13  S.  E. 
Rep.  373 ;  35  W.  Va.  217 ;  Anderson 
v.  O'Donnell,  29  S.  C.  355. 

«Hart  v.  Bait.  etc.  Co.,  6  W.  Va. 
336 ;  Somervill  v.  Winbush,  7  Gratt. 
(Va.)  205;  Bixler  v.  Barker,  3  Bush 
(Ky.),  166;  Morgan  v.  Cree,  46  Vt. 
786 ;  Collier  v.  Society,  8  B.  Mon.  68 ; 
Halbert   v.  Skyler,  1   A.  K.  Marsh. 


376 


JUDICIAL   NOTICE. 


[§  242. 


corporation,1  or  one  relating  exclusively  to  the  settlement  of 
an  estate.2  Such  private  acts  relating  to  a  few  persons  are  not 
matters  of  general  public  knowledge,  and  are  regarded  some- 
what as  quasi-contracts  between  the  state  and  those  persons 
specially  interested,  with  the  terms  of  which  the  court  is  ig- 
norant until  it  shall  have  ascertained  them  from  the  evidence.3 
So  courts  will  not  take  notice  of  foreign  laws,  either  statute 
or  common,  and  they  will  usually  have  to  be  alleged  and  proved 
as  matters  of  fact.4     The  states  and  territories  of  the  United 


1  Danville,  etc.  Co.  v.  State,  16  Ind. 
456;  Kelly  v.  Railroad  Co.,  58  Ala. 
489;  Hollo  way  v.  Railroad  Co.,  23 
Tex.  465  ;  Jackson  v.  Plumb,  8  Johns. 
295;  Peoria,  etc.  Co.  v.  Scott,  116 
III.  401.  Sometimes  proof  of  corpo- 
ration charters  is  dispensed  with  by 
statute  unless  incorporation  is  the 
fact  in  issue.  Star  Brick  Co.  v.  Reds- 
dale,  36  N.  J.  L.  229.  So  when  or- 
ganized under  general  laws  the 
courts  will  notice  the  latter,  but  not 
the  incorporation  under  it.  Coving- 
ton Draw.  Co.  v.  Shepherd,  20  How. 
(U.  S.)  227;  Danville,  etc.  Co.  v. 
State,  16  Ind.  456. 

2Leland  v.  Wilkinson,  6  Pet.  317; 
Ellis  v.  Eastman,  32  Cal.  447. 

3  Collier  v.  Society,  8  B.  Mon.  68 ; 
Leland  v.  Wilkinson,  6  Pet.  317; 
State  v.  Pose,  33  La.  Ann.  932; 
Banks  v.  Gruben,  87  Pa.  St.  468; 
Perdicaris  v.  Trenton,  etc.  Bridge 
Co. ,  5  Dutch.  (N.  J.)  367 ;  Broad  Street 
Hotel  Co.  v.  Weaver,  57  Ala.  26; 
Allegheny  v.  Nelson,  25  Pa.  St.  332. 
"The  courts  of  justice  are  bound, 
ex  officio,  to  take  notice  of  public 
acts  without  their  being  pleaded,  for 
they  are  part  of  the  general  law  of 
the  land,  which  all  persons,  and  par- 
ticularly the  judges,  are  presumed  to 
know ;  but  they  are  not  bound  to 
take  notice  of  private  acts  unless 
they  be  specially  pleaded  and  shown 
in  proof  by  the  party  claiming  the 
effect  of  them."    1  Kent's  Com.  430. 


4  Millard  v.  Truax  (Mich.,  1888),  41 
N.  W.  Rep.  328;  Pickering  v.  Fisk, 
6  Vt.  102 ;  Liverpool,  etc.  G.  W.  Co. 
v.  Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  129  U.  S.  464 
(English  statute);  Spellier,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Geiger,  23  Atl.  Rep.  547 ;  147  Pa. 
St.  399;  Cont.  Bank  v.  Wells,  73 
Wis.  352;  Leathevwood  v.  Sullivan, 
81  Ala.  458 ;  Dainese  v.  Hall,  91  U.  S. 
13;  Bouldin  v.  Phelps,  30  Fed.  Rep. 
547 ;  Polk  v.  Butterfield,  9  Colo.  325 ; 
Taylor  v.  Boardman,  25  Vt.  581; 
Ludlow  v.  Van  Rensselaer,  1  Johns. 
95  (foreign  revenue  laws) ;  Insurance 
Co.  v.  Forchheimer,  86  Ala.  541 ;  St. 
Louis  v.  San  Francisco  R.  R.  Co.,  35 
Kan.  426;  Mobile,  etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Whitney,  39  Ala.  468 ;  Walsh  v.  Dart. 
12  Wis.  635 ;  Cavender  v.  Guild,  4 
Cal.  250;  Anderson  v.  Anderson,  23 
Tex.  639;  Talbot  v.  Seaman,  1  Cranch 
(U.  S.),  38;  Ennis  v.  Smith,  14  How. 
(U.  S.)  400;  Chumasero  v.  Gilbert. 
24  111.  293;  Haines  v.  Hanrahan,  105 
Mass.  480 ;  Cutler  v.  Wright,  22  N. 
Y.  472.  In  Liverpool  Steam  Co.  v. 
Phenix  Ins.  Co.,  129  TJ.  S.  444,  the 
court  said :  "  The  law  of  Great  Brit- 
ain, since  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence, is  the  law  of  a  foreign 
country,  and  like  any  other  foreign 
law  is  a  matter  of  fact  which  the 
courts  of  this  country  cannot  be  pre- 
sumed to  be  acquainted  with  or  to 
have  judicial  knowledge  of,  unless  it 
is  pleaded  and  proved.  The  rule 
that  the  courts  of  one  country  can- 


§  242.]  JUDICIAL   NOTICE.  377 

States  are  so  far  foreign  to  one  another  that  this  rule  is  gen- 
erally applicable  to  their  courts.1 

As  constituting  an  exception  to  the  rule  which  has  been 
just  stated,  it  has  been  held  that  in  those  parts  of  the  United 
States  which  formerly  constituted  parts  of  the  colonial  pos- 
sessions of  France,  Spain  or  Russia,  the  laws  in  force  at  the 
time  such  territory  became  a  part  of  the  United  States  need 
not  be  proved  as  foreign  laws,  but  will  be  judicially  noticed.2 

Another  exception  to  the  rule  that  a  state  court  will  not 
judicially  notice  the  laws  of  a  sister  commonwealth  is  occa- 
sioned by  the  application  of  the  principle  that  a  federal  court 
will  always  take  notice  of  the  state  statutes  which  it  is  actually 
called  upon  to  administer.  Where  any  question  is  litigated  in 
a  state  court  involving  the  construction  or  enforcement  of  the 
federal  constitution  or  statutes,  and  is  or  might  be  subse- 
quently appealed  to  a  federal  court,  the  statutory  law  of  that 
state,  so  far  as  it  would  be  judicially  noticed  by  the  appellate 
federal  court,  will,  it  has  been  held,  be  judicially  noticed  by 
the  courts  of  other  states  also.3 

Treaties  made  by  the  federal  government  with  the  Indian 
tribes  or  with  a  foreign  government  are  a  component  part  of 
the  supreme  statutory  law 4  and  possess  the  full  power  and 
efficacy  of  an  act  of  congress.5    The  courts,  both  federal  and 

not  take  cognizance  of  the  law  oT  -'Crandall  v.  Sterling,  1  Colo.  106 

another  without  plea  and  proof  has  Pecquet  v.  Pecquet,  17  La.  Ann.  204 

been  constantly  maintained  at  law  Chouteau  v.    Soulard,    9    Mo.    581 

and  in  equity."  United  States  v.  Perot,  8  Otto,  428 

i  Thatcher  v.  Morris,  11  N.  Y.  437;  Adams  v.  Norris,  23  How.  (U.   S.) 

Wilson    v.    Cockrell,    8    Mo.   7;    St.  353;   Payne  v.    Tread  well,  16    Cal. 

Louis,  etc.  Co.   v.  Weaver,  35  Kan.  221;    Henthorn   v.    Doe,   1    Blatch. 

412 ;  21  Pac.  Rep.  408 ;  Owen  v.  Boyle,  157.      The  same  exception  obtains 

15    Me.     147;    Billingsley    v.    Dean,  where  new  states  are  formed  by  the 

11  Ind.  331 ;    Hanley  v.  Donoghue,  subdivision  of  one  already  existing. 

116  U.S.  1;  Sloan  v.  Torry,  78  Mo.  Delano    v.    Joysling,    1    Litt.    (Ky.) 

623;    Eastman   v.  Crosby,  90   Mass.  117;  Holley  v.  Holley,  12  Am.  Dec. 

206 ;  Bradshaw  v.  Mansfield,  18  Tex.  342. 

App.  21.     The  law  will  be  presumed  3  Butcher  v.  Brownsville,  2  Kan. 

to  be  known  to  foreigners  who  con-  70 ;  Morse  v.  Hewett,  28  Mich.   481 

tract  abroad  where  the  contract  is  to  State  v.  Hinchman,  27  Pa.   St.   479 

be  carried  out  in  this  country.     De-  Paine  v.  Schenectady,  11  R.  I.   411 

witt  v.  Brisbane,  16  N.  Y.  508.     Con-  Fellows  v.  Menasha,  11  Wis.  558. 

tra  where  such  a  contract  is  to  be  4  U.  S.  Const.,  art.  VI,  cl.  2. 

performed  abroad.     Merch.  Bank  v.  5 Holmes  v.  Jennison,  14  Pet.  569; 

Spalding,  9  N.  Y.  53.  Doe  v.  Braden,  16  How.  635 ;  Hunen- 


378  judicial  notice.  [§§  243,  244. 

state,  are  bound  to  take  judicial  notice  of  their  existence, 
dates,  character  and  contents,  and  of  the  rights  of  all  persons 
under  them.1 

Finally,  it  may  be  noted  that  the  legal  rate  or  amount  of 
interest  prevalent  in  the  jurisdiction  need  not  be  shown,  as 
the  court  will  compute  it,3  though  a  contrary  rule  obtains  as 
regards  the  legal  rate  abroad,8  or  even  in  a  neighboring  coun- 
try.4 

§  243.  Foreign  nations,  seals  and  official  acts.— The  ex- 
istence of  foreign  governments  need  not  be  proved,  for  a  court 
will  take  judicial  notice  of  this  fact  and  will  recognize  the  re- 
spective title,  flag  and  seal5  of  any  state  whose  existence  de 
facto  or  de  jure  has  been  admitted  by  the  sovereignty  within 
whose  jurisdiction  the  court  is  located.6  "Where  a  foreign 
government  has  not  been  acknowledged  its  existence  must  be 
proved,7  while,  if  it  has  been  acknowledged,  the  fact  of  its 
acknowledgment,  being  a  public  executive  act,  will  be  judi- 
cially noticed.8 

§  244.  Terms  of  courts,  records,  rules  of  practice  and 
judicial  proceedings. —  A  court  will  ordinarily  take  judicial 
notice  of  its  own  records,9  of  the  beginning10  and  length  of  its 

stein  v.  Lynhara,  10  Otto,  483.  See,  Johns,  4  Dall.  416;  Santissima  v. 
also,  1  Kent's  Com.  31,  32.  Trinidad,  7  Wheat.  273,  335;  Lazier 

1  Godfrey  v.   Godfrey,  17  Ind.  Q;    v.  Westcott,  26  N.  Y.  146. 

Carson  v.  Smith,  5  Minn.  78 ;  United  1  i  Kent's  Com.  189 ;  United  States 

States  v.    Payne,  2   McCrary  C.   C.  v.  Palmer,  3  Wheat.  610;  Yrissari  v. 

289;  Dole  v.  Wilson,  16  Minn.  472;  Clement,  2  C.  &  P.  223. 

Montgomery  v.  Deeley,  3  Wis.  623:  8  Taylor  v.  Barclay,  2  Sim.  213. 

United    States   v.   Reynes,   9   How.  » Dewey  v.  St.  Albans  Co.,  12  Atl. 

(U.  S.)  127;  Jones  v.  Laney,  3  Tex.  Rep.    224;    Dines  v.  People,  39  111. 

342.     Cf.  American  Ins.  Co.  v.  Can-  App.  565;  Minor  v.  Stone,  1  La.  Ann. 

ter,  1  Pet.   511;    Foster  v.   Neilson,  283;  Farrar  v.   Bolles,  55  Tex.  193; 

2  Pet.   314;    United  States  v.  Arre-  Brucker  v.  State,  19  Wis.  539;  Anix 

dondo,  6  id.  691.  v.  Miller,  54  Iowa,  541 :  Robinson  v. 

2  School  Dist.  No.  1  v.  Lyford,  27  Brown,  82  111.  279;  Jordan  v.  Circuit 
Wis.  506.  Court,  69  Iowa,  177;  State  v.  Postle- 

3  Coghlan  v.  Railroad,  142  U.  S.  wait,  14  Iowa,  446.  Contra,  Lake 
101.  Merced  W.  Co.  v.   Cowles,  31  Cal. 

^Kermott  v.  Ayer,    11   Mich.   181.  215;  Baker  v.  M„gatt,  141  U.  S.  141; 

The  rates  will  not  be  presumed  to  be  State  v.  Edwards,  19  Mo.  674;  Stan- 

the  same.  ley  v.  McEhath,  86  Cal.  449,  where 

5  Lincoln  v.  Battelle,  6  Wend.  476.  the  records  of  one  case  are  to  be 

"Schoerkin    v.    Swift,    19   Blatch.  used  in  another. 

(U.  S.)  209;  Church  v.  Hubbart,  2  10  Kidder  v.  Blaisdell,  45  Me.  461. 
Cranch,  187,  238;  United   States  v. 


§  244.] 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


379 


terms;1  of  its  officials,2  as  sheriff  or  marshal;3  of  the  signa- 
ture of  its  clerk4  or  its  attorneys  of  record,5  its  rules  of  prac- 
tice and  procedure;  nor  is  it  necessary  to  prove  similar  facts 
appertaining  to  other  courts  located  in  the  same  jurisdiction.6 
A  court  of  superior  or  appellate  jurisdiction  will  also  take  no- 
tice of  the  officers,  judges,7  seals,8  terms,9  organization,  juris- 
diction10 and  powers  of  inferior  courts.11  Where  insulting 
language  is  used  towards  a  judge  holding  court,  he  may  in 
committing  the  offender  for  contempt  act  solely  and  exclu- 
sively upon  his  own  knowledge  of  the  words  used,12  although 
under  such  circumstances  it  is  not  competent  for  him  to  take 
judicial  notice  of  the  fact  that  the  offender  had  been  thereto- 
fore tried  and  found  guilty  of  a  previous  contempt  of  the 
same  court.13 


»  Fabyan  v.  Russell,  38  N.  H.  84. 

-Norvell  v.  McHenry,  1  Mich.  227; 
Land  Co.  v.  Calhoun,  16  W.  Va.  362; 
Dyer  v.  Last,  51  111.  179. 

3  Slaughter  v.  Barnes,  3  A.  K. 
Marsh.  412;  Alexander  v.  Burnham, 
18  Wis.  199;  Ingram  v.  State,  27 
Ala.  17;  Thompson  v.  Haskell,  21 
111.  215.  But  the  official  character 
of  deputy -sheriffs  and  deputy-mar- 
shals must  be  shown.  Potter  v. 
Luther,  3  Johns.  431 ;  Land  v.  Pat- 
terson, Minor  (Ala.),  14;  Ward  v. 
Henry,  19  Wis.  76;  Bank  v.  Curran, 
10  Ark.  142;  Alford  v.  State,  8  Tex. 
App.  545. 

i  Yell  v.  Lane,  41  Ark.  53 ;  Buell  v. 
State,  72  Ind.  523;  Alderman  v.  Bell, 
9  Cal.  315;  Land  Co.  v.  Calhoun,' 16 
W.  Va.  362. 

8  Masterson  v.  Leclaire,  4  Minn. 
108. 

6Rees  v.  Lowenstein  (Minn.,  1888), 
40  N.  W.  Rep.  370;  Kenosha  v. 
Shedd,  82  Iowa,  140 ;  48  N.  W.  Rep. 
933;  Ohm  v.  San  Francisco  (Cal., 
1890),  25  Pac.  Rep.  155;  Stanley  v. 
McElrath,  86  Cal.  449;  Olmstead  v. 
Thompson,  8  S.  Rep.  755;  Benson 
v.  Christian,  129  Ind.  535;  State  v. 
Ulrich,  110  Mo.  350;  19  S.W.  Rep. 
656;  A'exander  v.  Gish  (Ky.,  1S91), 


17  S.   W.   Rep.    287.     Cf.    Holly  v. 
Bass,  68  Ala.  206. 

7  Graham  v.  Anderson,  42  111.  514. 

8  State  v.  Snowden,  1  Brews.  (Pa.) 
218;  Mangum  v.  Webster,  7  Gill,  78. 

»Stubbs  v.  State,  53  Miss.  437; 
Pugh  v.  State,  2  Head,  227;  Will- 
iams v.  Hubbard,  1  Mich.  446;  Mc- 
Ginnis  v.  State,  24  Ind.  500;  Bethune 
v.  Hale,  45  Ala.  522;  State  v.  Ham- 
met,  12  Ind.  448;  Davidson  v.  Peti- 
colas,  34  Tex.  37 ;  Simms  v.  Todd,  72 
Mo.  288. 

10  Masterson   v.   Mathews,   60  Ala. 
260;  Stiles  v.  Stewart,  12  Wend.  473; 
Tucker  v.  State,  11  Md.  322;  Kilpat-' 
rick  v.  Com.,  31  Pa.  St.  198. 

11  Hancock  v.  Worcester,  18  Atl. 
Rep.  1041 ;  Nelson  v.  Ladd,  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  309  (S.  D.,  1893);  Vahle  v. 
Brackenseick  (111.,  1893),  34  N.  E. 
Rep.  524 ;  Hatcher  v.  Rocheleau,  18 
N.  Y.  86;  Landlin  v.  Anderson,  76 
Ala.  403;  Cherry  v.  Baker,  17  Md. 
75;  Kilpatrick  v.  Com.,  31  Pa.  St. 
198;  Dorman  v.  State,  56  Ind.  454; 
Lewis  v.  Wintrebe,  76  Ind.  13;  Cut- 
ter v.  Caruthers,  48  Cal.  178. 

12  State  v.  Gibson,  10  S.  E.  Rep.  58; 
33  W.  Va.  97. 

l*  Myers  v.  State  (Ohio,  1888),  22 
N.  E.  Rep.  43 ;  Ralphs  v.  Hensler,  32 


380 


JUDICIAL    NOTICE. 


[§  244. 


As  respects  all  matters  of  which  judicial  notice  is  taken, 
the  judge  may,  where  his  knowledge  is  lacking  or  his  memory 
indistinct,  consult  any  person  or  such  works  of  reference  as 
he  may  select.1 


Pac.    Rep.    243;    Jordan  v.    Circuit 
Court,  69  Iowa,  177. 

i  Wagner's  Case,  61  Me.  178; 
United  States  v.  Teschnaaker,  22 
How.  (U.  S.)  392;  Taylor  Ev.  (7th 


ed.),  §  21 ;  Reed  v.  Wilson,  41  N.  J. 
L.  29,  holding  that  a  court  may  re- 
fer to  an  almanac.  See,  also,  Case 
v.  Perew,  46  Hun  (N.  Y.),  57. 


CHAPTER  XIX. 


BURDEN  OF  PROOF  AND  RIGHT  TO  OPEN  AND  CLOSE. 


247.  Burden  of  proof  defined. 

248.  Burden  of  proof    in  special 

proceedings. 

249.  Burden  of  proof  in  criminal 

trials. 

250.  Proof  of  negative  —  Facts  best 

known  to  party  alleging. 


§  251.  When  plaintiff  may  open  and 
close. 

252.  When  defendant  may  open 

and  close. 

253.  Right  to  open  and  close   in 

special  proceedings. 

254.  Right,  when  discretionary. 


§  247.  Burden  of  proof  defined. —  The  phrase  "burden  of 
proof"  maybe  defined  as  that  "obligation  which  the  law  im- 
poses on  a  party  who  alleges  the  existence  of  a  fact  or  thing 
necessary  in  the  prosecution  or  defense  of  an  action,  to  estab- 
lish it  prima  facie  by  proof."  l  The  law  casts  the  burden  of 
proof,  as  a  general  rule,  upon  the  party  maintaining  the  af- 
firmative side  of  the  issue.  In  other  words,  the  party  who 
alleges  his  possession  of  a  legal  right  is  under  the  necessity  of 
substantiating  his  allegation  by  a  preponderance  of  proof.2 
This  rule  is  intended  to  expedite  the  administration  of  justice 
and  to  aid  in  the  ascertainment  of  the  truth  by  requiring  the 
evidence  to  come,  in  the  first  instance,  from  the  party  whose 
allegations  are  most  susceptible  of  direct  and  simple  proof.3 
The  two  phrases  "burden  of  proof"  and  the  "weight  of  evi- 
dence" are  quite  diverse  in  meaning.  The  burden  of  proof  is 
fixed  at  the  inception  of  the  trial  and  does  not  change  at  any 


*  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  citing  Peo- 
ple v.  McCann,  16  N.  Y.  66;  Willett 
v.  Rich,  142  Mass.  357. 

•z  <<  Whoever  desires  any  court  to 
give  judgment  as  to  any  legal  right 
or  liability  dependent  on  the  exist- 
ence or  non-existence  of  facts  which 
he  asserts  or  denies  to  exist  must 
prove  that  those  facts  do  or  do  not 
exist."     Stephen's  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  9:3. 


SLauer  v.  Kuder  (111.,  1893),  34  N. 
E.  Rep.  484;  Columbus  Watch  Co. 
v.  Hodenpyle,  135  N.  Y.  430;  Hyde 
v.  Shank,  93  Mich.  535;  First  Nat. 
Bank  v.  Lowrey  (Neb.,  1893),  64  N. 
W.  Rep.  568;  Costigan  v.  Mohawk, 
etc.  Co.,  3  Denio,  609;  Panama,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Johnson,  63  Hun,  629;  Steven- 
son v.  Marony,  6  Ind.  330 ;  Jones  v. 
Kennedy,  11  Pick.  125,  132. 


3S2  BUKDEN    OF    PROOF,  ETC.  [§  247. 

later  stage  of  the  proceeding.1  The  weight  of  evidence,  on 
the  contrary,  fluctuates  from  one  party  to  the  other,  according 
to  the  strength  and  character  of  the  proofs  produced  by  either 
side  in  affirmance  or  in  denial  of  the  facts  in  issue,  and  the 
necessity  for  the  production  of  a  preponderance  of  evidence 
is  thus  shifted  from  side  to  side.2 

The  burden  of  proof,  i.  <?.,  the  duty  or  obligation  of  making 
out  a,  prima  facie  case,  and  the  obligation  of  convincing  the 
jury  by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence,  or  in  criminal  trials 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  may  both  be  imposed  upon  the 
same  party  and  may  remain  upon  him  throughout  the  trial, 
though  such  is  by  no  means  always  the  case.  Suppose  the 
plaintiff  introduces  evidence  upon  all  the  essential  points 
which  he  alleges,  thus  making  a  prima  facie  case  upon  which, 
if  it  is  not  met  by  any  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  defendant, 
the  court  would  be  justified  in  directing  a  verdict  in  his  favor. 
So  far  he  has  both  sustained  the  burden  of  proof  and  has  pro- 
duced a  preponderance  of  evidence.  But  if  his  case  as  thus 
made  out  is  met  by  some  evidence  on  the  part  of  the  defend- 
ant sufficient  to  send  the  case  to  the  jury,  the  plaintiff  will 
not  be  entitled  to  a  verdict  on  what  he  has  proved,  unless  the 
whole  evidence,  taking  in  consideration  what  the  defendant 
has  shown,  preponderates  in  the  plaintiff's  favor,  though  he 
has  complied  with  the  rule  requiring  him  to  sustain  the  bur- 
den of  proof,  i.  <?.,  to  show  a  prima  facie  case.3  Thus,  where 
one  sues  on  a  written  contract,  he  sustains  the  burden  of  proof 
satisfactorily  by  offering  the  writing  in  evidence.  He  need 
not  prove  the  consideration  as  a  part  of  his  case,  as  the  valid- 
ity and  sufficiency  of  the  writing  will  be  presumed.  But 
where  the  defendant  alleges  and  seeks  to  prove  a  failure  or 
invalidity  of  consideration,  or  to  show  fraud  in  procuring  the 
contract,  the  obligation  is  on  the  plaintiff  to  show  a  good  con- 
sideration and  that  he  has  acted  in  good  faith  by  a  prepon- 
derance of  all  the  evidence  in  the  case.4 

1  Lake  Ont.  etc.  Co.  v.  Judson,  122  v.  Long,  44  Mo.  App.  141 ;  Kitnerv. 
N.  Y.  278.  Whitlock,  88  111.  513 ;  Eaton  v.  Alger, 

2  See  the  remarks  of  the  court  in  47  N.  Y.  451 ;  Blanchard  v.  Young, 
Central  B.  Corp.  v.  Butler,  2  Gray  11  Cush.  (Mass.)  345;  Pease  v.  Cole, 
(Mass.),  132.  53  Conn.  71. 

3  Scott  v.  Wood,  81  Cal.  400 ;  Heine-  *  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  McConnell,  17 
man  v.  Heard,  62  N.  Y.  448;  Long  N.  Y.  S.  422;  63  Hun,  625;  Western 


§  248.] 


BURDEN    OF    PROOF,  ETC. 


383 


The  importance  of  ascertaining  on  whom  the  burden  of 
proof  is  cast  results  from  the  rule  by  which  that  party  is  enti- 
tled to  open  and  close  the  case  in  respect  to  the  introduction 
of  evidence  and  the  argument  of  counsel.  Asa  test  to  determine 
where  the  burden  of  proof  lies,  it  has  been  proposed  that  it 
should  be  imposed  upon  that  the  party  who,  upon  the  plead- 
ings and  the  admissions  of  record,  would  be  defeated  if  no 
evidence  were  offered  on  either  side.1  So  where  the  defend- 
ant admits  the  whole  cause  of  action  as  alleged  by  the  plaint- 
iff, inclusive  of  the  damages  or  sum  which  is  claimed,  but  pleads 
new  matter  by  way  of  confession  and  avoidance,  as  payment, 
fraud,  tender  or  release,  or  pleads  a  counter-claim  or  set-off, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  cast  on  him.2 

§  248.  Burden  of  proof  in  special  proceedings. —  It  is  also 
necessary  to  consider  the  burden  of  proof  in  proceedings  not 
at  common  law  and  where  no  actual  issue  is  involved,  as  a 

Nat.  Bank  v.  Wood,  19  N.  Y.  S.  81 ; 
Galvin  v.  Meridian  Nat.  Bank,  129 
Ind.  439  ;  Burnham  v.  Davis,  144 Mass. 
104;  Hogue  v.  Williamson  (Tex., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  762.  For  cases 
in  which  the  burden  of  proof  to  show 
bona  Jides  was  on  the  holder  of  the 
note,  see  Cover  v.  Myers  (Md.,  1892); 
23  Atl.  Rep.  856 ;  Clafy  v.  Farrow, 
18  N.  Y.  S.  160;  Joy  v.  Diefendorf, 
130  N.  Y.  6;  Kain  v.  Bare  (Ind., 
1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  205;  Hazard  v. 
Spencer  (R,  I.,  1892),  23  Atl.  Rep. 
729.  "  The  burden  of  proof  resting 
on  a  plaintiff  is  co-extensive  only 
with  the  legal  proposition  on  which 
his  case  rests.  It  applies  to  every 
fact  which  is  essential  to  or  is  nec- 
essarily involved  in  that  proposition  ; 
not  to  facts  relied  upon  in  defense 
to  establish  an  independent  proposi- 
tion, however  inconsistent  with  that 
upon  which  the  plaintiff's  case  de- 
pends. It  is  for  the  defendant  to 
furnish  the  proof  of  such  facts,  and 
when  he  has  done  so  the  burden  is 
upon  the  plaintiff,  not  to  disprove 
those  particular  facts,  nor  the  prop- 
osition  which   they  tend  to  estab- 


lish, but  to  maintain  the  proposition 
upon  which  his  own  case  rests,  not- 
withstanding such  contradictory 
testimony,  and  upon  the  whole  evi- 
dence in  the  case.  The  distinction 
may  be  narrow,  but  it  is  real  and  often 
decisive."  Wells,  J.,  in  Wilder  v. 
Coles,  100  Mass.  490 ;  Willett  v.  Rich, 
142  Mass.  357. 

1  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  228;  1 
Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  74;  1  Taylor  on 
Ev.,  §  338;  Kent  v.  White,  27  Ind. 
390.  So  by  statute.  See  Crabtree 
v.  Atchison  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  266.  "  The  burden  of  proving 
any  fact  necessary  to  be  proved  in 
order  to  enable  any  person  to  give 
evidence  of  any  other  fact  is  on  the 
person  who  wishes  to  give  such  evi- 
dence."    Stephen's  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  97. 

2  Fairbanks  v.  Erwin,  15  Colo.  366 ; 
Truesdale  v.  Hoyle,  39  111.  App.  532; 
Auerbach  v.  Peetsch,  18  N.  Y.  S. 
453 ;  Brown  v.  Tanrick,  20  N.  Y.  S. 
369;  Suiter  v.  Park  Nat.  Bank,  35 
Neb.  372;  Hamilton  v.  Coal  Co.,  61 
Hun,  624;  Woodson  Mach.  Co.  v. 
Morse,  47  Kan.  429. 


3S4 


BURDEN    OF   PROOF,  ETC. 


[§  249. 


proceeding  to  probate  a  will.  Here  the  proponent  of  the 
will  is  regarded  as  taking  the  affirmative,  and  is  compelled  to 
assume  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  first  instance  by  showing 
the  valid  execution  of  the  will,1  and  the  testamentary  capacity 
of  the  testator;2  while  the  contestants,  if  any,  have  cast  upon 
them  the  burden  of  proving  that  the  instrument  offered  was 
procured  by  fraud  or  undue  influence  practiced  upon  the  tes- 
tator.3 

§  249.  Burden  of  proof  in  criminal  trials. —  The  burden 
of  proof  and  the  obligation  to  convince  the  jury  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  upon  the  general  issue  of  the  prisoner's  guilt 
is  in  criminal  trials  upon  the  state  throughout.4  Though  the 
defendant  produce  no  evidence,  it  is  still  the  duty  of  the  court 
to  submit  the  prima  facie  case  against  him  to  the  jury,  and 
to  convict  him  they  should  be  convinced  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt  of  his  guilt.5  If  the  defendant  shall  plead  an  alibi,  or 
that  the  person  for  whose  homicide  he  is  indicted  is  alive,6  the 
burden  of  proof  to  establish  either  fact  is  upon  him:7  and  if 


1  Kennedy  v.  Upshavv,  66  Tex.  442 ; 
Bee  v.  Bowman  (Tenn.,  1891),  14  S. 
W.  Rep.  481;  Seebrock  v.  Fedawa 
(Neb.,  1891),  46  N.  W.  Rep.  650; 
Mathews'  Adm'r  v.  Furness  (Ala., 
1891),  8  S.  Rep.  661 ;  Goss  v.  Turner, 
21  Vt.  437. 

2  Norton  v.  Paxton,  110  Mo.  456; 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  807;  Knox  v.  Knox 
(Ala.,  1892),  11  S.  Rep.  201;  Jones  v. 
Jones,  63  Hun,  630;  Harrison  v. 
Bishop,  131  Ind.  161 ;  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
1069;  Prentiss  v.  Bates,  93  Mich. 
234 ;  Graybeal  v.  Gardner,  34  N.  E. 
Rep.  528;  Wilbur  v.  Wilbur,  129  111. 
392. 

3  Maddox  v.  Maddox  (Mo.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  499;  Chandler  v.  Jost 
(Ala.,  1893),  11  S.  Rep.  636;  Living- 
ston's Appeal  (Conn.,  1893),  26  Atl. 
Rep.  470;  Lynch  v.  Doran  (Mich., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  882;  Brown  v. 
Foster,  112  Mo.  297. 

4  Com.  v.  McKee,  1  Gray,  62-65; 
Lilienthal's  Tobacco  v.  United  States, 
97  U.  S.  237,  266;  Turner  v.  Com., 


86  Pa.  St.  54,  74;  People  v.  Hill,  49 
Hun,  432. 

5  See  ante,  §  6 ;  State  v.  Wingo,  66 
Mo.  181 ;  State  v.  Patterson,  45  Vt. 
308;  Black  v.  State,  1  Tex.  App. 
368;  People  v.  Perini,  94  Cal.  573; 
Day  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  213; 
Horn  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  601 ;  17 
S.  W.  Rep.  1094 ;  Slade  v.  State,  29 
Tex.  App.  381 ;  People  v.  Tarm  Poy, 
86  Cal.  225;  People  v.  Downs,  123 
N.  Y.  558 ;  State  v.  Taylor,  1  Houst. 
Cr.  Cas.  (Del.)  436;  McDaniel  v.  State, 
76  Ala.  366 ;  People  v.  West,  49  Cal. 
610;  Dixon  v.  State,  13  Fla.  636; 
Reid  v.  State,  50  Ga.  536;  State  v. 
Knight,  43  Me.  11 ;  Com.  v.  Webster, 
59  Mass.  295;  People  v.  McCarthy, 
110  N.  Y.  309;  State  v.  Byers,  100 
N.  C.  312;  Com.  v.  Daum,  58  Pa.  St. 
9;  United  States  v.  Mingo,  2  Curt. 
C.  C.  1 ;  Hogan  v.  State,  36  Wis.  296. 

6  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  295; 
State  v.  Vincent,  24  Iowa,  570. 

'  Westbrook  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  16 
S.  E.  Rep.  100 ;  French  v.  State,  12 


§  219.] 


BURDEN*    OF    PROOF,  ETC. 


385 


on  either  of  these  points  the  evidence  of  an  alibi  in  connec- 
tion with  all  the  testimony  raises  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the 
presence  of  the  accused,  the  jury  must  acquit  him.1 

I'pon  the  subject  of  the  burden  of  proof  where  the  defense 
is  insanity  two  views  are  held.  By  one  class  of  cases  it  is 
held  that,  the  existence  of  the  prisoner's  sanity  being  an  es- 
sential fact,  the  proof  of  which  is  necessary  to  make  the  act 
of  which  he  is  accused  a  crime,  it  must,  like  all  other  neces- 
sary facts,  be  proved  prima  facie,  by  the  prosecution,  as  a 
part  of  its  case.  The  presumption  of  law  that  every  person 
is  of  sound  mind2  must  of  course  be  taken  into  consideration 
as  sufficient  to  sustain  the  preliminary  burden  of  proof  on  this 
point.3  When  this  presumption  is  rebutted  or  overthrown  by 
facts  tending  to  show  a  lack  of  mental  capacity,  the  duty 
still  rests  upon  the  government  to  satisfy  the  jury  upon  the 
whole  evidence  and  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  pris- 
oner's sanity.4  Elsewhere  the  rule  is  stated  broadly  that 
Avhere  insanity  is  relied  on  as  a  defense  the  burden  of  proof 
is  on  the  defendant;  and  though  he  need  never  prove  his  in- 
sanity beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  it  is  sometimes  said  that  he 
must  do  so   by  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence.5     But  the 


Ind.  670;  Ware  v.  State,  67  Ga.  649; 
State  v.  Ward,  61  Vt.  192;  State  v. 
McCracken,  66  Iowa,  569 ;  24  N.  W. 
Rep.  43 ;  State  v.  Henrick,  62  Iowa, 
414;  Johnson  v.  State,  21  Tex.  A  pp. 
368;  Turner  v.  Com.,  S6  Pa.  St.  54; 
State  v.  Reitz,  83  N.  C.  634 ;  State  v. 
Johnson,  91  Mo.  439;  People  v.  Fong, 
64  Cal.  253;  State  v.  Jennings,  81 
Mo.  185;  Garrity  v.  People,  107  111. 
162;  Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  324. 
Contra,  McLain  v.  State,  18  Neb.  154; 
21  N.  W.  Rep.  720.  See,  also,  ante, 
§6. 

i  Howard  v.  State,  50  Ind.  192; 
Murphy  v.  State  (Fla..  1893),  12 
S.  Rep.  453;  State  v.  Beasley  (Iowa, 
1892),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  570;  State  v. 
Sanders,  106  Mo.  188 ;  State  v.  Taylor 
(Mo.,  1893),  23  S.  W.  Rep.  806; 
Adams  v.  State,  28  Fla.  511.  In 
Brieeland  v.  Com.,  74  Pa.  St.  469,  the 
25 


court  said :  "The  defense  must  cover 
the  time  when  the  offense  is  shown 
to  have  been  committed  so  as  to  pre- 
clude the  possibility  of  presence  at 
the  locus  in  quo.  This  impossibility 
is  to  be  proven  like  any  other  fact." 

2Seecmte,  §231. 

3Brotherton  v.  People,  75  N.  Y. 
159. 

^O'Connell  v.  O'Brien,  87  N.  Y. 
577;  Com.  v.  Pomeroy,  117  Mass. 
143;  Hefron  v.  State,  8  Fla.  73;  State 
v.  Millison,  15  La.  Ann.  537;  State 
v.  Hamilton,  55  Mo.  520;  Dass  Case, 
1  Gratt.  (Va.)  557;  State  v.  Jones,  50 
N.  H.  370;  State  v.  Wilner,  40  Wis. 
304 ;  Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  170; 
Chase  v.  People,  40  III.  352;  Walker 
v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  81 ;  Guetig  v. 
State,  66  Ind.  91 ;  Cunningham  v. 
State,  56  Miss.  269. 

s  Walker  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  81; 


380 


BURDEN    OF    PROOF,   KTO. 


[§  250. 


view  which  has  received  fullest  support,  and  one  by  which 
perhaps  the  lack  of  harmony  in  the  authorities  may  be  avoided, 
is  that  while  the  burden  to  show  insanity  is  on  the  defendant, 
yet  if  he  introduces  evidence  sufficient  to  raise  a  reasonable 
doubt  in  the  minds  of  the  jury  on  that  point,  it  is  the  duty 
to  acquit.1  This,  it  seems,  is  but  stating  in  another  form  the 
proposition  that  it  is  the  duty  of  the  state  to  satisfy  the  jury 
beyond  a  reasonable  doubt  of  the  prisoner's  guilt  upon  all  the 
evidence,  and  if  this  is  so,  the  seeming  divergence  of  the  cases 
is  reconciled.2 

§250.  Proof  of  negative  —  Facts  best  known  to  party 
alleging. —  Though  the  general  rule  is  that  the  burden  of  proof 
is  cast  on  him  who  maintains  the  affirmative,  because  the 
affirmative  of  any  proposition  is  most  susceptible  of  direct 
proof,  yet  it  should  not  be  considered  that  the  negative,  i.  e., 
a  denial  or  defense,  is  incapable  of  proof.  Particularly  if 
the  negative  is  more  than  a  mere  denial  of  an  affirmative 
proposition — in  other  words,  where  it  involves  quasi-nftivma,- 
tive  and  incidental  allegations  of  time,  place  or  manner  —  the 
party  asserting  it  may  and  should  assume  the  burden  of  proof. 

The  natural  probability  of  the  truth  of  the  affirmative,  the 
fact  that  prior  to  the  introduction  of  any  evidence  in  the  case 
the  affirmative  is  supported  by  some  rebuttable  presumption 
of  law,  or  the  fact  that  the  means  and  instruments  of  proof 
are  peculiarly  in  the  hands  of  the  party  alleging  a  negative, 
will  furnish  some  further  considerations  tending  to  emphasize 
the  propriety  under  certain  circumstances  of  casting  the  bur- 
den .of  proof  on  the  negative.3 

People  v.  Travers,  88  Cal.  238 ;  People  rison,  36  W.  Va.  729 ;  State  v.  Davis, 

v.  Taylor,  138  N.  Y.  398;  People  v.  109  N.  C.  780;  Langdon  v.  People, 

Bemmerly  (Cal.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  133  111.  332;  Fisher  v.  State,  30  Tex. 

263;  Lynch  v.  Com.,  77  Pa.  St.  205;  App.  503;  State  v.  Crawford,  33  Am. 

McLeod  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  331.  L.  Reg.  21 ;  Moore  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892), 

iBrotherton   v.  People,  75  N.  Y.  18  S.  W.  Rep.  833;  Boiling  v.  State 

159;  Casey  v.  People,  31  Hun,  528;  (Ark.,  1891),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  658;  State 

People   v.    McCann,    16    N.    Y.    58;  v.  West,  1  Houst.  Cr.  Cas.  371 ;  State 

Wallers  v.  People,  32  N.  Y.  147.  v.  Spenser,  21  N.  J.  L.  196;  State  v. 

2  King  v.   Stuart,    91    Tenn.    617;  Coleman,  20  S.  C.  444. 
State  v.  Schaefer  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.        3  Best,  Ev.   (Am.  ed.,  1883),  §§  270, 

Rep.  417;  Armstrong  v.  State,  30  Fla.  273,  278;  Colorado  Coal  &  Iron  Co. 

170;  Faulkner  v.  Territory   (N.  M.,  v.  United  States,  123  U.  S.  317. 
1893),  30  Pac.  Rep.  905 ;  State  v.  Har- 


§  250.]  BURDEN  OF  TROOF,  ETC.  387 

In  a  criminal  prosecution  the  burden  of  proving  the  guilt 
of  the  accused  is  upon  the  prosecution  throughout.  Hence,  if 
the  non-existence  of  some  fact,  or  the  non-performance  of  some 
duty,  is  a  constituent  and  essential  element  in  the  crime  with 
which  he  is  charged,  the  burden  of  proving  this  negative  alle- 
gation of  non-existence  or  non-performance  is  upon  the  pros- 
ecution.1 

So  in  a  civil  proceeding,  where  the  plaintiff's  case  is  based 
upon  a  negative  allegation,  the  proof  of  which  is  essential,  as 
in  an  action  brought  to  recover  damages  for  a  malicious  pros- 
ecution when  the  non-existence  of  a  probable  cause  for  the  ar- 
rest or  prosecution  is  a  material  fact  of  his  case,  he  will  be 
called  upon  to  prove  it.2  Again,  where  it  is  alleged  that  the 
contract  which  is  sued  on  is  not  the  contract  which  was  made,'1 
or  where  an  alteration  in  a  note  is  alleged,4  or  its  genuineness 
is  disputed  by  the  alleged  maker,5  or  a  deed  is  alleged  to  be 
invalid  because  of  incapacity  of  the  grantor  to  execute  it,6  or 
in  an  action  to  recover  a  penalty  for  the  non-performance  of 
some  specific  act,7  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  party  alleg- 
ing the  negative.8  If  a  fact  is  peculiarly  within  the  knowl- 
edge of  one  party  rather  than  the  other,  the  burden  of  proof 
is  cast  upon  him  who  has  the  better  means  of  proof.  This 
rule  may  and  does  result  very  often  in  casting  the  burden  of 
proof  upon  the  party  alleging  a  negative  fact.9     So,  for  ex- 

1  Com.  v.  Samuel,  2  Pick.  (Mass.)  932;  Pendleton  v.  Smissaert  (Colo., 
103;  State  v.  Morphy,  33  Iowa,  270;  1892),  29  Pac.  Rep.  521;  Galvin  v. 
State  v.  Hirsch,  45  Mo.  429.  Meridian  Nat.  Bank,  129  Ind.  439. 

2  1  Greenl.,  §78;  Lucas  v.  Hunt  6Trimbov.  Trimbo,  47  Minn.  389; 
(Ky.,  1891),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  781 ;  Nash  Chancellor  v.  Donell  (Ala.,  1892),  10 
v.  Hall,  4  Ind.   444;  Lane  v.  Crom-  S.  Rep.  910. 

bie,  12  Pick.  177.  7  Little   v.    Thompson,   2    Greenl. 

s  Sparks  v.  Sparks  (Kan.,  1893),  32  (Me.)  228;  Com.  v.  Samuel,  2  Pick. 

Pac.  Rep.  892;  Meentz  v.  Reiken,  42  (Mass.)    103;    Com.    v.    Maxwell,    2 

111.  App.  17;  Coffin  v.  Hydraulic  Co.,  Pick.    (Mass.)     139;    Woodbury    v. 

136  N.  Y.  655.  Frink,  14  111.  279. 

«  Hartley  v.  Corboy,  150  Pa.  St.  23;  8  Vigus  v.  O'Bannon,   118  111.  348; 

Conable   v.    Keeney,    61   Hun,  624;  Beardstown  v.  Virginia,  etc.,  76  111. 

Franklin  v.  Baker,  48  Ohio  St.  296;  34;  Kelly  v.  Owens  (Cal.,  1893),  30 

Hagan  v.   Insurance  Co.,  81  Iowa,  Pac.  Rep.  596. 

321;  Bushnell  v.  Glessner,  46  Minn.  9  Van  Horn  v.  Van  Horn  (N.  J., 

531.  1891),  20  Atl.  Rep.  826;  Kilbourn  v. 

5  Western  Nat.  Bank  v.  Wood,  19  Latta,  7  Mackey,  80;  Dickson  v.  Ev- 

N.  Y.  S.  81 ;  Tome  v.  Gerlach,  18  N.  Y.  ans,  6  T.  R.  57;  State  v.  Arnold,  13 


333 


BURDEN    OF    PROOF,  ETC. 


[§  250. 


ample,  in  a  prosecution  for  dealing  in  liquors,  or  carrying  on 
any  other  trade  or  avocation  without  a  written  license  where 
one  is  required  by  statute,  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the 
defendant  to  show  that  he  has  not  violated  the  statute.1 

The  party  making  a  negative  allegation  will  be  compelled 
to  assume  the  burden  of  proof  where  non-performance  or  a 
negligent  performance  of  duty  is  alleged,  as  in  actions  which 
are  brought  to  recover  damages  for  injuries  caused  by  negli- 
gence,2 or  where  an  allegation  of  fraud  is  made  and  denied, 
as,  for  example,  in  an  action  by  creditors  to  set  aside  a  con- 
veyance made  for  the  purpose  of  defeating  their  claims.3 

In  an  action  on  an  insurance  policy  the  burden  of  proof  is 
on  the  defendant  company  to  prove  that  the  insured  obtained 
it  by  fraud,4  or  by  the  suppression  of  material  facts  which  it 
Avas  his  duty  to  communicate,5  or  to  show  any  breach  of  con- 
dition that  will  defeat  a  recovery  on  the  policy.6 


Ired.  (N.  C.)  184;  Wheat  v.  State,  6 
Mo.  455;  State  v.  Higgins,  13  R.  I. 
330;  State  v.  Morrison,  3  Dev.  299; 
Mehan  v.  State,  7  Wis.  670. 

lCom.  v.  Zelt,  138  Pa.  St.  615; 
Stare  v.  Kriechbaum(Iowa,  1891),  47 
N.  W.  Rep.  872;  State  v.  Wilson,  39 
Mo.  App.  114;  Flower  v.  State,  39 
Ark.  209  (physician's  license);  Low- 
ell v.  Payne,  30  La.  Ann.  511;  Peo- 
ple v.  Nyce,  34  Hun,  298  (ferry 
license);  Great  W.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Bacon,  30  111.  347 ;  People  v.  Pease, 
27  N.  Y.  45;  Com.  v.  Curran,  119 
Mass.  206.  Contra,  Com.  v.  Locke, 
114  Mass.  288.  Of.  Potter  v.  Deyo,  19 
Wend.  361;  Bliss  v.  Brainard,  41  N. 
H.  256;  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  79. 

2  O'Kane  v.  Miller,  3  Ind.  App.  136 ; 
Texas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Morin,  66  Tex.  133; 
Dowell  v.  Guthrie  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  893.  Burden  of  showing 
contributory  negligence  is  on  defend- 
ant. Denver,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ryan  (Colo., 
1893),  28  Pac.  Rep.  79;  Spurrier  v. 
Front  St.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Wash.  St.  659; 
Ftilks  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co.  (Mo., 
1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  818;  Merrill  v. 
Eastern    R.    Co.,    139     Mass.     252; 


Omaha  v.  Ayres,  32  Neb.  375;  Water- 
man v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  217;  Railroad  Co.  v.  Owen,  15 
S.  E.  Rep.  853. 

SLauer  v.  Kuder  (111.,  1893).  34  N. 
E.  Rep.  484 ;  Zucker  v.  Karpeles,  88 
Mich.  413;  Sewell  v.  Mead  (Iowa, 
1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  227;  Marsh  v. 
Cramer  (Colo.,  1891),  27  Pac.  Rep. 
169;  Smith  v.  Ogiivie  (N.  Y.,  1891), 
27  N.  E.  Rep.  807:  Gleason  v.  Wil- 
son, 48  Kan.  500;  29  Pac.  Rop.  693; 
Probert  v.  McDonald,  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
212;  Martin  Brown  Co.  v.  Cooper,  82 
Tex.  242;  Blackshire  v.  Pettit,  35  W. 
Va.  547.  Contra,  Norton  v.  Bank, 
50  Ark.  59;  Bartlett  v.  Cleavenger, 
35  W.  Va.  719. 

4  Perine  v.  Grand  Lodge  A.  O.  U. 
W.  (Minn.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  367. 

5  Modern  Woodman  v.  Sutton,  38 
111.  App.  327;  Heilman  v.  Lazarus, 
90  N.  Y.  672;  Tidmarsh  v.  Wash.  F. 
&  M.  Ins.  Co.,  4  Mason,  439;  Murray 
v.  N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co..  85  N.  Y.  236; 
Elmer  v.  Mut.  Ben.  L.  Ass'n,  19  N. 
Y.  S.  289. 

6  Sutherland  v.  Stand.  L.  Ins.  Co. 
(Iowa,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  4531 


§  250.] 


BURDEN    OF    PROOF,  ETC. 


389 


Though  the  burden  of  proving  fraud  or  undue  influence  is 
cast  usually  upon  the  party  alleging  its  existence,  yet,  where 
from  the  circumstances  or  the  relations  of  the  parties  fraud  is 
presumed,  as  it  is  in  the  case  of  a  sale  or  a  gift  to  a  trustee  by 
the  beneficiary,  the  burden  is  shifted  and  the  grantee  or  donee 
will  be  compelled  to  prove  that  the  transaction  was  bona  fide 
and  for  a  good  consideration.1 

Where  a  note  is  alleged  to  be  usurious  and  void,2  or  without 
consideration,3  or  illegitimacy 4  or  insanity  is  alleged,5  or  breach 
of  warranty  in  an  action  on  contract,6  or  the  bad  reputation 
of  the  plaintiff  in  an  action  for  libel,7  these  allegations,  though 
negative  in  character,  cast  the  burden  of  proof  upon  the  party 
making  them.8 


1Whitridge  v.  Whitridge  (Md., 
1892),  24  Atl.  Rep.  645;  Carter  v. 
West  (Ky.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  592; 
White  v.  Johnson  (Wash.,  1892),  29 
Pac.  Rep.  932;  Jackson  v.  Tatebo,  3 
Wash.  St.  456;  Corrigan  v.  Peroni, 
48  N.  J.  Eq.  60? ;  King  v.  Jacobson, 
58  Hun,  610;  Newton  v.  Newton 
(Minn.,  1891),  48  N.  W.  Rep.  450; 
Haskins  v.  Warren,  115  Mass.  514. 

^  Holt  v.  Kirby  (Ark.,  1893),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  432;  White  v.  Benjamin, 
138  N.  Y.  623. 

3  MeKenzie  v.  Oregon  I.  Co.,  5 
Wash.  C.  C.  500. 

4  Morris  v.  Davies.  3  C.  &  P.  215. 
SHoge  v.  Fisher,  1  Pet.  C.  C.  163. 

Insanity  being  pleaded  as  a  matter 
of  defense  in  an  action  ex  contractu, 
the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  de- 
fendant to  show  insanity  (Young  v. 
Lamont  (Minn.,  1893 j,  57  N.  W.  Rep. 
478;  Brown  v.  Brown,  39  Mich.  792; 
Weed  v.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  70  N.  Y.  5G1 ; 
Jarrett  v.  Jarrett,  11  W.  Va.  562; 
Perkins  v.  Perkins,  39  N.  H.  163; 
Wright  v.  Wright,  139  Mass.  177), 
and  remains  on  him,  though  if  by 
evidence  he  shows  insanity,  then 
the  party  denying  the  insanity  will 
be  obliged  to  prove  by  the  weight  of 
evidence    either   that  the    insanity 


had  ceased  to  exist  or  that  a  lucid 
interval  had  occurred.  Wright  v. 
Wright,  supra. 

6  Piano  M.  Co.  v.  Root  (N.  D., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  924;  Cook  v. 
Tavenier,  41  111.  App.  C42. 

7  Lotto  v.  Dans  (Minn.,  1892),  52 
N.  W.  Rep.  130. 

8  In  the  following  cases  the  burden 
of  proof  has  been  held  to  rest  on  the 
plaintiff:  To  show  breach  of  aeon- 
tract  or  covenant:  Western  Union  T. 
Co.  v.  Bennett,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  558 ; 
Landt  v.  Mayor  (Colo.,  1893),  31  Pac. 
Rep.  524.  Damages  for  negligence: 
Richmond,  etc.  Co.  v.  White,  88 
Ga.  805.  Infringement  of  a  patent: 
National  Harrow  Co.  v.  Hanby,  54 
Fed.  Rep.  493.  Ultra  vires,  when 
ground  for  a  writ  of  quo  warranto: 
Ellerman  v.  Stockyards  (N.  J.,  1892), 
23  Atl.  Rep.  257.  Performance  of 
contract  when  performance  is  de- 
nied: Hitchcock  v.  Davis,  87  Mich. 
629.  Possession  in  trespass  to  try 
title:  Gunn  v.  Harris,  88  Ga.  439. 
Receipt  of  money  by  the  defendant 
in  conversion :  Panama  R.  Co.  v. 
Johnson,  63  Hun,  629.  Notice  of  a 
defect  in  highway  to  a  city :  McGrail 
v.  Kalamazoo,  94  Mich.  52. 

In  these  cases  the  burden  is  on  the 


390 


BURDEN    OF    PROOF,  ETC. 


[§  251. 


§  251.  When  plaintiff  may  open  and  close. —  The  general 
rule  being  that  the  burden  of  proof  is  upon  the  plaintiff,  it 
follows  that  he  has  the  right  to  open  and  close  in  most  cases.1 
This  is  true  though  there  may  be  several  issues  and  the  plaint- 
iff ma}'  have  the  burden  of  proof  on  only  one  of  them.2  In 
actions  on  contracts  either  express  or  implied,  where  the  de- 
fendant does  not  deny  the  execution  or  validity  of  the  con- 
tract but  pleads  an  affirmative  defense  such  as  payment,  or 
breach  of  contract  by  the  plaintiff,  and  where  substantial 
damages  are  claimed  which  the  contract  has  not  liquidated, 
the  plaintiff  has  the  burden  of  proving  damages  and  the  con- 
sequent right  to  open  and  close.3  The  rule  that  the  plaintiff 
has  the  right  to  open  and  close  in  cases  where  the  damages 
are  unliquidated  is  also  invoked  in  actions  in  tort.  The  fact 
that  the  defendant  does  not  plead  the  general  issue,  but  admits 
the  cause  of  action  and  pleads  a  defense  by  way  of  confession 
and  avoidance,  does  not,  unless  he  also  admits  the  amount  of 
damages  which  are  claimed,  deprive  the  plaintiff  of  his  right 


defendant:  To  show  truth  (Nelson 
v.  Wallace,  48  Mo.  App.  193)  or  the 
had  reputation  of  plaintiff  in  libel : 
Lotto  v.  Davenport  (Minn.,  1892),  52 
N.  W.  Rep.  130.  Justification  in  as- 
sault: Jennison  v.  Mosely  (Miss., 
1892),  10  S.  Rep.  582.  Prior  use  or 
want  of  invention  in  patent  cases: 
Hunt  Bros.  v.  Cassidy,  7  U.  S.  App. 
424;  Anderson  v.  Monroe,  55  Fed. 
Rep.  596.  Exemption  of  homestead: 
Kolsky  v.  Loveman  (Ala.,  1892),  12 
S.  Rep.  720;  Wagner  v.  Olson  (N.  D., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  286;  Robertson 
v.  Robertson  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  543.  Condonation  in  divorce 
proceeding:  McConnell  v.  McCon- 
nell  (Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  292. 
A  corporation  must  show  its  title  in 
quo  warranto :  Ginterman  v.  People 
(111.,  1892),  28  N.  W.  Rep.  1067. 
Abandonment  of  easement  on  party 
alleging  it:  Henessy  v.  Murdock, 
137  N.  Y.  317.  Freedom  from  negli- 
gence on  carrier:  Central  R.  &  B.  Co. 


v.   Hossalkus  (Ga.,   1893),   17   S.   E. 
Rep.  838. 

1  Railway  Co.  v.  Rhea,  44  Ark. 
258,  264;  St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  Ry. 
Co.  v.  Taylor  (Ark.,  1893),  20  S.  W. 
Rep.  1083;  Felts  v.  Clapper,  69  Hun, 
373. 

2  Shaw  v.  Barnhart,  17  Ind.  183; 
Bertrand  v.  Taylor,  32  Ark.  470; 
Auerbach  v.  Peetsch.  18  N.  Y.  S. 
452;  Johnson  v.  Maxwell,  87  N.  C. 
18. 

3  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  232; 
Stirnes  v.  Schofield  (Ind.,  1892),  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  480;  Whitesides  v.  Hunt, 
97  Ind.  191 ;  Mizer  v.  Bristol,  30  Neb. 
138;  Penhryn  Slate  Co.  v.  Meyer,  8 
Daly  (N.  Y.),  01 ;  Graham  v.  Gautier, 
21  Tex.  112;  Mercer  v.  Whall,  5  Ad. 
&  El.  (N.  S.)  447;  Bates  v.  Farelet, 
89  Mo.  121 ;  Hurley  v.  Sullivan,  137 
Mass.  86;  Dahlman  v.  Hammel,  45 
Wis.  466;  McBee  v.  Bowman,  89 
Tenn.  132;  Mathews  v.  Farnies,  91 
Ala.  157. 


§  251.] 


BURDEN    OF   PROOF,  ETC. 


391 


to  open  and  close.1  Thus,  in  an  action  to  recover  for  slander 
or  libel,  where  the  defendant  admits  that  he  uttered  the  libel- 
ous or  slanderous  language  which  is  alleged,  but  pleads  the 
truth  in  justification,  or  that  the  statements  were  privileged, 
he  is  not  entitled  to  the  right  to  open  and  close,  for  the  bur- 
den of  proving  malice  and  the  amount  of  damages,  if  any,  is 
still  on  the  plaintiff.2 

Cases  occur  which  do  not  arrange  themselves  under  the 
head  of  actions  in  contract  or  in  tort,  but  in  which  the  mov- 
ing party  applies  merely  to  set  aside  some  prior  judicial  or 
other  official  determination  or  action,  or  objects  to  that  which 
is  proposed  or  anticipated.  The  rule  here  invoked  is  that,  as 
the  burden  of  proof  is  on  him  who  would  change  the  existing 
condition  of  things,  the  applicant  or  party  protesting  will 
therefore  have  the  right  to  open  and  close.  Thus,  a  con- 
testant of  an  election,3  interpleading  claimants  in  attachment,4 
or  a  party  who  files  objections  to  the  settlement  of  an  exec- 
utor,5 or  excepts  to  the  report  of  an  auditor,6  or  who  applies 
for  a  supersedeas 7  or  a  license,**  has  the  right  to  open  and 
close.9 


»  Stirnes  v.  Schofield  (Ind..  1892),  31 
N.  E.  Rep.  411;  Young  v.  Highland, 
9Gratt  (Va.)  16:  Mercer  v.  Whall, 
5  Ad.  &  El.  (N.  S.)  447;  St.  Louis,  I. 
M.  etc.  Co.  v.  Taylor  (Ark.,  1893),  20 
S.  W.  Rep.  1083 ;  Beatty  v.  Hatcher, 
13  Ohio  St.  115;  Stillvvell  v.  Archer, 
18  N.-  Y.  S.  888 ;  Cunningham  v. 
Gallegher,  61  Wis.  170;  Aurora  v. 
Cobb,  21  Ind.  493;  Opdyke  v.  Weed, 
18  Abb.  Pr.  223. 

-'Tallmadge  v.  Press,  14  N.  Y.  S. 
331  ;  Burkhalter  v.  Coward,  16  S.  C. 
43.");  Heckerv.  Hopkins,  16  Abb.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  301;  Vifquain  v.  Finch,  15 
Neb.  505;  Shulse  v.  McWilliams,  104 
Ind.  512;  Louisville  C.  Jour.  v. 
Weaver  (Ky.,  1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep. 
1018;  1  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  230, 
n.  3.  The  rule  given  in  the  text  is 
applicable  where  the  defendant 
pleads  son  axsault  demesne  to  an  al- 
legation of  assault  and  battery.  1 
Thompson  on  Trials,  §  231);  Young 


v.  Highland,  9  Graft.  (Va.)  16;  Sey- 
mour v.  Baily,  76  Ga.  338;  Johnson 
v.  Josephs,  75  Me.  544. 

» Price  v.  Archuleta  (Colo.,  1892), 
29  Pac.  Rep.  460. 

4  Sanger  v.  Flow,  48  Fed.  Rep. 
152;  4  U.  S.  App.  32.  Cf.  Central 
R.  &  B.  Co.  v.  Cons.  &  In  v.  Co.,  32 
S.  C.  319;  33  id.  599. 

5  Clay  v.  Robinson,  7  W.  Va.  350. 

6  Arthur  v.  Gordon,  67  Ga.  220. 
7Pearsall   v.  McCartney,  28  Ala. 

110. 

8  Hill  v.  Perry,  82  Ind.  128. 

9  See,  also,  in  attachment,  Dolan 
v.  Armstrong,  35  ISeb.  339;  Jones  v. 
Swank  (Minn.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rer. 
634.  In  Huntington  v.  Conkey,  33 
Barb.  (N.  Y.)  218,  the  court  thus 
sums  up  the  rules  bearing  on  the 
right  to  open  and  close:  "First.  The 
plaintiff  in  all  cases  where  damages 
are  unliquidated  lias  the  right  to 
open  and  close.     Second.  Whenever 


392 


BURDEN    OF    rROOF,  ETC. 


U  252. 


§  252.  When  defendant  may  open  and  close. —  In  all  cases 
where  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  defendant  he  has  the  right 
to  open  and  close.  This  usually  occurs  where  he  admits  all 
the  facts  upon  which  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  is  based, 
in  dueling  the  amount  of  damages  claimed,  whether  liquidated 
or  not,1  and  pleads  payment,2  usury,3  want  of  consideration,4 
the  bar  of  the  statute  of  limitations,5  or  some  other  defense  in 
the  nature  of  a  justification  or  discharge.6 

The  defendant  who  seeks  to  open  and  close  cannot  claim  to 
do  so  upon  a  sham  plea  or  on  one  entirely  unsupported  by  any 
evidence,7  but  must  show  by  his  pleadings  that  he  has  the  right 
to  do  so  affirmatively  and  clearty,  for  the  court  will  not  examine 
all  the  pleadings  in  the  case  in  order  to  ascertain  where  that 
right  lies.8  But  the  denial  of  unnecessary  averments  which 
are  in  the  complaint  which  the  plaintiff  would  not  be  called 


he  has  anything  to  prove  on  the 
question  of  damages  or  otherwise  he 
may  begin.  Third.  In  cases  where 
the  damages  are  liquidated  or  de- 
pend on  mere  calculation,  the  party 
holding  the  affirmative  may  begin. 
Fourth.  The  affirmative  in  such  case 
means  the  affirmative  in  substance, 
not  in  form,  and  on  the  whole  rec- 
ord. Fifth.  The  denial  of  the  right 
to  begin  to  the  party  entitled  to  and 
claiming  it  is  reversible  error  unless 
the  court  can  see  clearly  that  no  in- 
jury or  injustice  resulted  from  the 
erroneous  decision." 

lUpdyke  v.  Weed,  18  Abb.  Pr. 
223. 

*Truesdell  v.  Hoyle,  39  111.  App. 
532;  Knapp  v.  Runals,  37  Wis.  135. 

3  Hoxey  v.  Green,  37  How.  Pr.  97 ; 
Summons  v.  Hawver,  25  W.  Va. 
678:  Huntington  v.  Kinkey,  33  Barb. 
(N.  Y.)  218;  Suter  v.  Bank,  35  Neb. 
372. 

4  McShane  v.  Braender,  66  How. 
Pr.  (N.  Y.)  294;  Brown  v.  Tausick, 
20  N.  Y.  S.  369. 

s  Maye  v.  Friedman,  69  N.  Y.  608; 
Payne  v.  Hathaway,  3  Vt.  312. 


&Lindley  v.  Sullivan  (Ind.,  1893), 
33  N.  E.  Rep.  361 ;  East  Term.  etc. 
Co.  v.  Fleetwood  (Ga.,  1893),  15  S.  E. 
Rep.  773;  Love  v.  Dickinson,  85  N. 
C.  5 ;  Auerbach  v.  Peetsch,  18  N.  Y. 
S.  452;  Donahoe  v.  Rich,  2  Ind.  App. 
540;  List  v.  Kortpeter,  26  Ind.  27; 
Lafayette  Bank  v.  Metcalf,  29  Mo. 
App.  384;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Bryan, 
90  III.  126;  Rigdon  v.  Jordan,  81  Ga. 
668;  Johnson  v.  Bradstreet,  81  Ga. 
425;  Page  v.  Carter,  8  B.  Mon.  192; 
Pingree  v.  Puckett,  35  S.  C.  178; 
Seymour  v.  Baily,  76  Ga.  338; 
Maurice  v.  Warden,  54  Md.  233.  The 
defendant  must  admit  all  of  plaint- 
iff's cause  of  action.  A  plea  which 
is  evasive  or  doubtful  (Seymour  v. 
Baily,  76  Ga.  338;  Comp.  v.  Brown, 
48  Ind.  575).  or  which  alleges  a 
modification  of  the  cause  of  action 
(McConnell  v.  Kitchens,  20  S.  C.  430), 
or  which  denies  the  alleged  value 
cf  the  subject-matter  (Saunders  v. 
Bridges,  67  Tex.  93),  will  not  suffice. 

7  Vanzant  v.  Jones,  3  Dana  (Ky.), 
464;  B.iehm  v.  Lies,  18  N.  Y.  S.  577. 

8  Claflin  v.  Baer,  28  Hun  (N.  Y.), 
204. 


§  253.]  BURDEN  OP  PROOF,  ETC.  393 

upon  to  prove  will  not  deprive  the' defendant  of  his  right  to 
open  and  close.1 

To  obtain  the  right  to  open  and  close,  the  defendant's  ad- 
mission of  the  plaintiff's  cause  of  action  must  be  seasonably 
made,  usually  before  trial  and  by  the  pleadings.2  Although 
this  question  was  the  subject  of  much  discussion  in  the  earlier 
cases,  it  is  now  well  settled  that  whenever  the  plaintiff  has 
anything  to  prove  on  the  question  of  damages  he  has  also  the 
right  to  begin.5  But  where  the  damages  are  liquidated,  as  in 
the  case  of  an  action  brought  on  a  promissory  note,4  bill  of 
exchange,5  order  for  the  payment  of  money  6  or  insurance 
policy,7  the  defendant  who  admits  the  cause  of  action  has  the 
right  to  open  and  close,  for  on  him  the  law  casts  the  burden 
of  proving  any  affirmative  defense  which  he  may  urge. 

§  253.  Right  to  open  and  close  in  special  proceedings. — 
In  special  proceedings  the  burden  of  proof  and  the  correlated 
right  to  open  and  close  are  his  "  who  seeks  to  alter  the  exist- 
ing state  of  things."  d  Thus,  in  proceedings  to  probate  a  will 
the  proponent  has  the  right  to  open  and  close  in  the  first  in- 
stance,9 though  when  the  validity  of  the  will  is  prima  facie 
established  by  probate,  the  party  who  attacks  it  subsequently, 
whether  in  the  same  court  or  elsewhere,  has  the  right  to  open 
and  close,  for  the  reason  that  he  seeks  to  alter  the  status  quo.10. 

The  petitioner  in  a  proceeding  to  condemn  land  for  public 
purposes  by  virtue  of  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  eminent  do- 
main, or  to  assess  damages  for  the  taking  thereof,  has  gen- 

i  Murray  v.   N.  Y.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  85  6Elwell  v.  Chamberlain,  31  N.  Y. 

N.  Y.  236.  611. 

2  Mitchell  v.  Fowler,  21  S.  C.  298;  7  Viele  v.  Insurance  Co.,  26  Iowa, 
Merriam  v.  Cunningham,  11  Cush.  10:  Brennan  v.  Security  L.  Ins.  Co., 
(Mass.)  40.  4  Daly  (N.  Y.),  296. 

3  Smith,  J.,  in  Huntington  v.  8  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  239.  See 
Conkey,    32    Barb.   218;    Mercer  v.  ante,  §  248. 

Whall,  9  Jur.  576.  9  Norton  \.  Paxton,  110   Mo.  456 

4  Crabtree  v.  Atchison  (Ky.,  1893),  Kennedy   v.  Upshaw,  66   Tex.  442 
20    S.    W.    Rep.    260;    Ayrault    v.  Perkins   v.    Perkins,  39   N.  H.  163 
Chamberlain.  33  Barb.   229;  Bowen  Harrison   v.    Bishop,    131    Intl.   161 
v.    Spears,    20   Ind.    146;   Brown   v.  Wilbur  v.  Wilbur,  129111.  392;  Hardy 
Tausick,  20  N.  Y.  S.  369;  Harvey  v.  v.  Merrill,  56  N.  H.  227. 
Ellithorpe,   26   111.  418;   Hudson  v.  10  In  re  Simcox,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 
Wetherington,  79  N.  C.  3.  545. 

5  List  v.  Kortpeter,  26  Ind.  27. 


394  BURDEN    OF    PROOF,  ETC.  [§  254. 

orally  the  right  to  open  and  close;  for  the  law  casts  on  him 
the  burden  of  showing  by  evidence  the  necessity  for  the  tak- 
ing and  the  value  of  the  property  appropriated.1  The  con- 
trary is  supported  by  some  cases,2  and  generally  the  owner 
will  have  the  right  in  any  appellate  proceeding  to  review  the 
award.3 

The  burden  of  proof  in  criminal  cases  is,  as  we  have  seen, 
upon  the  prosecution,  and  for  this  reason,  and  because  the  ac- 
cused is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until  he  is  proved  guilty,  the 
right  to  open  and  close  belongs  to  the  state  irrespective  of  the 
nature  of  the  defense,  and  even  where  the  accused  offers  no 
evidence  in  his  own  behalf.4 

§254.  The  right  to  open  and  close  —  When  discretionary. 
Though  a  substantial  unanimity  of  opinion  exists  that  the 
right  to  open  and  close  belongs  to  the  party  on  whom  is  cast 
the  burden  of  proof,  the  authorities  are  not  harmonious  upon 
the  question  whether  a  denial  of  the  right  is  ground  for  a  new 
trial.  Many  cases  sustain  the  rule  that  the  matter  is  wholly 
within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court,  being  a  matter  of  prac- 
tice over  which  its  jurisdiction  is  final  and  exclusive.5  But  this 
general  rule  is  sometimes  qualified  by  the  proviso  that  it  is 
only  applicable  where  a  denial  of  the  privilege  has  not  re- 
sulted in  prejudice,  injustice  or  unfairness  to  the  party.6  On 
the  other  hand,  it  is  held  that  the  denial  of  the  right  to  open 
and  close  is  a  substantial  error.  The  right  is  not  a  mere  privi- 
lege, and  discretionary,  but  absolute,  and  a  refusal  to  permit 
its  exercise  cannot  be  disregarded  on  a  motion  for  a  new  trial 
or  on  appeal.7   A  statute  granting  the  right  to  open  and  close 

i  Thompson  on  Trials,  §  247;  Gulf,  nagin  w  State,  10  Yerg.  (Tenn.)  529; 

etc.  Co.  v.  Ross  (Tex.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  State  v.  Millican,  15  La.   Ann.  557. 

Eep.    536;  Com'rs  v.   Trustees.    107  See  g  249. 

III.  489;  Neff  v.  Cincinnati,  32  Ohio  5Gran     v.    Spangenberg     (Minn., 

St.  215;  Spring   Valley,    etc.  Co.  v.  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  933;  Cothran 

Drinkhouse,  92  Cal.  528.  v.  Forsyth,  6S  Ga.  560;  Lancaster  v. 

2  Dallas  v.  Chenault   (Tex.,  1891),  Collins,    115   U.    S.    222;    Wade   v. 

16  S.  W.  Rep.  173;  Burt  v.  Wiggles-  Scott,  7  Mo.  509;  Fry  v.  Bennett,  28 
worth,  117  Mass.  302;  Springfield  R.  N.  Y.  324;  Corastock  v.  Hadlyme,  8 
Co.  v.  Rhea,  44  Ark.  258.  Conn.  254;  8  id.  296. 

3  Indiana,    etc.    Co.    v.    Cook,   102        « Carpenter  v.  Bank,  119  111.  352. 
Ind.  113:  Omaha,  etc.  Co.  v.  Walker,         7  Porter    v.    Still,    03    Miss.     357; 

17  Neb.  432.  Royal  Ins.  Co.   v.  Schuring,  87  Ky. 
*  Thompson  on  Trials,  §243;  Jar-    410;  9  S.    W.  Rep.  242;  Millard   v. 


§  9M.] 


BUKDEN    OF    I'UOOF,   ETC. 


395 


is,  of  course,  mandatory;1  but  the  party  claiming  it  should 
do  so  promptly  before  any  material  progress  has  been  made 
in  the  trial  of  the  case.2 


Tliorn,  5G  N.  Y.  402;  Elder  v.  Oliver, 
30  Mo.  App.  573;  Auerbach  v. 
Peetsch,  18  N.  Y.  S.  453;  Colwell 
v.  Brower,  75  111.  516;  Creston  v. 
Walker,  26  Iowa,  205;  Ashing  v. 
Miles,  16  Ind.  329;  Addison  v.  Dun- 


can, 35  S.  C.  178;  Thompson  on 
Trials,  §  226. 

1  Bertody  v.  Ison,  69  Ga.  317 ;  Heff- 
ron  v.  State,  8  Fla.  73. 

nicKibbon  v.  Folds,  38  Ga.  235; 
Mason  v.  Seitz,  36  Ind.  516. 


CHAPTER  XX. 


STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS. 


§  261.  Origin  and  nature  of  the  stat- 
ute. 

2G2.  Agreements  relating  to  inter- 
ests in  land. 

263.  Partition  of  real  property. 

26-1.  Trusts  in  real  and  personal 
estate. 

265.  Surrender    or   assignment   of 

leases. 

266.  Contracts  required   to  be  in 

writing. 


§  267.  Articles  of  partnership. 

268.  Form   and    character  of    the 

writing. 

269.  Wills  required  to  be  evidenced 

in  writing. 

270.  Agreements   not   within    the 

statute  of  frauds  which 
must  be  evidenced  by  writ- 
ings. 


§  261 .  Origin  ami  nature  of  the  statute. —  The  statute  of 
frauds  and  perjuries  which  was  passed  in  England  in  the 
twenty-ninth  year  of  Charles  II.  (1678),  and  which  has  been 
substantially  re-enacted  in  every  state  of  the  American  Union, 
was  the  means  of  introducing  into  the  law  of  evidence  a  new 
mode  of  proof  that  renders  its  consideration  of  great  impor- 
tance. The  spread  of  commerce  and  the  complexity  of  social 
affairs  hail  rendered  necessary,  while  the  increased  employ- 
ment of  writing  had  made  possible,  the  use  of  documentary 
evidence  in  a  large  class  of  cases  in  which  it  had  not  before 
been  employed.  The  object  of  the  statute  is  to  prevent  fraud. 
This,  it  is  conceived,  will  be  most  effectually  accomplished  bjr 
requiring  that  certain  transactions  shall  be  evidenced  in  writ- 
ing, which  is  then  presumed  to  be  the  best  evidence  of  the 
intention  of  the  parties.  Accordingly,  where  it  is  alleged  that 
any  one  of  the  various  classes  of  transactions  or  contracts  which 
are  within  the  statute  have  been  made,  a  writing  evidencing 
it  must  be  produced  or  the  party  claiming  the  execution  of 
the  contract  will  be  denied  a  legal  remedy.  The  various  stat- 
utes of  frauds  in  the  several  states  differ  in  minor  points, 
while  a  substantial  similarity  exists  among  all  of  them. 
Though  their  consideration  in  detail  is  impossible  in  this  work, 
attention  mav  be  called  to  some  of  their  more  salient  features. 


§  202. J  STATUTE    OF    FRAUDS.  307 

§  2G2.  Agreements  relating  to  interests  in  land. —  By  the 

statute  all  contracts  to  convey  land  and  all  conveyances  of  hind 
or  of  any  interest  in  land,  freehold  or  less  than  freehold,- future 
or  immediate,  vested  or  contingent,  except  leases  for  three 
years  or  less,  are  required  to  be  in  writing.  In  construing 
this  provision  the  main  difficulty  has  been  to  ascertain  the 
meaning  of  the  words  "land  or  an  interest  therein,"  and  to 
ascertain  what  was  conveyed  or  sold,  so  as  to  render  a  writing 
necessary.  An  agreement  to  convey,1  or  to  create  an  easement,2 
or  a  license  to  go  upon  land,3  or  to  relinquish  an  interest  in 
land,4  or  to  buy  lands  jointly  with  another,5  or  to  refrain  from 
bidding  at  an  auction  sale  of  land,6  or  to  take  away  a  certain 
amount  of  bark  yearly  from  trees,7  is  within  the  statute  and 
must  be  evidenced  in  writing.  On  the  other  hand  it  has  been 
held  that  an  agreement  between  adjacent  owners  to  establish 
boundaries,8  or  a  partnership  settlement  by  which  land  is  con- 
veyed,9 or  a  partnership  formed  to  deal  in  land,10  may  be 
shown  by  parol  evidence. 

Parol  contracts  for  the  sale  of  land  will  be  valid  and  en- 
forceable in  equity  where  there  has  been  a  partial  perform- 
ance by  the  party  seeking  the  enforcement  of  the  contract, 
either  by  his  payment  of  the  consideration  and  going  into 
possession  of  the  land  or  by  making  valuable  improvements 
thereon,  or  by  both.11     Upon  the  question  whether  a  sale  of 

1  Hayes  v.  Fine,  91  Cal.  391.  p  Murrell  v.  Mandlebaum  (Tex.),  19 

2C!anton    v.  Scruggs  (Ala.,  1892),  S.  W.  Rep.  880. 

10  S.  Rep.  757;  May  v.  Prendergast,  10  Speyer  v.  Desjardins  (111.,  1893), 

12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  220.  32  N.  E.  Rep.  283;  Fountain  v.  Men- 

» Cook   v.    Stearns,    11  Mass.  533.  ard   (Minn.,    1893),    55   N.   W.   Rep. 

As  respects  the  necessity  for  writing  601;  Bates  v.  Babcock,  95  Cal.  479; 

to  convey  lands  prior  to  the  statute,  Case    v.    Seger,    4   Wash.   St.   492; 

see  Tiederaan  on  R.  P.,  §783.  Sleven  v.    Wallace,    64    Hun,   288; 

4  Littell  v.  Jones  (Ark.,  1892),  19  Clarke  v.  McAuliffe,  81  Wis.  244. 

S.  W.  Rep.  497.  n  Barnes  v.  Bost.  etc.  Co.,  130  Mass. 

5  Morton  v.  Nelson  (111.,  1893),  32    388;  Hanlon  v.  Wilson,  10  Neb.  138; 
N.  E.  Rep.  916.  Marshall  v.   Peck,  91  111.  187;  Wal- 

6Roughton   v.    Rawlings,  88    Ga.  lace  v.  Rappleyea,  103  id.  229;  Ford 

819.  v.  Finney,  35  Ga.  258;  Cole  v.  Cole, 

7  Thompson  v.  Poor,  67  Hun,  653.  41   Md.  301;  So  wry  v.  Buffington,  6 

s  Archer  v.  Helm  (Miss.,  1892),   11  W.  Va.  249;  Reynolds  v.  Reynolds, 

S.  Rep.  3 ;  Lecomte  v.  Tondorize,  82  45  Mo.  App.  622 ;  Smith  v.  Arthur, 

Tex.  208;  Cavanaugh  v.  Jackson,  91  110  N.  C.  400;  Moulton  v.  Harris,  94 

Cal.  580.  Cal.  420 ;  St.  Louis  R.  Co.  v.  Graham, 


SOS  STATUTE    OF    FRAUDS.  [§  2G3. 

growing  timber  or  crops  must  be  evidenced  by  a  writing  the 
decisions  are  inharmonious.  The  English  cases  hold  that  if 
an  immediate  removal  and  severance  by  the  vendor  are  con- 
templated no  writing  is  requisite,  as  the  transaction  can  and 
ought  to  be  deemed  a  sale  of  goods  alone.1  The  American 
courts  hold  that  "standing  trees  are  a  part  of  the  inheritance, 
and  can  only  become  personalty  by  actual  severance  or  b\' 
severance  in  contemplation  of  law  as  the  effect  of  a  proper 
instrument  in  writing."2  If  in  the  sale  of  the  timber  or  of 
growing  crops  or  fruits  a  severance  and  delivery  of  the  trees 
or  crops  as  chattels  by  the  vendor  are  not  contemplated,  but 
the  vendor  is  given,  either  expressly  or  by  implication,  a  license 
to  go  on  the  land  and  cut  and  receive  them,  then  it  is  only 
reasonable  to  require  that  the  contract  conferring  the  license 
or  quasi-\ea.se  must  be  evidenced  by  a  writing,3  where  its  du- 
ration exceeds  the  term  for  which  a  valid  oral  lease  can  be 
made. 

§  263.  Partition  of  real  property. —  Whether  a  partition 
among  co-tenants  may  be  effected  and  proved  b}^  parol  is  a 
question  upon  which  considerable  variance  exists  among  the 
authorities.  Prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  statute  of  frauds 
partition  among  coparceners  and  tenants  in  common  of  cor- 
poreal hereditaments  might  have  been  made  by  parol  coupled 
with  livery  of  seizin  in  severalty.  According  to  the  English 
cases  and  the  early  American  decisions,  a  voluntary  partition 

55  Ark.  294;  Guthrie  v.   Anderson,  Smith  v.  Surman,   9  B.   &  C.   561; 

48  Kan.  3S1 ;  Frank  v.  Riggs,  93  Ala.  Watts  v.  Bruce,  10  B.  &  C.  446;  Mar- 

252;  Larsen  v.  Johnson,  78  Wis.  300.  shall  v.  Green,  33  L.  T.  Rep.  (N.  S.) 

"  Every  day's  experience  more  fully  404 ;  Evans  v.  Roberts,  5  B.  &  C.  836 ; 

demonstrates  that  the  statute  was  Bostwick   v.  Leech,  3  Day  (Conn.), 

founded  in  wisdom  and  absolutely  476;  Warwick  v.  Bruce,  2  M.  &  S. 

necessary  to  preserve  the  titles   to  205. 

real  property  from  the  chances,  the  2Tiedeman  on  Real  Prop.,  §799; 
uncertainty  and  the  fraud  attending  Trull  v.  Fisher,  28  Me.  548;  Green  v. 
the  admission  of  parol  testimony.  Armstrong,  1  Denio,  550;  McGregor 
When  courts  of  equity  have  relaxed  v.  Brown,  10  N.  Y.  117;  Vorebeck  v. 
the  rigid  requirements  of  the  statute,  Roe,  50  Barb.  305;  Buck  v.  Pick- 
it  has  always  been  for  the  purpose  well,  27  Vt.  104;  Hirth  v.  Graham 
of  hindering  the  statute  made  to  (Ohio,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  90;  De- 
prevent  frauds  from  becoming  the  laney  v.  Root,  99  Mass.  548;  Poor  v. 
instrument  of  fraud."  Purcell  v.  Oakman,  154  Mass.  316. 
Miner,  4  Wall.  517.  ^Tiedeman  on  Real  Prop.,  §799; 
iTiedeman  on  Real  Prop.,  §  799;  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  271. 


§  2G4r.]  STATUTE    OF    FRAUDS.  309 

of  land  was  considered  to  be  a  conveyance  which,  coming 
under  the  operation  of  the  statute  of  frauds,  must  necessarily 
be  in  writing;  and  the  courts  demanded,  therefore,  that  a 
party  alleging  the  fact  of  a  partition  must  prove  that  fact  by 
evidence  in  writing.1  But  the  contrary  proposition,  that  a 
parol  partition  is  valid  where  it  is  carried  out  and  is  followed 
by  an  actual  and  exclusive  possession  of  the  parcels  in  sever- 
alty, is  supported  by  the  more  recent  cases.  The  exclusive 
adverse  possession  in  severalty,  if  it  is  continued  long  enough 
to  bring  the  case  within  the  statute  of  limitation,  or  if  it  is 
coupled  with  the  making  of  extensive  improvements  by  one 
of  the  former  co-tenants  on  the  portion  which  has  been  set 
out  to  him  in  severalty,  would  be  sufficient  in  equity  or  law 
to  take  the  case  out  of  the  statute  of  frauds  and  to  dispense 
with  written  evidence.2  In  the  New  England  States  the  pro- 
prietors of  common  lands  could  make  partition  by  an  oral  vote 
and  without  actual  possession  in  severalty.  No  writing  was 
required  to  evidence  a  title  arising  under  such  a  partition.3 

§  264.  Trusts  in  real  and  personal  estate. —  Prior  to  the 
enactment  of  the  statute  of  frauds,  oral  evidence  was  admis- 
sible to  prove  an  express  trust  in  real  property.  By  that  stat- 
ute it  is  required  that  all  express  declarations  of  trusts  in  land 
shall  be  manifested  and  proved  by  a  writing  signed  by  the 
party  creating  the  trust.   The  statute  covers  all  express  trusts ; 4 

iCo.    Lit.    lS7a;    2    Cruise,    384;  Pipes  v.  Buckner,  51  Miss.  848;  John- 

Chenery   v.   Dole,   39   Me.    164;  Mc-  son  v.  Johnson,  65  Tex.  87 ;  McCon- 

Pherson   v.   Seguine,  3  Dev.  (N.  C.)  nell  v.  Carey,  48  Pa.  St.  430;  Dock- 

154;  Den  v.  Longstreet,  18  N.  J.  L.  terman  v.  Elder,  27  Wkly.  Law  Bui. 

414;  Porter  v.  Perkins,  5  Mass.  235;  195;    Boiling   v.    Teel,    76   Va.    487; 

Medlin  v.  Steele,  75  N.  C.  154;  Dow  Mellon   v.    Eeed,    114    Pa.    St.    647; 

v.   Jewell,    18   N.    H.   380:  Gratz  v.  Gates   v.   Salmon,  46   Cal.   461;  Mc- 

Gratz,  4  Rawle  (Pa.),  411;  Jones  v.  Mahan  v.  McMahan,  13  Pa.  St.  376; 

Reeves,  6  Rich.  (S.   C.)  132;  Wright  Tate  v.  Fashee,  117  Ind.  322;  Sanger 

v.  Cane,  18  La.  Ann.   579;  Craig  v.  v.  Merritt,  131   N.   Y.  614;  Rountree 

Taylor,  6  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  459;  Tiede-  v.  Lane,  32  S.  C.  160. 
man  on  Real  Prop.,  §  260.  3  Folger  v.  Mitchell,  3  Pick.  (Mass.) 

2Tiedeman   on  Real  Prop.,  §  260;  396;  Coburn  v.  Ellen  wood,  4  N.  H. 

Meacham  v.  Meacham  (Tenn.,  Ib92).  99;  Corbett   v.   Norcross,   35  id.  99; 

19  S.  W.  Rep.  757;  Bruce  v.  Osgood,  Springfield  v.  Miller,  12  Mass.  415. 
113  Ind.  360;  Brown   v.  Wheeler,  17        4Tiedeman  on  Eq.,  §  296;  Collar 

Conn.   345;   Bompart  v.  Roderman,  v.    Collar,  83   Mich.  507;  49   N.  W. 

24  Mo.  385;  Shepard  v.  Rinks,  78  III.  Rep.  507;  In  re  Groome,  94  Cal.  69; 

188;  Compton  v.  Mathews,  3  La.  128;  29  Pac.  Rep.  487;  Wolford  v.  Farn- 


400 


STATUTE    OF    FRAUDS. 


[§  204. 


but  implied,  resulting  and  constructive  trusts  are  excepted 
either  expressly  or  by  implication,1  and  may  be  proved  by 
parol.  It  is  never  necessary  that  the  express  trust  should  be  cre- 
ated in  writing,  for,  as  the  writing  is  only  required  for  proof,  it 
may  operate  as  an  admission  of  the  existence  of  the  trust.2 
The  evidence  must  be  clear,3  for  if  the  language  of  the  writing 
is  uncertain,  vague  or  fragmentary,  parol  evidence  will  not  be 
received  to  supply  the  omissions.4  Personal  or  business  cor- 
respondence, indorsements  and  admissions  by  parties  in  plead- 
ings have  been  held  sufficient  as  written  proof  of  an  express 
trust.5  Trusts  in  personal  property  are  not  within  the  statute 
of  frauds  and  may  be  proven  by  parol  evidence  without  the 
introduction  of  any  memorandum  or  other  writing  whatever.6 


ham,  44  Minn.  159;  Bragg  v.  Paulk, 
42  Me.  rM;  Hall  v.  Young,  37  N.  H. 
134;  Daily  v.  Kinsler,  31  Neb.  340; 
Pinney  v.  Fellows,  15  Vt.  525;  Pat- 
ton  v.  Beecher,  62  Ala.  579;  Spies  v. 
Price,  91  Aia.  166;  Watson  v.  Pinck- 
ney,  18  N.  Y.  S.  790;  Faxon  v. 
Folvey,  110  Muss.  392;  Packard  v. 
Putnam,  57  N.  H.  43;  Gibson  v. 
Foote,  40  Miss.  788 ;  Wadd  v.  Hazle- 
ton,  137  N.  Y.  213;  Tollarson  v. 
Blackstock,  11  S.  Rep.  2S4  (Ala., 
1892):  Renz  v.  Stoll,  94  Mich.  377; 
Hamilton  v.  Buchanan  (N.  C,  1893), 
17  S.  E.  Rep.  159;  Kinsey  v.  Bennett 
(S.  C,  1893),  15  id.  965. 

1  Holland  v.  Farthing  (Tex.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  67;  Franceston  v. 
Deering.  41  N.  H.  443;  Gee  v.  Gee,  32 
Miss.  190;  Merchon  v.  Duer,  40  N.  J. 
Eq.  333;  Brown  v.  Case,  23  S.  C. 
251;  Burdette  v.  May,  100  Mo.  13; 
Seiler  v.  Mohn,  37  W.  Va.  507;  Rice 
v.  Pt-nnypacker,  5  Del.  Ch.  33; 
Heneke  v.  Floring,  114  111.  554; 
Price  v.  Kane,  112  Mo.  412;  Larmon 
v.  Knight,  140  111.  232;  29  N.  E. 
Rep.  1116;  Hudson  v.  Wight,  17 
R.  I.  519;  Curd  v.  Williams  (Ky., 
1892),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  634;  Sasser  v. 
Sasser,  73  Ga.  275.  For  further  cita- 
tions see  Tiedeman  on  Real  Prop., 
§507. 


2McClellan  v.  McClellan,  65  Me 
500;  Trapnall  v.  Brown,  19  Ark.  48 
Moran  v.  Hayes,  1  Johns.  Ch.  339 
Phipard  v.  Phipard,  55  Hun,  433 
Orleans  v.  Chatham,  2  Pick.  29 
Guion  v.  Williams,  7  N.  Y.  S.  786 
Cornelius  v.  Smith,  55  Mo.  528;  Pin- 
ney v.  Fellows,  15  Vt.  525. 

3  Rogers  v.  Rogers,  87  Mo.  257; 
Hoover  v.  Hoover,  129  Pa.  St.  201; 
19  Atl.  Rep.  851. 

4  Parkhurst  v.  Van  Cortlandt,  1 
Johns.  Ch.  273;  Chad  wick  v.  Per- 
kins, 3  Me.  399;  Russell  v.  Switzer, 
63  Ga.  711;  Abell  v.  Radcliffe,  13 
Johns.  297;  Chase  v.  Stockett  (Md., 
1890),  19  Atl.  Rep.  761. 

*McCandless  v.  Warner,  26  W.  Va. 
754;  Fisher  v.  Fields,  10  Johns.  495; 
Barron  v.  Barron,  24  Vt.  375;  Hell- 
man  v.  Mc Williams,  70  Cal.  449; 
Moore  v.  Pickett,  62  111.  138;  Bates 
v.  Hurd,  65  Me.  180;  Johnson  v. 
Delaney,  35  Tex.  42;  Loring  v, 
Palmer,  118  U.  S.  321 ;  Macy  v.  Will- 
iams, 55  Hun,  489;  Weaver  v.  Emi- 
grant, etc.  Co.,  17  Abb.  N.  C.  82.  See 
Tiedeman  on  Real  Property,  §'§  506, 
507,  where  the  subject  is  treated  in 
full. 

6  Conn.  River  Bank  v.  Albee,  64 
Vt.  571;  Chace  v.  Chace,  130  Mass. 
128;  Maffitt's  Adm'r  v.   Reynd,  69 


§  265.]  STATUTE    OF    FRAUDS.  401 

§  265.  Surrender  or  assignment  of  leases.  It  is  also 
generally  provided  by  the  statute  of  frauds  that  no  leases  or 
other  interests  in  lands  of  any  sort,  save  in  copyhold  lands} 
can  be  assigned,  granted  or  surrendered  except  in  writing 
signed  by  the  party.1  The  effect  of  the  statute  is  to  abrogate 
the  cominon-law  rule  that  leases  for  life  or  years  could  be 
surrendered  by  parol,  and  such  surrender  or  the  assignment 
of  such  interests  must  now  be  evidenced  in  writing  under  the 
statute.2  The  common  law,  prior  to  the  statute,  proceeding 
upon  the  principle  that  estates  in  incorporeal  hereditaments, 
as  easements  and  estates  less  than  freehold,  depended  for 
their  validity  upon  a  written  grant  and  not  upon  feoffment 
and  livery  of  seizin,  recognized  the  rule  that  such  interests 
might  be  surrendered  by  the  destruction  of  the  deed  or  other 
writing  by  which  they  were  created.  The  assimilation  under 
the  statute  of  the  proof  which  is  required  to  evidence  incor- 
poreal and  corporeal  interests  should  not,  however,  be  con- 
strued to  render  the  cancellation  of  a  deed  conveying  a  cor- 
poreal estate  equivalent  to  a  surrender  of  the  same.  The 
deed,  properly  recorded,  is  but  evidence  of  a  transfer  of  title, 
and  a  conveyance  under  seal  of  a  similar  character  is  required 
under  the  statute  to  evidence  the  retransfer  or  surrender  of 
the  vested  interest.3  But  the  redelivery  to  the  grantor  of 
an  unrecorded  deed  by  which  no  title  has  passed  might,  under 
certain  peculiar  and  very  exceptional  circumstances,  operate 
as  a  reconveyance,  working  an  estoppel  on  the  grantee,  when 
the  interests  of  third  persons  had  become  vested  in  the  land.4 

Pa.  St.  380 ;  Gadsden  v.  Whaley,  14    Miller,    25   Pa.    St.    481 ;    Breher   v. 
S.  C.  210;  Roch  v.  George's  Adm'r    Reese,  17  111.  App.  545. 


<Ky„  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1039 
Davis  v.  Coburn,  128  Mass.  377 
Eaton   v.    Cook,    25   N.    J.    Eq.    55 


2  McClelland  v.  Rush,  11  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  R.  188;  Nally  v.  Reading,  107 
Mo.  150;  17  S.  W.  Rep.  978;  State  v. 
Silvey  v.  Hodgdon,  52  Cal.  363;  Ray  Ervien  (N.  J.,  1888),  12  Atl.  Rep.  136. 
v.  Simmons,  11  R.  I.  266;  Hawkins        3§  262. 

v.  Gardiner,  2  Sm.  &  Gif.  441;   Hon        41  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  265,  citing 
v.  Hon,  70  Ind.  135.  Farrar  v.  Farrar,  4  N.  H.  191 ;  Com. 

1  Chicago  Attachment  Co.  v.  Davis  v.  Dudley,  10  Mass.  403;  Hobbrook 
(111.,  1892),  28  N.  E.  Rep.  859.  If  a  v.  Turrell,  9  Pick.  105  Upon  the 
lease  is  under  seal  the  surrender  question  of  the  necessity  for  the  use 
must  also  be  under  seal.  Jackson  v.  of  a  sealed  instrument  to  pass  a 
Gardner,    8  Johns.  404;   Kiester  v.     freehold,    see    Tiedeman     on    Real 

Property,  §  783. 
26 


402  8TATDTE    OF    FRAUDS.  [§§  2G6,  2G7. 

§  2GG.  Contracts  required  to  be  in  writing. —  The  statute 
of  frauds  also  requires  that  every  contract  by  an  executor  or 
administrator  to  answer  out  of  his  own  estate,  all  promises  to 
answer  for  the  debt,  default  or  miscarriage  of  another  person, 
agreements  in  consideration  of  marriage,  contracts  not  to  be 
performed  within  a  year,  and  contracts  for  the  sale  of  goods 
not  exceeding  in  value  the  sum  of  £10  or  $50,  must  be  evi- 
denced by  a  writing  signed  by  the  party  to  be  charged  or  his 
agent.1  In  the  case  of  a  sale  of  goods  a  writing  is  not  required 
where  the  buyer  has  received  part  of  the  goods  or  has  paid 
earnest-money.2 

§  2G7.  Articles  of  partnership. —  It  is  not  necessary  that 
a  contract  of  partnership  or  an  assignment  of  a  share  therein 
should  be  evidenced  in  writing.3  If  the  existence  of  the  part- 
nership is  not  to  commence  within  one  year,4  or  if  its  dura- 
tion is  to  be  more  than  one  year,5  the  transaction  must  be  in 
writing  under  the  statute.  But  a  part  performance  of  an  oral 
contract  of  partnership  is  sufficient  to  take  it  out  of  the  stat- 
ute.6 A  partnership  formed  to  carry  on  the  business  of  buy- 
ing and  selling  land  need  not,  according  to  the  current  of  the 
decided  cases,  be  proved  by  a  writing,7  though  it  seems  that 
where  the  partners  contribute  as  their  shares  of  the  partner- 
ship fund  lands  held  by  them  individually,  or  as  tenants  in 
common,  a  writing  is  necessary  as  evidence  of  what  amounts 
to  a  conveyance  of  lands.8 

Where  real  estate  is  purchased  and  used  for  partnership 
purposes,  being  paid  for  with  the  money  of  the  firm,  it  becomes 
partnership  property.  Such  a  transaction  need  not  be  evi- 
denced by  a  writing  signed  by  all  the  partners,  for  if  the  con- 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  267.  Snyder  v.  Wolford,  38   Minn.    175 

2  2  Kent's  Com.  493-495;  1  Greenl.  Pennypacker  v.  Leary,  65  Iowa,  220 

on  Er.,  §267.  Knott  v.  Knott,  6  Oreg.  142:  Bun 

»Buckner  v.   Ries,  34  N.  Y.  344;  nell  v.  Taintor,  4  Conn.  568;  Hunter 

Jack  v.  Clemens,  41  Iowa,  95 ;  Jordan  v.  Whitehead,   42  Mo.   524;  Carr 

v.    Miller,   75  Va.    442;   Buffum   v.  Gravitt,  54  Mich.  540.    Contra,  Gantt 

Buflum,  49  Me.  108.  v.  Gantt,  6  La.  Ann.  667;  Smith  v. 

*  Williams  v.  Jones,  5  B.  &  C.  108.  Burcham,  3  Sumn.  (U.  S.)  435. 

5  Morris  v.  Peckham,  51  Conn.  128.        ^Larkins  v.  Rhodes,  5  Port.  (Ala.) 

6  Yates  v.  Fraser,  6  111.  App.  229;  195;  Clancy  v.  Cranie,  2  Dev.  Eq. 
Huntley  v.  Huntley,  114  U.  S.  394.  (N.  C.)  363. 

7  Holmes  v.  McCray,  51  Ind.  358 ; 


§  268.]  STATCTE    OF    FRAUDS.  403 

tract  was  signed  by  and   the  title  taken  in  the  name  of  one, 
he  will  be  regarded  as  a  trustee  for  his  associates.1 

§  2(>8.  Form  and  character  of  the  writing. —  No  particu- 
lar form  is  required  for  any  writing  evidencing  a  contract 
necessary  under  the  statute,  and  several  incomplete  or  frag- 
mentary documents  may  be  sufficient  if  on  being  construed 
together  the  existence  of  the  contract  can  be  ascertained  with 
reasonable  certainty.  But  parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to 
supply  words  which  have  been  omitted,2  though  it  may  be  re- 
ceived to  show  that  a  consideration  passed  where  none  is  ex- 
pressed in  the  writing.3  The  statutory  requirement  is  that  the 
writing  should  be  signed,  not  by  both  the  parties, -but  "  by  the 
party  to  be  charged"  alone.  The  plaintiff  who  is  seeking  to 
enforce  his  right  need  not  therefore  have  signed  the  writing- 
which  he  seeks  to  use  as  evidence.  The  position  of  the  signa- 
ture is  immaterial.  The  printed  name  of  the  vendor  in  a  bill 
will  suffice  if  the  name  of  the  vendee  and  the  items  are  in 
writing.4  Except  in  the  case  of  the  execution  of  a  conveyance 
of  land,  a  writing  signed  by  an  agent  or  attorney  will  not  be 
invalidated  because  his  authority  was  created  by  parol.  So  an 
agent  ma)7  be  verbally  authorized  to  enter  into  a  written  con- 
tract for  the  sale  of  land  belonging  to  his  principal.5  But  an 
authority  to  execute  a  deed  or  instrument  under  seal  must  have 
been  created  by  a  deed,  and  no  writing  not  under  seal  will  be 
received  as  evidence  of  the  existence  of  such  an  authority.6 
An  auctioneer  immediately  after  the  descent  of  the  hammer 

i  Bryant  v.  Hunter,  6  Bush  (Ky.),  22  Kent's  Com.  511 ;  1  Greenl.  on 

75;   Hogle   v.    Lowe,    12   Nev.    286;  Ev.,  §  268. 

Rank  v.  Grote,  50  N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  3  Packard  v.  Richardson,  17  Mass. 

L75;  Dewey  v.   Dewey,  35  Vt.  555;  122;  Drake  v.  Seaman,  97  N.  Y.  230. 

Martin    v.     Morris,     62    Wis.    418;  Cf.  Hayes  v.  Jackson,  37  Cent.  L.  J. 

Brooke  v.  Washington,  8  Gratt.  (Va.)  298. 

248;  Cilley  v.   Huse,  40  N.  H.  358;  4 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  268. 

Campbell  v.  Campbell,  30  N.  J.  Eq.  5  Dickerman  v.   Aston,    21   Minn. 

415;  Tillinghast  v.  Champlin,  4  R.  I.  538;  Warrall  v.  Munn,  5  N.  Y.  229; 

173;  Jones  v.   Smith,   31   S.  C.  527;  Moody  v.  Smith,  70  N.  Y.  598;  Riley 

Hardy  v.  Norfolk  Mfg.  Co.,80Va.  v.  Minor,  29   Mo.  439;  Wharter  v. 

404;  Kimberly  v.   Arms,   129  U.  S.  McMahan,    10    Paige  (N.    Y.),    386; 

512;  Paige-  v.   Paige,   71   Iowa,  318;  Rottman   v.    Wasson,    5   Kan.   552; 

Tenny   v.    Simpson,    37    Kan.    353;  Long  v.  Hartwell,  34  N.  J.  L.  116. 

Divine  v.  Mitchum,  4  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  6  Wheeler   v.    Nevins,   34   Me.  54; 

488.  Preston  v.  Hall,  23  Gratt.  (Va.)  600; 


4(H  STATUTE    OF   FRAUDS.  [§  209. 

begins  to  act  as  agent  for  the  buyer,  and  "his  signature  or 
memorandum  in  any  transaction,  whether  concerning  real  or 
personal  property,  will  bind  both  parties  as  a  note  in  writing 
under  the  statute.1 

§269.  Wills  required  to  be  evidenced  in  writing.— By 
the  fifth  section  of  the  statute  of  frauds  it  was  prescribed  that 
all  devises  of  lands  or  tenements  must  be  in  writing,  signed 
by  the  person  devising  or  by  some  one  in  his  presence  and  by 
his  express  direction,  and  they  should  be  attested  and  sub- 
scribed in  his  presence  by  three  or  four  witnesses.  Before 
the  Yictorian  statute  of  wills,2  testaments  disposing  of  per- 
sonal property  only  were  valid  if  they  had  been  reduced  to 
writing  before  the  death  of  the  testator,  though  never  signed 
or  seen  by  him  and  without  any  authentication  or  attestation. 
This  statute,  which  placed  wills  of  personalty  and  devises 
upon  the  same  footing  so  far  as  their  ceremonial  execution  is 
concerned,3  has  been  followed  by  similar  enactments  in  almost 
every  state  of  the  American  Union.4  A  will  disposing  of  real 
or  personal  property  must  therefore,  except  in  those  excep- 
tional cases  where  nuncupative  wills  are  permitted,  be  in  writ- 
ins:  signed  or  subscribed  bv  the  testator  in  the  presence  of  two 
witnesses  at  least,  who  must  then  usually  sign  as  witnesses  in 
the  presence  of  the  testator,  and  frequently  they  are  required 
to  sign  in  the  presence  of  each  other.  The  courts  in  constru- 
ing these  statutes  regulating  the  execution  of  wills,  which 

Wells  v.  Evans,  20  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  14  Ga.  173;  Jones  v.  Marks,  47  Cal. 

251;    Damon    v.    Granby,    2    Pick.  242. 

(Llass.)  345;  Harshaw  v.  McKesson,  !  Smith  v.  Arnold,  5  Mason  (U.  S.), 

65   N.  C.  688;  Adams   v.  Power,  52  414;  Morton  v.  Dean,  13  Met.  (Mass.) 

Miss.  828;  Desp.  Line  v.  Bellamy  M.  388;    White   v.   Crew,    16   Ga.    416; 

Co.,.  12  N.  H.  205;  Rhode   v.   Lou-  White    v.    Watkins,    23    Mo.    423; 

thain,  8  Blackf.  (Ind.)413;  Smith  v.  Walker   v.  Herring,  21   Gratt.  (Va.) 

Perry,  29  N.  J.  L.  74;  Rowe  v.  Ware,  678;  Cleaves  v.  Foss,  4  Greenl.  (Me.) 

30  Ga.  278;  Scheutze  v.  Baily,  40  Mo.  1 ;  Linn,  Boyd,  etc.  Co.  v.  Terrill,  13 

69;  Gordon   v.  Buckley,  14  S.  &  R.  Bush  (Ky.),  463;  Anderson  v.  Check, 

(Pa.)  331;  Cain   v.  Heard,- 1   Coldw.  1  Bailey  Eq.  (S.  C.)  118;  Harvey  v. 

(Tenn.)  163.     But  a  deed  executed  Stevens,  43  Vt.  653. 

by  an  agent  without  authority  under  2  1  Vic,  ch.  26. 

seal,  though  invalid  as  a  legal  con-  3  See  Tiedeman  on  Wills,  §  46  et 

veyance,  may  be  used  as  evidence  of  seq.,  where  the  subject  is  fully  dis- 

an  equitable  title.     Watson  v.  Sher-  cussed. 

man,  84   111.  263;  Ingram  v.  Little,  4Stimson,  Am.  St.  Law,  §  2640. 


§  2G9.]  STATUTE    OF    FRAUDS.  405 

differ  somewhat  in  minor  details  in  the  several  states,  have 
usually  been  satisfied  with  a  substantial  compliance  with  their 
provisions.1  Any  act  of  the  testator  by  which  a  sign  or  mark 
is  made  upon  the  paper  by  him  or  for  him  at  his  request  evinc- 
ing his  intention  that  the  instrument  shall  take  effect  as  his 
will  is  enough.2 

The  statutory  provisions  differ  as  to  the  position  of  the 
signature.  The  statute  of  frauds  and  the  American  statutes 
which  arc  remodeled  on  it  are  satisfied  with  a  signature  in 
any  part  of  the  will,  while  other  statutes  require  a  signing  or 
subscription  at  the  foot  or  end  of  the  will.  If  it  is  required 
that  the  will  should  be  subscribed  at  the  end,  a  siomino;  which 
precedes  any  dispositive  part  of  the  will  is  not  a  valid  sub- 
scription. But  a  substantial  compliance  with  the  statute  is 
all  that  is  required;3  and  the  fact  that  the  subscription  is  near, 
or  in  or  under  the  attestation  clause  is  not  material.4 

The  witnesses  are  usually  required  to  subscribe  the  will  in  the 
presence  of  the  testator.  As  to  what  shall  constitute  this  pres- 
ence the  cases  are  not  altogether  harmonious.  The  mere  bodily 
presence  of  the  testator  is  not  enough.  He  must  be  conscious  of 
what  is  going  on  about  him  or  the  attestation  will  be  invalid.5 
Yery  many  of  the  cases  sustain  the  very  liberal  statutory  con- 
struction that  the  signing  is  in  the  presence  of  the  testator, 
whether  performed  in  the  room  where  he  is  or  not,  if  he  can 
see  the  act  of  signing  if  he  wished  to  do  so.G  But  other  au- 
thorities hold  that  where  the  attestation  takes  place  in  another 
room,  in  order  to  make  it  a  signing  in  the  testator's  presence 

iln  re  Phelps,  98  N.  Y.  267;  Mc-  baerts,  10  Pa.   Co.   Ct.  R.  10;  In   re 

Donough  v.  Loughlin,  20  Barb.  238;  Dayger,  47  Hun,  127. 

In  re  Guilfoyle,  96  Cal.  598;  Mont-  ^Hallowell  v.  Hallowell,   88  Ind. 

goinery  v.  Perkins,  2  Met.  (Ky.)  418.  251 ;   Younger   v.    Duffie,   94  N.   Y. 

-'Baily    v.    Baily,    35    Ala.     6S7;  535. 

Sprague  v.  Luther,  8  R.  I.  252 ;  In  re  5  Right  v.  Price,  Doug.  241 ;  Gra- 

Guilfoyle,  96  Cal.   398;  In  re  Shot-  ham  v.  Graham,  10  Ired.  219. 

well.  11   Pa.   Co.   Ct.   R.  444;  In  re  6  Green  v.  Green  (111.,  1893),  33  N. 

Knox,  131   Pa.  St.  220;  Jenkyns  v.  E.   Rep.   941;    Snider   v.   Burke,   84 

Gaisford,  32  L.  J.  Prob.  122;  Tiede-  Ala.    53;    Pawtucket    v.   Ballou,   15 

man  on  Wills,  §§  47,  48,  49.  R.   I.   58;  Gallegher  v.  Killcerry,  29 

3  In  re  Yoorhis,   125  N.  Y.    765;  111.  App.  415;  Moore  v.  Spier,  80  Ala. 

Sticker  v.  Groves,  5  Whart.  386;  In  130;  Turner  v.  Cook,  36  Ind.  129;  In 

re  Conway,  58  Hun,  16;  In  re  Lam-  re   Downie,   42  Wis.    66;    Aiken  v. 

Weekerly,  19  Mich.  482. 


406  STATUTE    OF   FBAUDS.  [§  270. 

it  is  necessary  to  show  that  he  actually  did  see  the  witnesses 
in  the  act  of  subscribing  their  names.1  In  many  of  the  states 
by  statute,  and  in  some  others  as  the  result  of  judicial  legis- 
lation, it  is  now  required  that  the  testator  should  publish  his 
will  in  the  presence  of  the  witnesses.  This  he  may  do  in  ex- 
press terms  by  informing  the  witnesses  that  the  paper  the}'' 
are  attesting  is  his  will  or  by  any  signs  or  actions  by  which 
the  knowledge  of  that  fact  is  conveyed  to  them.2 

§  270.  Agreements  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds 
which  must  be  evidenced  by  writings. —  By  various  modern 
statutes  certain  transactions  not  originally  included  within 
the  statute  of  frauds  are  now  required  to  be  evidenced  in 
writing.  Thus,  in  New  York,  payment  of  money  by  execu- 
tors, administrators  or  testamentary  trustees  is  required  to  be 
shown  by  a  written  receipt.3  So,  too,  it  is  usually  provided 
that  a  new  promise,  in  order  to  be  sufficient  to  take  a  debt 
out  of  the  statute  of  limitation,  must  be  in  writing,4  and  the 
same  rule  is  applicable  to  the  acceptance  of  a  bill  of  exchange.5 
A  contract  to  make  a  will  must,  in  Massachusetts,  be  in  writ- 
ing,6 as  well  as  agreements  to  arbitrate,7  if  the  arbitration  is 
sought  to  be  enforced  in  a  court  of  record.  Notices  in  legal 
proceedings  are  often  required  to  be  in  writing,  as  in  the  case 
of  statutory  notice  to  quit.8 

So,  too,  b}r  various  federal  statutes  assignments  of  land 
warrants,  wages  due  for  naval  service,  of  contracts  with  In- 
dians, of  patents  and  of  copjTights  are  required  to  be  shown 
by  writing  signed  by  the  parties  thereto.  Written  evidence 
is  sometimes  required  of  a  contract  af  apprenticeship,9  and  of 
the  adoption  of  a  child.10 

1  Mandeville  v.  Parker,  31  N.  J.  N.  Y.  L.  1873,  p.  1243,  ch.  830.  The 
Eq.  242;    Hill  v.  Barge,  12  Ala.  687.     text  enumerates   in  part  only  the 

2  Tiedeman  on  Wills,  §  52.  transaction    which    should  be    evi- 

3  N.  Y.  Code  C.  P.  2734,  2750.  denced  by  a  writing.  In  University 
*  Mass.    Pub.    St.    1116,    ch.    197,     Law  School  Helps  No.  8,  a  leaflet  of 

§§  15,  16;  Code  C.  P.  395.  s'x  pages  prepared  by  Mr.  Austin 

s  1  N.  Y.  R.  S.  768,  §§  6,  8.  Abbott    of    New  York    city,    from 

6  Mass.  Pub.  St.  Sup.  746.  which  these  instances  are  condensed, 

7  Horton  v.  Wilcle,  8  Gray,  425.  will  be  found  a  full  and  concise 
8 1  N.  Y.  R.  S.  745,  §§  4,  11.  enumeration  of  the  principal  trans- 
9  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  827,  ch.  149,  §  5;  actions  which  under  the  statute  of 

2  N.  Y.  R.  S.  154.  frauds   and   other  statutes   may  or 

10  Mass.  Pub.  Stat.  824,  ch.  148,  §  2;    must  be  evidenced  in  writing. 


CHAPTER  XXI. 


ATTENDANCE  OF  WITNESSES. 


283.  Continuance     in      criminal 

trials. 

284.  Non-attendance  of  witness  — 

When  a  contempt. 

285.  Privilege  of  witnesses  from 

service  of  civil  process. 

286.  Privilege  of  witnesses  from 

civil  arrest. 

287.  Duration    of    the    privilege 

from  arrest. 

288.  Attendance  of  witnesses  in 

custody. 

289.  Attendance  of  witnesses  be- 

fore legislative  bodies. 


§  275.     The  attendance  of  witnesses 
at  private  arbitrations. 

276.  The  subpoena — Fees  of  wit- 

nesses. 

277.  Fees  in  criminal  cases. 

278.  Subpoena  duces  tecum. 

279.  Time  and  mode  of  serving 

the  subpoena. 

280.  Recognizance  to  secure  pres- 

ence of  a  witness. 

281.  Obstructing    attendance    of 

witnesses. 
281a.  Changing  venue  for  conven- 
ience of  witnesses. 

282.  Failure  of  witnesses  to  at- 

tend— Continuance,  when 
granted. 

§  275.  The  attendance  of  witnesses  at  private  arbitra- 
tions.—  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  state  that  private  individuals 
have  no  power  to  compel  the  attendance  of  witnesses  except 
in  the  course  of  a  judicial  or  legislative  investigation.  So 
private  arbitrators  cannot,  in  the  absence  of  statutory  author- 
ization to  that  effect,  procure  the  compulsory  attendance  of 
witnesses  or  the  production  of  documentary  evidence.1  But 
when  a  statutory  power  is  conferred  on  the  arbitrators,  the 
arbitration  becomes  a  public  and  g^as£- judicial  proceeding. 
The  arbitrator  may  then  commit  disobedient  witnesses  for 
contempt,  and  the  witnesses,  on  the  other  hand,  are  privileged 
from  civil  arrest  while  in  attendance  at  the  arbitration,2  or 
while  going  to  or  returning  from  it. 

§  276.  The  subpoena  —  Fees  of  witness. —  The  power  of 
the  court  to  hear  and  determine  controversies  confers  by  im- 
plication at  common  law  the  further  power  to  require  the  pro- 


*Tobey  v.  Bristol,    3  Story,  800; 
Webb  v.  Taylor,  1  D.  &  L.  676. 
2  Clark  v.  Grant,  2  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 


257 ;  Sanford  v.  Chase,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y. 
381 ;  People  v.  Judge,  41  Mich.  726. 


408  ATTENDANCE    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  276. 

duction  of  evidence  for  or  against  the  controverted  facts.1 
The  judicial  power  to  summon  witnesses  is  commonly  ex- 
ercised by  the  employment  of  a  subpoena,  which  may  be  de- 
fined as  "a  judicial  writ,  directed  to  the  witness,  commanding 
him  to  appear  at  the  court  to  testify  what  he  knows  in  the 
cause  therein  described,  pending  in  such  court,  under  a  certain 
penalty  mentioned  in  the  writ."2 

In  England,  and  in  most  of  the  states  of  the  Union,  it  is  re- 
quired by  statute  that  the  witness  shall  be  tendered,  when  he  is 
served  with  the  subpoena,  certain  fees  to  cover  his  expenses  in- 
curred in  going  to  and  from  the  place  of  trial  and  while  remain- 
ing there.  In  xAmerica  these  fees  are  usually  fixed  by  statute,' 
while  in  England  the  witness  is  allowed  his  living  and  travel- 
ing expenses,  according  to  what  may  be  his  social  position.4 
The  mileage  which  is  allowed  the  witness  is  limited  to  his  ex- 
penses incurred  while  traveling  within  the  boundaries  of  the 
jurisdiction  where  he  testifies,  since  the  process  of  the  court 
does  not  run  beyond  its  jurisdictional  limits,  and  his  deposition 
would  suffice  in  such  a  case.5  A  witness  whose  expenses  are 
not  paid  or  tendered  need  not  testify  though  he  has  obeyed  the 
subpoena,6  except  where  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  his  right 
thereto  is  waived  b}r  a  compliance  with  the  summons  or  the 
subpoena  ticket.7  Either  party  to  the  suit  who  appears  and 
testifies  solely  in  his  own  behalf  as  a  witness  is  not  entitled 

!The  attendance  of  a  witness  be-  Gunnison  v.  Gunnison,  41  N.  II.  121 ; 

fore  a  commissioner  who  has  been  Fish  v.    Farwell,  33   111.  App.    240: 

appointed  to  take  his  deposition  by  a  Melvin  v.  Whiting,  13  Pick.  190.     In 

court  which  has  received  letters  rog-  the  federal  courts,  if  the  distance 

atory  from  a  court  in  a  sister  state  traveled   is  not  wholly  within   the 

may  be  secured  by  a  subpoena  or  by  district,  mileage  will  only  be  allowed 

an  order  in  the  nature  of  a  subpoena,  for  one  hundred   miles  and  return. 

State  v-.  Bourne,  21  Oreg.  218.     See  The    Progress,   48    Fed.    Rep.    239; 

post,  §  289.  Buffalo  Ins.  Co.  v.  Steamship  Co.,  29 

2 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  309.  Fed.  Rep.  237. 

3  In  re  Cor  win,  6  Abb.  N.  C.  437;  ^Atwood  v.  Scott,  99  Mass.  177; 

State  v.   Ramsay  (Mont.,   1892),   28  Mattocks  v.  Wheaton,   10  Vt.   493; 

Pac.  Rep.   258.  Newton  v.  Harland,  9  Dowl.  16. 

*2  Phil.  Ev.,  pp.  375,  376;  2  Tidd,  7  But  ordinarily  a  witness  does  not 

p.  806;  3  Bl.  Com.  369.  lose  his  fees  by  not  insisting  on  pre- 

5  Crawford  v.  Abraham,   2  Oreg.  payment.    Young  v.  Merchants' Ins. 

163;   Kingfreed  v.    Pullen,    54  Me.  Co.,  29  Fed.  Rep.  273. 
398;  Stern  v.  Herren,  101  N.  C.  516; 


176.] 


ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES. 


40i> 


to  recover  his  fees  or  mileage  as  such,1  or  to  have  them  taxed 
as  costs,  though  the  rule  is  otherwise  if  he  is  summoned  to 
testify  in  behalf  of  his  opponent,2  and  he  need  not  testify  until 
he  is  paid.3 

Under  peculiar  circumstances  a  witness  may  be  entitled  to 
fees  for  his  attendance  in  two  or  more  simultaneous  cases,  as 
where  he  is  summoned  for  the  plaintiffs  in  different  suits  aris- 
ing out  of  one  subject-matter.4  The  fees  and  mileage  of  wit- 
nesses are  taxable  as  costs  where  they  attend  and  testifv, 
though  they  were  not  summoned;5  or  where  they  are  summoned 
in  good  faith  and  actually  appear,  though  they  may  not  be 
called  upon  to  testify.6  The  expense  incurred  by  the  witness 
in  procuring  a  survey  of  the  land  which  was  the  subject-mat- 
ter of  his  evidence  cannot  be  taxed  as  costs;7  nor  is  an  attor- 
ney who  testifies  solely  to  free  himself  from  an  imputation  of 
misfeasance  entitled  to  witness  fees.8 


1  Grinnell  v.  Dennison,  12  Wis.  402 ; 
Beal  v.  Stevens,  72  Cal.  451 ;  Stratton 
v.  Upton,  36  N.  H.  581 ;  Hale  v.  Mer- 
rill, 27  Vt.  738;  Grub  v.  Simpson,  6 
Heisk.  (Tenn.)  92 ;  Nichols  v.  Bruns- 
wick, 3  Cliff.  (U.  S.  C.  C.)  88;  Del- 
comyn  v.  Chamberlain,  48  How.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)  409. 

2  Goodwin  v.  Smith,  67  Ind.  101; 
Young  v.  English,  7  Beav.  10;  Har- 
vey v.  Tebntt,  1  J.  &  W.  197;  Penny 
v.  Brink,  75  N.  C.  68;  Bonner  v. 
People,  40  111.  App.  628 ;  Leeds  v. 
Amherst,  14  Sim.  357.  Of.  The  Prog- 
ress, 48  Fed.  Rep.  239. 

3  It  has  been  held  that  the  statu- 
tory fees  for  each  day's  attendance 
should  be  paid  or  tendered  on  the 
day  preceding,  and  the  failure  of  a 
party  to  do  so  will  justify  the  wit- 
ness in  returning  at  once  to  his  home. 
Bliss  v.  Brainard,  42  N.  H.  255. 

4 Young  v.  Insurance  Co.,  29  Fed. 
Rep.  273;  Vernon,  etc.  Co.  v.  John- 
son, 108  Ind.  128;  Archer  v.  Insur- 
ance Co.,  31  Fed.  Rep.  660;  The 
Vernon,  36  Fed.  Rep.  113. 

5Christensen    v.    Union,    32    Pac. 


Rep.  1018  (Wash.,  1893);  Cahn  v. 
Monroe,  29  Fed.  Rep.  675;  The  Sy- 
racuse, 36  Fed.  Rep.  830.  Contra, 
Stern  v.  Herren,  101  N.  C.  516. 

6  Fish  v.  Farwell,  33111.  App.  242; 
Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Trapp  (Ind.,  1892), 
30  N.  E.  Rep.  812;  Baumbach  v. 
Gessler,  82  Wis.  231 ;  Chandler  v.  Beal, 
137  Ind.  596;  Young  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  29  Fed.  Rep.  273;  Pugh  v.  Good 
(Oreg.,  1890),  23  Pac.  Rep.  827.  But 
where  thirty-two  witnesses  were 
summoned  to  impeach  plaintiff's 
character  the  fees  of  only  five  were 
allowed,  though  all  were  admitted 
to  have  been  called  in  good  faith. 
Kley  v.  Healey,  2  N.  Y.  S.  231. 

'  Tuck  v.  Olds,  29  Fed.  Rep.  883. 

spearsman  v.  Gold  (N.  J.,  1889), 
8  Atl.  Rep.  2S5.  It  is  provided  by 
the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United 
States,  section  850,  that  no  federal 
officer  or  clerk  shall  receive  more 
than  his  necessary  expenses  when  he 
is  attending  court  as  a  witness  for 
the  government.  Ex  parte  Burdell, 
32  Fed.  Rep.  681 ;  In  re  Waller,  49 
Fed.  Rep.  271.     In  calculating  mile- 


410  ATTENDANCE    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  277. 

§  277.  Fees  in  criminal  cases. —  The  prosecution  in  a 
criminal  proceeding  is  under  no  necessity  of  paying  its  wit- 
nesses their  expenses,  as  in  theory  it  is  conceived  to  be  the 
duty  of  every  citizen  to  assist  so  far  as  lies  in  his  power,  with- 
out compensation  or  reward,  in  the  punishment  of  wrong- 
doers. A  statute,  therefore,  which  provides  that  a  witness  is 
not  entitled  to  fees  in  criminal  cases  does  not  conflict  with  a 
constitutional  guaranty  that  no  man's  services  shall  be  de- 
manded without  just  compensation.1  If,  because  of  his  pov- 
erty, a  witness  who  is  summoned  in  a  criminal  trial  is  unable 
to  attend,  he  will  not,  it  seems,  be  in  contempt  of  court.2  The 
prisoner  on  trial  for  a  capital  crime  possessed,  at  common 
law,  no  right  to  compulsory  process  to  obtain  the  attendance 
of  his  witnesses,  while,  if  they  attended  voluntarily,  that  cruel 
system  of  jurisprudence  gave  the  judge  the  discretion  to  re- 
fuse to  permit  their  examination  because  they  had  not  been 
legally  summoned.3 

By  the  provisions  of  the  federal  constitution  and  the  con- 
stitutions of  the  several  states,  the  right  to  compulsory  pro- 
cess for  obtaining  the  attendance  of  witnesses  in  his  own 
behalf  is  secured  to  the  prisoner;4  and  it  is  often  provided  by 
statute  that  if  he  is  acquitted  his  witness  fees  shall  be  paid 
by  the  county.5  So,  too,  a  subpoena  is  not  always  essential; 
for  if  a  witness,  though  not  summoned,  is  in  court,  he  may  be 

age  the  distance  covered  is  measured  8Abb.  Crim.  Brief,  citing  United 

as  the  crow  flies  (Leigh  v.  Hind,  17  States  v.  Reid,  12  How.   (U.   S.)  361. 

E.   C.  L.  774),  though  sometimes  it  4  Homan  v.  State,  23  Texas,  212 ; 

may  be   measured  by  the  usually  Willard  v.  Superior  Court,  82  Cal. 

traveled  route.    Smith  v.  Ingraham,  456. 

7  Cow.  419.    "The  most  direct  route  5 State  v.    Massy,    104   N.  C.  877; 

of     travel"    between     two    places,  State  v.  Willis  (Iowa,  1889),  44  N.  W. 

within    the    meaning  of  a  statute  Rep.  699.  A  statute  which  prescribes 

giving  a  sheriff  mileage  for  carry-  that  a  criminal   trial  shall  not  be 

ing  prisoners  to  a  penitentiary,  is  the  postponed  when  either  party  thereto 

railroad,    although   it   is   sixty-four  consents  that  the  facts  contained  in 

miles  long   while    the    highway  is  an  affidavit  for  a  continuance  shall 

but  thirty-five.     Maynard  v.  Cedar  be  regarded  as  the  evidence  of  the 

County,  51  Iowa,  431.  absent  witness  is  unconstitutional, 

1  Daly  v.  Multnomah  Co.,  14  Oreg.  as  it  deprives  a  prisoner  of  his  con- 

20.     Cf.    Morin   v.    Multnomah    Co.  stitutional  right  to  compulsory  pro- 

(Oreg.,  1889),  22  Pac.  Rep.  490.  cess.     State  v.  Berkley,   92  Mo.  41. 

21  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §311;    United  This  constitutional  right,  however, 

States  v.  Durling,  4  Biss.  509.  is  not  absolute,  and  does  not  from 


§  278.]  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  411 

called  to  testify.1  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  an  attach- 
ment against  a  witness  will  not  be  granted  the  accused  in  the 
absence  of  a  showing  that  the  evidence  is  material,'-  and  that 
the  witness  has  been  summoned,  or  that  proper  efforts  have 
been  made  to  procure  his  attendance,  that  he  is  in  the  state, 
and  that  his  early  presence  can  be  secured.3  A  witness  who 
is  subpoenaed  and  who  testifies  in  behalf  of  a  person  accused 
of  a  felony  may  recover  for  his  services  in  an  action  of  as- 
sumpsit;* though  it  also  has  been  held  that  he  is  entitled  only 
to  the  amount  prescribed  by  statutory  enactment  as  witness 
fees,  even  if  the  party  had  promised  to  pay  more.5  If  a  wit- 
ness becomes  entitled  to  certain  statutory  fees  on  attending 
and  testifying,  his  right  thereto  is  a  vested  right  which  is  pro- 
tected by  constitutional  guaranties  and  which  cannot  be  de- 
stroyed or  impaired  by  any  subsequent  legislation." 

§  278.  Subpcena  duces  tecum. —  Where  the  production  of 
documentary  evidence  in  the  possession  of  the  witness  is  re- 
quired a  subpoena  duces  tecum-  is  employed,  commanding  him 
to  search  for  and  bring  to  court  certain  books  or  papers  which 
are  specifically  described,  together  with  all  documents  and 
writings  which  may  afford  evidence  in  the  cause.7  The  writ- 
necessity  include  witnesses  who  are  574.  Cf.  State  v.  McCarthy,  43  La. 
resident  out  of  the  state   (State  v.     Ann.  541. 

Pagels,  92  Mo.  300 ;  4  S.  W.  Rep.  931 ;  4  Bennett  v.  Kroth,  37  Kan.  235. 
State  v.  Hornsby,  8  Rob.  (La.)  554),  5  Walker  v.  Cook,  33  111.  App.  561. 
or  those  within  the  state  whose  In  this  connection  it  may  be  of 
deposition  can  easily  be  procured  if  service  to  define  the  word  "  wit- 
they  are  unable  to  attend  in  person,  ness."  The  term  is  a  general  one, 
Willard  v.  Superior  Court,  supra.  If  including  every  person  from  whose 
the  venue  is  changed  on  the  applica-  lips  testimony  is  received  or  ex- 
tion  of  the  state's  attorney,  the  court  tracted  to  be  used  in  a  judicial  or 
may  make  it  a  condition  that  the  quasi-judicial  proceeding.  An  "af- 
traveling  expenses  of  the  defend-  fiant  "  or  a  "  deponent"  is  always  a 
ant's  witnesses  who  are  too  poor  to  witness,  but  every  witness  is  of 
pay  their  own  expenses  shall  be  pro-  course  not  an  affiant  or  deponent, 
vided  for.  People  v.  Baker,  3  Abb.  Anderson's  Law  Dictionary,  citing 
Pr.  42;  3  Park.  dim.  Rep.  181.  Barker  v.  Coit,  1  Root,   225  (Conn.); 

1  Robinson  v.  Trull,  4  Cush.  249;    Bliss  v.  Shuman,  47  Me.  252. 

Rex  v.  Sadler,  4  C.  &  P.  218;  Black-  6  People  v.  Pyper  (Utah,   1889),  21 

burn  v.  Hargreave,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  259,  Pac.  Rep.  722. 

cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §311.  '  1  Greenl.  onEv.,  §309;  3  Bl.  Com. 

2  People  v.  Marseiler,  70  Cal.  9.  382. 

3  State  v.   Johnson,   41   La.    Ann. 


412  ATTENDANCE    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  278. 

ings  which  are  required  should  be  described  specifically  and 
with  certainty  according  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  so 
that  the  witness,  on  the  one  hand,  may  know  what  is  re- 
quired of  him,  and  the  court,  on  the  other,  may  ascertain  if 
the  subpoena  has  been  properly  obeyed.1  The  object  of  the 
writ  is  the  production  of  documentary  evidence  alone,  and  a 
piece  of  metal  or  other  article  cannot  be  brought  in  court  by 
a  subpoena  duces  tecum; 2  nor  can  the  writ  be  employed  for  the 
sole  purpose  of  discovering  a  secret  process  of  manufacturing 
a  patented  article,3  nor  to  compel  the  production  of  writings 
not  as  evidence  but  to  refresh  the  memory  of  a  witness.4  But 
disobedience  to  a  subpoena  duces  tecum,  by  a  postoffice  official 
is  not  excusable  because  the  rules  of  his  department  forbid 
the  disclosure  by  him  of  any  information  contained  in  its 
records.5 

As  the  power  to  issue  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  is  derived 
from  the  power  to  command  the  production  of  a  material 
witness  "  to  testify,"  the  omission  of  the  words  "  to  testify  " 
will  invalidate  the  subpoena  itself.6  A  witness  in  whose  pos- 
session are  papers  which  it  is  sought  to  produce  by  a  subpoena 
duces  tecum  is  not  excusable  for  refusing  or  neglecting  to 
brino-  them  into  court  because  thev  do  not  belong  to  him.7  If 
he  is  a  custodian  of  public  records,  he  may  be  excused  from 
doing  so  in  answer  to  a  subpoena  on  account  of  the  public  in- 

1  Mitchell  v.  Sheriff ,  7  Abb.  Pr.  96 ;  issue  of  a  subpoena  duces  tecum. 
United  States  v.  Babcock,  3  Dill.  While  a  subpoena  duces  tecum  is  un- 
(U.  S.)  568;  Elting  v.  United  States,  returned  or  unserved,  no  second  sub- 
27  Ct.  CI.  158.  poena   will   be    valid   for   the   same 

2  Re  Shepard,  18  Blatch.  266;  John-  purpose.  Elting  v.  United  States,  27 
son  v.  North  Branch  Co.,  48  Fed.  Ct.  CI.  158. 

Rep.  191.  7  The  mere  assertion  of  corporative 

3  Averell  v.   Barber,  63  Hun,  630.  officials  that  the  corporation's  books 

4  United  States  v.  Tilden,  10  Ben.  are  not  in  their  possession  is  not  suf- 
566,  570-581.  ficient  to  excuse  their  disobedience 

5  Rice  v.  Rice  (Ala.,  1893),  25  Atl.  of  an  order  of  court  for  the  produc- 
Rep.  21.  tion  of  the  books  where  it  appears 

6  Murray  v.  Elston,  23  N.  J.  Eq.  that  the  books  were  lately  in  their 
212.  In  Ex  parte  Moses,  53  Fed.  possession,  and  they  have  failed  to 
Rep.  316,  it  was  held  that  the  stat-  account  for  their  disappearance, 
utory  power  to  issue  a  subpoena  Fenlon  v.  Dempsey,  21  Abb.  N.  C. 
commanding  a  witness  "  to  appear  291. 

and  testify"  did  not  authorize  the 


§  270.]  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  413 

convenience  which  would  very  probably  ensue,  and  because 
the  writings  in  question  may  be  satisfactorily  proved  by  prop- 
erly authenticated  copies.1  In  any  case  the  sufficiency  of  the 
reason  for  not  producing  a  writing  in  obedience  to  a  subpoena 
duces  tecum  is  for  the  court.2 

§  279.  Time  and  mode  of  serving  the  subpoena. —  In  jus- 
tice to  the  witness  the  subpoena  should  be  seasonably  served. 
He  should  be  given  a  reasonable  opportunity  so  to  arrange 
his  business  that  it  will  not  suffer  greatly  by  his  absence.3  It 
is  now  generally  provided  by  statute  in  this  country  that  the 
wftness  shall  be  allowed  one  da}''s  time  for  every  twenty 
miles  he  is  compelled  to  travel  from  his  place  of  abode  to  the 
place  of  trial.  In  every  case,  however,  at  least  one  day's  no- 
tice is  necessary.4  The  subpoena  should  be  served  personalty, 
that  the  witness,  being  apprised  of  its  contents,  may  be  charge- 
able with  contempt  for  his  disobedience  to  it.  To  consti- 
tute personal  service  the  subpoena  should  be  shown  to  the 
witness,  and  a  copy  thereof  or  a  subpoena  ticket  containing  a 
concise  summary  of  its  contents,  with  an  oral  statement  of 
what  the  paper  is,  should  be  delivered  to  him  together  with 
his  statutory  fees.5 

Service  may  be  made  by  a  private  person  as  a  party6  or  by 
a  sheriff  or  other  official  acting  for  a  party  to  the  suit.  In 
the  former  case  proof  of  service  may  be  made  by  the  affidavit 
of  the  person  serving  the  writ;  in  the  latter  by  the  return  of 
the  officer.7  A  subpoena  is  only  valid  to  secure  the  attend- 
ance of  a  witness  in  the  particular  cause  in  which  it  has  been 
issued,  and  is  inoperative  to  secure  his  presence  at  a  subse- 
quent term  to  which  the  trial  has  been  subsequently  ad- 
journed.8 Sometimes  by  statute  a  penalty  is  imposed  upon  a 
witness  who  fails  or  refuses  to  obey  a  subpoena  which  has 
been  properly  served  on  him.  The  penalty  is  recovered  by 
a  civil  action   brought  against  the  witness  by  the  party  ag- 

1  See  ante,  %%  142c,  146-150.  means  personal    service   where    no 

2 1  Whart.  Ev.,  §  377.  other  mode  is  expressly  indicated. 

3  In  re  Hughbanks,  44  Kan.  105.  Rathburn  v.  Acker,  18  Barb.  375. 

4  Scammon  v.  Scammon,  33  N.  H.  6  Larimore  v.  Bobb  (Mo.,  1893),  21 
52 ;  Sims  v.  Kitchen,   5  Esp.  46 ;  1  S.  W.  Rep.  922. 

Greenl.  Ev.,  §  310.  7  McLane  v.  Piaggio  (Fla.,  1888),  3 

5  2  Phil.  Ev.,  §  373.     A  statute  re-    S.  Rep.  823.     See  ante,  %  150a. 
quiring  service  on  a  person  always        8  Sapp  v.  King,  66  Tex.  570. 


414  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  [§§  2S0,  281. 

grieved.  Under  such  circumstances  the  writ  of  subpoena  is 
regarded  as  primary  evidence  of  the  service  on  the  defendant 
and  its  existence  cannot  be  proved  by  the  admission  of  the 
defendant.1  Parol  evidence  is  admissible,  however,  to  show 
his  non-attendance.2 

§  280.  Recognizance  to  secure  presence  of  a  witness. — 
In  criminal  proceedings,  where  the  accused  has  been  com- 
mitted for  trial  or  to  await  the  action  of  the  grand  jury,  or 
where  the  trial  is  continued,  it  is  sometimes  the  practice  to 
require  the  recognizance  or  personal  bond  of  a  witness  in  order 
that  his  attendance  at  the  trial  may  be  secured.3  Sureties 
may  also  be  taken  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and  if  they 
are  not  procurable,  or  if  the  witness  refuses  to  give  his  Recog- 
nizance, he  may  be  kept  in  custody.4  The  modern  tendency 
is  to  regard  such  a  mode  of  procedure  as  oppressive  and  unjust 
to  an  innocent  person  whose  only  offense  is  his  accidental 
presence  at  a  place  where  a  crime  is  alleged  to  have  been 
committed,5  and  consequently  it  is  sometimes  provided  by 
statute  that  a  witness  who  is  unable  to  give  sureties  for  his 
appearance  may  be  released  from  custody  upon  giving  his 
deposition.6 

§  281.  Obstructing  attendance  of  witnesses. —  At  common 
law,  and  now  very  frequently  by  statute,  any  attempt  to  retard 
or  prevent  the  attendance  of  witnesses,7  or  the  act  of  advising 
a  witness  not  to  answer,8  is  a  misdemeanor.9     It  matters  not 

i  Hasbrouck  v.  Baker,    10  Johns.  7  4  Bl.  Com.  129;  Cutler  v.  Wright, 

248.  W.  N.  1890,  p.  28 ;  State  v.  Carpen- 

2  Cogswell    v.   Meech,    12    Wend,  ter,  20  Vt.   9;  Martin   v.  State,    28 

147.  Ala.  71;  United  States   v.    Kee,  39 

iGwyn    v.    State,   64   Miss.    324;  Fed.  Rep.  603 ;  Cora.  v.  Feely,  2  Va. 

Comfort  v.  Kittle,  81  Iowa,  179.  Cas.   1;  State  v.   Ames,  64  Me.  386; 

4  2  Hale,  P.  C.  282;  Roscoe,  Crim.  Cameron  v.  Lightfoot,  2  W.  Bl. 
Ev.,  p.  87;  Evans  v.  Rees,  12  Ad.  &  1193;  Com.  v.  Reynolds,  14  Gray, 
El.  55.  See  Laws  U.  S.  1846,  ch.  98,  87;  State  v.  Horner  (Del.,  1893),  26 
8  7;  Fawcett  v.  Linthecum,  7  Ohio  Atl.  Rep.  73. 

Cir.    Ct.   R.   141;  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  8  State  v.    Gandy,    23    Neb.    436; 

§  313.  Perrow  v.  State,  67  Miss.  365. 

5  See  State  v.  Grace,  18  Minn.  398.  9  The  fact  that  the  witness  was  ex- 

6  People  v.  Lee,  49  Cal.  37.  A  wit-  pected  to  testify,  though  he  is  not 
ness  imprisoned  is  entitled  to  his  per  under  recognizance  to  appear  or  has 
diem  while  thus  committed.  Robin-  been  subpoenaed,  is  enough.  State 
son  v.  Chambers,  94  Mich.  471.  v.  Horner  (Del.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  73. 


§  281a.]  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  415 

that  the  attempt  is  unsuccessful,1  or  that  the  obstructor  re- 
frains from  the  employment  of  violence  and  confines  himself 
wholly  to  threats  or  scurrilous  language,2  gets  the  witness 
drunk,3  or  employs  the  machinery  of  the  law  to  prevent  the 
attendance  of  the  witness  by  preferring  an  unfounded  charge 
of  crime  against  him,  and,  in  collusion  with  a  magistrate,  pro- 
cures bis  imprisonment.4  The  witness  himself  may  procure 
the  arrest  of  the  party  who  has  thus  maliciously  hindered  his 
attendance  at  court,5  or  the  person  who  is  guilty  of  the  offense 
of  intimidating  or  obstructing  the  witness  majr  be  indicted  by 
the  grand  jury.6  Intimidating  a  witness  from  testifying 
against  a  felon,  though  a  misdemeanor,  does  not,  it  is  held, 
constitute  the  offender  an  accessory  to  the  felony;7  nor  is  a 
person  punishable  for  intimidating  or  impeding  a  witness  who 
beats  him  after  he  has  given  his  testimony.8  The  public  pros- 
ecuting attorney  should  not  be  allowed  to  endeavor,  to  dis- 
suade the  witnesses  for  the  accused  from  appearing  and  testify- 
ing, even  though  he  may  believe  they  are  unreliable  and  will 
perjure  themselves.9 

§  281a.  Changing  venue  for  convenience  of  witnesses. — 
In  order  to  save  the  expenditure  of  large  sums  as  mileage  or 
for  the  taking  of  depositions,  it  is  very  frequently  provided 
by  statute  that,  where  the  convenience  of  the  witnesses  re- 
quires it,  the  venue  or  place  of  trial  of  the  action  may  be 
changed.  Thus,  where  all  the  transactions  occurred  in  the 
county  to  which  it  has  been  moved  to  change  the  venue,10  or 
where,  though  the  transaction  may  have  happened  elsewhere, 

1  Gandy  v.  State,  23  Neb.  436 ;  ity  of  the  evidence  of  the  witness 
State  v.  Carpenter,  20  Vt.  9.  (Com.  v.  Reynolds,  14  Gray,  87);  or 

2  Rex    v.    Onslow,    12   Cox,    356;  the  particular   method   used  to  in- 
Charlton's  Case,  2  My.   &  Cr.  316;  timidate  him  (State  v.  Ames,  64  Me. 
Littler  v.  Thompson,  2  Beav.  129.  386),  should  be  set  forth  in  the  in- 
state v.  Holt,  84  Me.  509.  dictment.  See,  also,  Perrow  v.  State, 
*  United    States    v.    Kindred,     4  67  Miss.  365 ;  State  v.  Bailer,  26  W. 

Hughes  (U.  S.),  493;  State  v.  Buck,  Va.  90. 

62  N.  H.  670  (witness  arrested  in  civil        7  Reg.  v.  Chappie,  9  C.  &  P.  355. 

case).  8  United  States  v.  Thomas,  47  Fed. 

5  Magnay  v.  Burt,  5  Q.  B.  394.  Rep.  807.     Cf.  United  States  v.  Kee, 

6  It  is  not  necessary  that  the  record  39  Fed.  Rep.  603. 

of  the  case  in  which  the  witness  was        9  Gandy  v.  State,  23  Neb.  436;  40 

summoned  (State  v.  Carpenter,  20    N.  W.  Rep.  303. 

Vt.  9);  or  the  fact  of  the  material-       10  Smith  v.  Mack,  24  N.  Y.  S.  131. 


416 


ATTENDANCE    OF   WITNESSES. 


[§•282. 


all  or  a  large  majority  of  the  material  witnesses  reside  in  that 
jurisdiction,  the  motion  to  change  the  venue  should  be  granted.1 
But  the  rule  is  that  no  change  of  venue  can  be  had  in  criminal 
trials  for  the  convenience  of  witnesses,2  and  in  civil  cases,  if 
the  adverse  party  will  sign  a  stipulation  admitting  what  the 
witnesses  will  prove,  the  motion  for  a  change  of  venue  for 
their  convenience  may  be  refused.3 

§  282.  Failure  of  witnesses  to  attend  —  Continuance,  when 
granted. —  The  parties  should  employ  and  exhaust  every  avail- 
able means  to  procure  the  attendance  of  their  witnesses,  and 
should  be  given  every  facility  by  the  court  for  this  purpose, 
together  with  any  reasonable  and  necessary  amount  of  dela}^. 
If,  however,  a  party  wholly  neglects  to  summon  a  witness,.or 
if,  having  subpoenaed  him,  counsel  voluntarily  goes  to  trial  or 
fails  to  ask  for  a  continuance  in  case  the  witness  does  not  ap- 
pear, the  party  cannot  be  heard  to  complain  because  the  court 
orders  the  trial  to  proceed.4 

The  granting:  of  a  continuance  because  of  the  absence  of  a 
witness  is  largely,  if  not  wholly,5  a  matter  of  discretion  for 


i  Thompson  v.  Brandt  (Cal.,  1893), 
32  Pac.  Rep.  890;  Ringgenburg  v. 
Hartman,  102  Ind.  537;  Nelson  v. 
Nelson,  G6  Hun,  633 :  Porter  v.  Lyle, 
id.  629;  Cordas  v.  Morrison,  23  N.  Y. 
S.  1076;  Thurfjell  v.  Witherbee,  24 
id.  278;  Dunn  v.  Lewis,  65  Hun, 
620;  Thompson  v.  Norwood,  64  id. 
636;  Perry  v.  Boomhauer,  17  N.  Y. 
S.  890;  63  Hun,  629;  Daley  v.  Hell- 
man,  62  Hun,  620 ;  Kurz  v.  Fish,  58 
id.  602. 

2  People  v.  Harris,  4  Den.  (N.  Y.) 
150. 

3  Wright  v.  Burritt,  63  Hun,  628. 
<  Pease    v.    State    (Ga.,    1893),    16 

S.  E.  Rep.  113;  Carllo  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  147;  Crew  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
973;  Clay  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  973;  Dale  v.  State,  88 
Ga.  552;  Spahn  v.  People,  117  111. 
538;  Johnson  v.  State,  85  Ga.  561; 
State  v.  Underwood,  44  La.  Ann. 
1114.     A  continuance  is  properly  re- 


fused where  a  party  admits  as  evi- 
dence the  statement  of  facts  in  his 
adversary's  application  for  the  con- 
tinuance showing  what  the  absent 
witness  was  expected  to  prove.  San- 
ford  v.  Gates,  38  Kan.  405 ;  Woolsey 
v.  Jones,  84  Ala.  88;  Chicago,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Duffin  (111.,  1888),  18  N.  E. 
Rep.  279.  If  the  absence  of  the  wit- 
ness was  anticipated,  and  particu- 
larly if  prior  to  his  departure  his 
deposition  could  have  been  readily 
obtained,  a  continuance  should  be 
refused  because  of  his  absence.  Valle 
v.  Picton,  91  Mo.  207 ;  3  S.  W.  Rep. 
860. 

5  Winklemeier  v.  Daber,  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  1036;  92  Mich.  621;  White  v. 
Portland  (Conn.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep. 
342;  Guy  v.  Metcalf,  83  Tex.  37; 
McQueen  v.  People's  Nat.  Bank,  111 
N.  C.  509;  Richmond  R.  &  E.  Co. 
v.  Dick,  8  U.  S.  App.  99;  52  Fed. 
Rep.  379;  Valle  v.  Picton,  91  Mo. 
207;  3  S.  W.   Rep.   860;   McKinsey 


§  282.] 


ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES. 


417 


the  court,  and,  unless  the  evidence  of  the  witness  is  material,  a 
refusal  to  allow  a  continuance  is  not  ground  for  a  new  trial.1 
Not  only  must  the  materiality  of  the  evidence  of  the  absent 
witness  be  shown,  but  the  party  should  also  show  that  he  has 
been  served  with  a  subpoena,  or,  if  he  cannot  be  found,  that  a 
diligent  search  has  been  made  for  him.2  If  the  witness  is  con- 
fined  to  his  house  by  illness  or  is  absent  from  the  jurisdiction, 
that  fact  must  appear,  and  usually  it  must  also  be  shown  that 
his  illness  is  so  severe  as  to  prevent  h!s  deposition  from  being 
obtained.3  The  party  must  also  show  that  no  other  witnesses 
are  known  to  him  by  which  he  could  prove  what  he  expects 
to  prove  by  the  absent  witness.4  So  a  continuance  should  be 
refused  where  the  witness  is  a  convict  whose  disabilities  have 
never  been  removed,5  where  it  appears  that  his  evidence  would 
be  irrelevant  or  otherwise  inadmissible,6  or  where  he  is  a  per- 
son having;  onlv  a  transient  abode,  without  social  or  business 
ties  in  the  jurisdiction,  and  the  party  knows  nothing  of  his 
whereabouts  or  of  the  possibility  of  obtaining  his  future  at- 
tendance.7 But  where  the  materiality  of  the  evidence  is 
shown,  the  absence  of  the  witness  satisfactorily  accounted  for, 


v.  McKee,  109  Ind.  209.  Plaintiff 
sued  to  recover  the  value  of  two 
horses.  Defendant  moving  for  a 
continuance  because  of  the  absence 
of  a  witness,  plaintiff  agreed  to  dis- 
miss the  suit  as  to  the  horse  regard- 
ing which  the  witness  was  to  testify. 
A  continuance  was  properly  refused. 
Herd  v.  Herd,  71  Iowa,  497. 

i  Barbour  v.  Melendy,  88  Va.  595 ; 
Central  R.  Co.  v.  Curtis,  87  Ga.  416: 
Cox  v.  Hart,  145  U.  S.  376;  Ala- 
bama, etc.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93  Ala.  514; 
Davis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Riverside  Co. 
(Wis.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  506; 
Stone  v.  Railroad  Co.  (S.  D.,  1893), 
53  N.  W.  Rep.  189;  Hodges  v.  Nash, 
43  111.  App.  638. 

2  Clouston  v.  Gray,  48  Kan.  31.  An 
allegation  of  diligence  in  the  search 
is  not  sufficient.  The  question  of 
diligence  is  for  the  court,  and  the 
facts  constituting  it  must  be  shown 
in  detail  by  the  affidavit  of  the  party. 
27 


Struthers  v.  Fuller,  45  Kan.  735; 
Doll  v.  Mundine,  84  Tex.  315;  Kilmer 
v.  St.  Louis,  Ft.  S.  &  W.  R.  Co.,  37 
Kan.  84;  14  P,.c.  Rep.  465. 

3  Marmet  v.  Archibald,  37  W.  Va. 
778;  Murphy  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  45;  Texas,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Hall,  83  Tex.  675;  St.  Louis,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Olive,  40  111.  App.  82;  German 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Penrod,  35  Neb.  273 ;  Doll 
v.  Mundine,  84  Tex.  315. 

4  Davis,  etc.  Co.  v.  Riverside  Co. 
(Wis.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  506; 
Hodges  v.  Nash,  supra;  Toledo,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Stevenson,  131  Ind.  203; 
Trevelyan,  Adm'r,  v.  Lofft,  83  Va. 
141. 

s  Tillman  v.  Fletcher,  78  Tex.  673. 

6  Longnecker  v.  Shields  (Colo., 
1892),  28  Pac.  Rep.  659. 

-  Carberry  v.  Warrell,  68  Miss.  573; 
Mantonya  v.  Hierter,  35  111.  App. 
27;  Watson  v.  Blymer  Manufg.  Co., 
2  S.  W.  Rep.  353 ;  66  Tex.  558. 


418 


ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  283. 


and  a  proper  guaranty  given  that  his  testimony  will  be  forth- 
coming at  the  next  term,  a  refusal  to  grant  a  continuance  has 
been  held  to  be  reversible  error.1 

§  283.  Continuance  in  criminal  trials. —  In  criminal  as  in 
civil  causes  the  power  to  grant  a  continuance  because  of  the 
absence  of  a  witness  is,  in  the  absence  of  statute  prescribing 
when  one  must  be  granted,  a  matter  of  discretion.2  As  a  rule 
the  courts  are  disposed  to  exercise  this  discretion  liberally  in 
favor  of  life  and  liberty;  and  where  the  competency  of  the 
absent  witness  and  the  materiality  and  probable  truth  of  his 
testimony  are  shown  prima  facie  by  affidavits  by  the  accused, 
the  courts  have  gone  very  far  in  sustaining  his  right  to  have 
a  continuance  granted.3  But  if  the  evidence  which  the  absent 
witness  is  expected  to  give  is  very  remote  or  immaterial,4 
or  is  merely  cumulative  in  its  character,5  the  continuance 
should  be  refused.  If  from  the  evidence  already  received 
it  appears  that  the  absent  witness  has  no  knowledge  of  the 
matter  in  issue,6  or  if  the  court  has  sufficient  reason  for 
believing  that  certain  facts  which  the  absent  witness  is  ex- 
pected to  controvert  are  alread}^  so  far  sustained  by  a  prepon- 
derance of  the  evidence  that  his  testimony  bearing  thereon 


1  Gonring  v.  Railroad  Co.,  78  Wis. 
16;  Johnson  v.  Mills,  31  Neb.  524; 
Cook  v.  Larson,  47  Kan.  70. 

2  Brown  v.  State,  1  Pickle  (Tenn.), 
439;  State  v.  Wise,  33  S.  C.  382; 
Jackson  v.  State,  54  Ark.  243; 
Walker  v.  State,  91  Ala.  76;  Wool- 
folk  v.  State,  85  Ga.  69 ;  Thompson 
r.  Com.,  88  Va.  45;  Price  v.  People, 
131  111.  223;  Hardesty  v.  Com.,  88 
Ky.  587;  Walkup  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
189)),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  221. 

3  Bovvlin  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  543;  Givens  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  44;  Tankersley 
v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  595;  State 
v.  Lund,  49  Kan.  580;  Harrington 
v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  577; 
Hyden  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep. 
401 ;  Price  v.  People,  131  111.  223 ; 
Pyburn  v.  State,  84  Ga.  193;  Mc- 
Adam  v.  State,  5  S.  W.  Rep.  826;  24 


Tex.  App.  80;  Sutton  v.  People,  119 
111.  250. 

*  Goldsmith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893), 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  405 ;  Dow  v.  State,  31 
Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  278;  Knowles  v.  State, 
31  id.  383;  State  v.  Falconer,  70 
Iowa,  418;  State  v.  Spillman,  43  La. 
Ann.  1001 ;  State  v.  Turlington,  102 
Mo.  642;  Hyburn  v.  State,  26  Tex. 
App.  668;  Crumpton  v.  United 
States,  138  U.  S.  361. 

5Attaway  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr. 
Rep.  475;  McKinney  v.  State,  3 
Wyo.  719;  Smith  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  68 ;  Gonzales  v. 
State,  30  Tex.  App.  203;  Wilkerson 
v.  Com. ,  88  Ky.  29. 

6  Griffin  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S. 
W.  Rep.  552 ;.  Jones  v.  State,  31  Tex. 
Cr.  Rep.  177;  Norris  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  592;  Cliilds  v. 
State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  1039. 


281.] 


ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES. 


419 


would  probably  be  untrue,1  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  re- 
fuse a  continuance.  Where  by  consent  and  to  avoid  a  contin- 
uance a  stipulation  is  entered  into  that  an  absent  witness  for 
the  accused  will  testify  as  alleged,  the  reputation  of  the  witness 
for  veracity  may  be  attacked  by  the  state.2 

§  284.  Non-attendance  of  witnesses  —  When  a  contempt  of 
court. —  A  witness  who  has  been  properly  summoned  is  guilty 
of  a  contempt  of  court  if  he  intentionally  fails  or  refuses  to 
attend ; 3  and  the  court  ma}%  if  his  contempt  is  very  mani- 
fest, grant  an  ex  parte  and  immediate  order  for  his  arrest, 
though  usually  an  attachment  will  issue  only  after  the  grant- 
ing and  return  of  a  preliminary  order  to  show  cause.4  Nor  is 
it  essential  that  the  trial  should  have  begun  or  the  witness 
have  been  called  in  open  court  before  an  attachment  will  issue 
to  procure  his  presence  if  clear  proof  is  offered  that  he  is  wil-, 
fully  disobedient  to  the  court  in  thus  absenting  himself.5  The 
party  should  move  promptly  for  an  attachment  to  bring  the 
witness  in  person  before  the  court,  founding  his  application 


i  Brown  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  596;  Robbins  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  358 ;  Harvey  v. 
State,  21  Tex.  App.  178. 

2  Johnson  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1894),  23 
S.  W.  Rep.  507.  The  affidavit  for  a 
continuance  must  show  specifically 
the  facts  to  which  the  witness  will 
testify,  their  connection  with  and 
relevancy  to  the  subject-matter 
(Long  v.  People,  135  111.  535;  State 
v.  Manceaux,  42  La.  Ann.  1164; 
Carthaus  v.  State,  78  Wis.  540 ;  Hol- 
land v.  State,  31  Tex.  Cr.  Rep.  345); 
that  the  witness  has  a  knowledge  of 
such  facts  (Long  v.  People,  34  111. 
App.  481 ;  Benge  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892), 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  146) ;  that  the  affiant 
believes  the  evidence  of  the  witness 
is  true  (State  v.  Dusenberry,  112  Mo. 
277;  North  v.  People,  139  111.  81); 
that  he  also  believes  that  his  testi- 
mony can  be  procured  in  time,  stat- 
ing the  grounds  for  such  belief  (State 
v.  Harrison,  36  W.  Va.  729 ;  Skates 
v.  State,  64  Miss.   644;  Faulkner  v. 


Territory  (N.  M.,  1893),  30  Pac.  Rep. 
905;  State  v.  Aired  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  363);  and  that  proper  dili- 
gence has  been  employed  to  pro- 
cure the  attendance  of  the  witness. 
Haverstick  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  785;  Vogt  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  213.  See  post, 
§§  355-358,  as  to  the  form  and  lan- 
guage of  affidavits  generally. 

3  In  re  Gunn,  50  Kan.  155 ;  People 
v.  Brown,  46  Hun,  320. 

4  The  power  to  grant  an  attach- 
ment is  discretionary  (Dowden  v. 
Junker,  48  N.  J.  Eq.  584 ;  State  v. 
Hillstock  (La.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  352; 
Bradley  v.  Fertilizer  Co.  (N,  C,  1893), 
17  S.  E.  Rep.  69),  though  the  matter 
is  usually  regulated  by  statute. 
People  v.  Barrett,  56  Hun,  351. 

5  Wilson  v.  State,  57  Ind.  71 ;  Brad- 
ley v.  Fertilizer  Co.  (N.  C,  1893),  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  69  (examination  of  de- 
fendant before  trial).  Cf.  Robsen  v. 
State,   83  Ga.  166;  9  S.  E.  Rep.  610. 


420  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  285. 

upon  affidavits  showing  a  prompt,  seasonable  and  personal 
service  of  the  subpoena  and  the  payment  or  tender  of  the 
proper  fees;  for  a  writ  of  attachment  for  contempt  is  an  ex- 
traordinary remedy,  wholly  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  and 
it  should  only  issue  upon  clear  and  convincing  evidence  that  its 
issuance  is  needed,1  and  that  the  evidence  of  the  witness  is  ma- 
terial,2 though  the  immateriality  of  his  evidence  will  be  no  de- 
fense for  a  witness  who  distinctly  refuses  to  obey  a  subpoena.3 
A  witness  who  has  received  early  notice  to  attend  court 
will  be  in  contempt  if,  believing  he  has  sufficient  time,  he 
postpones  compliance  with  the  subpoena  until  the  case  is  on 
trial.4  A  magistrate  who  by  the  laws  of  the  forum  possesses 
the  power  to  punish  for  contempt  may,  where  he  is  requested 
by  letters  rogatory  to  take  a  deposition,  commit  a  witness  for 
contempt  if  the  latter  fails  to  obey  his  summons  or  if  he  re- 
fuses to  be  sworn  or  to  answer  any  proper  questions.5 

§  285.  Privilege  of  witnesses  from  service  of  civil  pro- 
cess.— -A  witness  whose  residence  is  beyond  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  court  is  privileged  from  the  service  of  a  summons  or 
other  civil  process  under  the  same  conditions  as  to  time  and 
place,  and  for  the  same  reasons,  as  he  is  exempt  from  civil 
arrest  while  voluntarily  attending  court.6  The  defect  in  the 
service  of  a  writ,  caused  by  the  privilege  or  exemption  of  the 

i  Garden  v.   Creswell,   2  M.  &  W.  Wilder,  40  Ohio  St.   130;  Sherman 

319;  State  v.  Trounce,  5  Wash.  St..  v.  Gundlach,   37   Minn.  118;    In  re 

804 ;  People  v.  Van  Tassell,  64  Hun,  Healey,  53  Vt.  694 ;  Bolgiano  v.  Lock 

444;  Wyatt  v.  People,   17  Colo.  252.  Co.,    73    Md.    132;    Finch    v.   Galli- 

2Corbett  v.  Gibson,  16  Blatchf.  C.  gher,  25  Abb.  N.  C.  401;  Palmer  v. 

C.  334;  Dicasv.  Lawson,  1  Cr.,  M.  &  Rowan,   21    Neb.  452;  Mulhearn   v. 

R.  934.  Press  Pub.  Co.,  53  N.  J.  L.  153;  Mas- 

:>  Chapman  v.  Davis,   3   M.    &  G.  sey  v.  Colville,  45  N.  J.  L.  119;  Wil- 

G09;  Scholes  v.   Hilton,  10  M.  &  W.  son  v.  Donaldson,  117  Ind.  356;  Pope 

16.  v.    Negus,    14  Civ.    Pro.    Rep.   406; 

4  Jackson  v.  Seager,  2  D.  &  L.  13.  Marks  v.  Societie,  22  id.  201;  Shee- 
Cf.  Reg.  v.  Sloman,  1  Dowl.  618.  han  v.  Bradford,  etc.  Co.,  15  id.  429. 

5  Burnham  v.  Stevens,  33  N.  H,  This  exemption  is  limited  to  the 
247.  jurisdiction  in   which    the   witness 

6  See  §  286;  Hollander  v.  Hall,  58  testifies.  So  a  resident  of  Vermont 
Hun,  604 ;  Christian  v.  Williams,  35  may  be  served  with  civil  process  in 
Mo.  App.  297 ;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Massachusetts  while  passing  through 
Doty,  12  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R.  287 ;  Thorp  v.  that  state  to  testify  in  a  Connecticut 
Adams,  53  Hun,  603 ;  Mitchell  v.  court.  Holyoke,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ambden, 
Judge,    53   Mich.    541;Compton   v.  55  Fed.  Rep.  593. 


§  2S6.J  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  421 

person  served,  not  appearing  on  the  record,  the  service  cannot 
be  set  aside  on  motion  merely.  The  privilege  of  a  witness  is 
a  defense  which  must  be  pleaded  in  abatement,  and  the  issue 
of  fact,  if  any,  arising  thereon  is  for  the  jury.1 

§  280.  Privilege  of  witnesses  from  civil  arrest. —  Wit- 
nesses are  protected  from  arrest  under  civil  process  during  the 
time  they  are  proceeding  to,  remaining  at  or  returning  from 
court,2  or  a  place  where  a  legislative  or  congressional  investiga- 
tion committee  is  in  session.3  ISTon-resident  witnesses,  in  order 
to  encourage  their  voluntary  attendance,  and  because  they  can- 
not be  summoned  by  subpoena,  will  be  privileged  though  they 
may  come  into  the  state  voluntarily;4  but  the  rule  is  other- 
wise in  the  case  of  a  witness  residing  in  the  jurisdiction  at- 
tending voluntarily  without  a  subpoena.5  The  witness  waives 
his  privilege  by  voluntarily  submitting  to  arrest  or  by  failing 
to  assert  it  and  to  claim  his  liberty  at  his  earliest  opportunity.6 
He  cannot  then  claim  that  his  privilege  has  been  violated.7 
The  court  in  which  the  witness  is  called  to  testify  will,  in  the 
case  of  his  illegal  arrest,  order  his  immediate  discharge  upon 
motion,8  though  in  the  case  of  inferior  courts  the  witness  may 
be  under  the  necessity  of  employing  the  writ  of  habeas  corpus? 
The  trial  in  which  he  was  to  testify  will  be  continued  until 
his  discharge.10 

i  Greer  v.  Young,  120  111.  184.  L.)  517;  Hardenbrook's  Case,  8  Abb. 

2  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  316 ;  Meekins  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  416 ;  McNeil's  Case,  supra. 
v.  Smith,  1  H.  Bl.  636;  Ballinger  v.  6AVoods  v.  Davis,  34  N.  H.  328; 
Elliott,  72  N.  C.  596;  Randall  v.  Gur-  Smith  v.  Jones,  76  Me.  138;  Hess  v. 
ney,  3  B.  &  A.  252;  Huntington  v.  Morgan.  3  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  84. 
Schultz,  Harp.  (S.  C.)  452;  Hopkins  71  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  317;  Brown 
v.  Coburn,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)292;  May  v.  Getchell,  11  Mass.  11,  14;  Steven- 
v.  Shumway,  16  Gray,  86 ;  Ex  parte  son  v.  Smith,  28  N.  H.  12 ;  Dow  v. 
Temple,  2  Ves.  &  B.  391,  395;  Sand-  Smith,  7  Vt.  465. 

ford  v.  Chase,  3  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  381.  8  Moore  v.   Green,   73   N.  C.   394; 

3  Thompson's  Case,  122  Mass.  248.     Cooley's  Const.  Lim.,  p.  163. 

« Person   v.   Grier,   C6   N.  Y.    124;  » Smith  v.  Jones,  76  Me.  138. 

Norris  v.  Beach,  2  Johns.  294;  May  10  1    Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  318,  citing 

v.  Shumway,  16  Gray,  88;  Dixon  v.  Sanford  v.  Chase,  3  Cowen,  381 ;  Bell 

Ely,  4  Edw.  (N.  Y.)557;  Ballinger  v.  v.  State,  4  Gill,  301;  Hunt's  Case,  4 

Elliott,  72  N.  C.  596;  Jones  v.  Knaus,  Dall.  387;  Com.  v.  Daniel,  4   Pa.  L. 

31  N.  J.  Eq.  211.  J.  R.  49;  United   States  v.  Edme,  9 

5  Rogers  v.  Bullock,  2  Pen.  (3  N.  J.  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)   147;  Crocker  v.  Dun- 

cin,  6  Blackf.  (Ind.)  278. 


422  ATTENDANCE    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  287. 

§  287.  Duratiou  of  the  privilege  from  arrest.— The  wit- 
ness is  privileged  not  only  on  his  journey  to  and  from  court, 
but  during  his  detention  in  the  place  where  the  court  is  sit- 
ting, if  the  sole  reason  of  his  stay  is  his  purpose  to  testify.1 
The  rule  allows  a  reasonable  time  for  the  journey  but  does 
not  countenance  loitering,2  though  a  slight  deviation  to  par- 
take of  food,3  to  see  one's  friends4  or  to  obtain  papers  which 
are  to  be  used  as  evidence  at  the  trial,5  will  not  nullify  the  priv- 
ilege from  arrest.  If  the  witness,  after  testifying,  before  re- 
turning home  proceeds  to  transact  business  which  is  wholly 
unconnected  with,  his  functions  as  a  witness,  his  privilege 
ceases.6  A  witness  in  attendance  is  privileged  while  at  his 
lodgings7  or  during  a  temporary  adjournment  of  the  court,8 
though  his  inability  to  start  for  his  home  after  the  trial  is 
over  because  of  his  lack  of  means  will  not  extend  his  privilege.9 
An  officer,  unless  he  is  informed  thereof,  is  not  bound  to  know 
that  a  person  whom  he  arrests  is  privileged  as  a  witness;10  and 
it  seems  that  no  action  for  false  imprisonment  can  be  main- 
tained against  an  officer  making  or  a  person  procuring  the 
arrest  under  such  circumstances.11  An  arrest  made  after  the 
termination  of  the  privilege  is  not  illegal  because  it  is  based 
on  process  which  had  issued  and  on  which  the  witness  had 
been  once  illegally  arrested  while  the  privilege  existed.12 

i  Perse  v.  Perse,  5  H.  L.  Cas.  671;  429;    Gibbs   v.    Pbillipson,    1   R.    & 

Gibbs  v.  Pbillipson,  1   Russ.  &  My.  My.  19. 

19;  Ex  parte  Hurst,  1  Wasb.   C.   C.  8  Ex  pai.te  Temple,  2  Ves.   &  B. 

186.  391 ;  Spencer  v.  Newton,  6  Ad.  &  E. 

2 Chaffee  v.  Jones,  19  Pick.  (Mass.)  623;  Hatch  v.  Blisset,  2  Stra.  986. 

260.  9  Spencer  v.  Newton,  6  Ad.   &  E. 

»Mabon    v.    Mahon,  2    Irish   Eq.  623. 

440.  10  Cooley  on  Torts,  p.  192 ;  Secor  v. 

4  Pitt  v.  Coomes,  5  B.  &  Ad.  1078;  Bell,  18  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  52;  Sperry  v. 

I  Attorney-General  v.  Skinner's  Co.,  Willard,  1  Wend.  (N.  Y.)  32;  Wood 

8  Sim.  377:  Ex  parte  Clark,  2  Dea.  v.  Kinsman,  5  Vt.  588;    Brown  v. 

&  Cb.  99.  Getchell,  11  Mass.  11. 

5Ricketts  v.  Gurney,  7  Price,  699.  "Smith    v.    Jones,    76     Me.    138; 

e  Sbults  v.  Andrews,  54  How.  Pr.  Sperry  v.   Willard,  supra;    Vande- 

(N.  Y.)380;  Heron   v.   Stokes,   6  Ir.  velde  v.  Snellen,  1  Keb.  220;  Chase 

Eq.  125 ;  Pitt  v.  Coomes,  supra;  Selby  v.  Fish,  16  Me.  132. 

v.  Hills,  8  Bing.  166:  Jones  v.  Rose,  12  Humphrey  v.  Cumming,  5  Wend. 

11  Jur.  379.  (N.  Y.)  90;    Petrie  v.   Fitzgerald,   1 

7Childerston  v.   Barrett,  11  East,  Daly  (N.  Y.),  401. 


§§  2S8,  289.]  ATTENDANCE   OF    WITNESSES.  423 

§  288.  Attendance  of  witnesses  in  custody.— The  attend- 
ance of  a  witness  who  is  incarcerated  in  prison  or  who  is  in 
the  military  or  naval  service  may  be  procured  by  the  service 
of  a  writ  of  habeas  corpus  ad  testificandum  on  the  prison 
keeper  or  officer  in  whose  immediate  charge  he  is.1  The  ap- 
plication for  the  writ  should  specify  the  nature  of  the  suit  in 
which  his  attendance  is  needed,  that  the  evidence  of  the  wit- 
ness is  material,  and  that  the  witness  is  restrained  from  at- 
tending court,  together  with  the  circumstances  of  the  restraint 
so  far  as  they  are  known  to  the  affiant.2  As  the  general  rules 
governing  the  granting  and  the  service  and  return' of  this 
writ  are  those  which  obtain  in  connection  with  the  ordinary 
writ  of  habeas  corpus,  no  elaboration  of  them  is  necessary  in 
this  connection.3 

§  289.  Attendance  of  witnesses  before  legislative  bodies. 
As  a  rule  the  power  to  summon  witnesses  and  to  take  testi- 
mony is  considered  to  be  inherent  in  legislative  bodies  for  all 
purposes  within  the  scope  of  the  constitutional  powers  pos- 
sessed bj  those  bodies,  and  the  refusal  or  neglect  of  a  witness 
to  appear  or  to  answer  proper  questions  is  a  contempt  for 
which  he  may  be  arrested  and  imprisoned.4  The  power  of 
the  federal  congress  to  commit  for  contempt  should  be  strictly 
confined  within  the  constitutional  functions  of  that  body. 
Neither  house  is  a  court  of  justice,  as  was  the  English  parlia- 
ment originall3r,  but  either  house  may  exert  certain  powers 
under  the  constitution;  as,  for  example,  it  may  decide  con- 
tested elections  and  the  qualifications  of  its  members  or  may 
impeach  certain  public  officials.  If  then  congress  exceeds 
these  powers  and  summons  a  witness  to  testify  to  a  matter 
which  is  exclusively  for  judicial  investigation,  it  has  no  power 
to  commit  for  contempt  of  its  process  if  the  witness  refuse  to 
answer  questions.5 

1  Ex  parte  Marmaduke,  91  Mo.  228,  5  Kilbourn  v.  Thompson,  105  U.  S. 

251.  108,  181-205.     See,  also,  In  re  Pac. 

21  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  312.  R.  R.  Coin.,  32  Fed.  Rep.  251-253; 

3  See  Church  on  Habeas  Corpus.  Ex  parte   Dalton,  44  Ohio  St.  150. 

41  Kent,  236,  237;  2  Story,  Const.,  As  to  the  power  of  a  city  council  to 

§§  305-317;  In  re  Gunn,  50  Kan.  125 ;  commit  a  witness  for  contempt,  see 

Burnham  v.  Morrissey,  14  Gray,  226 ;  Whitcomb's  Case,  120  Mass.  123. 
Anderson   v.  Dunn,  6  Wheat.   204; 
Yards'  Case,  10  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  41. 


CHAPTER  XXII. 


COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES. 


§  300. 

Classes  of  persons  incompe- 
tent. 

§  310. 

301. 

Parties  as  witnesses  at  com- 
mon law. 

811. 

302. 

Testimony  of  party  admissi- 

ble   when    his    connection 

312. 

with  action  no  longer  ex- 

ists. 

313. 

303. 

What  constitutes  interest  in 

the  event. 

314. 

304. 

Exceptions  to  the  common- 
law  rule  —  The  answer  as 

evidence  for  the  defendant 

315. 

in  equity. 

305. 

Competency  of  parties  as  wit- 
nesses in  equity  —  The  em- 

316. 

ployment  and  effect   of  a 

317. 

bill  of  discovery. 

306. 

Defendant  in  criminal  trial  — 

318. 

His  competency  as  a   wit- 

319. 

ness. 

320. 

307. 

Statutory  competency  of  par- 
ties as  witnesses. 

308. 

Incompetency    of    interested 

persons    to    testify    as    to 

321. 

transactions  with  deceased 

or  insane  persons. 

309. 

What  are    transactions  with 

322. 

decedents. 

323. 
324. 

Persons  interested  —  Their 
statutory  incompetency. 

Incompetency  of  parties  to 
negotiable  instruments  to 
impeach  them. 

Competency  of  counsel  as  wit- 
nesses. 

Competency  of  judges  as  wit- 
nesses. 

Competency  of  arbitrators  as 
witnesses  in  an  action  on 
the  award. 

Definition  and  form  of  oath 
and  affirmation. 

Incompetency  because  of  a 
lack  of  religious  belief. 

Incompetency  of  insane  per- 
sons as  witnesses. 

Deaf  mutes  as  witnesses. 

Children  as  witnesses. 

Witnesses  rendered  incompe- 
tent by  conviction  of  in- 
famous crimes  —  The  effect 
of  pardon. 

Statutory  regulation  of  the 
competency  of  witnesses 
convicted  of  crime. 

Statutes  construed. 

Accomplices. 

Corroboration  of  accomplices. 


§  300.  Classification  of  persons  incompetent  as  witnesses. 

The  common  law,  proceeding  upon  the  theory  that  the  preven- 
tion of  perjury  was  of  paramount  importance  to  the  possible 
ascertainment  of  truth,  rejected  absolutely  certain  classes  of 
persons  as  witnesses.  Thus,  the  parties  to  the  suit  and  all 
other  persons  who  had  any  pecuniary  interest  in  the  litiga- 
tion; such  persons  as  from  a  deficiency  or  peculiarity  of  re- 


§  300.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  425 

ligious  belief  were  presumed  to  be  regardless  of  the  sanctity 
of  an  oath,  and  persons  of  imperfect  mental  powers,  as  luna- 
tics, children  and  idiots,  were  incompetent  as  witnesses.  It  is 
clear  that  by  rejecting  the  testimony  of  the  parties  and  of 
persons  interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit  two  most  valuable 
sources  of  information  were  lost.  Those  who  have  a  direct 
and  actual  pecuniary  interest  in  a  transaction,  or  who  are 
connected  by  ties  of  relationship  or  interest  with  the  parties 
to  it,  are  most  likely  to  be  best  informed,  not  only  as  to  the 
main  transaction,  but  as  to  its  most  trivial  details.  It  was 
considered,  however,  that  a  grave  danger  existed  that  inter- 
ested persons  would  perjure  themselves  if  allowed  to  testify 
as  witnesses,  and  to  obviate  the  danger  of  such  corrupting  in- 
fluences altogether  they  were  absolutely  excluded  from  the 
witness  stand.  That  interested  persons  when  summoned  as 
witnesses  would  always  commit  perjury  was  not  the  basis  of 
their  rejection.  But  the  very  great  probability  and  even  cer- 
tainty that  some  would  or  might  do  so  were  considered  suffi- 
cient to  incapacitate  them  as  a  class  from  testifying. 

The  arbitrary  character  of  this  common-law  rule  rendering 
the  parties  and  persons  interested  incompetent  as  witnesses 
was  recognized  even  by  those  authorities  and  cases  in  which 
it  was  formulated.  It  was  clearly  seen  that  interest,  like  bias, 
is  only  valid  as  an  objection  to  a  witness  when  it  is  urged  in 
connection  with  the  credibilit}7  of  his  testimony,  and  it  was 
admitted  that  it  was  absurd  to  permit  a  witness  to  testify,  no 
matter  how  friendl}7  or  hostile  he  might  be  towards  the  party 
who  called  him,  while,  at  the  same  time,  excluding  the  testi- 
mony of  other  witnesses  equally  well  and  perhaps  better  in- 
formed because  it  happened  that  they  had  a  slight  pecuniary 
interest  in  the  result  of  the  suit.  The  early  writers  do  not  at- 
tempt to  justify  the  rule  on  logical  grounds,  but,  with  the  con- 
servatism of  the  common  law,  they  merely  point  out  that  the 
rule  being  firmly  settled  from  early  times  ought,  in  order  to 
obtain  stability  and  certainty  in  the  law,  to  be  very  strictly 
adhered  to,  and  that  to  abrogate  it  would  certainly  open  the 
door  to  a  vast  amount  of  perjury  on  the  part  of  the  majority 
of  interested  witnesses.  In  the  quaint  language  of  Baron 
Gilbert,1  the  rule  was  designed  "  to  preserve  infirmity  from  a 

1 1  Gilb.  Ev.,  §§  220,  224. 


426  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  301. 

snare  and  integrity  from  suspicion."  Modern  statutory  legis- 
lation, while  full}''  recognizing  the  element  of  interest  as  it 
affects  the  credibility  of  testimony,  has  swept  away  this  arbi- 
trary exclusion  of  parties  and  interested  persons  as  witnesses. 
While  it  is  possible  that  perjury  in  court  has  been  sensibly 
increased  by  these  enactments,  it  is  very  clear,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  the  avenues  and  means  for  the  ascertainment  of 
truth  in  judicial  proceedings  have  been  wonderfully  widened 
and  augmented  thereby. 

§  301.  Parties  incompetent  as  witnesses  at  common  law. 
Though  the  common-law  rule  that  a  party  to  the  record  is 
not  competent  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  has  been  abol- 
ished in  this  country,  it  may  be  useful  to  consider  some  of  the 
cases  in  which  it  was  employed  at  common  law,  as  the  ele- 
ment of  interest  is  still  an  objection  to  the  competency  of  a 
witness  in  certain  cases  where  he  is  called  upon  to  testify 
against  the  representatives  of  a  deceased  person.  Neither  a 
real  nor  a  nominal  part}^  to  an  action  could  at  common  law 
be  compelled  by  his  adversary  to  testify  against  himself,1  so 
that  where  a  party  desired  to  interrogate  his  opponent  he  had 
to  resort  to  the  expensive  and  cumbrous  equitable  proceed- 
ing of  a  bill  of  discovery.2  As  the  admissions  of  a  party 
have  always  been  admissible  against  him,  he  might,  at  com- 
mon law,  consent  to  testify  voluntarily  for  his  adversary, 
though  it  seems  that  where  several  persons  were  joined  as  co- 
plaintiffs  none  of  them  could,  where  the  interest  of  all  was 
joint  and  not  several  merely,  testify  in  behalf  of  the  defend- 
ant, unless  with  the  consent  of  those  who  were  associated  as 
plaintiffs  with  him.3 

In  respect  to  the  competency  of  members  of  a  private  cor- 
poration as  witnesses  in  suits  to  which  the  latter  is  a  party,  a 
distinction  was  made  at  common  law  between  business  or 
trading  corporations  and  those  incorporated  solely  for  relig- 
ious or  charitable  purposes.  In  the  case  of  business  corpora- 
tions the  vested  pecuniary  interest  of  the  member  or  stock- 
holder was  considered  sufficient  to  render  him  incompetent  to 

1  Rex  v.  Woburn,  10  East,  395.  mere  nominal  party  could  not  con- 

2  See  post,  %  305.  sent  to  testify  for  his  opponent  witb- 

3  Scott  v.  Lloyd,  12  Pet.  149;  1  out  the  consent  of  the  real  party. 
Greenl.   on  Ev.,  §§  353,   354.     So  a  Frear  v.  Evertson,  20  Johns.  142. 


§  302.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  427 

testify  for  or  against  the  corporation.1  The  members  of  char- 
itable corporations,  on  the  other  hand,  were  competent  wit- 
nesses in  any  action  in  which  the  latter  was  a  party.2 

At  common  law  an  inhabitant  of  a  public  municipal  or 
^wasi-municipal  corporation  was  incompetent  (because  of  in- 
terest) as  a  witness  in  any  action  to  which  the  corporation  was 
a  party.3  But  the  interest  which  the  residents  of  a  municipal 
or  public  corporation  have  as  such  in  the  determination  of  the 
action  is  so  extremely  small  and  contingent,  and  the  necessity 
for  their  testimony  to  prevent  a  miscarriage  of  justice  is  so 
urgent,  that  this  rule  was  often  relaxed.  It  is  now  abrogated 
expressly  or  by  implication  both  in  England  and  in  the  United 
States.  So,  generally,  the  shareholders  in  a  private  corpora- 
tion are  now  competent  as  witnesses  for  or  against  the  corpo- 
ration. 

§  302.  Testimony  of  party  admissible  when  his  connec- 
tion with  action  no  longer  exists. —  At  common  law  one  of 
several  defendants  or  plaintiffs  jointly  sued  became  a  compe- 
tent witness  for  the  others  immediately  upon  the  severance 
of  his  connection  with  them  as  litigants.  In  civil  proceedings 
a  distinction  was  made  at  common  law  between  actions  ex 
contractu  and  those  which  are  ex  delicto,  so  far  as  the  compe- 
tenc}7  of  a  party  as  a  witness  is  concerned,  where  his  connection 
with  the  litigation  no  longer  existed.  In  an  action  on  a  joint 
contract  a  defendant  against  whom  judgment  had  been  taken 
by  default  was  not  allowed  to  testify  on  the  trial,  for  the  reason 
that  the  value  of  such  a  judgment  would  of  course  depend 
upon  the  ultimate  decision  of  the  action  for  or  agaiust  his 
joint  obligors.4  But  this  rule  is  not  universal.  There  are  many 
decisions  which  sustain  the  proposition  that  at  common  law 
a  party  whom  it  is  alleged  is  interested  jointly  with  others  in 
,  the  subject-matter  of  the  contract  which  is  sued  on  could 
testify  as  a  witness  for  or  against  his  alleged  associates  imme- 

1  City  Council  v.  King,  4  McCord,  Bloodgood  v.  James,  12  Johns.  285, 

487;    Foundry  v.    Hovey,   21   Pick,  and  cases  cited  in  1  Greenl.  on  Ev., 

453.  §  331. 

2 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  333  and  cases  4  Thornton  v.  Blaisdell,  37  Me.  190; 

cited.  Mills  v.  Lee,  4  Hill,  549;  Scherruer- 

'Odiorne  v.  Wade,    8  Pick.    518;  horn  v.  Schermerhorn,  1  Wend.  119; 

Rex   v.   London,   2   Lev.   231.      Cf.  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  355. 


428  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  303. 

diately  upon  his  ceasing  by  his  default  to  be  a  party  to  the 
record,1  or  by  a  nolle  prosequi  entered  as  to  him  upon  his  plea 
of  infancy,  mental  incapacity  to  contract,  release  or  other 
matter  which  will  result  in  his  discharge  from  liability.2 

A  joint  defendant  in  an  action  of  tort  becomes  at  common 
law  a  competent  witness  for  either  party  where  a  judgment 
is  taken  against  him  by  default,  upon  the  ground  that,  though 
jointly  sued,  there  can  be  no  contribution  among  wrong-doers, 
and  that  his  liability  being  ascertained  he  is  no  longer  an  in- 
terested party.3 

§  303.  What  constitutes  an  interest  in  the  event. —  By  the 
rules  of  the  common  law  persons  interested  in  the  event  of 
the  action  were,  with  the  parties  themselves,  incompetent  as 
witnesses  to  testify  therein,  their  incompetency  being  based 
upon  the  extreme  probability  which  was  supposed  to  exist 
that  they  would  testify  falsely.4  The  incompetency  of  inter- 
ested persons  has  been  almost  universally  abolished  b}1-  stat- 
ute, except  that  in  certain  cases  all  persons  interested  in  the 
event  of  the  action  are  forbidden  to  testify  to  any  transaction 
they  may  have  had  with  the  other  party  to  the  action  where 
such  party  is  deceased  or  insane.5  The  interest  which  will 
disqualify  a  witness  at  common  law  must  be  a  legal,  substan- 
tial, present,  vested  and  ex  parte  interest.  Its  amount  is  not 
material.  Because  of  the  difficulty  of  ascertaining  how  much 
the  witness  would  be  influenced  by  his  interest,  the  law  recog- 
nizes no  gradations  but  excludes  the  evidence  of  all  interested 
persons,  however  small  their  interest  may  be.  The  mere  be- 
lief or  expectation  of  the  witness  that  he  may  gain  or  lose 
by  the  result  of  the  trial,  or  that  he  is  morally  bound  to  reim- 
burse the  losing  party,  or  his  inclination  from  friendship  or 
relationship  towards  the  party,  will  not  render  him  incom- 
petent.6    So  the  witness  will  be  disqualified   only  where  he 

1  Berry  v.  Stevens,  71  Me.  503;  who  has  suffered  judgment  by  de- 
Manchester  v.  Moore,  19  N.  II.  564.  fault  may  influence  the  amount  of 

2  Blake  v.  Ladd,  10  N.  H.  190;  damages  recoverable,  it  would  seem 
Minor  v.  Bank,  1  Pet.  74  ;1  Greenl.  on  to  be  incompetent  at  common  law. 
Ev.,  §£  855-357.  Thorpe  v.  Barber,  5  M.,  G.  &  S.  675. 

3  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,    §  357,  citing  *  See  ante.  §300. 
Ward  v.  Hayden,  2  Esp.  552;  Had-  '■>  See  §§  308-310. 

rick  v.   Heslop,   12  Jur.  000.     In  so        6  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  386. 
far  as  the  testimony  of  a  defendant 


§  30i.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  429 

is  interested  in  the  event  or  result  of  the  particular  action. 
That  the  rule  of  law  which  is  decided  in  the  case  in  which  he 
testifies  will  render  him  liable  in  another  action  or  under  like 
circumstances  does  not  make  him  interested  in  the  event  un- 
less the  judgment  in  the  earlier  action  will  be  evidence  for  or 
against  him  in  the  later.1 

At  common  law  a  person  is  interested  in  the  event  where 
he  is  legally  bound  to  indemnify  a  party  against  the  conse- 
quences of  a  fact  which  is  essential  to  the  judgment.  So,  gen- 
eral^, where  the  title  to  real  or  personal  property  is  in  issue, 
or  where  the  quality  or  wholesomeness  of  articles  of  food  or 
other  merchandise  is  involved,  the  vendor  or  other  person 
who  stands  in  the  position  of  a  guarantor  to  one  of  the  par- 
ties is  interested  in  the  event  of  the  suit.2 

§  304.  Exceptions  to  the  common-law  rule  —  The  an- 
swer as  evidence  for  the  defendant  in  equity. —  The  com- 
mon-law rule  by  which  a  party  was  incompetent  as  a  witness 
in  his  own  behalf  was  subject  to  some  exceptions  even  prior 
to  its  modification  by  statutory  enactment.  So  where  inde- 
pendent proof  is  given  that  the  adverse  party  wrongfully 
intermeddled  with  or  converted  or  negligently  lost  property 
committed  to  him  as  bailee,  the  owner  was  permitted  to  tes- 
tify to  its  condition  and  value,  for  from  the  necessity  of 
the  case  these  facts  are  usually  known  to  him  alone.3  So  be- 
cause of  paramount  necessit}'  a  party  was  allowed  to  testify 
to  the  loss  of  a  missing  wrriting  as  a  foundation  for  offering 
secondary  evidence  of  its  contents,  or  he  was  permitted  to 
take  a  supplementary  oath  to  the  correctness  of  his  entries  in 
his  books  of  account  in  cases  where,  from  the  nature  of 
things,  neither  party  could  claim  any  knowledge  but  that 
which  was  contained  in  the  books.  When,  however,  a  party 
was  permitted  at  common  law  to  testify  to  the  loss  of  and  the 
search  for  a  deed,  independent  evidence  was  always  required 

1 1  Greenl.    on   Ev.,   §  3S9,   citing  Steers    v.    Carwardine,  8    C.    &   P. 

Stewart  v.  Kip,  5  Johns.  256;  Bent  570;  Biss  v.  Mountain,  1  M.  &  Rob. 

v.  Baker,  3  T.  R.  27 ;  Hoyt  v.  Wild-  302;    Baxter   v.    Graham,   5  Watts, 

fire,  3  Johns.  518;  Evans  v.  Eaton,  7  418;  Heennance  v.  Vernoy,  6  Johns. 

Wheat.  350;  Evans  v.  Hettich,  7  id.  5;  Hale  v.  Smith,  6  Greenl.  (Me.) 416. 
453;    Ovvings   v.    Speed,    5   id.    423;        3  Childrens  v.  Saxby,  1  Vern.  207; 

.Jackson  v.  Nelson,  6  Cow.  248.  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §§  348-350;  Snow 

2  1   Greenl.  on   Ev.,  §  397,  citing  v.  Railroad  Co.,  12  Met.  44. 


430  COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  304. 

to  show  that  the  deed  had  at  one  time  existed.1  So  at  com- 
mon law  the  testimon}'  of  a  party  was  competent  to  prove 
all  preliminary  allegations  not  directly  involved  in  the  main 
issue;  as,  for  example,  that  a  witness  was  deceased,  or  could 
not  be  produced  after  a  diligent  search  had  been  made.2 

The  sworn  answer  of  the  respondent  to  a  bill  in  equity 
constituted  another  exception  to  the  incompetency  of  a  part}r 
as  a  witness.  Where  his  opponent  had  by  such  means  pro- 
cured evidence  for  his  own  use,  and  by  implication  thus  ad- 
mitlcd  the  veracity  of  the  adverse  party,  it  was  considered 
only  Just  that  the  party  who  was  thus  compelled  to  furnish 
evidence  against  himself  should  receive  the  benefit  of  any- 
thing which  he  may  have  said  in  his  own  behalf.3  But,  on  the 
other  hand,  the  admissions  of  the  defendant  contained  in  his 
answer  are  conclusive  upon  him.4  It  should  be  noted,  how- 
ever, that  the  replies  to  the  interrogatories  which  are  contained 
in  the  answer  do  not  constitute  evidence  for  the  defendant 
where  the  answer  is  verified  only  on  information  and  belief.5 
As  the  denials  or  replies  of  the  respondent  constitute  evidence 
for  him  in  equity,  it  follows  that  for  the  plaintiff  to  overcome 
their  force  the  averments  in  the  bill  which  are  denied  or  not 
expressly  admitted6  must  be  substantiated  by  the  testimony 
of  two  witnesses,  or  by  that  of  one  witness  corroborated  by 
circumstances.7 


'Patterson  v.   Winn,  5  Pet.  240;  v.    Perry,    10    Yerg.    (Tenn.)    600; 

Poignard   v.    Smith,    8    Pick.    278;  Hard}'   v.    Summers,    10  Gill  &  J. 

Page  v.  Page,  15  id.  368.  (Md.)  316.     See  §  14. 

2  Forbes   v.   Wale,  1  W.  Bl.  532;  ^Langdell,  Eq.  PI.,    §  84;    Home 

Cook  v.  Remington,  6  Mod.  237.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Myers,  93  111.  271 ;  Miller 

»2    Story,    §    1528;    Patterson    v.  v.  Payne,  4  Brad w.  (111.)  112. 


Scott  (III,  1893),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  433 
Nulton's  Appeal,  103  Pa.  St.  286 
Johnson  v.  Crippen,  62  Miss.  597 
Rick  v.  Neitzy,  1  Mackey  (D.  C),  21 
Bird    v.    Styles,    18   N.   J.   Eq.    297 


5  Allen  v.  O'Donnell,  28  Fed.  Rep. 
17;  Berry  v.  Sawyer,  19  id.  286. 

6  Cushman  v.  Bonfield,  36  111.  App. 
436;  Peeler  v.  Lathrop,  48  Fed.  Rep. 
780. 


Monroe  Cattle  Co.  v.  Becker,  147  7"  Unless  the  complainant  have 
U.  S.  47;  Slessinger  v.  Bucking-  two  witnesses,  or  one  witness  and 
ham,  17  Fed.  Rep.  454;  Hartley  v.  corroborating  circumstances,  he  will 
Mathews  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S.  Rep.  452;  not  be  entitled  to  relief.  The  rea- 
Lee  v.  Baldwin,  10  Ga.  208;  Lyerly  son  is,  by  calling  upon  the  respond- 
v.  Wheeler,  3  Ired.  (N.  C.)  Eq.  599;  ent  to  answer,  the  complainant  ad- 
Miles  v.  Miles,  32  N.  H.  147;  Jones  mits  that  the  answer  will  be  evidence 


§  305.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  431 

This  rule  requiring  the  plaintiff  to  overcome  the  answer  of 
the  defendant  in  equity  by  a  preponderance  of  witnesses  is 
not  invoked  where  the  answer  is  not  sworn  to  by  the  respond- 
ent, even  though  a  verification  has  been  waived  by  the  plaint- 
iff,1 or  when,  because  of  the  fact  that  the  defendant  is  a  cor- 
poration, no  sworn  answer  can  be  procured,2  or  in  the  case 
of  any  replies  or  denials  in  the  answer  which  are  not  respon- 
sive to  the  interrogatories  or  to  the  allegations  of  the  bill,3  or 
where  the  defendant  on  being  permitted  to  testify  orally  con" 
tradicts  the  statements  in  his  sworn  answer,4  or  where  the 
denial  is  simply  a  denial  of  a  conclusion  of  law.5 

§  305.  Competency  of  the  parties  as  witnesses  in  equity  — 
The  employment  and  effect  of  a  bill  of  discovery. —  Prior  to 
the  enactment  of  the  statutes  regulating  the  competency  of 
parties  as  witnesses  their  testimony  was  receivable  in  equity 
with  a  great  deal  more  liberality  than  in  the  courts  of  common 
law.  The  chancellor  could,  even  if  discovery  was  not  required, 
in  the  exercise  of  his  discretion  issue  an  order  for  the  exam- 
ination of  the  defendant  upon  the  application  of  the  plaintiff 
and  upon  proof  by  affidavit  that  his  evidence  was  material.6 
The  usual  course,  however,  was  for  the  plaintiff,  where  he 
wished  to  procure  the  evidence  of  one  or  more  of  the  defend- 
ants, to  include  in  his  bill  a  prayer  that  the  defendants 
should  be  required  to  make  discovery,  i.  e.,  a  disclosure  upon 

equal  to  the  testimony  of  any  other  v.  Linville,  10  Humph.  1G3;  Bank  v. 

witness,  so  that  he   cannot  prevail  Gerry,  5  Pet.  99-112. 

unless  the  balance  of  proof  is  in  his  3  Patterson  v.  Gaines,  6  How.  550; 

favor.     To  turn  the  scales  he  must  Rudy  v.  Austin,  56  Ark.  73:  At  wood 

at  least  have  circumstances  which  v.  Harrison,    5  J.  J.    Marsh.    (Ky.) 

corroborate  such  single  adverse  wit-  329;  Lane   v.    Marshall,  65  Vt.   85; 

ness."     The  court,  in  Tobey  v.  Leon-  Sears  v.  Mason's  Adm'r  (Va.,  1890), 

ard,  2  Wall.  403.     See,  also,  United  10  S.  E.  Rep.  529 ;  Cloud  v.  Calhoun, 

States  v.  Ferguson,  54  Fed.  Rep.  28;  10  Rich.  (S.   C.)   Eq.  358;  Green  v. 

Meyer  v.  Gullinan,  105  111.  272 ;  Brook  Vardiman,    2     Blackf.    (Ind.)    324: 

v.  Silver,  5  Del.  Ch.  7.  Cartlege  v.  Cutliff ,  29  Ga.  758 ;  Fisher 

Throckmorton  v.  Throckmorton,  v.  Porch,  10  N.  J.  Eq.  243;  Ingersoll 

15  S.  E.  Rep.  289;  Pecke  v.  Hunter,  v.  Stiger,   46   id.    511;    Coleman  v. 

86  Va.  768 ;  Bartlett  v.  Gale,  4  Paige  Ross,  46  Pa.  St.  180. 

(N.  Y.)s  503 ;  United  States  v.  Work-  4  Morris  v.  \\  bite,  36  N.  J.  Eq.  324. 

logman's  Council,  54  Fed.  Rep.  994.  5  Gaines  v.  Russ,  20  Fla.  157;  Dei- 

2Langdell,  Eq.  PL,  g  78;  McLard  mel  v.  Brown,  136  111.  586. 

6Ashton  v.  Parker,  14  Sim.  632. 


432  COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  305. 

oath  of  the  truth  of  the  facts  in  the  case  so  far  as  they  knew 
them.  This  pra}rer  is  usually  inserted  in  every  bill  which  is 
properly  framed,  the  specific  term  "  bills  of  discovery  "  being- 
reserved  for  those  bills  the  sole  object  of  which  is  to  obtain 
evidence  by  discovery  which  is  to  be  employed  in  a  proceed- 
ing in  a  court  of  law.1  Interrogatories  supporting  and  relat- 
ing to  the  principal  and  material  allegations  of  the  bill  are 
usually  appended  to  it,  and  these,  if  they  are  consistent  with 
the  averments  in  the  bill,  should  be  specifically  and  respon- 
sively  answered  by  the  defendant.2  The  defendant,  in  case 
he  is  desirous  of  avoiding  discovery,  must  plead  or  demur  to 
the  bill.  If  he  elects  to  make  discovery  he  should  answer 
with  particularity  and  preciseness,3  for,  if  he  demur  or  plead, 
the  truth  of  all  averments  in  the  bill  which  are  not  expressly 
traversed  are  taken  as  true  pro  confesso  and  the  averments 
are  then  admissible  as  evidence  for  the  plaintiff.4  The  defend- 
ant is  not  compellable  to  give  discovery  in  any  case  where,  if 
he  were  a  witness,  he  might  claim  to  be  privileged  from  an- 
swering the  question  put  to  him;  as,  for  example,  where  his 
answer  would  tend  to  render  him  liable  to  a  criminal  prose- 
cution or  to  punishment  for  crime,5  or  where  the  information 
which  is  sought  had  been  communicated  to  the  defendant 
while  he  was  acting  in  a  confidential  capacity,  as  attorney, 
physician  or  priest.6 

As  an  unsworn  answer  cannot  be  considered  as  evidence  for 
the  defendant,  and  as  the  plaintiff  is  not  required  to  overcome 

1 2  Story's  Eq.,  §  1489.  Eq.  PI.,  §  846 ;  Hill  v.  Cravy,  7  Ark. 

2  Mechanics'  Bunk  v.  Lynn,  1  Pet.     530 ;  Jones  v.  Wing,  Harr.  Ch.  (Mich. ) 
(U.  S.)  376;  Miller  v.  Saunders,  17    001. 

Ga.  92;  Mechanics'  Bank  v.  Levy,  3  5Langdell's  Eq.  PI.,  §  69;  1  Dan. 
Paige  (N.  Y.),  606;  Read  v.  Wood-  Ch.  PL  &  Pr.,  pp.  562,567;  Butler  v. 
ruffe,  24  Beav.  421;  Parkinson  v.  Catling,  1  Root  (Conn.),  310;  Wolf 
Trousdale,  3  Scam.  (111.)  307;  War-  v.  Wolf,  2  Har.  &  G.  (Md.)  382; 
ing  v.  Suydam,  4  Edvv.  (N.  Y.)  302;  Livingston  v.  Tompkins,  4  Johns. 
Shotwell  v.  Struble,  21  N.  J.  Eq.  31 ;  (N.  Y.)  Ch.  415;  Leigh  v.  Everheart, 
Brooks  v.  Byam,  1  Story,  290;  Woo-  4  T.  B.  Mon.  (Ky.)  379;  Northwest- 
ten  v.  Burch,  2Md.  Ch.  190;  M.  E.  ern  Bank  v.  Nelson,  1  Gratt.  (Va.) 
Church  v.  Jaques,  1  Johns.  (N.  Y.)  108;  Dwinal  v.  Smith,  25  Me.  379. 
Ch.  65,  cited  in  1  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.,  61  Dan.  Ch.  PI.  &  Pr.,  pp.  573, 
§  204.  574;  1  Pom.  Eq.  Jur.,  §  203 ;  Story's 

3  Walker  v.  Walker,  3  Ga.  302.  Eq.  PI.,  §  846. 
^Langdell's  Eq.  PI.,  §93;  Story's 


§  306.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  433 

its  force  as  such  by  the  production  of  two  witnesses  or  o'.one 
witness  and  corroborative  circumstances,  it  follows  that  such 
an  answer  cannot  be  excepted  to  upon  the  ground  of  the  in- 
sufficiency of  the  discovery  contained  in  it.1  Where,  however, 
the  defendant  undertakes  to  make  discovery  on  oath,  he  wrill 
be  required  to  make  full  discovery,  and,  in  case  he  shall  refuse 
to  do  so,  he  may  be  coerced  into  making  further  and  full  dis- 
covery by  the  chancellor.2 

§  306.  Defendant  in  criminal  trial  —  His  competency  as 
a  witness. — At  common  law  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  pros- 
ecution was  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  because 
of  his  interest  in  the  result,  nor  could  he  be  compelled  to  tes- 
tify against  a  person  jointly  indicted  with  him  until  he  was 
discharged  from  custody  or  convicted.  But  where  one  of 
several  jointly  indicted  pleaded  guilty  and  received  his  pun- 
ishment, he  was  held  competent  as  a  witness  in  behalf  of  his 
fellows  who  denied  their  guilt.3  By  statute  in  nearly  all  the 
states  of  the  Union  and  in  the  federal  courts  as  well,  the  ac- 
cused may  now,  in  all  cases,  testify  as  a  witness  in  his  own 
behalf.4  The  statutory  changes  through  which  the  incompe- 
tency of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  prosecution  to  testify  in 
his  own  behalf  has  been  removed  have  rendered  a  defendant 
a  competent  witness  in  behalf  of  those  indicted  with  him. 
But  generally  accomplices  are  competent  witnesses  for  each 
other,  though  concerned  in  the  same  crime,  only  when  sepa- 

1 1  Dan.   Cli.  PI.  &  Pr.   760,  n.  2;  as  a  party  or  otherwise,  or  by  reason 

Smith  v.  St.  Louis  Mut.  Life  Ins.  Co.,  of  his  having  been  convicted  of  any 

2  Tenn.    Ch.    599;   Bulkley  v.   Van  crime,  but  such  interest  or  convic- 

Wyck,  5  Paige  (N.  Y.),  536;  United  tion  may  be  shown  for  the  purpose 

States  v.  McLaughlin,  24  Fed.  Rep.  of  affecting  his  credibility ;  provided, 

823.  however,  that  a  defendant  in  any 

2Satterwhitev.  Davenport,  10  Rich,  criminal   case    or    proceeding  shall 

(S.  C.)  Eq.  305.  only  at  his  own  request  be  deemed  a 

3  Rex  v.  Fletcher,  1  Stra.  633.  competent  witness,  and  his  neglect 

4  The  statutes  of  all  the  states  are  to  testify  shall  not  create  any  pre- 
substantially  the  same  in  principle,  sumption  against  him,  nor  shall  the 
That  of  Illinois  may  be  given  as  an  court  permit  any  reference  or  corn- 
example.  "  No  person  shall  be  dis-  ment  to  be  made  to  or  upon  such  neg- 
qualified  as  a  witness  in  any  crim-  lect."  Illinois  Crim.  Code,  §  426. 
inal  trial  or  proceeding  by  reason  of  The  statutes  are  given  in  Abb.  Crim. 
his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  same  Brief,  §  387. 

28 


484:  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  307. 

rately  indicted.1  Hence  where  several  are  jointly  indicted  and 
jointly  tried,  whether  the  defendant  testifies  in  behalf  of 
another  defendant,  or  when  he  volunteers  as  a  witness  for 
the  state  against  his  associates,  i.  e.,  turns  state's  evidence,  it 
is  necessary  that  the  proceedings  should  have  come  to  an  end 
so  far  as  he  is  concerned  either  by  his  condemnation  or  ac- 
quittal.2 

The  fact  that  the  trial  of  a  defendant  had  been  postponed,  or 
that  he  was  to  have  a  separate  trial,  was  formerly  deemed  in- 
sufficient to  render  him  competent  as  a  witness  for  or  against 
others  jointly  indicted  with  him.3  This  rule,  however,  is  in 
modern  practice  and  by  statute  somewhat  relaxed,  and  9,  defend- 
ant who  is  indicted  jointly  with  another  person  but  who  has 
been  granted  a  separate  trial  may  testify  against  but  not  for 
the  other  defendant  prior  to  the  final  disposition  of  the  charge 
against  himself.4  On  the  other  hand,  if  the  state  has  closed 
its  case  without  producing  evidence  of  the  guilt  of  any  de- 
fendant which  is  sufficient  to  go  to  the  jury,  it  is  the  duty  of 
the  court  to  direct  a  verdict  of  acquittal  as  to  him,  and  he  is 
then  competent  as  a  witness  for  the  other  party.5 

§  307.  Statutory  competency  of  parties  as  witnesses. — 
A  party  to  the  record  is  now  general!}',  if  not  universally,  both 
competent  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  and  compellable  to 
testify  for  the  adverse  party.6  This  important  change  has 
been  brought  about  by  statutory  enactment  in  the  different 
states,  but  as  a  general  or  detailed  account  of  the  numerous 

i  United  States  v.  Hunter,  1  Cranch,  Tenn.  923;  State  v.  Steifel,  106  Mo. 

446 ;  McKenzie  v.  State,  24  Ark.  636.  129;   Sparks   v.    Com.,  89  Ky.    644; 

2  South  v.  State,  86  Ala.  617 ;  State  Allen  v.  State,  10  Ohio  St.  287 ;  State 

v.  Minor  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  v.  Thaden,  43  Minn.  325;  Carroll  v. 

1085;   Ballard  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893).  State,  5  Neb.  31.    Cf.  State  v.  Math- 

12  S.  Rep.  865:  Com.  v.  Marsh,  10  ews,    98  Mo.    125;  Barnes  v.    State 

Pick.  57;  People  v.  Bell,  10  Johns.  (Tex.,  1889),  US.  W.  Rep.  679;  Day 

95;  McGinnis  v.  State  (Wyo.,  1893),  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  143.    See  post, 

31  Pac.  Rep.  978;  State  v.  Jackson,  §£  323,  324. 

106  Mo.  174;  State  v.  Miller,  100  Mo.  5  Cochran  v..   Amnion,   16  111.316; 

606.    Seepost,  §  :  30,  for  accomplices.  Beasley  v.  Bradley,  2  Swan  (Tenn.), 

3 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  363.  180.     And  see  cases  cited  in  last  two 

4 McGinnis  v.   State  (Wyo.,  1893),  notes. 

31  Pac.  Rep.  978;  State  v.  Barrows,  6  In  re  Chiles,  22  Wall.  157;  Dogge 

76  Me.  401 ;  Benson  v.  United  States,  v.  State,  27  Neb.  272. 
146  U.  S.  245 ;  Richards  v.  State,  91 


§  308.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  435 

and  variant  statutes  on  this  subject  is  impossible  in  a  work  of 
this  scope,  the  reader  is  referred  to  the  local  statute  of  his  own 
state  and  to  the  cases  which  are  cited  in  the  notes.1  Generally 
by  these  statutes  the  jury  are  empowered  to  take  into  consid- 
eration the  interest  of  the  witness  in  the  suit  as  an  element 
bearing  upon  the  credibility  of  his  evidence,2  though  no  in- 
ference should  be  drawn  by-  them  from  the  fact  that  the  party 
does  not  exercise  his  statutory  right  to  testify  in  his  own  be- 
half.3 

The  competency  of  witnesses  in  the  federal  courts  is  also 
regulated  by  a  statute  which  provides  in  substance  that  the 
laws  of  the  state  within  the  limits  of  which  the  federal  court 
is  located  shall  be  its  rules  of  decision  as  to  competency  "  in 
trials  at  common  law,  in  equity  and  admiralty."  The  compe- 
tency of  witnesses  in  criminal  trials  in  federal  courts  is  not, 
therefore,  regulated  by  the  statutes  of  the  state  in  which  they 
are  located,  but  by  the  common  law  of  the  state  when  it  was 
admitted  into  the  Union,  modified  of  course  by  the  federal 
statutes  regulating  criminal  proceedings  and  the  competency 
of  witnesses  therein.4 

§  30S.  Statutory  incompetency  of  parties  to  testify  as 
to  transactions  with  deceased  or  insane  persons. —  Some- 
times parties  and  interested  witnesses  are  made  competent  by 
statute  without  any  exception.     In  some  of  the  states  of  the 

lrThe  statutes    mentioned  in  the  necticut,  Gen.  St.  1888,  §1094;  Vir- 

text  are  as  follows :  Maine,  R.  S.  1881,  ginia,  Code  1887,  §  3345;  North  Cart, 

p.   707,  §993;   Massachusetts,    Pub.  lina,  Code  1883,  §  589;  Florida,  Dig. 

St.  1882,  p.  987,  §18;  Rhode  Island,  1881,   p.   518;    Georgia,   Code   1882, 

Pub.  St.  1882,  p.  587,  §  33 ;  New  York,  §  854 ;  Mississippi,  Code  1880,  §  1599 ; 

Code    C.    P.,     828;     Pennsylvania,  Kentucky,  Code  1888,  §  605 :  Illinois. 

Bright.  Dig.,  p.  727,  §  20;  Maryland,  R.  S.,  p.  681,  §  2;  Kansas,  Gen.  Stat. 

Pub.  Laws  1888.  p.  685,  §§1-4;  West  1889,  §4414;   Nebraska,  Comp.   St. 

Virginia,  Code,   p.  806,  §23;  South  1889,  §899;  Nevada,  Comp.  St.  1885, 

Carolina.    Code,    §400;    Alabama,  §3399. 

Code  1886,  §2765;  Tennessee,  Code  '-Meeteer   v.   Man.   R.   R.   Co.,  63 

1884,  §4563;  Ohio,  R.  S.  1890,  §5240;  Hun.   533;  Douglass  v.  Fullerton,  7 

Iowa,  Const.    1857,  art.  1,  §4;  Indi-  111.  App.  102;  State  v.  Rush,  95  Mo. 

ana,    R.   S.   1881,   §  496;    Michigan,  199;  Harrington  v.  Hamburg  (Iowa, 

How.  Ann.  St.  1882,  p.  7544;  Minne-  1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  201. 

sota,  Gen.   Stat.    1878,  p.   792,  §  9;  3  Moore  v.  Wright,  90  111.  470.    See 

Montana,    Comp.    St.    1887,    §  647;  post,  §  346a. 

Arizona,    1887,  §  1831;  New  Hamp-  ••Logan  v.  United  States,  144  U.  S. 

shire,  Gen.  Laws,  1878,  p.  531 ;  Con-  263;  12  S.  Ct.  617. 


430  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES,  [§  308. 

Union,  however,  it  has  been  enacted  that.no  party  or  person 
interested  in  the  event  shall  be  a  competent  witness  against 
an  executor,  administrator  or  the  committee  of  a  lunatic  or 
inebriate,  while  elsewhere  such  an  interested  witness  is  incom- 
petent only  so  far  as  he  is  called  to  testify  to  a  personal  trans- 
action with  the  deceased  person  or  lunatic,1  or  "as  to  a  matter 
of  fact  occurring  before  the  death  of  the  deceased  person,"2 
or  to  "matters  equally  within  the  knowledge"  of  deceased.8 
The  present  policy  of  the  law  is  to  admit  freely  interested 
persons  as  witnesses.  Nevertheless  it  is  deemed  expedient, 
where  the  mouth  of  one  party  to  a  transaction  is  closed  by 
death,  that  the  other  should  also  be  silenced.  The  aim  and 
end  of  these  statutes  are  to  put  both  parties  upon  an  equality.4 
But  the  provisions  of  these  statutes  may  be  waived  expressly 
or  by  implication  by  the  representative  of  the  deceased  per- 
son. So  it  is  often  provided  by  statute  that  if  the  representa- 
tive voluntarily  produces  testimony  to  a  conversation  or  trans- 
action which  was  had  with  the  deceased,  either  by  going  on  the 
stand  himself,5  or  by  producing  the  testimony  of  the  deceased 
taken  by  deposition,6  or  at  a  former  trial,7  the  other  party  or 
any  interested  person  is  thereby  rendered  competent.8     These 

i  Illinois  R.  S.  1880,  ch.  51;  Colo-  v.  Hart,  29  111.  App.  260,  the  statute 

rado  Gen.  Laws,  §§  3644,  3647 ;  New  was  applied  in  an  action  against  a 

York  Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  829.  firm,  one  partner  of   which   was  a 

2  Code  Cal.,  §  1880.  survivor  of  the  old  firm  with  which 

3  How.  St.  Mich.,  §  7545.  the  transaction  was  had. 

*  Abbott's  Trial   Evidence,  p.  61,  6  Allen  v.  Chouteau,  103  Mo.  309; 

citing  cases.  Nixon   v.  McKinney,   105  N.  C.  23; 

5 Cousins  v.  Jackson,  52  Ala.  265;  Munroe  v.  Napier,  52  Ga.  38S;  Dun- 
Mitchell  v.  Cochran,  10  N.  Y.  S.  545;  lop  v.  Dunlop,  94  Mich.  11. 
Hard  v.  Ashley,  117  N.  Y.  606;  23  7 Taylor  v.  Bunker  (Mich.,  188S), 
N.  E.  Rep.  606;  Wilcox  v.  Corwin,  36  N.  W.  Rep.  166;  Stone  v.  Hunt 
23  N.  E.  Rep.  500;  117  N.  Y.  500;  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  454.  Cf. 
Jackson  v.  Jones,  74  Tex.  104;  Wil-  Walker  v.  Taylor,  43  Vt.  612;  Hay- 
cox  v.  Corsvin,  50  Hun,  425;  Nay  v.  den  v.  Grillo,  42  Mo.  App.  1. 
Curley,  113  N.  Y.  575.  Where  asur-  8Munn  v.  Owens,  2  Dill.  477;  Com. 
viving  partner  in  an  action  brought  Ice  Co.  v.  Kiefer,  26  III.  App.  466; 
against  him  on  a  firm  note  volun-  Martin  v.  Martin,  118  Ind.  227; 
tarily  testified  to  that  transaction,  Haskell  v.  Henry,  74  Me.  197 ;  Potts 
the  plaintiff  was  permitted  to  testify  v.  Mayer,  86  N.  Y.  302;  Williamson 
in  his  own  behalf  to  facts  and  cir-  v.  State,  59  Miss.  235;  McCarlin  v. 
cumstances  in  rebuttal.  Wiley  v.  Traphagen,  45  N.  J.  Eq.  265;  Parris 
Morse,  30  Mo.  App.  260.     In  Foster  v.  McNeal   (Neb.,  1893),    55   N.    W. 


§  308. J  COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES.  437 

statutes,  it  is  held,  do  not  prevent  the  representative  from 
calling  a  party  or  an  interested  witness  to  testify  for  the  es- 
tate,1 though  this  fact  alone,  that  such  a  witness  testifies  for 
the  representative,2  or  testifying  in  behalf  of  the  opposite  party 
is  cross-examined3  by  the  representative,  does  not,  where  the 
prohibition  against  testifying  is  absolute,  waive  the  right  of 
the  latter  to  have  his  testimony  stricken  out. 

In  a  New  York  case  4  it  has  been  held  that  the  statute  ex- 
cluding evidence  of  a  personal  transaction  was  not  meant  to 
abrogate  the  common-la\y,  rule  or  principle  of  evidence  that 
where  one  party  calls  a  witness,  and,  in  examining  him,  brings 
out  a  particular  part  of  a  communication  or  transaction,  the 
other  part}'  may  bring  out  the  whole  communication  or  trans- 
action so  far  as  it  has  any  bearing  upon,  or  so  far  as  it  qualifies 
or  explains,  that  specific  part  to  which  the  examination  was 
directed.  So,  in  accordance  with  this  principle,  it  has  been 
held  that  where  a  representative  of  a  deceased  party  examines 
the  surviving  party  as  to  a  personal  transaction  or  conversa- 
tion with  the  testator  or  intestate,  the  party  thus  examined  is 
thereby  enabled  to  testify,  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf,  to 
the  whole  transaction  concerning  which  he  has  been  exam- 
ined,5 but  not  to  other  transactions  or  conversations.6  This 
result  follows  only  where  the  executor  testifies  directly  to  the 
transaction,  but  not  where  he  testifies  to  facts  from  which  the 
existence  or  non-existence  of  the  personal  transaction  or  of 
some  incident  thereof  may  be  inferred.7    In  such  a  case  it  has 

Rep.  222.     Thus  writings  signed  by  612;  Canady  v.  Johnson,  40  Iowa, 

the  deceased  have  been  admitted  to  587:  Hopkins  v.  Bowers,   108  N.  C. 

rebut  evidence  of  his  verbal  declara-  298. 

tions  given   by  the  representative.  3  Achilles  v.  Achilles  (111.,  1891),  28 

Smith  v.  Christopher,   16  Abb.  Pr.  N.  E.  Rep.  45.     If  the  direct  exam- 

(N.  S.)332.    See  further  in  support  of  ination  is  excluded  the  cross-exam- 

the  text,  Kenyon  v.  Pierce,  17  R.  I.  ination  goes  with  it. 

794;  Sherer   v.  Ingerman,  110  Ind.  4  Nay  v.  Curley,  113  N.  Y.  575. 

442;    Trahern    v.    Colburn,   63  Md.  5  Nay  v.   Curley,   113  N.  Y.   578; 

104;   Rice    v.    Daly,    66    Hun,    628;  Michigan  Sav.  Bank  v.  Butler(Micl)., 

Haines  v.  Watts  (N.  J.,  1893),  26  Atl.  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  253. 

Rep.  572.     Contra,  Louman  v.  Au-  6  Copeland  v.  Koontz,  125  Ind.  126; 

brey,  72  111.  619;  Blood  v.  Fairbanks,  Butz  v.  Schwartz,  32  111.  App.  156. 

50  Cal.  420.  "'  Bowers  v.  State,  19  N.  Y.  State 

>  Chase  v.  Evoy,  51  Cal.  618.  Rep.  926. 

2  Herrington  v.  Winn,  14  N.  Y.  S. 


438  COMPETENCY   OF    WITNESSES.  [§  308. 

been  held  that,  where  the  adverse  party  may  testify  directly 
to  the  transaction  itself  which  is  gone  into  by  the  direct  evi- 
dence of  the  executor,  he  cannot  testify  to  any  fact  which 
would  contradict  inferences  created  by  his  evidence.1  The 
executor  must  have  testified  voluntarily  in  his  own  behalf  in 
order  to  let  in  the  evidence  of  the  surviving  party.2  The 
statute  is  not  applicable  when  a  defendant  to  a  suit  in  equity 
dies  after  his  sworn  answer3  containing  matter  which  is  ad- 
missible in  evidence  has  been  filed,  or  where  a  party  dies  after 
his  adversary  has  been  examined,4  or  where  the  executor  is 
suing  on  his  own  title.5 

The  courts  have  adopted  liberal  rules  of  construction  in  con- 
struing the  meaning  of  the  words  which  indicate  representa- 
tion or  succession  which  occur  in  statutes  providing  that 
parties  or  interested  witnesses  shall  not  be  competent  to  tes- 
tify in  actions  by  or  against  the  representatives  or  heirs  of  a 
decedent.6  Thus,  it  has  been  held  that  the  word  "representa- 
tive" includes  heirs,7  legatees 8  and  devisees.9  The  general 
principle  is  that  so  long  as  the  judgment  will  affect,  whether 
favorably  or  otherwise,  the  value  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased 
person,  the  relation  in  which  the  representative  stands  to  it  or 
the  form  in  which  he  sues,  whether  individually  10  or  as  a  rep- 
resentative, is  not  material.11 

The  true  end  and  object  of  these  statutes  are  to  close  the 
mouth  of  a  party  to  a  contract  or  other  transaction  when- 
ever the  other  party  is  dead  or  otherwise  incapacitated  from 

i  Lewis  v.  Merritt,   113  N.  Y.  388.  7  Ferbrache  v.  Ferbrache,  110  111. 

2  Corning  v.    Walker,    100   N.   Y.  210;  Ellis  v.  Stewart  (Tex.,  1894),  24 

550;  Rankin  v.  Hannan,  38  Ohio  St.  S.  W.  Rep.  585. 

438.  8  Curtis  v.  Wilson  (Tex.,  1893),  21 

a  Sweet   v.   Parker,   22  N.  J.   Eq.  S.  W.  Rep.  787. 

455;  Lanning  v.  Lanning,  17  id.  228.  9  Jass  v.  Mohn  (R.  I.,  1893),  26  Atl. 

But  cf.  Beckhaus  v.  Ladner,  48  id.  Rep.  787. 

152.  io  Louis  v.  Easton,  50  Ala.  470. 

4  Marlatt  v.  Warwick,  18  N.  J.  Eq.  UHollister  v.  Young,  41  Vt.  456. 
108.  It  has  been  held,  however,  that  "  rep- 

5  Hodges  v.  Carvill,  44  N.  J.  L.  456.  resentative"  should  be  strictly  con- 

6  Marshall  v.  Peck,  91  111.  187;  strued  as  signifying  only  a  party  who 
Dewey  v.  Goodenough,  56  Barb.  54 ;  represents  another  on  the  record. 
Green  v,  Edick,  56  N.  Y.  696;  Lloyd  Crimmins  v.  Crimmins,  43  N.  J.  Eq. 
v.  Hollenback  (Mich. ,  1893),  57  N.  W.  87. 

Rep.  110. 


|j  308.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  439 

testifying  in  his  own  behalf,  and  where  his  rights  have  passed 
by  his  own  act  or  by  the  act  of  the  law  to  some  other  person 
who  represents  him  or  his  estate  in  the  action,  but  whose 
sources  of  original  information  as  regards  the  transaction  in 
question  are  so  inadequate  as  compared  with  the  other  and  sur- 
viving party  that  the  representative  is  presumed  to  be  utterly 
unable  to  testify  as  to  any  of  the  details  of  the  transaction.1 
In  case  the  statute  is  in  its  form  a  proviso  in  or  a  mere  ex- 
ception from  a  statute  abolishing  the  incompetency  of  inter- 
ested witnesses  at  common  law,  then,  if  the  party  or  interested 
person  would  have  been  competent  at  common  law  as  a  wit- 
ness against  the  estate  of  the  deceased  person,  he  is  so  against 
his  representative.2  But  the  evidence  of  an  interested  witness 
is  absolutely  excluded  by  a  statute  of  this  sort  which  is  an  in- 
dependent and  affirmative  enactment.3 

These  statutes  have  been  construed  liberally  with  the  sole 
object  of  placing  the  parties,  living  or  deceased,  upon  an 
equality  so  far  as  the  evidence  of  the  transaction  is  concerned. 
The  fact  that  one  only  of  several  persons  jointly  sued  repre- 
sents a  deceased  person  is  enough  to  render  the  adverse  party 
incompetent,4  though  where  one  of  several  joint  parties,  as, 
for  example,  the  members  of  a  firm,  is  deceased,  and  it  appears 
that  he  took  no  active  part  in  the  transaction  or  had  no  knowl- 
edge of  it,  his  death  before  the  suit  is  brought  will  not  render 
the  actual  parties  to  the  transaction  incompetent  as  witnesses.5 
But  under  such  circumstances,  when  the  deceased  partner  had 
full  personal  knowledge,  and  the  surviving  partner,  though 
equally  bound,  had  very  little,  if  any,  knowledge  of  the  trans- 
action, the  adverse  party  will  not  be  allowed  to  testify.6 

1  Taylor  v.  Dusterberg,  109  Ind.  »  Mattoon  v.  Young,  45  N.  Y.  696. 
165;  Paxton  v.  Paxton  ("W.  Va.,  4  Force  v.  Dutcher,  22  N.  J.  Eq. 
1894),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  765;  Louis  v.  453;  Godfrey  v.  Templeton  (Tenn., 
Easton,   50    Ala.    470;    Johnson    v.  1888),  6  S.  W.  Rep.  47. 

Heald,  33  Md.  352:  Hubbell  v.  Hub-  »  Hardy  v.   Chesapeake  Bank,  51 

bell,    22    Ohio    St.    208;    Brown    v.  Md.  596 ;  Fulkerson  v.  Thornton,  68 

Brightman,  11  Allen  (Mass.),  226.  Mo.  468. 

2  Fink  v.  Hey,   42  Mo.   App.  295;  <>  Wiley  v.  Morse,  30  Mo.  App.  266; 
Bates  v.  Forcht,  89  Mo.  120 ;  Beach  Campbell     Banking     Co.     v.    Cole 
v.    Pennell,   50   Me.    387;    Sykes  v.  (Iowa,   1893),  56   N.    W.    Rep.    441; 
Bates,  26  Iowa,  522;  ADgell  v.  Hes-  Williams  v.  Perkins,  83  Mo.  379. 
ter,  64  Mo.  142. 


uo 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  309. 


§  300.   What    are   transactions   with    decedents. —  The 

phrase  "personal  transaction,"  while  not  to  be  defined  in  the 
abstract,1  does  not  include  evidence  of  the  birth  of  a  deceased 
person,2  or  of  his  physical 3  or  mental  condition,4  or  an  opinion 
upon  the  value  of  services5  rendered  him  or  board  or  supplies 
furnished  him  by  the  plaintiff  or  by  some  other  person  than 
the  witness,6  or  evidence  of  the  fact  of  a  conversation  having 
been  had.  where  this  fact  is  collateral  merely.7  An  interested 
witness  may  testify  to  a  conversation  or  transaction  by  the 
deceased  with  a  co-party  to  the  record,8  or  with  some  third  per- 
son who  is  still  living,9  at  which  the  witness  was  present  and 
overheard  what  was  said,  provided  the  witness  did  not  him- 
self participate  in  the  conversation.10  So  the  general  rule  is 
that  the  interested  witness  may  testify  to  a  transaction  or 
conversation  which  he  had  with  an  agent  of  the  deceased  who 
is  still  alive  ll  and  who  disclosed  the  name  of  the  principal,12  or 
may  testify  that  a  contract  on  which  he  sues  is  in  deceased's 


1  Abbott's  Trial  Evidence,  p.  68. 

2  Matter  of  Paige,  62  Barb.  476. 

3  In  re  McCarthy,  65  Hun,  624; 
Sullivan  v.  Latimer  (S.  C,  1893),  17 
S.  E.  Rep.  701. 

4  Williams'  Ex'r  v.  Williams  (Ky., 
1890),  13  S.  W.  Rep.  250 ;  Carey  v. 
Carey,  104  N.  C.  171;  Ducker  v. 
Whitson  (N.  C,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep. 
854. 

5  Lewis  v.  Meginnis,  30  Fla.  419. 
6Pritchard  v.   Pritchard,  69  Wis. 

373. 

^Loder  v.  Whelpley,  111  N.  Y. 
239 ;  Daniels  v.  Foster,  26  Wis.  286 ; 
Hier  v.  Grant,  47  N.  Y.  278.  A 
party  offering  evidence  which  is 
prima  facie  objectionable  under 
these  statutes  must  show  at  the  trial 
that  as  limited  by  him  it  does  not 
infringe  the  statute.  Rhodes  v. 
Pray,  36 Minn.  395.  "A  transaction 
is  whatever  may  be  done  by  one 
person  affecting  another's  rights, 
and  out  of  which  a  cause  of  action 
ma}'  arise.  A  contract  is  a  transac- 
tion, but  a  transaction  is  not  always 
a  contract."    Scarborough  v.  Smith, 


18  Kan.  406 ;  Roberts  v.  Donovan,  70 
Cal.  113. 

8  Smith  v.  James,  34  N.  W«  Rep. 
309. 

9  Hughey  v.  Eichelberger,  11  S.  C. 
36;  Lehigh  v.  Railroad  Co.,  41  N.  J. 
Eq.  187 :  Petrie  v.  Petrie,  6  N.  Y.  S. 
831;  Stern  v.  Isman,  51  Hun,  224: 
Connelly  v.  O'Conner,  17  N.  Y.  State 
Rep.  261 ;  In  re  Budlong,  7  N.  Y.  S. 
229 ;  Badger  v.  Badger,  88  N.  Y.  559. 

io  Connelly  v.  O'Conner,  17  N.  Y. 
State  Rep.  261;  Stern  v.  Eisner,  51 
Hun,  224 ;  Lobdell  v.  Lobdell,  36  N.  Y. 
327;  Holcomb  v.  Holcomb,  95  N.  Y. 
325 ;  Petrie  v.  Petrie,  6  N.  Y.  S.  831 ; 
Cary  v.  White,  59  N.  Y.  336 ;  Badger 
v.  Badger,  88  N.  Y.  336. 

ii  Pratt  v.  Elkins,  80  N.  Y.  198; 
Reherd  v.  Clem,  86  Va.  374;  Cairns 
v.  Mooney,  62  Vt.  172;  Orr  v.  Rode, 
101  Mo.  387  (trustee  of  deceased 
trustor).  Contra,  Sutherland  v.  Ross, 
140  Pa.  St.  379;  21  Atl.  Rep.  354:  2S 
W.  N.  C.  17.  Cf.  Voss  v.  King,  38 
W.  Va.  236,  where  agont  and  princi- 
pal were  both  dead. 

i-  Stamford  v.  Hornitz,  49  Ind.  025, 


§  300.] 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


4dl 


handwriting,1  though  not  that  he  saw  him  sign  it.  The  sur- 
viving party  may  testify  as  to  his  place  of  residence  when  he 
had  the  transaction  with  the  deceased,  that  being  no  part  of 
the  transaction  itself.2 

The  term  "contract  in  issue"  in  a  statute  rendering  a  sur- 
viving  part\r  thereto  incompetent  signifies  the  contract  which 
is  substantially  in  dispute  and  not  that  which  appears  upon 
the  formal  allegations  of  the  pleadings.3  Testimony  is  ad- 
missible of  facts  occurring  after  the  decease  of  the  party  under 
a  statute  which  renders  incompetent  evidence  of  personal 
transactions  with  him.4  Nor  is  such  evidence  objectionable 
because  the  jury  may  infer  from  it  the  existence  of  a  personal 
transaction  with  the  deceased  party.5  The  rule  excluding  evi- 
dence of  a  personal  transaction  with  a  deceased  person  oper- 
ates to  prevent  the  survivor  from  testifying  to  the  contents 
of  a  letter  sent  to  the  deceased,6  or  to  the  fact  that  a  letter 
was  delivered  to  him,7  though  it  does  not  prevent  the  intro- 
duction of  a  writing  executed,  by  him.  The  writing  cannot 
be  explained  by  the  testimony  of  a  party  or  interested  witness8 


The  mere  fact  that  a  third  person 
was  present  at  an  interview  between 
the  deceased  and  a  surviving  party 
does  not  render  the  latter  competent. 
Hatch  v.  Perignet,  64  Barb.  189; 
Hutchison  v.  Cleary,  55  N.  W.  Rep. 
729;  Burnham  v.  Cleary,  34  Wis. 
117. 
i  Sawyer  v.  Grandy  (N.  C,  1893), 

18  S.  E.  Rep.  79.     Contra,  Holliday 
v.  McKinnie,  22  Fla.  153. 

2 Trimble  v.  Mims  (Ga.,  1894),  18 
S.  E.  Rep.  362.  Where  a  statute  in 
terms  excludes  the  testimony  of 
parties  and  interested  witnesses  "in 
any  action  upon  a  claim  or  demand 
against  the  estate  of  a  deceased  per- 
son," it  has  been  held  that  the  stat- 
ute does  not  operate  in  an  action  to 
enforce  a  mechanic's  lien  which  is  in 
the  nature  of  a  proceeding  in  rem. 
Booth  v.  Pendola  (Cal.,  1890),  23  Pac. 
Rep.  200.  But  the  contrary  was  held 
in  Gunther  v.   Bennett  (Md.,  1890), 

19  Atl.  Rep.  1048. 


3  Barnes  v.  Dow,  59  Vt.  545. 

*Kreps  v.  Carlisle  (Pa,  1893),  27 
Atl.  Rep.  741 ;  Swazey  v.  Ames,  79 
Me.  483;  Gifford  v.  Thomas  (Vt., 
1890),  19  Atl.  Rep.  1088. 

5  In  re  Debaun,  4  N.  Y.  S.  342; 
Porter  v.  Nelson,  121  Pa.  St.  640; 
Moore  v.  Dutson,  79  Ga.  458;  5  S.  E. 
Rep.  38;  Rothrock  v.  Gallaher,  91  Ga. 
id.  108 ;  Griffin  v.  Griffin,  17  N.  E.  Rep. 
782;  125  111.  430.  It  is  held  that  the 
witness  cannot  testify  to  a  relation- 
ship or  condition  which  existed  after 
the  death  of  the  party  which  was 
founded  on  a  personal  transaction 
with  him  prior  thereto.  Denison  v. 
Denison,  35  Md.  861  j  Adams  v.  Ed- 
wards, 115  Pa.  St.  211;  Adams  v. 
Morrison,  113  N.  Y.  152. 

6  Sabre  v.  Smith,  62  N.  H.  663. 

7  Howard  v.  Zimpelman  (Tex., 
1890),  14  S.  W.  Rep.  59. 

8  Miller  v.  Motter,  35  Md.  428; 
Berry  v.  Stevens,  69  Me.  290. 


442  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  310. 

when  offered  against  the  executor,  though  it  may  be  explained 
or  contradicted  when  offered  '  in  his  behalf,  as  by  such  action 
the  representative  has  opened  the  door  for  the  adverse  party. 

The  prohibition  of  the  introduction  of  evidence  of  a  per- 
sonal transaction  with  the  deceased  should  be  construed,  not 
only  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  direct  proof  of  such  a 
transaction,  but  to  prevent  its  proof  by  indirection  as  well. 
So  the  surviving  party  should  not  be  permitted  to  attempt  to 
prove  the  transaction  inferentially  by  offering  evidence  that 
some  third  person  did  not  do  the  thing  which  the  deceased  is 
alleged  to  have  done,  or  by  disconnecting  any  particular  fact 
from  its  surroundings  and  proving  it  as  a  seemingly  independ- 
ent fact,  when  in  truth  it  originated  in,  was  caused  by  or  was 
connected  with  a  personal  transaction  evidence  of  which  is  in- 
admissible.2 

Whether  a  transaction  is  within  the  statute  is  a  preliminary 
question  for  the  court,3  and  the  witness  who  is  about  to  testify 
may  be  interrogated  by  the  court  as  to  what  passed  and 
whether  he  was  a  privy  to  the  transaction  or  was  disinterested 
and  merely  overheard  a  conversation  of  the  deceased  with 
some  third  person.4  The  death  of  the  party  whose  representa- 
tive objects  to  the  admission  of  the  evidence  may  usually  be 
shown  prima  facie  by  the  letters  under  which  he  acts,5  though 
if  a  party  sued  individually  defends  as  an  administrator  and 
claims  the  statutory  privileges  of  a  representative,  he  must 
have  established  his  title  and  representative  status  in  some 
preliminary  proceedings.6 

§  310.  Persons  interested  —  Their  statutory  incompe- 
tency.—  In  some  of  the  states  it  is  provided  by  statute  that  no 
person  whatever  who  is  interested  in  the  event  of  an  action, 
or  any  person  from  whom  a  part}r  or  interested  person  de- 
rives his  interest,  can  testify  in  his  own  behalf  or  in  behalf  of 
a  party  claiming  under  him  against  the  personal  representa- 
tive of  a  deceased  or  insane  person  as  to  any  personal  con- 
versation or  transaction  with  the  latter.7     The  interest  which 

1  Hubbard  v.  Johnson,  77  Me.  139.        5  Parhan  v.  Moran,  4  Hun,  717. 

2  Clift  v.  Moses,  112  N.  Y.  426;  21  ^Prewitt  v.  Lambert  (Colo.,  1893), 
N.  Y.  State  Rep.  777.  34  Pac.  Rep.  G84. 

» Abbott's  Trial  E v.,  66,  "New    York     Civ.   Pro.,    §    829; 

4  Isenhour    v.   Isenhour,   64  N.   C.     Illinois  R.  S.,  ch.  51,  sec.  1;  Shields 

640;  Abbott's  Trial  Ev.,  66.  v.  Smith  (N.  C,  1893),  10  S.  E.  Rep. 


310.J 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


443 


will  disqualify  a  witness  who  is  not  a  party  to  the  action 
must  be  direct,  pecuniary  and  beneficial,1  such  as  would  render 
him  incompetent  at  common  law.2  So  if  the  witness  is  equally 
interested  on  both  sides,3  or  if  his  interest  is  very  contingent 
or  remote,  he  will  be  allowed  to  testify.4  An  heir,  legatee  or 
devisee  of  a  party  is  an  interested  person,  and  hence  is  in- 
competent to  testify  against  the  representative  of  a  deceased 
person.5 

The  term  "  person  from  whom  the  party  or  interested  wit- 
ness derives  his  title"  includes  not  onlv  his  immediate  assignor, 
but  all  prior  grantors  or  assignors.6     An   interested  witness 


76;  California  Code,  §  1880,  cl.  3; 
Florida  Laws,  ch.  101,  §  24;  Iowa 
Rev.  Code,  1886,  §  3639;  Maine  R.  S. 
1833,  ch.  82,  §  98;  Montana  Stat. 
Code  Civ.  Pro.,  §  647;  Nevada  Gen. 
Stat.  1885,  §  3399;  North  Carolina 
Code,  1883,  §§  £89,  590,  1357;  Ohio 
R.  S.  1886,  SS  5240,  5241,  5242;  West 
Virginia  Code,  ch.  130,  §  23. 

1  Fuchs  v.  Fuchs,  48  Mo.  App.  18; 
Nearpass  v.  Gilraan,  104  N.  Y.  210; 
Fowler  v.  Smith,  153  Pa.  St.  639;  In 
re  Bedlow's  Will,  67  Hun,  408; 
Bowers  v.  Schuler  (Minn.,  1893),  55 
N.  W.  Rep.  817;  Graves  v.  Safford, 
41  111.  App.  659;  In  re  Taylor,  154 
Pa.  St.  183;  Bunn  v.  Todd,  107  N.  C. 
226;  Fogal  v.  Page,  59  Hun,  625; 
Allen  v.  Hawks,  13  Pick.  70 ;  Hobart 
v.  Hobart,  62  N.  Y.  80;  Stewart  v. 
Kip,  5  Johns.  256;  Shaack  v.  Meily, 
136  Pa.  St.  161 ;  26  W.  N.  C.  569. 

2  Beard  v.  First  Nat.  Bank,  39 
Minn.  547. 

s  Scott  v.  Harris,  127  Ind.  520. 

4  Huckabee  v.  Abbott,  87  Ala.  409; 
Nearpass  v.  Gilman,  104  N.  Y.  507; 
Harrow  v.  Brown,  76  Iowa,  179; 
Clark  v.  McNeal,  114  N.  Y.  289; 
Rank  v.  Grote  (N.  Y.,  1888),  17  N.  E. 
Rep.  665;  Wallace  v.  Straus,  113  N. 
Y.  238;  Duryea  v.  Granger  (Mich., 
1887),  33  N.  W.  Rep.  730.  The  son 
of  a  party  to  an  action  is  not  by 
reason  of  his  relationship  a  person 


interested  whose  evidence  is  incom- 
petent. New  York  Smelting  Co.  v. 
Lieb,  4  N.  Y.  S.  545;  56  Super.  Ct. 
Rep.  (N.  Y.)  308. 

*Loder  v.  Whelpley,  111  N.  Y 
239;  Mills  v.  Davis,  113  N.  Y.  243 
Kerr  v.  Lunsford,  31  W.  Va.  659 
In  re  Eysamen,  113  N.  Y.  62.  Cf. 
Staser  v.  Hogan,  21  N.  E.  Rep.  911; 
Todd  v.  Dibble,  6  Dem.  Sur.  35 
Brigham  v.  Gott,  3  N.  Y.  S.  518 
Smith  v.  Pierce  (Vt.,  1893),  25  Atl 
Rep.  1092;  Dickson  v.  McGraw,  151 
Pa.  St.  98;  West  v.  Randall,  2  Mason, 
181;  Payne  v.  Kerr,  66  Hun,  636; 
In  re  Bedlow,  67  Hun,  408;  Carlile 
v.  Burley,  3  Greenl.  250.  A  widow 
whose  inchoate  right  of  dower  will 
attach  to  land  recovered  is  interested 
in  the  event.  Crane  v.  Crane,  81 
111.  166;  Ervin  v.  Ervin,  18  Civ.  Pro. 
Rep.  11;  Redfield  v.  Redfield,  110  N. 
Y  674;  Warrick  v.  Hull,  102  111.  280. 
Cf.  Miller  v.  Montgomery,  78  N.  Y. 
285;  Sanford  v.  Ellithorpe,  95  N.  Y. 
48;  Eisenlord  v.  Eisenlord,  2  N.  Y. 
S.  123;  Steele  v.  Ward,  30  Hun,  355; 
Devinney  v.  Carey,  23  N.  Y.  State 
Rep.  20S;  5  N.  Y.  S.  289  (holding 
that  a  tenant  by  the  curtesy  is  an  in- 
terested person). 

6  Parcell  v.  McReynolds  (Iowa, 
1887),  33  N.  W.  Rep.  139;  Pope  v. 
Allen.  90  N.  Y.  298;  Drew  v.  Sim- 
mons,   58    Ala.    4GJ;  Stackable    v. 


444 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  310. 


ma}7  be  made  competent  bjr  absolutely  releasing  his  claims,1 
though  he  ma}7  be  asked  if  the  assignment  was  made  solely 
to  qualify  him  as  a  witness; 2  and  if  it  is  not  a  ho?ia  fide  as- 
signment he  will  be  still  incompetent.3 

Where  the  statute  expressly  refers  to  parties  as  incompe- 
tent it  is  held  that  third  persons  merely  interested  in  the 
event  are  not  included  thereby.4  So  where  those  having  "ad- 
verse interests"  are  mentioned,  witnesses  whose  interests  are 
not  adverse  to  the  deceased  may  be  permitted  to  testify  in  be- 
half of  the  surviving  party.5  The  evidence  given  by  a  sur- 
viving party  or  by  an  interested  person  of  personal  transactions 
with  the  deceased  will  not  be  rejected  by  the  court  of  its  own 
motion,6  but  the  objection  to  the  witness,  which  must  specific- 
ally point  out  the  grounds,7  must  be  taken  by  the  administra- 
tor or  other  party  acting  in  a  representative  capacity,8  and 
it  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  waived  if  it  is  not  promptly 
made  by  him.9 

Upon  the  question  whether  the  death  or  insanity  of  an 
agent  or  other  fiduciary  representative  of  a  party  to  a  con- 
tract will  render  the  testimony  of  the  other  party  or  of  an 


Stackpole  (Mich.,    18S7),    33   N.  W. 
Rep.  808. 

i  O'Brien  v.  Weiler,  68  Hun,  64; 
Genet  v.  Lawyer,  61  Barb.  211 ;  In  re 
Wilson,  103  N.  Y.  374;  Loder  v. 
Whelpley,  111  id.  239;  Brown  v. 
Clock.  5  N.  Y.  Supp.  245. 

2  Buck  v.  Patterson,  75  Mich.  397. 

:>Bonstead  v.  Cuyler  (Pa.,  1887),  8 
Atl.  Rep.  848. 

<  Rawson  v.  Knight,  73  Me.  340 
Spencer  v.  Robbins,  106  Ind.  580 
Bassett  v.  Shepardson,  52  Mich.  3 
Wilson  v.  Russell,  61  N.  H.  355 
Lytlev.  Bond,  40  Vt.  618;  Pendell 
v.  Neuberger,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  177. 

»Gerz  v.  Weber,  151  Pa.  St.  396; 
Thistlewaite  v.  Thistlewaite,  132  Ind. 
355;  Howie  v.  Edward  (Ala.,  1893), 
11  S.  Rep.  748;  Haramill  v.  Sup. 
Council,  152  Pa.  St.  537. 

6  Rowland  v.    Rowland,   40  N.    J. 


Eq.  281.  Contra,  Sherman  v.  Lanier, 
39  N.  J.  Eq.  253. 

"'  Lewin  v.  Russell,  42  N.  Y.  251. 

8  Marcy  v.  Arnazeen,  61  N.  H.  133. 

9Parrish  v.  McNeal  (Neb.,  1893), 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  222;  Norris  v.  Stew- 
art's Heirs,  105  N.  C.  455;  10  S.  E. 
Rep.  912.  Of.  Sager  v.  Dorr,  4  N. 
Y.  S.  568;  Dilley  v.  Love,  61  Md. 
607.  If  the  objection  is  taken  be- 
fore judgment  it  seems  that  it  will 
suffice.  Dodge  v.  Stanhope,  55  Md. 
121.  Or  if  evidence  to  rebut  it  is 
offered.  Phillips  v.  McGrath,  62  Wis. 
124.  But  it  was  held  that  the  er- 
roneous reception  of  evidence  inad- 
missible under  these  statutes  is 
cured  where  the  opposite  party  fails 
to  attempt  to  rebut  the  fact  which 
has  been  testified  to  in  case  the  bur- 
den of  doing  so  is  on  him.  Wheeler 
v.  Wheeler,  18  N.  Y.  State  Rep.  445; 
2  N.  Y.  S.  44:;. 


§  311.1  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  445 

interested  person  incompetent  the  cases  are  not  harmonious. 
The  weight  of  the  decisions  sustains  the  rule  that  the  adverse 
party  will  not  be  allowed  to  testify  to  any  conversation  or 
transaction  he  may  have  had  with  the  deceased  agent.1  But 
the  contrary  doctrine  is  not  without  the  support  of  authority.2 
§  311.  Incompetency  of  parties  to  negotiable  instruments 
to  impeach  them. —  In  many  of  the  early  English  cases,3  in 
the  supreme  court  of  the  United  States,4  and  in  the  courts  of 
several  of  the  state  commonwealths,  a  rule  has  been  laid  down 
that  a  party  to  a  negotiable  instrument,  i.  e.,  the  maker  or  in- 
dorser  thereof,  is  incompetent  in  a  subsequent  suit  brought  on 
the  instrument  to  testify  as  a  witness  to  any  fact  impeaching 
the  instrument  which  existed  when  he  signed  or  indorsed  the 
note  or  other  negotiable  security.5  The  basis  of  this  exclusory 
rule  is  generally  stated  to  be  that  it  is  contrary  to  sound  public 
policy  and  good  morals  to  allow  a  person  who  has,  for  his  own 
benefit,  giving  currency  and  circulation  to  a  negotiable  instru- 
ment, to  state  facts  which  might  invalidate  it  in  the  hands  of 
a  bona  fide  purchaser  or  holder  for  value.  However  true  this 
view  may  be  in  case  the  person  is  himself  a  party  —  and  cer- 
tainly as  a  party  he  should  be  estopped,  upon  general  prin- 
ciples of  estoppel,  from  impeaching  his  own  deliberate  act, —  it 
does  not  seem  applicable  where  third  parties  only  are  in  liti- 
gation, if  the  witness  knows  the  discrediting  fact  and  if  that 

1  Whiting  v.  Traynor,  74  Wis.  86;  Henderson  v.  Anderson,  3  How. 
293;  Sabler  v.  Shef.   S.  Co.,  87  Ala.     (U.  S.)  73. 

305;  Warten  v.  Strane,  82  Ala.  311  5 Fox  v.  Whitney,   16  Mass.   118; 

(clerk);  Mobile  S.   Bank  v.  McDon-  Shainburg  v.  Commagere,  5  Martin 

nell.  87  id.  736;  Johnson  v.  Hart,  82  (La.),  9;    Sweeny  v.  Easter,  1  Wall. 

Ga.  767;  Kansas  M.  Co.  v.  Wagner,  166;  Haddock  v.  Wilmarth,  5  N.  H. 

25  Neb.  439.  187;     Dewey    v.    Warriner,    71    111. 

2  Farmers'  Ins.  Co.  v.  Insurance  198;  Fox  v.  Whitney,  16  Mass.  r.18; 
Co.,  40  Minn.  152;  Sprague  v.  Bond  Strong  v.  Wilson,  1  Morris  (Iowa}, 
(N.  C,  1894),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  701 ;  South  84;  Dearing  v.  Sawtelle,  4  Greeni. 
Baltimore  Co.  v.  Muhlback,  69  Md.  (Me.)  191;  Treon  v.  Brown,  14  Ohio, 
395;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Cornell,  41  482;  Rohrer  v.  Morningstar,  18  Ohio, 
Ohio  St.  401;  Reynolds  v.  Iowa  Ins.  579;  Thayer  v.  Crossman,  1  Mete. 
Co.,  80  Iowa,  563;  46  N.  W.  Rep.  (Mass.)  416;  Gaul  v.  Willis,  26  Pa. 
659.  St.  259.     The  rule  is  not  invoked  in 

3  Walton  v.  Shelley,  1  T.  R.  296,  case  the  party  has  indorsed  "  with- 
ered in  Greeni.  on  Ev.,  §  383.  out  recourse."    2  Pars,  on  Pr.  N.  & 

*  United  States  v.  LejBfter,  11  Pet.     B.  470;  Abbott  v.  Mitchell,  6  Shepl. 

355. 


UQ 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


C§ 312- 


fact  is  one  of  which  the  law  allows  proof.1  The  rule  has  been 
repudiated  both  in  England  and  in  America  by  the  majorit}' 
of  the  cases.2  In  any  case  it  is  only  applicable  to  negotiable 
paper  issued  in  the  usual  course  of  trade  before  maturity,3  and 
does  not  apply  between  the  original  parties  or  to  those  who 
take  the  paper  with  notice  of  any  equitable  defenses  good  as 
between  the  parties.4  The  rule  does  not  render  the  person 
incompetent  as  a  witness  to  any  facts  which  have  taken  place 
subsequent  to  his  act  of  indorsement,5  or  to  facts  not  in  any 
way  impairing  or  discrediting  the  validity  of  the  instrument.6 
§  312.  Competency  of  counsel  as  witnesses. —  By  some  of 
the  early  cases  it  was  held,  not  indeed  as  a  positive  rule  of 
law,  but  rather  as  a  matter  of  propriety  and  procedure  deemed 
necessary  to  the  impartial  administration  of  justice,  that  an 
attorney-at-law  could  not  testify  for  his  client  in  the  cause  in 
which  he  was  engaged.7  But  the  modern  rule  is  otherwise, 
and  counsel  are  competent  witnesses  for  a  party  as  to  all  facts 
which  are  within  their  personal  knowledge,8  though  the  prac- 
tice of  receiving  this  sort  of  testimony  should  not,  it  seems,  be 
encouraged,9  in  view  of  the  bias  with  which  the  mind  of  the 


1  Abbott's  Trial  Evidence,  §  417. 

2  Stafford  v.  Rice,  5  Cowen,  23; 
Guy  v.  Hull,  3  Murph.  (N.  C.)  150; 
Griffing  v.  Harris,  9  Port.  (Ala.) 
225;  Taylor  v.  Beck,  3  Rand.  (Va.) 
216;  Jackson  v.  Parker,  13  Conn. 
352;  Freeman  v.  Britton,  2  Harr. 
(N.  J.)  191;  Knight  v.  Packard,  3 
McCord,  71;  Slack  v.  Mass,  Dud. 
(Ga.)  161;  Abbott  v.  Ross,  62  Me. 
194;  Stump  v.  Napier,  2  Yerger 
(Tenn.),  35;  Todd  v.  Stafford,  1  Stew. 
(Ala.)  199;  Gorham  v.  Carroll,  3  Litt. 
(Ky.)  121;  Ringgold  v.  Tyson,  3 
Harr.  &  J.  172;  Parsons  v.  Phipps, 
4  Tex.  341 ;  Bank  v.  Hull,  7  Mo.  273; 
Williams  v.  Walbridge,  3  Wend. 
415 ;  Orr  v.  Lacey,  2  Doug.  230. 

3  Parke  v.  Smith,  4  Watts  &  S. 
287;  Rohrerv.  Morningstar,  18  Ohio, 
579;  Thayer  v.  Crossman,  1  Mete. 
416. 

4  Bubier  v.  Pulsifer,  4  Gray  (Mass.), 
592. 


5  Haines  v.  Dennett,  11  N.  H.  180. 

6  Sweeney  v.   Easter,  1  Wall.   166. 

7  Stones  v.  Byron,  4  Dowl.  &  L. 
393;  Dunn  v.  Packwood,  11  Jur.  242; 
Mishler  v.  Baumgardner,  1  Am.  L. 
J.  304. 

8  Little  v.  Keon,  1  N.  Y.  Code  R.  4 ; 
Linton  v.  Com.,  46  Pa.  St.  294;  Fol- 
lansbee  v.  Walker,  72  Pa.  St.  230 ; 
State  v.  Cook,  23  La.  Ann.  347;  Pot- 
ter v.  Ware,  1  Cush.  519,  524;  Mealer 
v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
142.  Cf.  Traser  v.  Haggerty,  86 
Mich.  521. 

9  Gardner  v.  Benedict,  27  N.  Y.  S. 
3.  As  to  privileged  communica- 
tions to  attorneys,  see  g§  169-174. 
In  Cook  v.  United  States,  11  S. 
Ct.  268 ;  138  U.  S.  157,  counsel  for 
the  defendant  was  examined  by  the 
prosecution  as  to  matters  not  priv- 
ileged. 


§§  313,  314.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  447 

counsel  is  imbued  because  of  his  relation  to  the  parties  to 
the  action. 

§  3 1 3.  Competency  of  judge  as  a  witness. —  In  consequence 
of  the  peculiar  province  and  duties  of  the  judge  presiding  in  a 
cause,  it  has  been  considered  objectionable,  if  not  highly  im- 
proper and  erroneous,  for  him  to  act  as  a  witness  in  the  same 
case.  Aside  from  the  objection  that  his  conduct  should  not 
be  subjected  to  cross-examination  and  comment,  his  peculiar 
duties  in  administering  oaths  to  the  witnesses,  in  case  the 
court  has  no  clerk,  in  adjudicating  upon  their  competency 
and  the  admissibility  of  the  evidence,  with  his  power  to  com- 
mit for  contempt,  render  it  unfit  that  he  should  assume  the 
dual  character  of  witness  and  judge  in  the  same  cause.1  So 
upon  analogous  reasoning  it  has  been  held  that,  where  a  cause 
was  pending  before  several  referees,  one  of  them  could  not  be 
sworn  or  examined  as  a  witness  by  the  others.2  But  while 
these  considerations  are  reasonable  they  do  not  apply  in  the 
trial  of  a  case  in  which  the  witness,  though  he  is  a  judge,  is  not 
presiding  in  that  case;  and  hence  it  is  a  rule  that  a  judge  ma}'' 
testify,  as,  for  example,  to  the  accuracy  of  the  notes  which  he 
has  taken  at  a  former  trial.3 

§  314.  The  incompetency  of  arbitrators  as  witnesses  in 
an  action  on  the  award. —  An  arbitrator  is  a  competent  wit- 
ness to  prove  any  facts  upon  the  existence  of  which  his  au- 
thority as  an  arbitrator  depended.  In  an  action  to  enforce 
the  award  he  may  be  required  to  testify  as  to  what  matters 
were  included  in  the  submission,4  or  what  subjects  actually 
came  before  him  for  action,5  and  what  matters  were  actually 

i  Baker  v.  Thompson,  89  Ga.  486;  (N.  Y.)  197;  Ross  v.  Buhler,  2  Mart. 

Buccleugh  v.  Board,  L.   R.  5  H.  L.  N.  S.  (La.)  312;  Welcome  v.  Batch- 

418,  433;  People  v.  Miller,  2  Parker  elder,  23  Me.  85. 

C.  R,  197;  Rex  v.  Harvey,  8  Cox  C.  4  Republic  Bank    v.   Darragh,    30 

C.  103;  Regina  v.  Gazard,  8  G  &  P.  Hun  (N.  Y.),  29;  Thrasher  v.  Overly, 

595.     See  ante,  §  175.  51    Ga.  91 ;  Hale  v.   Huse,  10  Gray 

2Morss  v.  Morss,  11  Barb.  310.  (Mass.),  99;  Hall  v.  Vanier,  6  Neb. 

3  State    v.    Duffy,    57   Conn.   525;  85;  Birbeck  v.  Burrows,  2  Hall,  51 ; 

People  v.    Doluing,    59   N.   Y.  374;  Cady  v.  Walker,  62  Mich.  157. 

Morss  v.  Morss,  11  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  510;  5Duke    of    Buccleugh    v.    Board, 

Shall  v.   Miller,  5  Whart,  (Pa.)  156;  L.   R.   5  H.  L.   Cas.  418;  2  Moak's 

People  v.   Miller,  2  Park.  Cr.  Cas.  Eng.  448. 


418  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  315. 

considered  by  him.1  So  an  arbitrator  may  testify  to  the  fact 
that  an  award  was  made  and  delivered,  and,  if  it  was  oral,  he 
may  be  asked  to  state  it  on  the  witness  stand.2  But  an  arbi- 
trator is  not  a  competent  witness  to  impeach  the  legality  or 
validity  of  the  award,  or  to  show  the  impropriety  of  his  own 
actions  in  connection  therewith,  unless  he  dissented  from  the 
award.  His  voluntary  assent  to  or  acquiescence  in  the  award 
as  rendered  will  estop  him  from  denying  its  validity  subse- 
quently.3 Neither  can  he  be  interrogated  as  to  his  reasons  or 
the  motives  which  actuated  him  while  exercising  the  quasi- 
judicial  and  discretionary  powers  over  the  matter  submitted 
to  him  for  arbitration.4 

§  315.  Definition  and  form  of  oath  and  affirmation. —  An 
oath  has  been  defined  as  "an  outward  pledge  given  by  the 
person  taking  it  that  his  attestation  or  promise  is  made  under 
an  immediate  sense  of  his  responsibility  to  God.""  5  This  defi- 
nition, it  should  be  noticed,  omits  entirely  the  imprecatory 
character  which  was  so  prominent  in  the  definitions  of  the 
earlier  writers  on  evidence,6  and  is  certainly  more  consonant 
with  modern  ideas  upon  this  subject  and  less  calculated  to 
give  offense  to  any  who  may  have  conscientious  scruples 
against  invoking  the  anger  of  Deity  upon  themselves. 

Oaths  are  divided  into  two  classes:  judicial  oaths,  which 
are  taken  during  a  judicial  proceeding,  according  to  legal 
direction  or  requirement,  and  extra-judicial  oaths,  which  are 
taken  without  any  express  authority  or  direction  of  law.7 
Judicial  oaths  are  usually  administered  by  the  clerk  of  the 
court,  who  repeats  the  following  formula  to  the  witness:  "You 

i  Mayor  of  New  York  v.  Butler,  1  Cobb  v.  Dortch,  52  Ga.  548;  Alex- 
Barb.  325 ;  Cole  v.  Blunt,  2  Bosw.  ander  v.  McNear,  28  Fed.  Rep.  403 ; 
116.  Tucker  v.  Page.  09  111.  179;  Jackson 

*Boughton    v.    Seamans,   9  Hun,  v.  Gager,  5  Cow.  (N.  Y.)  383. 

?,92.  5  Tyler  on  Oaths,  p.  15.     For  other 

3  Newland  v.  Douglas,  2  Johns.  02;  definitions,  see  Anderson's  Law- 
Jackson  v.  Gager,  5  Cow.  383;  Diet.,  citing  Parkes  v.  Parkes,  25 
Tucker  v.  Page,  69  111.  179;  Camp-  E.  L.  &  E.  019;  King  v.  White,  2 
bell  v.  Weston,  3  Paige,  124.  Leach  Cr.  Cas.  482. 

*  In  re  Whiteley  (1891),  1  Ch.  558;  6  i  stark.  Ev.  22. 

Chapman  v.    Ewing,   78  Ala.   403;  7  Anderson's  Law  Diet. 
Aldrich  v.  Jessiman,  85  N.  H.  510; 


315.] 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


449 


do  solemnly  swear  that  you  will  tell  the  truth,  the  whole  truth, 
and  nothing  but  the  truth,  as  a  witness  in  this  issue  now  joined 
between  A.  and  B.  So  help  vou  God."  The  assent  of  the  wit- 
ness is  expressed  by  his  uplifted  hand  or  by  his  placing  his 
hand  upon  a  copy  of  the  Gospels  while  the  oath  is  being  re- 
peated, and  by  his  kissing  the  Bible  at  its  close.1  But  no 
particular  form  of  administering  the  oath  was  or  is  required 
so  long  as  the  witness  is  sworn  in  such  a  way  as  he  will  con- 
sider binding  upon  his  conscience.2 

Where  a  witness,  when  about  to  be  sworn,  says  that  he  is 
an  adherent  of  a  religious  faith  other  than  Christianity,  he 
should  be  asked  what  oath  he  would  consider  most  binding, 
and  if  he  prefers  any  other  than  the  usual  form  he  should  be 
sworn  accordingly.3  Even  in  the  case  of  a  witness  who  is  a 
Christian,  his  wishes  and  scruples  will  be  respected,  and  if  he 
shall  object  to  being  sworn  upon  the  Gospels  his  solemn  af- 
firmation will  be  regarded  as  equivalent  thereto.4     A  witness 


!See  Jackson  v.  State,  1  Ind.  185; 
State  v.  Norris,  9  N.  H.  101. 

2  In  Omichund  v.  Barker,  Willes, 
545,  547,  the  court  said:  "Oaths 
were  instituted  long  before  the  be- 
ginning of  the  Christian  era,  and 
were  always  held  in  the  highest 
veneration.  The  substance  of  an 
oatli  has  nothing  to  do  with  Chris- 
tianity. The  forms  have  always 
been  different  in  different  countries. 
But  still  the  substance  is  the  same, 
which  is  that  God  in  all  of  them  is 
called  upon  to  witness  the  truth  of 
what  we  say.  Such  infidels  who  be- 
lieve in  a  God  and  that  he  will  pun- 
ish them  if  they  swear  falsely  may 
testify." 

3  Omichund  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21, 
46;  Atchison  v.  Everett,  Cowp.  389, 
390;  People  v.  Green  (Cal.,  1893),  34 
Pac.  Rep.  231 ;  State  v.  Chyo  Chiagk, 
92  Mo.  395. 

4  State  v.  Welch,  79  Me.  99.  Many 
persons,  construing  the  scriptural  in- 
junction "  Swear  not  at  all  "  as  an 
express  prohibition  of  oaths  of  every 

29 


sort,  refuse,  because  of  conscientious 
principle,  to  participate  in  or  assent 
to  any  form  of  words  which  involves 
an  invocation  of  the  Deity.  To  such 
persons  an  interrogation  somewhat 
in  the  following  form  is  usually  pro- 
pounded: "You  do  solemnly,  sin- 
cerely and  truly  declare  and  affirm 
that  you  will  state  the  truth,  the 
whole  truth,  and  nothing  but  the 
truth,  in  the  issue  now  joined  be- 
tween A.  and  B."  An  affirmative 
reply  to  this  question  is  equivalent 
to  an  oath,  and  renders  the  witness 
liable  to  a  prosecution  for  perjury  in 
case  he  testifies  falsely.  But  it  is 
now  held  in  England  that  the  wit- 
ness should  be  asked  by  the  judge 
whether  the  ground  of  his  refusal 
to  be  sworn  is  a  lack  of  religious  be- 
lief or  whether  he  objects  to  taking 
an  oath.  If  the  witness  declares  he 
has  a  religious  belief  he  should  be 
required  to  take  an  oath.  Reg.  v. 
Moore,  61  Law  J.  Mag.  80;  17  Cox 
Cr.  Cas.  458. 


450  COMPETENCY   OF    WITNESSES.  [§  315. 

may,  after  leing  sworn,  be  asked  if  he  considers  the  oath  he 
has  taken  as  binding,  though  it  would  be  improper  then  to 
ask  him,  if  any  other  form  would  be  deemed  b}'  him  to  be 
of  greater  force;1  for  he  is  liable  to  be  punished  for  per- 
jury, though  he  does  not  consider  himself  bound  by  the  form 
of  oath  by  which  he  was  sworn,  if  he  failed  to  object  at  the 
time  of  swearing.2  If  the  witness  is  sworn  before  a  separate 
trial  is  ordered  in  the  case  of  several  jointly  indicted,  he  must 
be  again  sworn  thereafter.3 

The  objection  that  a  witness  was  not  properly  sworn  cannot 
be  raised  for  the  first  time  wrhen  a  motion  is  made  for  a  new 
trial,4  unless  the  omission  to  swear  him  was  not  noticed  by  the 
objecting  party  until  after  the  trial  had  been  finished.5 

The  power  to  administer  oaths  is  usually  conferred  upon 
private  arbitrators  by  statute.  At  common  law  they  did  not 
possess  it,6  and  an  oath  administered  by  an  arbitrator  was  a 
nullity  so  far  as  a  prosecution  of  the  witness  for  perjury  was 
concerned.7  The  parties  to  the  arbitration  may,  however,  un- 
less the  witness  is  absolutely  required  to  be  sworn  by  a  stat- 
ute,8 waive  the  taking  of  an  oath  by  the  witness.9  After  the 
waiver,  which  may  be  by  express  language  or  by  necessary 

1  The  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  &  Bing.  6  Rice  v.  Hassenpflug,  13  N.  E. 
284.  Rep.  655 ;  45  Ohio  St.  477 ;  Large  v. 

2  State  v.  Whisenhurst,  2  Hawks,  Passmore,  5  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  51 ;  Peo- 
458.  The  clerk  will  be  allowed,  where  pie  v.  Townsend,  5  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
a  defendant  has  many  aliases,  to  re-  315. 

peat  them   in  swearing  a  witness,  7  Frazer  v.  Phelps,  3  Sandf.  (N.  Y.) 

stating  also  his  true  name.     If  the  741 ;  Bonner  v.    McPhail,   31   Barb. 

aliases  are  given  in  the  indictment,  (N.  Y. )  106. 

their  repetition  by  the  clerk  in  the  8  Wolfe  v.  Hyatt,  76  Mo.  156. 

hearing  of  the  jurors  is  not  calcu-  9  Newcomb  v.  Wood,  7  Otto(U.  S.), 

lated  to  prejudice  them  against  the  581;  Cochran  v.  Bartell,  91  Mo.  655; 

prisoner.     People  v.   Everhart,    104  3  S.  W.  Rep.  854 ;  Maynard  v.  Fred- 

N.  Y.  591;  11  N.  E.  Rep.  62.  erick,  7  Cush.  247;  Price  v.  Perkins. 

3  Abbott,  Crim.  Brief,  §  336 ;  Bab-  2  Dev.  Eq.  (N.  C.)  250.  An  arbitra- 
cock  v.  People,  15  Hun  (N.  Y.),  347.  tor  who  possesses  no  statutory  power 

4  Goldsmith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  to  administer  an  oath  should  call  in  a 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  405.  notary  or  other  officer  who  has  that 

5  Hawks  v.  Baker,  6  Greenl.  (Me.)  power.  Russell  on  Arbitration,  189. 
72.  In  a  trial  for  a  felony  it  is  ground  See  Rice  v.  Hassenpflug,  45  Ohio  St. 
for  reversal  to  swear  a  witness  while  377;  13  N.  E.  Rep.  655. 

the  accused  is  not  in  court.     Bear- 
den  v.  State,  44  Ark.  331. 


§  31C]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  451 

implication  from  the  conduct  or  the  silence  of  a  party,  he 
cannot  claim  to  have  an  award  set  aside  for  the  sole  reason 
that  the  witnesses  were  not  sworn.1 
§  316.  Incompetency  because  of  a  lack  of  religions  belief. 

At  common  law,  in  consequence  of  the  paramount  importance 
attached  to  the  religious  element  of  an  oath,  all  persons  whose 
religious  faith  did  not  involve  the  belief  in  a  Deity  who  would 
punish  falsehood  were  incompetent  as  witnesses.2  So  it  was 
sa'id,  to  require  an  oath  to  be  taken  by  one  who,  like  the  athe- 
ist, "  was  presumed  to  be  unable  to  appreciate  its  religious 
sanction,  was  a  mockery  of  justice."  3  Every  person  born  and 
educated  under  the  influence  of  Christianity  was  prima  facie 
presumed  to  possess  sufficient  religious  faith  to  render  him 
competent  as  a  witness.  In  any  case  he  was  only  required  to 
believe  in  a  God  who  would  punish  perjury,  and  it  was  of  no 
consequence  wThether  he  believed  that  the  perjurer  would  be 
punished  by  remorse  of  conscience  in  this  life  or  beyond  the 
grave  in  some  other  way.4  The  witness  could  not  usually  be 
directly  questioned  as  to  his  possession  of  a  religious  belief, 
though  his  atheism  might  always  be  shown  b}'  the  evidence 
of  other  persons  in  whose  hearing  he  had  voluntarily  declared 
his  lack  of  religious  belief:5  and  the  fact  that  he  had  subse- 
quently acquired  sufficient  religious  faith  to  render  him  com- 
petent might  also  be  shown.6 

It  is  now  the  law  by  statute  in  almost  every  state  in  the 
Union  that  no  witness  shall  be  considered  incompetent  be- 
cause of  his  belief  or  disbelief  in  the  tenets  of  any  system  of 
religious  faith,  provided  he  understands  the  nature  of  an  oath. 
In  conformity  with  the  principles  underlying  such  statutory 
enactments,  and  having  regard  to  existing  federal  and  state 
constitutional  guaranties  intended  to  secure  freedom  of  relig- 

i  Cochran  v.  Bartell,  91  Mo.  655.  369;  Bush  v.  Com.,  80  Ky.  248,  250. 

2  0michund  v.  Barker,  1  Atk.  21.  See  Com.    v.    Hills,    10    Cush.    532; 

3  See  ante,  §  315.  Hale  v.  Everett,  53  N.  H.  55 ;  Gibson 
4 1  Greenl.   on  Ev.,  §  369;  People  v.  Mut.  L.  Ins.  Co.,  37  N.  Y.  584,  for 

v.   Matteson,    2    Co  wen,    433,    473;  definitions  of    "atheist"   and    "in- 

Crappell  v.  State,  71  Ala.  324 ;  Brock  fidel." 

v.  Milligan,  10  Ohio,  123,  125;  Blocker  5  Odell  v.  Koppel,  5  Heisk.  (Tenn.) 

v.  Burness,    2   Ala.    355;  Arnold  v.  88;  Com.  v.  Smith,  2  Gray,  516. 

Arnold,  13  Vt.  43,  362;  Hunscom  v.  6Atwood   v.  Welton,  7  Conn.    66; 

Hunscom,  15  Mass.  184;  3  Bl.  Com.  Scott  v.  Hooper,  14  Vt.  535. 


452  COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  317. 

ious  belief,  any  question  tending  to  discredit  the  witness  by 
showing  his  atheism  or  agnosticism  is  decidedly  objection- 
able.1 So  where,  by  constitutional  enactment,  it  is  provided 
that  no  person  shall  be  denied  the  enjoyment  of  any  civil 
rights  on  account  of  his  religious  principles,  it  is  held  that  a 
party  is  not  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  his  own  behalf  be- 
cause he  did  not  believe  in  a  God  that  would  punish  false 
swearing.2 

§  317.  Incompetency  of  insane  persons  as  witnesses. — 
The  common  law  recognized  little,  if  any,  distinction  between 
the  numerous  forms  which  insanity  assumes.  Thus,  a  person 
mentally  unsound  in  any  respect,  whether  he  was  an  imbecile 
or  idiot,  a  furious  maniac  or  a  quiet  sufferer  from  melancholia, 
senile  dementia  or  some  harmless  and  perhaps  temporary 
monomania,  was  incompetent  as  a  witness,3  though  if  the  ex- 
istence of  a  lucid  interval  was  properly  established  he  was  per- 
mitted to  testify. 

It  is  now  well  established  that  the  insanity  or  intellectual 
weakness  of  a  witness,  no  matter  what  shape  it  ma}r  take,  is 
no  objection  to  his  competency,  provided  he  has  mental  ca- 
pacity sufficient  to  discern  between  right  and  wrong,  so  far 
as  the  facts  at  issue  and  his  testimony  thereon  are  involved, 
understands  the  binding  character  of  an  oath,4  and  can  give 
an  apparently  intelligible  and  reasonable  account  of  any 
transaction  which  he  has  seen  or  heard.5  Nor  is  a  party  pre- 
vented from  testifying  because  he  alleges  and  offers  evidence 
to  show  his  own  mental  impairment.6  A  witness  who  is  ex- 
amined by  a  commission  out  of  court  will  be  presumed  to  be 

i  People  v.  Copsey,  71  Cal.  548.  Crim.  Ev.    128;  Best's  Ev.,  p.  168; 

-'State  v.  Powers,  51  N.  J.  L.  432;  Evans  v.  Hettich,  7  Wheat.  453,  470. 

17  Atl.  Rep.  969;  Ewing  v.   Bailey,  <Reg.  v.  Hill,  15  Jur.  470;  5  Eng. 

36  111.  App.  191 ;  Hroueck  v.  People  L.  &  Eq.  547;  5  Cox's  C.  C.  259,  266; 

(111.,    1890),  24  N.   E.  Rep.   861.     In  Holcomb  v.  Holcomb,  28  Conn.  177; 

enunciating    the    rule    at    common  District  v.  Armes,    107   U.    S.  521 ; 

law,   Shaw,  C.  J.,  said  in  Com.  v.  Coleman  v.    Com.,    25    Gratt.    865: 

Smith,  2  Gray,  516:  "The  want  of  Worthington  v.  Mencer  (Ala.,  1892), 

such  religious  belief  must  be  estab-  11  S.  Rep.  72. 

lished  by  other  means  than  the  ex-  5  Walker  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  12 

animation  of  the  witness  upon  the  S.  Rep.  83. 

stand."  6  Dickson  v.  Waldron  (Ind.,  1893), 

3 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  365;  White's  35  N.  E.  Rep.  1. 
Case,  2  Leach's  Cr.  Cas.  430;  Rose. 


§§  318,  319.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  453 

sane,  and  in  case  evidence  of  his  insanity  is  offered  when  his 
deposition  is  read  in  court,  the  question  of  his  mental  capac- 
ity is  then  for  the  jury.1  Where  the  witness,  though  he  has 
been  legally  pronounced  insane  and  is  in  charge  of  a  commit- 
tee, has  been  permitted  bj7  the  court  to  testify  as  a  competent 
witness,  his  credibilit}7  is  a  question  for  the  jur}'.2  If  his  evi- 
dence is  uncorroborated,  and  where,  being  a  party,  he  is  inter- 
ested in  the  suit,  the  jury  may  refuse  to  believe  his  testimony 
if  upon  his  whole  evidence  and  his  actions  while  on  the  stand 
they  believe  his  mind  is  so  far  diseased  that  his  evidence  is  un- 
reliable and  incredible.3 

§  318.  Deaf-mutes  as  witnesses. —  By  the  earlier  common 
law  a  deaf-mute  was  regarded  as  an  idiot,4  and  deemed  to  be 
so  utterly  devoid  of  understanding  that  he  was  incompetent 
to  testify  as  a  witness  until  it  was  clearly  and  affirmatively 
shown  that  he  possessed  sufficient  intelligence  for  that  pur- 
pose,5 and  the  burden  of  proving  him  competent  was  on  the 
party  producing  him.  At  the  present  day,  if  he  can  read  and 
write,  he  may  be  questioned  and  may  reply  in  writing,6  though 
ordinarily,  even  if  he  can  write,  his  examination  may  be  con- 
ducted by  the  use  of  signs  with  the  aid  of  an  interpreter  who 
is  properly  qualified.7  Expert  testimony  is  not  required  to 
show  the  intelligence  of  a  deaf  and  dumb  witness  where  his 
employer  or  some  other  person  acquainted  with  him  testifies 
to  his  intelligence  and  to  his  knowledge  of  the  sign  language.8 

§  319.  Children  as  witnesses. —  Until  the  contrary  is  shown, 
it  is  a  presumption  that  after  a  child  has  attained  the  age  of 

^ainesworth  v.  Caldwell,  81  Ga.  which  he  can  make  it  intelligible, 

76.     Cf.  contra,  where  a  witness  is  but  such  writing   must   be  written 

examined  in  court,  Clements  v.  Mc-  and  such  signs  made  in  open  court. 

Ginn  (Cal.,  1893),   33  Pac.  Rep.  920.  Evidence  so  given  is  deemed  to  be 

2 People  ex  rel.   Norton  v.  N.  Y.  oral    evidence."    Stephen's    Digest, 

Hospital,  3  Abb.  N.  C.  £29.  art.  106. 

3  Worthington    v.    Mencer    (Ala.,  7  Skaggs    v.    State,    108    Ind.    53; 
1892),  11  S.  Rep.  72.  Com.  v.  Hill,  14  Mass.  207;  Ruston's 

4  4  Bl.  Cora.  303-4.  Case,  1  Leach's  Cr.  Cas.  408;  State  v. 

5  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  366.  Wolf,  8  Conn.  93;  State  v.  Howard 

6  Morrison  v.  Leonard,  3  C.  &  P.  (Mo.,  1893),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  81;  Sny- 
127.     "A  witness,  unable  to  speak  der  v.  Nations,  5  Blackf.  295. 

or  hear,  is  not  incompetent,  but  may        8  State  v.  Weldon  (S.  C,  1893),  17 
give  his  evidence  by  writing  or  by    S.  E.  Rep.  688. 
signs,  or  in   any  other  manner  in 


454:  COMPETENCY  OF    WITNESSES.  [§  320. 

fourteen  he  possesses  sufficient  intelligence  to  testify  as  a  wit- 
ness. In  the  case  of  a  child  under  that  age  his  competency 
must  be  shown.1  It  matters  not  how  young  he  may  be,  he 
will  be  competent  if  he  possesses  enough  mental  capacity  and 
memory  to  enable  him  to  give  a  reasonably  intelligent  account 
of  the  transaction  he  is  called  upon  to  describe,  and  understands 
the  character,  effect  and  obligation  of  an  oath.2  Where  the 
child  does  not  fully  understand  the  nature  t  and  obligation  of 
an  oath,  the  court  may,  in  its  discretion,  where  the  witness 
has  sufficient  mental  capacity  to  profit  by  such  teaching,  allow 
him  to  be  more  fully  instructed  by  a  proper  person.3  The 
competency  of  a  child  under  fourteen  is  always  a  question  for 
the  discretion  of  the  court,  and  unless  this  discretion  is  grossly 
abused,  its  exercise  is  not  reviewable  on  appeal.4 

§  320.  Witnesses  rendered  incompetent  by  conviction  of 
infamous  crimes  —  The  effect  of  pardon.— At  common  law 
persons  who  had  been  convicted  of  perjury,  murder,  piracy, 
forgery,  arson  or  other  infamous  crimes  were  thereby  ren- 
dered incompetent  to  testify  as  witnesses.  A  delinquency  of 
this  character  was  conclusively  presumed  to  indicate  such  a 
state  of  moral  turpitude  on  the  part  of  the  person  who  had 
been  convicted  that  his  absolute  incapacity  to  tell  the  truth 
was  taken  for  granted.     In  other  words,  the  probability  that 

1  Hughes  v.  Detroit,  31  N.  W.  Rep.  would  be  punished  if  she  did  not 
603 ;  63  Mich.  10.  tell  the  truth,  was  held  competent 

2  Davis    v.   State  (Neb.,   1890),  47    as  a  witness. 

N.  W.   Rep.   854 ;   State  v.  McGuff,  3  Rex  v.  Wade,  1  Mood.   Cr.  Cas. 

88  Ala.   151;  McGuire  v.  People,  44  86:  Com.  v.  Lynes,  142  Mass.  570- 

Mich.  286 ;  Jones  v.  Brooklyn,  etc.  580.     Contra,    Rex   v.    Williams,    7 

Co.,  3  N.  Y.  S.  253;  State  v.  Sever-  P.  &  P.  320.     Of.  Reg.  v.  Nicholas, 

son,   43  N.   W.   Rep.   533;  Hoist  v.  2  C.  &  K.  246;  Taylor  v.  State  (Tex., 

State,  23  Tex.  App.  1;  Moore  v.  State,  1887),  3  S.  W.  Rep.  753. 

79  Ga.  498.     But  the  dying  declara-  i  Ridenhour  v.   Kansas   City,   102 

tion  of  a  child  four  years  old  has  Mo.  270;  People  v.  Frindel,  58  Hun, 

been  rejected  upon  the  presumption  482;  Hawkins  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App. 

that  one  so  young  could  not  realize  273 ;  State  v.  Severson  (Iowa,  1889), 

the  idea  of  a  future  state.     Rex  v.  43  N.  W.  Rep.  533.     Leading  ques- 

Pike,  3  C.  &  P.  598;  People  v.  Mc-  tions  are  never  objectionable  when 

Nair,  21  Wend.  608;  State  v.  Michael,  put  to  a  youthful  witness  to  ascer- 

37  W.  Va.  565.    In  Agnew  v.  Brook-  tain    his    competency    and    under- 

lyn  City  R.  R.  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  S.  756,  a  standing  of  an  oath.    Hodge  v.  State 

child  only  six  and  a  half  years  of  (Fla.,  1890),  7  S.  Rep.  593. 
age,  who  stated  that  she  knew  she 


§  320.]  COMPETENCY   OF   WITNESSES.  455 

a  person  convicted  of  an  infamous  crime  would  commit  per- 
jury if  allowed  to  testif}r  as  a  witness  was  so  great  that  the 
interest  of  truth  and  justice  demanded  his  exclusion  from  the 
witness  stand.1  The  common  law  required  that  the  witness 
should  have  been  convicted  of  an  infamous  crime,  and  the 
early  writers  usually  classified  under  this  head  treason,  felony 
and  the  crimen  falsi? 

So  far  as  treason  is  concerned,  and  that  very  numerous  class 
of  offenses  which  in  England,  until  the  beginning  of  the  pres- 
ent century,  constituted  felony  at  common  law,  but  little  un- 
certainty was  experienced.  A  conviction  of  perjury,3  forgerj7,4 
or  conspiracy  to  suppress  testimon}T  or  to  obstruct  justice,5 
was  always  sufficient  to  exclude  the  person  convicted  from 
the  witness  stand.  On  the  other  hand,  under  the  term  crimen 
falsi  was  rather  loosely  grouped  those  minor  offenses,  such  as 
criminal  libel,  barratr}7,  maintenance  and  the  like,  which, 
while  not  amounting  to  felony  at  common  law,  indicate  an 
inherent  lack  of  respect  for  truth,  or  a  deliberate  intention  to 
interfere  with  and  obstruct  the  administration  of  justice,  or 
to  employ  the  machinery  of  the  law  for  improper  ends  by  the 
person  perpetrating  such  crimes.6 

As  between  third  parties  the  witness  was  absolutely  incom- 
petent,7 and  the  admission  of  his  evidence  was  adequate  ground 
for  a  new  trial.  But  it  seems  that  his  affidavit  under  certain 
circumstances  was  receivable  as  to  collateral  points  not  in- 
volved in  the  main  issue,  as,  for  example,  on  a  motion  to  set 
aside  a  judgment  which  had  been  irregularly  rendered.8  The 
incompetency  caused  by  infamy  is  removable  at  common  law 
by  the  pardon  of  the  witness,9  by  the  reversal  of  the  judgment 

I  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  372.     The  con-  3  Co.  Lit.  6b. 

viction  of  the  witness  could  only  be  i  Rex  v.  Davis,  6  Mod.  74. 

proved  by  the  record  as  at  present  5  Bushel  v.  Barrett,  Ry.  &  M.  434. 

(Rexv.  CastellCareinion,  8  East),  and  6  2  Russ.  on  Crimes,  592;  1  Greenl. 

the  judgment  must  have  been  ren-  on  Ev.,  g  375.     In  Butler  v.  Went- 

dered  by  a  court  having  jurisdiction,  worth,  84  Me.  25,  an  infamous  crime, 

Cooke  v.  Maxwell,  2  Stark.' 183.     So  for  which  no  one  can  be  held  unless 

if  he  has  been  convicted  merely,  but  indicted,   has  been  defined   as  one 

not  sentenced,   it  seems   he  is  still  that  is  punishable  by  more  than  one 

competent.     Brown  v.   Orr,  86  Va.  year's  imprisonment. 

935.  7  In  re  Sawyer,  2  Q.  B.  721. 

26  Com.  Dig.  353,  Testmoigne,  A.  81  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  374. 

4,  5;  Co.  Lit.  6b;  2  Hale,  P.  G.  277.  9Boyd  v.  United  States,  142  U.  S. 


45G 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  320. 


against  him,  or  by  his  enduring  the  punishment  of  imprison- 
ment or  transportation  annexed  to  the  crime  of  which  he  had 
been  convicted.  When,  however,  a  statute  in  expressly  pre- 
scribing the  punishment  which  is  to  be  inflicted  for  the  com- 
mission of  a  crime,  provides  also  that  the  person  convicted 
thereunder  shall  forever  be  incompetent  as  a  witness  in  any 
court,  a  pardon  is  ineffectual  to  restore  his  competency.1  A 
witness  who  is  infamous  is  not  rendered  competent  by  a  par- 
don which  merely  "remits  the  residue  of  the  punishment  he 
was  to  endure,"2  or  which  is  subject  to  revocation  by  the  par- 
doning power  in  case  he  shall  again  be  convicted.3  But  a  full 
pardon  is  not  rendered  ineffectual  because  it  was  granted  for 
the  express  purpose  of  rendering  a  witness  competent  to  tes- 
tify in  a  case  then  pending  in  a  court  under  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  pardoning  power,  and  in  which  the  state  is  the  prose- 
cutor.4 The  incompetency  caused  by  a  conviction  of  crime 
is  not  regarded  as  an  essential  part  of  the  punishment,  nor  is 


450 ;  Logan  v.  United  States.  144  id. 
263;  Puryear  v.  Com.,  83  Va.  51; 
Martin  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  1; 
United  States  v.  Hall(D.  C),  53  Fed. 
Rep.  352;  State  v.  Dodson,  16  S.  C. 
453;  Rivers  v.  State,  10  Tex.  App. 
177;  Hester  v.  Com.,  85  Pa.  St.  139; 
Jones  v.  Harris,  1  Strobh.  (S.  C.)  160. 
See,  also,  Com.  v.  Bush,  2  Duv.  (Ky.) 
264;  State  v.  Foley,  15  Nev.  64. 

iRex  v.  Ford,  2  Salk.  690;  Blane 
v.  Rogers,  49  Cal.  15 ;  2  Russell  on 
Crimes,  595,  596;  Bull.  N.  P.  292. 
It  is  provided  in  several  states  that 
a  person  convicted  of  perjury  is  not 
rendered  competent  as  a  witness  by 
his  pardon.  Virginia,  Code,  3898; 
Florida,  Thomp.  Dig.  344 ;  West  Vir- 
ginia, Code,  ch.  152,  §  17. 

2  Perkins  v.  Stevens,  24  Pick. 
(Mass.)  277. 

3McGee  v.  State,  16  S.  W.  Rep. 
422 ;  29  Tex.  App.  596. 

4  Boyd  v.  United  States,  142  U.  S. 
450.  Parol  evidence  is  admissible 
to  show  that  a  pardon  covered  the 
crime  of  which  witness  was  guilty 


(Martin  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  1),  or 
to  identify  the  person  named  in  it 
(State  v.  Rose,  92  Mo.  201).  .  The 
court  is  bound  to  take  judicial  no- 
tice of  a  general  amnesty  or  legisla- 
tive pardoning  act  (State  v.  Blalock, 
Phill.  (N.  C.)  242),  but  an  executive 
pardon  of  a  particular  individual, 
being  in  its  nature  a  private  deed  or 
release,  must  be  proved,  usually  by 
the  production  in  court  of  the  in- 
strument itself.  United  States  v. 
Wilson,  7  Pet.  (U  S.)  150;  State  v. 
Babtiste,  26  La,  Ann.  134  ;  Rosson  v. 
Stehr,  23  Tex.  App.  287;  Spalding 
v.  Saxton,  6  Watts  (Pa.),  338.  An 
absolute  pardon  once  delivered  and 
accepted  is  irrevocable  (Rosson  v. 
Stehr,  23  Tex.  App.  287),  while  if  the 
performance  of  some  act  by  the  wit- 
ness is  required  before  the  pardon 
becomes  operative  to  restore  his 
competency,  it  will  be  necessary  to 
show  that  the  condition  has  been 
performed.  Waring  v.  United  States, 

7  Ct.  CI.  501 ;  Scott  v.  United  States,. 

8  id.  457 ;  State  v.  Keith,  63  N.  C.  140. 


§  321.]  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  457 

the  conviction  effective  to  disqualify  the  person  beyond  the 
territorial  limits  of  the  jurisdiction  wherein  judgment  was 
rendered  against  him.  A  witness  convicted  in  one  state  is 
not  incompetent  to  testify  in  the  courts  of  a  sister  state,  though 
under  a  statute  of  the  latter  state  persons  convicted  of  crime 
are  incompetent.1 

§  321.  Statutory  regulation  of  the  competency  of  wit- 
nesses convicted  of  crime. —  The  common-law  incompetency 
of  persons  convicted  of  crime  is  generally  abolished  by  stat- 
utes in  the  United  States.  In  many  of  the  states  the  fact  that 
a  witness  has  been  convicted  of  any  crime,  however  that 
crime  may  imply  or  indicate  his  utter  lack  of  respect  for  truth, 
is  no  objection  to  his  competency,  though  it  is  allowable  to 
show  his  conviction  by  proper  evidence  to  enable  the  jury  to 
estimate  his  moral  character  as  a  man  and  his  credibility  as  a 
witness.2 

In  some  states  a  conviction  of  certain  crimes,  as  perjury, 
the  commission  of  which  involves  an  utter  disregard  of  the 
obligation  or  sanctity  of  an  oath,  is  still  an  insuperable  objec- 
tion to  the  competency  of  a  witness.3  In  some  few  of  the 
states  of  the  Union  a  witness  who  has  been  convicted  of  a 
capital  crime  or  of  certain  specified  felonies  which  involve  or 
indicate  a  high  degree  of  moral  turpitude,  such,  for  example, 

1  Logan  v.  United  States,  144  U.  S.  ch.  82,  §  105),  Missouri  (R.  S.  1889, 
263.  Contra,  Peltier  v.  State,  23  §  8925),  Wisconsin  (R.  S.  1878,  sec. 
Tex.  App.  366;  Sims  v.  Sims,  75  4073),  Delaware  (Laws,  vol.  17,  ch. 
N.  Y.  466.  598,  §  3),  Kansas  (Gen.    Stat.   1889, 

2  This  is  the  statute  law  in  New  §4414),  Nebraska  (Code,  p.  672,  §330), 
York  (Code  Civ.  Pro.  831),  Rhode  Nevada  (Gen.  St.  1885,  §  3399,  sec. 
Island  (Pub.  St.,  ch.  214,  §  38),  Utah  377),  Montana  (Code  Civ.  Proc.  647) 
(Compiled  Laws  1888,  vol.  2,  tit.  10,  and  Oregon  (Hill's  Ann.  Laws  1887, 
ch.  2),  Colorado  (Gen.  Laws,  §  3647),  ch.  8,  title  3,  §  710). 

California  (Civil  Code,  §  1879),  Con-  3  This  is  the  law  in  Alabama  (Code 

necticut  (Gen.  Stat.,  §  1098),  Indiana  1886,  §  2766),  Florida  (Laws,  ch.  202, 

(R.  S.,  1888,  §§  506,    1798),  Georgia  §  6),    Maryland    (Pub.    Gen.    Laws, 

(Code,  §  3854),   Michigan  (Howell's  art.   35,  §  1),  Mississippi  (Rev.  Code 

Ann.    Stat.,  §§   7543,    7544),  Illinois  1S80,    §   1600),    Pennsylvania  (Laws 

(R.    S.,    ch.  51,  §  1),  Massachusetts  1887,    ch.    89,  §  2).  Vermont   (R.  L. 

(Pub.  Stat.,  ch.  169,  §  19),  Minnesota  1880,  §  1008)  and  Washington  (Code, 

(Statutes,  §  5095),  New  Hampshire  vol.  2,  §  1647).     The  statutes  cited  in 

(Pub.   St.   1891,  ch.   223,  §  26),  Ohio  this  and  the  preceding  note  are  stated 

(R.  S.  1886,  §§  5240,  7284),  Iowa  (Rev.  in  full  in  1  Greenleaf,  note  to  §  372. 
Code  1886,  §  3637),  Maine  (R.  S.  1883, 


458  COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  322. 

as  burglary,  forgery,  counterfeiting,  rape,  arson,  perjury,  big- 
amy, sodomy,  etc.,  is  by  statute  rendered  absolutely  incom- 
petent to  testify.1 

§  322.  Statutes  construed. —  Where  the  conviction  of  a  wit- 
ness of  crime  is  no  longer  any  objection  to  his  competency 
the  party  in  whose  behalf  he  is  called  to  testify  may  intro- 
duce evidence  of  his  reputation  for  truthfulness  if  his  credi- 
bility is  impeached  by  proof  of  his  previous  conviction.2  In 
such  a  case  the  character  of  the  witness  for  truthfulness  is  con- 
sidered to  be  put  in  issue  by  evidence  from  which  the  jury  is 
permitted  to  draw  the  inference  that  the  witness  has  committed 
perjury  because  he  has  been  guilty  of  some  other  crime  of  per- 
haps a  totally  dissimilar  character.  In  other  words,  the  witness, 
having  been  shown  to  be  of  a  depraved  character  in  one  par- 
ticular, may  be  equally  deficient  in  moral  qualities  in  other 
directions.  The  conviction  must,  in  the  absence  of  statute, 
be  shown  by  the  record  ;:1  and  if  an  appeal  therefrom  is  pend- 
ing when  the  witness  is  examined,  evidence  of  the  conviction 
is  inadmissible  to  impeach  his  evidence.4 

Upon  the  question  whether,  under  the  existing  statutes,  the 
conviction  of  a  witness  for  any  crime  which  would  not  have 
rendered  him  incompetent  at  common  law  may  be  shown  for 
the  purpose  of  impeaching  his  credit,  the  cases  are  divided. 
Much  of  course  depends  upon  the  express  terms  of  the  stat- 
ute. On  the  one  hand,  it  has  been  held  that  the  witness  may 
be  discredited  by  showing  him  to  have  been  guilty  of  a  mis- 

i  Arkansas    (Code,    §    2859),   Ten-  land  v.  State,  2  Pickle  (Tenn.),  472), 

nessee  (Code,  §  4562),  Texas  (Code  if  he  elects  to  do  so. 

Cr.  Pro.  730),  Virginia  (Code   1887,  2  Webb  v.  State,  29  Ohio  St.  351 ; 

§   3898).     See  last   note.     See,  also,  Com.  v.  Ford,  146  Mass.  131;  Gertz 

Corn.  v.  McGuire,  84  Ky.  57.     These  v.  Fitchburg,  137  Mass.  77. 

statutes  are  to  be  strictly  construed  3  Com.  v.   Gorham,   99  Mass.  420; 

and  the  crimes  mentioned  in  them  Hilts  v.  Colvin,  14  Johns.  182;  Pul- 

will  be  presumed   to  be  crimes  at  len  v.    Pullen,    43    N.    J.    Eq.    139. 

common  law.     Williams  v.  Dicken-  Contra  by  statute,  Spiegel  v.  Hays, 

son,   28  Fla.   90;  Com.  v.  Minor,  89  118  N.  Y.  660;  Com.  v.  Sullivan,  150 

Ky.    555;    13    S.    W.    Rep.    5.     Nor  Mass.  315;  State  v.  Miller,  100  Mo. 

should  these  statutes  be  so  construed  606;  People  v.  Rodrigo,  69  Cal.  601; 

as  to  prevent  one  accused  of  crime  State  v.  Adamson,  43  Minn.  196. 

from   testifying  in  his  own  behalf  4  Jones  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S. 

(Ranson  v.  State,  40  Ark.  176;  Ray-  W.  Rep.  404;  Card  v.  Foot,  57  Conn. 

431.     See  g  354! 


§  323.] 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


459 


demeanor,1  though  where  a  statute  expressly  provides  that 
the  witness  may  be  interrogated  as  regards  a  "  conviction  of 
felony,"  proof  of  a  misdemeanor  is  inadmissible.2  The  cur- 
rent of  the  decisions,  however,  supports  the  contrary  view, 
that  a  conviction  for  those  infamous  crimes  only  can  be  proved 
which  would  have  destroyed  his  competency  at  common  law.3 
Where  a  statute  removes  the  common-law  disability  arising 
from  infamy,  the  confession  by  a  witness  that  he  has  per- 
jured himself  in  the  same  matter  to  which  he  now  testifies 
constitutes  no  objection  to  his  competency.4 

§  323.  Accomplices. —  At  common  law  an  accomplice  was 
competent  as  a  witness  for  or  against  the  accused,  even  though 
jointly  indicted  with  him,  provided  he  was  not  himself  act- 
ually a  party  to  the  record.5  If  they  are  jointly  tried  and  the 
evidence  against  either  is  insufficient  to  convict,  he  may  be 
acquitted  and  discharged  and  be  called  to  testify  as  a  witness.6 


i  State  v.  Pfefferlee,  36  Kan.  90; 
Fischer  v.  Insurance  Co.,  33  Fed. 
Rep.  544;  Quigley  v.  Turner,  150 
Mass.  ,108 ;  Com.  v.  Ford,  146  Mass. 
131;  15  N.  E.  Rep.  153;  Helm  v.  State 
(Miss.,  1S90),  7  S.  Rep.  487. 

2  Hanners  v.  McClelland,  74  Iowa, 
318. 

3  Bennett  v.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  73 ; 
Bartholomew  v.  People,  104  111.  601 ; 
Card  v.  Foot,  57  Conn.  431 ;  Coble  v. 
State,  31  Ohio  St.  100;  Com.  v. 
Dance,  8  Cush.  384 ;  Reddick  v.  State, 
21  Tex.  App.  267 ;  People  v.  Carolan, 
71  Cal.  195. 

<  People  v.  O'Neil,  109  N.  Y.  251. 
In  United  States  v.  Gates,  6  Fed. 
Rep.  866,  the  court  said:  "In  early- 
times  the  character  of  the  crime  was 
determined  by  the  punishment  in- 
flicted, but  in  modern  times  the  act 
itself,  its  nature,  purpose  and  effect, 
are  looked  at  in  determining  whether 
it  is  infamous  or  not." 

5  As  to  presumptions  respecting  ac- 
complices, see  §  226. 

6  See  ante,  §  305.    One  who,  solely 


for  the  purpose  of  discovering  and 
procuring  the  punishment  of  crim- 
inals, communicates  with  and  aids 
them  without  a  criminal  intent,  is 
not  an  accomplice.  People  v.  Smith, 
94  N.  Y.  649 ;  People  v.  Molins,  10 
N.  Y.  S.  130 ;  State  v.  McKean,  30 
Iowa,  343 ;  Com.  v.  Downing,  4  Gray 
(Mass.),  29;  Com.  v.  Baker,  29  N.  E. 
Rep.  512;  155  Mass.  287;  Com.  v. 
Willard,  22  Pick.  476;  Campbell  v. 
Com.,  84  Pa.  St.  187;  Harrington 
v.  State,  36  Ala.  236 ;  State  v.  Brown- 
lee  (Iowa,  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  25. 
Whether  an  accomplice  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  turn  "state's  evidence," 
and  when  he  does  so,  whether 
he  is  entitled  to  exemption  from 
future  prosecution  on  that  account, 
are  wholly  discretionary  with  the 
public  prosecutor.  State  v.  Runnels, 
28  Ark.  121.  Mere  knowledge  that 
an  offense  is  being  or  has  been  com- 
mitted does  not  render  a  party  pos- 
sessing such  knowledge  an  accom- 
plice. Alford  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim. 
Rep.  299 ;  State  v.  Umble  (Mo.,  1893), 


460  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  323. 

But  accomplices  jointly  indicted  are  not  competent  witnesses 
for  each  other  while  the  indictment  is  pending,  though  they 
may  be  tried  separately.  They  do  not  become  competent  for 
each  other  until  the  defendant  who  is  to  testify  as  a  witness 
has  his  name  taken  from  the  record  by  a  nolle  prosequi  or 
an  acquittal.1  When  the  defendants  are  separately  indicted 
they  are  of  course  competent  for  each  other.2  So  where  the 
common-law  disability  of  convicted  criminals  has  been  abro- 
gated by  statute,  or  where  it  is  removed  by  pardon  or  other- 
wise, no  valid  reason  is  conceived  to  exist  against  the  admission 
of  the  testimony  of  a  convicted  accomplice  upon  the  trial  of 
another  person  who  may  have  been  implicated  with  him  in 
the  commission  of  crime.3  Where  several  are  jointly  tried  it 
is  competent  for  the  court  to  order  the  entering  of  a  nolle 
prosequi  or  to  accept  a  plea  of  guilty  on  a  promise  of  im- 
munity or  to  order  an  acquittal  for  the  express  purpose  of  en- 
abling an  accomplice  to  testify  for  the  prosecution.4 

The  admission  of  the  testimony  of  accomplices  who  are 
under  indictment  as  witnesses  for  the  prosecution  is  said, 
however,  to  be  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.5  The 
question  is  usually  not  only  can  the  prisoner  be  convicted  if 
the  accomplice  does  not  testify,  but  can  he  be  convicted  if  he 
does  testify.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  sufficient  evidence  has  been 
given  upon  which  the  jury  may  convict  the  accused  without 
receiving  that  of  the  accomplice,  or  if,  on  the  other,  the  evi- 
dence which  was  offered  is  so  weak  and  conflicting  that  even 
Avith  his  testimony  no  reasonable  probability  arises  that  a 

22  S.  W.  Rep.   378;  People   v.   Mc-  State,   11   Colo.    170;    Townsend   v. 

Gonegal,  136  N.  Y.  62;  Elizando  v.  Bush,  1  Conn.  267;  State  v.  Walker 

State,  31  Tex.  Crira.  Rep.  237;  Peo-  (Mo.,  188S),  0  S.  W.  Rep.  646;  Mus- 

ple  v.  McGuire,  135  N.  Y.  639.  son  v.  Fales,  16  Mass.  335;  Churchill 

i  Noyes  v.  State,  40  N.  J.  L.  429;  v.  Stiter,  4  id.  1C2. 

State  v.  Barrows,  76  Me.  401 ;  Carroll  4  State  v.  Graham,  41  N.  J.  L.  15; 

v.  State,  5  Neh.  31;  Allen  v.  State,  10  Lindsay   v.   People,    63  N.  Y.    143; 

Ohio  St.  287;  MeKenzie  v.  State,  24  State  v.  Lyon,  SI  N.  C.  600;  United 

Ark.  C36.  States   v.  Ford,  9   Otto  (U.  S.),  594; 

2United  States  v.  Hunter,  lCranch,  State  v.  Steifel,  106  Mo.  129;  Oliver 

416;  Lucre  v.  State,  7  Baxter  (Tenn.),  v.  Com.,  77  Va.  590.    See  ante,  §  305. 

148.  s  people  v.  Whipple,  9  Cowen,  707 ; 

3  Taylor   v.  People,  12   Hun,  212;  Com.  v.  Brown,  130  Mass.  279;  Run- 
Rex  v.  Westbeer,  1  Leach,  14;  Rex  nels  v.  State,  28  Ark.  121. 
v.  Fletcher,  1  Stra.  633 ;  Wisdom  v. 


§  323.] 


COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES. 


461 


conviction  will  result,  the  court  may  reject  him  as  a  witness.1 
An  accomplice  who  voluntarily  confesses  his  own  guilt  and 
offers  to  testify  against  his  criminal  associates  cannot  demand 
as  of  right  any  exemption  from  a  prosecution  for  his  own 
crime.2  Cut  such  a  witness  whose  evidence  has  aided  mate- 
rially in  the  conviction  of  another  criminal  certainly  has  a 
strong  moral  claim  to  clemency,  and,  if  he  is  subsequently 
convicted  of  that  crime,  his  moral  claim  should  be  recognized 
by  the  pardoning  power  under  such  circumstances;  and,  partic- 
ularly if  his  testimony  was  procured  by  a  promise  of  immu- 
nity, or  during  interviews  with  the  public  prosecutor,  principles 
of  justice  demand  and  the  prevalent  practice  would  sanction 
the  judicial  recommendation  of  his  case  to  the  executive  in 
order  that  his  pardon  may  be  obtained.3  But  the  voluntary 
confession  of  an  accomplice  made  under  a  promise  of  immu- 
nity may  be  used  against  him  on  his  subsequent  trial  where 
lie  refuses  subsequently  thereto  to  testify  against  his  associ- 
ates in  crime.4  In  consequence  of  the  doubtful  character  of 
the  evidence  of  an  accomplice,  the  law  not  only  permits  but 
encourages  his  liberal  and  exhaustive  cross-examination  for  the 


1  Rex  v.  Mellor,  Staff  Sum.  Ass'n, 
1833;  State  v.  Pratt,  98  Mo.  482; 
Reg.  v.  Sparks,  1  F.  &  F.  388 ;  Ray  v. 
State,  1  Greene  (Iowa),  31(3;  Wight 
v.  Rindskopf,  43  Wis.  344. 

2  United  States  v.  Ford,  99  U.  S. 
594;  United  States  v.  Hinz,  35  Fed. 
Rep.  723 ;  Long  v.  State,  86  Ala.  36. 

3  State  v.  Graham,  41  N.  J.  L.  15; 
State  v.  Lyon,  81  N.  C.  600;  Neely 
v.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  324.  Cf.  Reg. 
v.  Garside,  2  Lew.  C.  C.  38 ;  Long  v. 
State,  86  Ala.  36.  "  Accomplices  not 
convicted  of  an  infamous  crime  when 
separately  tried  are  competent  wit- 
nesses for  or  against  each  other. 
The  universal  usage  is  that  such  a 
party,  if  called  and  examined  by  the 
state  on  the  trial  of  his  associates  in 
guilt,  will  not  be  prosecuted  for  the 
same  offense,  provided  it  appears 
that  he  acted  in  good  faith  and  that 


he  testified  fully  and  fairly.  But  it 
is  equally  clear  that  he  cannot  plead 
such  fact  in  bar  of  an  indictment 
against  him,  nor  avail  himself  of  it 
upon  his  trial;  for  it  is  merely  an 
equitable  title  to  the  mercy  of  the 
executive,  subject  to  the  conditions 
stated,  and  can  only  come  before  the 
court  by  way  of  application  to  put 
off  the  trial  in  order  to  give  the  pris- 
oner time  to  apply  to  the  executive 
for  that  purpose."  United  States  v. 
Ford,  99  U.  S.  595. 

4  United  States  v.  Hinz,  35  Fed. 
Rep.  272;  State  v.  Condry,  5  Jones' 
L.  (N.  C.)  418;  Com.  v.  Knapp,  10 
Pick.  (Mass.)  477;  Runnels  v.  State, 
28  Ark.  121 ;  Wight  v.  Rindskopf,  43 
Wis.  349;  Neely  v.  State,  27  Tex. 
App.  324;  Alderman  v.  People,  4 
Mich.  411 ;  Rex  v.  Gillis,  11  Cox  C.  C. 
69.     See  ante,  §  — ,  Confessions. 


4C2 


COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES. 


[§  324. 


purpose  of  testing  the  credit  due  him  while  on  the  witness 
stand.1 

§  324.  Corroboration  of  accomplices. — While  no  presump- 
tion of  law  exists  against  the  credibility  of  the  evidence  of  an 
accomplice  so  that  a  conviction  may  be  had  upon  his  uncor- 
roborated evidence  alone,2  the  jury  is  usually  instructed  or 
advised  that  the  utmost  caution  should  be  employed  in  the  re- 
ception and  consideration  of  accomplice  evidence,  or  that  it 
should  be  submitted  to  the  strictest  scrutiny.3  Accordingly 
juries  are  generally  advised  that  they  may  acquit  the  accused 
if  the  evidence  of  the  accomplice  is  not  corroborated,  though 
a  failure  to  so  instruct  is  not  ground  for  a  new  trial.4 


iCom.  v.  Price,  10  Gray  (Mass.), 
472;  Lee  v.  State,  21  Ohio  St.  151; 
Marler  v.  State,  67  Ala.  55;  Hamil- 
ton v.  People,  29  Mich.  173.  Cf. 
Craft  v.  Com.,  81  Ky.  349.  Whether 
a  witness  is  an  accomplice  has  been 
held  to  be  a  question  for  the  jury. 
People  v.  Bollinger,  71  Cal.  17.  The 
defense  may  show  that  an  accom- 
plice testifying  for  the  state  does  so 
with  the  expectation  of  gain  or  im- 
munity, and  it  is  immaterial  whether 
there  has  been  any  actual  agreement 
to  that  effect  with  the  public  prose- 
cuting officer  or  not.  Allen  v.  State, 
10  Ohio  St.'  287 ;  People  v.  Langtree, 
64  Cal.  256;  Tullis  v.  State,  30  Ohio 
St.  200;  United  States  v.  Hinz,  35 
Fed.  Rep.  272.  The  jury  need  not 
be  convinced  that  he  is  an  accom- 
plice beyond  a  reasonable  doubt. 
Com.  v.  Ford,  111  Mass.  394. 

2  Bacon  v.  State,  22  Fla.  51 ;  Porter 
v.  State,  76  Ga.  658 ;  State  v.  Prater, 
26  S.  C.  198;  2  S.  E.  Rep.  108;  State 
v.  Hawkins,  100  Mo.  666;  Wisdom  v. 
State,  11  Colo.  170;  State  v.  Jackson, 
106  Mo.  174;  Rountree  v.  State,  88 
Ga.  457 ;  State  v.  Dana,  10  Atl.  Rep. 
727;  59  Vt.  614;  State  v.  Miller,  97 
N.  C.  484;  People  v.  Gallagher,  75 
Mich.  512;  People  v.  O'Brien,  60 
Mich.  8.     See,  also,  ante,  §  226. 


3  See  ante,  Presumptions  of  Fact, 
Accomplices,  §  226.  "When  the 
only  proof  against  a  person  charged 
with  a  criminal  offense  is  the  evi- 
dence of  an  accomplice  uncorrobo- 
rated in  any  material  particular,  it 
is  the  duty  of  the  judge  to  warn  the 
jury  that  it  is  unsafe  to  convict  any 
person  upon  such  evidence  though 
they  have  a  legal  right  to  do  so." 
Stephen's  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  121. 

4  State  v.  Potter,  42  Vt.  495 ;  State 
v.  Litchfield,  58  Me.  267;  Ingalls  v. 
State,  48  Wis.  647;  State  v.  Miller, 
97  N.  C.  484;  Carroll  v.  Com.,  84  Pa. 
St.  107.  See  generally  upon  the  cor- 
roboration of  accomplices,  Sumpter 
v.  State,  11  Fla.  247;  State  v.  Hol- 
land, 83  N.  C.  624 ;  Tisdale  v.  State, 
17  Tex.  App.  444  ;  Lumpkin  v.  State, 
68  Ala.  56;  State  v.  Dana,  59  Vt.  614; 
10  Atl.  Rep.  727;  Craft  v.  Com.,  80 
Ky.  349;  White  v.  State,  52  Miss. 
216 ;  Cheatham  v.  State  (Miss.,  1890), 
7  S.  Rep.  294;  State  v.  Prater,  26  S. 
C.  198;  2  S.  E.  Rep.  108;  Ulmer  v. 
State,  14  Ind.  52;  Powers  v.  State, 
44  Ga.  209 ;  State  v.  Bayonne,  23  La. 
Ann.  78;  State  v.  Williamson,  42 
Conn.  261 ;  Smith  v.  State,  28  Tex. 
App.  309 ;  Earl  v.  People,  73  111.  329 ; 
State  v.  Watson,  31  Mo.  361  ;  State 
v.  Litchfield,  58  Me.   267;  Com.  v. 


§  324.]  COMPETENCY   OF   WITNESSES.  4G3 

The  credibility  of  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  and  the 
necessity  for  evidence  corroborative  of  it  before  a  conviction 
can  be  had  are  involved  in  some  confusion.  The  proposition 
that  an  accused  person  may  be  convicted  on  the  evidence  of 
an  accomplice  alone,  and  that  the  testimony  of  such  a  witness 
should  be  corroborated,  are  both  sound,  though  they  involve  a 
seeming  inconsistency.  The  proposition  that  an  accomplice 
must  be  corroborated  is  not  equivalent  to  the  proposition  that 
there  must  be  cumulative  testimony  from  some  other  witness 
to  the  same  facts  to  which  he  has  testified.  "  If  the  testimony 
of  the  accomplice,  his  manner  of  testifying,  his  appearance 
upon  the  ivitness  stand,  impress  the  jury  with  the  truth  of  his 
statement,  there  is  no  inflexible  rule  of  law  which  prevents  a 
conviction,"1  provided,  of  course,  the  jury  believe  that  the 
evidence  of  the  accomplice  tends  to  connect  the  accused  with 
the  crime  charged.2 

The  character  and  degree  of  corroboration  required  may, 
to  a  certain  extent,  be  measured  by  the  enormity  of  the  crime 
alleged,  the  moral  perversity  involved  in  its  commission  and 
the  punishment  which  may  be  inflicted,3  so  that  conviction  of 
a  misdemeanor  might  be  sustained  without  the  production 
of  independent  corroborative  evidence  before  the  jury  where 
such  evidence  would  be  required  in  the  case  of  a  felony.4  The 
corroboration  of  the  evidence  of  an  accomplice  need  not  ex- 
tend to  every  material  fact.5  If,  however,  independent  cor- 
roboration by  other  witnesses  is  required  in  any  case,  it  must 
refer  to  that  portion  of  the  testimony  of  the  accomplice  which 
is  material  to  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner.  The  corroborative 
evidence  must  tend  to  prove  the  guilt  of  the  accused  by  con- 
necting him  with  the  crime  committed,  for  it  is  of  no  impor- 
tance whatever  to  corroborate  the  accomplice  on  irrelevant  or 
immaterial  details,  or  to  show  that  he  has  not  perjured  himself 

Snow,  111  Mass.  411;  State  v.  Moran,  Reg.   v.  Young,  19  Cox  C.   C.   371; 

34  Iowa,  453.  McClory  v.  Wright,  10  Ir.  Law,  514; 

i  Cox  v.  Com.,  125  Pa.  St.  103;  Col-  Rountree  v.  State,  88  Ga.  457. 

lins  v.  People,  98  111.  584.  5  state    v.    Allen,    57    Iowa,    451 ; 

2  See  United  States  v.  Reeves,  38  State  v.  Hennessy,  55  id.  299;  United 
Fed.  Rep.  404.  States  v.  Howell,  56  Fed..  Rep.  21 ; 

3  Bell  v.  State,  73  Ga.  572;  Rex  v.  People  v.  Elliott,  100  N.  Y.  288; 
Jarvis,  2  M.  &  R.  40.  Lumpkin  v.  State,  68  Ala.  56. 

*  Reg.  v.  Farler,    8  C.  &  P.  106; 


464  COMPETENCY    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  324. 

in  stating  matters  not  pertinent  to  the  issue  on  trial  and  upon 
which  he  had  no  interest  to  testify  falsely.  The  corrobora- 
tion must  bear  directly  or  indirectly,  not  upon  his  general 
character  for  truthfulness,  but  upon  the  question  whether,  in 
this  particular  case  and  upon  the  facts  involved,  his  testimony 
is  reliable  and  worthy  of  credit  by  the  jury  in  determining 
the  guilt  or  innocence  of  the  prisoner.1 

The  rule  of  the  common  law  requiring  the  testimony  of  an 
accomplice  to  be  corroborated  under  certain  circumstances 
has  been  confirmed  by  statutes  in  some  of  the  states.  Thus, 
in  New  York,  "a  conviction  cannot  be  had  upon  the  testi- 
mony of  an  accomplice  unless  he  be  corroborated  by  such 
other  evidence  as  tends  to  connect  defendant  with  the  com- 
mission of  the  crime." 2  The  confession  of  the  accused  is 
competent  as  corroborative  evidence  of  the  testimony  of  an 
accomplice.3  Whether  the  testimony  of  an  accomplice  is  cor- 
roborated so  that  the  guilt  of  the  prisoner  is  proved  beyond  a 
reasonable  doubt  is  a  question  for  the  jury  to  decide.4  But 
whether  the  evidence  of  the  accomplice  shall  go  to  the  jury 
is  a  distinct  question  for  the  court.  If  corroborative  circum- 
stances are  proved  from  which,  with  the  evidence  of  the  ac- 
complice, reasonable  men  may  infer  the  existence  of  the  guilt 

i  Com.  v.  Bosvvorth,  22  Pick.  397,  Grindell,  15  Col.  301 ;  Cora.  v.  Chase, 

399;  Com.  v.  Holmes,  127  Mass.  424;  147  Mass.  597. 

State  v.  Jackson,  106  Mo.  174 ;  Mar-  2  People  v.  Everhardt,   104  N.  Y. 

ler  v.    State,    67   Ala.    55;   State  v.  594;  People  v.  Ogle,  104  id.  515;  Peo- 

Allen,   57  Iowa,  431;  United  States  pie  v.  Smith  (Cal.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep. 

v.  Ybanez,  53  Fed.  Rep.   530;  Com.  58;  People  v.  O'Neill,  109  N.  Y.  251; 

v.Holmes,  127  Mass.  424;  Cohen  v.  People   v.    Elliott,    106    N.   Y.    288; 

State,  11  Tex.   App.   622;  People  v.  Bowling  Green  v.  Com.,  79  Ky.  604; 

Clough,  73  Cal.  348;  15  Pac.  Rep.  5;  State  v.  Godell,   8  Oreg.  30;  People 

Kilrow  v.    Com.,    89    Pa.    St.    480;  v.  Clough,  73  Cal.  348 ;  People  v.  Ry- 

Coleman  v.  State,  44  Tex.  109 ;  Peo-  land,  28  Hun,  568 ;  People  v.  O'Neill, 

pie  v.  Elliott,  106  N.  Y.  288;  People  48  id.  36;  Middleton  v.  State,  52  Ga. 

v.  Ogle,  104  id.  511 ;  Watson  v.  Com.,  527;  Lumpkin  v.  State,  68  Ala.  56; 

95  Pa.  St.  418;  People  v.  Everhardt,  Burney  v.  State,  87  Ala.  80;  Myers 

104  N.   Y.  591;  Com.  v.  Drake,  124  v.  State,  7  Tex.  App.  640.     See,  also, 

Mass.    21;    State   v.    Kellerman,    13  McCalla  v.  State,  66  Ga.  346;  State 

Kan.   135;    State  v.   Thornburg,  26  v.  Hyer,  39  N.  J.  L.  598;  People  v. 

Iowa,    80;    State    v.    Walker  (Mo.,  Courtney,  28  Hun,  589. 

1888),  9  S.  W.  Rep.  646;  Crowell  v.  »Partee  v.  State,  67  Ga.  570. 

State,  24  Tex.    App.    204;   State  v.  4  Com.  v.  Holmes,   127  Mass.  424; 

Banks,  40  La.  Ann.  736;  People  v.  People  v.  Everhardt,  104  N.  Y.  591. 


324.] 


COMPETENCY    OF   WITNESSES. 


465 


of  the  accused,  the  court  is  justified  in  submitting  the  evidence 
of  the  accomplice  to  the  jury  under  such  a  statute.1  Corrobo- 
ration by  evidence  independent  of  accomplice  evidence  is  not 
dispensed  with  where  several  accomplices  are  produced  as 
Witnesses  against  a  prisoner.  The  accomplices  are  not  deemed 
to  corroborate  each  other.2 


1  People  v.  Jaehne,  7  N.  E.  Rep. 
290  (N.  Y.,  1889).  That  an  'accom- 
plice is  testifying  under  an  express 
agreement  of  immunity  is  an  objec- 
tion to  his  credibility  alone.  Black 
v.  State,  59  Wis.  471;  Olive  v.  State, 
11  Neb.  1. 

2  Rex  v.  Noakes,  5  C.  &  P.  326; 

30 


Whitlow  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  13  S. 
W.  Rep.  865;  United  States  v.  Hinz, 
32  Fed.  Rep.  272;  People  v.  O'Neill, 
109  N.  Y.  251;  State  v.  Williamson, 
42  Conn.  261.  But  a  failure  to  charge 
the  jury  to  this  effect  is  not  revers- 
ible error.  McConnell  v.  State  (Tea., 
1893),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  645. 


CHAPTER  XXIII. 


EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES. 


i  830.  Order  for  witnesses  to  with- 
draw from  court-room. 

331.  Direct  examination  and  cross- 
examination  distinguished. 

832.  Refusal  to  testify,  when  a 
contempt  —  Employment 
of  interpreter. 

333.  Mode  of  conducting  direct 
examination. 

834.  Questions  put  hy  the  judge 

or  by  members  of  the  jury. 

835.  Leading    questions  —  When 

allowable  on  direct  exami- 
nation. 

836.  Responsiveness  of  answers. 

837.  Witness     may     refresh     his 

memory  by  referring  to  a 
memorandum  or  writing. 


338. 


339. 

340. 

341. 
342. 
343. 

344. 
315. 


346. 


346a, 


Character  of  the  writing 
used  to  refresh  memory  of 
the  witness. 

Cross-examination  —  Its  pur- 
pose and  value. 

Power  of  cross  -  examina- 
tion —  Its  extent. 

Redirect  examination. 

Recalling  witnesses. 

Receiving  evidence  out  of 
court. 

Taking  the  view  by  the  jury. 

"  Real  evidence  "  —  Physical 
examination  by  the  jury 
in  court  —  Identification. 

Right  of  the  defendant  in  a 
criminal  trial  to  confront 
the  witnesses  against  him. 

The  accused  as  a  witness  in  a 
criminal  prosecution. 


§  330.  Order  for  witnesses  to  withdraw  from  court-room. 

The  presiding  judge  may,  when  he  considers  it  necessary  to 
a  proper  administration  of  justice,  order  the  exclusion  of  all 
other  witnesses  from  the  room  during  the  examination  of  a 
witness.  The  order,  though  not  perhaps  of  right.1  is  seldom 
refused  where  it  is  at  all  evident  that  the  ascertainment  of 


iVance  v.  State  (Ark.,  1892),  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  10U6;  State  v.  Fitzsim- 
ons,  30  Mo.  236;  Riley  v.  State,  88 
Ala.  93;  State  v.  Davis,  48  Kan.  1; 
Benaway  v.  Conyne,  3  Chand.  (Wis.) 
214;  Barnes  v.  State,  83  Ala.  204; 
Kelly  v.  People,  17  Colo.  130;  29 
Pac.  Rep.  805;  Nelson  v.  State,  2 
Swan(Tenn.),  237;  Binfield  v.  State 
(Neb.,  1884),  19  N.  W.  Rep.  607;   Er- 


rissman  v.  Errissman,  25  111.  136; 
Zoldoske  v.  State,  82  Wis.  580;  53 
N.  W.  Rep.  778;  Taylor  v.  Lawson, 
3  C.  &  P.  543;  Heath  v.  State,  7  Tex. 
App.  464;  Com.  v.  Thompson  (Mass., 
1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  1111 ;  Roberts  v. 
Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  845; 
Taylor  v.  State.  130  Ind.  66;  Haines 
v.  Territory,  3  Wyo.  166. 


§  330.]  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  467 

truth  will  be  advanced  thereby.1  If  a  witness  stays  in  the 
court-room,  though  by  inadvertence,  after  the  judge  has  or- 
dered the  witnesses  to  withdraw,  the  court  may,  in  its  discre- 
tion, refuse  to  allow  him  to  be  examined,2  and  its  action  in  so 
doing  will  not  be  reversible  error  unless  a  party's  substantial 
rights  are  shown  to  have  been  prejudiced  thereby.3  The  rule 
that  a  witness,  by  thus  disobeying  the  court,  renders  his  tes- 
timony subject  to  exclusion  is  not  universally  recognized.  It 
is  manifestly  unfair  to  deprive  a  party,  who  is  not  in  fault,  of 
testimony  on  which  he  relies,  and  on  which,  perhaps,  his 
whole  case  is  founded,  because  the  witness,  out  of  careless- 
ness, obstinacy  or  caprice,  refuses  or  neglects  to  obey  the 
order  of  the  court.  So  it  has  been  held  that  the  testimony  of 
such  a  witness  cannot  be  excluded,  but  must  be  received,  and 
the  jury  may  be  instructed  that  they  may  take  into  consid- 
eration the  fact  that  he  remained  in  court  in  determining  his 
credibility.4  The  witness  may  be  proceeded  against  for  con- 
tempt in  disobeying  the  order.5  After  witnesses  not  under 
examination  have  been  directed  to  withdraw,  it  is  within  the 
discretion  of  the  court  to  permit  one  or  more  of  them  to  re- 
main;6 and  an  exception  will  always  be  made  in  the  case  of 

1  Thomas    v.    State,    29    Ga.    287 ;  counsel  who  is  also  a  witness  cannot 

Hellems  v.  State,  22  Ark.  207.     An  be  excluded  even  where  the  right  to 

expert  witness  may  be  excluded  in  have  the  witnesses  separated  is  stat- 

a    criminal    case.     Vance   v.    State  utory);    State  v.    Thomas,  111  Ind. 

(Ark.,  1892),  19  S,  W.  Rep.  1066.  516;    13  N.    E.    Rep.    85;    Smith  v. 

SEthredge  v.  Hobbs,  77  Ga.  251;  State,  4  Lea  (Tenn.),  428;  Taylor  v. 

State  v.  Brookshire,  2  Ala.  303;  Mc-  State,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  415;  130  Ind.  66; 

Leon  v.  State,  16  Ala.  672;  Trujillo  State  v.    Ward,    61   Vt.   179;    Cook 

v.  Territory  (N.  Mex.,  1893).  30  Pac.  v.  State,  18  S.  W.  Rep.  412;  30  Tex. 

Rep.  870;  People  v.   Sam  Lung,  70  App.  607;  Grant  v.  State,  15  S.  E. 

Cal.    516;    Hey  v.   Com.,  32  Gratt.  Rep.  488;  89  Ga.  393;  State  v.  Lock- 

(Va.)  946.  wood,  58  Vt.  378;  Lassiter  v.  State, 

» Carlton  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892),  18  67  Ga.   739;    Sartorius  v.   State,  24 

S.  W.  Rep.  535;  Cook  v.  State,  30  Miss.  602;  Pleasant  v.  State,  15  Ark. 

Tex.  App.  607;  18  S.  W.   Rep.  412;  624;  Porter  v.  State,  2  Ind.  435. 
Lassiter  v.  State,  67  Ga.  739.  5  See  cases  cited  supra. 

*  Roberts  v.   Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  22        6  Indianapolis  Cab.    Co.    v.  Herr- 

S.  W.   Rep.   895;  Hubbard  v.  Hub-  man,  infra;  Riley  v.  State,  88  Ala. 

bard,  7  Oreg.  42 ;  O'Bryan  v.  Allen,  93;    Barnes  v.    State,   88  Ala.  204; 

95  Mo.  68;  8  S.  W.  Rep.  225;  Boal-  State  v.  Hopkins.  50  Vt.  316;  Carson 

mayer  v.  State,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  1102;  v.  State,  80  Ga.  170. 
31  Tex.  Crirn.  Rep.  473  (holding  that 


408 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§§  331,  332. 


a  party  to  the  suit,  his  attorney,1  an  officer  of  the  court,2  or  a 
juror3  who  is  also  a  witness,  and  he  will  not  be  required  to 
withdraw.4 

§331.  Direct  examination  and  cross-examination  dis- 
tinguished.—  The  direct  examination  of  a  witness  is  his  first 
examination  by  the  party  in  whose  behalf  he  is  called  to  tes- 
tify. His  cross-examination  is  his  subsequent  examination  by 
the  adverse  party  upon  the  same  subject-matter  to  which  he 
has  testified  upon  his  direct  examination.5 

§332.  Refusal  to  testify,  when  a  contempt  —  Employ- 
ment of  interpreter. —  A  witness  who  refuses  to  be  sworn  or 
to  answer  a  relevant  question  without  a  satisfactory  excuse  is 
guilty  of  contempt  of  court.  But  the  judicial  power  to  pun- 
ish for  contempt  in  refusing  to  testify  is  confined  to  courts  of 
record  and  to  legislative  bodies  in  the  absence  of  any  express 
statute  granting  it  to  other  officials  whose  duty  it  may  be  to 
interrogate  witnesses.6  A  court  may  punish  as  a  contempt 
the  refusal  of  a  witness  to  testify  before  a  commissioner  ap- 
pointed by  it  to  take  depositions,7  or  before  the  grand  jury 
over  which  it  exercises  supervision,8  or  at  an  examination  before 


1  Everett  v.  Lowdham,  5  C.  &  P. 
91. 

2  Kelly  v.  People,  17  Colo.  130;  29 
Pac.  Rep.  805. 

3  State  v.  Vari  (S.  C,  1892),  1|  S. 
E.  Rep.  892 ;  35  S.  C.  175. 

*  Allen  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1888),  9  S.  W. 
Rep.  703;  Kissam  v.  Forrest,  25 
Wend.  651 ;  Indianapolis  Cabinet  Co. 
v.  Herrman  (Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E. 
Rep.  579.  The  exclusion  of  a  party 
is  ground  for  a  new  trial.  Schneider 
v.  Haas,  14  Oreg.  174;  Mcintosh  v. 
Mcintosh,  44  N.  W.  Rep.  592; 
Chandler  v.  Avery,  47  Hun.  9 ;  Gar- 
mon  v.  State,  66  Miss.  196.  The 
court  will  not,  however,  prohibit 
witnesses  who  have  been  excluded 
from  reading  newspapers  which  con- 
tain the  evidence  in  the  case.  Com. 
v.  Hersey,  84  Mass.  173. 

5  Anderson's  Law  Diet.  See  post, 
§  341,  as  to  redirect  examination. 


6 White  v.  Morgan  Co.,  119  Ind. 
338;  People  v.  Rice,  ION.  Y.  S.  270; 
Barnes  v.  Reilly  (Mich.,  1892),  45  N. 
W.  Rep.  1016;  Brunger  v.  Smith,  49 
Fed.  Rep.  124 ;  Bradley  v.  Fertilizer 
Co.  (N.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  69; 
Llewellyn's  Case,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 
126;  Pittman  v.  Hagans  (Ga.,  1893), 
16  S.  E.  Rep.  352 ;  Enos  v.  Garrett, 
2  Pa.  Dis.  Co.  R.  86 ;  Ex  parte  Wood- 
worth,  29  W.  L.  Bui.  315  (contempt 
before  notary). 

TRobb's  Case,  11  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep. 
442.  "A  justice  of  the  peace,  though 
he  cannot  commit  a  witness  for  con- 
tempt, may  bind  a  party  refusing  to 
testify  to  answer  an  indictment  for 
obstructing  justice."  Albright  v. 
Lapp,  26  Pa.  St.  101. 

8  Ex  parte  Harris,  4  Utah,  5;  Peo- 
ple v.  Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74;  Ex  parte 
Stice,  70  Cal.  51. 


§  333.]  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.  4G9 

trial,1  and  it  may  do  so  as  often  as  the  witness  refuses  to  testify.2 
Where  the  statutory  right  is  conferred  upon  a  witness  to  answer 
only  pertinent  questions,  he  cannot  be  committed  for  contempt 
in  refusing  to  reply  to  a  question  which  is  not  pertinent;3  and 
generally,  where  the  court  has  not  acquired  proper  jurisdiction 
of  the  cause,  the  witness  who  refuses  to  testify  is  not  in  con- 
tempt.4 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  requiring  it,  the  employment  of 
an  interpreter  where  a  witness  is  unable  to  speak  or  under- 
stand the  English  language  is  discretionary,5  though  whe^n  a 
party  was  deprived  of  the  testimony  of  a  material  witness  by 
the  refusal  of  the  court  to  employ  an'  interpreter,  it  was  held 
good  ground  for  a  new  trial.6  A  witness  may  act  as  an  inter- 
preter for  another  Avitness,7  and  should  be  sworn  as  such  to 
interpret  faithfully ; 8  while  if  he  is  inefficient  as  an  interpreter 
his  restatement  or  interpretation  may  be  impeached  for  inac- 
curacy by  the  adverse  party.9 

§  333.  Mode  of  conducting  the  direct  examination.— 
After  the  witness  shall  have  been  sworn  and  asked  to  state 
his  name  in  order  that  his  identity  may  be  ascertained  or  con- 
firmed, he  is  to  be  questioned  in  regard  to  his  knowledge  of 
the  matter  in  issue.  The  jury  has  a  right  to  know  every  fact 
which  will  aid  them  in  estimating  the  credit  of  the  witness. 

1  Fenlon  v.  Dempsey,  21  Abb.  N.  C.  53 ;  State  v.  Severson,  78  Iowa,  653 : 
291.  Swan  v.  State,  26  Tex.  A  pp.  115. 

2  Ex  parte  Stice,  70  Cal.  51.  6  Chicago,   etc.   Co.   v.  Shenk,  131 

3  Ex  parte  Zeehandelaur,  71  Cal.  111.  283 ;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  436.  As  to  the 
238;  In  re  McKnight,  11  Mont.  126;  custom  of  employing  interpreters, 
In  re  Odell,  6  Dem.  Sur.  344.  see  under  the  word  "  translation," 

4  People  v.Warner,   51    Hun,    53.  Anderson's   Dictionary.      See,  also, 
As  regards  the  power  of  the  court  to  Amory  v.  Fellows,  5  Mass.  225. 
commit  a  witness  for   contempt  in  ">  Chicago,   etc.   Co.   v.   Shenk,  131 
failing  to  attend,  see  ante,  §§  284,  111.  283. 

289.      A  publisher  of  a  newspaper  8  People  v.  Dowdigan,  67  Mich.  95. 

who  refuses  to  testify  or  to  give  the  9Skaggs  v.    State,    108    Ind.    53; 

real  name  of  the  author  of  a  libelous  Schnier  v.  People,  23  111.    17.     The 

article  may   be    punished   for  con-  assistance  of  one  or  more  bystanders 

tempt,  though  he  is  himself   under  who  are  not  sworn  to  interpret  may 

indictment  for  the  libel.     Pledger  v.  be  allowed  the  interpreter  where  he 

State,  77  Ga.  242.  is  in  doubt.     United  States  v.  Gibert, 

5  Horn  v.   State  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  2  Suuin.  19. 
Rep.  329;  Staggs  v.  State,   108  Ind. 


470 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


B 


He  may  therefore  be  asked  to  explain  his  motives,1  and  to 
state  who  he  is,  whence  he  comes,  where  he  lived  and  other 
personal  details  of  a  like  character.2  It  is  not  permissible,  ex- 
cept in  certain  cases  which  will  be  discussed  later,  to  ask  the 
witness  leading  questions,  i.e.,  questions  which  by  their  form  or 
character  ''suggest  to  the  witness  the  answer  which  the  party 
desires  and  expects  him  to  make  and  leads  him  to  make  it."3 
Thus,  questions  which  take  the  form  of  a  statement  of  fact, 
and  suggest  thereby  that  the  witness  is  to  deny  or  affirm  it  by 
replying  merely  "yes"  or  "no,"  may  be  given  as  examples  of 
leading  questions. 

Somewhat  analogous  to  leading  questions  and  equally  inad- 
missible are  those  which  assume  particular  facts  in  issue  or 
material  thereto  as  proved  which  have  not  been,  or  certain 
answers  to  have  been  made  to  prior  questions  when  no  such 
answers  have  been  given.4  Except  as  elsewhere  explained,  in 
the  case  of  the  examination  of  experts,  it  is  not  permissible 
during  the  direct  examination  to  question  the  witness  in  re- 
gard to  matters  which  are  not  within  his  personal  knowledge, 
or  to  endeavor  by  assuming  or  leading  questions  to  elicit  his 
opinion  or  inference  as  to  any  matter  of  fact.5    But  in  certain 


i  Brooken  v.  State  (Tex.,  1888),  9 
S.  W.  Rep.  735. 

2  Avery  v.  Fitzgerald,  7  S.  W. 
Rep.  6. 

31  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  434;  Anderson's 
Law  Dictionary.  See,  also,  Chat- 
tanooga, etc.  Co.  v.  Huggins,  80  Ga. 
494;  Alabama,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hill,  93 
Ala.  514;  Hicks  v.  Sharp,  89  Ga. 
311;  15  S.  E.  Rep.  314;  Cannon  v. 
People  (111.,  1892),  30  N.  E.  Rep.  1077; 
Brice  v.  Miller,  35  S.  C.  272,  537; 
Daly  v.  Melendy,  32  Neb.  852;  Cling- 
man  v.  Irvine.  40  111.  App.  603 ;  Bald- 
ridge,  etc.  Co.  v.  Calrett,  75  Tex. 
628;  Spear  v.  Richardson,  37  N.  H. 
26;  State  v.  Johnson,  29  La.  Ann. 
717;  Wilson  v.  McCullough,  23  Pa. 
St.  440. 

4  Robertson  v.  Craver  (Iowa,  1892), 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  492;  Hays  v.  State 
(Tex.,    1893),    20    S.    W.    Rep.    361; 


Davis  v.  Willis,  67  Hun,  650;  Thomp- 
son v.  Ray  (Ga.,  1893',  18  S.  E.  Rep. 
59 ;  Bostie  v.  State,  94  Ala.  45 ;  Peo- 
ple v.  Lange,  90  Mich.  451;  Foster 
v.  Dickerson,  64  Vt.  233 ;  24  Atl.  Rep. 
253;  People  v.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  70  Cal. 
8 ;  Graham  v.  McReynolds,  90  Tenn. 
673. 

5  A  question  in  the  following  form 
has  been  held  not  to  be  a  leading 
question:  "You  may  state  whether 
you  were  directed  by  defendant,  or 
any  one  of  its  employees  or  its 
agents,  to  get  off  of  the  opposite  end 
of  this  coach  from  the  end  that  you 
did  get  off."  McDona'd  v.  Illinois 
Cent.  R.  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W. 
Rep.  102.  Nor  is  a  question  leading 
which  merely  repeats  what  a  wit- 
ness has  testified  to.  Brice  v.  Miller, 
15  S.  E.  Rep.  272;  35  S.  C.  537.  See 
§§  185-198. 


§  334.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


471 


circumstances  leading  questions  are  allowable,  and  it  is  largely 
a  matter  over  which  the  court  has  control,  and  upon  which  it 
may  exercise  a  sound  discretion  whether,  upon  the  facts  in 
any  particular  case,  leading  questions  should  be  permitted  to 
be  put  in  the  direct  examination.1  If  the  discretion  is  grossly 
abused  to  the  substantial  injury  of  either  party,  error  will 
lie.2  A  witness  may  be  permitted  to  give  his  testimony  in  a 
narrative  form,  and  either  party  may,  when  he  states  facts 
which  are  irrelevant,  stop  him  and  move  to  have  such  facts 
stricken  out.3 

§  3J34.  (Juestions  propounded  by  the  judge  or  jurors. — 
The  policy  of  the  law  requires  that  the  triers  of  fact  should 
not  entertain,  or  at  least  should  not  manifest,  any  partiality 
during  the  examination  of  the  witnesses.  Where  the  trial  is 
by  a  jury,  it  is  not  only  the  right  but  it  is  the  duty  of  the 
judge  to  decide  all  preliminary  questions  of  fact  bearing  on 
the  competency  of  witnesses  or  of  evidence,  and  to  enable 
him  to  do  so  he  must  question  the  witnesses.  No  objection 
can  be  made  so  long  as  his  questions  or  remarks  are  not  aimed 
to  elicit  facts  bearing  materially  on  the  issue.  Accordingly 
the  court,  in  ruling  on  the  competency  of  the  evidence  offered, 
may  state  the  theory  and  grounds  on   which  it  was  offered 


1  Van  Doren  v.  Jelliffe,  20  N.  Y.  S. 
636;  Donnell  v.  James,  13  Ala.  490; 
Pucker  v.  Wilson  (N.  C,  1893),  16 
S.  E.  Rep.  854;  McClain  v.  Com., 
110  Pa.  St.  263;  Walker  v.  Duns- 
paugh,  20  N.  Y.  170;  Com.  v.  Chaney, 
148  Mass.  8;  Lander  v.  Lander,  5 
Ir.  C.  L.  Rep.  27 ;  Wells  v.  Jackson, 
etc.  Co.,  48  N.  H.  491.  "Questions 
suggesting  the  answer  which  the 
person  putting  the  question  wishes 
or  expects  to  receive,  or  suggesting 
disputed  facts  as  to  which  the  wit- 
ness is  to  testify,  must  not,  if  objected 
to  by  the  adverse  party,  be  asked  in 
an  examination  in  chief  or  a  re- 
examination, except  with  the  per- 
mission of  the  court;  but  such  ques- 
tions may  be  asked  in  cross-examina- 
tion."    Stephen's  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  128. 

-  Gunter  v.  Watson,  4  Jones'  (N.  C.) 


L.  455;  Van  Doren  v.  Jelliffe,  20 
N.  Y.  S.  1;  1  Misc.  Rep.  354;  Whit- 
ing v.  Miss.  V.  I.  Co..  76  Wis.  592: 
Schuster  v.  State,  80  Wis.  107;  49 
N.  W.  Rep.  30;  Brassell  v.  State,  91 
Ala.  45;  8  S.  Rep.  679;  Foster  v. 
Dickinson,  64  Vt.  235;  24  Atl.  Rep. 
255; 'Travelers"  Ins.  Co.  v.  Shepherd. 
85  Ga.  751;  Badder  v.  Keefer,*  91 
Mich.  611 ;  52  N.  W.  Rep.  60;  Union 
Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Brien,  46  Fed.  Rep. 
538;  Weber  Wagon  Co.  v.  Keh],  139 
111.  644;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  714;  O'Neill 
v.  Howe,  9  N.  Y.  S.  746;  Walker  v, 
Dunspaugh,  20  N.  Y.  170:  ObernaJte 
v.  Edgar,  28  Neb.  70 ;  44  N.  W.  Rep. 
82;  White  v.  White,  82  Cal.  427. 

3  Northern  Pac.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Charless,  51  Fed.  Rep.  562;  2  C.  C. 
A.  380. 


472  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  334. 

and  rejected,  and  may  estimate  its  probable  effect  if  it  had 
been  received,  provided  no  language  is  used  that  will  improp- 
erly bias  the  jury  for  or  against  either  party.1  Indeed  it  has 
been  held  that  the  active  participation  of  the  court  in  the  ex- 
amination of  a  witness,2  even  to  the  extent  of  suggesting  to 
counsel  the  manner  in  which  the  questions  should  be  properly 
framed,3  or  warning  a  witness  that  if  he  answers  a  certain 
question  he  may  have  to  answer  another,4  though  not  a  com- 
mendable practice,  is  not  ground  for  a  new  trial  unless  a  party 
is  actually  prejudiced  thereby.5 

A  witness  may  very  properly  be  questioned  by  the  court  as 
to  his  understanding  of  a  question  which  has  been  asked  him 
by  counsel,6  and  the  court  may,  at  any  time,  in  order  to  ex- 
pedite the  administration  of  justice,  peremptorily  check  and 
silence  a  very  voluble  or  abusive  witness,7  or  interpose  sua 
sponte  and  without  the  objection  of  counsel,8  and  particularly 
if  a  party  has  no  counsel,9  to  exclude  incompetent  evidence. 
Sometimes,  as  a  matter  of  practice,  jurors  are  permitted  to 
interrogate  a  witness,  and  his  answers,  when  relevant,  are  not 
objectionable  because  thus  informally  obtained.  A  lengthy 
examination  by  a  juror,  during  which  the  juror's  mental  atti- 
tude or  bias  towards  the  parties  or  the  issue  is  exhibited, 
should  not  be  permitted  or  encouraged.10 

A  very  broad  line  of  demarcation  should   be  drawn  and 

'Queen   Ins.    Co.   v.    Studebaker,  4 Insurance  Co.  v.  Slowitch,  55  N. 

117  Ind.  416;  Thompson  v.  Ish,  99  Y.  Super.  Ct.  452. 

Mo.166;  Keith  v.  Wells  (Colo.,  1890),  5  See  Sharp  v.   State,  51  Ark.  147. 

23  Pac.  Rep.    991;  State  v.  Milling  estate  v.  Mathews,  98  Mo.  125. 

(S.  C.  1892),  14  S.  E.  Rep.  284:  Hodge  'Robinson   v.   State,    82  Ga.  535; 

v.  State  (Fla.,  1890),  7  S.  Rep.  593.  Bourdon  v.  Bailes,  101  N.  C.  612. 

2  Robinson  v.  State,  83  Ga.  535;  ^Durrett  v.  state,  62  Ala.  434; 
Hodge  v.  State  (Fla.,  1890),  7  S.  Rep.  People  v.  Turcott,  65  Cal.  126. 

593;  Hudson  v.  Hudson  (Ga.,  1893),  9  McClure  v.  Com.,  81  Ky.  448. 
16  S.  E.  Rep.  349;  Sanders  v.  Bag-  10  State  v.  Merkley  (Iowa,  1888),  39 
well(S.  C,  1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  714;  N.  W.  Rep.  111.  Sometimes  a  de- 
Bauer  v.  Beall  (Colo.,  1889),  23  Pac.  fendant  is  permitted  by  statute  to 
Rep.  345;  O'Conner  v.  Ice  Co.,  56  make  a  personal  statement  under 
N.  Y.  Super.  Ct.  410  (witness  called  oath  to  the  jury  of  his  defense.  He 
and  examined  by  court  over  objec-  is  not,  in  such  a  case,  a  witness,  nor 
tion  of  counsel).  can  he  be  examined  or  cross-exam- 

3  Metropolitan  St.  R.  Co.  v.  John-  ined  by  the  jurors  or  by  counsel, 
son  (Ga..  1893),  18  S.  E  Rep.  816.  (/.  The  court  should,  of  its  own  motion, 
contra,  Jefferson  v.  State,  80  Ga.  10.  protect  him   from   the  questioning 


331.] 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES. 


473 


recognized  between  the  competency  of  evidence  and  its  credi- 
bility. The  admissibility  of  evidence  is  a  judicial  question 
not  within  the  province  of  the  jury,1  and  no  remark  which  is 
made  by  the  judge  during  the  examination  of  a  witness  as  to 
his  competency  or  the  relevancy  or  admissibility  of  his  evi- 
dence, or  the  reason  for  its  exclusion  or  admission,  can  be  urged 
as  ground  for  a  new  trial.2  But  the  weight  and  credibility 
of  testimony  are  for  the  jury,  and  all  judicial  observations  or  re- 
marks upon  the  credibility  of  a  witness  or  the  amount  of 
weight  to  be  given  to  his  evidence  which  are  m&de  duri?t</  the 
examination  of  a  witness  are  improper  and  may  be  objected 
to.3  That  the  remarks  were  inadvertently  made  is  immaterial 
if  a  party  is  substantially  prejudiced  by  them,4  though  it 
seems  the  error  may  be  remedied  by  a  prompt  withdrawal 
or  explanation  of  the  objectionable  words,5  or  by  an  instruc- 
tion to  the  jury  to  disregard  them.6 


and  interference  of  counsel,  or  of 
any  other  person,  and  a  neglect  to 
do  so,  if  objection  is  promptly  made, 
will  be  ground  for  reversal.  Han- 
kins  v.  State  (Fla.,  1892),  10  S.  Rep. 
822. 

iSeeanfe,  §§  11-13. 

2  State  v.  Young,  105  Mo.  634; 
Patterson  v.  State,  86  Ga.  70 ;  Lewis 
v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep. 
697;  Com.  v.  Ward  (Mass.),  32  N.  E. 
Rep.  663;  Arnold  v.  State,  81  Wis. 
278;  Butler  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  16 
S.  E.  Repv894;  State  v.  Turner,  36 
S.  C.  534.  In  a  case  of  homicide  the 
witness  was  in  the  room  and  was 
repeatedly  questioned  as  to  the  exact 
spot  on  which  he  was  sitting.  On 
his  answering  evasively  the  court 
said:  "You  must  have  seen  a  part 
of  what  was  going  on,  didn't  j7ou?  " 
Adding,  "  We  all  know  that  if  any- 
thing is  going  on  in  a  room  it  is  a 
slight  circumstance  where  a  man 
sits.  He  may  turn  his  chair  or  turn 
around.  He  is  not  fixed  like  a  pillar 
of  wood.  The  jury  understand  that 
perfectly  well.  It  is  a  waste  of  time 
to  try  and  enlighten  them  on  the 
subject."    Held  no  error.     Carthaus 


v.  State,  78  Wis.  560;  47  N.  W.  Rep. 
679. 

3  Sharp  v.  State,  51  Ark.  147; 
State  v.  Raymond,  53  N.  J.  L.  2G0 ; 
People  v.  Wood,  126  N.  Y.  249; 
Shepherd  v.  State,  31  Neb.  389; 
Brunker  v.  Cummins  (Ind.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  732:  Sterling  v.  Callahan, 
94  Mich.  536;  Hudson  v.  Hudson 
(Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  349;  State 
v.  Jacobs,  106  N.  C.  695 ;  People  v. 
Fleming,  14  N.  Y,  S.  200;  People  v. 
Wood  (N.  Y.,  1891),  27  N.  E.  Rep. 
362;  Campbell  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 
369;  People  v.  Willard,  92  Cal.  482; 
State  v.  Lucas  (Oreg.,  1893),  33  Pac. 
Rep.  538;  People  v.  Hull,  86  Mich. 
449;  Bone  v.  State,  86  Ga.  108;  New- 
berry v.  State,  26  Fla.  334. 

4  Garner  v.  State,  28  Fla.  113. 

5  Johnston  v.  State,  94  Ala.  35; 
Reinhold  v.  State,  130  Ind.  467;  30 
N.  E.  Rep.  306;  Ryan  v.  State,  83 
Wis.  486;  Com.  v.  Ward  (Mass., 
1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  693;  State  v. 
Black,  42  La.  Ann.  861;  Wynn  v. 
City  R.  R.  Co.  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E. 
Rep.  649. 

6  People  v.  Northey,  77  Cal.  618; 
Vann  v.  State,  83  Ga.  44. 


471: 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  335. 


§335.  Leading  questions — When  allowable  on  direct 
examination. —  The  general  rule  rejecting  leading  questions 
as  above  stated  is  subject  to  several  important  exceptions.1 
Thus,  if  the  witness  on  his  direct  examination  manifest  hos- 
tility to  the  party  who  called  him  by  coloring  his  testimony 
to  favor  his  opponent  or  by  an  appearance  of  unwillingness 
to  answer  or  by  attempting  to  conceal  what  he  knows,  he 
may  be  asked  leading  questions.2  Leading  questions  may  be 
propounded  not  only  to  an  unwilling  witness  but  to  one  who 
is  forgetful  as  well,3  or  who  is  very  young  and  inexperienced,4 
or  who  is  ignorant  of  the  language,5  or  to  one  whose  memory, 
while  clear  as  to  the  main  facts  of  a  complicated  transaction, 


i  Hoody  v.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  498. 
In  this  case  the  law  on  this  point 
was  thus  stated  by  the  chief  justice: 
"The  court  have  no  doubt  that  it  is 
within  the  discretion  of  a  judge  at 
the  trial,  under  particular  circum- 
stances, to  permit  a  leading  question 
to  be  put  to  one's  own  witness ;  as 
when  he  is  manifestly  reluctant  and 
hostile  to  the  interest  of  the  party 
calling  him,  or  where  he  has  ex- 
hausted his  memory,  without  stat- 
ing the  particulars  required,  where  it 
is  a  proper  name,  or  other  fact  which 
cannot  be  significantly  pointed  to  by 
a  general  interrogatory,  or  where 
the  witness  is  a  child  of  tender 
years,  whose  attention  can  be  called 
to  the  matter  required  only  by  a 
pointed  or  leading  question.  So  a 
judge  may,  in  his  discretion,  pro- 
hibit certain  leading  questions  from 
being  put  to  an  adversary's  witness, 
where  the  witness  shows  a  strong 
interest  or  bias  in  favor  of  the  cross- 
examining  party,  and  needs  only  an 
intimation  to  say  whatever  is  most 
favorable  to  that  party.  The  wit- 
ness may  have  personally  concealed 
such  bias  in  favor  of  one  party  to 
induce  the  other  to  call  him  and 
make  him  his  witness;  or  the  party 
calling  him  may  be  compelled  to  do 
so,  to  prove  some  single  fact  neces- 


sary to  his  case.  This  discretionary 
power  to  vary  the  general  rule  is  to 
be  exercised  only  so  far  as  the  pur- 
poses of  justice  plainly  require  it, 
and  is  to  be  regulated  by  the  cir- 
cumstances of  each  case."  And  see 
Donell  v.  Jones,  13  Ala.  490. 

2  State  v.  Tall,  43  Minn.  278:  Meix- 
ell  v.  Feezor,  43  III.  App.  180;  Ro- 
senthal v.  Bilger  (Iowa,  139:?),  53  N. 
W.  Rep.  255;  McBride  v.  Wallace, 
62  Mich.  451;  State  v.  Bener,  64  Me. 
267;  Doran  v.  Mullen.  78  111.  342; 
Navarro  v.  State,  24  Tex.  App.  378, 
505;  Bradshaw  v.  Combs,  102  111. 
428. 

3  Born  v.  Rosenow  (Wis.,  1893), 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  1089;  King  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  26  N.  Y.  S.  973;  Graves  v. 
Merchants',  etc.  Bank  (Iowa,  1891), 
49  N.  W.  Rep.  65 ;  St.  Paul  F.  &  M. 
Ins.  Co.  v.  Gothell,  35  Neb.  351. 

"Palson  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),  35 
N.  E.  Rep.  907;  Proper  v.  State 
(Wis.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  1035. 
Thus  in  a  prosecution  for  commit- 
ting a  rape  on  a  child  the  state  was 
allowed  to  ask  the  prosecuting  wit- 
ness, "Do  you  know  that  boy  over 
there?"  pointing  to  the  accused 
party.  Paschal  v.  State,  89  Ga.  303; 
15  S.  E.  Rep.  322. 

5  Navarro  v.  State,  24  Tex.  378;  6 
S.  W.  Rep.  542. 


§  335.]  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  475 

is  weak  and  undecided  as  regards  the  minor  facts,  items  or 
dates  which  go  to  compose  it.1 

In  that  portion  of  the  direct  examination  which  is  merely 
introductory,  leading  questions  are  allowed,-  as  where  counsel 
are  permitted,  instead  of  asking  a  witness  what  was  said,  to 
ask  him  whether  particular  statements  or  communications 
were  made  in  his  hearing,  for  the  purpose  of  contradicting 
another  witness  who  had  previously  testified  that  they  were 
not  made.3  So,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  refreshing  the  memory 
of  one's  own  witness,  counsel  may  ask  him  on  his  direct  exami- 
nation if  he  did  not  at  a  prior  date  state  certain  facts  which  are 
not  consistent  with  his  present  statements.4  So  where  the  mem- 
ory of  the  witness  is  faint,  the  party  may  question  him  upon 
unimportant  and  irrelevant  but  suggestive  facts,5  or  may  ask 
the  witness  what  was  his  uniform  habit  or  routine  of  actin^  in 
connection  with  certain  transactions,6  if  the  evidence  of  the 
unimportant  fact  or  the  business  routine  will  surest  to  the 
memory  of  the  witness  a  relevant  fact  which  has  been  for- 
gotten by  him.7  The  witness  may  also  be  asked  if  he  men- 
tioned a  fact  which  he  has  himself  forgotten  to  another  person, 
and  if  he  replies  affirmatively  the  other  person  is  competent 
to  testify  to  such  a  fact.8  And  if  a  witness  is  questioned  as 
to  names  which  he  has  forgotten,  a  list  of  names  may  be  read 
over  to  him  for  the  purpose  of  refreshing  his  memory.9 

1  A  witness  who  on  direct  exam-  3  Farmers'  Mut.  Fire  Ins.  Co.  v. 
ination  denies  all  knowledge  of  the  Bair,  87  Pa.  St.  124;  Cannon  v. 
facts  which  she  is  called  to  prove,  People  (111.,  1S92),  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
but  subsequently  admits  she  sup-  1027;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  O'Brien, 
pressed  the  truth,  may  be  recalled,  49  Fed.  Rep.  53S;  4  U.  S.  A  pp.  221; 
on  motion,  though  the  party  has  1  C.  C.  A.  354.  See  'post,  §  350. 
rested  his  case.  Her  evidence  may  4  State  v.  Cummins,  76  Iowa,  133; 
then  be  regarded  as  newly  discov-  40  N.  W.  Rep.  121.  Cf,  Avery  v. 
ered.     Rice  v.  Rice  (N.  J.,  1892),  23  Mattice,  9  N.  Y.  S.  1G6. 

Atl.  Rep.  946.     If  a  witness  profess  5  Prentiss  v.  Bates,   88  Mich.  567; 

ignorance  of  a  transaction  he  can-  O'Hogan  v.  Dillon,  76  N.  Y.  170. 

not  be   required   to  inform  himself  e  People  v.  Oyer  &T.,  S3  N.  Y.  436; 

thereon  for  the  purpose  of  answer-  Morrow  v.   Ostrander,   13  Hun,  219. 

ing  a  question,  nor  does  the  court  "Abb.  Brief  on  Facts,  £393. 

err  in  refusing  to  direct  him  to  do  so.  8  Shear  v.  Van  Dyke,  10  Hun,  528 ; 

People  v.  Ching,  78  Cal.  389.  Green  v.  Cawthorn,  4  Dev.  (N.  C.) 

2  Paschal  v.  State,  15  S.  E.  Rep.  409;  Abb.  Brief  on  Facts,  §  397; 
522;  89  Ga.   303;  Shultz  v.  State,  5  Whart.  Crini.  Ev.,  §  360. 

Tex.   App.   390;  Lowe  v.  Lowe,  40        ^Aceno  v.  Petroni,  1  Stark.  100. 
Iowa,  220. 


476 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  336. 


§  336.  Responsiveness  of  answers. —  The  questions  which 
are  put  to  a  witness  should  be  neither  vague  nor  ambiguous,1 
and  his  replies  thereto  should  be  responsive,  stating  all  the 
facts  called  for,  and  no  more,  without  any  expression  of  his 
opinion  or  his  conjectures.2  If  a  witness  simply  adopts  the 
answer  of  another  witness  preceding  him,3  or  if  his  answer  is 
irresponsive  so  that  it  wholly  or  partially  fails  to  convey  the 
information  which  is  required,  it  may  be  stricken  out  on  mo- 
tion,4 so  far  as  it  is  irresponsive;5  and  a  refusal  by  the  court  to 
do  so,  if  the  objection  is  promptl}7  made,  would  be  reversible 
error.6  The  court  may,  without  abusing  its  discretion,  instruct 
a  witness  to  answer  a  question  responsively  where  he  persists 
in  giving  an  evasive  answer;7  and  whether  an  answer  is  re- 
sponsive is  for  the  court8  to  determine.  An  answer  which  is 
not  only  not  responsive,  but  abusive  to  the  adverse  party  or 
to  his  counsel,  to  such  an  extent  that  it  is  calculated  to  create 
prejudice  in  the  minds  of  the  jurors,  should  be  stricken  out  on 
motion  of  the  party  injured,  even  where  it  was  given  in  reply 
to  an  irrelevant  question.9 


1  Hill  v.  State  (Term.,  1892),  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  674;  Mann  v.  State,  23 
Fla.  010 ;  Bassett  v.  Shares,  63  Conn. 
39 ;  27  Atl.  Rep.  431. 

2  While  a  witness  may  state  all 
the  circumstances  which  are  neces- 
sarily involved  in  the  answer  re- 
quired, he  should  not  be  allowed  to 
go  beyond  this.  So,  where  a  wit- 
ness was  asked  to  state  a  conversa- 
tion he  had  with  a  certain  person, 
and  while  doing  so  stated  that  a 
third  person  who  was  present  was 
crying,  his  answer  is  to  that  extent 
irresponsive.  Pence  v.  Waugh  (Ind., 
1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  860. 

3  Eddy  v.  Lowry  (Tex.,  1894),  24 
S.  W.  Rep.  1076. 

4  Baldwin  v.  Walker,  94  Ala.  314; 
10  S.  Rep.  891 ;  Colclough  v.  Niland, 
68  Wis.  309;  Harnickell  v.  Copper 
Mining  Co.,  5  N.  Y.  S.  112;  Kennedy 
v.  Upshaw,  66  Tex.  442;  Link  v. 
Sheldon,  18  N.  Y.  S.  815;  64  Hun, 
632;  Lazard  v.  Mer.  &  Min.  Co., 
(Md.,  1893),  26  Atl.  Rep.  797;  Bischof 


v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  Co.,  18  N.  Y.  S.  863; 
Krey  v.  Schlusner,  62  Hun,  620; 
Angell  v.  Loomis  (Mich.,  1893),  55 
N.  W.  Rep.  100S. 

5  Benjamin  v.  N.  Y.  El.  R.  Co..  63 
Hun,  629;  17  N.  Y.  S.  608;  Pence  v. 
Waugh  (Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep. 
860. 

6  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Woodward,  47 
Kan.  191.  The  answer  thus  stricken 
out  is  wholly  withdrawn  from  the 
consideration  of  the  jury,  nor  is  it 
the  duty  of  the  court,  in  its  charge, 
to  caution  them  to  disregard  it. 
State  v.  McGahey  (N.  D.,  1893),  55 
N.  W.  Rep.  753;  Hillesum  v.  City 
of  New  York,  4  N.  Y.  S.  506. 

^State  v.  Farley  (Iowa,  1893),  53 
N.  W.  Rep.  1089. 

8  Galveston,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wesch 
(Tex.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  62;  Van 
Doren  v.  Jelliffe,  20  N.  Y.  S.  636. 

9  Galveston,  H.  &  S.  A.  R.  Co.  v. 
Smith  (Tex.,  1^94),  24  S.  W.  Rep. 
668.  In  this  case  the  plaintiff  suing 
to  recover  for  lost  baggage  replied 


§  337.] 


EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES. 


477 


§  337.  The  witness  may  refresh  his  memory  by  referring 

to  writings.— The  general  rule  is  that  a  witness  will  be  per- 
mitted to  speak  of  those  facts  only  which  are  within  his  per- 
sonal knowledge  and  recollection.1  He  is  at  liberty,  however, 
to  refresh  or  aid  his  memory,  if  it  is  at  fault,  by  consulting  on 
the  witness  stand  a  writing  or  memorandum  made  by  himself 
or  some  other  person,2  if,  after  examining  it,  he  is  able  to  tes- 
tify from  his  own  recollection  thus  renewed  and  revived.3  The 
writing  thus  used  is  not  generally  or  necessarily  evidence,  and 
no  question  of  its  relevancy  or  materiality  should  be  consid- 
ered; 4  nor  need  it  be  read  to  the  jury,5  though  it  has  been  held 
that  the  jury  may  examine  it  to  determine  whether  the  recol- 
lection of  the  witness  could  be  refreshed  b}7  it.6 

The  cases  in  which  a  witness  will  be  permitted  to  refresh 
his  memory  from  writings  may  be  classified  under  two  heads: 
First.  If  a  witness,  though  he  retains  no  independent  recollec- 
tion of  the  facts  transcribed  in  the  writing,  remembers  having 
made  it  himself  or  recollects  having  seen  it  before,  and  re- 


to  the  defendant's  counsel,  "it  is 
enough  to  be  robbed  without  being 
insulted  by  a  corporation  that  boasts 
of  its  millions  and  then  employs 
men  wanting  in  intellect  and  the  in- 
stincts of  a  gentleman  to  defend  it." 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  436;  1  Whart. 
Ev.,  §§  516-26. 

-  Flint  v.  Kennedy,  33  Fed.  Rep. 
820:  Card  v.  Foot.  56  Conn.  369; 
Culver  v.  Scott,  etc.  Co.,  55  N.  W. 
Rep.  552. 

» Jenkins  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  12 
S.  Rep.  677;  Morris  v.  Columbian 
Iron  Works  &  D.  D.  Co.  (Md.,  1893), 
25  Atl.  Rep.  417;  Third  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Owen,  101  Mo.  558;  Rohrig  v. 
Pearson,  12  Colo.  127 ;  Stavinow  v. 
Home  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mo.  App.  513; 
Byrnes  v.  Pac.  Exp.  Co.  (Tex.,  1891), 
15  S.  W.  Rep.  46 ;  McCloskey  v.  Barr, 
45  Fed.  Rep.  151 ;  Kingory  v.  United 
States,  44  Fed.  Rep.  669;  Weston 
v.  Brown,  30  Neb.  609;  46  N.  W. 
Rep.  826;  Com.  v.  Clancy,  154  Mass. 
128;  27  N.  E.  Rep.  1001;  Finch  v. 


Barclay,  87  Ga.  393;  Laboree  v. 
Closterman,  35  Neb.  150;  49  N.  W. 
Rep.  102;  Watrous  v.  Cunningham, 
71  Cal.  30.  "  The  writing  is  used  to 
aid  the  memory.  If  the  witness  has 
an  independent  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  there  is  no  propriety  in  his  in- 
specting any  note  or  writing."  State 
v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  15;  Sackett  v. 
Spencer,  29  Barb.  180.  Where  a 
witness  is  forgetful  be  may  be  in- 
terrogated upon  irrelevant  but  sug- 
gestive facts  to  refresh  his  memory 
of  the  main  transaction  but  not  to 
impeach  him.  Prentiss  v.  Bates,  88 
Mich.  567;  People  v.  Sherman,  61 
Hun,  623 ;  133  N.  Y.  349.    See  §  335. 

^McNeely  v.  Duff,  50  Kan.  488; 
Baum  v.  Reay,  96  Cal.  462 ;  29  Pac. 
Rep.  117 ;  Flood  v.  Mitchell,  68  N.  Y. 
507;  Pickard  v.  Bryant,  52  N.  W. 
Rep.  788;  92  Mich.  430. 

5  Raynor  v.  Norton,  3  Mich.  210. 

e  Com.  v.  Halley,  13  Allen,  587,  by 
Hoar,  J. 


478 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  337. 


members  that  when  he  saw  it  he  knew  it  to  be  a  correct  state- 
ment of  those  facts,  he  may  consult  it.1  Is"  uv  it  is  clear  upon 
considerations  elsewhere  explained  that  under  certain  circum- 
stances such  writings,  if  identified  by  the  witness  as  being  con- 
temporaneous and  original  entries,  if  regularly  made  in  the 
course  of  his  employment,  he  having  a  full  knowledge  of  the 
facts,  are  admissible  ns  independent  evidence  as  a  part  of 
the  res  gestae.2  But  where  the  writings  do  not  fulfill  these  re- 
quirements, that  is,  where  the  writings,  though  contemporane- 
ous, were  not  made  by  the  witness,  or  where  they  are  subse- 
quent copies  of  original  writings  made  by  the  witness  or  by 
another  person,  they  are  not  admissible  as  evidence  though 
the  witness  may  still  consult  them  to  refresh  his  memory,  and 
they  should  be  produced  in  court  that  the  opposite  counsel 
may  inspect  them  (without  being  obliged  to  put  them  in  evi- 
dence) and  have  an  opportunity  to  question  the  witness  as  to 
eve^  fact  which  they  contain.3 

1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §437;  Labaree  v.  the  like,  in  respect  to  which  no 
Closterman,  33  Neb.  150:  49  N.  W.  memory  could  be  sufficiently  re- 
Rep.  1102:  Baum  v.  Reay,  96Cal.  462;  tentive  without  depending  on  mem- 
29  Pac.  Rep.  117;  Hartley  v.  Cata-  oianda,  and  even  memoranda  would 
ract,  etc.  Co..  19  N.  Y.  S.  121 ;  Green  not  bring  the  transaction  to  present 
v.  Casilk,  16  Md.  556;  Wagonseller  recollection.  In  such  cases,  if  the 
v.Brown,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  663;  witness  on  looking  at  the  writing  is 
State  v.  Baldwin,  36  Kan.  1 ;  Con-  able    to  testifv  that  he  knows  the 


verse  v.  Hobbs,  61  N.  H.  42;  Hayden 
v.  Hoxie,  27  III.  App.  533;  Ellis  v. 
State,  25  Fla.  702;  6  S.  Rep.  768; 
Flint  v.  Kennedy,  33  Fed.  Rep.  820: 
Riordan  v.  Guggerty,  74  Iowa,  688; 
Butler  v.  Benson,  1  Barb.  526 ;  Bar- 
bank  v.  Dennis  (Cal.,  1893),  35  Pac. 
Rep.  444;  Downer  v.  Rowell,  24  Vt. 
343;  Costello  v.  Crowed,  133  Mass. 
355;  State  v.  Col  well,  3  R.  I.  132; 
George  v.  Joy,  19  N.  H.  544;  Mor- 
rison v.  Chapin,  97  Mass.  76;  Card  v. 
Foot,  56  Conn.  361);  Brotton  v. 
Langert,  1  Wash.  267.  In  Dugan  v. 
Mahoney,  11  Allen  (Mass.),  572,  the 
court  said:  "It  is  obvious  that  this 


transaction  took  place  though  he  has 
no  present  recollection  of  it,  his  tes- 
timony is  admissible." 

2  See  §§  58-62.  See,  also,  Cole  v. 
Jessup,  10  N.  Y.  9!5;  9  Barb.  395; 
Halsey  v.  Sinsebaugh,  15  N.  Y.  485. 
If  the  witness  on  consulting  the 
original  memorandum  does  not  find 
that  it  refreshes  his  memory  so  that 
he  can  speak  of  his  own  knowledge, 
the  writing  may  be  offered  in  evi- 
dence. Marcey  v.  Shults,  29  N.  Y. 
348.  If  a  writing  is  already  in  evi- 
dence it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to 
refuse  to  allow  a  witness  to  use  it  to 
refresh    his    memory.      Burlington, 


species  of  evidence  must  be  admis-  etc.  Co.  v.  Wallace,  28  Neb.  179;  44 

sible   in   regard   to   numbers,   dates  N.  W.  Rep.  225. 
and   deliveries  of  goods,   payments        31  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  437;  Russell 

and  receipts  of  money,  accounts  and  v.   Rider,   6  C.   &  P.   416;  Rex   v. 


§  338.]  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  479 

The  other  class  of  cases  includes  writings  which  the  witness 
does  not  remember  having  seen  before  and  of  whose  contents 
or  correctness  he  has  no  present  recollection,  but,  knowing 
the  writing-  to  be  genuine,  he  is  able  on  consulting  it,  and. 
because  of  its  aid  and  his  confidence  in  its  genuineness,  to  swear 
independently  and  of  his  own  knowledge  to  the  facts.  Thus  a 
subscribing  witness  seeing  his  own  signature  at  the  foot  of  an 
attestation  clause  will  be  enabled  to  testify  that  a  testator 
executed  a  will  though  the  witness  has  wholly  forgotten  some 
or  all  of  the  circumstances  of  the  execution.1 

§  338.  Character  of  the  writing  used  to  refresh  the  mem- 
ory of  the  witness. —  The  writing  by  which  the  witness  re- 
freshes his  memory  should  be  contemporaneous  with  the 
transactions  that  are  mentioned  in  it.2  This  is  the  general 
rule  which  is  supported  by  a  majority  of  the  cases,  though  it 
is  sometimes  qualified  by  the  statement  that  the  entry  need 
not  be  precisely  contemporaneous  if  it  was  made  before  the 
memory  of  the  person  making  it  had  become  weakened  and 
unreliable  by  lapse  of  time.3  In  many  cases  copies  made 
some  time  after  the  original  entry  or  writing  have  been  per- 
mitted to  be  used  if  the  witness  could  swear  of  his  own  knowl- 
edge to  their  accuracy.4     But  a  copy  cannot  be  used  by  the 

Ramsden,  2  id.  003;  Baura  v.  Reay,  Md.   54;   Watrous   v.   Cunningham, 

96     Cal.    402;     29    Pac.    Rep.     117;  71  Cal.  30:  Burbank  v.  Dennis  (Cal., 

Wagonseller  v.  Brown,  7  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  1893).  35  Pac.  Rep.  444. 
Rep.  663:  Little  v.   Lischkoff  (Ala.,         3  Culver  v.  Scott  (Minn.,  1893),  55 

1893),  12  S.  Rep.  429;  Arlae  v.  Zangs,  N.   W.   Rep.   552;  Sisk   v.   State,  28 

41   Iowa,    586;   Huff   v.   Bennett,   6  Tex.    App.   432;    Jones  v.   Stroud,  2 

N.  Y.  337;  Tibbetts  v.  Sternberg,  06  C.   &   P.   196;    Howell   v.    Bowman 

Barb.  (N.  Y.)  201:  Peck  v.  Lake,  3  (Ala.,  1892),  10  S.  Rep.  640;  Bank  v. 

Lans.  136;  Dew  v.  Downam,  1  Green,  Bollong,  21  Neb.  825.     So  it  has  been 

135;   Patterson  v.   Tucker,  4  Halst.  permitted    counsel    to    refresh    the 

322;  Bonnet  v.  Glarlfehlt,  24  111.  App.  memory  of  a   forgetful  witness  by 

533.     Contra,  Chattanooga,  etc.  Co.  reading  evidence  given  by  him  on  a 

v.  Owen  (Ga.,  1S93),   15  S.  E.  Rep.  former  trial  from  the  stenographer's 

853.  minutes.     Ehrisman  v.  Scott  (Ind., 

i  See  ante,  %  138.  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  867;  Batishill  v. 

2  Williams  v.   Wa?er,  64  Vt.  326;  Humphreys,  64  Mich.  514;  38  N.  W. 

Weston  v.   Brown,  35  Neb.  699;  46  R^p.  581. 

N.   W.   Rep.   826;   Com.  v.   Clancy,        4  Lord  Talbot  v.  Cusack,  17  Ir.  C. 

154  Mass.   128:  27  N.   E.  Rep.  1001;  L.  213;  Home  v.  McKenzie,  6  C.  &F. 

Converse   v.    Hobbs,    64   N.    H.   42;  628;  Birmingham  v.  McPoland  (Ala., 

Spring  Garden  Ins.  Co.  v.  Riley,  15  1893),  11  S.   Rep.  427;  Anderson  v. 


480 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  339. 


witness  until  the  absence  of  the  original  is  accounted  for.1  A 
witness  who  has  been  called  to  testify  to  the  value  of  "mate- 
rials may  use  a  price  list  on  the  stand  to  aid  him  in  forming 
a  correct  opinion,  where  it  is  shown  that  it  is  impossible  for 
him  to  retain  all  the  prices  in  his  memory.2 

§339.  Cross-examination  — Its  object  and  value.— As  a 
means  of  ascertaining  the  truth,  the  cross-examination  of  a 
witness  in  open  court  is  correctly  said  to  be  at  once  effective 
and  impartial.3.  Writers  on  the  law  of  evidence  have  fre- 
quently adverted  to  its  peculiar  efficacy  and  excellence  as  a 
method  of  investigating  the  motives  and  personal  prejudices 
of  the  witness,  and  his  relation  to  the  parties  and  to  the  sub- 
ject of  the  suit.  So,  also,  his  knowledge  and  general  intelli- 
gence, the  faithfulness  of  his  memory,  his  impartiality  or  bias, 
his  means  of  observation  and  his  opportunities  for  gaining  an 
accurate  and  full  acquaintance  with  the  facts  and  circum- 
stances, may  all  be  explored  and  ascertained  for  the  consider- 
ation of  the  jurors,  to  aid  them  in  determining  what  weight 
they  should  place  upon  his  evidence.4 


Imhof,  34  Neb.  335;  Stavinow  v. 
Home  Ins.  Co.,  43  Mo.  App.  513; 
Watson  v.  Miller,  82  Tex.  279;  Wat- 
rous  v.  Cunningham,  71  Cal.  30; 
Bonnet  v.  Glaclfeldt,  24  111.  App. 
533 ;  Flint  v.  Kennedy,  33  Fed.  Rep. 
820;  People  v.  Monroe  (Cal.,  1893), 
33  Pac.  Rep.  776;  Burbank  v.  Dennis 
(Cal.,  1893),  35  Pac.  Rep.  444;  Ston- 
dennie  v.  Harper,  81  Ala.  242 ;  Cald- 
well v.  Bowen,  80  Mich.  382. 

Byrnes  v.  Pacific  Exp.  Co.  (Tex., 
1891),  15  S.  W.  Rep.  46;  Anderson  v. 
Itnhoff,  34  Neb.  335;  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
854;  Birmingham  v.  McPoland(Ala., 
1893),  11  S.  Rep.  427.  That  a  witness 
may  refresh  his  memory  by  reading  a 
printed  article  published  from  manu- 
script supplied  by  him,  see  Hawes  v. 
State,  88  Ala.  37. 

2  Morris  v.  Columbian  Iron  Works 
&  D.  D.  Co.  (Md.,  1893),  25  Atl.  Rep. 
417. 

3  ' '  Cross-examination,  which  is  the 
right  of  the  party  against  whom  a 


witness  is  called,  is  a  means  of  sep- 
arating hearsay  from  knowledge, — 
error  from  truth  ;  opinion  from  fact ; 
influence  from  recollection ;  of  as- 
certaining the  order  of  the  events  as 
narrated  by  the  witness  in  his  ex- 
amination in  chief,  the  time  and 
place  when  and  where  they  occurred 
and  the  attending  circumstances, 
and  of  testing  the  intelligence,  mem- 
ory, impartiality,  truthfulness  and 
integrity  of  the  witness."  The  Ot- 
tawa, 3  Wall.  (U.  S.)  271. 

*1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  446;  1  Stark, 
on  Ev.,  §§  160,  161.  In  Alison's  Prac- 
tice, p.  546,  it  is  said:  "Where  a 
witness  is  evidently  prevaricating  or 
concealing  the  truth,  it  is  seldom  by 
intimidation  or  sternness  of  manner 
that  he  can  be  brought,  at  least  in 
this  country,  to  let  out  the  truth. 
Such  measures  may  sometimes  ter- 
rify a  timid  witness  into  a  true  con- 
fession ;  but  in  general  they  only 
confirm  a  hardened  one  in  his  false- 


§  330.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


481 


It  is  sometimes  an  important  question  whether  a  party  has 
so  examined  his  own  witness  as  to  give  his  adversary  the  right 
to  cross-examine  him.  A  witness  who  has  been  sworn,  but  to 
whom  no  questions  are  put,  cannot  be  cross-examined;1  and 
this  is  true  a  fortiori  where  the  only  object  of  calling  him 
is  to  obtain  the  production  of  a  writing  which  is  to  be  proved 
by  another  witness.2  But  error  in  refusing  a  party  the  right 
to  cross-examine  is  absolutely  waived  by  the  party  making 
the  witness  his  own.3  It  has  been  held  that  the  parties  to  an 
action  have  a  right  to  regard  the  witness  of  a  third  party  in- 
tervening as  adverse  where  the  original  parties  have  some 
interests  in  common  against  the  intervenor.  Both  parties 
lna}^  therefore  cross-examine  the  witnesses  of  the  party  inter- 
vening.4 The  right  and  scope  of  a  cross-examination  as  such 
are  confined  strictly  to  those  matters  concerning  which  the 
witness  has  already  been  interrogated  on  his  direct  examina- 
tion. In  other  words,  the  counsel  cross-examining  will  not  be 
permitted  to  ask  the  witness  leading  and  general  questions 
upon  matters  which,  though  involved  in  the  issue,  were  not 
touched  upon  in  his  direct  examination.5 


hood  and  give  him  time  to  consider 
how  seeming  contradictions  may  be 
reconciled.  The  most  effectual  rem- 
edy is  to  examine  rapidly  and  mi- 
nutely as  to  a  number  of  subordinate 
and  apparently  trivial  points  in  his 


Reed  v.  James,  t  Stark.  132;  Bush 
v.  Smith,  1  C.  M.  &  R.  94;  Davis  v. 
Dale,  1  M.  &  M.  514;  Summers  v. 
Mosely,  2  C.  &  M.  477.  A  witness- 
called  only  to  prove  a  signature  may 
be  cross-examined.     Yost  v.  Minn. 


evidence  concerning  which  there  is     Hard.  Works,  41  111.  App.  556. 


little  likelihood  of  his  being  pre- 
pared with  falsehood  ready  made; 
and  where  such  a  course  of  interro- 
gation is  skilfully  laid,  it  is  rarely 
that  it  fails  in  exposing  perjury  or 
contradictions  in  some  parts  of  the 
testimony  which  it  is  desired  to  over- 
turn." 

1  Austin  v.  State,  14  Ark.  555. 
One  of  several  jointly  tried  for  a 
crime  may  be  required  to  cross-ex- 
amine the  state's  witnesses  and  pro- 
duce his  own  before  the  same  is 
done  by  his  co-defendants.  State  v. 
Howard  (S.  C,  1892),  14  S.  E.  Rep. 
481. 

2  Perry  v.  Gibson,  1  Ad.  &  El.  48 ; 

31 


3  Hemminger  v.  Western  Ass.  Co.- 
(Mich.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  949. 
Cf.  Territory  v.  Rehberg,  G  Mont. 
467;  ISPac.  Rep.  132. 

4  Succession  of  Townsend,  40  La: 
Ann.  66;  3  S.  Rep.  488. 

5Eamesv.  Reiser,  142  U.  S.  488; 
St.  Louis  &  Iron  M.  R.  R.  Co.  v. 
Silver,  56  Mo.  265;  Bell  v.  Piewitt, 
62  111.  362;  Britton  v.  State,  115  Ind. 
55;  Haynes  v.  Ledyard,  33  Mich. 
C19;  Adams  v.  State,  28  Fla.  511;: 
Bullis  v.  Chicago,  etc.  R.  Co.,  76 
towa,  680;  Cramer  v.  Cullinane,  2 
MacArthur  (D.  C),  197;  Freeman  v. 
Hensley  (Gal.,  1893),  30  Pac.  Rep. 
792;  Jones  v.  Roberts,  37  Mo.  App. 


■182  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  310. 

If  a  witness  while  being  cross-examined  avoids  replying  or 
parries  the  questions,  he  may  be  pressed  for  an  answer,  and 
the  counsel  calling  him  should  not  be  allowed  to  interpose 
frivolous  objections  to  prevent  a  rapid  cross-examination  and 
to  afford  the  witness  an  opportunity  to  fabricate  evidence.1 
But  the  extent  to  which  the  same  question  may  be  repeated 
is  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  court.2 

§  340.  Power  of  cross-examination  —  Its  extent. —  Though 
the  court  may  exercise  its  discretion  in  allowing  or  refusing 
cross-examination  as  to  irrelevant  matters  bearing  on  credibil- 
ity alone,  the  right  to  cross-examine  upon  transactions  directly 
relevant  and  which  have  been  brought  out  on  the  direct  exam- 
ination is  absolute.  So  the  fact  that  relevant  evidence,  elicited 
by  a  proper  question  put  on  the  direct  examination,  has  been 
improperly  stricken  out,  furnishes  no  basis  for  a  claim  that 
other  strictly  relevant  evidence  of  the  same  matter  should  be 
expunged  when  stated  on  cross-examination.3  But  the  right 
to  cross-examine  a  witness  is  not  lost  because  the  party  fails  to 
object  to  a  direct  examination  out  of  the  proper  order.4  The 
proper  remedy  for  a  part}7-  who  has  had  no  opportunity  of 
cross-examining  an  adverse  witness  is  to  move  the  court  to 
strike  out  his  evidence  elicited  on  the  direct  examination  and 
to  request  an  instruction  that  the  jury  should  disregard  it.s 
The  extent  to  which  a  party  may  cross-examine  his  adversary's 

177;  Lloyd  v.  Thompson,  5  111.  App.  142  U.  S.  691 ;  Rigdon  v.  Conley,  31 

90;  Pye  v.  Bakke  (Minn.,  1893),  55  111.  App.  630;  Welcome  v.  Mitchell, 

N.  W.  Rep.  904;  Buckley  v.  Buck-  81  Wis.    566;  51   N.  W.    Rep.    1080; 

ley,  12  Nev.  423;  In  re  Westerfield,  State  v.  Willingham,    33   La.    Ann. 

96  Cal.  113;  Braly  v.  Henry,  77  Cal.  537. 

324;  Anheuser-Busch  Brewing  Ass.  l  State  v.  Duncan  (Mo.,  1893),   22 

v.  Hutmacher,  127  111.  656;  State  v.  S.  W.  Rep.  699. 

Chamberlain,  89  Mo.  132;  Hunsinger  2  Brown  v.  State,  72  Md.  477;  20 
v.  Hofner,  110  Ind.  390;  State  v.  Atl.  Rep.  140;  McGuire  v.  Manu- 
Farrington  (Iowa,  1894),  57  N.  W.  facturing  Co.,  156  Mass.  324;  Sand- 
Rep.  606;  Bohan  v.  Avoca,  154  Pa.  ers  v.  Bagwell  (S.  C,  1893),  15  S.  E. 
St.  104 ;  Townsend  v.  Briggs  (Cal.,  Rep.  714;  Lakens  v.  Hazlett,  37 
1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  307;  Chandler  v.  Minn.  441. 

Beal,  132  Ind.   596;  Hansen  v.   Mil-  3  Turnbull  v.  Richardson,  60  Mich, 

ler   (111.,  1893),  32  N.    E.   Rep.    548;  400;  37  N.  W.  Rep.  499. 

Amos  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S.  Rep.  4  Graham  v.  Larimer,  83  Cal.  173 ; 

424;  Gale  v.    People,  26   Mich.  157;  23  Pac.  Rep.  286. 

Mt.  Vernon  v.   Brooks,  39  111.  App.  5  People  v.  Cole,  43  N.  Y.  508. 
426;  Home  Ben.   Ass.    v.   Sargent, 


§  340.} 


EXAMINATION   OF   WITNESSES. 


is;; 


witnesses  upon  matters  not  directly  relevant  to  the  issue,  but 
which  affect  the  credibility  of  the  witness,  is  largely  within 
the  discretion  of  the  judge,1  and  a  reasonable  exercise  of  thi3 
discretion  will  be  always  allowed  in  limiting  the  method  or 
duration  of  the  cross-examination  or  in  admitting  irrelevant 
questions  tending  to  explain  the  motives,2  opportunities  3  and 
powers  of  observation,  the  knowledge,4  memory,5  reliability 6  or 
good  faith  of  the  witness.7 

Questions  put  to  the  witness  designed  to  ascertain  his  rela- 
tions, business  or  otherwise,  towards  the  parties  and  his  feel- 
ings or  bias  towards  them  are  not  objectionable.8  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  not  reversible  error  for  the  court  to  refuse  to 
permit  the  cross-examination  to  be  unreasonably  prolonged,9 


1 1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  447  ;  Wallace  v. 
Railroad  Co.,  119  Mass.  91;  Phillips 
v.  Marblehead,  148  Mass.  329 ;  Hunts- 
ville  Belt  Line  &  M.  S.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
Corpening  (Ala.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep. 
295 ;  Birmingham  F.  I.  Co.  v.  Pulver, 
18  N.  E.  Rep.  804;  126  111.  329;  Col- 
lar v.  Potter,  88  Mich.  549;  Graham 
v.  McReynolds,  90  Tenn.  673;  Hold- 
ridge  v.  Lee,  52  N.  W.  Rep.  265; 
State  v.  Norris,  109  N.  C.  820 ;  Rior- 
dan  v.  Guggerty,  74  Iowa,  688 ;  39 
N.  W.  Rep.  107;  State  v.  Miller,  93 
Mo.  263 ;  Gutsch  v.  Mcllhargey,  69 
Mich.  377;  Gadbois  v.  Chicago,  M.  & 
St.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  75  Iowa,  530; 
Schmidt  v.  McCarthy,  43  Minn. 
288. 

2  People  v.  Thomas,  92  Cal.  506; 
Hartman  v.  Rogers,  69  Cal.  643. 

3  State  v.  Avery  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  193:  International  R.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dyer,  76  Tex.  156;  Holmes  v. 
State,  88  Ala.  226. 

4  Hess  v.  Lowry,  122  Ind.  225; 
Williams  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  13  S. 
Rep.  834;  Chicago,  K.  &  N.  R.  Co. 
v.  Stewart,  47  Kan.  704;  Lentz  v. 
Carnegie  Bros.  Co.,  145  Pa.  St.  612; 
Schwartz  v.  Wood,  67  Hun,  648;  Col- 
lar v.  Potter,  88  Mich.  549.  A  wit- 
ness may  be  asked  on  cross-examina- 
tion if  he    understood    a  question 


asked  him  on  the  direct  examina- 
tion. Pence  v.  Waugh  (Ind.,  1893), 
34  N.  E.  Rep.  860. 

3  State  v.  Duffy,  57  Conn.  525; 
Sewall  v.  Robbins,  139  Mass.  164: 
Davis  v.  California  Pow.  Works,  84 
Cal.  617.  A  witness  may  be  asked 
to  repeat  on  cross-examination  his 
evidence  to  a  particular  point  on  his 
direct  examination  to  test  his  mem- 
ory and  ascertain  if  he  will  contra- 
dict himself.  Zucker  v.  Carpeles,  88 
Mich.  413;  Beers  v.  Payment  (Mich., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  886. 

6  Hare  v.  Mahoney,  60  Hun,  576. 

7  Doyle  v.  Beaupre,  63  Hun,  624 ; 
Pence  v.  Waugh,  sxipra;  Murray  v. 
G.  W.  Ins.  Co.,  25  N.  Y.  S.  414;  Cur- 
ren  v.  Ampersee  (Mich.,  1893),  56  N. 
W.  Rep.  87. 

8  Graham  v.  McReynolds,  88  Tenn. 
240;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Newmeyer, 
129  Ind.  401;  Com.  v.  Lyden,  113 
Mass.  452;  Knight  v.  Cunnington, 
13  N.  Y.  Supr.  Ct.  100 ;  Thomas  v. 
Loose,  114  Pa.  St.  47;  People  v. 
Thomson,  92  Cal.  596;  Jackson  v. 
Litch,  62  Pa.  St.  451;  Schwartz 
v.  Wood,  67  Hun,  648;  United  States 
v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  365;  Hamilton  v. 
Hulett  (Minn.,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
364;  Holmes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  26. 

o  Hamilton  v.  Hulett  (Minn.,  1893), 


4S4  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  340. 

or  for  the  court  to  refuse  to  allow  the  same  question  to  be 
asked  repeatedly  when  it  has  been  once  answered  satisfactor- 
ily,1 or  to  exclude  questions  which  are  designed  solely  to  ascer- 
tain wThat  witnesses  it  may  be  advantageous  for  the  party  to 
cross-examine.2  While  counsel  may  of  right  cross  examine  the 
witness  as  to  relevant  facts  gone  into  on  the  direct  examina- 
tion, he  should  not  be  permitted  to  open  his  own  case  and 
present  his  evidence  to  the  jury  by  a  process  of  cross-examin- 
ing the  adverse  witnesses.* 

The  general  rule  that  excludes  evidence  of  facts  collateral 
to  the  issue4  is  not  applied  so  rigidl3rto  the  cross-examination 
as  it  is  to  the  direct  examination.  The  theory  upon  which 
cross-examination  is  allowed  is  that  it  is  primarily  adapted  to 
ascertain  the  truth,  not  by  eliciting  positive  evidence  directly 
hearing  on  the  facts  in  issue,  but  by  furnishing  a  means  of  test- 
ing the  truthfulness  and  credibility  of  the  witness.5  It  is 
never  permissible  on  cross-examination  to  interrogate  upon 
wholly  irrelevant  and  collateral  matters  solely  for  the  purpose 
of  discrediting  the  witness  by  subsequently  contradicting  him 
directly  on  that  point  by  other  evidence.6     But  it  is  proper  to 

53  N.  W.  Rep.  364 ;  Pennsylvania  Co.  Rowell,  17  Pick.  499 ;  Mount  Vernon 

v.  Newmeyer,  129  Ind.   501 ;  Birm-  v.  Brooks,  39  111.  App.  426. 

ingham  F.   Ins.  Co.  v.  Culver,  126  4  See  ante,  §  210. 

111.  329;  18  N.  E.  Rep.  804.  5So  where  the  witness  testifying 

1  Remer  v.  Long  Island  R.  Co.,  1  to  a  date  states  that  on  the  date  in 

N.  Y.  S.  124;  Gutsch  v.  Mcllhargey,  question  he  looked  into  the  almanac, 

69   Mich.   377;  37   N.  W.    Rep.   303;  he  may  be  asked  on  cross-examina- 

Mason   v.    Hinds,  19   N.  Y.  S.  996;  tion  why  he  did  so,  though  strictly 

Jones  v.  Stevens  (Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  speaking  his    reason    is  irrelevant. 

W.   Rep.    251;  Hughes  v.  Ward,  38  Thomas  v.  Miller,  151  Pa.  St.  482. 

Kan.  452.  61   Greenl.    Ev.,  §  449;  Futch  v. 

^United  States  v.  Cross,  20  D.  C.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  102; 

3135.      An  inquiry  of  a   witness  on  Hoover  v.  Cary  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N.W. 

cross-examination  if  he  was  a  total  Rep.  415;  Pye  v.  Bakke  (Minn.,  1893), 

abstainer,  he  having  stated  that  the  55  N.  W.  Rep.  904;  State  v.  Elwood, 

plaintiff  had  been  discharged  by  his  17  R.  I.  763;  Elkhart  v.  Witman,  122 

employer  for    drunkenness,    is  im-  Ind.  538;  Morris  v.  Atl.  Ave.  R.  R. 

proper.     Fox  v.  Railroad  Co.,  52  N.  Co.,  116   N.  Y.  552;   People  v.  Mc- 

W.  Rep.  623;  92  Mich.  243.  Kellar,  53  Cal.  65;   Combs  v.  Win- 

3  Adams  v.  State,  28  Fla.  511;    10  Chester,  39  N.  H.  1 ;  Sutor  v.  Wood, 

S.  W.  Rep.  106;  Sullivan  v.  O'Leary,  76  Tex.  403;  People  v.  Hilhouse,  80 

146  Mass.   322;  Burke   v.   Miller,   7  Mich.  580;  Com.  v.  Hourigan  (Ky., 

Cush.    (Mass.)    547-550;    Moody    v.  1890),  12  S.  W.  Rep.   550;  State  v. 


§  340.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


4sr» 


ask  the  witness  whether  he  did  not  at  some  particular  time  or 
place  give  a  different  account  of  the  relevant  facts  to  that  which 
he  gave  on  his  direct  examination.  If  he  denies  that  he  has 
done  so,  a  foundation  is  laid  for  impeaching  him  by  the  testi- 
mony of  some  one  who  heard  him  make  the  contradictory 
statement.1  So,  too,  where  the  witness  on  cross-examination 
is  questioned  as  regards  his  interest  or  prejudice,  or,  in  other 
words,  where  the  purpose  of  the  questions  is  solely  to  eluci- 
date his  existing  or  previous  relation  or  conduct  towards  the 
subject-matter  or  towards  the  parties,  he  may  be  contradicted 
by  other  evidence.2  Thus,  a  witness  may  be  asked  on  his 
cross-examination  if  he  has  not  expressed  feelings  of  hostility, 
or  acted  unfriendly  towards  the  adverse  party  or  towards  the 
prisoner,3  and  if  he  refuses  to  answer,4  or  answers  in  the  neg- 
ative, the  fact  may  be  shown  by  the  evidence  of  those  who 
heard  him.5     But  if  the  witness  state  that  although  formerly 


Rieck,  43  Kan.  635 ;  State  v.  Blakely, 
43  id.  250;  Davis  v.  California  Pow. 
Works.  84  Cal.  617;  People  v.  Tiley, 
84  Cal.  651 ;  Robbins  v.  Spencer,  121 
Ind.  594.  But  it  seems  that  ques- 
tions which  would  be  irrelevant  on 
the  direct  examination  may  be  al- 
lowed on  the  cross-examination  if 
they  tend  to  explain  the  transaction 
in  issue  by  bringing  out  particulars 
which  were  not  touched  upon  by  the 
party  calling  the  witness  (Doyle  v. 
Beaupre,  63  Hun,  624;  Collar  v.  Pot- 
ter, 88  Mich.  549 ;  Pickard  v.  Bryant, 
92  Mich.  430;  52  N.  W.  Rep.  78S; 
Osbiston  v.  Kaufman,  29  Pac.  Rep. 
748),  because  adverse  to  his  case. 

1  See  infra,  §  350 ;  People  v.  Will- 
iams, 18  Cal.  187;  State  v.  Baldwin, 
36  Kan.  1 ;  State  v.  Tabott,  73  Mo. 
347.  And  where  a  witness  makes  a 
eertain  statement  on  cross-examina- 
tion, he  may  then  be  asked  if  he  did 
not  give  different  testimony  on  a 
former  trial.  Hall  v.  Chicago  R.  Co. , 
52  N.  W.  Rep.  247. 

*Holdridge  v.  Lee  (S.  D.,  1893),  52 
N.  W.  Rep.  265. 


3  The  prosecution  may  show  the  re- 
lationship between  the  witness  and 
the  prisoner,  though  this  relationship 
may  prejudice  the  latter  in  the  eyes 
of  the  jury.  State  v.  McGahey  (N.  D. , 
1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  753;  Burger  v. 
State,  83  Ala.  36. 

4  State  v.  McFarlain,  41  La.  Ann. 
686. 

5Lyle  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  153; 
Atwood  v.  Welton,  7  Conn.  60 ;  John 
Morris  Co,  v.  Burgess,  44  111.  App.  27 ; 
People  v.  Gillis  (Cal.,  1893),  32  Pac. 
Rep.  586;  Garnsey  v.  Rhodes,  138 
N.  Y.  461 ;  Bonnard  v.  State,  25  Tex. 
App.  173;  Scott  v.  State,  64  Ind.  400; 
Crumpton  v.  State,  52  Ark.  273; 
Hamilton  v.  Manhattan  Ry.  Co.,  9 
N.  Y.  313;  People  v.  Thomas,  92  Cal. 
506 ;  People  v.  Goldensen,  76  Cal.  328 ; 
Com.  v.  Byron,  14  Gray,  31.  The  ex- 
tent of  the  right  to  cross-examine  on 
immaterial  matters  to  ascertain  bias 
is  discretionary  with  the  court. 
Miller  v.  Smith,  112  Mass.  470.  The 
hostility  of  an  adverse  witness  may 
be  shown  by  the  evidence  of  another 
witness  without  questioning  the  hos- 


4SG 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES. 


[§  341. 


hostile  to  a  party  he  is  so  no  longer,  testimony  showing  his 
previous  hostility  is  irrelevant  as  being  too  remote.1 

§  341.  Redirect  examination. —  A  witness  may  be  re- 
examined by  the  party  calling  him  when,  on  cross-examina- 
tion, he  has  been  questioned  in  regard  to  a  prior  contradictory 
statement,2  or  he  may  be  requested  to  state  his  motives  for 
acts  done  by  him  and  described  in  his  cross-examination.3 
He  may  be  questioned  on  re-examination  with  a  view  of  as- 
certaining- the  real  meaning  of  his  statements  made  on  his 
cross-examination  and  those  made  out  of  court  in  order  to 
show  that,  though  seemingly  inconsistent,  yet  when  rightly 
understood  they  are  not  contradictory.4  But  counsel  will  not 
be  permitted  to  go  be}Tond  this  and  bring  in  new  matter  con- 
sisting of  statements  neither  explanatory  of  the  contradict- 
ory utterances  nor  connected  with  them,  although  contained 
in  the  same  conversation  and  relevant  to  the  subject-matter 
of  the  suit.5  In  re-examining  a  witness  he  may  also  be  asked 
questions  which  will  explain  all  facts  which  were  brought  out 
on  his  cross-examination  6  from  which  wrong  inferences  might 
be  drawn  or  which  tend  to  cast  doubts  upon  his  credit.7 


tile  witness.  People  v.  Brooks,  131 
N.  Y.  321 ;  30  N.  E.  Rep.  189.  But 
evidence  that  a  party  had  brought 
an  action  against  an  adverse  witness 
is  inadmissible  in  the  absence  of  evi- 
dence showing  the  actual  existence 
of  a  hostile  feeling  as  the  result  of 
the  suit.  Wischstadt  v.  Wischstadt, 
4?  Minn.  38;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  225. 

1  Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  35  Neb.  247. 

2  Butterfield  v.  Gilchrist,  63  Mich. 
155. 

3  Westbrook  v.  Aultman,  3  Ind. 
App.  83;  28  N.  E.  Rep.  1011;  Com. 
v.  Dill,  156  Mass.  266 ;  30  N.  E.  Rep. 
1016;  People  v.  Hanifan  (Mich., 
1893),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  1048;  Railroad 
v.  Randall,  85  Ga.  297. 

•  Wilkersons  v.  Eilers  (Mo.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Rep.  134;  Dole  v.  Wool- 
dridge,  142  Mass.  184;  Smith  v. 
State,  21  Tex.  App.  277;  State  v. 
Reed,  89  Mo.  168;  Fuller  v.  James- 
town, etc.  Co.,  26  N.  Y.  S.  1078. 


5  Miller  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Iowa, 
1893),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  418;  Prince  v. 
Samo,  7  Ad.  &  El.  627.  But  see 
contra,  Springfield  v.  Dalboy,  139 
111.  34;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  860. 

6  "The  examination  and  cross- 
examination  must  relate  to  facts  in 
issue,  or  relevant,  or  denied  to  be 
relevant  thereto;  but  the  cross- 
examination  need  not  be  confined 
to  the  facts  to  which  the  witness 
testified  on  his  examination  in  chief. 
The  re-examination  must  be  directed 
to  the  explanation  of  matters  re- 
ferred to  in  cross-examination ;  and 
if  new  matter  is  by  permission  of 
the  court  introduced  in  re-examina- 
tion, the  adverse  party  may  further 
cross-examine  upon  the  matter." 
Stephen's  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  127. 

7  State  v.  McGahey  (N.  D,  1893), 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  753;  Vanduzer  v. 
Letellier,  78  Mich.  492;  United 
>States  v.  Barrells,    8  Biatchf.   475; 


*  342.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


487 


A  suggestive  mode  of  interrogating  a  witness  on  the  re- 
direct  examination,  though  sometimes  permissible  *  and  always 
in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  is  not  to  be  commended.  Thus, 
counsel  should  not  be  allowed  to  extricate  the  witness  from 
his  difficulty  by  repeating  to  him  his  statement  made  on  the 
direct  examination,  and  then  asking  him  if  the  statements 
made  on  cross-examination  are  consistent  therewith.2  Where 
the  court  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion  permits  a  witness  to 
answer  irrelevant  questions  or  to  make  irrelevant  replies  to 
relevant  questions  on  the  cross-examination,  the  party  may  on 
the  redirect  examination  question  him  upon  the  same  matters.8 
If  the  adverse  party  desires  to  re-examine  the  witness  after 
the  redirect  examination  he  may  do  so  on  the  recross  exam- 
ination, but  he  will  be  restricted  to  new  matter  brought  out 
on  the  redirect  examination. 

§  342.  Recalling  witnesses. —  Whether  a  witness,  after 
having  given  his  testimony  and  left  the  stand,  shall  be  per- 
mitted to  be  recalled  by  the  party  in  whose  behalf  he  has  tes- 
tified, or  for  further  cross-examination  by  the  adverse  party,4 
is  a  matter  wholly  in  the  discretion  of  the  court;5  and  this 


Norwegian  Plow  Co.  v.  Hanthorn, 
71  Wis.  529;  37  N.  W.  Rep.  825; 
Pullen  v.  Pullen  (N.  J.,  1888),  12 
Atl.  Rep.  138;  Feather  v.  Reading, 
155  Pa.  St.  187 ;  Alderton  v.  Wright, 
81  Mich.  244.  Accordingly  where  a 
witness  acknowledged  that  a  written 
statement  had  been  prepared  by  the 
public  prosecuting  officer  at  whose 
bidding  she  signed,  she  will  be  al- 
lowed, on  the  redirect  examination, 
to  state  that  the  statement  was 
wholly  voluntary,  that  it  was  true, 
and  that  its  language  was  her  own. 
People  v.  Mills,  54  N.  W.  Rep.  488; 
94  Mich.  630. 

i  Smith  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  277. 

2  Smith  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  277 : 
Stoner  v.  Devilbiss,  70  Md.  160; 
Ohlsen  v.  Terrero,  L.  R.  10  Ch.  App. 
127;  Wells  v.  Jackson  I.  Mfg.  Co., 
48  N.  H.  491 ;  Moody  v.  Rowell,  17 
Pick.  498;  Gunter  v.  Watson,  4 
Jones'  (N.  C.)  L.  455.     If  a  party  in 


cross-examining  brings  out  a  partial 
disclosure  of  a  transaction  which  is 
not  admissible  if  coming  from  his 
opponent,  the  latter  may  on  his  re- 
direct examination  make  a  full  dis- 
covery. Howe  v.  Schwemberg,  4 
Misc.  Rep.  73;  Simmons  v.  Havens, 
101  N.  Y.  427. 

a  People  v.  McNamara,  94  Cal.  509 ; 
Furbush  v.  Goodwin,  5  Fost.  (N.  H.) 
425;  Uhe  v.  Chicago  M.  etc.  Co. 
(S.  D.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  601: 
State  v.  Cardoza,  11  S.  C.  195; 
Schaser  v.  State,  36  Wis.  429;  Good- 
man v.  Kennedy,  10  Neb.  270; 
Blewett  v.  Tregonning,  3  Ad.  &  El. 
554,  565,  581,  584,  cited  in  1  Greenl. 
Ev.,  §  468.  Contra,  Lake  Erie,  etc. 
Co.  v.  Morain,  36  111.  App.  632;  29 
N.  E.  Rep.  869. 

*  People  v.  Parton,  49  Cal.  632. 

5  Louisville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Barker 
(Ala.,  1893),  10  S.  Rep.  453;  Gulf,  C. 
&S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Pool,  70  Tex.  713; 


488  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  343. 

discretion,  it  has  been  held,  was  not  abused  where  a  witness 
was  recalled  after  a  direct,  cross,  redirect  and  recross-exami- 
nation.1 

So  if  the  witness  was  unable  to  answer  positively  or  defi- 
nitely when  on  the  stand,  it  is  proper  to  refuse  to  permit  him 
to  be  recalled  later  for  an  additional  examination,2  or  to  permit 
a  witness  who  has  already  testified  fully  and  satisfactorily  to 
a  certain  transaction  to  be  recalled  for  the  sole  purpose  of 
having  him  repeat  his  testimony  or  to  obtain  cumulative  tes- 
timony on  the  same  point.3  But  the  fact  that  a  witness  on 
being  recalled  merely  reiterated  his  previous  testimony  does 
not  constitute  error  provided  no  practical  injustice  has  re- 
sulted thereby.4  If  a  witness  is  recalled  for  further  direct 
examination  or  for  further  cross-examination,  the  adverse 
party  has  the  right  of  further  cross-examination  or  of  further 
redirect  examination  respectively.5 

§  343.  Receiving  evidence  out  of  court. —  It  is  highly  im- 
proper for  the  jury  to  seek  or  to  receive  evidence  out  of  court, 
and  such  an  act,  where  their  verdict  is  influenced  thereby, 
will  furnish  ground  for  its  reversal.  Thus,  the  jurors  will 
not  be  allowed  to  experiment,6  to  take  a  private  view  of 
the  premises,7  or  to  communicate  with  other  persons,8  particu- 

Fowler  v.  Strawberry  Hill,  74  Iowa,  28  S.  C.  29;  4  S.   E.  Rep.  799;  Rich- 

644;   38  N.  W.   Rep.   521;  Riley  v.  mond  &  D.  R.  Co.  v.  Vance,  93  Ala. 

State,  88  Ala.  193;  Nixon  v.  Beard,  144;  Brown  v.  State,  72  Md.  468. 

Ill    Ind.    137;    State   v.    Dilley,    15  2Bonnet  v.  Gladfeldt,  24  III.  App. 

Oreg.   70;  Humphreys  v.   State,  78  533;  120  111.  166;  11  N.  E.  Rep.  250. 

Wis.  569;  47  N.  W.  Rep.  836;  Snod-  3  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Hazels  (Neb., 

grass  v.   Com.  (Va.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  1889),  42  N.  W.  Rep.  93. 

Rep.  238;  State  v.   Huff,    76  Iowa,  <  Dillard  v.  State,  58  Miss.  368. 

200;  Graves  v.  Santway,  6  N.  Y.  S.  5  Stephen's  Dig.,  art.  126. 

892;  Huff  v.   Latimer  (S.  C,  1890),  6  Jim  v.  State,  4  Humph.  (Tenn.) 

11  S.  E.  Rep.  75§;  Francis  v.  Roosa,  289;  Yates  v.    People,    38   111.    527; 

151  Mass.  532.     In  State  v.  Clyburn,  Forehand    v.     State,    51  Ark.    553; 

16  S.  C.  375,  it  was  held  a  proper  ex-  Indianapolis  v.   Scott,  72  Ind.   196; 

ercise  of  the  judicial  discretion  to  State  v.  Sanders,  68  Mo.  202. 

permit  a  witness  to  be  recalled  by  7  Harrington    v.    Worcester,    etc. 

the  state  to  testify  to  a  single  fact,  Co.  (Mass.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  955: 

though  the  examination  of  the  de-  Woodbury  v.   Anoka  (Minn.,  1893). 

fendant's  witnesses  was  interrupted  54  N.  W.  Rep.  187;  Garsidev.  Watch 

and  suspended  thereby.  Case  Co.,  17  R.  I.  691. 

i  Hollings%vorth  v.  State,  4  S.  E.  «Wynn  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ga.,  1893), 

Rep.  560;  79  Ga.  605;  State  v.  Jacobs,  17  S.  E.  Rep.  649;  Hager  v.  Hager, 


343.] 


EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES. 


4S9 


larly  witnesses.1  Neither  party  has  any  legal  right  to  submit 
documentary  or  other  evidence  to  the  jury  except  during  the 
pendency  of  the  trial  and  in  the  presence  of  the  court.  Upon 
this  principle  the  reception  of  evidence  outside  of  court  will 
vitiate  the  verdict.  So  writings  not  a  part  of  the  evidence,2  as, 
for  example,  maps,3  and  legal  or  scientific  books  and  publica- 
tions,4 are  not  permitted  to  be  perused  by  the  jury.  But  they 
may  of  course  consult  the  pleadings,5  memoranda  or  notes  of 
the  judge's  instructions,6  and  all  papers  which  constitute  a  part 
of  the  evidence.7   But  writings  forming  no  part  of  the  evidence 


33  Barb.  92;  People  v.  Boggs,  20 
Cal.  432;  State  v.  Dorsey,  40  La. 
Ann.  739;  Epps  v.  State,  19  Ga.  102; 
State  v.  Fruge,  28  La.  Ann.  657; 
Dower  v.  Church,  21  W.  Va.  24,  55; 
March  v.  State,  44  Tex.  64;  Peter- 
sen v.  Siglinger  (S.  D.,  1893),  52  N. 
W.  Rep.  1060;  Collier  v.  State,  20 
Ark.  36. 

1  See  cases  in  last  note.  If  a  juror 
has  personal  knowledge  of  the  facts 
in  issue  or  of  the  character  of  a  party 
or  a  witness,  he  should  be  called  to 
give  his  evidence  as  a  witness  in 
open  court.  Where  the  verdict  is 
based  upon  or  influenced  by  state- 
ments of  matters  known  to  a  juror 
alone,  made  by  him  in  the  jury- 
room,  which  would  be  evidence  if 
he  were  on  the  witness  stand,  a  new 
trial  should  be  granted.  People  v. 
Thornton,  74  Cal.  48;  Winslow  v. 
Morrill,  68  Me.  362;  McKiesick  v. 
State,  26  Tex.  673 ;  Anshicks  v.  State, 
6  Tex.  App.  527 ;  Salina  v.  Tuspar, 
27  Kan.  544 ;  Wade  v.  Ordway,  57 
Tenn.  229 ;  Taylor  v.  State,  52  Miss. 
84;  Wood  River  Bank  v.  Dodge 
(Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  234; 
Lucas  v.  State,  27  Tex.  App.  322. 

2  State  v.  Hartman,  46  Wis.  478; 
Cavanaugh  v.  Buehler,  120  Pa.  St. 
441 ;  Munde  v.  Lambre,  125  Mass. 
367;  State  v.  Lantz,  23  Kan.  728; 
Chase  v.  Perley,  148  Mass.  289;  Mc- 
Leod  v.  Railway  Co.,  71  Iowa,  138; 


Toohy  v.  Lewis,  78  Ind.  474 ;  Meyer 
v.  Cadwalader.  40  Fed.  Rep.  32. 

3  Moore  v.  McDonald,  68  Md.  321 ; 
State  v.  Hartman,  46  Wis.  248; 
State  v.  Lantz,  23  Kan.  728. 

4  Johnson  v.  State,  27  Fla.  215; 
Chamberlain  v.  Pybus,  81  Tex.  511; 
Merrill  v.  Mary,  10  Allen  (Mass.), 
416;  State  v.  Wilson,  40  La.  Ann. 
757;  State  v.  Smith,  6  R.  I.  33; 
State  v.  Tanner,  38  La.  Ann.  307; 
Bernhart  v.  State,  82  Wis.  23;  Har- 
ris v.  State,  24  Neb.  803;  State  v. 
Hopper,  71  Mo.  425  ;  State  v.  Gilleck, 
10  Iowa,  98;  Moon  v.  State,  68  Ga. 
687;  State  v.  Harris,  34  La.  Ann. 
118. 

SHitchins  v.  Frostburg.  68  Md. 
100;  Smith  v.  Holcomb,  99  Mass. 
553. 

6  Cowles  v.  Hayes,  71  N.  C.  231 ; 
State  v.  Thompson,  83  Mo.  257 ;  Po- 
sey v.  Patton,  109  N.  C.  455;  Henly 
v.  State,  29  Ark.  17. 

^ Hudspeth  v.  Mears  (Ga.,  1893), 
17  S.  E.  Rep.  837;  People  v.  For- 
mosa, 61  Hun,  272;  Territory  v. 
Jones,  6  Dak.  85;  State  v.  Raymond, 
53  N.  J.  L.  528;  Baker  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  625  (deposition) ; 
State  v.  Thompkins,  71  Mo.  63;  Peo- 
ple v.  Cochran,  61  Cal.  548;  Paige  v. 
Chedsey,  23  N.  Y.  S.  879;  Beeks  v. 
Odom,  70  Tex.  183;  Hewitt  v.  Rail- 
road, 67  Mich.  61 ;  Shoms  v.  Ziegler, 
10   Phila.   (Pa.)  315;  Davis  v.  State 


490  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  344. 

should  not  be  allowed  in  the  jury-room1  unless  both  parties 
consent.  On  general  principles  of  justice,  the  impropriety  of 
permitting  the  jurors  to  take  with  them  from  the  court  arti- 
cles which  have  been  used  to  explain  the  evidence  and  from 
which  they  may  draw,  in  the  absence  of  the  court  and  the 
accused,  erroneous  inferences  of  fact,  will  be  readily  admitted. 
So  to  permit  the  jury  to  take  with  them  into  the  jury-room  a 
weapon  with  which  it  is  alleged  a  crime  was  committed  is  re- 
versible error,  as  such  a  course  of  action  is  likely  to  result  in 
serious  injustice  to  the  accused.2  If  the  accused  consents  to 
it,  however,  it  seems  that  even  articles  not  in  evidence  may  be 
taken  by  the  jury  to  aid  them  in  their  deliberations.3 

§  344.  Taking  the  view  by  the  jury. —  In  some  of  the 
states  it  is  permitted  by  statute  for  the  court  to  order  the  jury 
to  be  taken  in  a  body  and  in  charge  of  a  sworn  officer  to  the 
place  where  the  subject  under  litigation  is  located  or  where  a 
fact  material  to  the  issue  occurred.  But  a  view  cannot  be  or- 
dered in  the  absence  of  statute4  without  the  consent  of  the 
parties  to  the  cause. 

-  The  exercise  of  the  statutory  authority  to  grant  a  view  of 
the  premises  lies  wholly  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,5  and  to 

(Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  292;  Cargill  jury  as  evidence,  either  in  the  court- 

v.  Com.  (Ky. ,  1893),  20  S.  W.   Rep.  room    or    elsewhere.      It   is    proper 

782;  Sholly  v.  Dillar,  2  Rawle  (Pa.),  to  instruct  the  jury  that  the  indict- 

147;  Posey  v.  Patton,  109  N.  C.  455;  ment  has  no  evidential  value  and  to 

Wood  v.  Wood,  47  Kan.  617;  Nott  v.  point  out  to  them  its  true  use  and 

Thomson,  35  S.  C.  461 ;  14  S.  E.  Rep.  signification.     State  v.  Hart,  66  Mo. 

940;  Chamberlain  v.  Pybus,  81  Tex.  208. 

511;  Falvey  v.  Richmond,  87  Ga.  99;  2  Forehand  v.  State,   51  Ark.  553; 

Avery  v.  Moore,  133  111.  74;  Mooney  11  S.  W.  Rep.  766. 

v.   Hough,   84  Ala.   80;    Cockrill  v.  3  People  v.  Mahoney,  77  Cal.  529. 

Hall,  76  Cal.  192.  4Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  (Mass.) 

1  State  v.  Baker  (Oreg.,  1893),  32  295,298;  Smith  v.  State,  42  Tex.  444 ; 

Pac.  Rep.  161 ;  Himes  v.  Krehl,  154  State    v.    Bertin,    24   La.    Ann.   46 ; 

Pa.    St.    190;     Spalding    v.    Saltill  Bostock  v.   State,   61  Ga.   635,  639; 

(Colo.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  486  (plead-  Doud   v.    Guthrie,    13  Bradw.    (111.) 

ings  excluded);  Hefrom  v.  Gallup,  653. 

55   Me.    563;    Oskaloosa  College    v.  5  Jenkins  v.  Railroad  Co.,  110  N.  C. 

Western  U.  T.   Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  54  438;  Springer  v.  Chicago,  37  111.  App. 

N.  W.   Rep.    152,  and   cases  in  last  206;  135  111.  532;  Stewart  v.  Railroad 

note.     The  indictment  in  a  criminal  Co*,  86  Mich.  315;  Springfield  v.  Dal- 

trial  is  not  evidence,  nor  should  it  be  bey,  139  111.  34;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  860; 

read  to  or  by  the  members  of  the  Kan.  Cent.  R.   R.  v.  Allen,  22  Kan. 


3W.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNE88ES. 


491 


obtain  a  new  trial  for  a  refusal  to  grant  a  view  it  must  bo 
clearly  shown  that  the  view  was  necessary,  practicable,  and 
that  by  the  request  being  denied  the  party  was  injured.1 
Where  a  jury  trial  is  had  in  equity  it  has  been  held  that  the 
judge  should  accompany  the  jury  in  taking  the  view.2  And 
in  some  cases  the  power  may  be  exercised  sua  spo/ite,  while  in 
others  the  view  can  only  be  ordered  if  requested  by  a  party. 
The  subject  depends  wholly  upon  the  terms  of  the  statutes, 
which  should  be  consulted. 

Whether  the  object  of  the  view  is  to  supply  the  jury  with 
evidence  or  to  enable  them  to  comprehend  more  clearly  the 
evidence  given  in  court  has  been  differently  decided.  The 
latter  proposition  is  supported  by  the  weight  of  the  decisions 
and  seems  most  consistent  with  the  well- recognized  rules  of 
evidence  and  procedure.3  The  opposite  opinion  is  not  without 
support.4  So  the  question  of  the  right  of  the  accused  to  be 
present  when  the  view  is  ordered  in  a  criminal  trial  is  still 
unsettled.  If  the  knowledge  thus  acquired  by  the  jury  be  re- 
garded as  evidence,  his  presence  is  indispensable,  as  he  has 
a  constitutional  right  to  confront  the  witnesses  in  the  pres- 
ence of  the  court  and  to  hear  the  evidence  against  him,5  while 


285;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Leah,  41  111. 
App.  584,  592;  Gunn  v.  Ohio,  etc. 
Co.,  37  W.  Va.  421;  Klepsch  v.  Don- 
ald, 4  Wash.  St.  436 ;  Board  v.  Cas- 
tetter  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  986 ; 
King  v.  Iowa  Midland  R.  Co.,  34 
Iowa,  458 ;  Chute  v.  State,  19  Minn. 
271 ;  Owen  v.  Miss.  Pac.  R.  Co.,  38 
Fed.  Rep.  571 ;  Smith  v.  Railroad  Co., 
32  Minn.  1 ;  Leonard  v.  Armstrong, 
75  Mich.  577 ;  Snow  v.  Railroad,  6 
Me.  230;  Boardman  v.  Westchester 
Fire  Ins.  Co.,  54  Wis.  364;  Baltimore, 
etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Polly,  14  Gratt.  (Va.) 
447,  470;  People  v.  Bonny,  19  Cal. 
426. 

i  Hudson  v.  Roos,  76  Mich.  173; 
Gunn  v.  Railroad  Co.,  36  W.  Va.  165; 
Stewart  v.  Cincinnati,  etc.  Co.,  89 
Mich.  315. 

-'Fraedrich  v.  Flieth,  64  Wis.  184; 
Jelfersonville,  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Bowen, 
40  Ind.  545. 


3  Morrison  v.  Railroad  (la.,  1892), 
57  N.  W.  Rep.  75 ;  Heady  v.  Vevay 
Turnpike  Co..  52  Ind.  117;  Parks  v. 
Boston,  15  Pick.  (Mass.)  209;  Colum- 
bus v.  Billingmeier,  7  Ohio  Cir.  Ct. 
Rep.  136.  "The  purpose  is  to  en- 
able the  jury  the  better  to  under- 
stand the  testimony  and  thereby  the 
more  intelligently  to  apply  it  to  the 
issues;  not  to  make  them  silent  wit- 
nesses, burdened  with  testimony  un- 
known to  the  parties  and  with  no 
opportunity  for  cross-examination  or 
correction  of  error  if  any  is  made." 
Anderson's  Law  Diet.  See  Close  v. 
Samm,  27  Iowa,  507. 

4  Washburn  v.  Railway  Co.,  59 
Wis.  364,  368;  Parks  v.  Boston,  15 
Pick.  (Mass.)  198;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 
v.  Dunlap,  47  Mich.  456;  Springfield 
v.  Dalbey,  139  III.  34. 

&  Benton  v.  Slate,  30  Ark.  328; 
People  v.  Bush  (Cal.),  10  Pac.  Rep. 


402  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  345. 

if  this  view  be  repudiated  his  presence,  while  allowable,  is 
never  indispensable.1 

In  proceedings  to  condemn  land  under  the  exercise  of  the 
right  of  eminent  domain,  where  a  jury  trial  is  allowed,  the 
members  of  the  jury  act  as  quasi-assessors  in  fixing  the  value 
of  the  land  taken,  and  under  such  circumstances  the  infor- 
mation obtained  may  justly  be  deemed  evidence.2  The  view 
may  be  had  after  the  summing  up,3  but  no  oral  evidence 
should  then  be  admitted  during  its  progress,  the  duty  of  the 
showers  being  only  to  point  out  the  place  itself.4 

§345.  "Real  evidence" — Physical  examination  by  the 
jury  in  court  —  Identification. —  By  "real  evidence"  is  meant 
that  evidence  which  is  obtained  through  the  eyes  by  the  in- 
spection of  a  person  or  thing  by  the  judge  or  jury  in  open 
court.5  The  question  of  the  production  of  articles  in  court  to 
illustrate  the  evidence  having  been  considered  elsewhere,6  it 
will  be  necessary  in  this  place  to  consider  those  cases  only  in 
which  some  question  of  personal  identity  or  resemblance  is 
involved,  and  in  which  the  person  himself  may  be  required  to 
submit  to  the  examination  of  the  jury. 

Where  the  legitimacy  of  a  child  is  in  issue  the  court  has 
often  permitted  it  to  be  exhibited  to  the  jury  in  court  in  order 
that  they,  from  a  personal  inspection,  and  comparison  with  its 
putative  parent,  may  be  enabled  to  ascertain  whether  or  not 
it  resembles  the  latter.7     But  where  the  child  was  very  young, 

169;  Carroll  v.  State,  5  Neb.  1;  Fos-  2Remy  v.  Mun.  No.  2,  12  La.  Ann. 

ter  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  500,  503;  Mich.  etc.  R.  Co.  v.  Barnes, 

822.     "  A  person  accused  of  a  crime  44  Mich.  222;  Parks  v.  Boston,    12 

is  deprived  of  his  right  of  appearing  Pick.  (Mass.)  209;  Toledo,  etc.  R.  Co. 

in  person  and  of  being  confronted  v.  Dunlap,  47  Mich.  456;  Harper  v. 

with  the  witnesses  against  him  if  the  Lexington,  etc.  R.  Co.,  2  Dana(Kan.), 

jury  view  the  locus  in  quo  without  227;  Washburn  v.   Railway  Co.,  59 

his   presence."     People  v.    Lowrey,  Wis.  364;  Springfield  v.  Dalbey,  139 

70  Cal.  193.     But  see  contra,  Blythe  111.  34. 

v.  State,  4  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Rep.  435.  3  Patchin  v.    Brooklyn,    2  Wend. 

iCom.  v.  Knapp,  9  Pick.  (Mass.)  (N.  Y.)  377;  Ken.  Cent.  Ry.  Co.  v. 

496;  State  v.  Adams,  20  Kan.  311;  Smith,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  392. 

Com.   v.   Webster,  5   Cush.    (Mass.)  4  Hey  ward  v.  Knapp,  22  Minn.  5; 

295;  People  v.  Yut  Ling,  74  Cal.  569;  State  v.  Lopez,  15  Nev.  407. 

State  v.  Ah  Lee,  8  Oreg.  214;  Reg.  v.  'Gaunt  v.  State,  50  N.  J.  L.  491. 

Martin;  L.  R.  1   Cr.   Cas.   Res.   378;  *  Ante,  §39. 

State  v.  Sasse,  72  Wis.  3.  7  Warlick  v.  White,  76  N.  C.  175 ; 


§  345.]  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  493 

evidence  obtained  in  this  way  has  been  held  to  be  irrelevant 
because,  the  child's  features  and  personal  appearance  not  hav- 
ing yet  assumed  a  permanent  character,  the  resemblance,  if 
any,  would  be  fallacious.1  The  resemblance  alone,  however 
striking,  while  insufficient  evidence  to  go  to  the  jury  as  sole 
proof  of  paternity,  is  a  circumstance  for  them  to  consider  in 
connection  with  evidence  of  other  relevant  facts.  Where  an 
inspection  of  this  sort  is  made  by  the  jury,  the  person  is  re- 
garded as  an  exhibit  from  which  the  jury  alone  are  to  draw 
inferences  without  any  oral  comments  or  accompanying  ex- 
planation, in  the  same  manner  that  they  adopt  in  the  case  of 
any  relevant  testimon\\  The  appearance  of  the  person,  his 
form,  features  and  complexion  as  they  appear  to  the  eyes  of 
the  jurors,  being  evidence  of  facts  within  common  knowledge, 
it  is  a  usurpation  of  the  powers  of  the  jurj'-  to  admit  the  opin- 
ions of  expert  or  of  other  witnesses  upon  such  points  in  con- 
nection with  the  inspection  of  the  person  himself.2 

Similar  comparisons  have  been  allowed  where  a  person's 
race  or  color  was  in  issue.  Here  an  inspection  is  of  great 
value  on  account  of  the  more  or  less  marked  external  racial 
characteristics  which  enable  all  men  of  ordinary  intelligence 
to  distinguish  between  the  various  races  o£  mankind.3  So 
where  the  issue  is  negligence  there  can  be  no  objection  to 
permitting  the  plaintiff  to  show  to  the  jury  the  injured  mem- 
State  v.  Horton,  100  N.  C.  443;  v.  Gray,  4  Allen,  435.  In  Garvin  v. 
Hutchison  v.  State,  19  Neb.  263;  State,  52  Miss.  507,  the  court  said: 
State  v.  Smith,  54  Iowa,  104;  Risk  "  Juries  may  use  their  eyes  as  well  as 
v.  State,  19  Ind.  153;  Crow  v.  Jor-  their  ears."  So  on  cross-examination 
dan,  49  Ohio  St.  655 ;  Gilmanton  v.  a  party  or  a  witness  who  has  testified 
Ham,  38  N.  H.  108;  Finnegan  v.  that  he  cannot  read  (Ord  v.  Fowler. 
Dugan,  14  Allen,  197;  Scott  v.  Don-  31  Kan.  478),  or  has  been  physically 
ovan,  153  Mass.  378;  State  v.  Arnold,  injured  to  such  an  extent  that  he  is 
13  Ired.  (N.  C.)  184;  State  v.  Wood-  unable  to  walk  (Hatfield  v.  Railroad 
ruff,  67  N.  C.  89.  Co.,  33  Minn.  130),  may  or  may  not 

1  State  v.  Danforth,  48  Iowa,  43;  be  directed  to  read  or  walk  in  the 
Ingram  v.  State,  24  Neb.  33;  Clark  presence  of  the  jury  in  the  discretion 
v.   Bradstreet,  80  Me.    456;  15   Atl.     of  the  court. 

Rep.  26;  Overlook  v.  Young,  81  Me.  3  Garvin   v.    State,    52    Miss.    207; 

348;  Hana wait  v.  State,  64  Wis.  84;  Clark     v.  Bradstreet,    80    Me.  456: 

Fuller  v.  Carny,  29  Hun,  47;  Risk  v.  Jacobs' Case,  5  Jones  (N.    C),  259: 

State,  19  Ind.  153.  Warlick    v.    White,    76   N.    C.    175; 

2  Jones  v.  Jones,  45  Md.  148;  Eddy  State  v.  Arnold,  13  lied.  (N.  C.)  184. 


494  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  345. 

bor  or  part  of  his  body  as  evidence  of  the  effect  of  the  alleged 
negligence  of  the  defendant.1 

Whether  or  not  the  jury  will  be  permitted  to  determine  the 
age  of  a  person  from  his  personal  appearance  or  his  demeanor 
on  the  witness  stand  in  the  total  absence  of  oral  evidence  has 
been  variously  decided.  Some  of  the  cases  hold  that  knowl- 
edge obtained  by  such  an  examination  would  be  satisfactory 
evidence  of  age.2  Other  cases  hold  that  such  evidence  is  in- 
competent,3 and  that  the  jurors  should  not  be  permitted  to  de- 
termine age  solely  from  an  inspection  of  the  person. 

Though  evidence  of  resemblance,  identity,  race  or  age  thus 
obtained  by  inspection  admittedly  possesses  little  probative 
force  because  of  the  unreliability  of  the  untrained  powers  or 
faculties  of  human  observation,  this  objection  cannot  be  justly 
urged  to  its  admissibility,  if  it  is  deemed  relevant,  though 
it  may  bear  upon  its  credibility.  Whether  a  compulsory  exam- 
ination by  the  jury  of  one  accused  of  crime  can  be  construed 
into  infringing  his  constitutional  right  to  be  protected  from 
furnishing  evidence  against  himself  depends  on  circumstances. 

Where  the  accused  waives  his  constitutional  privileges  by 
going  on  the  stand  and  submitting  to  cross-examination  in  his 
own  behalf,  he  may  be  directed  to  exhibit  a  part  of  his  person 
to  the  jury.4  And  if  the  defendant  voluntarily,  in  open  court, 
stand  up  and,  without  objection,  permit  a  witness  to  identify 
him  as  the  person  who  committed  the  crime,  he  cannot  after- 
wards ask  for  a  new  trial  on  this  ground.5 

Pointing  out  a  person  by  a  witness  to  the  jury  without 
naming  him  is  a  sufficient  identification,6  while  if  the  prisoner 

i  Cunningham  v.   Union  Pac.  R.  State  v.  Woodruff ,  67  N.  C.  89 ;  State 

Co.,  4  Utah,  206;  7   Pac.  Rep.    795;  v.  Hall  (Iowa,  1890),  44  N.  W.  Rep. 

Schroeder  v.   Chicago,  etc.   Co.,  47  914;  Garvin  v.  State,  52  Miss.  207; 

Iowa,  375;    Louisville,   etc.    Co.    v.  State  v.  Wieners,  66  Mo.  13;  Beavers 

Wood,    113   Ind.    548;    Mulhado    v.  v.  State,  58  Ind.  530 ;  Short  v.  State, 

Brooklyn,  etc.  Co.,  30  N.  Y.  370.  63  Ind.  376;   McDoud  v.    State,  90 

2  New  York  Pen.  Code,  §  19;  State  Ind.  320;  Story  v.  State,  99  id.  413. 
v.  Arnold,  13  Ired.  (N.  C.)  184;  Com.  Contra,  Blackwell  v.  State,  67  Ga. 
v.  Emmons.   98  Mass.    6;  Keith   v.  76. 

New  Haven  &  N.  R.  Co.,  140  Mass.        5  Gallaher  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 
175.  247;  12  S.  W.  Rep.    1087;  People  v. 

3  Stephenson    v.    Arnold,    28  Ind.     Goldensen,  76  Cal.  328. 

278;  Bird  v.  State,  104  Ind.  384.  <*  Com.  v.  Whitman,  121  Mass.  361. 

*  State  v.  Ah  Chuey,  14  Nev.  70 ; 


§  340.]  EXAMINATION    OF   WITNESSES.  495 

refuse  to  arise  to  be  identified  the  witness  may  explain  and 
rectify  his  failure  or  mistake  made  in  the  attempt  to  identify 
him; l  nor  will  all  the  testimony  of  the  witness  be  expunged 
because  he  totally  fails  to  identify  a  prisoner  who  will  not 
stand  up  lor  that  purpose.2 

§  340.  Bight  of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  trial  to  con- 
front the  witnesses  against  him. —  By  various  guaranties 
contained  in  the  United  States  constitution  and  in  the  consti- 
tutions of  the  several  states,  it  is  provided  that  the  accused  in 
a  criminal  trial  shall  be  entitled  to  meet  his  accusers  face  to 
face  and  that  he  shall  be  confronted  with  the  witnesses  against 
him.3  A  statutory  provision  that  the  testimony  of  a  deceased  or 
absent  witness  shall  be  competent  in  a  subsequent  trial  of  the 
accused  when,  at  the  first  trial,  a  full  opportunity  was  given 
the  prisoner  to  cross-examine  him,  is  not  a  violation  of  such 
a  constitutional  provision.4  Nor  is  it  violated  by  a  rule  of 
practice  which  permits  the  state  to  admit  that  a  witness  would 
testify  as  it  is  claimed  he  would  in  an  affidavit  by  the  accused 
asking  for  a  continuance  because  of  his  absence,5  or  by  a  con- 
sent to  admit  depositions6  of  absent  witnesses,  or  by  the  fact 
that  the  testimony  of  a  witness  against  the  accused  was  taken 
at  the  trial  by  means  of  an  interpreter,7  or  by  a  statutory  pro- 
vision that  if  the  accused  shall  escape  after  the  trial  has  com- 
menced the  trial  may  proceed  and  the  witnesses  may  be  ex- 
amined in  his  absence.8 

Under  some  circumstances,  particularly  where  the  accused 
has  had  an  opportunity  of  cross-examining  the  witnesses 
against  him  at  the  preliminary  examination,  their  depositions 
may  be  read  at  his  trial.  But  it  has  been  held  that  a  steno- 
graphic report  of  the  testimony  taken  at  the  preliminary 
examination  is  inadmissible  at  the  trial,  as  its  admission  con- 

1  People  v.  Foley,  27  Weekly  Dig.  People  v.  Fish,  125  N.  Y.  156.  Cf. 
(N.  Y.)  217.  People  v.  Penhallow,  42  Hun,  103. 

2  Walsh  v.  People,  88  N.  Y.  458;  4Com.  v.  Cleary,  23  Atl.  Rep.  1110; 
Abb.  Brief  on  Facts,  §  457.  30  W.  N.  C.  1 ;  148  Pa.   St.  26.     Cf. 

3 Const,  U.  S..  Am.,  ait.  6;  Const.     People  v.  Fish,  125  N.  Y.  126. 
111.,  art.  2,  g  9;  Westfall  v.  Madison        5Hoyt  v.  People,  140  111.  588. 
Co.,  62  Iowa,    427.      The  provision        6Peopiev.  Murray,  52  Mich.  288. 
in  the  federal  constitution  is  not  ap-        "State  v.  Hamilton,  42  La.   Ann. 
plicable    to    trials  in  state    courts.     1204. 

8  Gore  v.  State,  52  Ark.  285. 


496  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  34G-Y. 

stitutes  an  infringement  of  the  right  of  the  accused  to  be  con- 
fronted with  the  witnesses  against  him  in  the  presence  of  the 
court.1  When,  however,  the  absence  of  the  adverse  witnesses 
is  brought  about  by  the  accused,  the  latter  cannot  complain 
if  their  testimony,  given  at  a  former  trial,  is  introduced  in 
evidence  against  him.2  The  constitutional  right  to  confront 
the  witnesses  is  reciprocal  in  its  nature.  Accordingly  the 
public  prosecutor  ma}r  demand  that  the  witnesses  for  the  pris- 
oner shall,  when  possible,  be  produced  in  court  in  order  that 
they  majr  give  their  testimony  orally  and  be  submitted  to  a 
cross-examination.3 

§  346a.  The  accused  as  a  witness  in  a  criminal  prosecu- 
tion.—  By  modern  statutes  the  accused  is  now  a  competent 
witness  in  his  own  behalf,  though  he  cannot,  in  view  of  exist- 
ing constitutional  provisions,4  be  placed  upon  the  stand  as  a 
witness  against  himself.  If  he  shall  go  on  the  stand  in  his 
own  behalf,  the  credibility  of  his  testimony  is  a  question  solely 
for  the  jury,  though  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  instruct  the 
jury  that  they  should  5  or  that  the}'  may 6  consider  the  fact  of 
his  interest  in  the  event  of  the  trial,  and  that  the  fact  that  he 
is  testifying  in  his  own  behalf  may  be  considered  by  them  in 
estimating  the  credit  to  be  given  him.     The  jury  should  not, 

1  People   v.   Chung  Ah   Chue,    57        5  State    v.  Renfrew,  111  Mo.   589; 

Cal.   567;    People  v.  Gardner  (Cal.,  People  v.  Cronin,  34  Cal.  191;  Peo- 

1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  880.  pie  v.  Crowley,  102  N.  Y.  231;  An- 

'■Howserv.  Com.,  51  Pa.  St.  338.  derson  v.  State,  104  Inch  367;  Wil- 
li! People  v.  Brogle,  88  N.  Y.  585;  kins  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep. 
10  Abb.  N.  C.  300,  it  was  held  that  312;  Chambers  v.  People,  105  111. 
no  error  was  committed  by  permit-  489;  State  v.  Moelchen,  53  Iowa, 
ting  a  cross-examination  by  counsel  310;  5  N.  W.  Rep.  186;  State  v.  Mc- 
for  defense  while  defendant  was  Ginnis,  76  Mo.  326;  State  v.  Slinger- 
temporarily  absent.  land,  19  Nev.  135. 

3  United  States  v.  Angell,  11  Fed.        6  Wilkins  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  13 

Rep.  34.  S.    Rep.    312;    Spies  v.    People,   122 

<U.  S.  Const,  Fifth  Amend.  The  111.  1;  123  U.  S.  131;  State  v.  Ma- 
constitutional  provision  has  been  guire(Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  212; 
held  applicable  not  only  to  criminal  State  v.  Ihrig,  106  Mo.  267;  Faulk- 
proceedings  in  court  but  to  the  ner  v.  Territory  (N.  Mex.,  1893),  30 
case  of  accused  persons  summoned  Pac.  Rep.  965;  Siebert  v.  People  (111., 
to  appear  before  the  interstate  com-  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  431.  Contra, 
merce  commissioners  (Counselman  Townsend  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893),  12 
v.  Hitchcock,  142  U.  S.  547),  and  to  S.  Rep.  209.  Cf.  Com.  v.  Wright, 
contempt  proceedings.  In  re  Mc-  107  Mass.  403. 
Kenna,  47  Kan.  738. 


§  34Ga.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


497 


however,  permit  the  fact  that  the  witness  is  accused  of  crime 
to  influence  them  to  such  an  extent  that  they  will  disregard 
all  his  testimony  if  it  is  otherwise  credible,  but  should  re- 
member  that  the  prisoner  is  presumed  to  be  innocent  until  his 
guilt  is  shown  upon  the  whole  evidence  beyond  a  reasonable 
doubt.1 

"Where  a  person  accused  of  crime  takes  the  stand  as  a  wit- 
ness in  his  own  behalf  he  waives  his  peculiar  constitutional 
privileges,2  and  is  subject  to  the  ordinary  rules  of  examina- 
tion, and  may  be  asked  the  same  questions  on  cross-examina- 
tion in  regard  to  his  previous  life  as  any  other  witness.3  He 
may  be  asked  questions  tending  to  criminate  him  by  connect- 
ing him  with  the  crime  for  which  he  is  on  trial,4  and  his  pre- 
vious arrest,5  indictment  or  conviction  of  crime,6  his  prior 
contradictory  statements7  or  disorderly  actions,8  or  disbelief 


1  Bird  v.  State,  107  Ind.  154;  Ran- 
dall v.  State,  32  N.  E.  Rep.  305 ;  132 
Ind.  539;  State  v.  Wells,  111  Mo. 
589 ;  State  v.  Sullivan,  28  N.  E.  Rep. 
381;  114  111.  24;  State  v.  Sandars, 
106  Mo.  188;  17  S.  W.  Rep.  223. 
See  ante,  §  234. 

2  Clark  v.  State,  87  Ala.  71. 

-  8  Disque  v.  State,  49  N.  J.  L.  249. 
<  People  v.  Spies,  122  111.  1.  See 
2>ost,  §  354a,  for  other  cases  cited  on 
this  point.  In  some  states  by  stat- 
ute it  is  allowable  for  the  state  to 
cross-examine  the  prisoner  only  as 
to  those  matters  referred  to  in  his 
direct  examination.  These  statutes 
are  strictly  construed.  State  v.  San- 
ders, 14  Oreg.  300;  State  v.  Under- 
wood, 44  La.  Ann.  852;  State  v. 
Baker,  44  id.  11 08;  Elliott  v.  State, 
34  Neb.  48;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  315;  State 
v.  Turner,  110  Mo.  196;  19  S.  W. 
Rep.  645 ;  State  v.  Chamberlain,  89 
Mo.  129.  Under  these  statutes, 
which  are  construed  strictly  in  favor 
of  the  prisoner,  it  has  been  held  re- 
versible error  to  allow  the  cross- 
examination  to  extend  beyond  the 
limits  of  the  direct,  not  only  as  re- 
gards matters  relevant  to  the  issue, 
32 


but  also  as  regards  questions  affect- 
ing the  credibility  of  the  accused  as 
a  witness.  And  this  is  so  where  a 
different  rule  is  applicable  to  other 
witnesses.  State  v.  Lurch,  12  Oreg. 
99,  and  other  cases  cited  supra  in 
this  note. 

5  State  v.  Murphy  (Tex.,  1893),  13  S. 
Rep.  229 ;  People  v.  Foote,  93  Mich.  38. 

estate  v.  Minor  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S. 
W.  Rep.  1083;  State  v.  Alexis,  su- 
pra; Childs  v.  State  (Tex..  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  1039;  State  v.  McGuire, 
15  R.  I.  53;  Prior  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893), 
13  S.  Rep.  681.  A  prior  conviction 
of  an  infamous  crime  does  not  de- 
prive the  defendant  in  a  criminal 
trial  of  the  statutory  right  to  testify 
in  his  own  behalf.  Williams  v.  State, 
12  S.  W.  Rep.  1103;  28  Tex.  App. 
301.     Cf.  %%  317,  318,  319. 

'  Hicks  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893).  13  S. 
Rep.  375;  May  v.  State  (Tex.,  1894), 
24  S.  W.  Rep.  910;  Brubakerv.  Tay- 
lor, 76  Pa.  St.  83;  State  v.  Avery 
(Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  193;  Hoff- 
man v.  State,  28  Tex.  App.  174. 

8  People  v.  McCormack,  135  N.  Y. 
663;  Com.  v.  Barry,  8  Pa.  Co.  Ct. 
Rep.  216. 


498  EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  34G<2. 

in  religion,1  his  attempt  to  bribe  a  witness,2  or  his  simulated 
insanity,3  may  all  be  brought  out  by  questions  put  to  him  to 
show  what  credit  he  is  entitled  to  as  a  witness.4 

When  one  of  several  jointly  indicted  goes  on  the  stand  to 
testify  in  his  own  behalf  alone,  he  is  open  to  cross-examina- 
tion, not  only  by  the  district  attorney  but  by  the  counsel  who 
represent  the  other  defendants.5  The  cross-examination  of 
the  accused  should  be  conducted  in  a  regular  manner;  nor  can 
he  be  directly  interrogated  by  the  district  attorney  until  he  is 
properly  turned  over  to  him  at  the  close  of  the  direct  exam- 
ination for  that  purpose.  But  where  the  defendant,  on  tak- 
ing his  seat  after  his  direct  examination,  impulsively  declares 
to  the  jury  that  he  is  a  peaceable,  law-abiding  citizen,  and 
that  he  had  no  idea  of  committing  the  crime  with  which  he 
is  charged,  it  is  not  reversible  error  to  permit  the  district  at- 
torney to  ask  him  if  he  had  not  had  trouble  with  many  other 
persons.6  It  has  also  been  held  that  the  court  may  recall  the 
accused  after  his  examination  for  the  purpose  of  further  cross- 
examination.7 

The  counsel  for  the  accused  is  not  precluded  from  objecting 
to  questions  put  to  the  latter  on  his  cross-examination  upon 
the  ground  that  they  are  irrelevant.  In  this  respect  he  has 
the  same  right  to  object  to  irrelevant  questions  put  to  his 
client  as  he  would  have  if  they  were  put  to  any  other  wit- 
ness called  by  him.8 

1  State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  C.  534.  defendant  made  a  similar  defense  is 

2  Bates  v.  Holladay,  31  Mo.  App.  not    admissible    to    impeach     him. 
162.  Com.  v.  Lamon,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  467 ; 

3  State  v.   Pritcher,  101  N.  C.  667.  155  Mass.  168. 

*  Bell  v.  State,  31  Tex.  Crim.  Rep.  5  Com.  v.  Mullen,   150  Mass.  394; 

276;  People  v.  Tice,  131  N.  Y.  651;  23  N.  E.  Rep.  51. 

McDaniel  v.  State  (Ala.,  1883),  12  S.  6 Taylor  v.    Com.,  18  S.  W.  Rep. 

Rep.  241;   State  v.  Farmer,    84  Me.  852  (Ky.,  1892). 

436;  State  v.   Walsh,    44   La.    Ann.  7  State  v.  Home,  9  Kan.  119;  State 

1122;    Parker  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),  v.  Johnson,  72  Iowa,  393;  State  v. 

35   N.  E.    Rep.  1105;  United  States  Kohn,  9  Nev.   179.     Where  the  ac- 

v.  Brown,  40  Fed.  Rep.  457;  Mitch-  cused   denies  on  the  witness  stand 

ell  v.  State,  94  Ala.  68;  10  S.  Rep.  that  he  wrote  an  instrument  in  issue. 

518;    Com.  v.  Goodnow,  154   Mass.  he  may  be  compelled  on  cross-exam- 

487;  Keyes  v.  State,    122  Ind.    527;  ination  to  write  the  same  words  on 

Com.  v.  Lamon,  155  Mass.  168;  State  paper.     United  States  v.  Mullaney, 

v.  Buell,   89  Mo.  595 ;  State  v.  Mc-  32  Fed.  Rep.  730. 

Guire,    15  R.  I.  23.     Evidence  that  8  People  v.  Brown,  72  N.  Y.  571; 

on  a  former  trial  for  a  similar  crime  Hanoff  v.  State,  37  Ohio  St.  178. 


§  346a.] 


EXAMINATION    OF    WITNESSES. 


499 


In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  it  is  usually  provided  by 
statute  that  the  failure  of  the  accused  to  testify  must  not 
be  considered  as  a  circumstance  against  him,  nor  can  it  be  al- 
luded to  or  commented  on  by  counsel.  Under  such  a  statute 
it  is  the  duty  of  the  court  to  charge  that  the  defendant's  silence 
creates  no  presumption  of  his  guilt.1  A  strict  compliance 
with  such  a  statutory  provision  is  usually  required.  So  the 
prosecuting  attorney  will  not  be  allowed  to  evade  this  require- 
ment that  he  shall  keep  silence  as  to  the  defendant's  failure 
to  testify  by  calling  the  attention  of  the  jury  to  the  fact  that 
none  of  the  neighbors  of  the  defendant  in  a  trial  for  the  mur- 
der of  his  wife  was  informed  by  him  how  the  latter  came  to 
her  death,2  or  by  stating  to  the  jury  that  if  the  defendant 
fails  to  testify  the  law  forbids  the  state  to  comment  upon  his 
failure  to  do  so.3  But  if  the  accused  goes  upon  the  stand  and 
testifies  to  any  particular  fact,  the  state  may  call  attention  to 
his  silence  re^ardino*  or  his  failure  to  denv  certain  other  facts 
concerning  which  he  must  have  had  personal  knowledge;4  and 
if,  after  commenting  on  the  failure  of  defendant  to  testify  at 
all,  the  district  attorney  withdraws  his  remarks  and  the  judge 
instructs  the  jury  that  defendant's  failure  to  testify  must  not 
be  considered,  the  error  is  cured.5 


iFulcher  v.  State,  13  S.  W.  Rep. 
750 ;  28  Tex.  App.  465 ;  State  v.  Ice, 
34  W.  Va.  244;  12  S.  E.  Rep.  695; 
Staples  v.  State,  14  S.  W.  Rep.  603 ; 
89  Term.  231;  People  v.  Doyle,  58 
Hun,  535;  McFadclen  v.  State,  28 
Tex.  App.  241;  Sutton  v.  Com.,  85 
Va.  128;  State  v.  Mathews,  98  Mo. 
125;  State  v.  Teriison,  22  Pac.  Rep. 
429;  42  Kan.  302;  People  v.  Rose, 
52  Hun,  35;  Watt  v.  People,  126  111. 
9;  Nelson  v.  Harrington,  72  Wis. 
591:  40  N.  W.  Rep.  228;  Quinn  v. 
People,  15  N.  E.  Rep.  46;  123  111. 
333.  In  Ruloff  v.  People,  45  N.  Y. 
213;  Austin  v.  People,  102  111.  261; 
State  v.  Weddington,  103  N.  C.  364 ; 


and  Com.  v.  Hanley,  140  Mass.  457, 
it  was  held  that  any  allusion  by  the 
court  in  its  charge  to  the  fact  that 
the  defendant  has  not  testified  is 
error. 

2  State  v.  Moxley,  14  S.  W.  Rep. 
969:  15  id.  556;  102  Mo.  374. 

s  Jordan  v.  State,  16  S.  W.  Rep. 
543 ;  29  Tex.  App.  449. 

*State  v.  Walker  (Mo.,  1888),  9 
S.  W.  Rep.  646;  Cotton  v.  State,  87 
Ala.  103;  Lee  v.  State  (Ark.,  1892), 
19  S.  W.  Rep.  6.  Contra,  State  v. 
Graves,  95  Mo.  510. 

5  People  v.  Hess,  85  Mich.  128 ;  48 
N.  W.  Rep.  181;  State  v.  Chisnell 
(W.  Va.,  1892),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  412. 


CHAPTER  XXIV. 


IMPEACHMENT  OF  WITNESSES. 


§  347.     Party  cannot    impeach  his 
own  witness. 

348.  Exceptions  to  the  rule  that  a 

party  vouches  for  hi3  own 
witnesses. 

349.  How    the    adverse    witness 

may  be  impeached  —  Gen- 
eral reputation  for  verac- 
ity, etc. 

350.  Impeachment     by     proving 

contrary  statements  or  si- 
lence of  witness  on  a  for- 
mer occasion. 

351.  Falsus  in  lino  falsus  in  om- 

nibus. 


§  352.  Evidence  of  general  reputa- 
tion of  an  impeached  wit- 
ness. 

353.  Privileges     of    witnesses  — 

Questions    disclosing     pe- 
cuniary liability. 

354.  Questions    tending    to    dis- 

grace the  witness. 

354a.  Questions  calculated  to  ex- 
pose the  witness  to  a  crimi- 
nal charge. 

354&.  Bias  and  prejudice  of  the 
witness. 


§  347.  Party  cannot  impeach  his  own  witness. —  The  word 
"impeach,"  when  employed  in  connection  with  the  examina- 
tion of  a  witness  in  court,  has  a  twofold  application,  because 
of  which  some  ambiguity  may  arise.  When  used  in  connec- 
tion with  the  witness  himself, —  as,  for  example,  in  the  phrase 
to  impeach  one's  own  witness, —  it  means  to  attempt  to  prove 
him  unreliable  or  unworthy  of  belief.  On  the  other  hand, 
when  employed  in  connection  with  the  evidence  of  the  wit- 
ness, or  more  strictly  speaking  in  connection  with  the  credit 
to  be  given  his  evidence,  its  meaning  is  to  disparage,  destroy 
or  render  useless.  A  party  will  not  be  permitted,  as  a  gen- 
eral rule,  to  impeach  the  veracity  and  credibility  of  any  wit- 
ness that  he  calls  in  his  own  behalf.  It  is  very  reasonable  to 
presume  that  he  is  well  acquainted  with  the  character  and 
previous  life  of  his  witnesses  and  that  he  knows  whether  they 
are  habitually  truthful  or  not.  But  this  rule  and  its  excep- 
tions should  be  qualified  by  the  statement  that  it  is  only  ap- 
plicable to  impeaching  testimony  which  shows,  first,  that  the 
character  of  the  witness  for  truthfulness  is  bad;  second,  that 
he  has  made  contradictory  statements  out  of  court;  or,  third, 


§  347.] 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


501 


to  contradicting  him  solety  with  a  view  to  impeach  him  and 
not  incidentally  in  proving  other  acts  referred  to.1  For  it 
is  well  settled  that  a  party  is  not  to  be  enjoined  from  prov- 
ing any  relevant  fact  by  a  witness  because  his  testimony  to 
that  fact  directly  contradicts,  and  thus  discredits  necessarily, 
the  testimony  of  another  of  the  party's  witnesses  to  that  or 
to  some  other  relevant  fact.  Nor  is  it  material  that  the  gen- 
eral effect  of  such  a  conflict  of  evidence  is  to  prove  that 
either  one  or  the  other  of  the  witnesses  was  wholly  unworthy 
of  confidence  or  belief.2  Where  a  party,  in  cross-examining, 
makes  his  adversary's  witness  his  own  by  going  into  matters 
outside  of  the  examination-in-chief  of  the  witness,  he  will  not 
then  be  allowed  to  impeach  him,3  but  the  part}'-  who  originally 
called  the  witness  may.4  In  the  absence  of  a  statute  to  the 
contrary,  where  a  party  summons  his  adversary  as  a  witness 
he  vouches  for  his  credibility.5  This  rule  has,  however,  been 
abrogated  by  statute  in  some  of  the  states,  and  the  party 
calling  the  adverse  part}^  may  examine  and  impeach  him  as 


1  Chester  v.  Wilhelm,  111  N.  C. 
314;  Pollock  v.  Pollock,  71  N.  Y. 
137;  Cross  v.  Cross,  108  id.  629;  Na- 
tional Syrup  Co.  v.  Carlson,  42  111. 
App.  17S;  Snodgrass  v.  Cora.,  17  S. 
E.  Rep.  23S;  Chism  v.  State  (Miss., 
1893),  12  S.  Rep.  852 ;  Thalheimer  v. 
Klapetzy,  59  Hun,  619;  Eastern 
Lum.  Co.  v.  Gill,  9  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  R. 
630;  Dixon  v.  State,  86  Ga.  754; 
Artz  v.  Chicago  R.  R.  Co.,  44  Iowa, 
284.  "  By  calling  him  to  testify  the 
party  represents  his  witness  as 
worthy  of  credit,  or  at  least  as  not 
wholly  unworthy  of  credit.  For 
him  to  attack  the  veracity  of  the 
witness  would  be  bad  faith  towards 
the  court  and  give  power  to  destroy 
the  witness  if  unfavorable  and  to 
make  good  if  favorable.  Hence 
while  a  party  may  contradict  inci- 
dentally he  cannot  ordinarily  im- 
peach his  witness."  United  States 
v.  Watkins,  3  Cranch  C.  C.  442;  1 
Greenl.  onEv.,  §§461,  462;  Sheppard 
v.  Yocum,  10  Oreg.  410. 


2McFarland  v.  Ford,  32  111.  App 
173 ;  Cross  v.  Cross,  108  N.  Y.  629 
Lawrence  v.   Barker,  5  Wend.  305 
Cowden  v.  Reynolds,  12  S.  &  R.  281 
Moffatt  v.  Terney,  30  Pac.  Rep.  348 
17   Colo.    189;    Cross   v.    Cross,    108 
N.  Y.  629;  Hollingsworth  v.  State, 
79  Ga.  603;  Warren  v.  Gabriel,  51 
Ala.  235;  Pollock  v.  Pollock,  71  N.  Y. 
137;  Hall  v.  Houghton,   37  Me.  411; 
Chester  v.  Wilhelm,   111  N.  C.  314; 
Seavy  v.   Dearborn,   19  N.  H.  351; 
Coulter  v.  Amer.  Exp.  Co.,  56  N.  Y. 
585;  Edwards   v.  Crenshaw,  30  Mo. 
App.  510. 

3  Hill  v.  Froehlick,  14  N.  Y.  S.  610. 

4  Pickard  v.  Bryant,  52  N.  W.  Rep. 
788;  92  Mich.  430;  Smith  v.  Utesch 
(Iowa,  1892).  53  N.  W.  Rep.  343. 

5 Good  v.  Knox  (Vt.,  1892),  23  Atl. 
Rep.  520:  Bensberg  v.  Harris,  46  Mo. 
App.  404 ;  Tarsney  v.  Turner,  48  Fed. 
Rep.  818;  Graves  v.  Davenport,  50 
Fed.  Rep.  881;  Dravo  v.  Fabel,  132 
U.  S.  487. 


502  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  348. 

though  he  were  testifying  in.  his  own  behalf.1  But  the  stat- 
utory right  to  call  a  party  as  a  witness  does  not,  alone  and 
by  implication,  confer  the  right  to  impeach  him.2 

§  348.  Exceptions  to  the  rule  that  a  party  vouches  for 
his  own  witnesses. —  If  the  witness  is  one  that  the  law  thrusts 
on  the  party,  he  is  not,  strictly  speaking,  his  own  witness,  and 
the  party  does  not  vouch  for  his  truthfulness.  So  where  a 
subscribing  witness  is  called  to  testify  to  the  execution  of  a 
deed  or  a  will,  the  party  who  is  under  the  necessit}r  of  calling 
him  is  not  concluded  by  his  answers,  and  may  impeach  his 
character  for  veracity,  or  prove  the  execution  by  another  wit- 
ness in  case  he  denies  it.3  Again,  the  claims  of  a  party  should 
not  be  sacrificed  or  defeated  out  of  consideration  for  a  treach- 
erous witness  who,  when  placed  upon  the  stand,  intentionally 
misrepresents  the  facts  or  states  them  differently  from  what 
he  had  previously  told  the  party  out  of  court.  The  witness 
may  have  been,  or  may  be  now,  in  the  secret  employment  or 
under  the  control  of  the  adverse  party,  and  he  may  have  made 
the  extra-judicial  statements  for  the  purpose  of  being  called 
as  a  witness,  intending  to  confound  the  party  calling  him  by 
his  hostile  testimony. 

1  Crocker  v.    Agenbrod,    122  Ind.  laying  a  foundation  for  his  impeach- 

585;    Schmidt  v.  Durnham  (Minn.,  ment.  Bennett  v.  State,  28  Tex.  App. 

1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  277;  Ga.  Stat.,  359. 

Act    Oct.    14,    1891 ;    Landford    v.  2  Good  v.  Knox,  23  Atl.  Rep.  520 ; 

Jones,   18  Oreg.  307 ;  22   Pac.  Rep.  64  Vt.  97. 

1064;  De  Meli  v.  De  Meli,  120  N.  Y.  3  Orser  v.  Orser,  24  N.  Y.  51 ;  gem- 
485;  "Webber  v.  Jackson  (Mich.,  inary  v.  Calhoun,  25  N.  Y.  422; 
1890),  44  N.  W.  Rep.  591;  Helms  v.  Sharey  v.  Hursey,  32  Me.  579;  Feck 
Green,  105  N.  C.  251.  The  evidence  v.  Cary,  27  N.  Y.  9;  Thornton  v. 
of  an  adverse  party,  taken  before  Thornton,  39  Vt.  122;  Foster  v.  Dick- 
trial  for  his  opponent's  use,  may  be  inson,  64  id.  233 ;  Crocker  v.  Agen- 
impeached  at  the  trial.  Crocker  v.  brod,  122  Ind.  587;  Freer  v.  Will- 
Agenbrod,  122  Ind.  585.  Of.  Miller  iams,  7  Baxt.  550,  556;  Edwards  v. 
v.  Cook,  124  id.  101.  Where  the  Crenshaw,  30  Mo.  App.  510;  Hil- 
statute  permits  the  testimony  of  the  dreth  v.  Aldrich,  15  R.  I.  63;  Mays 
adverse  party  to  be  impeached  by  v.  Mays  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep 
"adverse  testimony,"  his  credibility  921;  Martin  v.  Perkins,  56  Miss 
and  reputation  cannot  be  attacked  204 ;  Brown  v.  Bellows,  4  Pick.  179 
directly.  Helms  v.  Green,  105  N.  C.  Whitaker  v.  Galesburg,  15  id.  544 
251  A  party  does  not  lose  his  right  Garrison  v.  Garrison,  15  N.  J.  Eq 
to  impeach  an  adverse  witness  by  266;  Turner  v.  Cheesman,  15  id.  243 
recalling  him  with  the  sole  object  of  Williams  v.  Walker,  2  Rich.  Eq.  291 


§  348.] 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


503 


In  spite  of  some  uncertainty,  the  current  of  the  decisions 
now  sustains  the  proposition  that  a  party  may  show  that  the 
evidence  of  such  a  witness  has  taken  him  wholly  by  surprise,1 
and  he  may  then  proceed  to  impeach  its  credibility.  So  the 
party  ma}'  show  by  questioning  the  witness  that  the  latter  has 
been  or  is  under  the  influence  of  his  opponent,  and  he  may  be 
asked  if  he  has  made  contradictory  statements  out  of  court.2 

In  many  of  the  states  it  is  enacted  by  statute  that,  if  a  hos- 
tile witness  denies  that  he  has  made  contradictory  statements, 
a  party  may  show  by  other  witnesses  that  the  witness  has 
made  prior  statements  inconsistent  with  his  testimony.  These 
statutes  being  in  derogation  of  the  common  law  must  be 
strictly  construed.3  So  the  circumstances  of  time  and  place 
under  which  the  contradictory  statements  were  made  must  be 
particularly  described  to  the  witness,  it  not  being  sufficient 
merely  to  ask  him  if  he  has  not  made  inconsistent  statements 
to  some  particular  person.4  Where  one  to  lay  a  foundation 
for  a  charge  of  fraud  introduces  a  writing  as  evidence,  the  rule 
that  a  party  vouches  for  his  witness  is  not  applicable,  as  in 


Deffenderfer  v.  Scott,  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
87;  Goodtitle  v.  Clayton,  4  Burr. 
3224;  Scribner  v.  Crane,  2  Paige, 
147.  Evidence  of  the  bad  character 
of  a  subscribing  witness  was  rejected 
in  Boylan  v.  Meeker,  4  Dutch.  275. 

1  National  Syrup  Co.  v.  Carlson,  42 
111.  App.  178;  Williams  v.  State,  25 
Tex.  App.  176:  McNerney  v.  Read- 
ing, 150  Pa.  St.  611 ;  30  W.  N.  C. 
534.  The  fact  that  a  witness  on  tbe 
stand  appears  wholly  ignorant  of  the 
facts  in  issue  or  fails  to  testify  as 
was  expected  does  not,  unless  he 
gives  hostile  evidence,  permit  the 
party  examining  to  show  that  he 
made  the  desired  statements  out  of 
court  or  that  he  professed  to  have  a 
competent  knowledge  of  the  matter. 
Chism  v.  State  (Miss.,  1893),  12  S. 
Rep.  852:  People  v.  Mitchell,  94  Cal. 
550;  29Pac.  Rep.  1106. 

2  Davis  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  369 ;  Bullard  v.  Pearsall,  53 


N.  Y.  230;  Rice  v.  N.  E.  Ins.  Co.,  4 
Pick.  439;  Brown  v.  Bellows,  4  id. 
179;  Hurlbut  v.  Hurlbut,  63  Vt.  667; 
Bank  of  Northern  Liberties,  6  W.  & 
S.  285 ;  Adams  v.  Wheeler,  97  Mass. 
67;  Coulter  v.  American  Express 
Co.,  56  N.  Y.  585;  People  v.  Jacobs, 
49  Cal.  384;  State  v.  Sorter  (Kan., 
1893),  34  Pac.  Rep.  1036 ;  Gardner  v. 
Connelly,  75  Iowa,  205.  But  it  has 
been  held  that  the  answer  of  the 
witness  is  conclusive  on  the  party. 
Hall  v.  Railroad  Co.,  51  N.  W.  Rep. 
150  (Iowa,  1892). 

3  Williams  v.  State  (Tex.,  1888),  7 
S.  W,  Rep.  661 ;  Hemingway  v. 
Garth,  51  Ala.  530;  Blackburn  v. 
Com.,  12  Bush,  181:  Day  v.  Cooley, 
118  Mass.  524;  Brooks  v.  Weeks,  121 
id.  433 ;  Newell  v.  Homer,  120  id.  277. 

4  Com.  v.  Thyng,  134  Mass.  191; 
People  v.  Bushton,  80  Cal.  161.  See 
ante,  §  342. 


504:  IMPEACHMENT    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  34$. 

such  a  case  there  is  no  witness  and  he  may  therefore  discredit 
it  subsequently.1 

In  general,  the  intention  to  impeach  a  witness  is  to  be  ascer- 
tained rather  from  the  actual  purpose  of  the  question  than 
from  its  mere  form.  Thus;  a  question  to  one's  own  witness 
whether  he  has  not  testified  differently  at  a  former  trial  is  not 
inadmissible  where  its  sole  purpose  is  to  refresh  the  recollec- 
tion of  the  witness,  not  to  impeach  him.2 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  said  that  the  rule  against  impeach- 
ing one's  own  witness  does  not  apply  after  the  adverse  party 
has  called  the  witness  to  testify  in  his  behalf  against  the  party 
who  first  called  him.3 

§  349.  How  adverse  witness  may  be  impeached  —  General 
reputation  for  veracity,  etc.—  The  credibility  of  a  witness 
who  has  been  examined  in  chief  may  be  impeached  not  only  by 
contradicting  the  facts  as  stated  by  him  in  his  evidence  by 
other  witnesses,  but  by  evidence  directly  tending  to  destroy 
his  general  reputation  for  truthfulness.  In  impeaching  the 
general  reputation  of  a  witness  for  veracity  it  is  proper  to  ask 
the  impeaching  witness,  who  ought  to  be  called  from  among 
persons  resident  near  the  witness  whose  reputation  is  under 
consideration,4  whether  he  knows  the  general  reputation  of 

1  Henry  Buggy  Co.  v.  Pratt,  73  *  Redden  v.  Tefft  (Kan.,  1892),  29 
Iowa,  485 ;  35  N.  W.  Rep.  587 ;  Pac.  Rep.  157 ;  Louisville,  N.  A.  etc. 
Bunce  v.  Gallegher,  5  Blatch.  481.  Co.  v.  Richardson,  66  Tnd.  43 ;  Healey 

2  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v.  Hurt  v.  Terry,  9  N.  Y.  S.  519;  State  v. 
(Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  130.  A  party  Johnson,  41  La.  Ann.  574;  People  v. 
who,  to  avoid  a  continuance,  admits  Markham,  64  Cal.  157.  This  rule 
the  facts  to  which  an  absent  witness  applies  in  a  prosecution  for  crime 
will  testify  is  thereby  precluded  when  the  accused  testifies  in  his  own 
from  impeaching  him.  North  Chi-  behalf.  State  v.  Rugan,  5  Mo.  App. 
cago  St.  R.  Co.  v.  Cottingham,  44  592;  State  v.  Beal,  68  Ind.  345; 
111.  App.  46;  Powers  v.  State,  80  Mershon  v.  State,  51  Ind.  14.  So  the 
Ind.  77.  If,  however,  he  only  ad-  reputation  must  be  recent.  Sun  Fire 
mits  that  the  witness  will  testify  as  Office  v.  Ayerst,  55  N.  W.  Rep.  635. 
it  is  alleged  he  will,  he  may  impeach  But  evidence  of  bad  reputation  two 
him,  though  he  is  absent.  State  v.  or  more  years  before  the  trial  is  com- 
Swain,  68  Mo.  605.  petent,  as  no  presumption  exists  that 

3  Pickard  v.  Bryant  (Mich.,  1892),  a  person  of  mature  age  would  by  ref- 
52  N.  W.  Rep.  788;  Smith  v.  Utisch  ormation  acquire  a  good  reputation 
(Iowa.  1892),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  343.  But  in  that  period.  Mynatt  v.  Hudson, 
cf.  Richards  v.  Stete  (Wis.,  1892),  51  66  Tex.  66 ;  Davis  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893), 
N.  W.  Rep.  652.  23  S.  W.  Rep.  585.     "  It  has  been 


§  349.] 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


505 


A.  and  what  that  reputation  is.  So  the  witness  may  also 
be  asked  whether  from  what  he  knows  of  him  and  from  his 
reputation  he  would  believe  A.  under  oath.1  But  the  fact  that 
a  witness  fails  to  state  that  he  would  not  believe  the  witness 
under  oath  will  not  prevent  the  introduction  of  evidence  of 
the  bad  reputation  of  the  witness.2 

The  question  whether  the  witness  would,  from  his  knowl" 
edge  of  the  party,  believe  him  under  oath  was  excluded  by 
the  earlier  American  cases  as  calling  for  the  expression  of  a 
conclusion  or  opinion  b}7  a  non-expert  witness.  It  was  con- 
sidered as  an  unwarranted  departure  from  the  established 
rules  of  law,  as  tending  to  permit  the  prejudice  and  personal 
bias  of  a  witness  to  infect  the  minds  of  the  jurors  and  as  in- 
vading their  province  as  triers  of  the  facts.3  But  the  existence 
of  a  person's  reputation,  i.  <?.,  what  the  community  in  which 
he  resides  says  of  him,  is  a  fact  which  any  witness  maj7  prove 
who  has  learned  the  reputation  from  what  he  hears.     "  What 


said  that  the  regular  mode  of  exam- 
ining a  witness  is  to  inquire  whether 
he  knows  the  general  character  of 
the  person  whom  it  is  intended  to 
impeach.  In  all  such  cases  the  word 
'character'  is  used  as  synonymous 
with  '  reputation.'  What  is  wanted 
is  the  common  opinion  in  which 
there  is  general  concurrence ;  in  other 
words,  general  reputation  or  charac- 
ter attributed;  that  is  presumed  to 
be  indicative  of  actual  character." 
Knode  v.  Williamson,  17  Wall.  588. 
1  Mayes  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  24  S. 
W.  Rep.  421;  State  v.  Boswell,  2 
Dev.  209,  211;  Hudspeth  v.  State,  50 
Ark.  534 ;  Ford  v.  Ford,  7  Humph.  92 ; 
People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  257,  258; 
1  Hill  (S.  C),  258;  Wetherbee  v. 
Norris,  103  Mass.  565 ;  State  v.  Chris- 
tian, 44  La.  Ann.  950;  Hamilton  v. 
People,  29  Mich.  173;  Nelson  v.  State 
(Fla.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  361;  Lyman 
v.  Philadelphia,  56  Pa.  St.  483; 
People  v.  Tyler,  35  Cal.  553:  National 
Bank  v.  Scriven,  63  Hun,  375 ;  Eason 
v.  Chapman,  21  111.  35;  State  v. 
Johnson,    40  Kan.   266;    Keator  v. 


People,  32  Mich.  484.  Contra,  King 
v.  Peakman,  20  N.  J.  Eq.  316 ;  Grif- 
fin v.  State,  26  Tex.  App.  157;  Mar- 
shall v.  State,  5  Tex.  App.  273. 
"Unwillingness  to  believe  a  man 
under  oath  must  be  based  upon  two 
facts  —  that  the  witness  knows  the 
reputation  for  veracity  among  the 
man's  neighbors  and  that  such  repu- 
tation is  bad."  Spies  et  al.  v.  People, 
122  111.  208.  It  is  error  to  instruct 
the  jury  that  they  may  rely  upon 
their  personal  knowledge  of  the 
character  of  the  witnesses.  Chatta- 
nooga, etc.  Co.  v.  Owen  (Ga.,  1893), 
15  S.  E.  Rep.  853.    See  §  343,  ante. 

2  Mitchell  v.  State,  94  Ala.  68 ;  10 
S.  Rep.  518.  The  fact  that  a  witness 
accepted  a  very  small  sum  of  money 
in  satisfaction  of  a  slanderous  accu- 
sation of  perjury  made  against  him 
may  be  given  in  evidence  to  show- 
that  he  estimates  his  own  reputation 
at  a  low  figure.  Bird  v.  Hudson 
(N.  C,  1893),  18  S.  E.  Rep.  209. 

3  Phillips  v.  Kingfield,  1  Appleton, 
375. 


iOC 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  349. 


the  witness  has  heard  is  the  reputation."  l  If,  however,  such 
evidence  be  regarded  as  an  opinion,  then  it  is  admissible  on 
the  same  ground  as  are  opinions  of  a  person's  sanity,  temper, 
etc.  The  impeaching  witness  cannot  be  permitted  to  testify 
to  the  commission  of  any  specific  acts  of  untruthfulness  or 
other  bad  conduct.2  He  will  be  required  to  confine  his  evi- 
dence strictly  to  showing  the  reputation  of  the  witness,  not 
his  actions;3  for  it  is  admitted  that  no  man  can  with  fairness 
be  called  upon,  without  notice,  to  defend  his  particular  actions, 
perhaps  long  since  forgotten  by  him.4  The  impeaching  wit- 
ness need  not  be  personally  acquainted  with  the  witness,5  and 
he  may  be  cross-examined  to  ascertain  how  he  acquired  the 
knowledge  on  which  his  opinion  is  based  or  his  general  char- 
acter for  truthfulness  may  in  turn  be  attacked.6  By  some  of 
the  cases  evidence  of  this  sort  is  confined  to  proving  the  good 
or  bad  reputation  of  the  witness  for  veracity  alone,7  and  if  the 
witness  has  no  knowledge  upon  that  point  he  is  wholly  in- 
competent to  testify.8     But  elsewhere  greater  latitude  is  per- 


1Cooley,  J.,  in  Bathrick  v.  Detroit 
P.  &  T.  Co.,  50  Mich.  652. 

2  State  v.  Rogers  (Mo.,  1892),  18  S. 
W.  Rep.  976;  Rattarre  v.  Chapman, 
79  Ga.  574;  People  v.  O'Brien,  96 
Cal.  371;  Davey  v.  Lohrman,  20  N. 
Y.  S.  675 ;  Mentze  v.  Tuteur,  77  Wis. 
236;  Smith  v.  State,  88  Ala.  73; 
People  v.  Ryan,  55  Hun,  214;  Com. 
v.  Fox  (Ky.,  1890).  1  S.  W.  Rep.  396. 

3  Mentze  v.  Tuteur,  77  Wis.  236;  46 
N.  W.  Rep.  123;  Clink  v.  Gunn(Mich., 
1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  193 ;  Moreland 
v.  Lawrence.  23  Minn.  84;  Smith  v. 
State,  88  Ala.  73;  Fox  v.  Com.  (Ky., 
1891),  1  S.  W.  Rep.  396;  Randall  v. 
State,  132  Ind.  539;  Conley  v.  State, 
85  N.  Y.  618;  Dimick  v.  Downs,  82 
111.  570. 

4  "  All  the  cases  agree  that  the  in- 
quiry must  be  restricted  to  his  gen- 
eral reputation  for  truthfulness  or  to 
his  general  character,  and  that  it 
cannot  be  extended  to  particular 
facts  or  transactions,  for  the  reason 
that  while  every  man  is  supposed  to 


be  fully  prepared  to  meet  those  gen- 
eral inquiries,  it  is  not  likely  he 
would  be  prepared,  without  notice, 
to  answer  as  to  particular  acts." 
Tees  v.  Huntingdon,  23  How.  11-13. 

5  State  v.  Turner,  36  S.  C.  534. 

6State  v.  Perkins.  66  N.  C.  126; 
Nelson  v.  State  (Fla.,  1893),  13  S. 
Rep.  861.  If  a  party,  to  impeach  his 
adversary's  witness,  offers  evidence 
which  impeaches  his  own  witness, 
he  should  not  be  allowed  to  endeavor 
to  rebut  it.  Mealer  v.  State  (Tex., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  142. 

7  Spears  v.  Forrest,  15  Vt.  435 ; 
State  v.  Clavvson,  30  Mo.  App.  139; 
Kennedy  v.  Shaw,  66  Tex.  442; 
Briggs  v.  Com.,  82  Va.  554;  Bates 
v.  Barber,  4  Cush.  107;  State  v. 
Jackson,  44  La.  Ann.  160;  Sleeper  v. 
Van  Middlesworth,  4  Denio,  431; 
People  v.  Abbott  (Mich.,  1893),  56  N. 
W.  Rep.  S62. 

8  Healey  v.  Terry,  9  N.  Y.  S.  519 ; 
State  v.  Coffey,  44  Mo.  App.  455; 
Com.    v.    Lawler,  12  Allen  (Mass.), 


§  350.]  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  507 

mitted,  and  it  is  held  that  evidence  may  be  given  involving 
the  whole  moral  character  of  the  person  whose  evidence  is 
impeached,  on  the  theory  that  where  a  person  is  shown  to 
have  been  addicted  to  a  vicious  habit  of  living,  indicating 
great  moral  turpitude,  it  is  a  very  fair  inference  that  his  char- 
acter for  truthfulness  is  also  bad  and  that  he  would  perjure 
himself  if  it  was  to  his  interest  to  do  so.1 

§  350.  Impeachment  by  proving  contrary  statements  or 
silence  of  witness  on  a  former  occasion. — "  Every  witness 
under  cross-examination  in  any  proceeding,  civil  or  criminal, 
may  be  asked  whether  he  has  made  any  former  statement 
relative  to  the  subject-matter  of  the  action  and  inconsistent 
with  his  present-testimony,  the  circumstances  of  the  supposed 
statement  being  referred  to  sufficiently  to  designate  the  par- 
ticular occasion;  and  if  he  does  not  distinctly  admit  that  he 
has  made  such  a  statement,  proof  may  be  given  that  he  did 
in  fact  make  it.  The  same  course  may  be  taken  with  a  wit- 
ness upon  his  examination  in  chief  if  the  judge  is  of  opinion 
that  he  is  adverse  (i.  e.,  hostile)  to  the  party  by  whom  he  was 
called  and  permits  the  question."2 

585;  State  v.  Jackson  (La.,  1892),  10  State  v.  Eaven  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W. 
S.  Rep.  600;  State  v.  Perkins,  66  Rep.  376.  A  male  witness  cannot 
N.  C.  126;  Holmes  v.  State,  88  Ala.  be  impeached  by  proof  of  his  general 
29;  Redden  v.  Teft  (Kan.,  1892),  29  reputation  for  unchastity.  State  v. 
Pac.  Rep.  157.  A  party  is  not  pre-  Coffey,  44  Mo.  App.  455.  The  fact 
eluded  from  offering  cumulative  evi-  that  a  female  witness  is  a  prostitute 
dence  of  bad  character  because  he  may  be  shown  b}'  her  own  ad  mis- 
has  already  impeached  the  character  sions  on  the  stand  or  by  independent 
of  a  witness.  Browder  v.  State,  30  evidence;  but,  while  the  testimony 
Tex.  App.  614;  18  S.  W.  Rep.  197.  of  such  witnesses  should  be  closely 
1  McTyler  v.  State  (Ga.,  1893),  18  scrutinized  by  the  jury,  they  should 
S.  E.  Rep.  140;  Pierce  v.  Newton,  13  not  be  disbelieved  on  account  of 
Gray,  528;  Gilliam  v.  State,  1  Head,  their  bad  character  for  unchastity  if 
38;  Eason  v.  Chapman,  21  111.  33;  otherwise  credible.  People  v.  Mills, 
State  v.  Miller,  98  Mo.  263;  State  v.  94  Mich.  630;  Paul  v.  Paul,  37  N.  J. 
Boswell,  2  Dev.  (N.  C.)  200,  210 ;  Peo-  Eq.  25.  Nor  should  evidence  that  a 
pie  v.  Webster  (N.  Y.,  1893),  34  N.  witness  has  been  fined  in  an  inferior 
E.  Rep.  730;  State  v.  McClintick,  73  court  be  received  to  impeach  his 
Iowa,  603;  People  v.  Harrison,  53  character  where  it  is  not  shown  that 
N.  W.  Rep.  725;  93  Mich.  594;  he  committed  any  offense  which  is 
Crump  v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  immoral  per  se.  Goode  v.  State 
Rep.  390;  Winter  v.  Cent.  Iowa  R.  (Tex.,  1893),  24  S.  W.  Rep.  102. 
Co.,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  737;  Hollings-  -' Stephen's  Dig.  Ev.,  art.  131.  See 
worth  v.  State,  53  Ark.  337;  Mitchell  ante,  §  336. 
v.  State,  94  Ala.  68;  10  S.  Rep.  518; 


508 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  350. 


In  order  to  impeach  a  witness  by  proof  that  he  has  made 
contradictory  statements  out  of  court,  it  is  always  necessary 
in  fairness  to  him  to  lay  a  foundation  by  first  asking  him  upon 
his  cross-examination,  clearly  and  distinctly,  whether  he  did 
or  did  not  at  some  particular  time  and  place  and  in  the  pres- 
ence of  or  to  some  particular  person  make  such  statements.1 
By  having  his  attention  directly  called  to  the  particular  cir- 


1  This  rule  was  so  thoroughly  dis- 
cussed in  the  Queen's  Case,  2  Brod.  & 
Biug.  313,  314,  that  it  is  sometimes 
called  "  the  rule  in  the  Queen's 
case."  But  the  court  in  that  case 
only  affirmed  a  principle  which  was 
already  well  recognized  in  the  com- 
mon law.  The  court  says:  "If  the 
witness  admits  the  words  imputed 
to  him,  the  proof  on  the  other  side 
becomes  unnecessary;  and  the  wit- 
ness has  an  opportunity  of  giving 
such  reason,  explanation  or  exculpa- 
tion of  his  conduct,  if  any  there  may 
be,  as  the  particular  circumstances 
of  the  transaction  may  happen  to 
furnish;  and  thus  the  whole  matter 
is  brought  before  the  court  at  once, 
which  in  our  opinion  is  the  better 
course.  If  the  witness  denies  the 
words  imputed  to  him,  the  adverse 
party  has  an  opportunity  afterwards 
of  contending  that  the  matter  is 
such  that  he  is  not  bound  by  the  an- 
swer, and  his  proof  in  contradiction 
will  be  received  at  the  proper  sea- 
son." See,  also,  Cohn  v.  Heimbauch 
(Wis.,  1893),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  638; 
Com.  v.  Mosier,  135  Pa.  St.  221; 
Bruce  v.  State,  21  S.  W.  Rep.  681 ; 
31  Tex.  Cr.  App.  590;  State  v.  Tur- 
ner, 15  S.  E.  Rep.  602;  36  S.  C.  534; 
McCulloch  v.  Doleson,  133  N.  Y.  114; 
Zebley  v.  Storey,  117  Pa.  St.  47S; 
Spohn  v.  Mo.  P.  R.  Co.  (Mo.,  1893), 
22  S.  W.  Rep.  690;  State  v.  Jones, 
44  La.  Ann.  960;  State  v.  Calligan, 
41  La.  Ann.  574,  578;  Jones  v.  State, 
65  Miss.  179;  State  v.  M'Laughlin, 
44  Iowa,  82 ;  Kent  v.  State,  42  Ohio 


St.  429;  State  v.  Glynn,  51  Vt.  577; 
Hanscom  v.  Burmood,  35  Neb.  504; 
Bonnelli  v.  Bowen  (Miss.,  1893),  11 
S.  Rep.  791;  Greer  v.  Higgins,  20 
Kan.  420;  State  v.  Baldwin,  36  id.  1  ; 
State  v.  Davis,  29  Mo.  391 ;  St.  Louis, 
I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v.  Swelt  (Ark., 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  587 ;  Jackson  v. 
Swope  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep. 
909;  Wright  v.  Hicks,  15  Ga.  160; 
State  v.  Hunsaker,  16  Oreg.  497; 
Morris  v.  Atl.  Ave.  R.  R.  Co.,  116  N. 
Y.  556;  Diffenderfer  v.  Scott  (Ind., 
1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  87 ;  Hughes  v. 
Ward,  38  Kan.  452;  Hammond  v. 
Dike,  42  Minn.  273;  Babcock  v.  Peo- 
ple, 13  Colo.  515;  Klug  v.  State,  77 
Ga.  734;  Koehler  v.  Buhl,  94  Mich. 
496;  Bock  v.  Wygant,  5  111.  App. 
643;  State  v.  Wright,  75  N.  C.  439; 
Root  v.  Borst,  65  Hun,  622 ;  State  v. 
Parker,  96  Mo.  382.  The  witness 
may  be  contradicted  by  his  testi- 
mony given  on  a  prior  trial  of  the 
same  case  if  he  asserts  that  his  pres- 
ent testimony  is  the  same  as  that 
previously  given  (Hudson  v.  State, 
2S  Tex.  App.  323;  Bennett  v.  Syn- 
dicate Ins.  Co.,  43  Minn.  48;  Brown 
v.  State,  76  Ga.  623),  and  he  should 
be  allowed  to  explain  the  contradic- 
tion. State  v.  Reed,  62  Me.  129.  Of. 
Toplitz  v.  Hedden,  146  TJ.  S.  252; 
Phifer  v.  Ervvin,  100  N.  C.  59;  6  S. 
E.  Rep.  672.  A  question  whether 
the  witness  had  not  made  a  contra- 
dictory statement  "last  July"  is 
sufficiently  definite  as  to  time.  State 
v.  Walters  (Wash.,  1893),  34  Pac. 
Rep.  938,  1098. 


§  350.]  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  509 

cumstances  under  which  his  alleged  inconsistent  declaration 
was  made,  he  is  not  taken  unfairly  by  surprise,  but,  his  mem- 
ory refreshed  by  these  facts,  he  may  be  able  to  show  that  he 
was  innocently  mistaken  or  that  he  was  misunderstood,  or  he 
may  explain  away  the  seeming  inconsistency  of  his  statements 
by  showing  their  true  relation,  meaning  and  purpose. 

Where  a  witness,  when  asked  if  he  made  certain  contra- 
dictory statements,  declares  he  does  not  remember  making 
them,  evidence  may  be  adduced  to  show  that  he  made  them,1 
without  further  foundation  for  their  introduction.2  Whether 
the  witness  denies  making  the  contradictor}'  statement  or 
declares  that  he  does  not  remember  it,  the  question  asked 
the  witness  who  is  called  to  impeach  him  should  be  the  same 
as  respects  the  time,  place  and  substance  of  the  contradict- 
ory statement  as  the  question  put  to  the  original  witness. 
The  question  also  should  be  so  shaped  as  to  admit  of  "yes" 
or  "no"  for  an  answer.3  If  the  witness  is  a  party,  his  contra- 
dictory statements  are  admissible  as  direct  evidence  and  not 
merely  as  impeaching  evidence.  Hence  it  is  not  necessary  to 
lay  a  foundation  for  their  introduction  if  the  party  has,  in  the 
course  of  the  trial,  a  full  opportunity  to  testify.4 

The  rule  as  above  stated  is  equally  applicable  whether  the 
evidence  to  be  impeached  is  oral  and  given  viva  voce  in  open 
court  or  is  contained  in  a  deposition;5  but  in  the  case  of  affi- 
davits and  depositions,  which  are  generally  formal  in  their 
phraseology,  the  considerations  pointed  out  by  Lord  Lang- 
dale6  should  never  be  lost  sight  of.  In  the  case  cited  the  un- 
fairness of  comparing  an  affidavit  made  out  of  court  by  one 

i  Smith  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  20  S.  gan  v.  Butcher,  37  N.  W.  Rep.  596; 

W.  Rep.   554;  Heddles  v.   Chicago,  22  Neb.  523;  King  v.  State,  77  Ga. 

etc.  Co.,  77  Wis.  228;  Levy  v.  State,  734;  Young  v.  Bradley,  94  Cal.  128; 

28  Tex.  App.  203;  Payr.e  v.  State,  60  Lewis  v.  State  (Ga.,  1S93),  16  S.  E. 

Ala.   80;  Billings  v.  State,   52  Ark.  Rep.  986. 

303.     Cf.   Mayer  v.  Stone,   21  Neb.  5  Gilyard  v.   State  (Ala.,  1893),  13 

717.  S.  Rep.  891 ;  United  States  v.  Taylor, 

2  Fuller  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  559 ;  35  Fed.  Rep.  484 ;  Hammond  v.  Dike, 
17  S.  W.  Rep.  1108.  42  Minn.  273;  Tabor  v.  Judd,  62  N. 

3  Pence  v.  Waugh  (Ind.,  1894),  34  H.  288;  Marx  v.  Strauss,  90  Ala.  453; 
N.  E.  Rep.  860.  Leiber  v.  Railroad  Co.  (Iowa,  1892), 

*  Meyer  v.  Campbell,  20  N.  Y.  S.     50  N.  W.  Rep.  547. 
705;  1  Misc.  Rep.  283;  Rose  v.  Otis        6  In  Jolin&ton  v.  Todd,  5  Beav.  600. 
(Colo.,  1893),  31  Pac.  Rep.  493;  Milli- 


510  IMPEACHMENT    OF   WITNESSES.  [§  350. 

who  is  unskilled  in  or  ignorant  of  the  proper  use  of  language 
with  his  subsequent  spontaneous  replies  in  oral  examination 
in  open  court  is  pointed  out.  In  such  a  case  the  language  of 
the  affidavit  is  not  his;  and  though  it  may  have  been  read  to 
him  before  he  signed  it  by  the  person  whom  he  trusted  to 
voice  his  ideas  in  proper  form,  he  may  totally  misunderstand 
the  meaning  of  a  writing  couched  in  such  unusual  and  often 
technical  language.  These  considerations,  together  with  the 
agitation  and  hurry  of  a  cross-examination,  and  the  trickery 
and  intimidation  too  often  practiced  upon  ignorant  witnesses, 
go  far  to  render  any  comparison  which  is  made  between  the 
testimony  of  a  witness  taken  in  open  court  and  his  prior  affi- 
davit very  misleading  and  unreliable.1 

Where  the  contradictory  statement  is  a  writing  the  coun- 
sel is  bound,  if  he  intends  to  contradict  the  witness,  to  show 
the  writing  to  the  witness  and  ask  him  if  he  wrote  it,,  or  call 
his  attention  to  the  part  contradictory  of  his  evidence.2  If  he 
admits  that  he  wrote  it,  the  whole  must  then  be  read  to  him 
as  the  best  evidence  of  what  is  contained  in  it.  The  witness 
cannot  be  asked  whether  he  made  certain  statements  in  the 
letter  unless  the  whole  of  it  is  read.3     Sometimes  a  portion  of 

1  Johnston  v.  Todd,  5  Beav.  600,  been  committed  to  writing  and  ad- 
602,  cited  1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  462.  mitted  by  consent,  is  open  to  contra- 

2  Foster  v.  Worthington,  146  Mass.  diction  if  its  truth  is  not  also  admit- 
607 ;  Perishable  Freight  T.  Co.  v.  ted,  to  the  same  extent  as  though  the 
O'Neill,  41  111.  App.  423;  Maxted  v.  witness  had  testified  viva  voce  in 
Fowler,  91  Mich.  106;  People  v.  Cbing,  open  court,  even  though  no  founda- 
74  Cal.  389;  Weymouth  v.  Broad-  tion  can  be  laid.  United  States  v. 
way,  etc.  Co.,  2  Misc.  R.  506;  Gunter  Taylor,  35  Fed.  Rep.  484. 

v.  State,  83  Ala.  96;  State  v.  Crow,  3  Dunbar  v.  McGill,  69  Mich.  297; 
107  Mo.  341 ;  Robinson  v.  State,  124  Richmond  v.  Sundborg,  77  Iowa, 
111.  366.  A  deposition  when  it  is  of-  258;  §  32.  Where  it  is  attempted  to 
fered  at  a  trial  cannot  be  impeached  impeach  a  witness  by  his  inconsist- 
by  an  earlier  deposition  containing  ent  statements  made  on  the  prelim- 
contradictory  statements,  though  on  inary  examination  of  the  prisoner, 
account  of  the  death  of  the  witness  his  testimony,  if  in  writing,  should 
it  is  impossible  to  lay  a  foundation  be  shown  to  him  and  the  inconsist- 
by  calling  his  attention  to  them,  encies  pointed  out.  State  v  Card  en, 
Eppert  v.  Hall  (Ind.,  1893),  31  N.  84  Ala.  217;  Simmons  v.  State  (Ala., 
E.  Rep.  74.  Contra,  Thompson  v.  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  896.  It  may  then 
Gregor,  11  Colo.  531.  On  the  other  be  read  or  as  much  of  it  as  the  wit- 
hand  it  has  been  held  that  the  evi-  ness  denies.  State  v.  Jones,  29  S.  C. 
dence  of  absent  witnesses,  which  has  201. 


§  350.] 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


ill 


a  writing  may  be  shown  to  the  witness  and  the  question  put 
to  him,  Did  you  write  that?  He  cannot,  however,  be  exam- 
ined upon  writing  at  all  if  he  denies  that  he  is  the  author  of 
that  part,  nor  can  the  attorne}'  for  the  adverse  party  ex- 
amine the  paper.1 

Where  a  witness  is  asked  if  he  has  not  made  a  contradictory 
statement  out  of  court  in  regard  to  some  matter  which  is 
wholly  irrelevant  to  the  issue  and  he  replies  that  he  has  not, 
his  answer  is  conclusive,  and  he  cannot  in  the  absence  of  a 
statute  be  contradicted  by  the  party  cross-examining  him.2 
If  a  witness  is  proved  to  have  made  contradictory  statements 
out  of  court,  questions  on  re-examination  to  show  that  he 
has  made  other  statements  consistent  with  his  testimony  are 
not  universally  considered  allowable,3  though  where,  because 
of  relationship  to  the   party  or  to  the  subject-matter  of  the 


1  The  Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  B.  288. 
The  English  rule  is  thus  laid  down 
by  Sir  James  Stephen:  "A  witness 
under  cross-examination  (or  a  wit- 
ness whom  the  judge  has  permitted 
to  be  examined  by  the  party  who 
called  him  as  to  previous  statements 
inconsistent  with  his  present  testi- 
mony) may  be  questioned  as  to  pre- 
vious statements  made  by  him  in 
writing,  or  reduced  into  writing,  rel- 
ative to  the  subject-matter  of  the 
cause,  without  such  writing  being- 
shown  to  him  (or  being  proved  in 
the  first  instance);  but  if  it  is  in- 
tended to  contradict  him  by  the 
writing,  his  attention  must,  before 
such  contradictory  proof  can  be 
given,  be  called  to  those  parts  of  the 
writing  which  are  to  be  used  for  the 
purpose  of  contradicting  him.  The 
judge  may  at  any  time  during 
the  trial  inquire  the  document  to  be 
produced  for  his  inspection,  and  may 
thereupon  make  such  use  of  it  for 
the  purposes  of  the  trial  as  he  thinks 
fit."  Dig.,  art.  132.  Contradictory 
statements  are  not  admissible  to  im- 
peach a  deposition  where  the  atten- 
tion of  the  witness  was  not  called  to 


them  when  his  deposition  was  taken. 
Fitch  v.  Kennard,  19  N.  Y.  S.  468. 

2  Jones  v.  Lumber  Co.  (Ark.,  1893), 

23  S.  W.  Rep.  679 ;  Union  P.  R.  Co. 
v.  Reese,  56  Fed.  Rep.  288;  Carter 
v.  St?te(Neb.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep. 
853;  Hill  v.  State  (Tenn.,  1892),  19 
S.  W.  Rep.  674;  Second  Nat.  Bank 
v.  Wenzel,  151  Pa.  St.  142:  Murphy 
v.  Com.,  18  N.  Y.  S.  353;  28  Abb.  N. 
C.  207;  State  v.  Morris,  109  N.  C. 
820;  Murphy  v.  Com.,  23  Gratt.  (Va.) 
960;  Com.  v.  Buzzell,  16  Pick.  157; 
Com.  v.  Jones,  155  Mass.  170;  29  N. 
E.  Rep.  467;  Phila.  etc.  Co.  v.  Stimp- 
son,  14  Peters,  461 ;  Harris  v.  Wil- 
son, 7  Wend.  57;  Lake  Erie,  etc.  Co. 
v.  Morain,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  869;  36  111. 
App.  862. 

3  Davis  v.  Graham  (Colo.,  1892).  29 
Pac.  Rep.  1007;  Robb  v.  Hackley,  23 
Wend.  50;  Smith  v.  Stickney,  17 
Barb.  (N.  Y)489;  People  v.  Doyell, 
48  Cal.  85;  Fallin  v.  State,  83  Ala.  5; 
State  v.  Flint,  60  Vt.  304;  Smith  v. 
Morgan,  38  Me.  468;  Maitland  v. 
Bank,  40  Md.  540;  Williams  v.  State, 

24  Tex.  App.  637;  Railroad  Co.  v. 
Davis,  1  Gray,  88;  Connor  v.  People 
(Colo.,    1893),     33    Pac.    Rep.    159; 


512  IMPEACHMENT   OF    WITNESSES.  [§  351. 

cause,  it  is  sought  on  cross-examination  to  show  that  the 
witness  is  strongly  biased,  the  party  calling  him  may  show 
that  before  the  relationship  existed  he  made  a  similar  state- 
ment to  what  he  has  testified,  to  on  his  direct  examination.1 
Sometimes  it  is  attempted,  to  impeach  a  witness  as  regards 
particular  matters  testified  to  by  him  by  showing  that  he  was 
silent  or  that  he  concealed  his  knowledge  of  such  facts  on  a 
prior  occasion  when  he  might  naturall}7'  have  been  expected 
to  speak. 

That  a  witness  on  a  second  trial  recollects  a  material  fact 
which  he  did  not  testify  to  on  the  first  trial  is  a  suspicious 
circumstance  in  itself.  The  fact  that  he  withheld  testimony 
of  that  fact,  or  denied  that  he  possessed  any  knowledge  of  it, 
is  never  conclusive  of  the  unreliabilit}7"  of  his  later  testimony; 
for  he  may  be  permitted  to  explain  the  reasons  of  his  pre- 
vious denial,  silence  or  real  or  assumed  forgetfulness  and 
ignorance.  Thus  it  may  be  shown  that  the  occasion  of  his 
previous  silence  wras  a  judicial  proceeding  at  which  he  was 
not  questioned  on  the  matter  at  all,2  or  that  his  prior  state- 
ments were  unintentionally  omitted  from  the  record  of  the 
first  trial;3  that  he  actually  forgot  the  facts,4  or  suppressed 
them  through  fear,5  or  that  his  silence  or  concealment  was  in 
good  faith  and  prompted  by  correct  motives.6 

§  351.  Falsus  in  uno  falsus  in  omnibus. —  The  principle 
illustrated  by  the  above  maxim  permits  the  inference  to  be 
drawn  that  because  a  witness  is  guilt}'  of  deliberate  perjury 

Loomis  v.  New  York  Cent.  &  H.  R.  2  Babcock  v.  People,  13  Colo.  515; 

R.  R.  Co.  (Mass.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  State  v.  Flint,  CO  Vt.  304;  Territory 

82.     Contra,    Bell    v.    State    (Tex.,  v.    Clayton,    8  Mont.    1;    Hyden  v. 

1893),  20   S.  W.    Rep.  302 ;  Hobbs  v.  State,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  764 ;  31  Tex.  Cr. 

State  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  1019 ;  Rep.  401 ;  Bickford  v.  Menier,  9  N.  Y. 

Davenport  v.  McKee,  98  N.  C.  500 ;  S.  775 ;  Cowan   v.    Third  Ave.  Ry. 

State  v.  Rowe,  98  N.  C.  629;  4  S.  E.  Co.,  9  N.  Y.  S.  610. 

Rep.  506;  Malonee  v.   Duff,  72  Md.  3  United   States   v.  Ford,  33  Fed. 

283;  19  Atl.  Rep.  708;  State  v.  Mc-  Rep.  861. 

Kinney,  111  N.  C.  683.  4  State  v.  Turner,    15  S.    E.   Rep. 

1  State   v.  Thoniason,  1  Jones   (N.  602:  36  S.  C.  534. 

C),  274;  Thompson  v.  State,  38  Ind.  5  People   v.    Chapleau,    121   N.  Y. 

89;  Hotchkiss  v.    Gen.    Ins.    Co.,  5  266;  24  N.  E.  Rep.  469. 

Hun  (N.  Y.),  101 ;  State   v.  Flint,  60  6  Bruce  v.    State,   21   S.  W.   Rep. 

Yt.  304;  14  Atl.   Rep.    178;  Hewitt  602. 
v.  Carey,  150  Mass.  445. 


§  351.] 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


513 


in  one  particular  his  testimony  may  be  wholly  discredited  by 
the  jury  in  other  respects.  The  ride  rejecting  the  evidence 
of  witnesses  who  had  been  convicted  of  an  infamous  crime  is 
largely  based  upon  this  principle,  and  the  effect  of  the  rule 
ma}-  be,  according  to  circumstances,  either  to  demolish  the 
case  of  the  party  who  is  shown  to  have  knowingly  and  de- 
liberately perpetrated  or  connived  at  a  falsehood,  or  its  effect 
may  be  restricted  to  the  testimony  of  the  single  witness  guilty 
of  perjury.  It  is  therefore  not  error  for  the  court  to  charge 
that  the  jury  may  disbelieve  all  the  evidence  of  any  witness 
whose  evidence  as  to  o  material  fact  is  impeached,1  though  if 
a  false  statement  is  made  not  wilfully  but  through  misappre- 
hension, inadvertence,  mistake  or  forgetfulness,  the  entire  tes- 
timony of  the  witness  should  not  for  this  reason  be  disre- 
garded.2 But  if  the  jury  believe  that  the  witness  has  wilfully 
and  deliberately  sworn  falsely  on  any  material  point,  they 
have  the  right,  and  it  may  be  their  duty,  to  disregard  his  evi- 
dence altogether,3  except  so  far  as  it  has  been  corroborated 
by  other  credible  evidence  or  by  the  facts  and  circumstances 
which  may  be  inferable  from  such  evidence.4 

JSeligman  v.  Rogers  (Mo.,  1893),  dan  v.  State,  81  Ala.  20;  IS.  Rep. 

21  S.  W.  Rep.  94;  Clapp  v.  Bullard,  577;    Church  v.    Chicago,    etc.    Co. 

23  III.  App.  609.  (Mo.,  1893),  23  S.  W.  Rep.  1036;  Peo- 

2Barney  v.  Dudley,  40  Kan.  247;  pie   v.    O'Neill,   109   N    Y.    25};    16 

Winter  v.  Cent.  Iowa  R.  Co.  (Iowa,  N.   E.   Rep.  68;  Dunn  v.  People,  29 

1889),  45  N.  W.  Rep.  737:  Frazer  v.  N.  Y.  529. 

State,   19  S.  W.  Rep.  838;  56  Ark.  4Lohr  v.  People,  132  111.  504;  Reyn- 

242;  Spencer  v.  Dougherty,   23   111.  olds  v.  Greenbaum,  80  111.  416;  City 

App.    399;    Plyer    v.    German   Am.  of  Sandwich  v.  Dolan,  31  N.  E.  Rep. 

Ins.   Co.,  121   N.   Y.  689;  Murtaugh  416;    42   111.    App.    53;    Hillman    v. 

v.  Murphy.  30  111.  App.  59.  Schwenk,    68    Mich.    293.       In   The 

3  Winter  v.  Railroad  Co.,  80  Iowa,  Santissima  Trinidad,  7  Wheat.  339, 

443; -Seligman  v.  Rogers  (Mo.,  1893),  the  court,  per  Story,  J.,  said:    "If 

21  S.  W.  Rep.  94 ;  Cole  v.  L.  S.  &  the  circumstances  respecting  which 

M.  S.  R.  Co.  (Mich.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  testimony  is  discordant  be  imrnate- 

Rep.   638;    Morgenthau  v.    Walker,  rial,  and  of  such  a  nature  that  mis- 

21  N.  Y.  S.  936;  Judge  v.  Jordan,  81  takes  may  easily  exist,  and  be  ac- 

Iowa,  519;  Speight  v.  State,  80  Ga.  counted  for  in  a  manner  consistent 

512;  Clapp  v.  Bullard,  23  111.  App.  with  the  utmost  good  faith  and  prob- 

009;  People  v.   Petmecky,  99  N.  Y.  ability,  there  is  much  reason  for  in- 

415;  Frazier  v.   State,  56  Ark.  242;  dulging  the  belief  that  the  discrep- 

State   v.    Beaucleigh,    92    Mo.    490;  ancies  arise  from  the  infirmity  of  the 

Moett    v.    People,    85    N.    Y.    373;  human  mind  rather  than  from  de- 

Welke  v.  Welke,  63  Hun,  625 ;   Jor-  liberate  error.    But  where  the  party 
33 


514 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  352. 


Whether  or  not  a  witness  has  been  successfully  impeached 
so  that  his  credibility  has  been  destroyed  is  a  question  over 
which  the  province  of  the  jury  or  other  tribunal  having  power 
to  determine  the  facts  is  exclusive.  They  are  not  bound  by 
any  rule  of  law  to  disregard  his  evidence  whollj',  but  may 
take  it  into  consideration  for  what  it  is  worth,  together  with 
all  the  evidence  in  the  case;  for  though  the  witness  may  have 
been  impeached  on  some  material  points,  his  evidence  on  others 
may  be  credible  in  itself  or  may  be  corroborated  by  other  evi- 
dence which  is  credible.1 

§  352.  Evidence  of  the  general  reputation  of  an  impeached 
witness. —  The  direct  impeachment  of  a  witness  by  any  of  the 
means  which  have  been  above  explained  creates  an  issue  re- 
specting his  general  character  for  truthfulness.  Evidence  to 
support  this,  and  to  show  that  he  is  a  person  in  whose  testi- 
mony the  jury  may  have  confidence,  is  therefore  now  relevant.2 
But  evidence  of  reputation  is  not  relevant  merely  because 
there  is  a  contradiction  between  adverse  witnesses,3  or  because 
the  credibility  of  a  witness  is  shaken  on  his  cross-examination,4 
though  its  admission  in  such  cases  may  not  be  reversible  error.5 

speaks  to  a  fact  in  respect  to  which    Strauss    v.  Abraham,  32  Fed.   Rep. 
he  cannot  be  presumed  liable  to  mis-    210;  Flyer  v.  Ger.  Am.  Ins.  Co.,  121 
take,  as  in  relation  to  the  country  of    N.  Y.  089. 
his  birth,  or  his  being  in  a  vessel  on 
a  particular  voyage,  or  living  in  a 
particular  place,  if  the  fact  turn  out 
otherwise  it  is  extremely  difficult  to 
exempt  him  from  the  charge  of  de- 
liberate  falsehood,    and   the   courts 
under  such  circumstances  are  bound, 
upon    principles    of    law,    morality 
and    justice,    to   apply   the    maxim 
falsus  in  lino  falsus  in  omnibus." 

iWimer  v.  Smith  (Oreg.,  1892), 
30  Pac.  Rep.  416;  Surles  v.  State,  89 
Ga.  167;  Lyles  v.  Com.  (Va.,  1892), 
13  S.  E.  Rep.  802;  Kerr  v.  Hodge,  39 
III.  App.  546;  Cent.  W.  H.  Co.  v. 
Sargent,  40  111.  App.  4-8;  People  v. 
Wallace,  89  Cal.  158;  State  v.  Pat- 
rick (Mo.,  1892),  17  S.  W.  Rep.  666; 
Howell  Lumber  Co.  v.  Campbell 
(Neb.,  1894),  57  N.  W.  Rep.  383; 
James    v.    Mickey,    26    S.    C.    270; 


'-'  Clem  v.  State,  33  Ind.  418;  Surles 
v.  State  (Ga.,  1892),  15  S.  E.  Rep. 
38;  State  v.  Cherry,  63  N.  C.  493; 
Louisville,  N.  A.  etc.  Co.  v.  Frawley, 
110  Ind.  26;  George  v.  Pilcher,  28 
Gratt.  (Va.)  299;  Griffith  v.  State,  26 
Tex.  App.  157;  State  v.  Jones,  29 
S.  C.  201;  7  S.  E.  Rep.  290;  Isler 
v.  Dewey,  71  N.  C.  14;  Hadgo  v. 
Gooden,  13  Ala.  718;  Paine  v.  Til- 
den,  5  Washb.  C.  C.  554;  Kennedy 
v.  Upshur,  66  Tex.  442;  Magee  v. 
People  (111.,  1892),  28  N.  E.  Rep. 
1077. 

3  Saussy  v.  So.  Flor.  R.  Co.,  22  Fla. 
327;  Britt  v.  State,  21  Tex.  App.  215; 
Diffenderfer  v.  Scott  (Ind.,  1893),  32 
N.  E.  Rep.  87. 

4  Stevenson  v.  Gunning,  64  Vt.  601. 

5  Greene  v.  State  (Tex.,  1891),  12 
S.  W.  Rep.  872. 


§  353.]  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  515 

A  distinction  has  sometimes  been  made  by  which  it  has 
been  held  that  general  evidence  of  the  character  of  the  wit- 
ness for  truthfulness  is  not  relevant  if  he  was  impeached 
merely  by  showing  that  he  had  made  contradictory  state- 
ments.1 This  distinction  is  repudiated  by  a  majority  of  the  de- 
cisions which  support  the  proposition  that  general  evidence 
of  the  character  of  the  witness  as  a  truthful  person  is  always 
admissible  whenever  any  attempt,  though  it  may  have  been 
unsuccessful,  has  been  made  to  impeach  it;2  as,  for  example, 
where  another  witness  is  asked  what  is  his  character  for  truth 
and  replies  that  it  is  good.3 

§353.  Privileges  of  witnesses  —  Questions  disclosing  a 
pecuniary  liability. — -The  question  of  the  privilege  of  the 
witness  from  answering  questions  during  his  examination  has 
a  twofold  aspect,  so  that  the  immunity  which  the  witness  en- 
joys may  have  for  its  object  the  protection  either  of  the  wit- 
ness himself  or  the  protection  of  some  other  person  to  whose 
interests  he  may  be  related  in  a  confidential  capacity.  In  the 
former  class  of  cases,  which  we  must  now  consider,  the  privi- 
lege is  personal  to  the  witness  and  consequently  may  be  waived 
by  him.  It  cannot  be  claimed  by  either  party  to  the  action 
if  the  witness  chooses  to  waive  it.  In  the  latter  class,  in  which 
are  included  confidential  communications  made  to  the  witness 
in  his  professional  capacity,  the  privilege  cannot  be  waived 
by  any  one  except  the  person  who  has  made  the  communica- 
tions.4 

In  England  at  the  common  law  a  considerable  diversity  of 
opinion  existed  upon  the  point  whether  a  witness  could  claim 
the  privilege  of  not  answering  a  question  which  would  tend 
merely  to  expose  him  to  a  civil  liability  or  action  or  a  pecun- 
iary loss.5  In  England  and  in  some  of  the  states  the  matter 
was  regulated  by  statute  at  an  early  date,6  while  in  other 
states  a  precisely  similar  rule  has  been  adopted  by  the  courts, 

i  Brown  v.  Mooers,  6  Gray,  451.  Thornsberry  (Tex.,   1892),   17  S.  W. 

Cf.  Harrington  v.  Lincoln,  4  Gray,  Rep.  521. 

563,  565.  3  Com.  v.  Ingraham,  7  Gray,  46. 

2  Com.  v.   Ingraham,   7  Gray,  46;  *  See  §§165-178. 

People  v.  Ah  Fat,  48  Cal.  61 ;  Tipton  3  Lord  Melville's  Case,  29  How.  St. 

v.  State,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  1097 ;  30  Tex.  Trials,  683. 

App.   530;    Galveston,    etc.    Co.   v.  «46  Geo.  III.,  ch.  37;  2  N.  Y.  R.  S. 

405,  §  71. 


516  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  [§  354. 

so  that  it  is  now  the  general  rule  that  no  witness  is  privileged 
from  answering  any  relevant  question  solely  for  the  reason 
that  his  answer  may  tend  to  render  him  liable  to  a  civil  liability 
or  open  the  door  for  the  prosecution  of  a  civil  action  against 
him.1 

§354.  Questions  tending  to  disgrace  the  witness. —  In 
regard  to  those  questions  which  merely  tend  to  disgrace  the 
witness  in  the  eyes  of  those  who  know  him,  an  important  dis- 
tinction is  made  by  the  authorities  founded  on  the  nature  and 
relevancy  of  the  fact  which  is  to  be  elicited.2  Where  the 
question  is  put  on  the  direct  examination,  with  the  sole  object 
of  obtaining  evidence  of  some  fact  directly  relevant,  it  is  not 
only  unjust  but  absurd  to  close  the  mouth  of  the  witness, 
where  the  life,  the  liberty  or  the  most  valuable  rights  of  others 
may  depend  upon  his  answer,  solely  because  that  answer  may 
disgrace  him.  The  answer  which  he  may  give,  while  it  may 
disgrace  him,  will  not  render  him  liable  to  punishment  for  a 
crime  nor  subject  him  to  the  danger  of  a  civil  suit.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  may  be  absolutely  necessary  in  ascertaining  the 
guilt  or  innocence  of  a  prisoner  accused  of  some  heinous 
crime  or  to  determine  pecuniary  interests  of  paramount  im- 
portance.3 So  a  witness  will  be  compelled  to  give  evidence, 
however  much  it  may  humiliate,  disgrace  or  degrade  him,  to 
any  transaction  which  forms  a  part  of  the  matter  which  is  in 
issue.4  But  where  questions  tending  to  disgrace  a  witness  are 
asked  in  cross-examining  a  witness  different  principles  apply. 
To  prevent  the  multiplication  of  issues  it  is  not  allowable,  as 
we  have  explained,  to  interrogate  on  cross-examination  upon 
wholly  irrelevant  matters  merely  for  the  purpose  of  subse- 
quently contradicting  the  witness.     Accordingly,  if  the  dis- 

i  Williams  v.  Butcher,  22  Neb.  68?.;  2 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  454;  Phil.  & 

37   N.   W.  Rep.  586;  Cox  v.    Hill,  3  Am.  on  Ev.,  pp.  917,  918. 

Ohio  St.    411;  Clark   v.    Zeigler,  85  3  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  250- 

Ala.    154;  Jones  v.   Lanier,  2   Dev.  254;  Cundell  v.  Pratt,  1  M.  &  Malk. 

(S.  C.)  L.  480;  Durfee   v.    Knowles,  108.  See  Phil.  &  Am.  on  Ev.,  pp.  917. 

50  Hun,  601;  2  N.  Y.  S.  466;  Taney  918;  2  Phil.  Ev.  422. 

v.    Kemp,   4  H.    &  J.   348;  Moline  4  Ex  parte  Boscowitz,  84  Ala.  463; 

Wagon  Co.  v.  Preston,  35  111.  App.  4  S.  Rep.  279 ;  Johnston  Hard.  Co.  v. 

338;    Ward   v.    Sharp,    15  Vt.    115.  Muller,  72  Mich.  2C5.     See  cases  in 

Contra,  Benjamin  v.   Hathaway,  3  note  3. 
Conn.  528. 


§  354;.]  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSE8.  517 

gracing  question  is  asked  for  that  purpose  it  may  be  excluded 
because  it  is  irrelevant.  But  objections  based  on  irrelevancy 
are  to  be  taken  by  the  parties,  not  by  the  witness,  and  mere 
irrelevancy  alone  will  not,  in  strictness  of  language,  confer  any 
personal  privilege  as  such  upon  a  witness. 

It  is  not  possible  to  lay  down  any  general  rule  as  to  what 
questions  are  relevant  on  a  cross-examination.  While  the  matter 
is  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  it  is  clear  that  this 
discretion  should  be  exercised  in  protecting  a  witness  from 
needless  insult  and  from  impertinent  questions  designed  to 
surprise  him  and  to  cause  him  to  lose  his  temper.1  The  pres- 
ent tendency  is  to  regard  all  facts  as  relevant  which  will 
enable  the  jurors  to  decide  to  what  extent  the  testimony  of 
the  witness  can  be  relied  upon,  and  among  such  facts  are  his 
present  or  previous  moral  character  and  his  previous  conduct 
and  life,  whether  irreproachable  or  the  reverse.  Accordingly 
a  witness  ma}7  be  asked,  with  a  view  to  show  his  character  for 
truthfulness,  as  to  specific  facts  not  too  remote  in  time  which 
may  tend  to  disgrace  him,  and  counsel  will  be  bound  by  his 
answers.2 

In  the  absence  of  a  statute  permitting  the  question,  the 
witness  cannot  be  asked  on  cross-examination  if  he  has  been 
convicted  of  or  imprisoned  for  a  crime.  Here  no  question  of 
privilege  arises.  It  is  for  the  party  or  the  court,  of  its  own 
motion,  to  interpose,  since  the  conviction  or  imprisonment  is 
usually  of  record,  and  a  complete  transcript  of  the  record  is 
the  best  and  only  competent  evidence  of  the  fact  of  convic- 
tion.3   So  while  the  fact  that  a  prosecuting  witness  in  a  trial 

iCom.  v.  Shaw,  4Cush.  593;  Com.  Shore,  etc.  Co.  (Mich.,  1893).  54  N. 

v.  Sacket,   22    Pick.   394;  Smith  v.  W.  Rep.   638;  Ex  parte  Boscowitz. 

Castles,  1  Gray,  108.  84  Ala.  434;  People  v.  Casey,  72  N. 

^  Best,  Ev.,§546;  Clayton  v.  State  Y.  383;  Ryan  v.  People,  79  N.   Y. 

(Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  404;  At-  594;  Carroll  v.  State  (Tex.,  1893),  24 

torney-General  v.  Hitchcock,  1  Ex.  S.  W.  Rep.  100.     Cf.  contra,  State  v. 

102;  Reg.  v.  Burke,  8  Cox,  44;  Peo-  Houx,  109  Mo.  654. 
pie  v.    Hite    (Utah,    1893),  33   Pac.        » Chambless  v.  State  (Tex.,  1894), 

Rep.   254;    Roberts    v.    Com.     (Ky.,  24  S.  W.  Rep.  899;  Rex  v.  Lewis,  4 

1893),   20  S.   W.   Rep.  267;  State  v.  Esp.  225;  Newcomb  v.  Griswold,  24 

Miller,  13  S.    W.   Rep.  832;  100  Mo.  N.  Y.  298;  Spiegel  v.  Hays,  118  id. 

606;  State  v.  Taylor  (Me.,  1893),  22  661;  State  v.  Minor  (Mo.,  1893).  22 

S.  W.  Rep.  806;  Ford  v.  State  (Ga.,  S.  W.    Rep.    1085;   State   v.    Alexis 

1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  667;  Cole  v.  Lake  (La.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  394;  Daggett 


518 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  354. 


for  rape  or  seduction  bad  committed  adultery  with  other 
men  is  not  directly  relevant  upon  the  guilt  or  innocence  of 
the  prisoner,  questions  respecting"  such  intimacy  may  be  asked 
her  if  intended  solely  to  impeach  her  testimon}'  that  she  was 
previously  chaste.1 

Every  man's  family  relations,  his  domicile,  his  business  and 
his  social  connections,  his  avocation  and  his  manner  of  living, 
are,  to  a  certain  extent,  within  his  own  power  of  selection.  If 
then  he  voluntarily  associates  with  persons  who  are  disrepu- 
table, or  engages  in  practices  or  in  occupations  which  are  dis- 
graceful or  vicious,  though  not  perhaps  criminal,  he  may,  so 
far  as  these  facts  bear  upon  his  truthfulness,  be  compelled  to 
answer  all  interrogatories.2     So  a  witness  may  be  asked  on 


v.  Sims,  79  Ga.  253;  State  v.  Farmer, 
84  Me.  436.  Cf.  contra.  State  v. 
Taylor  (Mo.,  1893),  24  S.  W.  Eep. 
449;  People  v.  Crowley  (Cal.,  1893), 
35  Pac.  Rep.  84.  It  is  very  improper 
for  counsel  to  accuse  the  witness  of 
perjury  by  implication  by  asking 
him  if  he  knows  the  penalty  for 
that  crime.  People  v,  O'Brien 
(Mich.,  1893),  56  N.  W.  Rep.  72. 
Sometimes  it  is  provided  by  statute 
that  a  witness  may  be  asked  on  his 
cross-examination  if  he  was  ever 
convicted  of  a  crime.  Spiegel  v. 
Hays,  US  N.  Y.  660:  People  v.  Rod- 
rigo,  69  Cal.  601 ;  State  v.  Adamson, 
43  Minn.  196;  State  v.  McGuire,  15 
R.  I.  23;  State  v.  Miller,  100  Mo. 
106;  Handlin's  Estate  v.  Law,  34  111. 
App.  84;  Helm  v.  State,  67  Miss. 
562;  Com.  v.  Morgan,  107  Mass.  205; 
State  v.  O'Brien  (Iowa,  1891),  46 
N.  W.  Rep.  861 ;  State  v.  Merriman 
(S.  C,  1891),  12  S.  E.  Rep.  619;  State 
v.  Pefferle,  36  Kan.  90.  If  he  denies 
that  he  was  ever  convicted  of  a 
crime,  he  may  be  contradicted  by 
the  record  of  his  conviction.  State 
v.  McGuire,  15  R.  I.  23;  People  v. 
Carolau,  71  Cal.  195 ;  State  v.  Wise, 
33  S.  C.  582  ;  Helwig  v.  Laschcowitz, 
82  Mich.   619;    Sisson    v.   Yost,   58 


Hun,  609;  State  v.  Sauer,  42  Minn. 
258.  See,  also,  cases  supra.  These 
statutes  are  strictly  construed.  Thus, 
a  question,  "'Were  you  ever  con- 
convicted  of  crime?"  is  improper 
under  a  statute  allowing  the  witness 
to  be  interrogated  as  to  his  previous 
"conviction  of  felony."  Hanners  v. 
McClelland,  74  Iowa,  318.  Where  a 
statute  permits  a  "  conviction  of  any 
crime"  to  be  shown,  any  crime, 
whether  a  felony  or  misdemeanor, 
may  be  shown.  Helm  v.  State,  67 
Miss.  562;  State  v.  Sauer,  42  Minn. 
258.  See  cases  cited  under  §§  318, 
319.  To  i-ebut  the  presumption  raised 
by  proof  of  the  conviction  of  the 
witness,  he  may  on  his  redirect 
examination,  testify  to  his  inno- 
cence of  crime.  Walkoff  v.  Tefft, 
12  N.  Y.  S.  464.  And  where  it  ap- 
pears that  he  was  pardoned,  the  rea- 
sons for  granting  the  pardon  aud  the 
celerity  with  which  it  was  granted 
may  also  be  shown.  Sisson  v.  Yost, 
58  Hun,  609;  12  N.  Y.  S.  373. 

i  Taylor,  Ew,  §  1293,  n. ;  People 
v.  Harrison,  93  Mich.  594;  Com.  v. 
Regan,  105  Mass.  593.  Contra,  State 
v.  Patterson,  74  N.  C.  157. 

2  Grimes  v.  Connell,  23  Neb.  187; 
People  v.  Tiley,  84  Cal.  651. 


§  354a.]  IMrEACIIMENT   OF    WITNESSES.  519 

cuoss-exami nation  if  she  keeps  a  house  of  ill-fame;1  if  she  is  a 
prostitute 2  or  an  habitual  user  of  opium;3  whether  he  is  a 
volunteer  witness;4  if  he  has  attempted  to  bribe  another  wit- 
ness/1 or  whether  he  had  not  fled  to  escape  criminal  prosecu- 
tion.6 But  a  witness  who  is  also  a  party  defendant  cannot  be 
asked  on  his  cross-examination  if  he  has  disposed  of  his  prop- 
erty with  the  view  of  escaping  an  adverse  judgment  in  that 
case.7  Nor  can  a  witness  be  asked  if  he  was  impeached  as  a 
witness  in  another  cause.8 

The  asking  of  incriminating  or  disgracing  questions  is  a 
matter  largely  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,9  and  where  no  ma- 
terial injury  is  thereby  done  to  either  party,  the  refusal  of  the 
court  to  order  such  a  question  stricken  out  will  not  be  reversi- 
ble error.  If,  however,  counsel  persists  in  asking  a  material 
witness,  whose  credit  is  otherwise  unimpeached,  insulting  and 
disgracing  irrelevant  questions  not  tending  to  show  that  the 
witness  was  to  be  disbelieved,  and  follows  this  up  by  attempt- 
ing to  contradict  him  by  offering  and  reading  from  inadmissible 
writings,  stating  to  the  jury  that  the  witness  had  contradicted 
himself,  a  conviction  of  murder  will  be  set  aside  because  of 
the  unfair  and  prejudicial  effect  of  such  a  course  of  action  on 
the  minds  of  the  jurors.10 

§  354a.  Questions  tending  to  expose  witness  to  a  criminal 
charge. —  A  witness  cannot  be  compelled  to  answer  any  ques- 
tion where  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  his  answer  will 
tend  to  incriminate  him  or  render  him  subject  to  punishment 
for  crime.11     It  is  immaterial  whether  the  question  has  been 

i  State  v.  Hack  (Mo.,  1893),  23  S.  9  Com.  v.  McDonald,  110  Mass.  545. 

W.  Rep.  1089.  io  People  v.  Carr,  64  Mich.  702;  31 

2  State  v.  Coella,  5  Wash.  99.  N.  W.  Rep.  509.     Cf.  Com.  v.  Shaw, 

3  People  v.  Webster,  G8  Hun,  11,  4  Cush.  593. 

4  Wabash,  etc.  Co.  v.  Ferris  (Inch,  n  Worthington     v.    Scribner,     109 
189:3),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  112.  Mass.  487;  Stevens  v.  State,  32*  Pac. 

5  State  v.  Hack,  supra.     Cf.  Com.  Rep.  350 ;  50  Kan.  712 ;  Friess  v.  N.  Y. 
v.  Mason,  105  Mass.  163.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R.,  22  N.  Y.  S.  104;  67 

«  State  v.  Duncan  (Wash.,  1893),  35  Hun,  205;  Taylor  v.  Mclrvin,  94  III. 

Pac.  Rep.  117;  Copp  v.  Hollins,  9  N.  488;  Minter  v.  People,  139  111.  363; 

Y.  S.  57.  State  v.  Hardware  Co.,  109  Mo.  118; 

7  French   v.   Wilkinson,  93  Mich.  Yard's  Appeal,  148  Pa.  St.  509;  Ex 

322;  53  N.  W.  Rep.  530.  parte  Boscowitz,  84  Ala.  483;  State 

sCockrill   v.  Hall,  76  Cal.  192;  18  v.  Coella,  3  Wash.  St.  99;  Com.  v. 

Pac.  Rep.  318.  Trider,  143  Mass.  180;  Minter  v.  Peo- 


520 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  354a, 


partially  answered  before  he  objects  or  is  wholly  unanswered  ;* 
for  if  the  answer  "forms  but  one  link  in  the  chain  of  testi- 
mony which  would  convict  him,"  he  need  not  answer  at  all.2 
If  the  witness  will  swear  that  he  believes  that  to  answer 
would  incriminate  him,  he  need  not  show  in  detail  how  that 
result  would  be  produced,  for  to  compel  him  to  do  this  would 
be  to  destroy  the  protection  which  he  enjoys.3  If  he  choose 
to  answer  he  may  do  so,  but  the  court  must  inform  him  that 
he  need  not;4  and  it  is  for  the  judge  to  determine  as  a  matter 
of  law  whether  any  possible  answer  that  the  witness  may 
give  will  tend  to  incriminate  him  directly,  or  indirectly  by  fur- 
nishing a  missing  link  in  the  chain  of   proof.5     If  from  all 

pie,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  45;  39  111.  App. 
438;  Temple  v.  Com.,  75  Va.  892; 
Southard  v.  Rexford,  6  Cowen,  254. 
In  an  early  case  it  was  held  that  an 
incriminating  reply  wrongfully  ex- 
torted from  the  witness  could  not 
subsequently  be  used  against  him. 
Reg.  v.  Garbott,  1  Denio,  C.  C.  236 ; 
Emery  Cases,  107  Mass.  180.  A  de- 
fendant in  chancery  will  not  be  com- 
pelled to  answer  interrogatories  con- 
tained in  a  bill  of  discovery  which 
will  tend  to  incriminate  him  or  sub- 
ject him  to  punishment.  Mclntire 
v.  Mancius,  16  Johns.  592;  Wigram 
on  Discovery,  pp.  61,  150,  195;  Story's 
Eq.  Pleading,  §§  524,  576,  577,  592- 
598.  So  also,  both  in  equity  and  at 
law,  a  witness  will  not  be  compelled 
to  answer  questions  where  his  an- 
swer may  subject  him  to  a  forfeit- 
ure of  his  estate.  1  Greenl.  Ev., 
^453;  Story's  Eq.  Plead.,  §§607,  846; 
Respublica  v.  Crihbs,  3  Yeates,  429. 

1  The  matter  is  largely  in  the  dis- 
cretion of  the  court.  Mayo  v.  Mayo, 
119  Mass.  290;  1  Whart.  Ev.,  §§  553- 
540.  Only  the  incriminating  portion 
of  the  testimony  should  be  stricken 
out  where  the  witness  has  answered. 
State  v.  Tall,  43  Minn.  273. 

2 1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  451.  In  1  Burr's 
Trial,  241,  the  court  by  Marshall, 
C.  J.,  said:   "Many  links  frequently 


compose  that  chain  of  testimony 
necessary  to  convict  an  individual  of 
a  crime.  It  appears  to  be  the  true 
sense  of  the  rule  that  no  witness  is 
compellable  to  furnish  any  one  of 
them  against  himself.  It  is  certainly 
not  only  a  possible  but  a  probable 
case,  that  a  witness  by  disclosing  a 
single  fact  may  complete  the  testi- 
mony against  himself  and  to  every 
effectual  purpose  accuse  himself  en- 
tirely, as  he  would  by  stating  every 
circumstance  which  would  be  re- 
quired for  his  conviction." 

3  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend.  229, 
252,  253, 254  ;  In  re  Bellinger,  8  Wend. 
595;  Friess  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  &  H.  R.  R. 
Co.,  67  Hun,  205.  The  actual  inno- 
cence of  the  witness  is  immaterial  if 
his  answer  would  tend  to  convict 
him  of  a  crime.  Adams  v.  Lloyd,  4 
Jur.  (N.  S.)  590.  If,  having  been  in- 
structed as  to  his  rights,  the  witness 
answers  an  incriminating  question, 
he  may  be  compelled  to  go  into 
every  detail  of  the  inculpatory  cir- 
cumstances. Foster  v.  Pierce,  11 
Cush.  437,  439;  Com.  v.  Pratt,  126 
Mass.  462 ;  State  v.  Van  Winkle,  80 
Iowa,  15;  Williams  v.  State  (Ala., 
1893),  13  S.  Rep.  333. 

*  Close  v.  Olney,  1  Denio,  319. 

■"'See  People  v.  Mather,  4  Wend. 
252-254 »  State  v.  Thaden,  43  Minn. 


§  354a.] 


IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


521 


the  circumstances  and  from  the  character  of  the  answer  which 
is  required  it  seems  clear  that  there  is  no  reasonable  ground 
for  the  supposition  that  the  answer  will  tend  to  incriminate 
him,  the  witness  should  be  compelled  to  answer,  though  he 
shall  swear  that  he  believes  his  answer  will  incriminate  him.1 
If  the  danger  to  the  witness  is  apparent  he  may  be  allowed  to 
use  a  large  discretion  in  refusing  to  answer.2 

A  defendant  in  a  criminal  trial  who  testifies  voluntarily  in 
his  own  behalf  cannot  refuse  to  answer  incriminating  ques- 
tions on  his  cross-examination,  for  by  denying  his  guilt  on  the 
stand  he  will  (except  in  those  states  where  the  cross-examina- 
tion is  limited  by  statute  to  the  matters  gone  into  on  the  direct 
examination)3  by  implication  be  deemed  to  have  waived  his 
privilege  as  a  witness  so  far  as  questions  relevant  to  his  guilt 
or  to  his  credibility  are  concerned.4 

The  privilege  of  refusing  to  answer  incriminating  questions 
is  personal  to  the  witness.  Neither  party  can  object  to  the 
witness   answering   them   if   he   desires   to  do  so.5    The  jury 


253;  State  v.  Tall,  43  id.  273;  Com.  v. 
Bell,  145  Pa.  St.  374.  A  person  who 
waives  his  privilege  and  testifies  be- 
fore the  grand  jury  cannot,  when  he 
is  indicted  with  others  for  the  crime, 
refuse  to  testify  on  the  trial  of  a  co- 
defendant  because  his  answer  may 
criminate  him.  State  v.  Van  Winkle, 
45  N.  W.  Rep.  388. 

» Forbes  v.  Willard,  37  How.  Pr. 
193;  Lathropv.  Roberts,  16  Colo.  250. 

2  Williams  v.  Dickinson,  28  Fla. 
90;  Chamberlain  v.  Wilson,  12  Vt. 
491 ;  Minter  v.  People,  29  N.  E.  Rep. 
45 ;  39  111.  App.  438. 

3  State  v.  Chamberlain.  89  Mo.  129. 
OfcClain  v.  People,  1  Atl.  Rep.  45; 

110  Pa.  St.  263;  Sullivan  v.  People, 
114  111.  24;  State  v.  Sanders,  106  Mo. 
188;  State  v.  Uhrig,  106  Mo.  267; 
Com.  v.  Mullern,  97  Mass.  545;  Rains 
v.  State,  88  Ala.  91  ;  Andrews  v. 
Frye,  104  Mass.  234 ;  State  v.  Ober, 
52  N.  H.  459 ;  Connors  v.  People,  50 
N.  Y.  240;  State  v.  Allen,  107  N.  C. 
105;  Spies  v.    People,    122  111.    205; 


State  v.  Withan,  73  Me.  531 ;  People 
v.  Tice,  131  N.  Y.  651;  Com.  v. 
Damon,  136  Mass.  441 ;  People  v. 
Oyer  &  Terminer,  83  N.  Y.  436 ,  Com. 
v.  Morgan,  107  Mass.  199;  Com.  v 
Nichols,  114  id.  285;  State  v.  Went- 
worth,  65  Me.  234;  Stover  v.  People, 
56  N.  Y.  315;  Roddy  u.  Finnegan, 
43  Md.  490. 

5  Williams  v.  Dickinson,  28  Fla.  90: 
State  v.  Went  worth,  65  Me.  234; 
Thomas  v.  Newton,  1  M.  &  M.  48; 
Taylor  v.  State  (Ga.,  1890),  10  S.  E. 
Rep.  412;  People  v.  Teague,  82  Mich. 
22;  Com.  v.  Gould  (Mass.,  1893),  33 
N.  E.  Rep.  656:  Brown  v.  State  (Tex  , 
1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  924;  Cliffton  v. 
Granger  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
316;  People  v.  Teague,  11  S.  E.  Rep. 
665 ;  106  N.  C.  576 ;  Com  v.  Shaw,  4 
Cush.  (Mass.)  594;  Lathrop  v.  Rob- 
erts, 16  Colo.  250.  Where  the  ac- 
cused has  voluntarily  testified  to  his 
age,  he  may  properly  be  required  to 
stand  up  so  that  the  jury  may  ob- 
serve his  personal  appearance.   Will- 


;99 


IMPKACIIMENT    OF    WITNESSES. 


[§  354J. 


should  be  advised  that  no  inference  that  the  witness  is  a  crim- 
inal should  be  drawn  from  his  refusal  to  answer,1  and  in  any 
case  if,  after  he  has  claimed  his  privilege,  he  is  forced  to  answer, 
the  information  given  cannot  afterwards  be  used  against  him,2 
or  by  either  party  in  the  pending  action.3  Where  the  witness, 
because  he  has  been  acquitted,4  or  by  lapse  of  time,  is  no  longer 
liable  to  a  prosecution,  he  is  not  privileged,  and  may  be 
compelled  to  answer.5 

§  354b.  Bias  and  prejudice  of  the  witness. —  These  words, 
though  commonly  employed  together,  are  not  synonymous. 
Prejudice,  in  strictness  of  language,  means  a  prejudgment, 
any  judgment  or  opinion  formed  beforehand,  and  does  not, 
in  its  legal  acceptation,  necessarily  imply  any  ill-will  or  en- 
mity towards  a  person.6  But  a  person  whose  mind  is  biased, 
whether  he  be  a  witness  or  a  juror,  is  one  who  entertains 
such  a  degree  of  personal  dislike  towards  one  party,  or  such 
an  inclination,  affection  or  prepossession  towards  the  other, 
that  he  is  utterty  incapable  of  acting  or  speaking  indiffer- 
ently and  impartially  as  to  a  transaction  in  which  either  is 
concerned.7     A  man  who  is  prejudiced,  who  has  made  up  his 


iaras  v.  State  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep. 
333. 

i  State  v.  Bartlett,  55  Me.  200; 
Devries  v.  Phillips,  G3  N.  C.  53.  It 
is  submitted  that  any  rule,  whether 
statutory  or  formulated  by  judicial 
legislation,  which  forbids  a  juror 
from  drawing  the  perfectly  logical 
and  fair  conclusion  that  a  witness  is 
a  criminal  because  he  claims  the 
privilege  of  refusing  to  answer  in- 
criminating questions,  would  be  nu- 
gatory. 

2  So  by  statute.  See  Ex  parte  Bus- 
kett,  106  Mo.  602;  17  S.  W.  Rep.  753; 
United  States  v.  Smith,  47  Fed.  Rep. 
501. 

3  Reg  v.  Kinglake,  22  L.  T.  (N.  S.) 
335.  A  witness  who  is  under  indict- 
ment for  a  crime  which  is  the  sub- 
ject of  a  legislative  investigation 
cannot  for  that  reason  refuse  to  at- 
tend or  to  be  sworn  as  a  witness. 
He  must  wait  until  he  is  questioned 


before  he  can  claim  to  be  privileged 
from  answering  the  incriminating 
questions.  In  re  Eckstein,  24  Atl. 
Rep.  G3;  3  W.  N.  C.  59;  10  Pa.  Co. 
Ct.  R.  41. 

4  Lathrop  v.  Roberts,  16  Colo.  250. 

5  Ex  parte  Boscowitz,  84  Ala.  434; 
People  v.  Kelly,  24  N.  Y.  74;  So. 
Rail.  N.  Co.  v.  Russell  (Ga.,  1893),  18 
S.  E.  Rep.  40.  Contra,  McFadden  v. 
Reynolds  (Pa.,  1888),  11  Atl.  Rep. 
638.  He  may  also  be  compelled  to 
answer  incriminating  questions 
where  it  is  expressly  provided  by 
statute  that  such  testimony  shall  in 
no  case  be  used  against  him.  Ex 
parte  Buskett,  17  S.  W.  Rep.  753; 
108  Mo.  602. 

6  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  "Preju- 
dice;" Willis  v.  State,  12  Ga.  448; 
Com.  v.  Webster,  5  Cush.  297. 

7  In  Evernian  v.  Hyman  (Ind., 
1892),  28  N.  E.  Rep.  1022,  bias  is  de- 
fined as  "  A   leaning  of  the  mind, 


§  354&.]  IMPEACHMENT    OF    WITNESSES.  523 

mind  and  formed  an  opinion  as  to  the  justice  of  the  cause,  is 
necessarily  biased  towards  that  party  whose  case  he  believes 
is  just.  But  a  witness  may  be  biased  b}7  his  interest  or  by 
the  ties  of  friendship  or  affection  without  being  prejudiced, 
i.  e.,  without  having  any  definite  opinion  as  to  the  merits  of 
the  case. 

The  bias  of  a  witness  so  far  as  it  affects  the  credibility  of 
his  testimony  is  not  collateral  and  may  always  be  shown 
either  by  his  own  statements  on  his  examination  or  by  the 
independent  evidence  of  others.  Thus,  as  has  been  already 
pointed  out,  a  party  may  show  that  his  own  witness  has  un- 
expectedly proved  hostile  to  him  and  may  emphasize  such 
hostility  or  bias  by  showing  by  another  witness  that  the 
biased  witness  was  formerly  favorably  inclined  towards  him.1 
The  bias  of  the  witness  may  also  be  shown  on  his  cross-exam- 
ination by  interrogating  him  as  to  his  sympathy  or  hostility 
towards  either  of  the  parties  or  as  to  his  interest  in  the  sub- 
ject-matter.2 Though  the  possession  of  an  actual  pecuniary 
interest  is  generally  no  longer  an  objection  to  the  competency 
of  a  witness,  it  may  still  be  shown  as  a  fact  from  which  the 
jury  may  infer  that  the  witness  was  biased.  And  the  same 
principle  is  recognized  in  the  case  of  an  existing  relationship 
between  the  witness  and  a  party  to  the  action.  So  the  jury 
may  with  propriety  employ  great  caution  in  weighing  the 
testimony  of  witnesses  who  are  near  relatives  of  the  accused 
in  a  criminal  trial  when  they  testify  in  his  behalf,3  unless  the 
inference  of  bias  is  rebutted  by  the  party  who  calls  the  wit- 
propensity  towards  the  object,  not  Cal.  173:  Bates  v.  Holladay,  31  Mo. 
leaving  the  mind  indifferent;  incli-  App.  162  (bribery  of  witness).  If 
nation,  prepossession,  bent."  on  being  questioned  witness  denies 

1  See  ante,  §  348.  that  he  is  biased,  the  fact  may  then 

2  See  ante,  §  340.  In  proving  bias  be  shown  by  other  witnesses.  State 
for  the  purpose  not  of  direct  contra-  v.  McFarlain,  41  La.  Ann.  68(5; 
diction  but  of  discrediting  the  wit-  Hamilton  v.  Man.  Ry.  Co.,  9  N.  Y. 
ness,  it  is  the  general  rule  that  a  S.  313;  Bennett  v.  State,  28  Tex. 
foundation  must  be  laid  and  the  at-    App.  329. 

tention  of  the  witness  called  to  the        3  United   States  v.   Ford,  33  Fed. 

time  and  place  of  the  declarations  Rep.  861 ;  State  v.  Byers,  100  N.  C. 

showing  bias.     Queen's  Case,  2  B.  &  512;  6  S.  C.  R.  420;  Simpson  v.  State, 

B.  284,  811;  Edwards  v.  Sullivan,   8  78  Ga.  91;  Staser  v.  Hogan,  120  Ind. 

Ired.  (N.  C.)  302 ;  Crumpton  v.  State,  207. 
52  Ark.   273;  Baker   v.   Joseph,   16 


524  IMPEACHMENT   OF    WITNESSES.  [§  354£. 

ness  proving  that  the  witness  and  he  have  been  on  bad  terms.1 
The  bias  of  the  witness  may  have  arisen  because  of  promises 
or  threats  made  or  bribes  offered  by  one  of  the  litigants. 
Though  the  witness  was  thus  tampered  with  his  testimony  is 
still  admissible,  and  while  evidence  of  the  attempt  to  bribe  is 
admissible  it  is  for  the  jury  to  determine  if  either  party 
was  implicated  and  what  effect,  if  any,  the  threats  or  bribery 
may  have  had  upon  the  credibility  of  the  testimony  of  the 
witness.2 

1  Clapp  v.  Wilson,  5  Denio  (N.  Y.),        2  Hitchcock  v.  Moore,  70  Mich.  112 ; 
285.  87  N.  W.  Rep.  914. 


CHAPTER  XXV. 


AFFIDAVITS  AND  DEPOSITIONS. 


§  355.  Affidavits  and  depositions  de- 
fined and  distinguished. 

356.  Parties  to  affidavits. 

357.  Formal  requisites  of  affida- 

vits. 

358.  Language  of  the  affidavit. 

359.  Definition  and  character  of 

depositions. 


§  360.  Mode    of    procuring    deposi- 
tions. 

361.  Statutes  construed  —The  cer- 

tificate. 

362.  Objections  to  depositions. 

363.  Use  of  depositions  as  evidence. 

364.  Equitable  bills  to  perpetuate 

testimony. 


§  355.  Affidavits  and  depositions  defined  and  distin- 
guished.—  Written  evidence  which  is  verified  by  an  oath  is 
sometimes  loosely  classified  under  the  general  term  "deposi- 
tion." .  In  view  of  the  different  uses  to  which  affidavits  and 
depositions  may  be  put,  it  is  important  to  distinguish  clearly 
between  them.  A  deposition  usually  consists  of  answers  to 
questions  oral  or  written,  and  the  opposite  party  is  entitled  to 
notice  and  must  be  given  an  opportunity  to  cross-examine  the 
deponent.1  An  affidavit,  on  the  other  hand,  is  commonly  vol- 
untary,2 ex  parte,  and  may  be  and  usually  is  taken  without  no- 
tice to  the  adverse  party.3  So  the  uses  to  which  an  affidavit 
may  be  put  are  very  different  from  a  deposition.  Thus,  an 
affidavit  is  of  utility  in  matters  which  are  collateral  or  initia- 
tory to  the  subject  of  the  trial,  but  which  prepare  for  it  or 
facilitate  its  progress;  as,  for  example,  where  some  extraor- 
dinary remedy,  as  an  attachment4  or  an  injunction,  is  sought, 
or  where  a  commission  is  required  for  the  purpose  of  procur- 
ing the  testimony  of  an  absent  witness,5  or  where  it  is  desired 


1  See  post,  §  359  et  seq. 

2  Dudley  v.  McCord,  65  Iowa,  671. 

3  "  An  affidavit  is  simply  a  declara- 
tion, on  oath,  in  writing,  sworn  to 
by  the  declarant  before  a  person 
who  has  authority  to  administer 
oaths."  Harris  v.  Lester,  80  111.  311 ; 
Woods  v.  State  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E. 


Rep.  903;  State  v.  Hennings  (S.  D., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  537 ;  Stimpson 
v.  Brooks,  3  Blatch.  436;  Atchison 
v.  Bartholow,  4  Kan.  124;  State  v. 
Dayton,  25  N.  J.  L.  54. 

*  Wirt  v.  Dinan,  44  N.  Y.  App.  583. 

5  "  Questions  which  do  not  involve 
the  matter  in  controversy,  but  mat- 


520 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS. 


[§  356. 


to  open  a  default  to  obtain  a  continuance1  or  a  new  trial,2  or 
on  a  motion  for  judgment  on  a  nonsuit.3  They  are  no  part  of 
the  record  unless  the}'  are  made  so,  and  serve  mainly  to  verify 
facts  which  are  not  themselves  matter  of  record.  Except  so 
far  as  they  may  constitute  admissions  of  the  affiant,  affida- 
vits are  not  evidence  of  the  material  facts  in  issue.4 

§  356.  Parties  to  affidavits. —  An  affidavit  should  be  made 
by  a  party  to  the  action,  and  it  is  immaterial  whether  he  is  a 
party  to  the  record  if  he  is  a  party  in  interest;5  though,  if  it 
be  shown  that  the  party  is  disabled  by  illness,  or  that  he  is 
out  of  the  jurisdiction,  an  affidavit  by  his  counsel  may  be  ad- 
missible.6 But  the  reason  that  the  affidavit  is  not  made  by 
the  party,7  and  the  authority  of  the  attorney  to  act  for  him, 
must  appear  on  the  face  of  the  affidavit.8    In  the  absence  of 


ter  which  is  auxiliary  to  the  trial, 
which  facilitates  the  preparation  for 
it,  often  depend  on  the  oath  of  the 
party.  An  affidavit  to  the  material- 
ity of  a  witness,  for  the  purpose  of 
■obtaining  a  continuance  or  a  com- 
mission to  take  his  deposition,  or  an 
affidavit  of  his  inability  to  attend,  is 
usually  made  by  the  party  and  re- 
ceived without  objection.  So  affi- 
davits in  support  of  a  new  trial  are 
often  received."  Taylor  v.  Biggs,  1 
Pet.  (U.  S.)  591. 

1  Freeport  v.  Penrod,  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
74 ;  35  Neb.  273 ;  Dawson  v.  Coston 
(Colo.,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  189;  Keith 
v.  Knoche,  43  111.  App.  161. 

2  Atkinson  v.  Saltinan  (Ind.,  1893), 
29  N.  E.  Rep.  435. 

3  Ames  v.  Merriam,  9  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
498.  Supplemental  affidavits  are 
those  which  contain  averments  upon 
the  same  subject  as  another  prior 
affidavit  and  which  are  designed  to 
remedy  some  defect  in  it.  Callan  v. 
Lukens,  89  Pa.  St.  136;  Fritz  v. 
Hathaway,  19  Atl.  Rep.  1011 ;  26  W. 
N.  C.  273. 

4  Lewis  v.  Bacon,  3  Hen.  &  M. 
(Va.)  89;  Armstrong  v.  Boylan.  4  N. 
J.  L.  84;  Patterson  v.  Insurance  Co., 


3  Har.  &  J.  (Md.)  71 ;  Nat.  S.  S.  Co- 
v.  Tugman,  143  U.  S.  28;  Asbach  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N. 
W.  Rep.  90 ;  Ohio,  etc.  Co.  v.  Levy 
(Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  815. 

4  Feeley  v.  Steinmetz,  22  Pa.  St. 
437;  Hunter  v.  Riley,  36  Pa.  St.  509; 
Miller  v.  Hooker,  2  How.  Pr.  (N.  Y.) 
124. 

6  Spencer  v.  Bell,  109  N.  C.  39; 
Gazam  v.  Royce,  78  Ga.  512.  Con- 
viction of  an  infamous  crime  ren- 
ders a  person  incompetent  to  make 
an  affidavit  at  common  law.  Peo- 
ple v.  Robinson,  26  How.  Pr.  90; 
Webster  v.  Mann,  56  Tex.  119.  See 
ante,  §31 9.  Where  an  affidavit  is 
made  by  a  person  who  is  incarcer- 
ated in  an  insane  asylum,  the  jurat 
must  show  the  place  where  it  was 
made  and  all  the  surrounding  cir- 
cumstances in  order  that  the  mental 
condition  of  the  affiant  may  be  in- 
quired into.  Spittle  v.  Walton,  L  R. 
11  Eq.  420. 

7  Pack  v.  Geofroy,  19  N.  Y.  S.  583; 
Blake  Crusher  Co.  v.  Ward,  1  Am. 
L.  T.  R.  423;  Jackson  v.  Wood- 
worth,  3  Paige  (N.  Y.),  136;  City  v. 
Devine,  1  W.  N.  C.  (Pa.)  358. 

8  Adams  v.  Kellogg,  63  Mich.  105; 


§  357.] 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS. 


527 


statute  an  affidavit  may  bo  sworn  to  before  any  official  au- 
thorized to  administer  oaths.1  When,  however,  a  statute 
authorizes  certain  officials  to  administer  oaths,  an  affidavit 
not  sworn  to  before  that  official  is  invalid  and  may  be  disre- 
garded.2 

As  a  general  rule  affidavits  which  are  sworn  to  before  the 
attorney  of  the  party  are  not  competent  though  the  attorney 
may  be  otherwise  authorized  as  a  notary  to  take  affidavits.3 
But  this  rule  is  not  without  exceptions;4  and  generally  an 
affidavit  may  be  taken  by  the  partner  of  the  attorney  if  the 
latter  is  not  also  the  attorney  of  the  party.5 

§  357.  Formal  requisites  of  affidavits. —  The  affidavits 
should  be  accurately  entitled,6  though  as  a  general  rule,  when 
the  affidavit  can  be  otherwise  identified,  a  mistake  in  this  re- 
spect or  the  absence  of  a  caption  or  a  title  will  be  disregarded.7 
If  the  venue  is  stated  in  the  affidavit 8  it  is  immaterial  that  it 
does  not  appear  appended  to  the  signature  of  the  notary;9  for 


Weatherwax  v.  Paine,  2  Mich.  555; 
Rutledge  v.  Stribling,  26  111.  App. 
453;  Willis  v.  Lyman,  22  Tex.  268; 
Wallace  v.  Byrne,  17  La.  Ann.  8. 
Contra,  Simpson  v.  McCarthy,  78 
Cal.  175.  The  affidavit  of  a  corpo- 
ration should  be  made  by  its  chief 
official  having  a  competent  knowl- 
edge of  the  facts.  Ex  parte  Ser- 
geant, 17  Vt.  425. 

1  Cassidy  v.  Meyeiv.,  64  Miss.  510 ; 
Young  v.  Rollins,  78  N.  C.  485. 

2  Haight  v.  Proprietors,  4  Wash. 
C.  C.  601,  606;  Irving  v.  Edrington, 
41  La.  Ann.  671;  United  States  v. 
Bailey,  9  Pet.  (U.  S.)  238;  Stanton  v. 
Ellis,  16  Barb.  (N.  Y.)  319;  Benedict 
v.  Hall,  76  N.  C.  113;  Love  v.  Mc- 
Alister,  42  Ark.  183;  Roberts  v.  Rail- 
road Co.,  1  Brew.  (Pa.)  538. 

sPullen  v.  Pullen  (N.  J.,  1839),  17 
Atl.  Rep.  310;  Taylor  v.  Hatch,  12 
Johns.  340 ;  Toorle  v.  Smith,  34  Kan. 
27;  Swearingen  v.  Hawser,  37  Kan. 
126;  Vary  v.  Godfrey,  6  Cow.  5S7; 
Willard  v.  Judd,  15  Johns.  531; 
Hammond  v.   Freeman,  9  Ark.  62. 


Cf.  Linck  v.  Litchfield  (111.,  1893),  31 
N.  E  Rep.  123. 

4Reavis  v.  Cowell,  56  Cal.  588; 
Young  v.  Young,  18  Minn.  90 ;  Ry- 
burn  v.  Moore,  72  Tex.  85 ;  Daws  v. 
Glasgow,  1  Pin.  (Wis.)  171. 

5  Northumberland  v.  Todd,  L.  R. 
7  Ch.  Div.  777. 

6  Baxter  v.  Seaman,  1  How.  (N.  Y.) 
51 :  Humphrey  v.  Caude,  2  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  o09. 

7  Harris  v.  Lester,  80  III.  207; 
Beebe  v.  Morrell,  76  Mich.  114; 
Maury  v.  Van  Arnum,  1  Hill  (N.  Y.), 
370;  Hawley  v.  Donnelly,  8  Paige 
(N.  Y.),  415 ;  Minzenheimer  v.  Heinze, 
74  Tex.  254. 

8  Thompson  v.  Burhans,  61  N.  Y. 
52;  Cook  v.  Staats,  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
407. 

9  Smith  v.  Runnells,  94  Mich.  617; 
State  v.  Can.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  17  Nev. 
239.  But  the  venue  must  appeal 
somewhere  on  the  face  of  the  affida- 
vit. People  v.  Canvassers,  20  N.  Y. 
S.  329. 


528 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS. 


[§  35T. 


though  without  a  venue  stated  the  affidavit  is  void  as  such,1 
yet  in  a  prosecution  for  perjury,  committed  in  swearing  to 
the  affidavit,  the  absence  of  the  venue  is  immaterial,  aa  time 
and  place  may  be  shown  orally.2  A  signature  is  indispensable 
to  the  validity  of  the  affidavit  only  when  it  is  required  by 
statute  or  by  a  rule  of  court;3  but  an  unsigned  affidavit  will 
sustain  a  prosecution  for  perjury,  the  gist  of  the  crime  being 
the  false  swearing.4  The  jurat  must  state  that  it  was  sworn 
to  or  affirmed  before  the  proper  official,5  and  it  must  gener- 
ally be  subscribed  by  him,6  and  should  be  authenticated  by 
his  official  seal,7  unless  it  is  to  be  used  in  the  county  in  which 
he  resides.8 

But  generally  the  courts  are  disposed  to  exercise  a  wise  dis- 
cretion in  allowing  amendments  of  technical  defects,9  and 
sometimes  of  those  which  are  material  as  well.10 


iCook  v.  Staats,  18  Barb.  (N.  Y.) 
407;  Lane  v.  Morse,  6  How.  (N.  Y.) 
394. 

2Reavis  v.  Cowell,  56  Cal.  558; 
Young  v.  Young,  18  Minn.  90;  Par- 
ker v.  Baker,  8  Paige  (N.  Y.),  428. 

3Haff  v.  Spicer,  3  Paige  (N.  Y), 
190;  Norton  v.  Hauge,  47  Minn.  405; 
Shelton  v.  Berry,  19  Tex.  154;  Al- 
ford  v.  McCormac,  90  N.  C.  151; 
Gill  v.  Ward,  23  Ark.  16;  Bates  v. 
Robinson,  8  Iowa,  318;  Hargadine 
v.  Van  Horn,  73  Mo.  370;  Nave  v. 
Ritter,  41  Ind.  301. 

4  See  cases  in  last  note. 

s  State  v.  Green,  15  N.  J.  L.  88; 
Palmer  v.  McCarthy  (Colo.,  1893),  31 
Pac.  Rep.  241 ;  Ladow  v.  Groom,  1 
Denio  (N.  Y.),  420 ;  Morris  v.  State, 
2  Tex.  App.  502. 

6Cantwell  v.  State,  27  Ind.  505; 
McDermaid  v.  Russell,  41  111.  490; 
State  v.  Richardson,  34  Minn.  118; 
Davis  v.Rich,  2  How.  (N.  Y.)86; 
State  v.  Green,  15  N  J.  Law,  88. 
That  the  official  omits  to  state  his 
official  title  is  immaterial.  People 
v.  Van  Rensselaer,  6  Wend.  (N.  Y.) 
543;  Hunter  v.  Leconte,  6  Cow.  (N. 
Y.)  728. 


7  Chase  v.  Street,  10  Iowa,  593. 

8  Stout  v.  Slattery,  12  III.  162; 
Clemens  v.  Bullen  (Mass.,  1893),  34 
N.  E.  Rep.  173;  Mountjoy  v.  State, 

78  Ind.  172.  Cf.  Coward  v.  Dillin- 
ger,  56  Md.  59.  "If  an  oath  was 
administered  by  a  proper  officer  the 
law  was  satisfied,  and  the  mere 
omission  of  a  clerk  to  put  his  name 
to  an  act  which  was  done  through 
him  as  an  instrument  should  not 
prejudice  an  innocent  party."  The 
court,  in  Kruse  v.  Wilson,  79  III. 
233. 

9  Rosenberg  v.  Claflin  (Ala.,  1893), 
10  S.  Rep.  521 ;  Stacy  v.  Farnham,  2 
How.  (N.  Y.)  26;  Watts  v.  Womack, 
44  Ala.  605. 

1«  Cutler  v.  Rathbone,  1  Hill,  205 
(affidavit  of  hearsay);  Hardin  v. 
Lee,  51   Mo.   241 ;  Kruse  v.  Wilson, 

79  111.  233;  Jones  v.  Slate  Co.,  16 
How.  (N.  Y.)  129;  Salmon  v.  Mills, 
4  U.  S.  App.  101 ;  1  C.  C.  A.  278. 
Cf.  Freer  v.  White  (Mich.,  1893),  51 
N.  W.  Rep.  807;  Brookmire  v.  Rosa 
(Neb.,  1890),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  840; 
Sheldon  v.  Kivett,  110  N.  C.  408. 
That  an  affidavit  may  be  filed  or  a 
jurat  added  nunc  pro  tunc,  see  Will- 


358.] 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS. 


529 


§  358.  Language  of  the  affidavit. —  The  terms  in  which 
the  affidavit  is  expressed  must  be  certain,  positive  and  unam- 
biguous.1 The  affiant  must  swear  to  a  definite  thing,  though 
an  affidavit  will  not  be  construed  in  a  technical  spirit  if  in  the 
main  it  substantiates  the  party's  case.2  Still  it  may  be  said 
that  where  an  affidavit  is  required  to  be  made  by  statute  the 
requirements  of  the  statute  must  be  complied  with,  and  in  such 
a  case  a  strict  adherence  to  the  language  of  the  statute  is  the 
only  safe  course  for  the  party  to  pursue  in  order  to  render  the 
affidavit  valid.3  Scandalous  matter  may  vitiate  an  affidavit,4 
but  the  fact  that  an  affidavit  is  a  translation,5  or  that  it  was 
sworn  to  in  a  foreign  language  which  was  not  understood  by 
the  affiant,  will  not  render-  it  invalid,  provided  it  was  properly 
translated  to  him.6  Where  a  statute  permits  the  affiant  to 
amend  his  affidavit  he  may  amend  at  any  time.  He  need  not 
wait  until  it  is  pronounced  defective.7 


iams  v.  Stevenson,  103  Ind.  243. 
"  Oral  evidence  given  on  affidavit 
must  be  confined  to  such  facts  as 
the  witness  is  able  of  his  own  knowl- 
edge to  prove  except  on  interlocu- 
tory motions,  on  which  statements 
as  to  his  belief  and  the  grounds 
thereof  may  be  admitted.  The  costs 
of  every  affidavit  unnecessarily  set- 
ting forth  matters  of  hearsay  or  ar- 
gumentative matter,  or  copies  of  or 
extracts  from  documents,  must  be 
paid  by  the  party  filing  them." 
Stephen's  Dig.,  art.  125. 

i  Boulter  v.  Behrend,  20  D.  C.  567 ; 
Cosmer's  Adm'r  v.  Smith,  15  S.  E. 
Rep.  977 ;  36  W.  Va.  788 ;  Johnson  v. 
Buckel,  20  N.  Y.  S.  566;  65  Hun, 
601;  Hitnier  v.  Boutclies,  67  Hun, 
203;  Irvin  v.  Howard,  37  Ga.  23; 
Dunnenbaum  v.  Schram,  59  Tex. 
281 ;  Winters  v.  Pearson,  72  Cal.  553; 
Parsons  v.  Stockbridge,  42  Ind.  121 ; 
Burnett  v.  McCluey  (Mo.,  1888),  4  S. 
W.  Rep.  694;  Carleton  v.  Carleton, 
85  N.  Y.  313 ;  Thompson  v.  Judge, 
54  Mich.  237. 
34 


2Altmeyer  v.  Caulfield,  37  W.  Ya. 
847;  Haight  v.  Arnold,  48  Mich.  512; 
Filer,  etc.  Co.  v.  Sohns,  63  Wis.  118 ; 
Wirt  v.  Dinan,  44  Mo.  App.  583; 
Baumgartner  v.  Mfg.  Co.  (Minn., 
1893),  52  N.  W.  Rep.  964;  Hinzie  v. 
Moody,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  26 ;  Hall  v. 
Kintz,  13  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  24;  Bige- 
low  v.  Chatterton,  10  U.  S.  App. 
267. 

3  Carleton  v.  Carleton,  85  N.  Y. 
313;  Pearce  v.  Hawkins,  62  Tex. 
435;  Ilett  v.  Collins,  102  111.  402; 
Mathews  v.  Sharp,  99  Pa.  St.  560; 
Miller  v.  Munson,  34  Wis.  579;  Blum 
v.  Davis,  56  Tex.  426. 

*  Balls  v.  Smith,  2  M.  &  G.  350; 
Opdyke  v.  Marble,  18  Abb.  Pr.  375. 

5  In  re  Eady,  6  Dowl.  Pr.  Cas.  615. 

6Bose  v.  Solliers,  6  Dow.  &  Ry. 
514 ;  Marzetti  v.  Du  Jouffray,  1  Dowl. 
Pr.  Cas.  41. 

7Musgrove  v.  Mott,  90  Mo.  107; 
2  S.  W.  Rep.  214;  Fortenheim  v. 
Claflin,  47  Ark.  49. 


530  AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS.  [§  359. 

§  359.  Definition  and  character  of  depositions. —  "A  dep- 
osition is  evidence  given  under  interrogatories,  oral  or  writ- 
ten, and  usually  written  down  by  an  ollicial  person."  1  Deposi- 
tions may  be  offered  as  evidence  in  all  cases  where  a  non-resident 
witness  refuses  or  is  unable  to  attend  court,  or  where  a  wit- 
ness who  is  resident  within  the  jurisdiction  is  so  ill  or  feeble 
that  he  cannot  appear  in  court.2  The  usefulness  of  this  mode 
of  procuring  evidence  was  first  recognized  in  courts  of  admir- 
alty, where  it  is  of  particular  value  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
obtaining  the  presence  of  mariners,  who  are  usually  transient 
in  their  habits  of  living  and  places  of  abode. 

The  practice  of  taking  depositions  has  been  universally 
adopted  in  other  tribunals  of  justice,  and  it  is  now  almost 
wholly  regulated  by  statutes,  which  should  be  consulted  in 
every  case.  Under  these  statutes,  and  as  a  matter  of  prac- 
tice, in  their  absence  the  party  who  wishes  to  secure  the  tes- 
timony of  an  absent  witness  applies  to  the  court  to  issue  a 
letter  rogatoiy,  which  is  in  form  a  writ,  issued  3  under  the  seal 
of  the  court  directed  to  a  court  of  superior  jurisdiction  located 
in  the  state  or  country  in  which  the  foreign  witness  resides, 
and  requesting  the  latter  court  in  furtherance  of  justice,  and 
out  of  international  comity,  to  cause  the  evidence  of  the  wit- 
ness named  therein  to  be  procured  according  to  its  customary 
mode  of  procedure,  to  have  the  same  committed  to  writing 
and  returned  to  the  court  issuing  the  letter. 

Interrogatories  framed  by  the  parties  are  forwarded  with 
the  letter,  and  these,  with  the  original  answers  thereto, 
signed  by  and  verified  with  the  oath  of  the  witness  and  duly 
authenticated,  are  returned  to  the  court  in  which  the  deposi- 
tion is  to  be  used.4    Under  certain  circumstances  the  witness 

1  Stitnpson   v.    Brooks,    3    Blatch.  subsequent  introduction  of  the  evi- 

(U.  S.)  456.  dence  of  witnesses  who  are  disqual- 

-'  People  v.  Lundquist,  84  Cal.  23 ;  ified,  see  ante,  §§  120-124. 

People    v.    Thompson,    84    id.    598.  3  Blakelee  v.   Dye  (Colo.,  1893),  27 

Where     a    physician    testifies    that  Pao.  Rep.  881. 

though  an  infirm  and  sick  witness  4  Hemenway  v.  Knudsen,  67  Hun, 

was  able  to  attend  court,  yet    she  648;  Fry  v.  Man.  Trust  Co.,  23  Civ. 

should  not  be  compelled  to  do  so,  Pro.    It.    520;    Hobart    v.    Jones,    5 

her  deposition  will  be  taken.    Norris  Wash.    St.    383 ;    Stierle    v.    Kaiser 

v.  Norris,  3  Ind.  App.  500.    See,  also,  (La.,  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  839.     The  in- 

ante,   §§    282,   283,  288.     As   to  the  terrogatories  should  not  be  leading 


§  360.] 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS. 


531 


may  be  examined  viva  voce  without  written  interrogatories 
or  the  two  methods  of  examination  may  be  combined.1 

§  360.  Mode  of  procuring  depositions. —  The  details  of  the 
law  governing  the  taking  of  depositions  are  largely  regulated 
037  statutes  which,  while  differing  in  minor  points,  are  upon 
the  whole  substantially  alike.  By  the  federal  statute  the  com- 
mission may  issue  to  a  judge  of  a  federal  court,  or  of  a  supe- 
rior state  court,  or  county  court,  court  of  common  pleas,  or  to 
a  ma}Tor  or  chief  magistrate  of  a  city.2  The  adverse  party  is 
entitled  to  reasonable  notice  personally  served  on  him  or  his 
attorney,  and  has  the  absolute  right  to  be  present  and  to  cross- 
examine  the  witness;3  and  a  failure  to  notify  him,4  or  a  notice 
received  when  he  is  elsewhere  taking  another  deposition  in  the 
case,5  will  render  the  deposition  inadmissible.8  The  witness 
should  be  duty  sworn  in  the  precise  mode  which  is  prescribed 
by  the  statute,  if  any,7  and  the  examining  magistrate's  failure 
to  state  the  fact  that  he  was  so  sworn  will  render  the  depo- 
sition inadmissible.8 

The  deposition  when  completed  with  a  proper  certificate  of 


(Lott  v.  King,  79  Tex.  292),  nor  im- 
material (In  re  Allis,  44  Fed.  Rep. 
21(5),  nor'  call  upon  the  witness  to 
speak  from  hearsay.  Gilpin  v.  Daly, 
58  Hun,  610. 

1  Laidley  v.  Rogers,  67  Hun,  653 ; 
23  Civ.  Pro.  R.  110;  1  Greenl.  on 
Ev.,  §  320;  Pole  v.  Rogers,  3  Bing. 
N.  C.  780.  Of.  Nevitt  v.  Crow  (Cal., 
1892),  29  Pac.  Rep.  749.  See  as 
to  "open  commissions"  in  New 
York,  Code  C.  P.,  §§  893,  894,  897 
et  seq. ;  Jones  v.  Hoyt,  10  Abb.  N.  C. 
324 ;  63  How.  Pr.  94 ;  Heney  v.  Weed, 
4  Law  Bui.  (N.  Y.)  10;  Jennison  v. 
Citizens'  Sav.  Bank,  85  N.  Y.  546 ; 
Whitney  v.  Wyncoop,  4  Abb.  Pr. 
(N.  Y.)370;  Dwinnelle  v.  Howland, 
1  Abb.  Pr.  (N.  Y.)  87  (return  of  com- 
mission). 

2U.  S.  R.  S.,  §§  863-875;  Bibb  v. 
Allen,  149  U.  S.  481. 

3  Cole  v.  Hall,  131  Mass.  88;  Vaw- 
ter  v.  Hulse,  112  Mo.  633;  Carring- 
ton  v.  Stimpsou,  1  Curt.  C.  C.  437. 


4  Sinsheimer  v.  Skinner,  43  111. 
App.  608;  Goodhue  v.  Bartlett,  5 
McLean,  186.  The  reasonableness 
of  the  notice  will  depend  upon  the 
circumstances  of  each  case,  among 
which  are  the  distance  of  the  for- 
eign witness  from  the  court  and  the 
facility  with  which  he  may  be 
found.  Sing  Cheong  Co.  v.  Yung 
Wing,  59  Conn.  535;  Harris'  Appeal 
(Conn.,  1891),  20  Atl.  Rep.  617. 

5  Uhle  v.  Burnham,  44  Fed.  Rep. 
792;  Latham  v.  Latham,  30  Gratt. 
307;  Collins  v.  Richart,  14  Bush 
(Ky.),  621. 

6  See,  also,  Atchison,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Sage,  49  Kan.  524;  Crabb  v.  Orth 
(Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  711. 

7  Bacon  v.  Bacon,  33  Wis.  147. 

8  Parsons  v.  Huff,  38  Me.  147; 
West.  U.  Tel.  Co.  v.  Collins,  45 
Kan.  88 ;  Gulf  City  Ins.  Co.  v.  Ste- 
phens, 51  Ala.  121 ;  Home  v.  Haver- 
hill, 113  Mass.  344;  Bush  v.  Barron, 
78  Tex.  5  (signature). 


532  AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS.  [§  301. 

its  regularity  attached  should  then  be  securely  sealed  by  the 
commissioner  and  transmitted  by  mail,1  or  by  some  other  con- 
venient and  safe  method/  properly  superscribed  so  as  to  show 
the  nature  of  its  contents,  to  the  clerk  of  the  court  where  it  is 
to  be  used.3  If  the  purpose  of  the  deposition  is  solely  to  pro- 
cure evidence  to  rebut  evidence  which  the  party  expects  his 
adversary  will  offer,  a  notice  to  that  effect  must  accompany 
the  interrogatories,  or  he  may  be  compelled,  on  request,  to 
read  the  deposition  to  the  jurj\4  A  failure  to  examine  all 
the  witnesses  who  are  named  in  the  commission  will  not  ren- 
der the  depositions  of  those  actually  examined  invalid ;  nor 
need  an  officer  employ  an  interpreter  if  an  attorney  of  one  of 
the  parties  is  able  to  translate  the  answers  to  his  satisfaction.5 
§  361.  Statutes  construed  —  The  certificate. —  The  statu- 
tory right  to  take  depositions  being  in  derogation  of  common- 
law  rules,  it  has  been  considered  that  the  statute  should  be 
strictly  construed,  particularly  in  view  of  the  fact  that  such  evi- 
dence, if  taken  ex  parte  and  without  notice,  may  easily  be  dis- 
torted and  employed  to  deceive  the  jurors  and  subvert  the 
proper  administration  of  justice.6  Whether  in  any  case  a 
deposition  is  necessary  is  a  question  for  the  court,  and  clear 
proof  should  be  required  that  the  witness  cannot  attend  in 
person  before  the  commission  should  issue.7  The  certificate  of 
the  judicial  officer  taking  the  deposition  is  usually  sufficient 
2?ri7na  facie  evidence  of  his  authority  to  do  so,8  of  the  reason 
and  necessity  for  taking  the  deposition,9  and  of  the  actual 
domicile  of  deponent.10 

1  Prouty  v.  Ruggles,  2  Story,  194.        7  Everett  v.  Tidball,  34  Neb.  803 ; 

2  Andrews  v.  Parker,  48  Tex.  94.        Turnbull  v.  Laubagh,  G  Kulp,  368; 
3Babb    v.  Aldrich,  45   Kan.   218;     Whitford  v.  Clark  Co.,  119  U.  S.  523. 

Beal   v.    Thompson,    8  Cranch,  70;  8  Fowler  v.  Merrill,  11  How.  375; 

Travers  v.  Jennings  (S.  C,  1893),  17  Hoyt  v.  Hammekin,  14  How.  346; 

S.  E.  Rep.  849.  Littlehale    v.    Dix,    11    Cusb.    365; 

4  Linfield  v.  Old  Colony  R.  R.  Co.,  Palmer  v.  Fogg,  35  Me.  368;  McNeal 
10  Cusb.  570.  v.  Brann,  21  Oreg.  218 ;  Scbunior  v. 

5  Scbunior  v.  Russell,  83  Tex.  33.  Russell,  83  Tex.  83;  Curtis  v.  Curtis, 

6  Stebbins  v.  Duncan,  108  U.  S.  45 ;  131  Ind.  489. 

Jones  v.  Neale,  1  Hughes  C.  C.  268 ;  9  West    Boylston    v.    Sterling,    17 

Walsh  v.  Rogers,  13  How.  286,  287;  Pick.  126;  Kinney  v.  Berran,  6  Cusb 

Greening  v.  Keel,  84  Tex.  326  (an-  304 ;  Littlehale  v.  Dix,  supra. 

swers  privately  supplied  to  witness  10Patapsco  Ins.  Co.  v.  Soutbgate,  5 

by  party).     Cf.  Moore  v.  Robertson,  Pet.  (U.  S.)  603, 
62  Hun,  623. 


§  362.]  AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS.  533 

§  362.  Objections  to  depositions.—  Objections  to  deposi- 
tions should  be  promptly  made  immediately  upon  discovery  of 
defects  where  the  objection  is  only  to  the  irregular  or  im- 
proper manner  or  form  in  which  they  were  taken,  and  which 
is  remedial  by  a  retaking,1  and  a  failure  to  object  until  trial 
may  constitute  a  waiver.2  But  substantial  objections  either  to 
the  incompetency  of  the  witness  or  the  irrelevancy  of  the  evi- 
dence may  be  interposed  at  the  trial.3  If  the  witness  is  incom- 
petent because  of  interest  when  his  deposition  is  taken,  it  is 
not  admissible  at  the  trial  though  he  may  have  released  his 
interest  in  the  meantime.4  The  deposition  of  a  competent 
witness  is  not  rendered  admissible  by  his  subsequent  incom- 
petency.5 

Parol  evidence  is  inadmissible  to  show  the  reason  for  taking 
the  deposition  where  the  statute  requires  that  to  appear  in  the 
certificate;6  nor  will  a  deposition  be  admissible  which  is 
written  down  by  a  party  or  his  counsel,7  or  by  a  third  person, 
where  the  law  direct:;  that  it  shall  be  reduced  to  writing  by 
the  officer  or  the  witness.8  Motions  to  suppress  depositions 
after  they  have  been  opened  are  in  the  discretion  of  the  court  ;9 
nor  can  a  part}7  object  to  the  suppression  of  a  deposition  which 
would  not  benefit  his  case.10 

In  introducing  depositions  in  evidence  it  is  usually  con- 

1  Bell  v.  Jamison,  102  Mo.  71 ;  by  statute  before  the  trial.  Haynes 
Harris    v.    Nations.    79    Tex.    409 ;     v.  Rovve,  40  Me.  181. 

Leavitt   v.   Baker,  82  Me.   28;  Bar-  5  Sabine    v.    Strong,    6    Met.    270. 

num  v.  Barnum,  42  Md.  251;  Mer.  Contra,  Messimer  v.  McCrary  (Mo., 

Dis.  Co.  v.  Leysor,  89  111.  48 ;  Leslie  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  17. 

v.    Leslie,    110   Mo.    81;    Vilmar    v.  6  Chase  v.  Garretson,  54  N.  J.  L.  42. 

Schall,  61  N.  Y.  564;  Orr  v.  Hance,  "Cook  v.  Shorthill,  82  Iowa,  277. 

44  Mo.  App.  461;  Johnson  v.  Rail-  8  East  Tenn.,  V.  &  G.  R.  Co.  v.  Ar- 

road  Co.,  51  Iowa,  25.  nold,    89    Tenn.    107.     A   deposition 

2  Thompson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  45  taken  on  a  typewriter  is  "reduced 
Minn.  13;  Sheldon  v.  Bury,  39  111.  to  writing."  Behrensmyer  v.  Kreitz, 
App.  154 ;  Howard  v.  Stillwell,  139  135  111.  59. 

U.  S.  199.  9  Smith   v.   The   Serapis,   49  Fed. 

3  Fielden  v.  Lahens,  2  Abb.  App.  Rep.  393 ;  Lewis  v.  Fish,  40  111.  App. 
Dec.  Ill;  Chase  v.  Garretson,  54  372;  Zogan  v.  Hamilton,  90  Ala. 
N.  J.  L.  42;  Nobles  v.  Hogg,  36  S.  C.  454;  Ervin  v.  Bevil,  80  Tex.  332; 
322.  Goldmark  v.   Metro.  Opefti  H.  Co., 

4  Reed  v.  Rice,  25  Vt.  171.     Contra  67  Hun,  652. 

where  the  incompetency  is  removed       10  Cowen  v.  Eartherly  (Ala.,  1892), 

11  S.  Rep.  195. 


534  AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS.  [§§  363,  364. 

sidered  necessary  to  prove  that  a  commission  had  issued.  This 
should  be  proved  by  the  production  of  the  commission  itself. 
The  production  of  the  interrogatories,  while  always  advisable, 
may  be  dispensed  with,  though  the  answers  may  be  less  easily 
comprehended  because  of  the  absence  of  the  questions.1  Both 
affidavits  and  depositions,  which,  by  actual  filing,  have  become 
a  part  of  the  record,  may  be  proved  in  other  courts  by  the 
means  adopted  in  proving  judicial  records.2 

§  363.  Use  of  depositions  as  evidence.— A  deposition  once 
admitted  may  be  used  by  either  party  as  evidence  in  the  ac- 
tion,3 and  the  party  in  whose  behalf  it  was  taken  may  con- 
tradict it  if  offered  by  his  adversary.4  But  an  extract  from 
a  deposition  cannot  be  read  unless  the  whole  is  in  evidence;5 
nor  can  a  deposition  which  has  been  taken  for  use  in  one  cause 
be  introduced  as  evidence  in  a  subsequent  proceeding  unless 
the  parties  in  both  cases  are  substantially  identical.6  The 
presence  of  the  witness  in  court  does  not  of  necessity  prevent 
the  court  from  allowing  his  deposition  to  be  read  in  evidence.7 

§  364.  Equitable  bills  to  perpetuate  testimony. —  Where 
a  party  has  a  vested  or  contingent  right  to  be  enforced  in  a 
future  action  he  may  bring  a  bill  in  equity  to  obtain  the  evi- 
dence of  an  aged  or  feeble  witness,  or  of  one  who  is  about  to 
leave  the  jurisdiction.  The  commission  is  issued  and  executed 
in  the  same  manner  and  form  as  commissions  to  take  other 


1 1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  517;  Rowe  v.  foreign  corporation  whose  principal 

Brenton,  8  B.  &  C.  737,  765.  office  is  out  of  the  state.     King  v. 

2  See  §  146.  Enterprise  Ins.  Co.,  45  Ind.  43;  New 

8 Watson   v.    Race,   46    Mo.    App.  York  Laws  1869,  ch.  589,  and  Laws 

546;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Forest,  44  1863,  ch.  206.     See,  also,  Code  Civ. 

Fed.  Rep.  246;  Rucker  v.  Reid,  36  Pro.,  §£  3343  and  929-931. 
Kan.  470.  echoato   v.  Huff   (Tex.,  1892),  18 

4Bloomington  v.  Osterle,  139  111.  S.  W.  Rep.  87;  Sewall  v.  Robbins, 

120.  139  Mass.  164;  McClaskey  v.  Barr, 

5Lanahan  v.  Lawton  (N.  J.  Ch.,  47  Fed.  Rep.  154;  Fearn  v.  West 
1892),  23  Atl.  Rep.  476;  Thomas  v.  Jersey  Ferry,  143  Pa.  St.  122;  Stew- 
Miller,  151  Pa.  St.  4S2.  Cf.  Jackson-  art  v.  Register,  108  N.  C.  588;  Hew- 
ville,  etc.  Co.  v.  Southworth,  32  111.  elette  v.  George,  68  Miss.  703. 
App.  307.  It  is  provided  by  statute  ^O'Conner  v.  Curtis  (Tex.,  1892),  18 
in  some  of  the  states  that  the  books  S.  W.  Rep.  953 ;  Page  v.  Krekey,  63 
of  a  private  corporation  may  be  Hun,  629;  O'Conner  v.  Andrews,  81 
proved  by  depositions  taken  outside  Tex.  28. 
of  the  jurisdiction  in  the  case  of  a 


§  364.] 


AFFIDAVITS    AND    DEPOSITIONS. 


535 


depositions,  and  the  evidence  may  be  used  when  the  litigation 
arises.  The  party  must  have  a  fixed  interest  which  is  recog- 
nized and  maintainable  at  law,  though  it  may  be  contingent 
or  conditional.1  So,  though  the  rule  has  been  changed  by 
statute  in  England,2  an  heir  could  not  procure  a  commission 
to  perpetuate  testimony  in  respect  to  the  possibility  of  an  in- 
terest which  he  may  acquire  in  the  property  of  his  ancestor.3 
The  interest  of  the  orator  may  be  in  any  property,  real  or 
personal,4  but  must  be  such  an  interest  as  could  not  be  the 
subject  of  an  immediate  action,  for  if  there  is  shown  no  rea- 
son why  the  testimony  should  be  perpetuated  the  suit  will  not 
be  entertained.5  The  testimony  having  been  obtained,  the 
suit  is  at  an  end,  and  the  deposition  will  be  filed  or  recorded 
only  when  the  suit  in  which  it  is  to  be  used  is  commenced  or 
on  the  death  of  the  witness.6 


'Townsend  Peerage  Cases,  10  CI. 
&  Fin.  289;  Belfast  v.  Chichester,  2 
J.  &  W.  451;  Dursley  v.  Fitzhard- 
inge,  6  Ves.  251 ;  Allan  v.  Allan,  15 
id.  134. 

2  Campbell  v.  Earl  of  Dalhousie, 
L.R1H.  Sc.  A  pp.  462. 

*  In  re  Tayleure,  L.  R.  6  Ch.  416; 
Sackville  v.  Ayleworth,  1  Vern.  105. 


«  Earl  of  Suffolk  v.  Green,  1  Atk. 
450. 

5  Angell  v.  Angell,  1  S.  &  S.  83; 
Ellice  v.  Roupell,  32  Beav.  299;  Earl 
Spencer  v.  Peck,  L.  R.  3  Eq.  415. 

6  Attorney-Genera)  v.  Ray,  2  Hare, 
518;  Angell  v.  Angell,  1  S.  &  S.  63; 
Barnsdale  v.  Lowe,  2  Russ.  &  My. 
142;  Beavan  v.  Carpenter,  11  Sim.  22. 


CHAPTER  XXVI. 


RECEPTION  OF  EVIDENCE  —  NUMBER  OF  WITNESSES. 


§  366. 

Mode  of  offering  and  object- 
ing to  evidence. 

§  378. 

367. 

Waiver  of  objections  to  evi- 

dence —  Necessity    for*  re- 

.379. 

peating  objections. 

368. 

Motions    to    strike    out    evi- 
dence. 

-"  380. 

369. 

The  improper  admission    of 
evidence,  when  immaterial. 

370. 

The    improper    exclusion    of 
evidence,  when  immaterial. 

381. 

371. 

Nature  and  use  of  stipulations 
as  regards  evidence. 

382. 

372. 

Demurrer  to  evidence. 

383. 

373. 

Surprise. 

374. 

Rebutting  evidence  —  Nature 
and  use  of. 

384. 

375. 

Order  of  proof  —  Evidence  of- 
fered by  the  party  after  he 

rests. 

385. 

376. 

Materiality  and  sufficiency  of 

newly-discovered  evidence. 

386. 

377. 

Diligence    of    party   offering 
new     evidence     must     be 
shown. 

Newly-discovered  evidence 
must  not  be  cumulative  or 
impeaching  merely. 

Writ  of  error  —  When  em- 
ployed at  common  law. 

The  powers  of  appellate  tri- 
bunals in  relation  to  the 
evidence  received  in  the 
trial  court. 

Limitations  on  the  number  of 
witnesses. 

Number  of  witnesses  neces- 
sary in  trials  for  perjury. 

Number  of  witnesses  in  trials 
for  treason. 

Compelling  the  calling  of  the 
witnesses. 

Positive  and  negative  testi- 
mony —  Number  of  wit- 
nesses as  affecting  the 
weight  of  evidence. 

The  discretionary  power  of 
the  court  —  Judicial  discre- 
tion defined  and  considered. 


§366.  Mode  of  offering  and  objecting  to  evidence. —  An 

offer  of  evidence  should  not  be  too  broad,  general  or  vague  in 
character.  It  should  be  specific  in  terms,  pointing  out  clearly 
the  facts  which  are  intended  to  be  proved  under  it,1  so  that 
the  court  may  judge  of  the  materiality  of  the  evidence.  The 
burden  of  showing  the  materiality  of  any  evidence  which  is 


1  Lyon  v.  Batz,  42  Mo.  App.  606 ; 
Johnson  v.  Merry,  etc.  Co.,  53  Fed. 
Rep.  569;  Kennedy  v.  Currie,  3 
Wash.  St.  442;  Brelscherv.  Treitske, 
33  Neb.  699;  Wincbell  v.  Express 
Co.,  61  Vt.    15;  Toledo,  etc.  Co.  v. 


Jackson  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep. 
793;  Carley  v.  Railroad  Co.,  48  Hun, 
619;  Wolford  v.  Farnham,  47  Minn. 
95;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Debaum,  2 
Ind.  App.  281. 


§  36G.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  537 

offered  is  upon  the  party  offering  it,  and  unless  he  shall  con- 
vince the  court  that  the  evidence  is  material  and  relevant  to 
the  issue  no  error  is  committed  bv  the  court  in  excluding  it. 
Hence,  the  purpose  of  the  party  in  introducing  evidence  must 
clearly  appear  in  order  that  an  exception  to  its  exclusion  may 
be  taken  advantage  of  by  him  upon  appeal.1  The  adverse 
party  has  the  right  to  demand,  except  where  the  witness  is 
under  strict  cross-examination,  that  counsel  shall  state  con- 
cisely the  substance  of  what  he  proposes  to  prove  by  the  wit- 
ness. If  he  request  it,  and  if  he  does  not  then  the  court  of 
its  own  motion,  may  require  the  purpose  of  the  question  to  be 
shown  before  it  is  answered  and  not  after  the  objection  to  the 
answer  as  it  is  given  has  been  sustained,2  though  if  the  com- 
petency of  the  evidence  is  ascertainable  only  after  the  answer 
has  been  given,  it  should  be  allowed  subject  to  objection  by 
the  adverse  part)7.3  If  evidence  is  offered  by  a  party  as  a 
whole,  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  reject  all  of  it  where  it 
clearly  appears  that  a  part  of  it  is  inadmissible,  and  the  facts 
which  are  susceptible  of  proof  or  which  are  relevant  cannot 
be  readily  separated  from  those  which  are  not.4  And  where 
evidence  is  offered  for  a  particular  purpose,  it  is  not  error  to 
receive  it  over  a  general  objection  that  it  is  not  admissible  for 
any  purpose,  if  it  was  admissible  for  any  purpose  though  not 
for  the  purpose  which  was  specified.5 

Again,  evidence  which  is   originally  offered  without  any 
limitation  as  to  its  purpose,  when,  on  objection,  its  purpose 

1  Smethurst  v.   Propes,  148  Mass.  Va.  421 ;  Carley  v.  New  York,  etc. 

261;  Atherton   v.  Atkins,   139  Mass.  Co.,  1  N.  Y.  S.  637. 

61;  Lahn  v.  Gustafson,  73  Iowa,  633;  *  Clark  v.  Ryan  (Ala.,  1893),  11  S. 

35  N.  W.  Rep.  660;  Masters  v.  Marsh,  Rep.  22;  Reynolds  v.    Franklin,    47 

19  Neb.  458;  Hamilton  v.   Ross,  23  Minn.  145;  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  North 

id.  630;  White  v.  Spreckels,  75  Cal.  (S.  D.),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  96;  Cincinnati' 

610 ;    Dwyer    v.    Rippetoe,    72   Tex.  etc.  Co.  v.  Roesch,  126  Ind.  445 ;  Over 

520 ;    Hathaway    v.    Tinkham,    148  v.  Schiffling,   102  id.  691 ;  Beard  v. 

Mass.  85;  Cheek  v.  Herndon,  82  Tex.  First  Nat.  Bank,  41  Minn.  153.     Cf. 

146;  Johnson  v.  Merry,  53  Fed.  Rep.  Gorsuch  v.  Rutledge,  70  Md.  272. 

569;  Lauter  v.  Simpson,  2  Ind.  App.  5  Charleston  Ice  Mfg.  Co.  v.  Joyce 

293;  Hurlbut  v.  Hurlbut,  63  Vt,  667.  (C.  C.  A.),  54  Fed.  Rep.  332;  Giles  v. 

-'Chicago,  etc.   Co.  v.   Debaum,  2  Vandiver  (Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E.   Rep. 

Ind.  App.  281.  115;  Odell  v.  Metro.  El.   R.  Co.,  22 

3Gunn   v.  Ohio   Riv.   Co.,   37  W.  N.  Y.  S.  737;  Parsons  v.  New  York 

Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  112  N.  Y.  355 


538  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  366. 

is  stated,  becomes  admissible  for  all  legitimate  purposes  when 
a  farther  objection  is  made  and  overruled  that  it  is  not  admis- 
sible for  any  purpose.1  It  is  discretionary  with  the  court  to 
call  either  for  a  distinct  statement  of  the  purpose  and  mate- 
riality of  the  evidence,  or  to  let  these  elements  appear  from 
the  tenor  of  the  question  itself.2  If  the  question  upon  its  face 
clearly  calls  for  evidence  which  is  irrelevant  or  otherwise  in- 
admissible, the  court  has  the  right  to  rule  it  out  at  once,  and 
it  may  treat  the  matter  as  concluded  and  refuse  to  listen  to 
counsel  in  case  they  attempt  to  show  by  argument  that  the 
answer  which  is  called  for  is  not  incompetent  evidence.  It  is 
always  within  the  sound  discretion  of  the  court  to  reject  oral 
evidence  which  is  offered  under  circumstances  from  which  the 
inference  may  be  drawn  that  the  offer  was  not  made  in  good 
faith.3  Among  circumstances  which  are  calculated  to  excite 
suspicion  is  the  absence  from  court  of  the  witness  who  is  ex- 
pected to  give  the  oral  evidence. 

Again,  the  court  may,  and  perhaps  should,  require  that  the 
evidence  shall  be  offered  so  that  it  will  not  be  heard  by  the 
jurors,  where  it  is  likely  that  they  will  be  prejudiced  thereby 
in  case  it  is  pronounced  inadmissible.4  If,  however,  the  jury 
are  plainly  instructed  to  disregard  the  evidence  which  is 
offered  in  their  hearing  if  it  shall  be  deemed  incompetent,  no 
error  is  committed  by  allowing  them  to  hear  it  as  offered,  or 
to  be  present  during  the  argument  upon  the  question  of  its 
admissibility.5 

An  objection  to  evidence,  to  be  sufficient,  should  be  specific, 
pointing  out  clearly  to  the  court  the  nature  of  the  objection  and 
the  particular  grounds  upon  which  the  rejection  of  the  evidence 
is  sought,  or  an  exception  will  not  be  available.6     A  general 

y       i  Sears  v.  Starbird,  78  Cal.  225.  W.  Va.  679;  State  v.  Wood,  53  N.  H. 

3  Osgood   v.  Bauder  (Iowa,  1891),  484. 

47  N.  W.  Rep.   1001;  Hathaway  v. "  6Ohio  &  M.  R.  Co.  v.  Walker,  113 

Tinkham,  148  Mass.  85.  Ind.  196;  Noftsger  v.  Smith  (Ind., 

3  Scotland  Co.  v.  Hill,  112  U.  S.  1893),  32  N.  E  Rep.  1024;  Smith  v. 
183;  Robinson  v.  State,  1  Lea (Tenn.),  Morrill,  39  Kan.  665;  18  Pac.  Rep. 
673.  915;  Carroll  v.  O'Shea,  21   N.  Y.  S. 

4  Omaha  Coal,  etc.  Co.  v.  Fay  956;  Godfrey  v.  Knodle,  44  111.  App. 
(Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  211.  638;  Brown  v.  Wakeman,  18  N.  Y. 

5  People  v.Smith,  104  N.  Y.  491 ;  263;  Pennsylvania  Co.  v.  Horton, 
10  N.  E.  Rep.  873;  State  v.  Cain,  20  132  Ind.  189;  Mooney  v.  Peck,  49  N. 


§  366.] 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


539 


objection  that  the  evidence  is  "incompetent,  immaterial  and 
irrelevant"  will  not  suffice.1 

Upon  an  appeal  or  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  no  other  objec- 
tions can  be  urged  than  those  which  were  put  forward  on  the 
trial.2  A  party  whose  evidence  has  been  rejected  must,  in 
order  to  have  a  review  on  appeal,  take  an  exception  to  the 
action  of  the  court  after  a  formal  tender  and  objection,  which 
exception  should  be  noted  by  the  judge  or  by  the  court  ste- 
nographer for  him.  The  exception  should  be  plainly  and  spe- 
cifically stated  in  the  bill  of  exceptions  over  the  signature  of 
the  party  or  his  counsel,  and  the  bill  should  be  examined  by 
the  judge,  who  should  also  sign  it  if  it  is  true.3 

Where  an  assignment  of  error  is  required  to  be  contained 
in  the  transcript  of  the  record,  in  the  case  on  appeal  or  in 
the  appellant's  brief,  it  must  point  out  the  particular  erroneous 
rulings  of  the  trial  court  on  the  evidence;  for  a  mere  statement 
that  the  court  erred  in  overruling  all  of  appellant's  objec- 


J.  L.  232;  Linton  v.  Allen,  154  Mass. 
432;  Tilley  v.  Bllvens,  110  N.  C.  343 
Helena  v.  Albertose,  8  Mont.  499 
Drew  v.  Drum,  44  Mo.  A  pp.  25 
Briggs  v.  Jones,  46  Minn.  277 ;  Will- 
iams v.  Clink,  90  Mich.  297 ;  Hogan 
v.  Shuart,  11  Mont.  498. 

i  Stringer  v.  Frost,  116  Ind.  477; 
Johnson  v.  Brown,  130  Ind.  61 ; 
Churchman  v.  Kansas  City,  49  Mo. 
App.  366;  Alcorn  v.  Railroad  Co., 
108  Mo.  81 ;  Evans.  R.  Co.  v.  Fettig, 
130  Ind.  61 ;  Rupert  v.  Penuer,  35 
Neb.  587 ;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Beh- 
mey,  48  Kan.  47.  An  objection  to 
an  expert  witness  must  clearly  point 
out  the  incompetency  of  his  evi- 
dence. Mortimer  v.  Met.  E.  R.  Co., 
129  N.  Y.  84 ;  Jefferson  v.  New  York 
El.  R.  Co.,  132  id.  483. 

2  Bailey  v.  Chicago,  M.  etc.  Co. 
(S.  D.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  596; 
Falk  v.  Gast  Lith.  Co.,  54  Fed.  Rep. 
890;  Whitaker  v.  White,  69  Hun, 
258;  Wilson  v.  Railroad  Co.,  114  N. 
Y.  487;  Haviland  v.  Man.  R.  Co.,  61 
Hun,  626;  131  N.  Y.  630;  Toplitz  v. 


Heddens,  146  U.  S.  252 ;  Little  Rock 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  56  Ark.  495;  Chand- 
ler v.  Beal,  132-Ind.  596;  Hommedieu 
v.  Railroad  Co.,  120  Ind.  435. 

3Hartsock  v.  Mort,  76  Md.  281; 
Connell  v.  O'Neill,  154  Pa.  St.  582; 
Welborn  v.  Atl.  R.  Co.  (Ga.,  1893), 
17  S.  E.  Rep.  672.  As  to  the  para- 
mount necessity  for  a  bill  of  excep- 
tions, see  Brooke  v.  Tradesmen's 
Bank,  68  Hun,  129;  Cramer  v.  Akin, 
49  Mo.  App.  163;  Pace  v.  Lanier 
(Fla.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  363;  Spangen- 
berg  v.  Charles,  44  111.  App.  526; 
State  v.  Cent.  P.  R.  R.  Co.,  17  Nev. 
259;  Whidby  Land  Co.  v.  Nye,  5 
Wash.  St.  501 ;  Pedrosena  v.  Hotch- 
kiss,  95  Cal.  636 ;  Bray  v.  Kemp  (Mo., 
1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  220;  Lusk  v. 
Parsons,  39  111.  App.  380 ;  Elmer  v. 
Marsh,  3  Ind.  App.  558;  Schneider 
v.  Tombling,  34  Neb.  661.  The  bill 
of  exceptions  should  contain  all  the 
evidence  where  insufficiency  of  evi- 
dence is  alleged.  Texas,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Cox,  145  U.  S.  593.  See,  also,  note  1, 
p.  558,  post 


540  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  367. 

tions  will  not  suffice.1  The  evidence  itself  should  be  stated 
and  the  action  of  the  court  thereon  clearly  described.  A  party 
has  no  right  to  speculate  on  the  effect  of  evidence.  He  should 
not  be  permitted  to  maintain  silence  in  case  the  inadmissible 
evidence,  which  was  introduced  by  his  adversary  without  ob- 
jection, proves  favorable  to  himself,  and  move  to  strike  it  out 
if,  on  the  other  hand,  it  turns  out  more  favorably  to  his  ad- 
versary. Hence,  the  reception  of  inadmissible  evidence  is  not 
ground  for  a  new  trial  because  the  jury  was  not  warned  to 
disregard  it,  unless  the  party  objected  promptly  when  the 
evidence  was  offered  and  took  an  exception  in  case  his  objec- 
tion was  overruled.2  If  evidence  is  rejected  on  the  trial 
because  it  was  irrelevant  or  otherwise  improper  for  the  pur- 
pose for  which  it  was  offered,  a  new  trial  will  not  be  granted 
because  it  has  been  subsequently  discovered  that  the  evidence 
would  have  been  admissible  on  other  grounds  or  for  another 
purpose,  unless  the  party  who  appeals  or  moves  for  a  new  trial 
shall  show  that  he  was  not  in  fault  in  the  matter  and  that  he 
has  been  unjustly  and  substantially  prejudiced  by  its  admis- 
sion.3 

§  367.  Waiver  of  objections  to  evidence  —  Necessity  for 
repeating  objections.—  Objections  to  the  admission  of  evi- 
dence should  be  promptly  made;  for  if  a  party  is  negligent  in 
permitting  the  evidence  to  be  placed  before  the  jury  without 
making  any  objection,  bis  laches  may  debar  him  from  a  new 
trial,  even  though   he  may  have  moved  to  suppress  it  before 

i  Weston   v.   Moody,  29  Fla.  169 ;  Graham   v.    McReynolds,   90   Tenn. 

Union  Bldg.  Ass'n  v.  Insurance  Co.,  673;  Haines  v.  Savies,  93  Mich.  440; 

83  Iowa,   647;  Mitchell    v.  Mitchell,  Matson  v.  Frazer,  48  Mo.  App.  302; 

84  Tex.  803;  Giboney  v.  German  Ins.  Carpenter  v.  Willey  (Vt.,  1893),  26 
Co.,  48  Mo.  App.  185;  Herbert  v.  Atl.  Rep.  488 ;  Fleming  v.  Latham, 
Duffur  (Oreg.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  48  Kan.  773 ;  Crawford  v.  Anderson, 
502 ;  Robertson  v.  Coates,  1  Tex.  Civ.  129  Ind.  117;  O'Connell  v.  Main 
App.  664;  McElroy  v.'Braden,  152  Hotel  Co.,  90  Cal.  515;  Teal  v.  Bilby, 
Pa.  St.  r«8;  Reese  v.  Coffey  (Ind.,  123  U.  S.  572:  8  S.  Ct.  239;  "Wiggins 
1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  720.  v.  Guthrie,  101  N.  C.  601;  Johnston 

2  Cleveland,    etc.    Co.    v.  Wynant  v.  Allen,  100  N.  C.  131. 
(Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  569;  In  re        ^Tuomey  v.  O'Reilly,  22  N.  Y.  S. 

Gannon's  Wills,  2  Misc.  Rep.  329;  W.  930;     Higginbotham     v.     Campbell 

U.T.Co.  v.Lindley,89Ga.484;Deev.  (Ga.,  1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  797;  Haines 

Sharon  Hill  Acad.,  2  Pa.  Co.  Ct.  Rep.  v.  Thompson,  2  Misc.  Rep.  385;  Sul- 

228;  Boughton   v.   Smith,  67   Hun,  livan  v.  Sullivan  (Ind.,  1893),  32  N. 

652;  People  v.  Cronise,  51  Hun,  489;  E.  Rep.  1132. 


§  3G7.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  541 

trial,  as  in  the  case  of  a  deposition  which  is  read  to  the  jury,1 
or,  where  the  witness  is  permitted  to  answer  an  immaterial 
or  irrelevant  question,  he  has  moved  to  strike  out  the  answer.2 
"Where  a  witness  has  testified  to  certain  facts  without  any  ob- 
jection, an  objection  to  the  admission  of  similar  or  cumulative 
evidence  from  him  or  from  another  witness  will  be  deemed 
waived  by  the  party's  silence.3  On  the  other  hand,  where  ob- 
jections to  the  general  competency  of  the  witness,  or  to  the 
admissibility  of  his  testimon}'  in  its  entirety,  or  to  a  certain  por- 
tion of  it  consisting  of  similar  questions,  have  been  promptly 
made  and  overruled,  counsel  is  under  no  necessity  of  repeat- 
ing his  objections  indefinitely,  either  to  the  competency  of  the 
witness  or  to  the  relevancy  or  admissibility  of  any  question.? 
which  may  be  included  legitimately  in  the  prior  objections.4 
The  party  over  whose  objection  evidence  is  received  should 
demand  an  express  ruling  by  the  court  upon  his  exception 
taken  thereto,  for  if  no  rulings  appear  upon  the  record  it  will 
be  presumed  that  the  party  waived  his  right  to  take  an  ex- 
ception to  evidence  which  he  claims  was  inadmissible.5 

In  conformity  with  the  general  rule  that  objections  not 
promptly  made  will  be  deemed  to  have  been  waived,  it  is  held 
that  objections  to  evidence  cannot  be  urged  on  a  trial  de  novo 
in  an  appellate  court  which  were  not  interposed  in  the  court 
below.6     An  objection   to  the  reception  of  evidence  may  be 

'  Union  Pac.  Ry.  v.  Reese,  56  Fed.  v.  Miller,  89  Ga.  73;  Brice  v.  Miller, 

Rep.  569.  35  S.  C.  537. 

2  Cleveland,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wynant  4  Gilpin  v.  Gilpin,  12  Colo.  504; 
(Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  569;  Sharon  v.  Sharon,  79  Cal.  633 ;  Whit- 
Omaha  So.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Beeson  (Neb.,  ney  v.  Traynor,  74  Wis.  289;  In  re 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  557;  Chandler  Eysamon,  113  N.  Y.  62.  If  either 
v.  Beall,  132  Ind.  596 ;  Scott  v.  Metro,  party  without  objection  introduce 
El.  R.  Co.,  21  N.  Y.  S.  631;  Dall-  a  part  of  a  conversation  in  evidence, 
meyer  v.  Dallmeyer  (Pa.,  18SS),  16  his  adversary  will  not  be  considered 
Atl.  Rep.  72;  Hughes  v.  Ward,  38  to  have  thereby  waived  his  right  to 
Kan.  452;  Lewars  v.  Weaver,  121  object  to  the  residue  if  the  part  al- 
Pa.  St.  268.  Contra,  Jones  v.  State,  ready  called  out  was  irrelevant.  Peo- 
118  Ind.  39.  pie  v.  White,  14  Wend.  (N.  Y)  111. 

3  Pharo  v.  Beadleston,  21  N.  Y.  S.  5  Shroder  v.  Webster  (Iowa,  1892), 
989;  Denver  &  R.  G.  Co.  v.  Morri-  55  N.  W.  Rep.  569;  Taliaferro  v.  Lee 
son  (Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  859;  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.  Rep.  125;  Burdin 
Shrimpton  v.  Philbrick  (Minn.,  1S93),  v.  Trenton  (Mo.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  551 ;  Bank  v.  Innaan  728. 

{Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  21;  Payne        6The  cases   are  very   numerous. 


542 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


[§  368. 


waived  by  the  party  who  has  objected  to  it  introducing  evi- 
dence by  his  own  witnesses  bearing  upon  the  same  fact  or 
transaction  to  which  the  objectionable  evidence  related.1  But 
cross-examining  the  adverse  witness  who  has  given  the  objec- 
tionable evidence  is  not  a  waiver.2  Thus  where  a  party,  after 
objecting  that  his  witness  was  not  properly  examined  to  lay  a 
foundation  for  showing  contradictory  statements,  recalls  the 
witness  and  proceeds  to  examine  him  as  regards  the  same 
statements,  he  waives  the  objection.3 

§  368.  Motions  to  strike  out  evidence.— If  a  party's  ob- 
jection to  evidence  is  overruled,  or  in  case  evidence  is  received 
upon  the  strength  of  a  promise  by  the  party  that  he  will 
show  its  relevancy,  and  he  fails  to  do  so,  and  in  certain  cir- 
cumstances if  the  party,  being  without  fault,  has  failed  to 
object  before  the  witness  has  answered,  he  should  move  to 
strike  out  the  answer,  stating  specifically  the  grounds  upon 
which  his  motion  to  strike  out  is  based.  His  failure  to  move 
to  strike  out  will  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  urge  the  errone- 
ous admission  of  the  evidence  on  an  appeal.4     The  motion 


The  following  may  be  cited:  Brown 
v.  Foster,  20  S.  W.  Rep.  611;  112 
Mo.  297;  Paine  v.  Trask,  56  Fed. 
Rep.  233 ;  West  Side  Bank  v.  Meehan, 
66  Hun,  627;  Van  Kamen  v.  Roes, 
65  Hun,  625 ;  Rupert  v.  Penner,  35 
Neb.  587;  id.  803;  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
892 ;  Wilkinson  v.  Ward,  42  111.  App. 
541;  Chicago  v.  Edson,  43  id.  417; 
Brand  v.  Servass,  11  Mont.  86; 
Barnes  v.  Scott,  29  Fla.  285 ;  Benner 
v.  Dredging  Co.,  134  N.  Y.  456;  Mer- 
rill v.  Floyd,  2  C.  C.  A.  58. 

1  Doyle  v.  Kansas  City  Ry.  Co. 
(Mo.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  970. 

2  Pugh  v.  Ayres,  47  Mo.  App.  490. 

3  Gaff  ney  v.  People,  50  N.  Y.  423 ; 
People  v.  Weldon,  111  N.  Y.  596. 

4  Pennsylvania,  etc.  Co.  v.  Cook, 
123  Pa.  St.  170;  Link  v.  Sheldon,  136 
N.  Y.  1 ;  Doren  v.  Jelliffe,  20  N.  Y. 
S.  636;  Payne  v.  Dicus  (Iowa,  1893), 
55  N.  W.  Rep.  483;  Tuoraey  v. 
O'Reilly,  22  N.  Y.  S.  930;  Cleveland, 
etc.  Co.  v.  Aherns,  42  111.  App.  434; 


Riche  v.  Martin,  20  N.  Y.  S.  693; 
Flynn  v.  Manhattan  Co.,  20  id.  652; 
Vannatta  v.  Duffy  (Ind.,  1893),  30 
N.  E.  Rep.  807 ;  Partridge  v.  Russell, 
50  Hun,  601 ;  2  N.  Y.  S.  529;  Turner 
v.  Newberg,  109  N.  Y.  301 ;  Reiley 
v.  Haynes,  38  Kan.,  259;  Delamater 
v.  Prudential  L.  Ins.  Co. ,  5  N.  Y.  S. 
586 ;  Kilpatrick  v.  Dean,  4  N.  Y.  S. 
708.  In  some  states  it  is  held  that 
where  no  objection  has  been  made 
to  the  reception  of  incompetent  evi- 
dence, the  court  is  not  bound  to 
order  it  to  be  stricken  out,  but  may, 
on  request,  direct  the  jury  to  disre- 
gard the  objectionable  evidence. 
But  it  is  also  held  in  the  same  juris- 
diction that  the  court  may  strike 
evidence  of  its  own  motion ;  and 
where  incompetent  evidence  has 
been  stricken  out  it  is  not  error  for 
the  court  to  omit  to  direct  the  jury 
to  disregard  such  evidence,  though, 
if  requested,  this  instruction  should 
be  given,  and,  even  in  the  absence  of 


§  368.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  543 

should  be  confined  strictly  to  that  portion  of  the  testimony 
which  is  objectionable,  and  the  denial  of  a  general  motion  to 
strike  out  all  the  witness  has  said  will  be  sustained  on  appeal 
where  a  part  of  his  evidence  was  clearly  admissible.1  A  mo- 
tion to  strike  out,  made  after  all  the  evidence  is  in,  comes 
too  late;2  nor  is  such  a  motion  proper  upon  the  sole  ground 
of  the  insufficiency  of  evidence,  the  proper  remedy  being  a 
demurrer  or  a  motion  to  direct  a  verdict.3  If  the  evidence 
which  is  given  by  the  witness  is  irresponsive,4  or  irrelevant,5 
or  if  it  appears  that  he  has  no  knowledge  of  the  matter6  upon 
which  he  is  interrogated,  a  denial  of  a  motion  to  strike  out  is 
reversible  error.  So,  also,  when  by  consent  the  cross-exam- 
ination of  a  material  witness  is  suspended  on  his  promise  that 
he  will  attend  for  further  cross-examination  when  he  is  wanted, 
it  is  error,  for  which  a  new  trial  should  be  granted,  for  the 
court  to  refuse  to  strike  out  his  testimony  if  he  fails  to  appear 
as  promised.7 

A  motion  to  strike  out  is  properly  denied  where  the  sole 
ground  on  which  it  is*  based  is  the  unfavorable  character  of 
an  answer  which  a  party  has  elicited  from  his  own  witness  in 
reply  to  a  relevant  and  proper  question.8 

any  request,  it  is  the  better  practice  3  Wilcox  v.    Stephenson,    30  Fla. 

for  the  court  to  do  so.     Platner  v.  377. 

Platner.   78  N.  Y.   90 ;  Gall  v.  Gall,  *  See  §  336 ;  Stillwell  v.  Patton,  108 

114  N.  Y.  109.  Mo.  352. 

'  Fleming  v.  Shepherd,  83  Ga.  338 ;  5  Williams  v.  Klink,  90  Mich.  297 ; 

Davis  v.  Hopkins  (Col.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Chester  v.   Bakersfield,  64  Cal.  42; 

Rep.    70 ;    Waymire    v.    Lank,    121  Gainard  v.  Rochester  City  R.  R.  Co. , 

Ind.  1 ;  Moore  v.  McDonald,  68  Md.  2  N.  Y.  S.  470. 

321;   Wilson   v.   Equitable  Gas  Co.,  6  Bishop  v.  Hendrickson,  16  N.  Y. 

152  Pa.   St.   566;  Miller  v.  Windsor  S.  799;  Bronson  v.  Leach,  42  N.  W. 

W.  Co.,  148  Pa.  St.  429;  Buford  v.  Rep.  174;  74  Mich.  713. 

Shannon  (Ala.,  1893),  10  S.  Rep.  263;  ?  Mathews  v.   Mathews,  53  Hun, 

Carrico  v.  West  Vir.,  etc.  Co.,  35  W.  244;  6  N.  Y.  S.  589. 

Va.  689;  Roberts  v.  Burgess,  85  Ala.  8  East  Tenn.  etc.  Co.  v.  Turvaville 

192;    Binford   v.    Young,    115    Ind.  (Ala.,  1893),   12  S.  Rep.  63;  Central 

174;  Bamford  v.  Iron  Co.,  33  Fed.  R.  &  Banking  Co.  v.  Ingram  (Ala., 

Rep.  677.  1893),    12    S.    Rep.    801 ;    Smith   v. 

2  Kansas,  etc.  Co.  v.  Phillips  (Ala.,  Zeigler,  63  Hun,  624;  Silberstein  v. 

1893),    13    S.    Rep.    265;    Falvey  v.  Houston,  W.,  St.  &  P.  F.  R.  Co.,  4 

Jackson,   132   Ind.    176;    Overby  v.  N.  Y.  S.  843. 
Chesa.  &  O.  R.  Co.,  37  W.  Va.  524. 


544 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


[§  369. 


§  309.  The  improper  admission  of  evidence,  when  imma- 
terial,—1 If  it  is  clearly  shown  beyond  all  doubt  that  the  evi- 
dence which  has  been  improperly  admitted  did  not  and  could 
not  have  had  any  possible  effect  upon  the  jury  because  of  its 
admission,  a  new  trial  should  not  be  granted.1  The  irrelevancy 
or  immateriality  of  evidence  which  was  admitted  is  not  ground 
for  a  new  trial  if  its  admission  is  not  affirmatively  shown  to 
have  influenced  the  verdict.2  So  it  has  been  laid  down  as  a 
general  rule  that  if  the  verdict  is  rendered  upon  a  preponder- 
ance of  sufficient,  satisfactory  or  uncontradicted  relevant  and 
competent  evidence,  it  is  never  material  how  much  irrelevant 
or  otherwise  incompetent  or  inadmissible  evidence  has  been 
received.3 


1  Williams  v.  Fresno  Canal  &  Irr. 
Co..  30  Pac.  Rep.  961;  96  Cal.  14; 
Van  Kamen  v.  Roes,  65  Hun,  625 ; 
Indianapolis  Cabinet  Co.  v.  Herrnian 
(Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  579;  Mitch- 
ell v.  Bradstreet  Co.  (Mo.,  1893),  22 
S.  W.  Rep.  724  ,  Montross  v.  Eddy,  53 
N.  W.  Rep.  916;  94  Mich.  100; 
Angell  v.  Hill,  18  N.  Y.  S.  824;  Cas- 
sin  v.  La  Salle  County,  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
122;  ITex.  Civ.  App.  127;  Reed  v. 
Stapp,  52  Fed.  Rep.  641 ;  3  C.  C.  A. 
244 ;  9  U.  S.  App.  34 ;  Smith  v.  Sun 
Pub.  Co.,  55  Fed.  Rep.  240;  Grun- 
diesv.  Kelso,  41  111.  App.  200;  North 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Cook,  43  id.  634 ; 
Peck  v.  Hutchison  (Iowa,  1893),  55 
N.  W.  Rep.  511;  Wayne  v.  Blun 
(Ga.,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep.  288. 

2  People  v.  Duffie,  62  Mich.  487; 
Dibble  v.  Dimick,  23  N.  Y.  S.  680; 
4  Misc.  Rep.  190;  Foster  v.  Oldham, 
23  N.  Y.  S.  1024;  4  Misc.  Rep.  201. 
So  permitting  an  incompetent  wit- 
ness to  testify  is  not  error  where 
his  evidence  is  wholly  cumulative. 
Travis  v.  Continental  Ins.  Co.,  47 
Mo.  App.  472;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v. 
Bivans  (111.,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Rep.  456; 
Reed  v.  New,  39  Kan.  727:  Con- 
nor v.  City  of   New  York,    19    N. 


Y.  S.  85;  Dawson  v.  Schloss,  93 
Cal.  194;  29  Pac.  Rep.  31;  Phoenix 
Ins.  Co.  of  London  v.  Freedman 
(Tex.,  1893),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  1010;  In 
re  Gannon's  Will,  21  N.  Y.  S.  960; 
Larson  v.  Lombard  Inv.  Co.  (Minn., 
1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  179;  Miller  v. 
James  (Iowa,  1893),  53  N.  W.  Rep. 
227;  Lane  v.  Lane  (Mo.,  1893),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  99. 

3  Wolfe  v.  Underwood  (Ala.,  1893), 
12  S.  Rep.  234;  Keely  v.  Andrew* 
(Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  175.  The  ad- 
mission of  the  evidence  of  an  expert, 
who  was  incompetent,  upon  a  ques- 
tion of  value  is  not  error  when  his 
estimate  was  lower  than  the  verdict 
recovered.  Bramble  v.  Hunt,  68 
Hun,  204.  The  admission  of  irrele- 
vant evidence  is  not  error  if  no 
finding  is  based  on  it  (In  re  Coun- 
tryman's Estate,  151  Pa.  St.  577;  25 
Atl.  Rep.  146;  31  W.  N.  C.  148;  Ca- 
hill  v.  Murphy,  30  Pac. .  Rep.  195; 
94  Cal.  129;  Harrington  v.  Harring- 
ton, 154  Mass.  517;  Alcorn  v.  Chi- 
cago &  A.  R.  Co.,  108  Mo.  81;  18 
S.  W.  Rep.  188;  Theodorsen  v.  Ahl- 
gren,  37  111.  App.  140),  or  if  the  rec- 
ord does  not  show  that  it  was  sub- 
mitted or  read  to  the  jury.     In  re 


§  370.] 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


545 


Again,  as  respects  the  proof  of  particular  facts  considered 
apart  from  the  question  of  a  preponderance  of  the  evidence 
in  the  whole  case,  it  has  been  held  that  the  admission  of  in- 
competent evidence  tending  to  prove  such  facts  is  not  reversi- 
ble error  where  they  were  admitted  or  have  been  proved  by 
satisfactory  evidence  of  a  different  description.1  Thus  the 
exclusion  or  admission  of  evidence  to  prove  any  particular 
facts,  the  truth  of  which  is  admitted  by  either  party  in  his 
pleadings,  is  immaterial.2 

The  admission  of  irrelevant,  immaterial  or  otherwise  inad- 
missible evidence  in  a  trial  by  the  court  without  a  jury,  though 
perhaps  improper,  is  not  ground  for  reversal  on  an  appeal,  the 
theory  of  the  law  being  that  the  court  will  not  permit  itself 
to  be  influenced  in  its  findings  of  fact  by  such  incompetent 
evidence.3 

§  370.  The  improper  exclusion  of  evidence,  when  imma- 
terial.—  The  improper  rejection  or  exclusion  of  competent 
evidence  by  the  court  in  a  jury  trial  is  no  ground  for  reversal 


Westerfield,   96    Cal.    113;  30    Pac. 
Rep.  1104. 

1  Connor  v.  City  of  New  York,  19 
N.  Y.  S.  85;  64  Hun,  635;  Symes 
v.  Exchange  Bank,  48  Kan.  713; 
Vulcanite  Paving  Co.  v.  Euch,  147 
Pa.  St.  251 ;  25  Atl.  Eep.  555 ;  Phoe- 
nix Ins.  Co.  v.  Pickel,  3  Ind.  App. 
332;  29  N.  E.  Eep.  432;  Dawson 
v.  Schloss,  93  Cal.  194;  Stanton 
v.  Esty  Mfg.  Co.,  90  Mich.  12;  51 
N.  W.  Eep.  101 ;  Eeid  v.  New  York, 
N.  H.  &  H.  E.  Co.,  63  Hun,  630; 
Searles  v.  State,  6  Ohio  Cir.  Ct.  Eep. 
331 ;  Eastis  v.  Montgomery,  93  Ala. 
293;  McKay  v.  Eiley,  135  El.  586; 
People  v.  Fong  Ah  Sing,  70  Cal.  8; 
Pensacola,  etc.  Co.  v.  Anderson,  26 
Fla.  425 ;  State  v.  Conable,  81  Iowa, 
60;  Hunter  v.  McElhanney,  48  Mo. 
App.  234;  McGarry  v.  Averill,  50 
Kan.  362;  Montgomery  v.  Hinds 
(Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Eep.  1100; 
Grout  v.  Cottrell,  67  Hun,  650? 
Dorsheimer  v.  Glenn,  51  Fed.  Eep. 
404;  2  C.  C.  A.  309;  4  U.  S.  App. 
35 


500;  Seligman  v.  Eogers  (Mo.,  1893), 
21  S.  W.  Eep.  94;  Greer  v.  Laws,  56 
Ark.  37.  Thus  the  admission  as 
evidence  of  a  memorandum  used  to 
refresh  the  memory  of  a  witness, 
who  then  testifies  fully  to  all  the 
matters  referred  to  in  the  memo- 
randum, is  not  erroneous.  Butler  v. 
Chicago,  etc.  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  54 
N.  W.  Eep.  208. 

2  Hartman  v.  Louisville,  etc.  Co., 
48  Mo.  App.  619;  Bosenbaum  v. 
Eussell,  53  N.  W.  Eep.  384 ;  35  Neb. 
513;  Consaul  v.  Sheldon,  52  N.  W. 
Eep.  1104;  35  Neb.  247;  Greenspau 
v.  American  Star  Order,  20  N.  Y. 
S.  945;  Heinlein  v.  Heilbron  (Cal., 
1893),  31  Pac.  Eep.  838. 

3  Markell  v.  Mathews  (Colo.,  1893), 
32  Bac.  Eep.  176 ;  St.  Louis,  A.  &  T. 
Co.  v.  Turner,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App.  625; 
Baker  v.  Smith  (Ga.,  1893),  15  S.  E. 
Eep.  788;  Kleiman  v.  Geiselman 
(Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Eep.  796; 
Laumeier  v.  Gehner,  110  Mo.  122; 
White  v.  White,  82  Cal.  427 ;   Eat- 


510  KEOEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  370, 

where  it  would  not,  if  admitted,  have  resulted  in  bringing 
about  a  different  verdict  than  was  rendered.  If  the  probative 
force  of  the  excluded  evidence  is  very  slight,  or  if  its  credi- 
bility is  doubtful,  or  its  relevancy  so  remote  that  it  is  very 
clear  that  it  would  not  have  affected  the  result  in  case  it  had 
been  permitted  to  go  to  the  jury,  it  exclusion,  though  im- 
proper, is  not  reversible  error,  as  neither  party  is  prejudiced 
thereby.1  If,  however,  the  exclusion  of  the  competent  evi- 
dence resulted  in  preventing  the  case  from  going  to  the  jury, 
or  if  the  evidence  was  thereby  caused  so  to  preponderate  in 
favor  of  the  successful  party  that  the  verdict  as  rendered  by 
the  jury  was  the  direct  result  of  keeping  the  competent  evi- 
dence from  their  consideration,  then  a  serious  injustice  has 
been  done,  and  the  party  who  is  prejudiced  by  the  erroneous 
ruling  of  the  court  should  have  a  new  trial.2  But  an  erroneous 
ruling  by  which  competent  and  material  evidence  is  excluded 
will  always  be  deemed  cured  by  its  subsequent  admission  be- 
fore the  verdict  is  rendered.3  If  the  evidence  is  excluded  on 
the  direct  examination  of  the  witness,  the  error  is  cured  when 
it  is  subsequently  elicited  during  his  cross-examination. 

cliffe  v.   County  Court,   36  W.  Va.  Tuomey  v.  O'Reilly,  22  N.  Y.  S.  930 ; 

202.  3  Misc.  Rep.  302. 

1  Doll  v.  People  (111.,  1893),  34 .  N.  2  McNarnara    v.    Corp.     of    New 

E.  Rep.  413;  Dexter  v.  Harrison  (111.,  Melleray  (Iowa,  1892),  55  N.  W.  Rep. 

1893),  34  id.  46;  Stevenson  v.  Gun-  322;  Haines  v.  Thompson,  21  N.  Y. 

ning,  25  Atl.   Rep.   697;  64  Vt.  601;  S.  991;  2  Misc.  Rep.  385. 

Higginbothani    v.    Campbell    (Ga.,  3  Gregory  v.  Coleman  (Tex. ,  1893), 

1893),  15  S.  E.   Rep.   797;   Smith  v.  22  S.    W.    Rep.    181;    Carpenter  v. 

Mott,  65  Hun,  625 ;  Good  v.  Knox,  Knapp,  66  Hun,   632 ;   McKenzie  v. 

64  Vt.  97;  Barnes  v.  Denslow,  9  N.  Oregon  Imp.   Co.,  5  Wash.  St.  409; 

Y.  S.  53;  Tischler  v.  Apple,  30  Fla.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.  v.  Wedel(Ill.,  1893), 

132 ;    Taylor  v.  Dominick,  36  S.   C.  32  N.  E.   Rep.   547 ;  Smalley  v.  Ful- 

368;  Abbott  v.  Petersburgh  Granite  lerton  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep. 

Quarry  Co.,  62  Hun,  622 ;  Hunnicutt  520 ;  Tenn.  Riv.  Transp.  Co.  v.  Kava- 

v.  Railroad  Co.  (Ga.,  1890),  11  S.  E.  naugh  (Ala.,  1893),  13  S.   Rep.   283; 

Rep.  580.     No  error  is  committed  by  Pharo   v.  Beadleston,  21   N.    Y.    S. 

the  exclusion  of  evidence  which  is  989;    2  Misc.    Rep.    424;   St.  Kevin 

competent  to  fix  liability  on  a  de-  Mining  Co.  v.  Isaacs  (Colo.,  1893),  32 

fendant  against  whom  the  action  is  Pac.  Rep.    822 ;    Hamilton    v.   Rich 

dismissed    on  other   valid  grounds  Hill  Coal  Mining  Co.,  108  Mo.  364; 

where  such  evidence  is  wholly  irrele-  18  S.  W.  Rep.  977 ;  Minnesota  S.  Ag. 

vant  as    to    the    other    defendants  Soc.  v.  Swanson,  48  Minn.  231 ;  Jer- 

against  whom  judgment  is  rendered,  man  v.   Tenneas,  44  La.   Ann.   620; 

Kelly  v.  Insurance  Co.,  82  Iowa,  137. 


§  371.]  RECEPTION    OF   EVIDENCE.  54:7 

§  371.  Nature  and  use  of  stipulations  as  regards  evidence. 

A  stipulation  is  an  agreement  between  counsel  usually  required 
by  statute  to  be  in  writing1  and  to  be  entered  upon  the  minutes 
of  the  court,2  respecting  the  carrying  on  of  a  case  which  is  in 
litigation  in  court.  When  a  stipulation,  voluntarily  entered 
into  by  the  parties  or  by  their  counsel,  is  committed  to  writing 
and  filed  with  the  clerk  of  the  court,  it  becomes  a  part  of  the 
record,  is  irrevocable,  and  both  parties  are  conclusively  bound 
thereby  to  the  same  extent  and  on  the  same  principles  as  by 
any  other  matter  constituting  an  estoppel  of  record.3  But  a 
stipulation  is  not  binding  on  persons  who  became  parties  to 
the  action  after  it  was  entered  into  by  the  original  parties,4 
nor  will  the  stipulation  be  held  to  estop  infant  parties  unless 
it  is  ratified  by  the  court  upon  affirmative  proof  that  it  is  not 
prejudicial  to  them.5 

Yery  frequently,  for  the  purpose  of  saving  time  and  expense, 
when  a  witness  is  ill  or  out  of  the  jurisdiction  so  that  his  evi- 
dence can  only  be  obtained  by  a  commission,  or  where  the  point 
to  be  proved  is  collateral,  immaterial  or  uncontradicted,  a  stip- 
ulation is  entered  into  that  the  witness  will  testify  to  certain 
facts  set  forth  therein,  or  that  the  point  in  question  shall  be 
admitted  as  proved.  In  the  former  case  the  fact  that  the  ab- 
sent witness  appears  in  court  after  the  party's  case  is  closed,*5 
or  the  fact  that  the  deposition  of  the  witness  subsequently 
procured  is  inconsistent  with  the  statement  of  his  evidence 
contained  in  the  stipulation,  does  not  give  the  adverse  party 

1  Taylor   v.    Chicago,   etc.  Co.,  80  Idaho,  1174.    A  stipulation  as  to  evi- 

Iowa,  431 ;  Gulf,  C.  &  S.  F.  Ry.  Co.  dence  which  is  filed  in  one  action  is 

v.  King  (Tex.,  1891),  16  S.  W.  Rep.  admissible  as  evidence  in  a  subse- 

641.  quent  action  between  the  same  par- 

2Garrigan  v.   Dickey  (Ind.  App.,  ties,   though  not  specially   pleaded 

1891),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  713.  by  the   party  who  offers  it.     Cou- 

3  Kenton   Ins.    Co.    v.    First    Nat.  brough  v.   Adams,  70  Cal.   374;    11 

Bank  (Ky.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Rep.  841;  Pac.  Rep.  634. 

City  of  Chicago  v.  Drexel  (111.,  1892),  *  Kneeland  v.  Luce,  141  U.  S.  437 ; 

30  N.  E.  Rep.  774;  Whalen  v.  Bren-  Midland  R.  Co.  v.  Island  Coal  Co., 

nan,  34  Neb.  129 ;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  759 ;  126  Ind.  384. 

Worsham  v.  McLeod  (Miss.,  1892),  11  5  Eidam  v.  Finnegan,  48  Minn.  53; 

S.   Rep.   107 ;   Dilworth  v.  Curts,  29  50  N.  W.  Rep.  933. 

N.  E.  Rep.  8G1;  139  111.   508;  Amer.  6  Harris  v.  McArthur  (Ga.,  1893), 

Bank  Note  Co.  v.  Man.  Ry.  Co.,  66  15  S.  E.  Rep.  758. 
Hun,   627;  Mahoney  v.   Marshall,  2 


548  EE0EPTI0N   OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  371. 

a  right  to  claim  that  the  latter  shall  be  disregarded,1  or  de- 
prive the  party  in  whose  behalf  the  evidence  is  offered  of 
his  right  to  use  it.  Though  it  has  sometimes  been  laid  down 
as  a  rule  that  a  stipulation  ought  to  be  construed  most  strictly 
against  the  party  for  whose  benefit  it  was  made,2  yet  such  an 
agreement  should  receive  a  liberal  and  reasonable  construe- 
tion  by  the  court,  so  as  to  bring  about  the  apparent  intention 
of  the  parties  and  to  aid  in  the  expeditious  administration  of 
justice.3  So  it  has  been  held  that  parol  evidence  is  inadmis- 
sible to  vary  the  terms  of  a  stipulation,  but  that  the  court 
should  gather  its  meaning  from  the  whole  instrument  viewed 
in  the  liirht  of  all  the  circumstances  in  the  case.4 

Where  a  party  has  entered  into  a  stipulation  that  evidence 
which  has  been  given  in  a  prior  proceeding  by  witnesses  who 
may  be  unable  to  attend  shall  be  used  in  a  pending  trial,  he 
does  not  waive  his  rights  under  it,  in  case  any  witness  is  sub- 
sequently unable  to  attend,  by  calling  one  of  these  witnesses 
who  may  be  in  court.5  Where  documentary  evidence  has 
been  lost  and  the  parties  enter  into  a  stipulation  that  a  cer- 
tain mode  of  proof  shall  be  adopted  in  lieu  thereof,  a  substan- 
tial compliance  with  the  mode  agreed  on  is  all  that  can  be 
required,  and  proof  as  made  will  not  be  rejected  because  not 
precisely  identical  in  time,  place  or  manner  with  that  which 
has  been  stipulated  for.6     Any  stipulation  entered  into   by 

i  Dickerson  v.  Mathewson,  50  Fed.  4  Schroeder  v.  Fry,  12  N.  Y.  S.  625. 

Rep.  73.  5  Foster's  Ex'r  v.  Dickinson,  64  Vt. 

2  Heller  v.  Petterson,  3  N.  Y.  S.  257 ;  233;  24  Atl.  Rep.  253.     Astipulation 

18  N.  Y.  State  Rep.  928.  that  evidence  given  in  one  case  may 

3Lally  v.  Rossman,   82  Wis.    147;  be  read  "on  the  trial"  of  another 

51  N.  W.  Rep.  1132;  People  v.  Cooper,  case   means  on  any  trial,  whether 

139  111.  461;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  872;  Mackay  first  or  second  (Herbst  v.   Vacuum 

v.  Armstrong  (Tex.,  1892),  19  S.  W.  Oil  Co.,   68  Hun,  222);   though  by 

Rep.   463 ;    Keator  v.  Colo.  Coal   &  signing  such  a  stipulation  the  party 

Iron  Co.  (Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac.   Rep.  does  not  waive  his  right  to  object  to 

857;  Davidson  v.  Felder  (Tex.,  1893),  evidence  which,  though  competent 

21   S.    W.    Rep.    714;    Schroeder   v.  in  the  early  trial,  is  not  competent 

Frey,    114   N.    Y.    266;    Blossom  v.  in  the  later.     Bridgham's   Appeal, 

Griffin,  13  N.  Y.  569 ;  Field  v.  Mun-  82  Me.  323.     Contra,  Thompson  v. 

son,  47  id.  221 ;  Springsteen  v.  Samp-  Thompson  (Ala.,  1891),  8  S.  Rep.  419. 

son,  32  id.  703 ;  Calkins  v.  Falk,  39  6  Crow  v.  Gleason,  20  N.  Y.  S.  590 ; 

Barb.  620;  Otis  v.  Conway,  114  N.  Y.  65  Hun,  625.    But  c/.  Keator  v.  Col- 

113;  Rogers  v.  Kneeland,  10  Wend,  orado,  etc.  Co.  (Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac. 

219.  Rep.  857. 


§  372.]  KECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  549 

the  parties  which  is  equitable  and  fair  to  both,  which  is 
reasonable  in  itself  and  does  not  contravene  public  polic}''  or 
good  morals,  will  be  binding  on  the  court.1  If  a  stipulation 
is  tainted  with  fraud,  or  if  it  has  been  entered  into  by  counsel 
without  his  client's  consent,  or  improvidently  or  unadvisedly,2 
as  wThen,  for  example,  by  mistaking  the  legal  effect  of  the 
agreement,  the  counsel  admits  as  true  material  facts  which 
are  not  so.  and  this  would  prevent  a  trial  of  the  case  on  its 
merits,  it  will  be  disregarded.3  So  if  the  stipulation  is  framed 
in  such  a  manner  that  the  interest  of  a  party  is  likely  to  suf- 
fer because  of  the  fraud,  collusion  or  unfairness  which  has 
been  practiced,  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  court  to  cause 
it  to  be  set  aside.4 

§  372.  Demurrer  to  evidence. —  The  defendant,  by  demur- 
ring to  the  evidence  of  the  plaintiff,  is  considered  to  admit  its 
truth.  So  the  plaintiff  is  then  entitled  to  all  favorable  infer- 
ences which  may  reasonably  and  fairly  be  drawn  from  the 
evidence,  whether  the  facts  which  constitute  his  evidence 
were  elicited  by  direct  or  by  cross-examination.5  But  a  de- 
murrer serves  rather  as  an  objection  to  the  competency  of  the 
evidence  than  to  its  sufficiency  and  weight;  and  if,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  court,  there  is  evidence  sufficient  to  go  to 
the  jury,  it  is  its  duty  to  overrule  the  demurrer.6 

1  Matter  of  N.  Y.,  L.  &  W.  R.  R.  strongly  against  him ;  and  such  con- 
Co.,  93  N.  Y.  447;  Hong  Kong  &  elusions  as  a  jury  may  justifiably 
Shanghai  Banking  Co.  v.  Cooper,  draw  the  court  ought  to  draw." 
114  N.  Y.  388.  Pawling  v.  United  States,  4  Cranch, 

2Sperb  v.   Railroad  Co.,  57  Hun,  221.      See,    also,    Nuzum    v.    Pitts- 

588.  burgh,  C.  &  St.  L.  R.  Co.,  30  W.  Va. 

3  Ward  v.  Clay,  82  Cal.  502.  228. 

*  Stonesifer  v.  Kilburn,  94  Cal.  33 ;  6  Shaw  v.  County  Court,  30  W.  Va. 

Powell  v.  Turner,  139  Mass.  97.  488 ;  4  S.  E.  Rep.  430 ;  Hartman  v. 

SHawley  v.  Dawson,  16  Oreg.  344;  Cin.  etc.  Co.  (Iud.,  1893),  30  N.  E. 
Hopkins  v.  Bowers,  111  N.  C.  175;  Rep.  930;  Pitt  v.  Texas  Storage  Co. 
City  of  St.  Louis  v.  Missouri  Pac.  R.  (Tex.,  1893),  18  S.  W.  Rep.  465;  Ben- 
Co.  (Mo.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep.  202;  ninghof  v.  Cubbison,  45  Kan.  621. 
Healey  v.  Simpson  (Mo.,  1893),  20  S.  "A  demurrer  to  plaintiff's  evidence 
W.  Rep,  8S1  (in  equity).  "The  de-  admits  the  facts  the  evidence  tends 
murrant  admits  the  truth  of  the  to  prove.  The  court  is  to  make 
testimony,  and  such  conclusions  as  every  inference  of  fact  in  favor  of 
the  jury  may  fairly  draw,  but  not  the  plaintiff  which  a  jury  might  in- 
forced  and  violent  inferences.  The  fer.  If  then  the  evidence  is  insufli- 
testimony    is    to    be    taken    most  cient  to    support   a  verdict   in  his 


550  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  373. 

In  a  criminal  prosecution,  where  the  accused  has  once 
pleaded  not  guilty,  the  state  may  hold  him  to  his  election  of 
a  jury  trial  and  refuse  to  permit  a  demurrer  to  the  evidence; 
and  even  if  it  shall  join  issue  on  the  demurrer,  the  matter  is 
wholly  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  who  may  refuse  to  en- 
tertain the  plea.1 

§  373.  Surprise. —  By  surprise  is  meant  the  introduction 
of  evidence  at  the  trial  which  causes  such  a  variance  between 
the  allegations  and  the  proofs  that  the  adverse  party  is  mis- 
led in  maintaining  his  action  or  defense  on  the  merits.2  A 
party  who  has  thus  been  surprised  must  move  for-  a  new 
trial,  which  should  be  granted  if  the  variance  was  material 
and  the  party  was  unjustly  treated.3  To  warrant  a  court  in 
setting  aside  judicial  proceedings,  which  are  prima  facie  fair 
and  regular,  upon  the  ground  of  surprise,  it  must  have  been 
a  legal  surprise,  and  the  party  alleging  it  must  himself  have 
been  wholly  without  fault.4 

The  fact  that  relevant  evidence  is  introduced  at  the  trial 
which  a  party  did  not  expect  would  be  introduced,5  or  which 
he  is  for  any  reason  unprepared  to  rebut,  does  not  constitute 
surprise  in  its  technical  sense.  If  the  evidence  does  not  give 
rise  to  a  material  variance  between  the  allegation  and  the 
proof,  so  that  a  new  cause  of  action  or  a  new  defense  is  sub- 
stituted for  the  original  cause  or  defense,  there  is  no  surprise 
for  which  a  new  trial  will  be  granted.  Where  the  party  goes 
to  trial  without  sufficient  preparation,  or  fails  to  examine 
witnesses,  or  is  unable  to  produce  evidence  upon  some  point 
entirely  within  and  relevant  to  the  issue,  to  meet  the  unex- 
pected evidence  of  his  adversary,  he  must  abide  the  conse- 

favor,  the  demurrer  should  be  sus-  29  Pac.  Rep.  1044;  Tittman  v.  Thorn- 

tained."     Donohue  v.  St.  Louis,  etc.  ton,  107  Mo.  500;  Griffin  v.  O'Neill, 

R.  Co.,  91  Mo.  360.  47  Kan.   116.     A  new  trial  will  not 

Duncan  v.  State  (Fla.,   1892),  10  be  granted  because  the  successful 

S.  Rep.  815.  party  perjured  himself  on  a  mate- 

2  Nash  v.  Town,  5  Wall.  698 ;  An-  rial  point  if  his  adversary,  knowing 
derson's  Law  Diet.  See  ante,  §§22-24.  the  true   facts,    was  unprepared  to 

3  Kenezleber  v.  Wahl,  92  Cal.  202 ;  prove  them.      Randall  v.   Packard, 
Texas,  etc.    Co.   v.  Barron,   78  Tex.  20  N.  Y.  S.  718. 

421;  14  S.  W.  Rep.  698.  5  Bingham  v.  Walk,  128  Tnd.  164; 

*Lockwood  v.  Rose,  125  Ind.  588;     Shotwell  v.  McElhenny,  101  Mo.  677. 
O'Donnell  v.  Bennett  (Mont,  1892), 


§  374.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  551 

quences  of  his  own  laches;  and  though  in  its  discretion  tho 
court  may  grant  delay,  he  cannot  claim  a  new  trial  because 
he  has  been  surprised.1  So  the  mere  absence  of  material  wit- 
nesses does  not  give  the  party  a  right  to  claim  that  he  is  sur- 
prised so  as  to  obtain  a  new  trial,  particularly  if  their  absence 
is  the  fault  of  the  party,  or  if  he  has  failed  to  ask  for  delay  to 
procure  their  attendance.2 

§374.  Rebutting  evidence  —  Nature  and  use  of. —  The 
primary  significance  of  the  word  "rebut"  is  to  contradict  or 
oppose.  From  this  word  is  derived  "  rebuttal,"  which  is  fre- 
quently used  as  equivalent  to  the  order  and  time  in  which 
evidence  that  is  intended  to  contradict  other  evidence  is  to  be 
introduced.  Thus  we  speak  of  evidence  "on"  or  "in"  rebut- 
tal.3 

"Kebutting  evidence"  sometimes  signifies  any  evidence 
which  is  conclusive,  which  will  overcome  a  presumption  or 
outweigh  other  evidence.  Again,  the  expression  may  mean 
only  evidence  which  contradicts.  In  the  one  case  the  effect 
of  the  rebutting  evidence  is  to  avoid  the  operation  of  a  pre- 
sumption of  law  or  of  fact.  In  the  other  the  result  is  to  de- 
stroy by  explanation  or  denial  the  effect  of  affirmative  evidence 
already  adduced.4  What  evidence  shall  be  received  in  rebut- 
tal is,  as  we  have  seen,  largely  discretionary  with  the  court.3 
If  the  evidence  which  is  offered  is  such  that  a  party  should 
have  properly  introduced  it  in  making  out  his  original  cause 
of  action  or  his  defense,  it  is  not  error  for  the  court  to  reject 
it  if  he  seeks  to  introduce  it  under  the  guise  of  rebutting 
evidence.6     But  this  principle  should  not  be  pushed  too  far ; 

i  Davidson  v.   Wheeler,    17  R.  I.  Fain  v.  Cornett,  25  Ga.  186 ;  People 

433 ;  Hartnian  v.  Journal,  19  N.  Y.  S.  v.  Page,  1  Idaho,  194 ;  Butterfield  v. 

401;  Dillingham  v.  Flack,  63  Hun,  Gilchrist,    63    Minn.    155;    State   v. 

629;    Jinks  v.    Lewis,    89   Ga.   787;  Claire,  41  La.  Ann.  1067;  Collins  v. 

Crowell  v.    Harvey,   30    Neb.    570;  Glass,  46  Mo.  App.  297. 

Francisco  v.  Benepe,  6   Mont.  243;  5  See  §  375. 

Smith  &  Keating  Implement  Co.  v.  «  Young  v.  Brady,  94  Cal.  128 ;  29 

Wheeler,  27  Mo.  App.  16.  Pac.  Rep.  489 ;  Belden  v.  Allen,  61 

2  Brady  v.  Valentine,  21  N.  Y.  S.  Conn.  173;  Shearer  v.  Middleton,  88 
776;  3  Misc.  Rep.  19;  Cassiano  v.  Mich.  621;  50  N.  W.  Rep.  737; 
Straus,  23  N.  Y.  S.  1036;  Leonard  Chateaugay  Ore  &  Iron  Co.  v.  Blake, 
v.  German  F.  Ins.  Co.,  23  id.  6S4.  144  U.  S.  476;  O'Connell  v.  People, 

3  See  Anderson's  Law  Diet  87  N.  Y.  377. 
*  Anderson's    Law     Diet. ,    citing 


552  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  374. 

nor  is  the  rule  applied  with  much  strictness.  Evidence  which 
is  corroborative  or  cumulative  of  other  evidence  already  offered 
by  a  party,  but  which  does  not  at  the  same  time  contradict 
any  affirmative  adverse  evidence  or  tend  to  overthrow  any 
presumption,  is  not  admissible  in  rebuttal.  But  the  mere  fact 
that  certain  evidence  has,  or  may  have,  a  tendency  to  corrob- 
orate other  evidence  which  the  party  has  introduced  to  sub- 
stantiate his  cause  of  action  so  that  it  could  more  appropri- 
ately have  been  introduced  as  evidence  in  chief,  does  not 
necessarily  render  it  inadmissible  in  rebuttal.  The  party 
should  not  be  deprived  of  his  right  to  contradict  and  weaken 
the  evidence  of  his  opponent  because  the  only  means  available 
consists  of  evidence  which  he  might  have  used  to  confirm  and 
strengthen  his  original  case.1  So,  though  the  introduction  of 
cumulative  evidence  is  not  to  be  encouraged,  such  evidence 
has  often  been  held  to  be  admissible  in  rebuttal  where  one's 
witness  has  been  directly  contradicted  as  to  some  material 
fact  in  issue.  Here  the  party  may  introduce  another  witness 
to  testify  to  the  same  fact  as  the  witness  whose  evidence  was 
contradicted.2 

Where  the  office  of  rebutting  evidence  is  to  overcome  a 
presumption,  evidence  of  a  fact  which  was  irrelevant  or  inad- 
missible on  the  direct  examination  may  be  introduced  in  re- 
buttal to  overcome  a  presumption  created  by  the  adverse 
party's  evidence.3  This  evidence  which  is  offered  in  rebuttal, 
though  it  may  not  have  been  competent  because  of  its  irrele- 
vancy or  for  some  other  reason  as  evidence-in-chief  to  support 

i  State  v.  Magoon,  50  Vt.  333.  368;  Branstetter  v.  Morgan  (N.  D., 

2  Green  v.  Gould,  3  Allen  (Mass.),  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  758;  Zacharie 
465;  Sherwood  v.  Titman,  55  Pa.  St.  v.  Franklin,  12  Pet.  151;  Southern 
77;  Rorner  v.  Center  (Minn.,  1893),  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v.  Rauh,  49  Fed.  Rep. 
54  N.  W.  Rep.  1052;  Kansas  City,  696;  1  C.  C.  A.  416;  Miner  v.  Baron, 
etc.  R.  R.  Co.  v.  McDonald,  51  Fed.  30  N.  E.  Rep.  481;  131  N.  Y.  677; 
Rep.  278;  2  C.  C.  A.  153;  Cogswell  Schott  v.  Youree  (111.,  1892),  31  N.  E. 
v.  West  St.  &  N.  E.  Elev.  Ry.  Co.,  3  Rep.  591 ;  Brunei-  v.  Wade  (Iowa, 
Pac.  Rep.  411;  5  Wash.  St.  446;  1892),  51  N.  W.  Rep.  251;  Hopkins 
East  Tenn.  etc.  Co.  v.  Hesters  (Ga.,  v.  Bowers,  111  N.  C.  175;  Louisville. 
1893),  15  S.  E.  Rep.  828;  Waterman  etc.  Co.  v.  Crayton,  69  Miss.  152; 
v.  Chicago  &  A.  R.  Co.,  52  N.  W.  Medlin  v.  Wilkins,  1  Tex.  Civ.  App. 
Rep.  247;  82  Wis.  613.  465;  Sheahan  v.  National  S.  S.  Co., 

3  Winslow  v.    State,    92   Ala.    78 ;  66  Hun,  48. 
First  Nat.  Bank  v.  Clark,  134  N.  Y. 


§  375.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  553 

the  case  of  the  party,  has  been  rendered  competent  by  the  ac- 
tion of  the  adverse  party.1  So,  where  a  party  brings  out  a 
part  of  a  conversation,  his  adversary  should  in  fairness  be 
allowed  in  rebuttal  to  elicit  the  residue  from  the  witness,  to 
explain  the  earlier  portion  or  rebut  any  adverse  inferences  or 
presumptions  which  may  be  drawn  therefrom  by  the  jurors.2 

§  375.  Order  of  proof — Evidence  offered  by  the  party 
after  he  rests. —  The  party  who  has  the  right  to  open  and 
close  will  not  be  allowed  to  develop  his  case  in  part  only. 
It  is  usually  considered  proper  to  require  him  to  introduce  all 
the  evidence  he  may  have  to  support  his  case,  though  he  need 
not  anticipate  the  evidence  of  his  adversary  and  attempt  to 
rebut  it  before  it  is  offered.  Each  party  should  be  compelled 
to  exhaust  his  evidence,  and  neither  should  be  permitted  to 
withhold  evidence  for  the  purpose  of  gaining  an  unfair  advan- 
tage over  his  opponent  by  producing  evidence  as  in  rebuttal 
which  should,  because  of  its  relation  to  the  facts  in  issue,  be 
offered  in  chief.3 

After  the  evidence  in  chief  on  both  sides  has  all  been  re- 
ceived, the  party  who  has  the  right  to  open  and  close  may- 
offer  evidence  in  rebuttal  intended  to  destroy  or  overcome  the 
effect  of  some  particular  evidence  which  the  adverse  party 
has  attempted  to  prove  as  a  part  of  his  case.  But  the  order 
and  time  of  introducing  evidence  are  largely  in  the  discretion 
of  the  court,  and  if  the  evidence  which  is  offered  is  relevant, 
and  if  the  failure  of  the  party  to  introduce  it  at  the  proper 
time  and  in  its  proper  order  is  not  due  to  a  lack  of  diligence 

1  O'Brien  v.  Weiler,  68  Hun,  64;  55  N.  W.  Rep.  88;  Blewett  v.  Gay- 
Ingrani  v.  "Wackernagel,  83  Iowa,  nor,  77  Wis.  378 ;  Dunn  v.  People, 
82;  Kruschkev.  Stefan,  83  Wis.  373;  29  N.  Y.  523;  Blake  v.  People,  73 
Koontz  v.  Owens,  109  Mo.  1.  N.    Y.    586;  State   v.   Hunsaker,   16 

2  Haver  v.  Schuyhart,  48  Mo.  App.  Oreg.  497;  Union  Pac.  Ry.  Co.  v. 
50;  Schwarz  r.  Wood,  67  Hun,  648;  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  51  Fed.  Rep.  309; 
Swift  Elec.  L.  Co.  v.  Grant,  90  Mich.  York  v.  Pease,  2  Gray  (Mass.),  282; 
469;  51  N.  W.  Rep.  539;  Scott  v.  Cushing  v.  Billings,  2  Cush.  (Mass.) 
People  (111.,  1892),  30  N.E.  Rep.  329;  158;  Brown  v.  Marshall,  120  Ind. 
House  v.  Lock  wood,  63  Hun,  630.  323;  Easley  v.  Miss.  Pac.  Ry.  Co.,  20 

3  Hamilton  Buggy  Co.  v.  Iowa  S.  W.  Rep.  1073 ;  McDermott  v.  Chi- 
Buggy  Co.  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  cago,  etc.  Co.  (Wis.,  1893),  55  N.  W. 
498  ;  Ankersmit  v.  Bluxome,  48  Hun,  Rep.  79;  Mutual  L,  Ins.  Co.  v. 
1 ;  Casteel  v.  Millison,  41  111.  App.  61 ;  Thomson  (Ky.,  1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep. 
Thatcher  v.   Stickney  (Iowa,    1893),  87;  Lamance  v.  Byrnes,  17  Nev.  197. 


554 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


[§  376. 


on  his  part,  the  court  may  re-open  the  case  to  admit  it,  not 
only  after  the  party  has  rested,  but  even  after  the  argument 
has  begun.1 

§  376.  Materiality  and  sufficiency  of  newly-discovered 
evidence. —  The  power  to  grant  a  new  trial  because  of  newly- 
discovered  evidence  is  to  a  large  extent  a  discretionary  power,2 
and  to  call  forth  its  exercise  the  court  should  be  satisfied  that 
the  new  evidence  is  reasonably  conclusive  and  of  such  force 
and  sufficiency  that  had  it  been  admitted  the  verdict  which 
was  rendered  in  the  trial  would  have  been  set  aside  as  against 
the  evidence.3 

It  is  the  policy  of  the  law  to  make  an  end  of  litigation  and 
to  render  necessary  litigation  as  inexpensive  as  possible.  For 
this  reason  the  courts  are  chary  in  granting  retrials  upon  the 


I  Taylor  v.  Cayce,  97  Mo.  242 ;  Hill 
v.  Miller,  50  Kan.  659;  Fogarty  v. 
State,  80  Ga.  785 ;  State  v.  Pratt,  98 
Mo.  482;  Kimball  v.  Saguin  (Iowa, 
1892),  53  N.  W.  Rep.  116;  Gregg  v. 
Mallett,  111  N.  C.  74:  Owens  v. 
Gentry,  30  S.  C.  490;  Des  Moines 
Sav.  Bk.  v.  Hotel  (Iowa,  1893),  55  N. 
W.  Rep.  67 ;  State  v.  Maber,  74  Iowa, 
77;  Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v.  Mc- 
Donald, 51  Fed.  Rep.  178;  Lewis  v. 
Alkire,  32  W.  Va.  504;  Scbuman  v. 
Pilcher,  36  111.  App.  43;  Sbaban  v. 
Swan  (Obio,  1892),  26  N.  E.  Rep. 
222;  Cousins  v.  Partridge,  79  Cal. 
224 ;  Jacksonville,  etc.  v.  Peninsular, 
etc.  Co.  (Fla.,  1892),  9  S.  Rep.  661; 
McNutt  v.  McNutt,  116  Ind.  545; 
Jobbins  v.  Gray,  34  111.  App.  208; 
Blackman  v.  State,  80  Ga.  785.  Tbe 
reception  of  evidence  by  tbe  court 
after  the  jury's  deliberations  have 
begun  has  been  held  not  reversible 
error.  Keeveny  v.  Ottman,  26  Wkly. 
L.  Bui.  65 ;  McConib  v.  Insurance 
Co.,  48  N.  W.  Rep.  1038.  So  a  judg- 
ment not  objected  to  when  rendered 
will  not  be  set  aside  because  the 
court  admitted  evidence  thereafter. 
Clavey  v.  Lord,  87  Cal.  413;  Meserve 
v.  Folsom,  62  Vt.  504.     In  State  v. 


Magoon,  50  Vt.  333,  the  court  said 
*'  the  order  in  which  testimony  shall 
be  admitted  is  one  of  practice  rather 
than  of  strict  right,  and  may,  in  the 
discretion  of  the  court,  be  varied  to 
meet  the  exigencies  of  a  given  case 
without  error  being  predicable 
thereon,  unless  it  is  manifest  that  the 
variance  has  operated  to  surprise  or 
in  some  way  work  a  legal  disadvan- 
tage to  the  excepting  party." 

2  State  v.  Carlos  (S.  C,  1893),  16  S. 
E.  Rep.  832. 

3  City  of  Chicago  v.  Edson,  43  111. 
App.  417;  Wilson  v.  Heath,  68  Hun, 
209;  Finelite  v.  Finelite,  68  Hun,  82; 
Upington  v.  Keenan,  67  Hun,  648; 
Hilburn  v.  Harris  (Tex.,  1893),  21  S. 
W.  Rep.  572;  State  v.  Myers  (Mo., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  382;  Williams 
v.  United  States,  137  U.  S.  113.  "A 
new  trial  will  not  be  granted  in  any 
civil  action  on  the  ground  of  the  im- 
proper admission  or  rejection  of 
evidence,  unless  in  the  opinion  of 
the  court  to  which  the  application 
is  made  some  substantial  wrong  or 
miscarriage  has  been  thereby  occa- 
sioned in  tbe  trial  of  the  action." 
Stephen's  Dig.,  art.  143. 


§  377.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  555 

production  of  new  evidence  by  the  defeated  party,  who  has 
little  to  lose  and  everything  to  gain  by  a  new  trial.  Some- 
thing more  must  be  produced  as  new  evidence  than  weak  or 
unsatisfactory  evidence  which  would  not  have  changed  the 
result  had  it  been  introduced,  or  which  is  readily  reconcilable 
with  either  side  of  the  case.1  Not  only  must  the  sufficiency 
of  the  evidence  be  shown  but  its  materiality  and  relevancy 
must  appear  as  well.  If  the  new  evidence  would  not  have 
been  admissible  at  the  trial  because  of  its  irrelevancy  or  other- 
wise, then  its  sufficiency  need  not  be  considered,  while,  on  the 
other  hand,  its  relevancy  alone  is  not  enough  if  it  would  not 
change  the  result  in  a  new  trial.2  The  material  character  of 
the  new  evidence  and  the  manner  in  which  it  would  have  in- 
fluenced the  result  of  the  trial  must  be  affirmatively  and 
explicitly  shown  in  reasonable  detail  in  the  application  and 
accompanying  affidavits.  Nothing  should  be  left  to  inference 
or  conjecture  on  these  important  points.3 

§  377.  Diligence  of  party  offering  new  evidence  must 
we  shown. —  A  party  who  moves  for  a  new  trial  because  of 
new  evidence  must  show  affirmatively  and  specifically  4  the 
reasons  for  his  failure  to  produce  the  witness  at  the  trial, 
and  he  must  convince  the  court  that  he  was  not  guilty  of 
delay  or  negligence.5     The  fact  that  the   newly-discovered 

i  Laing    v.    Rush,   66    Hun,    635 ;  Whalen  v.  New  York,  17  Fed.  Rep. 

Helmke    v.    Stetler,    69    Hun,    109;  72. 

Eddy  v.  Newton  (Tex.,  1893),  22  S.  3  Shewalter    v.    Williamson,    125 

W.    Rep.  533;  Field   v.    Corn.    (Va.,  Ind.  373;  Grayson  v.  Buchanan (Va., 

1893),   16  S.  E.  Rep.  835;  Gaddis  v.  1891),  13  S.  E.  Rep.  457;  Roberts  v. 

State  (Ga.,  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  931;  Johnstown  Bank,  14  N.  Y.  S.  432. 

Humphrey  v.  State  (Wis.,  1891),  47  *  Etowah  G.  M.  Co.  v.  Exter  (Ga., 

N.  W.  Rep.  836.  1893),  16  S.  E.  Rep.  991. 

2  Thompson  v.  Thompson,  88  Cal.  5  Chicago  E.  &  B.  P.  Co.  v.  John- 

110.     "The   unconsidered   evidence  son,  44  111.  App.  224 ;  Coffey  v.  Proc- 

tnust  be  such  as  reasonable  diligence  ter  Coal  Co.  (Ky.,  1892),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 

on  the  part  of  the  party  asking  for  2S6;  Weinberg  v.  Somps  (Cal.,  1893), 

the  rehearing  could  not  have  secured  33  Pac.  Rep.  341 ;  Succession  of  Coste, 

at  the  former  trial;  it  must  be  ma-  43  La.  Ann.  144;  Queen  v.  Bell,  22 

terial,  not   merely  cumulative,  cor-  N.   Y.   S.  398;  Briel   v.  Buffalo,    68 

roborative  or  collateral,  and  be  such  Hun,  219;  Broat  v.  Moore,  44  Minn, 

as  ought  to  produce  important  re-  468;  Briggs   v.    Rush,    1   Tex.    Civ. 

suits    on    its    merits."     Codman   v.  App.  19;  State  v.  Ginger,  80  Iowa, 

Verm.  etc.  Co.,  17  Blatchf.  (TJ,  S.)  3;  574;  Keisling  v.  Readle,  1  Ind.  App. 

Dower   v.    Church,    21   W.    Va.  57;  240. 


556  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  37S. 

evidence  is  relevant  and  material  and  will  probably  result  in 
a  change  in  the  verdict  on  a  new  trial  will  not  excuse  the 
party's  original  negligence,1  if  he  fails  to  show  a  good  reason 
for  not  producing  it  at  the  trial;  and  a  fortiori  th\s  is  the  case 
where  the  moving  party  suppressed  the  evidence  himself.2 
The  application  for  a  new  trial  is  usually  accompanied  by  the 
affidavits  of  the  party.  They  should  set  forth  in  detail  the 
various  steps  which  have  been  taken  by  him  to  obtain  the  evi- 
dence at  the  trial,  and  the  reason  why  the  new  evidence  was 
not  offered,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  court  of  his  diligence.3 

§  378.  Newly-discovered  evidence  must  not  be  cumula- 
tive or  impeaching  merely. —  A  new  trial  should  be  granted 
on  the  ground  of  new-discovered  material  evidence  only  when 
it  is  positively  shown  that  the  evidence  is  not  cumulative 
merely,4  or  argumentative,5  unless  the  testimony  on  the  earlier 
trial  was  very  unsatisfactory,6  or  the  verdict  was  rendered  upon 
a  mere  numerical  preponderance  of  witnesses  which  the  cumu- 
lative evidence  would  have  counteracted.7  But  an  exception 
to  the  rule  that  a  new  trial  will  be  refused  if  newly-discovered 
evidence  is  cumulative  is  recognized  where  the  new  evidence  is 
cumulative  of  the  admissions  made  by  an  adverse  witness  favor- 
able to  the  moving  party,8  or  of  the  evidence  of  an  adverse 
witness  on  his  cross-examination.  Neither  should  a  new  trial 
be  granted  because  of  newly-discovered  evidence,  the  sole  ef- 
fect of  which  would  be  to  contradict  or  otherwise  impeach 

1  Kansas  City,  etc.  Co.  v.  Philips  7  Kulp,  103;  State  v.  Hendrix  (La., 
(Ala.,  1893),  13 S.  Rep.  65;  Fitzgerald  1893),  12  S.  Rep.  G21;  People  v. 
v.  Brandt  (Neb.,  1893),  54  N.  W.  Hong,  92  Cal.  41 ;  27  Pac.  Rep.  1096; 
Rep.  992.  Maurer  v.  State,  129  Ind.  5S7;  Will- 

2  Mills  v.  Husson,  63  Hun,  632.  iams   v.  Com.  (Ky.,  1892),  18  S.  W. 

3  Bank  v.  Gilmore  (N.  D.,  1893),  54  Rep.  364;  Weitling  v.  Millston,  77 
N.  W.  Rep.  1032;  McDonald  v.  Wis.  523;  Langdon  v.  People,  133 
Coryell  (Ind.,  1893),  34  N.  E.  Rep.  7.  111.  3S2;  State  v.  Potts  (Iowa,  1892), 

*  First  Nat.  Bank  v.  William  Ruehl  49  N.  W.  Rep.  845 ;  State  v.  Stowe, 

Co.,    33    111.     App.    121;    Davis    v.  3  Wash.  St.  203. 

Mann,  43   111.  App.  401;  Wilson   v.  5 Thompson  v.  Thompson,  88  Cal. 

Heath,    68  Hun,    209;    Douglass   v.  110. 

Anthony,  45  Kan.  439;  Elmborg  v.  6  Louisville,  N.  O.  &  T.  Ry.  Co.,  69 

St.  Paul  C.   R.  Co.  (Minn.,  1893),  52  Miss.  152. 

N.  W.  Rep.  639 ;  Sweat  v.  State  (Ga.,  ~  Bulkin  v.  Ehret,  29  Abb.  N.  C.  62. 

1893),  17   S.    E.    Rep.   273;  King   v.  *>  White   v.  Nafus  (Iowa,  1892),  51 

State,  91  Tenn.   617;  People  v.   Ur-  N.  W.  Rep.  5. 
quidas,  96  Cal.  239;  Com.  v.  Brown, 


§  379.]  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  557 

the  evidence  of  some  witness  whose  evidence  was  sufficiently 
credible  or  corroborated.1  So  a  new  trial  should  not  be 
granted  merelj7  because  a  witness  subsequently  to  the  trial  ad- 
mits that  he  swore  falsely,2  or  makes  statements  contradictory 
of  what  he  said  on  the  witness  stand.3 

§  379.  Writ  of  error  —  When  employed  at  common 
law.— An  appeal  or  appellatio  as  defined  by  Blackstone  an 
other  writers  on  the  common  and  the  civil  law  was  a  pro- 
ceeding the  use  of  which  was,  to  a  large  extent,  confined  to 
courts  of  equity,  admiralty  and  ecclesiastical  jurisdiction, 
whose  procedure  was  modeled  after  the  rules  of  the  Roman 
civil  law.  It  was,  as  the  word  implies,  an  appeal  or  applica- 
tion for  relief  against  the  alleged  injustice  of  an  inferior  court, 
and  by  the  civil  law  the  whole  proceeding  was  removed  to 
the  appellate  court,  and  the  matter  was  reviewed  and  retried 
by  that  court  both  as  to  the  facts  and  the  rules  of  law  in- 
volved.4 The  purpose  of  the  common-law  "  writ  of  error,"  on 
the  other  hand,  was  not  primaril}7  to  procure  a  retrial  of  the 
whole  subject  by  the  supervisory  court,  for  the  reason  that 
the  trial  at  nisi  prius,  being  always  by  a  jury,  a  retrial  in  the 
court  of  error  of  the  issue  of  fact  involved  b}7  the  same  method 
was  not  possible.  The  theory  of  this  writ  was  that  the  issue 
of  fact  had  been  properly  decided  b}7  the  jury  on  sufficient 
evidence,  but  that  in  case  it  had  not,  or  if  an  erroneous  de- 
cision of  any  rule  of  law  had  been  made,  the  error  would 
appear  at  once  upon  an  inspection  of  the  record  itself,  or  it 
might  be  more  clearly  and  specifically  pointed  out  by  the  as- 
signment of  error.  Thus,  a  writ  of  error  might  be  brought 
for  a  notorious  or  open  mistake  in  any  part  of  the  record,  or 

i  Fist  v.  Fist  (Colo.,  1893),  32  Pac.  v.  State,  129  Ind.  5S7 ;  29  N.  E.  Rep. 

Rep.  719;  W.  U.  T.  Co.  v.  Hainan  392 ;  Hudspeth  v.  State,  55  Ark.  323; 

(Tex.,    1893),   20   S.    W.    Rep.    1133;  Russell   v.  Nail,  79  Tex.  644;  15  S. 

Keith  v.  Knoche,  43  111.  App.  161 ;  W.  Rep.  635;  Vanderburg  v.  Cainp- 

Sweigert  v.  Finlay,  144  Pa.  St.  266 ;  bell,  64  Miss.  89. 

Green  v.  Beckner,  3  Ind.  App.  39;  2Hoy  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co.,  46  Minn. 

State  v.  Potter,  108  Mo.  424;  Pease  269. 

v.  State   (Ga.,  1883),  16   S.  E.  Rep.  3  State  v.  Workman  (S.  C,  1893), 

113;  State   v.    Potts,   83   Iowa,  317;  16  S.  E.  Rep.  770. 

Marable  v.  State,  89  Ga.  425;  Peo-  'Hestres  v.   Brennan,  50  Cal.  217; 

pie   v.    Loui,    27  Pac.    Rep.  295 ;  90  United  States  v.  Wonson,  1  Gall.  13. 

Cal.  377 ;  State  v.  Chambers,  43  La.  See,  also,  Anderson's  Law  Diet. 
Ann.  1108;  10  S.  Rep.  247;  Maurer 


558  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  380. 

for  any  omission,  irregularity  or  informality  in  the  process  or 
committed  at  the  trial.1  The  proceeding  under  the  writ  of 
error  affected  the  record  alone  which  was  removed  into  the 
higher  court,  and  on  the  denial  of  the  allegation  of  error  an 
issue  was  raised  placing  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  party  al- 
leging the  error  in  the  record  to  prove  its  existence  affirma- 
tively.2 

In  most  of  the  states  of  the  American  Union  the  proceeding 
by  which  the  judgment  of  an  inferior  court  is  reviewed  by 
another  court  exercising  supervisory  powers,  though  termed 
an  appeal,  is  substantially  and  in  principle  the  common-law 
writ  of  error  regulated  and  modified  as  to  details  by  statutory 
provisions.  So  far  as  these  modern  appellate  proceedings  in- 
volve a  reconsideration  of  the  evidence  which  has  been  given 
in  the  lower  court,  they  are  regulated  rather  by  the  princi- 
ples of  the  common  law  than  by  the  rules  governing  appeals 
in  admiralty  and  ecclesiastical  courts. 

§  380.  The  powers  of  appellate  tribunals  in  relation  to 
the  evidence  receiver!  in  the  trial  court. —  The  weight  of 
evidence  and  the  credibility  of  witnesses  are  for  the  jury  ex- 
clusively, and  the  general  rule  is  that  the  appellate  court 
will  not,  either  in  civil  or  criminal  cases,  review  the  evidence 
merely  because  it  may  have  been  of  a  weak,  contradictory  or 
conflicting  character,3  provided  that  upon  an  inspection  of  the 

1  "At  common  law  a  writ  of  error  taken  at  the  trial.  If  the  bill  con- 
might  be  had  for  an  error  apparent  tains  matter  falsely  or  untruly  stated, 
on  the  record,  or  for  an  error  in  fact,  the  judge  ought  to  refuse  to  affix  his 
but  not  for  an  error  in  law  not  ap-  seal."  Wheeler  v.  Winn,  53  Pa.  St. 
pearing  on  the  record;  hence  any-  126. 

thing  alleged  ore  tenus  and  overruled  2  Burkhalter  v.  State,  58  Pa.  St.  376 ; 

could  not  be  assigned  for  error.     To  Bragg  v.  Danielson,  141  Mass.  195. 

remedy  this  evil  was  the  object  of  3  Board  of  Com'rs  Pulaski  Co.  v. 

the  statute  of  Westminster.     Under  Shields,  29  N.  E.  Rep.  385;  130  Ind. 

its  provisions  a  bill  of  exceptions  is  6;  Aultman  v.  Ritter,  81  Wis.  395; 

founded  on  some  objection  in  point  Belles  v.  Anderson,  38  111.  App.  126; 

of  law  to  the  opinion  and  direction  Vowels  v.  Com.,  83  Ky.  193;  Bull  v. 

of  the  court,  either  as  to  the  com-  Wagner  (Neb.,  1892),  49  N.  W.  Rep. 

petency  of  a  witness,  the  admissi-  1130;   Smith  v.  State,  11  Pac.  Rep. 

bility  or  the  legal  effect  of  evidence,  908;  35  Kan.  618;  Cooper  v.  Perry, 

or  other  matter  of  law  arising  from  27  Pac.  Rep.  946;  16  Colo.  436;  Ros- 

facts    not  denied   in    which    either  enthal  v.  McMann,  29  Pac.  Rep.  121 ; 

party  is  overruled  by  the  court.    The  93   Cal.    505;    Graves  v.  Griffith,  3 

seal  attests  that  the  exception  was  Wash.    St.  742 ;   Allen  v.    Kirk,  81 


§  380.]  KECEPTION   OF    EVIDENCE.  559 

record  there  is  no  such  manifest  preponderance  of  evidence 
on  the  side  of  the  defeated  party  as  will  show  that  the  ver- 
dict as  rendered  is  erroneous  or  unjust.1 

A  verdict  will  not  be  reversed  on  appeal  which  was  based 
upon  facts  which  were  shown  in  evidence,  the  legitimate  in- 
ferences from  which  were  uncertain  or  controvertible.  If  the 
facts  which  were  proved  are  capable  of  more  than  one  con- 
struction in  the  minds  of  persons  of  average  intelligence,  or  if 
the  evidence  is  such  that  reasonable  men  may,  in  considering 
it,  arrive  at  different  conclusions,  the  decision  of  the  jury  is 
final  where  the  issue  of  fact  was  clearly  and  fairly  submitted 
to  them.2  If  there  is  any  evidence  to  sustain  a  verdict  which 
is  in  itself  reasonable  on  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case,  the 
verdict  should  not  be  set  aside  because  of  insufficiency  of  evi- 
dence, though  the  appellate  court  might  have  arrived  at  a 
different  conclusion  from  the  jury  on  such  evidence.3  Where, 
however,  the  verdict  as  it  appears  from  the  evidence  sent  up 
and  contained  in  the  case  on  appeal  is  not  only  against  the 
weight  of  evidence  but  is  wholly  unsupported  by  any  evidence, 
the  appellate  court  will  not  hesitate  to  reverse  the  judgment 
of  the  lower  court.  Every  presumption  will  be  made  that  the 
jurjT  acted  impartially  and  fairly,  and  that  their  verdict  was 
according  to  the  evidence.  Especially  is  this  true  where  there 
is  a  conflict  of  evidence,  and  here  the  supervisory  or  appellate 
court  will  not  disturb  the  verdict,  though  the  evidence  may 

Iowa,  60S;  Bonner  v.  Beam,  80  Tex.  Rep.  713;  Puget  Sound   R.    Co.    v. 

152;  Simmons  v.  Spratt,  26  Fla.  449;  Ingersoll,  4  Wash.  St.  675;  Coleman 

Powell  v.  Achey,  87  Ga.  8;  McBride  v.  Jones,  89  Ga.  459;  Wells  v.  Yar- 

v.  Railroad  Co.,  60  Hun,  585;  Sears-  borough,   84   Tex.    660;    Richmond, 

mont  v.    Lincolnville,    83    Me.    75;  etc.  Co.  v.  Burnett,  88  Va.  538. 
Noyes  v.  Pugin,  2  Wash.  St.  258.  2Evansville,    etc.    Co.    v.    Weikle 

1  Rudolph   v.    Davis   (Neb.,   1892),  (Ind.,  1893),  33  N.  E.  Rep.  639;  Goff 

52  N.    W.   Rep.   841;  Lalor   v.    Mc-  v.  Akers,  21  N.  Y.  S.  454;  Paige  v. 

Donald,   44  Mo.  App.  439;  San  Ga-  Chedsey,    20    id.     898;    Meentz    v. 

briel  Wine  Co.  v.  Behlow,  94  Cal.  Reiker,  42  111.  App.  17. 
108;  Huffman  v.  Burr,  26  Atl.  Rep.         3St.  Louis,  I.  M.  &  S.  R.  Co.  v. 

367;  155  Pa.  St.  218;  Van  Vlissenger  Spann   (Ark.,  1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep. 

v.  Cox,  44  111.  App.  247;  Mansfield  914;  Eckert  v.  Rule  (Kan.,  1893),  32 

v.  Rab,  21  N.  Y.  S.  65;  66  Hun,  631;  Pac.   Rep.   657;   Kimball  v.  Saguin 

Monselle   v.    Bacon,    66    Hun,    628;  (Iowa,    1893),   53   N.    W.    Rep.    116; 

Beveridge  v.  Parmlee,  43  111.  App.  Lalor  v.  McDonald's  Adm'rs,  44  Mo. 

459;  Ya'don  v.  Mackey,  50  Kan.  630;  App.    439;    Shailer    v.    Corbett,    61 

Eppert  v.  Hall  (Iowa,  1893),  32  N.  E.  Hun,  626. 


560 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


[§  380. 


preponderate  somewhat  against  it  and  call  for  a  different 
verdict.1  On  the  other  hand,  where  the  verdict  is  not  against 
the  mere  weight  of  conflicting  evidence,  but  against  uncon- 
tradicted evidence  amounting  to  positive  proof  of  the  fact 
alleged,2  or  where  the  preponderance  of  evidence  against  the 
verdict  is  so  excessive  that  it  is  fair  to  presume  that  it  was 
rendered  only  because  of  the  existence  of  partiality,  unfair- 
ness or  corrupt  motives  or  gross  ignorance  on  the  part  of  the 
jury,  the  judgment  of  the  trial  court  will  be  reversed.3 

The  same  rules  that  are  held  applicable  to  the  review  on 
appeal  of  a  verdict  b}7  a  jury  are  also  recognized  where  a  jury 
trial  in  the  lower  court  is  not  of  right  or  is  waived  by  the 
consent  of  the  parties.  If  the  evidence,  though  it  is  conflict- 
ing, tends  to  or  is  sufficient  to  support  the  judgment,  and  no 
errors  of  law  appear  from  the  record  to  have  been  committed, 
the  decision  or  findings  of  the  judge  upon  matters  of  fact  will 
be  regarded  as  final,  notwithstanding  the  appellate  court 
might  arrive  at  a  different  conclusion  upon  the  same  evidence 
if  before  it.4 


iGayheart  v.  Patton  (Ky.,  1893), 

20  S.  W.  Rep.  912;  Angus  v.  Foster, 
42  111.  App.  19;  Kouhn  v.  Schroth, 
44  id.  513;  Louisville  &  N.  R.  Co.  v. 
Kenley  (Term.,  1893),  21  S.  W.  Rep. 
326. 

2 Walton  v.  Kansas,  etc.  Co.,  49 
Mo.  App.  620. 

3  Lewis  v.  Pallin,  48  Mo.  App.  657; 
Porter  v.  Sherman  Co.  Banking  Co. 
(Neb.,  1893),  55  N.  W.  Rep.  234;  Cole 
v.  National  Sch.  Furn.  Co.,  45  111. 
App.  273;  Stanfell  v.  Lewellyn(Ky., 
1893),  22  S.  W.  Rep.  645;  Reuber  v. 
Crawford  (Neb.,  1893),  54  N.  W. 
Rep.  549;  Kunimer  v.  Christopher 
&  Tenth  St.  R.  Co.,  2  Misc.  Rep. 
298;  Unas  v.  Penn.  R.  R.  Co.,  152 
Pa.  St.  326;  Gary  v.  Cole,  38  111. 
App.  236;  Huber  v.  Schmocht,  39 
111.  App.  229;  Marabitti  v.  Bagolan, 

21  Oreg.  299. 

4Castner  v.  Richardson  (Colo.,  1893), 
33  Pac.  Rep.  163;  Teeter  v.  Teeter, 
20  N.  Y.  S.  259;  65  Hun,  623;  Kehoe 


v.  Burns  (Wis.,  1893),  54 N.  W.  Rep. 
731;  Keesey  v.  Gage  (Tex.,  1893),  21 
S.  W.  Rep.  397;  Tolman  v.  Crane.  44 
111.  App.  237;  Com.  v.  WTestinghouse 
Elec.  &  Mfg.  Co.,  24  Atl.  Rep.  1107; 
151  Pa.  St.  265 ;  Gamble  v.  Ross,  44 
111.  App.  291 ;  Brown  v.  Sullivan,  3 
Ind.  App.  211;  29  N.  E.  Rep.  453; 
Smith  v.  Kipp,  49  Minn.  119;  Rob- 
bins  v.  City  of  Fond  du  Lac,  82  Wis. 
340;  Chase  v.  Jones,  84  Me.  107; 
Glover  v.  Holliday,  109  Mo.  108; 
Schuler  v.  Eckert,  90  Mich.  165; 
Gwyn  v.  Butler,  17  Colo.  114;  Worth- 
ington  v.  Worthington,  32  Neb.  334 ; 
Long  v.  Langsdale,  56  Ark.  239; 
Redfearn  v.  Douglas,  35  S.  C.  569; 
Markley  v.  Hull,  49  N.  W.  Rep. 
1050;  51  Iowa,  109;  Tatum  v.  Col- 
vin,  9  S.  Rep.  747;  43  La.  Ann.  755; 
Belford,  Clarke  &  Co.  v.  Scribner,  144 
U.  S.  488;  Cox  v.  Jones,  110  N.  C. 
309.  A  statutory  provision  that  an 
appellate  court  "shall  review  a 
cause  where  trial  by  jury  has  been 


§  381.] 


RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE. 


5G1 


So,  in  an  appeal  from  the  decision  of  the  chancellor  or  of  a 
master  in  equity,  the  appellate  court  will  not  review  his  find- 
ings of  fact  unless  it  appears  that  they  are  so  manifestly  er- 
roneous and  lacking  in  evidence  to  support  them  as  to  be  un- 
just or  that  they  are  evidently  the  result  of  mistake.1  The 
decision  or  finding  of  fact  of  a  master  in  chancery,  referee  or 
auditor  which  is  confirmed  by  the  court  by  which  he  was  ap- 
pointed is  equivalent  to  the  verdict  of  a  jury  upon  the  same 
point,  will  be  presumed  to  have  been  based  on  sufficient  evi- 
dence, and  will  be  conclusive  upon  the  parties  in  the  appellate 
court.2 

§  381.  Limitations  on  the  number  of  witnesses. —  It  is 
the  right  of  both  parties  to  have  all  the  witnesses  heard  by 
the  jury  who  are  able  to  testify  of  their  own  knowledge  to 
any  material  fact  which  is  controverted.  The  court  cannot 
in  such  a  case  limit  the  number  of  witnesses,  and  its  action  in 
doing  so  over  an  objection  which  is  taken  in  time  will  be 

For  the  same  reason  if  a  party  rely- 


ground  for  a  new  trial.3 


waived  in  the  same  manner  and  to 
the  same  extent  as  if  it  had  been 
tried  by  a  jury  "  does  not,  it  has 
been  held,  mean  that  the  appellate 
court  shall  decide  upon  the  weight 
of  the  evidence.  Lynch  v.  Grayson 
(N.  M.,  1893),  32  Pac.  Rep.  149.  If  a 
plain  and  manifest  error  is  shown  to 
have  been  made  by  the  trial  judge 
in  his  findings  of  facts  they  should 
be  reversed.  Metro.  Nat.  Bank  v. 
Rogers,  3  C.  C.  A.  666 ;  53  Fed.  Rep. 
776.  But  a  finding  of  fact  will  not 
be  disturbed  where  it  can  be  shown 
to  be  erroneous  only  by  discrediting  a 
witness,  as  the  credibility  of  testi- 
mony is  for  the  trial  judge  exclu- 
sively. Delano  v.  Jacoby,  31  Pac. 
Rep.  290;  96  Cal.  275. 

i  Ellis  v.  Ward,  137  111.  509;  Mon- 
tague v.  Stoltz  (S.  C,  1893),  15  S.  E, 
Rep.  868 ;  Dooly  Block  v.  S.  L.  Rap. 
T.  Co.  (Utah,  1893),  33  Pac.  Rep.  229; 
Thomas  v.  Chicago,  etc.  Co. ,  49  Mo. 
App.  110;  McGill  v.  Hawks  (Mich., 
1893),  54  N.  W.  Rep.  707;  Hamlin  v. 
36 


Phillips  (Cal.,  1893) ,  33  Pac.  Rep.  331 ; 
Berry  v.  Berry,  24  Atl.  Rep.  957 ;  84 
Me.  541;  Daveyac  v.  Seder  (Ky., 
1893),  20  S.  W.  Rep.  375;  Herbert  v. 
Keck,  35  Neb.  508.  The  rule  stated 
in  the  text  is  also  applicable  to  the 
findings  of  fact  on  conflicting  evi- 
dence by  a  surrogate  or  similar  ju- 
dicial officer.  In  re  Sherman,  24 
N.  Y.  S.  283;  In  re  Snelling's  Will, 
136  N.  Y.  575. 

2  McHugh  v.  Railroad  Co.,  65  Hun, 
619;  Warner  v.  Hare,  154  Pa.  St. 
548;  Crim  v.  Starkweather,  136  N.Y. 
635;  Knell  v.  Stephan,  65  Hun,  624; 
Tischler  v.  Apple,  30  Fla.  132;  Por- 
ter v.  Christian,  88  Va.  730:  Craw- 
ford v.  Osmun,  90  Mich.  77 ;  Witte  v. 
Weinberg  (S.  C,  1893),  17  S.  E.  Rep. 
681 ;  Johnston  v.  Markle  Paper  Co., 
153  Pa.  St.  189;  Morrell  v.  Kelly 
(Mass.,  1893),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  755; 
Mech.  &  Trad.  Nat.  Bank  v.Wynant, 
49  Hun,  607 ;  Levi  v.  Blaokwell,  35 
S.  C.  511. 

3  Village  of  South  Danville  v.  Ja- 


502  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  382. 

ing  upon  a  misstatement  by  the  judge  refrains  from  introduc- 
ing material  evidence,  he  will  be  entitled  to  a  new  trial  if  the 
judgment  is  against  him.1  But  where  there  is  no  contradic- 
tion as  to  the  fact  to  which  the  witness  is  to  testify,  or  where 
the  fact,  though  not  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  is 
immaterial,  it  has  been  held  repeatedly  that  the  court  has  a 
discretion  to  refuse  to  permit  other  witnesses  to  testify  thereto 
whose  evidence  would  be  merely  cumulative.2 

An  exception  to  the  general  rule  occurs  in  the  case  of  ex- 
pert or  opinion  evidence.  Here  it  has  been  held  that  the 
court  may  limit  the  number  of  experts  which  may  be  exam- 
ined by  either  party.3 

§  382.  Number  of  witnesses  necessary  in  trials  for  per- 
jury.—  It  was  at  one  time  a  settled  rule  of  law  that  no  con- 
viction of  perjury  could  be  had  unless  upon  the  oath  of  two 
witnesses;  for  otherwise  the  single  oath  of  the  accused  would 
be  met  only  by  the  oath  of  one  other  person.4  But  this 
is  no  longer  the  law.  The  accused  in  a  trial  for  perjury  may 
be  convicted  upon  the  evidence  of  one  witness  corroborated 
by  other  independent  evidence,  which,  though  it  need  no  longer 
necessarily  be  "tantamount  to  another  witness,"5  must  still 
be  so  strong,  clear,  convincing  and  corroborative6  that,  with 
the  evidence  of  the  single  witness,  it  shall  overcome  the 
oath  of  the  accused  and  the  presumption  of  his  innocence,7 
and  convince  the  minds  of  the  jury  of  his  guilt  beyond  a  rea- 
sonable doubt.8    In  case  several  acts  of  perjury  are  alleged  in 

cobs,  42  111.  App.  543;  Page  v.  Kre-  Rep.   G78;  Lake  Shore,    etc.   Co.  v. 

key,  137  N.  Y.  307;  Meier  v.  Morgan,  Brown,  123  111.  162;  Couts  v.  Neer, 

82  Wis.  289;  Greene  v.  Phenix  Ins.  70  Tex.  468;  9  S.  W.  Rep.  46;  Bar 

Co.,  134  111.  310.     Contra  (where  a  hyte  v.  Summers,  68  Mich.  341;  36 

default  is  set  aside  as  a  matter  of  N.  W.  Rep.  93. 

favor),   Burhans  v.   Norwood    Park  3  Carpenter    v.    Knapp,    66    Hun, 

(111.,  1891),  27  N.  E.  Rep.  1088.  632:  Sixth  Ave.  R.  Co.  v.  Railroad 

i  Hanna  v.  Barrett,  39  Kan.  446;  Co.,  138  N.  Y.  548. 

18  Pac.  Rep.  497.  41  Greenl.   on  Ev.,  §  257;   4  Bl. 

2Mears  v.  Cornwell,  73  Mich.  78;  Com.  358;  2  Russell  on  Crimes,  179. 

Stillwell  v.    Farwell,    64    Vt.    286;  *1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  g  257;  State  v. 

Seekell  v.  Norman,  73  Iowa,  254;  43  Peters,  107  N.  C.  8'.  6. 

N.  W.  Rep.  190;  Powers  v.  McKen-  6Woodbeck  v.  Keeler,  6  Cow.  118 

zie,  90  Tenn.  167;  Detroit  City  Ry.  121. 

Co.  v.  Mills,  85  Mich.  634;  Owen  v.  1  State  v.  Miller,  44  Mo.  App.  159. 

Williams,    114  Ind.    179;  15  N.    E.  8  Waters  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App. 


§  383.]  RECEPTION   OF    EVIDENCE.  563 

one  indictment,  it  seems  that  there  must  be  a  corroboration 
as  to  each  act,  for  a  conviction  cannot  be  secured  on  any 
which  is  thus  corroborated  though  there  maybe  the  testimony 
of  a  single  witness  to  each  act  of  perjury.1  But  any  fact  al- 
leged in  an  indictment  for  perjur}',  excepting  the  falsit}'  of  the 
evidence  given  under  oath  by  the  person  and  the  fact  that  he 
did  not  believe  it  to  be  true,  may  be  proved  by  the  testimony 
of  one  witness  uncorroborated  by  independent  evidence.2 

The  rule  which  requires  the  testimony  of  a  single  witness 
with  corroboration  in  order  to  justify  a  conviction  of  perjury 
has  been  confirmed  by  statute  in  many  of  the  states.  In  the 
absence  of  such  a  statute  it  may  be  that  the  prisoner  could  be 
convicted  without  any  oral  evidence  bearing  directly  upon  the 
corpus  delicti.  So  the  written  admissions  of  the  accused  or  of 
those  criminally  associated  with  him,  or  documentary  evidence 
found  in  his  possession,  and  acted  on  by  him  as  true,  may,  if 
strong,  be  regarded  as  equivalent  to  the  testimony  of  a  single 
witness.3  But  the  authenticity  of  such  documents  would  have 
to  be  clearly  shown. 

§  383.  Number  of  witnesses  in  trials  for  treason. —  At 
the  common  law,  prior  to  the  enactment  of  the  statutes  of 
1  Ed w.  VI.,  ch.  12,  and  5  and  6  Edw.  VI.,  ch.  11,  a  person  might 
have  been  convicted  of  treason  upon  proof  by  one  witness 
alone.  Those  statutes  provided,  and  the  provision  has  been 
adopted  into  the  constitution  of  the  United  States,4  and  into 
most  of  the  state  constitutions,  that  no  person  shall  be  con- 
victed of  high  treason  "unless  upon  the  sworn  testimony  of 
two  witnesses  to  the  same  overt  act  or  on  confession  in  open 
court." 

284;  State  v.  Gibbs,  10  Mont.    213;  324;  Williams  v.  Cora.,   91  Pa.   St. 

United  States  v.  Wood,   14  Peters,  493.     If  the  jury  believe  the  witness 

440;  United  States  v.  Hall,  44  Fed.  is  not  a  "credible  witness,"  whero 

Rep.  864;  Reg.  v.   Boulter,   16  Jur.  the  testimony  of  such  a  witness  is 

135;  State  v.  Heed,  57  Mo.  252;  Rex  required  by  statute  in  a  prosecution 

v.  Mayhew,  6  C.  &  P.  315;  Reg.  v.  for    perjury,    they    should    acquit. 

Braithwaite,  8  Cox  C.  C.  254.    As  to  Kitchen  v.  State,  29  Tex.  App.  45. 

the  corroboration  required,  see  Reg.  2  United   States  v.   Hall,    44  Fed. 

v.  Shaw,  10  Cox  C.  C.  66;  State  v.  Rep.  864;  People  v.  Hayes,  24  N.  Y. 

Blize,  111  Mo.  464;  People  v.  Hayes,  S.  194. 

24  N.  Y.  S.  194;  Heflin  v.  State,  88  3  United  States  v.  Woods,  14  Peters, 

Ga.  151.  440,  441. 

1  Reg.  v.  Virrier,  12  A.  &  E.  317,  <  Art.  3,  §  3. 


5C4  RECEPTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  384. 

The  English  statute  was  so  construed  as  to  permit  a  convic- 
tion upon  the  testimony  of  one  witness  to  one  overt  act  and 
of  another  witness  to  another  overt  act  of  the  same  sort,1  and 
such  doubtless  would  be  the  law  in  those  states  of  the  Union 
which  do  not,  in  their  bills  of  rights,  require  testimony  to  the 
same  overt  act. 

The  extra-judicial  confession  of  the  accused  may  be  proved 
by  one  witness  where  it  is  offered  in  corroboration  of  the  evi- 
dence of  the  witnesses  who  testify  to  an  overt  act;2  and  gen- 
erally any  collateral  fact  not  involving  an  overt  act  of  treason 
may  be  proved  3  in  the  same  manner  as  in  the  case  of  indict- 
ments for  other  crimes.4 

§  384.  Compelling  the  falling  of  the  witnesses. —  The 
prosecution  in  a  criminal  trial  cannot  be  compelled  to  call  all 
the  witnesses  whose  names  are  on  the  indictment,5  or  who 
know  anything  of  the  crime  which  is  alleged;  nor  can  it  be 
required  to  put  a  particular  witness  on  the  stand  though  he 
may  be  present  in  court  in  obedience  to  the  service  of  a  sub- 
poena.6 The  introduction  of  evidence  for  the  state  in  a  crim- 
inal trial  being  within  the  province  of  the  prosecuting  attor- 
ney, his  failure  to  place  all  his  witnesses  upon  the  stand  is  not 

1 1  Greenl.  on   Ev.,  §  255,   citing  of    protecting    the    subject  against 

Lord  Stafford's  Case,  7  How.  St.  Tr.  royal  oppression,  which  was  continu- 

1527.  ally   seeking  opportunities  for  the 

2  Willis'  Case,  15  How.  St.  Tr.  623-  silencing  or  punishment  not  only  of 

G25;  Grossfield's  Case,  26  id.  55,  57.  those  whose  deeds  were  obnoxious, 

3 1  Greenl.  Ev.,  §  255.  but  of  those  whose   language  was 

4  The  origin  of  the  English  statu-  calculated  to  arouse  popular  feelings 

tory  requirement  has  been  by  some  as  well. 

ascribed  to  the  weight  and  binding  5  Bressler  v.  People,  117  111.  422; 

efficacy  of  the  oath  of  allegiance  of  State  v.  Cain,  20  W.  Va.  177;  State 

the  accused  (1  Greenl.  on  Ev.,  §  255),  v.  Baxter,  S2  N.  C.  602. 

while  the  introduction  of  the  rule  6Com.  v.  Haskell,   140  Mass.  128; 

has  been  by  others  attributed  to  the  State  v.   Middleham,  62  Iowa,  150; 

fact  that  the  clerical  judges  of  early  Selph  v.  State,  22  Fla.   537;  People 

times  followed  the  canon  law,  which  v.  Oliver,  4  Utah,  460 ,  State  v.  Mor- 

provided  that  no  one  shall  be  con-  gan,  35  W.  Va.  260;    Hill  v.   Com. 

demned  as  a  heretic  save  on  the  tes-  (Va.,  1892),  14  S.  E.  Rep.  330;  Terri- 

timony  of  two  lawful  and  credible  tory  v.  Hanna,  5  Mont.  248;  Keller 

witnesses.    Stafford's  Case,  T.  Raym.  v.  State,  123  Ind.  110;  23  N.  E.  Rep. 

408.    In  the  writer's  opinion  the  rule  1138.    Contra,  People  v.  Kenyon,  93 

of  law  requiring  two  witnesses  to  an  Mich.  19;  Phillips  v.  State,  22  Tex. 

overt  act  was  due  solely  to  the  neces-  App.  229;  Maher  v.  People,  10  Mich, 

sity  for  the  adoption  of  some  means  212. 


§  385.]  RECEPTION    OF   EVIDENCE.  505 

ground  for  dismissing  the  indictment;  nor  can  it  be  urged  in 
support  of  a  motion  for  a  new  trial  if  the  evidence  which  was 
introduced  by  the  state  was  sufficient  to  convict  the  accused. 
Nor  is  the  prosecution  debarred  from  calling  a  witness  in  re- 
buttal merely  because  the  district  attorney  has  declined  to 
call  that  witness  to  testify  in  chief  upon  the  request  of  the 
defendant  that  he  should  do  so.1  If,  however,  the  evidence 
against  the  prisoner  is  wholly  circumstantial  and  is  met  by 
positive  and  direct  evidence  on  his  part,  the  refusal  of  a  re- 
quest that  the  state  be  required  to  put  certain  persons  on  the 
stand  who  are  present  in  court,  and  who  were  eye-witnesses 
of  the  event  with  which  it  is  sought  to  connect  the  accused,  is 
reversible  error.2 

§385.  Positive  and  negative  testimony  —  The  number 
of  witnesses  as  affecting  the  weight  of  evidence. —  When 
the  occurrence  of  a  certain  event  is  the  fact  in  issue,  a  witness 
called  to  prove  its  non-occurrence  may,  if  he  had  a  good  op- 
portunity of  observing  it,  testify  that  he  did  not  see  or  hear 
it,  though  unable  to  say  positively  that  it  did  not  take  place;3 
and  he  may  also  be  permitted  to  testify,  if  able  to  give  the 
details,4  that  he  would  have  heard  or  seen  it  if  it  had  hap- 
pened.5 Though  the  weight  and  credibility  of  evidence  are 
for  the  jury  to  determine,  the  court  may  be  permitted  to  in- 
struct them  that  the  positive  testimony  of  a  witness  that  a 
certain  event  has  happened,  while  not  conclusive,6  is  entitled 
to  more  weight  than  the  statements  of  others  who  say  they 

1  United  States  v.  Bennett,  17  People  v.  Etter,  45  N.  W.  Rep.  1109; 
Blatchf.  (U.  S.)  357.  In  this  case  81  Mich.  370.  Cf.  Wheelis  v.  State, 
the  court  said:  "Whether  the  evi-    23  Tex.  App.  238. 

dence  of  the  witness  was  necessary  3  Abb.   Brief  on  the  Facts,  §  559, 

to  make  out  a  case  for  the  prosecu-  citing  Greany  v.  L.  I.  R.  R.  Co.,  101 

tion  belonged  to  the  district  attor-  N.  Y.  419;  Maxwell  v.  Harrison,  8 

ney  to  determine  for  himself.  What  Ga.  61. 

the  defendant  would  testify  to  could  4  Burnham   v.    Sherwood,  14  Atl. 

not  be  foreseen;  and  when  the  de-  Rep.  714. 

fendant's  testimony  compelled  the  5  Abb.  Brief  on  the  Facts,  §  559 ; 

production  of  evidence  in  rebuttal,  Casey  v.    N.  Y.  Cent.   R.  R  Co.,  6 

the  rights  of  the  prosecution  to  pre-  Abb.   N.   C.   104,  124:  Hollender  v. 

sent  such  evidence  by  the  testimony  Railroad  Co.,  19  id.   18;  Chicago  R. 

of  any  witness  able  to  testify  to  the  R.  Co.  v.  Dillon,  123  111.  570. 

facts  is  not  open  to  question."  6  Lighthouse  v.  Railroad  Co.,  54  N. 

2  Thompson  v.  State,  30  Tex.  App.  W.  Rep.  320. 
325;  People  v.  Wright,  90  Mich.  302; 


566  KECEPTION   OF    EVIDENCE.  [§  386. 

did  not  see  it,1  though  they  were  present.  The  circumstance 
that  the  latter  admitted  that  their  attention  was  not  called  to 
it  would  render  a  verdict  based  upon  their  negative  evidence 
subject  to  reversal.2  So  the  positive  knowledge  of  a  fact  by 
one  witness  is  of  greater  value  than  the  ignorance  or  forget- 
f ulness3  of  another  person  who  may  have  had  equal  opportu- 
nities of  acquiring  knowledge.4  But  where  two  witnesses 
with  equal  opportunities  for  knowing,  testifying  from  their 
recollection  of  a  transaction,  contradict  each  other,  no  infer- 
ence should  be  drawn  by  the  jury  from  the  fact  that  one  is 
more  positive  in  his  assertions  than  the  other.5  The  jury 
have  a  right,  and  it  is  their  duty,  to  consider  the  character  of 
a  party's  witnesses  as  well  as  their  number;  and  the  fact  that 
the  jury  have  based  their  verdict  on  the  testimony  of  one 
witness  and  rejected  that  of  several  who  contradicted  him 
will  not  justify  setting  it  aside.6 

§  386.  The  discretionary  power  of  the  court  —  Judicial 
discretion  defined  and  considered. —  The  phrases  "judicial 
discretion"  or  "in  the  discretion  of  the  court"  as  they  are 
used  in  this  treatise  do  not  refer  to  any  purely  arbitrary  exer- 
cise of  the  will  of  the  judge,  but  to  a  deliberate  and  careful 
choice  made  by  him,  and  to  his  exercise  of  a  calm  judgment 
unswayed  by  personal  bias  or  prejudice,  but  guided  by  fair- 
ness under  established  legal  rules.7 

We  have  seen  the  important  part  that  judicial  discretion 
occupies  in  the  examination  of  witnesses,  in  the  allowance  of 
amendments  where  a  variance  is  alleged,  in  the  granting  of  a 
continuance,  in  the  admission  of  cumulative  evidence,  and  in 

iCanfield   v.    Asheville,   etc.  Co.,  781 ;  Hinkle  v.  Higgins  (Tex.,  1892), 

111   N.   C.  597;  Allen  v.  Bond,  112  19  S.  W.  Rep.  147. 

Ind.  523.  5  Marshall   v.    Harkenson    (Iowa, 

2  Neil  v.  State,  79  Ga.  779 ;  Rainey  1892),  50  N.  W.  Rep.  559. 

v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  R.  Co.,  23  N.  Y.  S.  6  Neal  v.    Deniing,  21  S.  W.  Rep. 

80;  68  Hun,  495;  Hoffman  v.  Fitch-  1066;  Goldstrohm  v.  Steiner,  155  Pa. 

burgR.  Co.,  67  Hun,  581.     Cf.  Horn  St.    28;  Chicago,  etc.   Co.  v.  Fisher 

v.    Baltimore  &  O.  R.  Co.,  54  Fed.  (111.,    1892),  31  N.  E.  Rep.  406.     Cf. 

Rep.    301;  Missouri  Pac.    R.  Co.  v.  Howell  v.  Dilts  (Ind.,  1892),  30  N.  E. 

Pierce,  39  Kan.  391.  Rep.  313. 

3Rai!sbackv.    Patton,   52   N.  W.  7See  Anderson's  Law  Diet.,  Discre- 

Rep.  277.  tion.  citing  Piatt  v.  Munroe,  34  Barb. 

<  McCluskey  v.  Barr,  54  Fed.  Rep.  (N.  Y.)  293;  Tripp  v.  Cook,  26  Wend. 

152 ;  Faber  v.  Bruner,  13  Mo.  543. 


§  386.]  KECErTION    OF    EVIDENCE.  567 

similar  matters  of  detail  appertaining  to  practice  and  pro- 
cedure. 

Judicial  power  to  determine  causes  does  not  exist  aside  from 
the  law,  of  which  the  courts  are  the  creatures  and  instruments. 
The  judge  has  no  discretion  except  that  which  is  conferred 
upon  him  by  the  law.  That  discretion  is  a  legal,  not  a  per- 
sonal, discretion,  and  consists  in  discerning,  expounding  and 
canning  out  the  law  as  it  comes  from  the  law-making  power 
and  as  it  is  contained  in  or  modified  by  prior  judicial  prece- 
dents.1 

To  permit  the  courts  to  mold  the  law  in  any  particular  case 
as  often  as  the  rights  of  a  particular  litigant  may  seem  to  de- 
mand it  would  involve  the  whole  body  of  jurisprudence  in 
uncertainty,  and  substitute  the  caprice  or  personal  opinion  of 
a  fallible  judge  for  those  well-considered  and  long-established 
legal  rules  and  principles  which  are  recorded  in  the  statute 
books,  and  in  the  reports  of  judicial  decisions,  which,  being  mat- 
ter of  such  notoriety,  are  or  may  easily  be  known  beforehand 
by  all  men.  So  when  it  is  said  that  a  matter  is  within  the 
discretion  of  the  court  and  is  not  subject  to  review  or  re-exam- 
ination, legal  discretion  is  referred  to,  operating  within  the 
limits  of  well-recognized  legal  rules  and  implying  the  presence 
and  exercise  of  fairness  and  justice  by  the  court.  But  on  the 
other  hand,  the  abuse  of  the  discretion  possessed  by  the  court, 
particularly  if  the  abuse  shall  be  palpable  and  gross,  is  always 
subject  to  review.  Such  a  perversion  or  abuse  of  judicial  dis- 
cretion occurs  when  the  court  departs  from  the  well-trodden 
path  of  legal  rules  and  remedies  and  permits  its  action  to  be 
swayed  and  guided  by  personal  will  or  passion,  by  the  prompt- 
ings of  prejudice  or  of  affection,  by  bias,  by  partiality,  or  by 
the  allurements  and  rewards  of  corruption.2 

1  See  the  remarks  of  Marshall,  C.  J.,  the  law  of  tyrants;  it  is  always  un- 
in  Osborn  v.  United  States  Bank,  9  known ;  it  is  different  in  different 
Wheat.  860.  men  ;  it  is  casual,  and  depends  upon 

2  White  v.  Leads,  51  Pa.  St.  189;  constitution,  temper  and  passion.  In 
People  v.  N.  Y.  Cent.  R.  Co.,  29  N.  the  best  it  is  often  caprice;  in  the 
Y.  431 ;  Com.  v.  Lesher,  17  S.  &  R.  worst  it  is  every  vice,  folly  and  pas- 
164;  Tilton  v.  Cofield,  93  U.  S.  166;  sion  to  which  human  nature  can  be 
Ex  parte  Reed,  100  id.  23;  United  liable."  Lord  Camden,  cited  by  Gib- 
States  v.  Atherton,  102  U.  S.  375.  son,  C.  J.,  in  Commonwealth  v. 
"The  private  discretion  of  a  judge  is  Lesher,  17  S.  &  R.  (Pa.)  164. 


INDEX. 


References  are  to  pages. 
ABANDONMENT: 

of  old  road,  evidence  of,  291. 

ABANDONMENT  OF  CONTRACT: 
parol  evidence  to  show,  312-314. 

ABBREVIATIONS: 

parol  evidence  to  explain,  319. 

judicial  notice  of,  365. 

of  printers,  etc.,  364.  , 

ABILITY: 

evidence  to  show,  283. 

ABODE  (see  Domicile). 

ABOLITION  OF  SLAVERY: 
judicial  notice  of,  367. 

ABORTION: 

dying  declarations  not  admissible  in,  141. 

time  and  means  required  to  procure,  285. 
ABSENCE : 

presumptions  from,  356,  357. 

of  witness,  evidence  to  explain,  16. 

of  witness,  when  a  contempt  of  court,  419,  420. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  350. 

evidence  of,  guilt  presumed  from,  124. 

declarations  to  explain,  65. 
(see  also  Alibi.) 

of  witness,  when  suspicious,  538. 

ABSENT  WITNESSES: 

commissions  to  procure  depositions  of,  530-534 

testimony  of  missing  witnesses,  167. 

witness  need  not  be  deceased,  167-169. 

witnesses  who  have  become  sick,  decrepit  or  insane,  169. 

cross-examination  at  former  trial  requisite;    identity  of  parties,  169, 

170. 
precise  language  of  witness,  how  far  necessary,  171-173. 
continuance  granted  because  of  — 

in  civil  trials,  416-418. 

in  criminal  trials,  418,  419. 


570  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

ABSOLUTE  CONTRACT: 

allegation  of,  not  supported  by  proof  of  an  alternative  contract,  40. 
ABSOLUTE  DEED: 

parol  evidence  to  show  it  is  mortgage,  329,  330. 

may  be  shown  to  be  a  trust,  312. 
ABUSIVE  LANGUAGE : 

by  witness,  striking  out,  476. 
ABUSIVE  WITNESS : 

checking  by  court,  472. 
ACCEPTANCE : 

primary  evidence  of,  54 

ACCEPTANCE  OF  DEED : 
when  presumed,  346. 
presumption  of,  evidence  to  rebut,  315. 

ACCESS : 

of  husband,  presumption  from,  360. 

ACCIDENT: 

relevancy  of  evidence  of  prior  accident,  19. 
evidence  to  show  liability  to,  268. 

ACCOMPLICES : 

their  competency  for  and  against  one  another,  433,  434 

who  are,  459. 

competency  of,  as  witnesses,  459. 

when  jointly  indicted,  460. 

when  separately  indicted,  460. 

when  convicted,  460. 

admission  of,  as  witnesses,  when  discretionary,  460,  461. 

promises  of  immunity  to,  461. 

claims  to  immunity  by,  461. 

pardon  of,  461. 

cross-examination  of,  461. 

conviction  on  evidence  of,  462. 

corroboration  of,  462. 

extent  of  corroboration  required,  338,  463. 

corroboration,  when  required  by  statute,  463. 

corroboration  by  confession  of  accused,  463,  464. 

presumptions  against,  338. 

confessions  of,  136. 

ACCOUNT  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  78-86. 

must  be  regularly  kept,  84. 
ACCOUNTS  STATED,  113. 
ACCUSED : 

the  identification  of,  494,  495. 

cannot  be  called  as  a  witness  against  himself,  496. 


INDEX.  571 

References  are  to  pages. 

ACCUSED  (continued) : 

the  credibility  of  his  testimony,  496. 

his  interest,  496. 

his  right  to  confront  the  witnesses,  496. 

presumed  innocent,  497. 

waives  his  privileges  by  going  on  stand,  497. 

may  be  questioned  as  to  prior  life,  497. 

limits  of  cross-examination  of,  497. 

effect  of  prior  conviction,  497. 

simulation  of  insanity  by,  498. 

his  rights  to  cross-examine  the  witnesses,  169,  170,  4981 

he  may  be  recalled  after  testifying,  498. 

he  may  object  to  irrelevant  questions,  498. 

his  failure  to  testify,  effect  of,  499. 

comments  by  counsel  on,  499. 

his  right  to  be  present  at  taking  the  view,  491,  492. 

his  explanation  to  the  jury,  473,  473. 

ACCUSED  AS  A  WITNESS: 
in  his  own  behalf,  433. 
for  co-defendant,  433,  434. 
against  co-defendant,  433,  434. 

ACCUSED  IN  CRIMINAL  TRIAL: 

his  right  to  cross-examine  and  confront  witnesses,  169,  170. 
physical  examination  of,  298. 

ACCUSED  PERSONS  (see  Confessions)  : 
preliminary  examination  of,  131. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT : 

as  proof  of  handwriting,  187,  188. 

substantial  compliance  with  statute  is  required,  187. 

necessity  for,  to  obtain  record,  188. 

who  may  take,  188. 

by  de  facto  officials,  188. 

before  attesting  witness,  188. 

before  relative  of  the  grantor,  188. 

before  attorney  of  the  grantor,  188. 

before  grantee,  188. 
when  taken  out  of  jurisdiction  of  official,  189, 
venue  of,  must  be  stated  in,  189. 
certificate  of,  189. 
official  seal  on,  190. 
language  of,  190. 
amendment  of,  191. 
use  of,  as  evidence,  192. 
impeachment  of,  192. 

extrinsic  evidence  to  supply  omissions,  191. 
as  notice  to  purchasers,  192. 


572  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

ACKNOWLEDGMENT  (continued) : 

of  married  women,  192. 

mandamus  to  compel  amendment  of,  19L 

impeachment  of,  189,  192. 

conclusiveness  of,  189,  192. 

fraud  in  procuring,  189. 

reformation  of,  in  equity,  191. 

of  agent,  when  binding  on  the  principal,  100-103. 
(see  also  Admissions.) 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF  GOVERNMENT: 

judicial  notice  of,  378. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT  OF  PAYMENT: 

evidence  of,  86,  87. 

of  firm  debt,  after  dissolution,  93,  94 

ACQUAINTANCE : 

of  witness  with  handwriting,  195. 

of  witness  with  party  at  telephone,  122. 

ACQUIESCENCE : 

as  an  estoppel,  111-123. 
presumption  from,  341. 

ACQUITTAL: 

of  witness,  admits  incriminating  questions,  522. 
of  accomplice,  its  effect,  434 

ACTS: 

of  congress,  judicial  notice  of,  374-376. 

of  executive  officials,  379. 

estoppel  from,  118-122. 

of  untruthfulness  to  impeach,  506. 
(see  also  Admissions.) 
ACTUAL  KNOWLEDGE : 

when  witness  must  have,  64 
ADDITIONAL  CONSIDERATION: 

parol  evidence  of,  306. 
ADEQUACY  OF  CONSIDERATION  (see  Consideration). 

ADMINISTRATOR: 

exclusion  of  interested  witnesses  in  actions  against,  436-439. 

(see  also  Personal  Transactions.) 
admissions  by,  91,  109. 

before  appointment,  100. 

"  ADMISSIBLE : " 

defined,  14,  15. 
ADMISSIBILITY  OF  EVIDENCE: 

of  collateral  facts,  17-19. 

of  motive,  etc.,  20-24 

of  character,  24-27. 


INDEX.  573 

References  are  to  pages. 
ADMISSIONS : 

definition  and  character,  88,  89. 

privity  as  affecting,  89,  90. 

parties  whose  admission   is    received ;  joint  interest,  when   required, 

90,  91. 
of  partners,  their  effect,  92-94. 
declarations  of  conspirators,  94-96. 
assignor  and  assignee,  96,  97. 

wife's  admission,  when  binding  on  husband,  97,  98. 
of  inhabitants  of  towns,  99. 

of  strangers  to  the  record ;  principal  and  surety,  99,  100. 
of  agents,  101-104. 
by  attorneys  of  record,  104,  105. 
offers  of  compromise;  admissions  under  duress  against  interest,  106, 

107. 
in  pleadings,  107,  108,  109. 
by  reference,  109-111. 
from  conduct  and  assumed  character,  111. 
self-serving  declarations,  111-113. 
mode  of  proof;  nature  of  the  admissions,  114-116. 
weight  and  sufficiency  of  admissions,  116. 
when  conclusive;  mistake,  116-11S. 
estoppel  defined,  118-120. 
intention  of  party  estopped,  121,  122. 
admissions  and  communications  sent  and  received  by  telephone,  122, 

123. 
to  prove  handwriting,  186,  187. 
to  prove  an  express  trust,  400. 

distinguished  from  declarations  against  interest,  162. 
(see  also  Declarations.) 

ADMISSION  AS  PRIMARY  EVIDENCE,  58. 

ADMISSION  OF  CAUSE  OF  ACTION: 

must  be  seasonable,  393. 
ADMISSION  OF  INCOMPETENT  EVIDENCE: 

when  not  ground  for  new  trials,  544,  545. 
ADOPTION: 

agreements  of,  406. 

certificate  of,  as  evidence,  211. 

ADULTERY: 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  22,  24 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  350. 

condonation  of,  burden  of  proof,  390. 

incompetency  of  husband  and  wife  on  trial  of  issue  of,  248, 

ADVANCEMENTS : 

parol  evidence  to  rebut  presumption  of,  315. 

ADVERSE  EVIDENCE: 

bringing  out  on  cross-examination,  485. 


574  INDEX. 

Beferences  are  to  pages. 

ADVERSE  INTERESTS: 

as  disqualifying  witnesses,  444 

ADVERSE  PARTY: 

as  witness,  when  he  may  be  impeached,  501,  502. 

ADVERSE  POSSESSION: 

husband  and  wife  claiming  by,  98. 
presumptions  from,  338-340. 
resulting  from  parol  partition,  399. 

ADVERSE  WITNESS: 

impeachment  of,  by  showing  his  bad  reputation,  504 

ADVERTISEMENT  (see  Newspapers). 

ADVICE: 

confidential,  from  attorney,  250-254 

evidence  to  show  taking,  66-68. 

to  show  good  faith,  67. 

AFFECTION : 

evidence  to  show  signs  of,  270. 
AFFIDAVIT: 

affidavits  and  depositions  defined  and  distinguished,  526. 

parties  to,  526,  527. 

formal  requisites  of,  527,  528. 

language  of,  529. 

in  denial  of  genuineness  of  writing,  187. 
.  to  prove  service  of  subpoena,  414 

necessity  of,  to  obtain  continuance,  419. 

what  facts  must  be  shown  in,  419. 

to  procure  attachment  for  a  witness,  419,  420, 

AFFINITY: 

in  declarations  of  pedigree,  72. 

agency,  not  created  by,  alone,  97,  98. 
AFFIRMATION: 

denned,  449. 

form  of,  449,  450. 
(see  also  Oath.) 
AFFIRMATIVE : 

burden  of  proof  on  party  alleging,  381,  386, 
AFFIRMATIVE  DEFENSE : 

right  to  open  and  close  in  case  of,  393. 
AGE: 

evidence  of,  216. 

opinion  of,  269. 

family  reputation  as  to,  75. 

evidence  of,  from  inspection,  75. 

inspection  by  jury  to  determine,  494   , 

of  document,  148. 


INDEX.  575 

References  are  to  pages. 
AGENCY: 

scope  of.  101. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  349. 

proof  of,  by  agent,  101-104. 

between  husband  and  wife,  97,  98. 

among  partners,  92-94. 

of  railroad  employees,  103. 

none  from  relationship,  97,  98. 

usage  to  explain,  316,  317. 

of  speaker  at  telephone,  123,  123. 

of  telegraph  company,  54. 

creation  by  parol,  403. 

proof  by  admissions,  104. 

AGENTS: 

declarations  and  admissions,  101-103. 

AGREEMENTS  (see  Alterations ;  Ambiguity;  Admissions ;  Parol  Evi- 
dence ;  Consideration  ;  Seals,  etc). 

ALCOHOLIC  LIQUORS : 
judicial  notice  of,  371. 

ALIAS  (see  Assumed  Name). 

ALIBI : 

reasonable  doubt  in  cases  of,  12. 
burden  of  proof  to  show,  384-386. 
what  must  be  shown,  385. 
(see  also  Absence.) 

ALIEN  (see  Naturalization). 

ALLEGATIONS : 

when  formal,  38,  39. 

when  descriptive,  36,  37. 
ALLOWANCE : 

of  time,  to  witness,  413. 

ALMANACS: 

to  show  sunrise,  218. 

as  evidence,  217. 

court  may  use  to  refresh  recollection,  218,  380. 

ALTERATIONS  IN  WRITINGS : 
defined,  178. 

distinguished  from  spoliation  and  from  cancellation,  etc.,  178. 
when  material,  179. 
in  conveyances,  180. 
fraudulently  made,  180. 
before  delivery,  180. 
blanks  in  writings,  180,  181. 
presumptions  as  to  date  of,  181, 182. 
suspicions  caused  by,  181. 


576  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

ALTERATIONS  IN  WRITINGS  (continued): 

by  consent,  180. 

testimony  of  expert  to,  204. 

in  contracts,  burden  of  proof,  387. 
ALTERNATIVE  CONTRACT : 

proof  of,  under  allegation  of  absolute  contract,  40. 

AMATEUR  PHOTOGRAPHS: 
their  admissibility,  60. 

AMBIGUITIES: 
denned,  323. 

patent  and  latent,  323,  325. 
parol  evidence  to  explain,  324. 
evidence  to  prove  usage  in  case  of,  316. 
blanks,  181,  182,  326. 
technical  words,  use  of,  317,  318. 
in  affidavits,  530. 

AMENDMENT : 

statutes  of,  41,  45,  46. 

of  pleadings,  when  presumed,  354. 

of  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  191. 

of  returns,  229. 

of  affidavits,  528,  529. 

ANALYSIS : 

chemist  may  testify  to  the  result  of,  283. 

ANARCHISTS'  CASE,  96. 

ANCESTOR : 

judgment  against,  binds  heir,  231. 

admission  of,  binds  heir,  89,  90. 

ANCIENT  BOUNDARIES  (see  Boundaries). 

ANCIENT  DOCUMENTS: 
definition,  148. 

must  come  from  proper  custody,  149, 150. 
execution  need  not  be  proved,  150,  151. 
extent  of  corroboration  required,  151,  152. 

ANCIENT  FACTS : 

of  history,  how  proved,  217. 

ANGER: 

opinion  evidence  to  show,  270. 
declarations  of,  68. 
(see  also  Threats.) 

ANIMALS : 

evidence  of  breed  of,  275. 

evidence  of  value  of,  292. 
ANIMAL  BLOOD: 

distinguished  from  human  blood,  281. 


INDEX.  577 

References  are  to  pages. 

ANNULMENT  OF  MARRIAGE: 
examination  of  party,  297,  298. 

ANOTHER  SIMILAR  CRIME: 
evidence  to  prove,  21. 

ANSWER: 

of  third  persons,  as  admissions,  109-111. 
of  witness,  may  be  qualified,  2(i7. 
of  witness,  must  be  responsive,  476. 

ANSWER  IN  EQUITY: 

admissions  contained  in  the,  109. 

mode  of  proof,  221. 

when  it  is  evidence  for  defendant,  430-43& 

conclusive  on  defendant,  430. 

proof  to  overcome,  430. 

waiver  of  verification  of,  431. 

when  irresponsive,  431. 

when  contradicted  by  defendant,  431. 

as  legal  conclusion,  431. 

must  be  full  and  responsive,  432,  433. 

when  privileged,  431. 

ANTE  LITEM  MOTAM  (see  Controversy): 

declaration  of  reputation  must  be,  155. 

defined,  156. 
APPEAL: 

effect  of  on  final  judgment,  232. 

variance  cannot  be  shown  on,  46. 

evidence  not  reviewable  on,  558. 

preponderance  must  be  shown  on,  558. 

when  insufficiency  of  evidence  will  be  considered  on,  559. 

APPEARANCE : 

of  person,  from  inspection,  492  495. 

APPOINTMENTS  TO  OFFICE: 
primary  evidence  of,  55. 

APPRAISAL : 

of  goods,  by  expert  witnesses,  291-294 

APPRENTICESHIP: 
contracts  of,  406. 

APPROACHING  DEATH: 
sense  of,  139. 

how  shown  generally,  140. 
by  declarations,  140. 
a  question  for  the  court,  140. 
burden  of  proof  to  show,  140. 
37 


578  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
ARBITRATION: 

attendance  of  witnesses  at  an,  407. 
agreements  for,  must  be  in  writing,  406. 
presumptions  as  to  regularity  of,  356. 
evidence  taken  at.  169. 
submission  to,  by  attorney  at  law,  104. 

ARBITRATORS : 

competency  of,  as  witnesses,  110. 

parol  evidence  by.  when  inadmissible,  110. 

rules  regulating  evidence  before,  110,  111. 

parol  evidence  to  vary  their  written  awards,  300. 

power  of,  to  administer  oath,  451. 

waiver  of  oath  before,  451. 

what  facts  they  may  prove,  447,  448. 

ARCHITECT : 

as  an  expert  witness,  290. 

ARREST : 

privilege  of  witness  from,  407,  421. 

of  non-resident  witness,  421. 

duration  of  privilege  from,  422. 

delay  of  witness  abrogates  privilege  from,  422. 

notice  to  officer,  422. 

waiver  of  privilege  from,  by  witness,  422. 

of  persons  intimidating  witness.  415. 

of  accused,  may  be  shown,  497. 

of  witness,  for  contempt,  419. 

(see  Non-attendance  and  Contempt.) 

ARTICLES  IN  COURT: 

cannot  be  obtained  by  subpoena  duces  tecum,  412. 
exhibition  of,  to  explain  evidence,  60-62. 

ASSAULT: 

right  to  open  and  close  in  trial  for  an,  391. 

ASSESSMENT  OF  DAMAGES: 

for  land  taken,  right  to  open  and  close,  393,  394 
ASSESSMENT  ROLLS: 

as  evidence,  210. 
ASSESSOR : 

confidential  communications  to,  256. 
ASSIGNMENT: 

of  lease,  must  be  in  writing,  401,  406. 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  300. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  ERROR: 
necessity  for,  539. 

ASSIGNMENT  OF  JUDGMENT: 
proof  of,  225. 


INDEX.  579 

References  axe  to  pages. 
ASSIGNOR: 

when  incompetent,  443. 

of  negotiable  paper,  444. 

his  admissions,  when  binding  on  assignee,  96. 

judgment  against,  when  binding  on  assignee,  231. 

ASSUMED  NAME: 

living  under,  23. 
ASSUMING  QUESTIONS: 

confessions  procured  by  means  of,  130. 
(see  Hypothetical  Questions.) 

ASSUMPSIT,  ACTION  OF: 
formal  allegations  in,  38. 
by  witness,  to  recover  expenses,  411. 

ASSUMPTION  OF  FACTS: 

in  hypothetical  questions.  272-274. 

by  court  in  its  charge,  31. 
ATTACHMENT: 

against  witness,  when  granted,  410,  411. 

may  be  ex  parte,  419. 

affidavits  to  show  ground  for,  419. 

discretionary  character  of,  420. 

for  witness  giving  deposition,  420. 

ATTACK: 

on  validity  of  judgment,  230, 
effect  of  presumptions,  355. 

ATHEISM : 

as  disqualifying  a  witness,  451,  452. 
ATTEMPT: 

to  prevent  the  attendance  of  witnesses,  415. 
ATTENDANCE  OF  WITNESSES: 

at  private  arbitrations,  407. 

the  subpoena ;  fees  of  witness,  407-409. 

fees  in  criminal  cases,  410,  411. 

subpoena  duces  tecum,  411-413. 

time  and  mode  of  serving  the  subpoena,  413,  414 

recognizance,  414. 

obstructing  attendance  of  witnesses,  414,  415. 

changing  venue  for  convenience  of  witnesses,  415,  416. 

failure  of  witnesses  to  attend;  continuance  when  granted,  416-418. 

continuance  in  criminal  trials,  418,  419. 

non-attendance  of  witness,  when  a  contempt,  419,  420. 

privilege  of  witnesses  from  service  of  civil  process,  420,  42L 

privilege  of  witnesses  from  civil  arrest,  421. 

duration  of  the  privilege  from  arrest,  422. 

witnesses  in  custody,  423. 

witnesses  before  legislative  bodies.  423. 


580  INDKX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
ATTESTATION: 
of  will,  405,  406. 

ATTORNEY  AT  LAW: 

competency  of,  as  a  witness,  4-16. 

admissions  by,  104,  105,  107--109. 

stipulations  by,  104. 

compromises  by,  104. 

submission  to  arbitration  by,  104. 

as  witness  to  handwriting.  198,  203. 

for  grantor,  acknowledgment  before,  188. 

power  of  to  make  affidavits  for  party,  526. 

confessions  obtained  by,  130. 

may  testify  to  foreign  law,  212. 

ATTORNEY  AT  LAW  (CONFIDENTIAL  COMMUNICATIONS): 
knowledge  of,  obtained  non -professionally,  251. 
employed  by  both  parties,  252,  254. 
termination  of  the  suit,  252. 
waiver  of  privilege  by  client,  249,  252,  253. 
waiver  by  representative  of  the  client,  252. 
objection  to  testimony  of,  by  client,  253. 
communications  to,  when  acting  as  conveyancer,  253. 
documents  in  possession  of,  when  privileged,  253,  254, 
both  parties,  when  acting  for,  252,  254. 
advice  by,  to  aid  infraction  of  law,  254. 
advice  to  both  parties,  252. 
disclaimer  of,  by  client,  253. 
fees  of,  necessity  for,  250. 
to  clerk  of  attorney,  250. 
to  interpreter,  250. 
third  person,  presence  of,  250. 
time  of  the  confidential  communication,  251. 
what  attorney  may  divulge,  251,  255. 

ATTORNEY'S  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  82. 

AUCTIONEER : 

as  agent  of  both  parties,  403. 

AUCTION  SALE: 

of  land,  contract  to  refraiu  from  bidding  at,  397. 

AUTHENTICATION: 

of  standard  of  comparison  for  handwriting,  2CO-204. 
of  private  writings  (see  Private  Writings). 
of  copies  of  public  records,  209. 
of  copies  of  statutory  law,  211. 

AUTHOR : 

of  scientific  treatises  not  under  oath,  275. 


INDEX.  581 

References  are  to  pages. 
AUTHORITY: 

to  speak  through  telephone.  122,  123. 

of  agent,  created  by  parol,  404. 

of  persons  making  promises  to  secure  a  confession,  134. 

of  agents,  attorneys,  etc.,  to  make  admissions,  101-109. 

AUTOPSIES: 

medical  testimony  regarding,  280. 

AWARDS: 

as  admissions.  109. 

parol  evidence  of,  110,  30G. 

setting  aside,  110. 

presumption  of  validity,  356. 

facts  involved  in,  may  be  shown,  448. 

B. 

BAD  FAITH: 

evidence  to  rebut,  23. 
evidence  to  show,  23. 

BAD  REPUTATION  OF  PARTY: 
in  libel,  burden  of  proof,  389. 

BAD  REPUTATION  OF  WITNESS: 

may  be  shown,  to  impeach  his  credibility,  506,  507. 

must  not  be  too  remote,  506. 

(see  Reputation  for  Truth.) 
BAILMENT : 

negligence  in  case  of,  when  admitting  evidence  of  bailor,  429. 

receipt  forming  a  contract  of,  309,  310. 

BANK  BUSINESS: 

regularity  presumed,  133. 

BANK  CHECKS: 

as  evidence,  84. 
BANKERS: 

judicial  notice  of  customs  of,  372,  373. 
BANK   MESSENGER: 

his  entries  as  evidence,  79. 

BANK  OFFICIALS: 

as  witnesses  to  handwriting,  203. 
BANK  PASS-BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  84 
BANKRUFfCY : 

evidence  of  general  results  in,  57. 

declarations  to  show,  67.  ,i      . 

BAPTISM : 

ceitificate  of ;  its  use  as  evidence,  216. 


582  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
BAR: 

pleading  judgment  in.  230,  242. 
BARK  ON  TREES: 

contract  to  soil,  must  be  written,  397,  398. 
BASIS  OF  BELIEF,  4. 
BASIS  OF  FACT: 

for  opinion  of  witness,  268,  285. 
BEER: 

judicial  notice  of  nature  of,  371. 

BEHAVIOR  OF  ACCUSED: 

where  homicide  is  charged,  24. 
BEHAVIOR  OF  PERSON : 

evidence  to  show,  270. 

BELIEF: 

in  religion,  of  witnesses,  451,  452. 

BELIEF  OF  WITNESSES : 

as  to  meaning  of  conversation,  289. 
reasons  for,  267. 
as  to  handwriting,  198. 
as  to  identity  of  person  or  thing,  269. 
as  to  good  faith,  intention,  etc.,  270. 
(see  also  Expert  Evidence.) 

BELIEF  UNDER  OATH : 
evidence  to  show,  505,  506. 

BENEFICIARY  OF  TRUST: 

when  bound  by  admissions  of  trustee,  100. 

when  bound  by  judgment  against  trustee,  233. 
BEST  EVIDENCE: 

when  required.  47-62. 

(see  Primary  and  Secondary.) 
BIAS: 

of  witness,  defined,  523. 

distinguished  from  prejudice,  523. 

when  it  may  be  shown,  524. 

is  not  collateral,  524. 

from  pecuniary  interest,  524 

from  promises  or  threats,  525. 

may  be  shown  on  direct  examination,  502,  503, 

in  evidence  of  common  reputation,  155. 
BILLIARD  TABLES: 

judicial  notice  of  use  of,  365. 

BILL  OF  DISCOVERY: 
nature  of,  431. 
definition,  432. 
interrogatories  in,  432. 


INDEX.  58o 


References  are  to  pages. 

BILL  OF  DISCOVERY  (continued): 
answers  to,  must  be  precise,  432. 
averments  of,  confessed  by  silence,  432. 
privilege  in  refusing  to  answer,  432. 
unsworn  answers  to,  432. 

full  and  further  answer  may  be  compelled.  433. 
contempt  in  refusing  to  answer,  433. 

BILL  OF  EXCEPTIONS: 

its  use  to  show  testimony  of  a  missing  witness,  172. 
necessity  for  and  form  of,  539. 

BILL  OF  LADING : 

presumption  from  the  possession  of,  346. 

BILL  OF  PARCELS : 

does  not  exclude  parol  evidence,  308. 
BILLS  TO  PERPETUATE  TESTIMONY,  534,  535. 

BIRTH : 

not  provable  by  certificate  of  baptism,  80. 

family  reputation  as  evidence  of,  73,  74 

primary  evidence  of,  what  is,  53. 
BLACKBOARD : 

use  of  by  expert,  204. 
BLANK : 

in  wills,  cannot  be  filled  by  parol,  326. 

in  other  writings.  180,  181. 
BLENDED  QUESTION  OF  LAW  AND  FACT,  3a 

BLOOD  STAINS: 

exhibition  of  clothing  containing,  to  jury,  61. 
evidence  to  identify,  281. 

BLOW: 

evidence  to  show  direction  of,  270. 

BOARD  AND  LODGINGS: 
evidence  of  value  of,  293. 

BODILY  CONDITION: 

at  death,  physician  as  witness  to,  283. 

BODILY   FEELINGS: 

verbal  expressions  of,  68-71. 
BONA  FIDES: 

evidence  of,  21-24. 

burden  of  proof,  388,  389. 

BONA  FIDE  HOLDERS: 

presumptions  in  favor  of,  346, 347. 
BONDS : 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  301. 


584  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
BOOK  ENTRIES: 

as  evidence,  78-80. 

as  declarations  against  interest,  163,  105,  166. 
(see  Stranger's  Declarations.) 
BOOK-KEEPER: 

as  witness  to  handwriting,  198,  203. 
BOOKS : 

evidence  to  show  results  of  examination  of,  57. 

erasures  in,  178-182. 

alterations  in,  178-182. 

(see  also  Public  Records;  Documentary;  Evidence.) 
BOOKS  AND  PAPERS: 

production  of,  175,  176. 
BOOKS  OF  PARTY: 

as  evidence  for  himself,  81-86. 
BOOKS  OF  SCIENCE: 

use  of,  in  cross-examining  experts,  275. 
BOUNDARIES: 

public  and  private  distinguished,  158. 

reputation  as  proof  of,  90,  159. 

declarations  of  surveyors  to  prove,  160,  291. 

maps  and  field-notes  to  prove,  160. 

parol  evidence  of,  321. 

monuments  constituting,  primary  evidence  of,  55. 

of  jurisdiction,  witness  fees  in,  408. 

agreements  to  establish,  397. 

BOUNDARIES  OF  STATES.  COUNTIES,  ETC.: 
judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 

BRAKEMAN: 

on  trains,  288. 

BREACH  OF  CONDITION: 
burden  of  proof,  388,  38a 

BREED  OF  ANIMALS: 

books  to  show,  275. 

BRICK  BUILDING: 

meaning  of  the  term,  290. 

BROKEN  LEG: 
evidence  of,  282. 

BROKERS : 

usages  of,  373. 

rules  of  board  of,  375. 

BUILDER : 

as  au  expert  witness,  290. 


INDEX.  585 

Beferences  are  to  pages. 
BUILDING: 

opinion  evidence  to  8lio\v  strength  aud  construction  of,  290. 
relevancy  of  evidence  cff  condition  of,  18,  226. 
photographs  of,  59. 

BURDEN  OF  PROOF: 
defined,  381-383. 
in  special  proceedings,  383,  384. 
in  criminal  trials,  384-386. 

proving  a  negative,  facts  best  known  to  party  alleging,  386-389. 
to  show  confession  is  voluntary,  127. 
sense  of  approaching  death,  140. 
to  account  for  alterations  in  writing,  182. 

BURGLAR'S  TOOLS: 

exhibition  of  to  jury  to  explain  the  evidence,  61. 
evidence  of  their  possession,  when  relevant,  23. 

BUSINESS: 

usages  of,  316,  317. 

usual  course  of,  to  aid  memory,  475. 

presumptions  from  course,  346-349. 

BUSINESS-MEN : 

as  witnesses  to  handwriting,  203. 

BY-LAWS: 

of  municipal  corporations,  213-215. 

(see  Municipal  Ordinances.) 
not  judicially  noticed,  375,  376. 

c. 

CALENDARS : 

as  evidence,  217,  218,  38a 

CALLING  ATTENTION: 

of  witness,  on  impeaching,  507-513. 

CALLING  WITNESSES : 

power  of  the  court  to  compel,  564. 
by  prosecution  in  criminal  trial,  564 
refusal  of  request  to  compel,  565. 

CANCELLATION : 
defined,  182. 

CANCELLATION,  SUITS  FOR: 
parol  evidence  in,  331,  332. 

CAPACITY : 

of  experts,  294. 

evidence  of,  by  comparison,  296,  297. 

of  machinery,  290. 


580  INDKX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
CARE: 

common  knowledge,  265,  260. 

special  knowledge,  265-268,  289,  290. 

what  may  have  been  avoided,  265,  289. 

observation  with  evidence,  to  show,  268-270. 
CARGO : 

stowage  of,  289. 
CASUALTY: 

opinion  as  to  cause  of,  268,  278-280,  289. 
CAUSE : 

of  death,  physical  injuries,  etc.,  278-°80. 

of  leak  in  vessel,  289. 

opinions  as  to  cause,  when  admissible,  268. 

form  of  question  as  to,  272-274. 

exhibiting  instrument,  279. 

experiments  to  illustrate,  296. 
CAUSE  OF  ACTION : 

identity  when  necessary,  233,  234. 

splitting  of,  234. 
CAUTION : 

to  be  employed  in  weighing  expert  evidence,  278. 

employed  by  witness  in  answering,  267. 

CAUTIONING  THE  JURY,  31. 
CERTAINTY : 

distinguished  from  reasonable  doubt,  10. 

CERTIFICATES: 

of  public  records,  209. 

of  records  of  public  departments,  210. 

of  private  writings,  211. 

form  of,  209. 

deputy  may  sign,  209. 

signature  to,  209. 

of  consul,  to  show  foreign  law,  212. 

of  publication  in  newspaper,  214. 

of  baptism,  80,  216. 

CERTIFICATE  ACCOMPANYING  DEPOSITION: 
language  of,  531. 
as  prima  facie  evidence  to  show  — 

reasons  for  taking  the  deposition,  531. 

domicile  of  deponent,  531. 
parol  evidence  to  supply  omissions,  533. 

CERTIFICATE  OF  ACKNOWLEDGMENT: 
when  recitals  in,  conclusive,  189. 
official  seal  of,  190. 
signature  of,  190. 
language  of,  190. 


INDEX.  587 

References  are  to  pages. 

CERTIFICATE  OF  ACKNOWLEDGMENT  (continued): 
amendment  of,  191. 

mandamus  to  compel  amendment  of,  191. 
omissions  in,  when  supplied  by  parol,  191. 
impeachment  of,  192. 
conclusiveness  of,  192. 
as  proof  of  handwriting,  187,  188. 
necessity  for,  to  obtain  record,  188. 
who  may  take,  188. 

(see  also  under  Acknowledgment,  Deed,  and  Notary  Public.) 

CERTIFIED  COPY: 

when  primary  evidence,  50. 

CENSUS : 

proof  of,  208. 

CENSUS  REPORTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  368. 

CHANGE  OF  VENUE: 

for  convenience  of  witnesses,  415,  416. 

CHARACTER: 

in  civil  actions,  24,  25. 

good  character  of  prisoner,  20. 

of  deceased  on  trial  for  homicide,  27. 

when  synonymous  with  reputation,  507. 
CHARGING  THE  JURY : 

as  to  the  evidence,  30-34. 

CHARTER: 

of  corporation,  usage  to  explain.  317. 

CHARTER-PARTY: 

oral  contract  in  connection  with,  311. 
CHARTS  OF  PEDIGREE..  73. 

CHASTITY : 

evidence  of,  when  relevant,  24. 

of  plaintiff  in  trial  for  seduction,  361. 

CHECKS : 

as  evidence,  84. 

CHEMICAL  TESTS : 

applied  to  writings  in  court,  297. 

CHEMISTS : 

may  testify  to  — 

as  to  poisons,  283. 
results  of  analysis,  283. 
effects  of  noxious  gases.  284, 
ingredients  of  ink,  281. 
safety  of  lamps,  284. 
wholesomeness  of  food,  284. 


588  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
CHILD : 

exhibition  of  to  jury,  492. 

CHILDREN : 

their  presence  at  conversation  between  husband  and  wife,  248. 
presumptions  of  their  legitimacy,  360. 

CHILDREN  AS  WITNESSES: 
when  presumed  competent,  453. 
when  competency  must  be  shown,  453. 
dying  declarations  of,  453. 
may  be  instructed,  453. 

CIRCUIT  COURT: 

jurisdiction  of,  374. 
will  notice  state  laws,  374 
CIRCULATING  MEDIUM: 
judicial  notice  of,  365-367. 

CIRCUMSTANCES: 

parol  evidence  of,  320-322. 

CIRCUMSTANTIAL  EVIDENCE: 

direct  and  circumstantial  evidence  distinguished,  5,  6. 
nature  and  effect  of  circumstantial  evidence,  7,  8. 
reasonable  doubt  and  the  weight  of  evidence,  9-13. 
(see  also  Presumptions.) 

CITIES: 

admissions  of  inhabitants  of,  99. 
judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 

CITY  STREETS: 

location  of,  judicial  notice,  366. 
CITIZENSHIP  (see  Naturalization). 
CIVIL  ARREST  (see  also  Arrest). 

CIVIL  PROCEEDING : 

criminal  intention  involved  in,  10. 
CLERGYMEN : 

confessions  to,  not  privileged  at  common  law,  130. 

confidential  communications  to,  258,  259. 
CLERK  OF  ATTORNEY: 

communications  to,  253. 
CLIENT: 

when  bound  by  admissions  of  attorney,  104,  105. 

when  bound  by  pleadings,  107-109. 

counsel  may  testify  for,  446. 

communications  by,  to  the  attorney,  251-255. 

CLOTHING: 

blood  stains  on,  61,  281. 

exhibition  of,  to  jury,  to  explain  the  evidence,  6L 


INDEX.  589 

References  are  to  pages. 

COACHING  WITNESS: 

to  handwriting,  199. 

"C.  0.  D. :" 

meaning  of,  365. 

COHABITATION : 

presumption  of  legitimacy  from,  359. 
as  proof  of  marriage,  158. 

COIN: 

judicial  notice  of  value  of,  365-367. 
"COLD  STORAGE:" 

evidence  to  explain  term,  319. 
COLLATERAL  ATTACK: 

on  judgment,  230. 
COLLATERAL  FACTS: 

relevancy  of  evidence  of,  17-19. 

judgment,  when  conclusive  as  to,  233. 

when  involved  in  offer  of  compromise,  106. 
on  cross-examination,  484. 
COLLATERAL  WRITINGS: 

parol  evidence  to  show,  307,  308. 

primary  evidence  of,  54,  55. 

COLLECTIVE  FACTS  (see  Expert  and  Opinion  Evidence). 

COLLISION : 

cause  of,  289. 
COLLUSION : 

absence  of  witness  by,  may  be  relevant,  16. 
COLOR : 

inspection  by  jury  to  determine,  493,  494. 

COMBINING  WITNESSES  OR  EVIDENCE: 
to  show  value,  294. 

COMMERCIAL  TERMS: 

evidence  to  explain  meaning  of,  318. 
COMMISSION: 

to  take  testimony  (see  Letters  Rogatory). 
COMMISSIONER: 

to  take  testimony,  power  to  issue  subpoena,  408. 

COMMITTEE  OF  INVESTIGATION: 

attendance  of  witnesses,  423. 
COMMITTEE  OF  LUNATIC: 

exclusion  of  interested  witnesses  against,  436-445. 
(see  also  Personal  Transactions.) 
COMMITMENT: 

of  witness  in  criminal  trials,  414. 


590  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

COMMON  CARRIERS: 

judicial  notice  of  customs  of.  373. 

COMMON  DISASTER: 
death  in,  358,  359. 

COMMON  KNOWLEDGE: 

opinion  evidence,  when  inadmissible  in  matters  of,  265-270. 

COMMON  LANDS: 

parol  partition  of,  399. 

COMMON  LAW: 

judicial  notice  of,  372. 

presumption  of,  348. 

of  foreign  country,  proof  of,  211.  212, 

illogical  character  of  rules  of,  425. 
COMMON  REPUTATION  (see  General  Reputation). 

COMMUNICATIONS : 

through  telephone,  122,  123. 

between  attorney  and  client.  249-255. 

between  husband  and  wife,  245-247. 

between  physician  and  patient,  259,  260. 

between  priest  and  penitent,  258,  259. 

through  interpreter,  66,  111,  173,  253,  469,  532. 

with  deceased  persons,  exclusion  of,  440-442. 
COMMUNITY  OF  INTEREST: 

distinguished  from  privity,  90. 
COMPARISON : 

proof  of  value  by,  294. 

by  experts  in  court,  296,  297. 

of  machinery,  290. 

COMPARISON  OF  HANDWRITING: 
defined,  200. 
statutory  rules  — 
in  England,  200. 
in  America,  201. 
comparison  with  irrelevant  writiugs,  202. 
COMPENSATION : 
of  experts,  277. 

when  entitled  to,  277. 
cannot  be  taxed  as  costs,  277. 
for  services,  evidence  to  show,  2931 
for  witnesses  (see  Mileage). 
COMPETENCY : 

of  deceased  person  as  witness  necessary  to  render  dying  declarations 

admissible,  143. 
of  expert,  witness  may  testify  to,  271-274. 


INDEX.  591 

References  are  to  pages. 

COMPETENCY  OF  EVIDENCE: 
a  judicial  question,  34,  35. 

COMPETENCY  OF  WITNESSES: 

classes  of  persons  incompetent,  424-426. 

parties  incompetent  as  witnesses  at  common  law,  426,  427. 

testimony  of  party  admissible  when,  427,  428. 

what  constitutes  interest  in  the  event,  428,  429. 

exceptions  to  the  common-law  rule ;  the  answer  as  evidence  for  the  de- 
fendant, 429-431. 

competency  of  witnesses  in  equity;  the  bill  of  discovery,  431-433. 

defendant  in  criminal  trial ;  his  competency,  433,  434 

statutory  competency  of  parties,  434,  435. 

incompetency  of  interested  persons  to  testify  as  to  transactions  with 
deceased  or  insane  persons,  435-439. 

what  are  transactions  with  decedents,  440-442. 

persons  interested;  their  statutory  incompetency,  442-445. 

incompetency  of  parties  to  negotiable  instruments  to  impeach  them, 
445,  446. 

competency  of  counsel,  446,  447. 

competency  of  judges,  447. 

competency  of  arbitrators.  447,  448. 

definition  and  form  of  oath  and  affirmation,  448-451. 

incompetency  because  of  a  lack  of  religious  belief,  451,  452. 

incompetency  of  insane  persons,  452,  453. 

deaf  mutes  as  witnesses,  453. 

children  as  witnesses,  453,  454. 

witnesses  incompetent  by  conviction  of  crimes :  the  effect  of  pardon, 
454-457. 

statutory  regulation  of  the  competency  of  witnesses  convicted  of  crime, 
457,  458. 

statutes  construed,  458,  459. 

accomplices,  459-462. 

corroboration  of,  462-465. 

COMPETENT: 
defined,  14. 

COMPLAINT: 

made  by  the  victim  of  a  rape,  71, 

COMPROMISE,  OFFERS  OF: 
as  admissions,  106,  107. 
when  confidential,  106. 
collateral  facts  involved  in,  106. 
by  attorneys  of  record,  104. 

COMPULSORY  EXAMINATION: 
of  an  accused  person,  494. 


592  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

COMPULSORY  PROCESS  FOR  WITNESSES: 
right  of  prisoner  to  have,  410. 
right  to,  is  not  absolute,  416. 
depositions  of  absent  witness,  411. 

CONCEALMENT: 

when  material  in  an  insurance  policy.  295. 

of  witness  by  party  admits  his  testimony  at  a  former  trial,  168. 

CONCEALMENT  OF  KNOWLEDGE: 
by  witness,  512. 

CONCLUSIONS : 

when  inadmissible,  265-270. 

when  admissible,  268. 

inadmissible  as  dying  declarations,  141,  143. 

CONCLUSIVE  PRESUMPTIONS,  333,  334. 

CONCLUSIVENESS : 

of  extra-judicial  confessions,  134. 

of  judicial  confessions,  135. 

of  probate  of  will,  227. 

of  judgments,  232-234. 

of  judgments  in  rem,  236. 

of  criminal  judgments,  237. 

of  evidence  to  show  value,  292. 

of  recitals  in  an  acknowledgment,  189,  192. 

of  deeds  as  evidence,  307. 

of  the  presumption  of  a  grant,  340. 

of  the  answer  of  a  hostile  witness,  503. 

CONCLUSIVENESS  OF  ADMISSIONS,  116-118. 
(see  Estoppel.) 

CONDEMNATION  PROCEEDINGS : 

evidence  of  value  of  land  at,  18. 

right  to  open  and  close  in,  393. 
CONDITION : 

photographs  to  show,  59,  60. 

physical  condition,  inspection  by  jury  to  show,  492-495. 

of  things  by  inspection,  60-62. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  349. 

of  highways,  machinery,  etc.,  evidence  to  show,  269-273,  291. 

of  mind,  evidence  to  show,  285-288. 

of  parties  or  subject-matter,  relevancy  of,  18,  20. 

of  culverts,  evidence  to  show,  270, 289. 

of  body,  283. 

of  railroad,  evidence  to  show,  288. 
CONDITIONAL  CONTRACT: 

proof  of,  under  allegation  of  absolute  contract,  40. 


INDEX.  593 

References  are  to  pages. 

CONDITIONAL  DELIVERY: 
of  deed,  may  be  shown,  315. 

CONDITIONAL  PARDON : 
effect  of,  454,  456. 

CONDITIONS  PRECEDENT  TO  CONTRACT  IN  WRITING: 

when  oral,  may  be  shown,  311. 
CONDONATION  OF  ADULTERY: 

in  divorce  proceedings,  burden  of  proof,  390. 

CONDUCT: 

presumptions  from,  12,  298,  314,  315. 

as  estoppel,  111,  118-123. 
CONDUCTOR  OF  RAILROAD  CAR: 

his  admissions  not  binding  on  company,  102. 

duty  of,  evidence  to  show,  288. 

CONFEDERATE  (see  Conspiracy). 

CONFESSIO  JURIS: 

evidence  of,  is  inadmissible,  58. 

CONFESSIONS : 

definition  and  classification,  124, 125. 
to  be  regarded  with  caution,  125, 126. 
voluntary  character  of,  126-128. 
when  voluntary ;  inducements  offered,  128,  129. 
need  not  be  spontaneous,  129-131. 
preliminary  examination,  131-133. 
extra-judicial  must  be  corroborated,  133, 134. 
conclusive  character  of  judicial  confessions,  135. 
persons  offering  inducements,  135,  136. 
of  persons  other  than  defendant,  136. 
of  conspirators,  136,  137. 
of  treason,  137,  564. 

(see  also  Admissions;  Declarations;  Privileged  Communica- 
tions; Reference;  Silence.) 

CONFESSION  AND  AVOIDANCE: 

burden  of  proving  in  plea  of,  383. 
CONFESSION  OF  JUDGMENT: 

after  dissolution  of  firm  by  partner,  93.  i 

CONFIDENTIAL  COMMUNICATIONS  (see  Privileged  Communications). 
CONFIDENTIAL  OFFERS  OF  COMPROMISE,  106. 
CONFIDENTIAL  RELATIONS : 

presumption  of  undue  influence  from,  389. 
CONFINEMENT : 

of  witnesses,  414. 
CONFLICT  OF  WITNESSES: 

is  not  impeachment,  501. 
38 


.">91  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

CONFRONTING  THE  WITNESSES: 

before  interstate  commerce  commission,  496. 
constitutional  right  of,  495. 
evidence  of  deceased  witnesses,  495. 
evidence  received  by  interpreter,  495. 
absence  of  witness  caused  by  accused,  496. 
right  is  reciprocal,  496. 

(see  also  Taking  the  View.) 

CONGRESS : 

acts  of,  how  proved,  208. 

CONJECTURE : 

as  a  basis  for  hypothetical  questions,  273. 

CONNECTING  EVIDENCE: 

when  alleged  to  be  irrelevant,  16. 

CONNECTION  OF  WRITINGS: 
parol  evidence  to  show,  308,  309. 

CONSCIOUSNESS : 
of  guilt,  126-128. 

(see  also  Admissions  ;  Confessions  ;  Silence.) 
of  danger,  as  affecting  confessions,  131-133. 
of  deceased  persons,  146. 

CONSENT: 

to  alterations,  when  implied,  180. 

CONSEQUENCES : 

natural,  when  presumed  to  be  intended,  361,  363. 

CONSIDERATION : 
denned,  306. 

must  be  proved  strictly,  40,  41. 
parol  evidence  of,  305-307. 
presumption  of,  346. 
burden  of  proof  to  show  validity  of,  383. 
payment  of,  in  a  parol  sale  of  land,  397. 
may  be  shown  by  parol,  402. 
illegality  of,  may  be  shown,  305-307. 

CONSPIRATORS : 

declarations  of,  94-96. 

confessions  of,  134,  135. 
CONSTITUTION : 

judicial  notice  of,  373,  374. 
CONSTITUTIONAL  RIGHT: 

of  accused,  to  have  compulsory  prqcess,  410,  411. 

CONSTRUCTION : 

of  machinery,  evidence  to  show,  290. 


INDEX-  595 

References  are  to  pages. 

CONSTRUCTION  OF  WRITINGS : 

distinguished  from  their  interpretation,  301,  302. 

definition,  302. 

liberal  and  strict  construction,  302. 

pi'ovince  of  jury,  303. 

adherence  to  former  construction,  304 

foreign  records,  226. 

contracts  and  wills  contrasted,  32.7. 

of  affidavits,  530. 
CONSTRUCTIVE  TRUSTS: 

parol  evidence  to  establish,  312. 

by  gift  in  will,  32a 

CONSUL: 

certificate  of,  to  show  foreign  law,  213. 
may  testify  to  foreign  law,  213. 

CONTEMPORANEOUS  CHARACTER : 

of  res  gestae,  77. 

of  writings  to  refresh  memory,  478,  479. 

CONTEMPORANEOUS  WRITINGS: 

incorporation  of,  by  reference,  308,  309. 
CONTEMPT: 

expert  witness  cannot  be  committed  for,  if  refusing  to  testify  without 
compensation,  277. 

non-attendance  of  witness,  when,  419. 

attachment  in  cases  of,  419. 

evidence  to  show,  419,  420. 

wilful  delay  no  excuse,  420. 

by  deponent,  420. 

power  of  congress  to  commit  for,  423. 

in  equity,  433. 

power  of  arbitrators  to  commit  for,  407. 

non-attendance  of  witness,  when  not,  410. 

of  witness  remaining  in  court,  467. 

CONTESTED  ELECTIONS : 
judicial  notice  of,  370. 

CONTINUANCE,  FOR  ABSENCE  OF  WITNESSES: 
affidavit  to  obtain,  526. 
when  granted,  416. 
party  must  not  be  negligent,  416. 
discretion  of  court  to  grant,  416. 
stipulation  to  avoid,  416,  419. 
witness  must  be  material,  417. 
witness  must  be  procurable,  417. 

evidence  must  not  be  cumulative,  and  must  be  probably  true,  418. 
in  criminal  trials,  418,  419. 
party  must  show  diligence,  417,  418. 


596  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

CONTINUANCE,  FOR  ABSENCE  OF  WITNESSES  (continued): 

facts  must  appear  in  affidavit,  419. 

language  of  affidavit,  419. 

evidence  admitted  to  avoid,  impeachment  of,  503. 
(see  Non-attendance.) 
CONTINUED  COURSE  OF  DEALING: 

evidence  of,  to  construe  contract,  304. 
CONTINUITY : 

presumption  of,  349. 

CONTINUOUS  SEIZIN : 

presumption  from.  339. 
CONTRACT: 

variance  in  proof  of,  40. 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  etc.,  301. 

impeaching  validity  of,  304,  305. 

impeaching  consideration  in,  305,  306. 

alteration  of,  burden  of  proof,  387. 

right  to  open  and  close  in  actions  on,  390. 

for  default  of  another  under  statute  of  frauds,  403. 

under  statute  of  frauds,  397-404. 

to  make  will,  must  be  in  writing,  406. 

(see  Alterations  ;  Consideration,  etc.) 
"  CONTRACT  IN  ISSUE :  " 

defined,  441. 

CONTRACTS  AND  RECEIPTS: 

distinguished,  310. 

CONTRACTS  IN  WRITING: 
best  evidence  of,  52-54 

CONTRACT  OF  HIRING : 
proof  of.  40,  41. 

CONTRADICTION : 
of  confessions,  134. 

does  not  render  admissions  incompetent,  115. 
of  one's  own  witness  incidentally,  501. 
by  usage.  316,  317. 
of  recitals,  304-306. 
of  expert,  by  text-books,  275. 

CONTRADICTORY  STATEMENTS: 
as  in  showing  admissions,  115. 
proving,  to  impeach  witness,  507. 
laying  foundation  for,  508. 
the  rule  in  the  Queen's  Case,  508. 
time  and  place  of,  must  be  stated,  508. 
evidence  on  former  trial,  508. 
when  forgotten,  mode  of  proof,  509. 


INDEX.  597 

Eeferences  are  to  pages. 

CONTRADICTORY  STATEMENTS  (continued): 
when  denied,  mode  of  proof,  509. 
in  affidavits  and  depositions.  509.  510. 
impeaching  affidavits  by,  510,  511. 
when  in  writing  it  must  be  shown,  510,  511. 
in  writing,  denial  of,  511. 
as  to  irrelevant  matters,  511. 
confirmatory  statements  to  rebut,  511. 
confirmatory  statements  to  show  bias,  512. 
explaining  on  redirect  examination,  486. 
of  accused,  may  be  shown,  497. 

CONTRADICTORY  WRITINGS : 

reconciling  by  parol  evidence,  308. 

CONTRIBUTORY  NEGLIGENCE: 
burden  of  proof,  388. 
must  be  pleaded,  46. . 

CONTROVERSY  (see  Ante  Litem  Motam): 
definition  of,  156. 
declarations  must  precede,  156. 
declarant  must  have  knowledge,  157. 
knowledge  of  controversy  will  be  presumed,  157. 
declarations  made  to  prevent,  158. 

CONVENIENCE : 

of  witnesses,  change  of  venue  for,  416. 

CONVERSATION : 

to  explain  intention,  entire  statement  of,  interpreted,  66,  111,  253. 

through  telephone,  122,  123. 

signs  as,  453. 

evidence  to  show  understanding  of,  268,  269. 

referred  to  in  a  writing,  307. 

CONVERSION : 

burden  of  proof  in,  389. 

CONVEYANCES: 

acknowledgment  of,  187-192. 
by  corporation,  185. 
when  unstamped,  211. 
parol  evidence  to  vary,  300. 
presumption  of  delivery  of,  etc.,  345. 

CONVEYANCERS : 

confidential  communications  to,  253. 

as  witnesses  to  handwriting.  203. 

judicial  notice  of  customs  of,  373. 
CONVICT: 

as  witness,  continuance  in  case  of,  416. 


598  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

CONVICTION  OF  CRIME: 

admissibility  of,  as  evidence,  257. 

to  prove  fact  of  conviction,  238. 

suing  for  exoneration,  238. 

infamous  crime,  what  is,  454 

incompetency  caused  by,  454. 

effect  of  pardon,  454. 

when  pardon  of,  is  conditional,  454. 

absolute  incompetency  caused  by,  457. 

when  an  objection  to  credibility,  458. 

mode  of  proving,  458. 

what  may  be  shown,  459. 

may  be  shown  by  questioning  accused,  497. 

primary  evidence  of,  517. 

questions  put  to  witness  to  show,  518. 

when  renders  affidavit  incompetent,  526. 

COPIES: 

when  receivable  as  secondary  evidence,  48,  49. 

of  statutory  laws,  209-211. 

of  legislative  acts,  208. 

as  primary  evidence  of  written  admissions,  115. 

use  of,  to  refresh  memory,  479,  480. 

(see  Exemplified  Copies  ;  Public  Records,  eta) 

COPIES,  CERTIFIED  (see  Certificates). 

CORONER'S  INQUEST: 

evidence  taken  at,  cannot  be  used  subsequently  if  a  witness  is  missing, 

169. 
examination  of  accused  at,  132. 

CORPORATION : 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  350. 

execution  of  conveyance  by,  185. 

when  bound  by  admissions,  102. 

their  members,  when  incompetent  as  witnesses  at  common  law,  427. 

affidavits  by  officer  of,  527. 

CORPORATION  CHARTERS: 

judicial  notice  of,  376. 
CORPORATION  RECORDS: 

right  to  inspect,  207. 

primary  evidence  of,  54 

CORPUS  DELICTI: 

order  of  proof  of,  16. 

confession  as  proof  of,  133,  135. 

in  passing  counterfeit  money,  134 
CORRECTNESS : 

of  records,  when  presumed,  354. 


INDEX.  599 

References  are  to  pages. 


CORRESPONDENCE: 

declarations  of  pedigree  in,  73. 

familiarity  with  handwriting  derived  from,  197.J 

CORROBORATION :  , 

of  extra-judicial  confessions,  133,  134. 

required  in  the  case  of  ancient  writings,  151,  152. 

required  of  plaintiff  in  equity,  430,  431. 

of  witness,  by  showing  former  statements,  511. 

to  show  bias,  512. 

of  evidence  of  impeached  witness,  514. 

required  in  trial  for  perjury,  562. 

CORROBORATION  OF  ACCOMPLICES: 
mode  and  extent  of,  462,  463. 
when  required  by  statute,  464. 
in  case  of  felonies,  463. 
in  case  of  misdemeanor,  463. 
must  tend  to  show  guilt,  464. 
question  for  jury,  464. 
question  for  court,  464. 
by  confession  of  accused,  464. 

CORROBORATIVE  EVIDENCE: 
defined,  3. 

COSTS : 

where  amendment  is  allowed,  45. 

COUNSEL: 

when  taken  excludes  declarations,  77. 
competency  of,  as  witnesses,  446. 
may  state  testimony  of  absent  witness,  173. 
(see  also  Privileged  Communications.) 

COUNTERFEIT  MONEY: 

presumptions  from  possession  of,  342,  343. 
corpus  delicti  of  issuing,  134. 

COUNTERPARTS : 

their  use  and  effect  as  evidence,  49. 

COUNTIES : 

judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 
admissions  of  inhabitants  of,  99. 

COURSE  OF  TRADE : 
presumption  from,  346. 

COURT,  CONTEMPT  OF   (see   Contempt;   Non-attendance   of  Wit- 
ness). 

COURTS : 

presumptions  as  to  their  jurisdiction,  353-356. 
records  of  (see  Public  Records). 


600  INDEX. 

Beferences  are  to  pages. 

COURTS  NOT  OF  RECORD: 
proving  their  proceedings,  221. 

COURT  ORDERS: 

as  evidence  of  reputation,  161. 

CRAMPED  HANDWRITING: 

testimony  of  expert  to,  204. 
CREDIBILITY : 

of  circumstantial  evidence,  8. 

of  admissions,  114,  115. 

of  dying  declarations,  144. 

of  private  entries,  215. 

of  expert  evidence,  276. 

as  affected  by  interest,  434-437. 

of  evidence,  is  for  jury,  473. 

of  evidence  of  insane  person,  453. 

of  the  evidence  of  the  accused,  496. 

impeachment  of,  500-524. 

CRIME : 

conviction  of,  when  admissible,  518. 

(see  Conviction  ;  Infamous  Crimes.) 
CRIMINAL  CONVERSATION : 

incompetency  of  husband  and  wife,  248. 
CRIMINAL  INTENT: 

relevancy  of  evidence  of  similar  acts,  21, 

presumptions  of,  361-363. 
CRIMINAL  JUDGMENTS: 

operation  and  effect  of,  237. 
CRIMINAL  TRIALS : 

variance  in,  43-46. 

exhibition  of  articles  to  the  jury  in,  61. 

competency  of  wife  in  trial  of  husband,  245. 

burden  of  proof  in,  384. 

right  to  open  and  close,  394. 

fees  of  witnesses  in,  410,  411. 

recognizance  to  secure  attendance  of  witness  in,  414 

change  of  venue,  for  convenience  of  witnesses,  416, 

continuance  in,  for  absent  witnesses,  418,  419. 

indictment  not  evidence  in,  490. 

CRIMINATING  ARTICLES: 

illegally  obtained  from  the  accused,  61. 
CRIMINATION: 

by  writing  name,  200. 
CROPS : 

farmer  as  witness  to  value  of,  292. 

growth,  etc.,  judicial  notice  of,  366,  367. 

sale  of,  when  growing,  397,  398. 


INDEX.  601 

^References  are  to  pages. 

CROSS-EXAMINATION : 

as  to  contents  of  writing,  51. 

utility  of,  64,  400. 

admissions  made  on,  107. 

as  to  voluntary  nature  of  a  confession,  127. 

necessity  of  opportunity  for,  170. 

of  witnesses,  to  handwriting,  198-200. 

party  may  be  asked  to  write  his  name  on,  200. 

of  expert,  272,  273,  275. 

right  to,  when  exists.  481. 

of  witness,  producing  writing,  481. 

waiver  of  right  to,  481. 

by  intervening  party,  481. 

confined  to  matters  brought  out  on  direct,  481. 

value  of  rapidity  in,  481. 

evasive  answers  on,  482. 

as  to  irrelevant  matters,  482. 

discretion  of  court,  482. 

motion  to  strike  out  by  party  denied  right  of,  482. 

questions  affecting  credibility,  483. 

questions  on,  to  ascertain  memory,  knowledge,  etc.,  of  witness,  483. 

prolongation  of,  483,  484. 

repetition  of  questions  on,  484 

collateral  facts  on,  484. 

testing  truthfulness  of  witness  on,  484. 

conclusiveness  of,  484. 

when  witness  may  repeat  testimony  on,  483. 

impeaching  on,  485. 

showing  hostility  of  witness  on,  485,  486. 

right  of  accused  to,  498. 

irrelevant  questions  to  accused  on,  498. 

writing  by  accused  on,  498. 

making  adverse  witness  one's  own  by,  501. 

disgracing  questions  on,  517. 

CRY: 

of  pain,  admissibility  of,  68. 

CULVERT: 

evidence  to  show  condition  of,  270,  289, 

CUMULATIVE  EVIDENCE: 
defined,  3. 
on  recalling  witness,  487. 

CURABLENESS : 

opinion  as  to,  279,  280. 

CUSTOMS  (see  Usage)  : 
judicial  notice  of,  372. 
of  foreign  countries,  proof  required,  373. 


602  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
DAMAGES : 

evidence  of,  292,  293. 

actions  to  recover,  burden  of  proof,  388. 

when  admitted,  burden  of  proof,  383. 

when  unliquidated,  burden  of  proof,  389. 

when  unliquidated,  right  to  open  and  close,  390-392. 

when  liquidated,  right  to  open  and  close,  392,  393. 

DAMPNESS : 

of  walls,  its  cause,  290. 

DATE: 

of  birth,  80. 

evidence  of,  365. 

of  contracts,  may  be  varied,  314 

of  erasures,  182. 

of  delivery  of  deed,  345. 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  fix,  20. 

DATE  OF  DEATH: 

presumption  of,  357. 
judicial  notice  of,  370,  371. 
DATE  OF  WRITING : 

testimony  of  expert  to  decipher,  204. 

may  be  supplied  or  explained  by  parol,  307,  314. 

presumed  correct,  314. 

DAY  OF  WEEK : 

judicially  noticed,  365. 

DEADLY  WEAPON: 

presumption  from  deliberate  use  of,  361,  362. 

DEAF  MUTES,  AS  WITNESSES: 
common-law  incompetency  of,  453. 
their  present  competency,  453. 
may  give  testimony  in  writing,  453. 
or  by  signs,  453. 

DEALERS : 

as  expert  witnesses  to  value,  292. 
DEATH: 

family  reputation  as  evidence  of,  75. 

sense  of  approach  of,  138-141. 

of  declarant,  necessary  to  admit  reputation,  155. 

of  declarant  against  interest,  165. 

of  subscribing  witness,  194 

effect  of  on  confidential  communication,  248. 

physician  may  testify  to  — 

probable  cause  of,  278,  279. 

probable  time  of,  280. 

probable  means  of,  281. 

condition  of  body  at,  283. 


INDEX.  603 

Keferences  are  to  pages. 
DEATH  (continued): 

presumption  of,  from  absence,  356. 

of  one  having  fixed  abode,  357. 

date  of,  357. 

presumption  of,  without  issue,  heirs,  etc.,  358. 

evidence  of  report  of,  358. 

in  common  disaster,  358,  359. 

presumption  in  case  of,  when  caused  by  use  of  a  deadly  weapon,  381, 

362. 
incompetency  of  interested  witness  in  case  of,  435-445. 

DEBT: 

presumption  of  payment  of,  347. 

DEBTOR : 

admissions  of,  when  binding  on  surety,  99. 

DECEASED  MEMBER  OF  FAMILY: 

his  declarations,  72. 

DECEASED  PERSONS: 

declarations  of,  90,  155,  165. 
dying  declarations  of,  138-147. 

(see  Personal  Transactions  with  Deceased.) 

DECEASED  WITNESSES  (see  Absent  Witnesses). 

DECEIT: 

writings  obtained  by,  177. 
DECEPTION : 

confessions  procured  by  deception,  130. 

DECK  LOAD: 

safety  of,  289. 
DECLARATIONS: 

as  evidence  of  marriage,  54. 

of  bodily  or  mental  feelings,  68-71. 

constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  74-80. 

constituting  pedigree,  71-74 

when  self-serving,  111-113. 

of  general  reputation,  153-161. 

of  testator,  when  admissible,  322. 

(see  also  Admissions  ;  Dying  Declarations.) 
DECLARATIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST,  162-16& 

(see  Stranger's  Declarations.) 
DECLARATIONS  OF  TRUST : 

under  the  statute  of  frauds,  400. 
DECOY  LETTERS,  177,  178. 
DEDICATION : 

evidence  of  reputation  to  prove,  161. 
DEDIMUS  (see  Deposition  and  Letters  Rogatory^ 


604  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
DEEDS : 

pedigree  in,  73. 

as  evidence  of  reputation,  161. 
destruction  of,  178. 
fraudulent  alterations  of,  180. 
blanks  in,  180. 

unrecorded,  when  valid,  188. 
acknowledgment  of,  188-192. 
presumption  as  to  alterations  in,  181. 
incorporation  of,  by  reference,  308,  309. 
authority  to  execute  must  be  under  seal,  403. 
(see  Delivery.) 

DEEDS.  PROOF  OF  (see  Ancient  Documents). 

DE  FACTO  OFFICIALS: 

their  appointment  and  tenure,  55. 

may  take  acknowledgments,  188. 
DEFEASANCE : 

of  mortgage,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  333. 

DEFECTIVE  AFFIDAVITS: 
amendment  of,  528. 

DEFENDANT : 

when  he  may  open  and  close,  390,  391. 

when  competent  for  or  against  each  other  — 
in  civil  cases,  427,  428. 
in  criminal  cases,  433,  434. 

in  equity,  answer,  when  evidence  for  him,  430,  431. 
answer  as  admissions,  109. 
DELAY: 

as  excluding  declarations,  77. 

presumption  from,  341. 

estoppels  from,  338-340. 
DELIBERATE  FALSEHOOD: 

presumption  from,  512-514. 
DELIBERATION: 

as  shown  by  writing,  300. 

DELIBERATION  IN  HOMICIDE: 
declarations  to  show,  76. 

DELIVERY  (see  also  Deeds;  Date,  etc.): 

of  deed,  parol  evidence  to  show,  305. 

of  deed,  when  presumed,  345,  346. 

evidence  to  rebut  presumption,  315. 
DEMAND: 

as  evidence  of  value,  293. 
DEMEANOR: 

evidence  to  show,  24,  270. 


INDEX.  CU5 

References  are  to  pages. 


DEMONSTRATION : 
defined,  3,  10. 

DEMURRER : 

to  bill  in  equitj' :  its  effect,  433. 

DEMURRER  TO  THE  EVIDENCE: 

in  civil  cases,  549. 

in  criminal  trial,  550. 
DENIAL: 

of  right  to  open  and  close,  392. 

when  refusal  to  deny  is  an  admission,  112. 
DEPARTMENTAL  REGULATIONS : 

judicial  notice  of,  370. 
DEPOSITION : 

non-production  of,  its  effect,  16. 

witness  may  be  released  on  giving,  414. 

when  obtainable  to  avoid  continuance,  416. 

of  insane  persons,  453. 

definition  and  character  of,  529,  530. 

mode  of  procuring,  531,  532. 

statutes  construed  ;  the  certificate,  532. 

objections  to,  533,  534. 

use  of  depositions  as  evidence,  534. 

equitable  bills  to  perpetuate  testimony,  535. 

impeachment  by  contradictory  statements,  510,  511. 
DEPUTY-SHERIFF: 

ad?nissions  of,  binding  on  sheriff,  99. 
DERAILMENT  OF  RAILROAD  TRAINS,  288. 
DESCRIPTION : 

when  ambiguous,  parol  evidence  to  explain,  321. 
DESIGN: 

to  mislead,  in  estoppel,  121. 

DESTITUTION : 

evidence  to  show,  269. 
DESTRUCTION : 

of  deed  by  stranger,  effect  of,  178. 

of  deed  by  party,  effect  of,  178. 
DESTRUCTION  OF  EVIDENCE: 

presumption  from,  343,  344. 

DESTRUCTION  OF  WRITING: 
must  be  shown,  183. 
oath  of  party  to  show,  183. 
whether  shown,  a  judicial  question,  184 
preliminary  proof  necessary,  184. 
search  for  writing  must  be  shown,  184. 
lost  instrument,  in  hands  of  bona  fide  holder,  184. 


606  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
DETAILS: 

opinion  of  witness,  with,  268,  269. 
refreshing  memory,  477-479. 

DETECTIVES: 

evidence  obtained  by,  5,  178. 

DETENTION : 

of  witnesses,  414. 

DEVELOPMENT  OF  LAW,  1. 

DEVIATION: 

by  witness  in  returning  from  court,  422. 

DEVISEES : 

admissions  of,  not  binding  on  co-devisees,  91* 
bound  by  admissions  of  the  testator,  89. 

DIAGRAMS  (see  Maps). 

DIARY  OF  SURGEON: 
entry  in,  as  evidence,  80. 

DIRECT  EVIDENCE: 

definition  of,  6. 

may  be  disregarded  by  the  jury,  12. 

as  a  basis  for  presumptions,  835,  336.  337. 
DIRECT  EXAMINATION: 

distinguished  from  cross-examination,  468. 

mode  of  conducting,  469. 

leading  questions  on,  470. 

assuming  questions  on,  470. 

when  leading  questions  are  allowed,  471. 

answers  on,  may  be  in  narrative  form,  471. 

questions  by  the  court  on,  471-473. 

leading  questions  on,  474,  475. 

disgracing  questions  on,  516. 
DIRECTING  A  VERDICT: 

when  it  may  be  done,  28. 

on  prima  facie  case,  382. 

DIRECTION  OF  BLOW: 
evidence  to  show,  270. 

DIRECTORS : 

admissions  of,  when  binding  — 
on  co-directors,  91. 
on  corporation,  102. 
"DIRECT  ROUTE:" 

of  travel,  defined,  410. 
DISASTERS : 

presumption  of  death  in,  358. 


INDEX.  607 

References  are  to  pages. 


DISCHARGE : 

of  writing,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  312-314 
of  witness  from  arrest,  421. 

DISCHARGE  OF  PRISONER: 
how  proved,  216. 

DISCLAIMER : 

of  attorney  by  client,  253. 

DISCOVERY : 

by  defendant,  made  in  equity,  431-433. 

DISCOVERY  OF  BOOKS  AND  PAPERS: 
how  obtained,  175. 

DISCREDIT: 

error  to  cast,  on  expert  testimony,  276. 

DISCREPANCIES : 

reconcilement  of,  32. 

DISCRETIONARY  POWER: 
to  allow  amendments,  46. 

DISCRETION  OF  COURT: 

right  to  open  and  close  in,  394,  395. 
to  grant  continuance  — 
in  civil  trial,  416. 
in  criminal  trial,  418. 
to  recall  witness,  487. 
to  decide  on  necessity  for  depositions,  532* 
over  cross-examination,  484 
to  permit  disgracing  questions,  517. 
to  limit  number  of  witnesses,  562. 
defined  and  distinguished,  566,  567. 

DISEASE: 

evidence  by  expert,  279. 

curability  and  character  of,  280. 

simulation  of,  280. 

proper  treatment  of,  281,  282. 

evidence  of,  by  non-expert  witness,  283. 

DISGRACING  QUESTIONS: 
rule  when  relevant,  516. 
as  to  irrelevant  matters,  516. 
in  the  cross-examination,  516. 
discretion  of  court  to  admit,  517,  519. 
protecting  the  witness  from,  517. 
as  to  specific  facts,  517. 
must  not  be  too  remote,  517. 
to  show  prior  conviction  of  witness,  517,  51& 
form  of,  518. 


008  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

DISGRACING  QUESTIONS  (continued) : 
in  trial  for  rape,  518. 
answer  to,  when  not  conclusive,  518. 

to  show  habits,  occupation  and  social  surroundings  of  the  witness,  518. 
protection  from,  519. 

DISOBEDIENCE  (see  also  Non-attendance): 
by  a  witness,  407,  419,  420. 
excused  by  his  poverty,  410. 
to  subpoena  duces  tecum,  412,  413. 
evidence  to  show,  414. 

DISPOSITION  OF  A  PERSON: 
evidence  to  show,  269-271. 
relevancy  of  proof  of,  21. 

DISPUTABLE  PRESUMPTIONS,  333. 

DISPUTED  WRITINGS: 

primary  evidence  of,  51,  52. 
testimony  to  genuineness  of,  195-197. 
proof  of,  by  comparison,  200-204. 

DISQUALIFICATION : 

of  witnesses  (see  Absent  Witnesses). 

DISSEIZIN : 

presumption  arising  from,  339. 

DISSOLUTION  OF  PARTNERSHIP: 

power  of  partner  to  bind  firm  after,  93. 

DISTANCES : 

judicial  notice  of,  368. 

DISTRICT  ATTORNEY: 

must  not  obstruct  witnesses,  415. 

"DOCKET:" 

definition  of,  221. 

-  DOCUMENT : " 
defined,  175. 

DOCUMENTARY  EVIDENCE: 

presumptions  from  possession  of,  344. 

(see  also  Public  Records  ;  Private  Writings.) 
obtained  by  subpoena  duces  tecum,  411-413. 

evidence  of  contents  of,  inadmissible  against  representative,  441. 
(see  Statute  of  Frauds.) 

DOCUMENTS: 

admissible  as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  78-86. 
when  ancient,  148-152. 


INDEX.  009 

References  are  to  pages. 
DOMICILE: 

declarations  to  show  change  of,  76. 

not  provable  by  reputation,  157. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  350. 

absence  from,  presumption  created  by,  356-358. 

surviving  party  may  testify  to,  441. 

of  deponent,  evidence  of,  532. 

DOUBT : 

expression  of,  by  witness,  267. 
(see  Reasonable  Doubt.) 

DRAINS: 

evidence  to  show  condition  of,  270,  289. 

DRUGS : 

possession  of,  intended  to  procure  an  abortion,  285. 
judicial  notice  of,  372. 

DRUNKENNESS,  269. 
(see  Intoxication.) 

DUCES  TECUM.  SUBPOENA : 
when  it  issues,  411. 
language  of  must  be  certain,  412. 

to  produce  articles  or  memoranda  to  refresh  memory,  412. 
power  to  issue,  whence  derived,  412. 
excuses  for  disobedience  to,  by  public  or  private  officials,  412. 

DUPLICATE : 

of  will,  may  be  shown,  328. 
DURATION : 

opinion  evidence  to  show,  267. 

DURESS : 

in  procuring  writing,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  305. 

rendering  confession  inadmissible,  127,  128. 
DUTY: 

presumption  of  performance  of,  349. 

non-performance  of,  burden  of  proof,  387-389. 

negligent  performance  of,  burden  of  proof,  389. 

DYING  DECLARATIONS: 
defined,  138. 

necessity  for  religious  belief  of  deceased,  138. 
made  under  sense  of  approaching  death,  139. 
proof  of  sense  of  death,  139. 
by  his  own  statements,  140. 
subsequent  expectation  of  recovery,  140. 
admissible  only  in  cases  of  homicide,  141. 
time  intervening  before  death  occurs,  141. 
dying  declarations  and  res  gestce  distinguished,  142. 
credibility  and  weight  of,  144. 
39 


610  Index. 

Heferences  are  to  pages. 

DYING  DECLARATIONS  (continued): 
in  cases  of  alibi,  143. 
form  of  the  dying  declaration,  K5. 
influence  of  a  narcotic,  145 
by  signs,  145,  146. 
in  writings,  146. 
language  of,  146. 
untruthfulness  of,  147. 
not  admissible  in  civil  cases,  145. 
contemporaneous  deaths,  145. 
witness  may  state  substance  of,  147. 
(see  also  Declarations.) 

E. 

EASEMENTS: 

presumption  of  grant  of,  840. 

agreement  to  create,  must  be  in  writing,  397. 

EARNINGS: 

of  expert  witness,  evidence  inadmissible,  275. 

EFFECT : 

of  what  was  said,  269. 

probability  of  future,  278-280. 

opinion  evidence  to  show%  268. 
EJACULATIONS : 

admissibility  of  evidence  to  show,  68. 

ELECTIONS : 

judicial  notice  of,  369,  370. 

EMINENT  DOMAIN: 

right  to  open  and  close  in  proceedings  in,  393. 

EMPLOYEES : 

of  corporations,  declarations  by,  102. 

EMPLOYEES'  ENTRIES: 

as  evidence,  81-85. 
ENDORSEMENT  (see  Indorsement). 

ENGINEER: 

his  admissions  not  binding  on  railroad  company,  102. 

ENJOYMENT : 

evidence  of,  to  corroborate  reputation,  155. 
presumptions  from,  when  continuous,  339,  340. 

ENTRIES : 

which  are  a  part  of  the  res  gestce.  78-80. 
as  declarations  agaiust  interest,  163,  165,  166. 
(see  Stranger's  Declarations.) 

EQUITABLE  ESTOPPELS,  119-122. 


INDEX.  61 1 

References  are  to  pages. 
EQUITY: 

jurisdiction  of,  as  influenced  by  the  statute  of  frauds,  398. 

answer  of  defendant  in,  429-433. 

bills  in,  to  perpetuate  testimony,  534,  535. 
EQUITY,  COURTS  OF: 

proving  their  records,  221. 
EQUIVOCAL  ACTS: 

declarations  to  explain,  76. 

ERASURES : 

presumptions  as  to  date,  182. 
expert  testimony  to,  204. 
(see  Alterations.) 

ERROR,  WRIT  OF  (see  Appeals  ;  Writ  op  Error). 

ESCAPE : 

evidence  of  attempt  to,  when  relevant,  23. 

as  a  confession,  124 

ESSENTIAL  DESCRIPTION: 
matter  of,  36,  37. 

ESTOPPEL : 

by  awards,  110. 

by  pleadings,  107-109,  117. 

by  attorney's  admissions,  105. 

by  judicial  admissions,  117,  118. 

defined,  118-120. 

intention  of  party  estopped,  121,  122. 

in  pais,  119. 

by  record,  119. 

to  deny  genuineness  of  handwriting,  187,  197. 

by  recitals  in  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  189,  192. 

by  returns,  229. 

by  judgments,  230,  233-235. 

by  deed,  307. 

from  lapse  of  time,  341. 

by  silence,  341. 

EVASIVE  PLEA: 

does  not  give  right  to  open  and  close,  392. 

EVENT : 

interest  in  the,  what  constitutes,  428,  429. 
EVIDENCE  DEFINED,  2. 

EXAMINATION : 

by  physicians,  278,  297,  298. 
by  jurors  in  and  out  of  court,  492-495. 
of  experts,  271-273. 

of  witnesses,  to  prove  writing,  198-200. 
of  persons  by  the  jury,  492-495. 
(see  also  Real  Evidence.) 


612  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

EXAMINATION  OF  BOOKS: 

when  binding  as  admissions,  113. 
primary  evidence  of  result,  58. 

EXAMINATION  OF  PLAINTIFF  (see  Physical  Examination). 

EXAMINATION  OF  WITNESSES: 

order  for  witnesses  to  withdraw  from  court-room,  466-468. 

direct  examination  and  cross-examination  distinguished,  468. 

refusal  to  testify,  when  a  contempt ;   employment  of  interpreter,  468, 
469. 

mode  of  conducting  direct  examination,  469-471. 

questions  put  by  the  judge  or  by  members  of  the  jury,  471-473. 

leading  questions,  when  allowable  on  direct  examination,  474,  475. 

responsiveness  of  answers,  476. 

witness  may  refresh  his  memory  by  referring  to  a  memorandum  or 
writing,  477-479. 

character  of  the  writing  used  to  refresh  memory  of  the  witness,  479, 480. 

cross-examination,  its  purpose  and  value,  480-482. 

power  of  cross-examination ;   its  extent,  482-486. 

redirect  examination.  486.  487. 

recalling  witnesses.  487,  488. 

receiving  evidence  out  of  court,  488-490. 

taking  the  view  by  the  jury,  490-492. 

•'real  evidence;"  physical  examination  by  the  jury  in  court;  identi- 
fication, 492-495. 

right  of  the  defendant  in  a  criminal  trial  to  confront  the  witnesses 
against  him,  495,  496. 

the  accused  as  a  witness  in  a  criminal  prosecution,  496-499. 
(see  also  Cross-examination.) 

EXAMINATION,  PRELIMINARY,  131-133. 
EXAMINED  COPIES: 

defined,  219,  220. 
EXCEPTION : 

necessity  for,  35,  539,  540. 

waiver  of,  541,  542. 
EXCEPTIONAL  DEMAND: 

as  evidence  of  value,  293. 

EXCLAMATIONS: 

evidence  of,  68. 

EXCLUDING  WITNESSES: 
from  court-room,  466-468. 

EXCLUSION  OF  EVIDENCE: 

when  of  slight  force,  546. 

when  immaterial,  546. 

when  ground  for  a  new  trial,  546. 

when  error  in,  is  cured  in  cross-examination,  546. 


INDEX.  613 

Keferences  are  to  pages. 


EXECUTION: 

of  wills,  403-405. 

of  negotiable  paper,  when  presumed,  346. 

of  deed,  presumptions  from,  341. 

of  ancient  writing,  need  not  be  proved,  150. 

EXECUTION  AND   ACKNOWLEDGMENT: 
presumption  from,  345,  346. 

EXECUTIVE  ACTS: 
judicial  notice  of,  370. 

EXECUTOR: 

admissions  of  testator  binding  on,  89. 
admissions  of,  91. 

exclusion  of  interested  witnesses  against,  436-445. 
(see  also  Personal  Transactions.) 

EXECUTORY  COVENANTS  AND  CONTRACTS: 
effect  of  material  alteration  in,  180. 

EXEMPLIFIED  COPIES: 

definition  and  use  of,  219.  220. 
when  dispensed  with,  222. 

EXEMPTION : 

of  witnesses,  420-422. 

(see  Arrest  ;  Privilege.) 

EXHIBITION  IN  COURT: 

of  persons,  492-495. 

of  articles,  60. 

of  writings,  200-20& 

EXHIBITS : 

proof  of,  205. 

defined,  205. 
EXISTENCE  OF  GOVERNMENT: 

judicial  notice  of,  378. 
EXONERATION : 

party  suing  for,  when  may  prove  judgment,  238. 
EXPECTATION  OF  LIFE: 

may  be  shown  by  life  tables,  218. 
EXPEDIENCY : 

as  a  basis  for  presumptions,  335. 

EXPENSES : 

of  witness,  what  allowed,  409. 
(see  also  Mileage) 
EXPERIENCE : 

when  necessary  for  expert,  264,  265. 

as  ground  for  belief,  4. 


614  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
EXPERIMENTS: 
out  of  court,  '396. 

conditions  must  be  reproduced,  236. 
expert  may  make,  296. 
operating  machine  in  court,  296. 
by  jurors,  not  allowed,  488. 

EXPERT  AND  OPINION  EVIDENCE: 

definition,  264,  265. 

matter  of  common  knowledge;  opinions  of  n<5n-experts,  when  admis- 
sible, 265-270. 

expert  evidence  when  admissible,  270,  271. 

competency  and  examination  of  experts,  271-274. 

cross-examination  of  experts;  use  of  scientific  books  as  evidence,  275. 

the  weight  and  credibility  of  expert  and  opinion  evidence,  276. 

compensation  of  expert  witnesses,  277. 

physicians  as  experts ;  cause  of  death,  278-280. 

evidence  of  medical  experts  to  show  character  of  disease  and  blood- 
stains; expert  evidence  as  to  autopsies  and  malpractice,  280-282. 

non-expert  evidence  upon  a  person's  physical  condition,  282,  283. 

chemists  as  experts ;  poisons.  283,  284. 

expert  evidence  where  sexual  crimes  have  been  committed,  284,  285. 

expert  and  non-expert  evidence  upon  insanity,  285-288. 

mechanical  experts,  288-291. 

expert  evidence  as  to  value,  291-294. 

underwriters  as  experts,  294,  295. 

to  show  handwriting,  197,  198,  200,  203-205. 

experiments  in  and  out  of  court,  296,  297. 

physical  examination  of  the  party  by  experts,  297,  298. 

EXPERT  WITNESSES: 

number  of,  may  be  limited,  562. 

EXPLANATION: 

of  alterations,  178-182,  204 
of  ambiguity,  324. 
of  language,  316,  317. 

EXPRESS  ADMISSIONS  (see  Admissions)l 

EXPRESSIONS : 

of  bodily  or  mental  feelings,  68-71. 

EXPRESS  TRUSTS: 

must  be  evidenced  by  writing,  312,  399,  400. 

EXTENSION : 

of  contract  in  writing  may  be  shown  by  parol,  312-314 

EXTRA-JUDICIAL  OATHS  (see  Oaths). 


INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

EXTRA-JUDICIAL  CONFESSIONS : 
must  be  corroborated,  133. 
substance  must  be  repeated,  134. 
their  weight  for  the  jury,  134. 
completeness  of,  134. 

(see  also  Confessions.) 

EXTRINSIC  CIRCUMSTANCES: 
parol  evidence  of,  321,  322. 

EXTRINSIC  EVIDENCE  (see  Parol  Evidence). 

EYE-SIGHT : 

evidence  of  condition,  283. 


P. 


FABRICATION  OF  EVIDENCE: 

of  alibi,  12. 
FACT: 

definition  of  the  word,  3. 

statements  to  be  proved  as,  66. 

question  of,  27-35. 

agreement  as  matter  of,  237,  238. 

conclusiveness  of  judgment  as  a,  233. 

assumed  in  hypothetical  questions,  270-272. 

judicial  notice  of,  364  et  seq. 

peculiarly  in  knowledge  of  party,  386-388. 

FACTS  OF  GEOGRAPHY: 
proof  of,  218. 
judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 

FACTS  OF  HISTORY: 
proof  of,  217. 
judicial  notice  of,  367,  368. 

FACT,  PRESUMPTIONS  OF  (see  Presumption). 

FAILURE :  % 

to  produce  evidence,  342. 

FAILURE  OF  ACCUSED  TO  TESTIFY: 
no  presumptions  from,  499. 
comments  on,  not  permissible,  499. 
when  comments  on  allowed,  499. 

FALSE  CONFESSIONS,  125. 
FALSE  IMPRISONMENT : 

evidence  of  character  in  action  for,  25. 

variance  of  proof  in,  36. 

action  for,  bv  witness  arrested,  422. 


C15 


016  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pagea. 

FALSUS  IN  UNO,  FALSUS  IN  OMNIBUS: 

meaning  of,  512. 

jury  may  disregard,  513. 

corroboration  may  avoid,  514. 
FAMILY  BIBLES: 

as  pedigree  evidence,  72. 
FAMILY  HISTORY: 

of  testator,  327-329. 
FAMILY  PHYSICIAN: 

his  testimony  on  insanity,  288. 

FAMILY  REPUTATION,  71-74. 

(see  General  Reputation.) 
FARMER: 

as  witness,  to  value  of  crop.  292. 

as  witness,  to  quality  of  milk,  284. 
FEAR: 

as  an  element  in  inducing  confessions,  evidence  to  show,  126-129. 

FEDERAL  COURTS: 

competency  of  witnesses  in,  435. 

mileage  in,  408. 

when  bound  by  state  laws,  374. 

will  notice  judicially  the  constitution  and  laws  of  a  state,  373. 
FEELINGS : 

declarations  to  show,  68-71. 

FEES: 

of  witnesses  (see  Mileage). 
FEES  OF  EXPERT  WITNESS  (see  Compensation). 

FELLOW-PRISONER : 

confession  made  to,  131. 

FELLOW-SERVANT : 

entries  made  by,  85. 
FICTION : 

of  a  presumed  grant,  339,  340. 

FIELD-NOTES : 

0 

as  primary  evidence,  57,  218. 

FILING : 

of  pleadings,  when  presumed,  354 

of  returns,  necessity  for,  228. 
FINAL  JUDGMENT: 

defined,  232. 
FIRE-ARMS : 

exhibited  to  jury,  60,  62. 
FIRE  EXPERTS,  294,  295. 


INDEX.  617 

Beferences  are  to  pages. 


FIRM  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  81-85. 


FIXED  SUM: 

proof  of.  agreement  to  pay,  40. 

FLAGS  AND  BANNERS : 

primary  evidence  of  inscription  on,  54. 

FLIGHT  OF  ACCUSED : 
relevancy  of,  23. 
as  confessions,  124. 

FLOODING  LAND: 

evidence  of  surveyor,  291. 

FOOD: 

wholesomeness  of,  284. 

FOOT-PRINTS : 

compulsory  comparison  of,  298, 

FOREIGN  CURRENCY: 
value  of,  366. 

FOREIGN  JUDGMENT: 
certification  of,  223-225. 

handwriting  of  certifying  official  must  be  proved,  225, 
seal  must  be  proved,  226. 
proof  of,  225-227. 
validity  of,  238-240. 
in  rem,  238. 

FOREIGN  LAW: 

books  as  evidence  of,  212. 
court  may  construe,  211. 
question  for  jury,  211. 
consul  may  testify,  212,  213. 
attorney  may  testify  to,  212. 
expert  in,  may  testify,  212,  213. 
presumptions  as  to,  349. 
not  judicially  noticed,  376,  377. 

foreign  Nations,  seals,  etc.: 

judicial  notice  of,  378. 
FOREIGN  RATE  OF  INTEREST: 
not  judicially  noticed,  378. 

FORGERY : 

relevancy  of  evidence  of  possession  of  forged  writings,  20. 

proof  of  handwriting  in  trial  for,  186. 

witness  may  be  asked  to  write  in  trial  for,  200. 
FORGETFUL  WITNESS: 

may  be  asked  leading  questions,  474,  475. 


CIS  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

FORGETFULNESS  OF  WITNESS: 

when  admits  evidence  at  prior  trial,  169. 
(see  Refreshing  the  Memory.) 

FORGOTTEN  FACTS  (see  Refreshing  the  Memory). 

FORM : 

of  affidavits,  527,  528. 

FORMAL  ALLEGATIONS,  38,  39. 

FORMER  JUDGMENT: 
plea  of,  2:36. 

FORMER  STATEMENTS: 

to  impeach  witness  (see  Contradictory  Statements). 

FOUNDATION : 

for  impeachment,  485. 

for  proving  hook  entries,  79. 

FRANCHISE : 

evidence  of  reputation  to  show  enjoyment  of,  153. 

FRAUD : 

evidence  to  show,  7. 

when  allegation  of  creates  an  issue  allowing  evidence  of  character,  25. 

facilitated  by  reception  of  hearsay  evidence,  66. 

as  an  element  in  estoppel,  121. 

possession  of  writings  obtained  by,  177. 

presence  of,  where  writing  is  altered,  179. 

acknowledgment  obtained  by,  189. 

in  obtaining  judgment,  may  be  shown,  230. 

in  execution  of  contract,  may  be  shown  by  parol  evidence,  305,  308. 

in  use  of  deed,  parol  evidence  to  show,  329. 

in  procuring  depositions,  532. 

presumption  of,  from  failure  to  testify,  when  alleged,  344. 

FRAUD.  BURDEN  TO  SHOW: 

in  procuring  will,  384. 

in  conveyance,  on  creditors,  389. 

in  conveyance,  on  grantor,  390. 

FRAUD  (see  also  Statute  of  Frauds). 

FRAUDULENT  ALTERATIONS,  179. 

FRAUDULENT  MISREPRESENTATIONS: 
relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  22. 

FRIGHT : 

of  horse,  evidence  to  show,  269. 

FRUITS : 

sale  of  growing.  397,  398. 

FRUITS  OF  CRIME: 

presumptions  from  possession  of,  342,  343. 


INDEX.  619 

Beferencea  are  to  pages. 

FUTURE  INTENTION: 

declarations  of,  when  au  estoppel,  120,  121. 

FUTURE  VALUE : 

evidence  to  show,  203. 

FURNITURE : 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  292,  293. 
FURTHER  CONSIDERATION : 

parol  evidence  of,  300. 

G. 

GARMENTS: 

exhibition  of,  to  the  jury,  61. 
(JASES: 

testimony  to  show  nature  and  effect  of,  284 
GAZETTE: 

official,  as  evidence,  208. 
GENERAL  DENIAL: 

effect  of.  38. 
GENERAL  REPUTATION; 

adequate  knowledge  of  declarant,  153,  154 

identity  of  declarant.  155. 

death  of  declarant,  155. 

date  of  declaration,  155,  156,  157. 

evidence  of  reputation  in  the  case  of  private  rights,  157.  158. 

traditionary  evidence  regarding  private  boundaries,  158,  159. 

documents  showing  general  reputation,  160,  161. 

to  prove  marriage,  158. 

to  rebut  presumption  of  death,  358. 

impeachment  (see  REPUTATION  FOR  TRUTH). 

GENERAL  RESULTS: 

primary  evidence  of,  57. 
GENERAL  USAGE: 

evidence  to  show,  316,  317. 
GENUINENESS  (see  Handwriting)  : 

of  handwriting,  how  shown,  1S6-205. 

by  comparison,  200-204 
GENTLENESS: 

of  horse,  opinion  evidence  of,  269. 
GEOGRAPHICAL  FACTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 
GESTURE: 

dying  declarations  made  by,  145,  146. 

GIFT: 

to  trustee;  burden  of  proving  bona  fides  of,  389. 


020  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

GOOD  CHARACTER  OF  ACCUSED: 
when  relevant,  26. 

GOOD  FAITH: 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  20-24 

evidence  of  declarations  to  show,  67. 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  483. 

GOOD  JOB: 

meaning  of,  290. 

GOOD  QUALITY: 

evidence  of,  by  comparison,  297. 

GOOD  RISK: 
to  insure,  295. 

GOOD  SPIRITS: 

evidence  to  show,  270. 

GRAND  JURORS: 

confidential  communications  to,  257. 

GRAND  JURY: 

refusal  to  testify  before,  469. 

GRANT: 

presumption  of  a,  340. 

GRANTEE : 

when  may  take  acknowledgments,  188. 

character  of  his  title,  180. 
GRANTING  A  VIEW  (see  Taking  a  View). 

GRANTOR : 

judgment  against  binds  grantee,  231. 
admissions  of,  89. 
acknowledgment  before,  189. 
incapacity  of,  burden  of  proof,  387. 

GRAVE-STONES : 

inscriptions  on,  primary  evidence  of,  57. 

GROWING  TIMBER: 

when  a  writing  is  necessary  in  selling,  397,  398. 

GROUNDS  OF  BELIEF,  4,  5. 

GUARANTIES : 

parol  evidence  to  vaiy,  301. 

GUARANTOR: 

his  interest  in  the  event,  429. 

admissions  of,  99. 
GUARDIAN: 

admissions  of,  100. 


INDEX.  621 

References  are  to  pages. 
GUILT : 

must  be  proved  beyond  a  reasonable  doubt,  8,  9,  13. 

burden  of  proof  to  show,  384-386. 
GUN: 

exhibition  of,  to  jury,  GO. 

H. 

HABEAS  CORPUS: 

to  obtain  discharge  of  witness  from  arrest,  421. 

HABEAS  CORPUS  AD  TESTIFICANDUM: 

when  employed  to  procure  the  attendance  of  a  witness,  423. 

HABIT: 

of  intemperance,  209. 
evidence  to  show,  270. 

HANDCUFFS : 

confession  made  by  prisoner  in,  127. 
HANDWRITING : 

defined,  185,  186. 

mark  as,  185. 

of  subscribing  witness,  186. 

pi'oof  of,  by  admissions.  186. 

production  of  writing,  when  necessary,  186,  187. 

denial  of  genuineness  of,  how  made.  187. 

proof,  by  acknowledgments,  187-192. 

proof  of,  by  subscribing  witnesses,  192-194 

proof  by  witnesses,  195-198. 

proof  by  comparison,  200-204. 

proof  by  testimony  of  experts,  204,  205. 

mode  of  examining  witness  as  to  disputed  writing,  198-200. 

photographs  as  evidence  of,  59. 

HAPPINESS : 

evidence  to  show,  270. 

HATRED: 

opinion  evidence  to  show,  270. 
(see  also  Threats.) 
HEALTH : 

evidence  of  physician  to  show,  278. 

evidence  of  non-expert  witness,  282. 
HEARING: 

evidence  of  a  person,  283. 
HEARSAY : 

definition,  grounds  for  its  rejection,  63-66. 

statements  to  be  proved  as  facts,  66-68. 

expressions  of  bodily  or  mental  feeling,  68-71. 

pedigree,  oral  and  written  declarations,  71-74. 


623  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

HEARSAY  (continued): 

declarations  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gesta:  74,  75. 
requisites,  75. 

must  be  illustrative  and  connected  with  main  transaction.  75,  76. 
must  be  contemporaneous,  77,  78. 

entries  as  part  of  the  res  gestce  and  made  by  third  persons,  78-80. 
entries  against  interest  and  entries  which  are  part  of  the  res  gestae  dis- 
tinguished, 80,  81. 
a  party's  own  books  as  evidence,  81-86. 
indorsements  as  part  of  the  res  gestw,  86,  87. 
commissions.  88  et  seq. 
confessions,  124  et  seq. 
general  reputation,  153  et  seq. 
dying  declarations,  138  et  seq. 
ancient  writings,  148  et  seq. 
witnesses  absent  or  disqualified,  167-173. 
in  affidavits,  528,  529. 

HEIR: 

admissions  of,  not  binding  on  co-heirs,  91. 
bound  by  judgment  against  ancestor,  231. 
when  an  interested  witness,  443. 
presumption  of  death  without,  358. 

HERD-BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  275. 
HEREDITAMENTS: 

presumptions  of  grant,  339,  340. 
HIGHWAY: 

necessity  for,  evidence  to  show,  270. 

reputation  to  show  existence  of,  153. 

evidence  to  show  condition  of,  18. 
HISTORICAL  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  217,  218. 
HISTORICAL  FACTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  367,  36a 

proof  of,  217,  218. 
HOLDING  ELECTIONS: 

judicial  notice  of,  370. 

HOLIDAYS : 

judicial  notice  of,  365. 
"  HOMESTEAD  FARM :  " 

evidence  to  explain,  319. 
HOMICIDE: 

behavior  of  accused  after,  24. 

allegation  of  weapon  in  indictment  for,  38,  44 

insanity  as  a  defense  to,  351-3>3. 


INDEX.  623 

References  are  to  pages. 

HOMICIDE  (continued) : 

dying  declarations  in,  138-147. 
relevancy  of  evidence  in,  27. 
burden  of  proof  iD,  384-386. 

HOPE: 

as  an  element  in  inducing  confessions,  126-129. 

HORSE: 

disposition  of,  opinion  as  to,  269.  * 

HOSTILE  WITNESS: 

impeachment  of,  by  party  calling,  502. 

hostility  and  bias  of,  may  be  shown  in  direct  examination,  503. 

contradictory  statements  by,  503. 

foundation  for  contradicting,  504. 

may  be  asked  leading  questions,  474. 

HOUSE : 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  290. 

HOUSEHOLD  FURNITURE: 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  291,  292,  293. 

HOUSEKEEPER : 

as  witness,  to  show  value  of  board,  293. 

HUMAN  BLOOD: 

stains  caused  by,  281. 

HUSBAND : 

when  bound  by  wife's  admissions.  97,  98. 

competency  of  as  witness,  244,  245. 

confidential  communications,  245,  247-249. 

statutory  legislation,  245-247. 

death  of,  its  effect,  248. 

as  witnesses  in  issue  of  adultery,  248. 

as  witness  to  non-access,  249. 

HYPOTHETICAL  CASE: 
stating  to  jury,  32. 

HYPOTHETICAL  QUESTION : 
defined,  272. 

facts  on  which  based,  272. 
not  based  on  conjecture,  273. 
must  assume  and  state  material  facts  alone,  273. 
may  assume  doubtful  facts,  273. 
in  cross-examination,  274. 
when  employed  to  test  skill  of  expert,  274. 
length,  273. 

may  be  put  in  writing,  273. 
on  insanity,  287,  288. 


62  i  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

I. 

IDEM  SONANS,  43. 

IDENTIFICATION: 

of  third  person  making  an  admission,  115. 

of  speaker  at  telephone,  122,  123. 

use  of  photographs  for  the  purpose  of,  59. 

of  prisoner's  statement  at  preliminary  examination,  132. 

of  deceased  person  whose  declarations  constitute  reputation,  155. 

by  witnesses  in  court,  298. 

of  subject-matter  of  writing,  by  parol,  320. 

of  persons,  by  witnesses,  494,  495. 

IDENTITY : 

'opinion  evidence  to  show,  269. 

of  cause  of  action,  to  admit  prior  judgment,  234-236. 

IDENTITY  OF  INTEREST: 

as  regulating  admissions,  89,  90. 

IDENTITY  OF  PARTIES: 

required  where  evidence  of  missing  witness  is  given  at  a  subsequent 

trial,  169,  170. 
when  judgment  is  relied  on  as  estoppel,  233,  234. 

IGNORANCE  OF  WITNESS: 

when  it  admits  contradictory  statements  or  evidence  of  knowledge,  503. 
when  permitting  leading  questions,  474. 
effect  of,  as  evidence,  566. 

ILLEGAL  ARREST: 

of  witnesses  (see  Privilege  of  Witnesses). 

ILLEGALITY: 

of  consideration,  evidence  of,  306. 

ILLEGIBLE  WORDS: 

parol  evidence  to  explain,  324. 

ILLNESS; 

evidence  of  non-expert  witness,  282. 

of  witness,  ground  for  a  continuance,  416. 

ILLNESS  OF  WITNESS: 

admits  testimony  taken  at  a  prior  trial,  169. 

IMMORALITY: 

of  consideration,  evidence  of,  306. 

of  witness,  may  be  shown  to  impeach,  505,  506. 

"  IMPEACH : " 

definition  of,  500. 


INDEX.  625 

References  are  to  pages. 
IMPEACHMENT: 

of  accuracy  of  photographs,  59. 

of  confessions,  134. 

of  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  189,  192. 

of  foreign  judgments,  235. 

of  domestic  judgments,  240. 

of  expert  by  scientific  book,  275. 

of  consideration  by  pai-ol,  305-307. 

of  competency  of  interpreter,  469. 

IMPEACHMENT  OF  WITNESSES: 

party  cannot  impeach  his  own  witness,  500-502. 

exceptions  to  the  rule  that  a  party  vouches  for  his  own  witnesses,  502- 

504. 
how  the  adverse  witness  may  be  impeached ;  general  reputation  for 

veracity,  504-507. 
impeachment  by  proving  contrary  statements  or  silence  of  witness  on  a 

former  occasion,  507-512. 
falsus  in  uno,  falsus  in  omnibus,  512-514. 
evidence  of  general  reputation  of  impeached  witness,  514,  515. 
privileges  of  witness ;  questions  disclosing  pecuniary  liability,  515,  516. 
questions  tending  to  disgrace  the  witness,  516-519. 
questions  calculated  to  expose  the  witness  to  a  criminal  charge,  519-522. 
bias  and  prejudice  of  the  witness,  522-524 
IMPERTINENT  QUESTIONS : 
refusal  to  answer,  469. 

IMPLIED  ADMISSIONS: 

by  conduct,  111. 

by  silence,  112,  113. 

by  inspection  of  books,  113. 
(see  also  Admissions.) 
IMPLIED  CONFESSIONS,  124,  125. 

IMPLIED  CONTRACT: 

allegation  of  an,  40. 
IMPLIED  MALICE,  362. 

IMPLIED  TRUSTS: 

parol  evidence  to  establish,  312. 

not  covered  by  statute  of  frauds,  400. 
IMPOTENCY : 

physical  examination  when  alleged,  297. 

IMPRESSIONS : 

of  witnesses,  268-270. 
IMPRISONMENT: 

of  witness,  to  prevent  attendance,  415. 
IMPROPER  ADMISSION  OF  EVIDENCE:       - 

when  immaterial,  544,  545. 
40 


026  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
IMPROVEMENTS: 

on  land  as  a  partial  performance,  397. 

INADEQUACY  (see  Consideration). 

INCAPACITY : 

of  grantor,  burden  of  proof,  387. 

INCARCERATION: 
of  witnesses,  414. 

INCIDENTAL  IMPEACHMENT: 
of  witness,  501. 

INCOMPETENCY: 

of  privileged  communications,  243-260. 
of  accused  as  witness,  433. 

INCOMPLETE  WRITINGS: 

parol  evidence  to  fill  out  omissions,  307,  308. 

INCORPORATION : 

when  proof  of,  required,  376. 

INCORPORATION  OF  WRITINGS: 
by  reference,  308. 

INCORPOREAL  HEREDITAMENTS: 
presumption  of  grant,  339,  340. 

INCREASE  OF  RISK: 
evidence  to  show,  294. 

INCRIMINATING  QUESTIONS: 
answer  to,  not  compellable,  519. 
"  one  link  in  chain  of  proof,''  520. 
details  need  not  be  shown,  520. 
belief  of  witness,  520,  521. 
province  of  court,  520,  521. 
witness  may  answer,  520. 
to  defendant  in  chancery,  520. 
innocence  of  witness,  not  material,  520. 
if  witness  waive  privilege  he  must  give  details,  520. 
when  accused  must  answer,  521. 
privilege  from,  is  personal,  521. 
answers  to,  canuot  be  used,  522. 
if  prosecution  is  barred,  522. 
no  presumption  from  refusal  to  answer,  522. 

INDEBTEDNESS : 

primary  evidence  of,  57,  58. 
INDEPENDENT  PAROL  CONTRACTS: 

may  be  shown,  310. 

INDIAN  TREATIES: 
judicial  notice  of,  377. 


INDEX.  627 

References  are  to  pages. 


INDICTMENT: 

allegation  of  weapon  in,  38-44. 

proof  of  and  variance,  42-44. 

when  severable,  42.  % 

for  intimidating  witness,  415. 

is  not  evidence,  490. 

instruction  on,  490. 

of  service,  admissibility  of,  166. 

INDORSEMENTS : 

as  a  part  of  the  res  gestce,  86,  87. 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  301. 
INDORSER: 

his  incompetency  to  ynpeach  note,  445,  446. 

his  admissions,  91. 

INDUCEMENTS : 

offered  to  procure  confessions,  135,  136. 

INFAMOUS  CRIMES: 
defined,  454. 

common-law  incompetency  caused  by,  454,  455. 
pai'don  of,  as  removing  incompetency,  455. 
conditional  pardon,  456. 
effect  of  full  pardon,  456. 
incompetency  caused  by,  extent  of,  456. 
statutes  relating  to  incompetency  caused  by,  457. 
statutes  construed,  458. 
what  crimes  may  be  shown,  458,  459. 

INFAMOUS  PERSONS  (see  Falsus  in  Uno). 
INFAMY : 

of  subscribing  witness,  194. 

INFANTS : 

exhibition  of,  to  jury,  492-495. 

INFANTS,  AS  WITNESSES  (see  Children). 

INFERENCES : 

inadmissible  as  evidence,  265-270. 

INFERENCES  OF  FACT  (see  Presumptions). 

INFIDELITY : 

as  disqualifying  a  witness,  451,  452. 
INFORMATION  AND  BELIEF: 

admissions  based  on,  115. 

INFORMERS : 

evidence  of,  5,  178. 

names  of,  cannot  be  divulged,  256. 
INJURIES : 

judicial  notice  of,  372. 

non-expert  evidence  to  show  cause,  etc.,  of,  283. 


G2S  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
INK: 

testing  with  chemicals  in  court,  296. 
evidence  to  show  composition  of,  284 

INNOCENCE : 

presumption  of,  9,  337,  360,  361,  497. 
presumption  of  life,  361. 

IN  REM : 

foreign  judgments  in,  238. 
domestic  judgments  in,  236,  237. 

INSANITY : 

not  provable  by  reputation,  157. 

declarations  to  show,  67.  $ 

subsequent  insanity  of  witness,  169, 

opinions  of  subscribing  witness  to,  194. 

non-expert  evidence  to  show,  285,  286. 

witness  must  give  facts,  285. 

weight  of  evidence  of  non-expert  witness,  286. 

expert  evidence  on,  286. 

when  based  on  personal  examination,  287. 

when  based  on  hypothetical  question,  287,  288. 

testimony  by  subscribing  witnesses  to  will,  288. 

of  accused,  permits  involuntary  physical  examination,  298. 

of  testator,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  328. 

presumptions  of,  350. 

in  homicide,  351. 

evidence  to  show,  352. 

McNaghten's  Case,  352,  353. 

burden  of  proving,  in  criminal  trials,  385,  386. 

burden  of  proving,  in  civil  proceedings,  389. 

simulation  of,  may  be  shown,  498. 

incompetency  of  interested  witnesses  in  case  of,  435-445. 

renders  person  incompetent  as  witness,  452,  526. 

INSCRIPTIONS : 

pedigree  contained  in,  73. 

INSCRIPTIONS  ON  BANNERS: 
primary  evidence  of,  55. 

INSOLVENCY : 

not  provable  by  reputation,  157. 
INSPECTION  BY  JURY: 

to  determine  age,  race  and  parentage,  492-495. 

of  writings,  200. 

of  articles,  60. 

(see  also  Real  Evidence.) 

INSPECTION  OF  BOOKS: 

when  binding  as  admi&sions,  113. 


INDEX.  629 


Eeferences  are  to  pages. 

INSPECTION  OF  RECORDS: 
right  to,  206. 

viandamus  to  compel,  207. 
of  private  corporations,  207. 
rules  regulating,  207. 

INSTRUCTIONS : 

on  the  evidence  generally,  29-33. 
on  expert  testimony,  276. 
on  the  presumption  of  innocence,  361. 
on  the  value  of  positive  evidence,  565. 

INSTRUMENTS : 

possession  of,  intended  to  procure  an  abortion,  285, 

INSTRUMENT  IN  WRITING: 
best  evidence  of,  49.  50. 
defined,  175. 
may  be  connected  by  parol,  308,  309. 

INSUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE: 
defined,  30. 
demurrer  because  of,  543. 

INSULTING  QUESTIONS: 
put  to  witness,  519. 

INSURANCE  EXPERTS: 

their  testimony  of  risks  and  premiums,  294,  295. 

INSURANCE  POLICY: 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  301. 
burden  of  proof  in  actions  on,  388. 

INTENTION : 

evidence  of,  20-24. 

evidence  of  declarations  to  show,  67. 

declarations  to  explain,  76. 

when  deliberate,  300. 

evidence  of  usage  to  ascertain,  316. 

parol  evidence  to  ascertain,  320-324. 

of  testator,  evidence  to  ascertain,  325-329. 

presumption  of  malicious  intention,  361-363. 

INTEREST : 

declarations  against,  80,  81. 

stranger's  declarations  against,  162-166. 

of  witness  to  handwriting,  199. 

of  accused,  when  a  witness,  496. 

of  deponent,  incompetency  caused  by,  533. 

INTERESTED  PERSONS: 

their  statutory  incompetency  as  witnesses,  434-437. 


030  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pagea. 

INTERESTED  WITNESSES: 

reasons  for  their  incompetency,  425. 

their  sources  of  knowledge,  425. 

admissions  of,  426. 

when  they  become  competent,  427-431. 

their  statutory  incompetency,  442. 

interest  of,  must  be  pecuniary,  443. 

when  w  idow,  heir,  legatee  is,  443. 

when  assignor  is,  443. 

how  rendered  competent,  444. 

having  adverse  interests,  444. 

exception  to,  must  be  promptly  taken,  444. 

in  case  of  death  of  agent  of  party,  444. 

INTEREST  IN  THE  EVENT: 

what  constitutes,  at  common  law,  428,  429. 
statutory  modification,  428. 

INTEREST,  RATE  OF : 
judicial  notice  of,  378. 

INTERLINEATIONS  (see  Alterations). 

INTERNATIONAL  LAW : 
judicial  notice  of,  372. 

INTERPRETATION  OF  WRITINGS,  301-304. 

(see  also  Construction.) 
INTERPRETER : 

his  intervention  does  not  make  evidence  hearsay,  66. 

admissions  by  employment,  111. 

may  state  evidence  of  absent  witness,  173. 

confidential  communications  to,  253. 

employment  of,  discretionary,  469. 

witness  may  act  as,  469. 

by-standers  may  assist,  469. 

employment  of,  in  taking  deposition,  532. 

INTERROGATORIES : 

sent  with  letters  rogatory.  530. 

not  indispensable  when  reading  deposition,  534. 

in  bills  in  equity,  432,  433. 

must  be  answered  responsively,  432. 

INTERVIEW  (see  Admissions ;  Conversation;  Parol  Evidence,  etc.). 

INTIMIDATION : 

of  witnesses  (see  Obstructing  the  Attendance  of  Witnesses). 
INTOXICATION : 

confession  procured  from  intoxicated  prisoner,  130. 

evidence  to  show  fact  of,  269. 

of  party  to  writing,  305. 


INDEX.  Ci>l 


References  are  to  pages. ' 


INTOXICATING  LIQUORS : 
judicial  notice  of,  371. 

INVALID  DEED: 

use  of  as  evidence,  404. 

INVALIDITY: 

of  writing,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  304-306. 
of  will,  may  be  shown,  328. 

"  I.  O.  U. :  " 

meaning  of,  319. 

IRRELEVANCY : 

motion  to  strike  out  for,  543. 
when  not  error,  544. 

IRRELEVANT  WRITINGS: 

when  admissible  as  standards  of  comparison,  200. 

IRRESISTIBLE  IMPULSE  (see  Insanity). 

IRRESPONSIVENESS : 

of  answers  of  witness,  476,  543. 
ISSUE : 

presumption  of  legitimacy  of,  359. 

presumption  of  death  without,  358. 

ISSUE  OF  FACT: 

when  for  jury,  27  et  seq. 

J. 

JAIL: 

attendance  of  witness  in,  how  procured,  423. 

JETTISON : 

necessity  for,  289. 

JOINT  CONTRACTS : 
remedies  on,  236. 

JOINT  DEFENDANTS: 

when  competent  as  witnesses,  433,  434. 

JUDGE: 

his  incompetency  as  a  witness,  447. 
his  duty  to  certify  to  records,  224. 
JUDGE'S  NOTES: 

to  prove  testimony  of  absent  witness,  172. 

JUDGES  OF  INFERIOR  COURTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  379. 
JUDGE,  PROVINCE  OF,  27  et  seq. 

(see  Province  of  Judge.) 


G32  INDEX. 

Beferences  are  to  pages. 
JUDGMENTS : 

how  proved,  218-221. 

in  equity,  221,  222. 

of  sister  states,  222-225. 

of  foreign  countries,  225,  226. 

of  surrogates'  courts,  226,  227. 

effect  of,  230,  231. 

finality  of,  232. 

conclusiveness  of,  233. 

identity  of  cause  of  action,  234-236. 

judgments  in  rem,  236.  237. 

in  criminal  trials,  237. 

as  facts,  237,  238. 

foreign,  their  validity,  238-240. 

of  sister  states,  241. 

in  bar,  242. 

best  evidence  of,  50. 

JUDICIAL  ADMISSIONS: 

of  record,  104,  105,  107-109,  117. 

JUDICIAL  CONFESSIONS  (see  ConfessionsX 

JUDICIAL  DISCRETION: 
defined,  566. 
not  personal  caprice,  567. 

JUDICIAL  KNOWLEDGE: 

aiding,  380. 

(see  also  Judicial  Notice.) 
JUDICIAL  NOTICE: 

judicial  notice,  364,  365. 

matter  of  common  knowledge,  320,  365-367. 

historical  facts,  367,  368. 

geographical  facts,  369. 

political  facts ;  elections,  370,  371. 

scientific  facts,  371,  372. 

common  and  statutory  law ;  municipal  ordinances  and  local  and  for- 
eign laws,  372-378. 

foreign  nations,  seals  and  acts,  378. 

terms  of  court,  records,  rules  of  practice  and  judicial  proceedings,  378- 
380. 

JUDICIAL  OFFICIALS : 

communications  to,  255. 
JUDICIAL  OATHS  (see  Oaths). 
JUDICIAL  RECORDS  (see  Public  Records). 
JURAT: 

must  show  venue,  when,  526. 

must  be  signed  and  sealed,  528. 


INDEX.  t)33 

References  are  to  pages. 
JURISDICTION: 

presumptions  of,  353-356. 
of  appellate  courts,  557-561. 
lack  of,  may  be  shown,  230. 
may  be  inquired  into,  235. 
judicial  notice  of,  379. 
JURISDICTIONAL  FACTS: 
when  presumed,  353-355. 

JURORS : 

private  view  by,  488. 

communications  to,  out  of  court,  488,  489. 

evidence  received  by,  out  of  court,  489. 

maps,  law  books,  pleadings,  etc.,  read  by,  489. 

articles  examined  by,  in  jury-room,  489,  490. 

as  witness  if  they  know  the  facts,  489. 

questions  put  by,  472. 

their  oaths,  6. 

confidential  communications,  257. 

may  state  testimony  of  absent  witness,  173. 
JURY: 

offering  evidence  and  examination  of  witnesses  out  of  hearing  of,  143, 
538. 

JURY,  PROVINCE  OF: 

province  of  judge  and  jury,  27-32. 

blended  questions  of  law  and  fact,  33,  34. 

preliminary  facts  bearing  on  admissibility,  34,  35. 

over  presumptions,  333-336. 
JUSTICES'  COURTS: 

certification  of  their  proceedings,  222. 
JUSTICE  OF  THE  PEx\CE : 

incompetency  of,  as  a  witness,  447. 
JUSTIFICATION : 

of  an  assault,  burden  of  proof,  390.  . 

K. 

KEROSENE : 

judicial  notice  of  explosive  character  of,  371. 

KIND  DEMEANOR: 

opinion  evidence  to  show,  269,  270. 

KNOWLEDGE: 

of  party  making  entry,  79. 

of  reputation  by  the  declarant,  155,  157. 

of  strangers,  declaring  against  interest,  165. 

of  witness  to  handwriting,  198,  199. 

of  expert,  264,  265. 

of  absent  witness,  necessary  for  a  continuance,  418. 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  483. 


G34  INDEX. 

Heferences  are  to  pages. 

L. 

LABOR: 

evidence  of  the  value  of,  291,  292. 

LACHES : 

in  summoning  witness,  effect  of,  41G. 

in  failing  to  object  to  evidence,  540. 
LAGER  BEER: 

judicial  notice  of  its  character  as  a  malt  liquor,  371. 
LAMP : 

evidence  to  show  safety  of,  284. 
LAND: 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  17,  292. 

evidence  of  flooding  of,  291. 

partnership  to  buy  and  sell,  402. 

when  land  is  partnership  property,  402. 

contracts  for  sale  of,  what  are,  397. 
LANDLORD  AND  TENANT: 

relationship  of.  primary  evidence  to  show,  52. 
LAND-OWNER: 

when  estopped,  120. 
LANGUAGE: 

of  admissions,  116. 

caution  required  in  the  use  of,  126. 

of  witness  subsequent!)'  missing,  171,  172. 

of  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  190. 

of  writing,  its  construction,  302,  303. 

LANGUAGE  OF  AFFIDAVITS: 
must  not  be  vague,  529. 
statute  must  be  followed  in,  529. 
when  scandalous,  529. 
amending,  529. 

LAPSE  OF  TIME: 

presumptions  from,  338-341. 
\  .ARCENY : 

variance  in  an  indictment  for,  42-44. 

presumption  of,  from  possession  of  stolen  goods,  342,  343. 

LATENT  AMBIGUITIES: 

parol  evidence  to  explain,  322-325. 
LAW  AND  FACT: 

questions  of,  27-35. 
LAW  BOOKS: 

excluded  from  jury,  489. 
LAWFULNESS : 

presumption  of,  349. 


index.  G3; 

References  are  to  pages. 


LAW  MERCHANT: 
presumptions  of,  349. 
judicial  notice  of,  373. 

LAW,  PRESUMPTIONS  OF  (see  Presumptions). 

LAW,  STATUTORY: 
proof  of,  208. 

LAYING  FOUNDATION: 

to  prove  contradictory  statements,  508. 
not  necessary,  when,  509. 

LEADING  QUESTIONS: 

may  be  employed  to  obtain  dying  declaration,  14& 
on  direct  examination,  470,  471. 

when  witness  is  hostile,  474. 

when  forgetful,  474,  475. 

when  ignorant,  474. 
on  redirect  examination,  487. 

LEAK: 

e%ridence  to  show  cause,  289. 

LEASE : 

need  not  be  produced  to  show  rental  value,  52. 

as  showing  reputation,  161. 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  300. 

oral  contract  to  rebuild,  to  vary  written  lease,  311. 

surrender  or  assignment  of,  must  be  in  writing,  401. 

LEDGERS : 

entries  in,  as  evidence,  85. 

LEFT-HANDED  PERSONS  (see  Direction  of  Blow). 

LEGALITY : 

evidence  of,  declarations  to  show,  67. 

LEGAL  TERMS : 

judicial  notice  of  their  meaning,  365. 

LEGATEE : 

is  bound  by  admissions  of  the  testator,  89, 
when  an  interested  witness,  443, 

LEGISLATIVE  ACTS: 
proof  of,  208. 

LEGISLATIVE  BODIES: 

power  to  summon  witnesses,  423. 

to  commit  for  contempt,  423. 
LEGISLATURE : 

privileged  communications,  256. 
LEGITIMACY : 

inspection  of  child  by  jury,  492. 

presumption  of,  359,  360. 


636  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
LETTERS : 

in  cross-examining,  must  be  shown  to  the  witness,  51, 

as  standards  of  comparison,  200-204. 

when  unanswered,  are  not  admissions,  113. 

replies  to,  may  be  read,  114. 

presumption  from  mailing,  347. 

proof  of  (see  Handwriting). 

LETTER-PRESS  COPY: 
as  evidence,  48,  49. 

LETTERS  ROGATORY: 
defined,  530. 
their  use  in  equity,  530. 
interrogatories  therein,  530. 
return  of,  530. 

to  what  courts  issuable,  531. 
notice  to  adverse  party,  531. 
examination  of  witness  under,  531. 
certificate  of  examining  magistrate,  531, 
commissioner  under,  may  issue  subpoena,  408. 

LEX  FORI : 

when  applied,  349. 

LIBEL: 

question  of,  for  jury,  29. 

evidence  of  character  in  action  for,  25. 

right  to  open  and  close  in  action  for,  39L 
LIBERAL  CONSTRUCTION: 

defined,  302. 

LICENSE: 

burden  of  proof  to  show,  388. 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  301. 
LIFE : 

presumption  of,  356. 

LIFE  INSURANCE  POLICY: 

evidence  of  physician  in  action  on,  295. 
LIFE  TABLES: 

to  show  expectation  of  life,  218. 
LIMB: 

exhibition  of,  to  jury,  to  show  injury,  493. 

examination  of,  by  physican,  297,  298. 

LIMITATIONS  ON  THE  NUMBER  OF  WITNESSES: 

when  erroneous.  561. 

when  permitted,  562. 
LIMITATION.  STATUTE  OF: 

presumptions  from.  339. 


INDEX.  037 

References  are  to  pages. 

LIQUIDATED  DAMAGES : 

right  to  open  and  close  in  cases  of,  392,  393. 

LIQUORS,  INTOXICATING: 
judicial  notice  of,  270,  371. 

LIS  MOTA,  156. 

(see  also  Controversy.) 
LITHOGRAPHS : 

when  primary  evidence,  49. 
LOAN: 

presumption  of,  arising  from  payment,  317. 

LOCALITIES : 

judicial  notice  of,  369. 
LOCAL  LAW: 

judicial  notice  of,  374,  375. 

LOCUS  IN  QUO : 

taking  the  view  of,  490  et  seq. 

LOG-BOOKS : 

when  evidence,  216. 
LOITERING : 

by  witness,  422. 

LOOSE  SLIPS : 

to  refresh  memory,  477-479. 

LOST  ARTICLES : 

proof  of  the  value  of,  294 
LOST  RECORDS : 

primary  evidence  of,  55. 
LOST  WRITINGS : 

evidence  to  show  contents,  183-185,  313. 
(see  Destruction  of  Writings.) 
LUCID  INTERVAL: 

in  insanity,  parol  evidence  of,  328. 

LUNATICS  (see  also  Insanity)  : 

when  incompetent  as  witnesses,  452,  453. 
incompetency  of  interested  witnesses,  434. 

M. 

MACHINERY : 

evidence  to  show  condition  and  capacity  of,  18,  266,  271,  290. 

operation  of,  in  court,  296. 
MACHINISTS : 

as  expert  witnesses,  290. 
MAILING  LETTER: 

presumption  from,  347. 


638  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
MAILS: 

placing  decoy  letters  in,  178. 

MAIL  TIME: 

judicial  notice  of,  368,  370. 

MALICE: 

court  may  define,  31. 

declarations  showing,  68,  76. 

of  client,  cannot  be  shown  by  the  declaration  of  his  attorney,  105. 

defined,  363. 

presumption  of,  in  criminal  trials,  361,  362. 

MALICIOUS  PROSECUTION : 

evidence  of  good  character  in,  25. 
evidence  of  probable  cause,  67. 
burden  of  proof  in,  387. 

MALINGERING: 

physical  examination  of  party,  297. 
MALPRACTICE : 

physician  may  testify  — 

that  treatment  was  or  was  not  proper,  281. 
but  not  as  to  defendant's  diploma,  281. 
or  his  general  reputation,  280. 
opinions  as  to  medicine  employed,  281. 
may  state  customary  mode  of  treatment,  281. 
MANDAMUS : 

to  obtain  inspection  of  records,  206. 
to  compel  record  or  filing  of  paper,  207. 
to  compel  sealing,  207. 

to  compel  amendment  of  acknowledgment,  190,  191. 
MANNER  OF  ACTING: 
evidence  to  show,  270. 

MAPS : 

as  evidence  constituting  a  part  of  the  res  gestae,  80. 

as  evidence  of  reputation,  160. 

as  evidence  of  boundaries  and  distances,  217. 

should  be  authenticated.  218. 

used  to  explain  evidence,  218. 

incorporation  of,  in  deeds  by  reference,  309. 

when  not  in  evidence,  excluded  from  jury,  489. 
MARK: 

signature  by,  185. 

proved  by  witnesses,  185. 

subscribing  witness  may  sign  by,  185. 

name  alfixed  to,  186. 
MARKET  REPORTS: 

as  evidence  of  value,  294. 


INDEX.  030 

t 
References  are  to  pages. 


MARKET  VALUE: 

evidence  to  show,  293. 
MARRIAGE: 

primary  evidence  of,  54. 

reputation  as  proof  of,  158. 

cohabitation  as  proof  of,  158. 

proof  by  register,  216. 

annulment  of,  evidence  in  action  for,  297,  298. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  350. 
MARRIED  WOMAN: 

her  acknowledgment,  192. 
(see  Husband  and  Wife.) 

MASON : 

as  an  expert  witness,  290. 
MASTER  IN  CHANCERY: 

may  state  testimony  of  an  absent  witness,  173. 
"MATERIAL:" 

defined,  14,  15. 
MATERIAL  FACTS: 

judgment  conclusive  as  to,  233. 
MATERIALITY : 

of  absent  witness,  when  it  must  be  shown,  416. 

of  alterations,  179. 

of  evidence,  must  appear  from  offer,  538. 
MATURITY  OF  CROPS : 

judicial  notice  of,  366. 

MAXIMS : 

judicial  notice  of,  372. 

McNAGHTEN'S  CASE,  352. 
MEANING: 

of  manifestations  of  feeling,  270. 

of  conversation,  269. 

of  gesture,  270. 

of  technical  terms,  parol  evidence  to  explain,  318. 
MEANS  OF  KNOWLEDGE: 

burden  of  proof  on  party  having,  386-388. 

MECHANICAL  EXPERTS,  288-291. 
MEMBER  OF  FAMILY: 

declarations  of,  constituting  pedigree,  72. 
MEMORANDA : 

in  books,  not  admissible,  84. 

as  evidence,  86. 

made  on  writing,  when  an  alteration,  179. 

parol  evidence  of  written  memoranda,  308. 

of  judge's  charge,  may  be  read  by  jury,  489. 


640  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

MEMORANDA,  TO  REFRESH  MEMORY: 

use  of,  199,  477. 

when  evidence,  477,  478.  ■ 

when  not  evidence,  477,  478. 

must  be  contemporaneous,  479. 

when  copies  may  be  used  as,  480. 
(see  Refreshing  the  Memory.) 
MEMORY : 

its  unreliability,  51. 

refreshing  memory  of  expert,  275. 

refreshing  memory  of  court,  380. 

refreshing  by  leading  questions,  475. 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  483. 
(see  also  Refreshing  the  Memory.) 
MENTAL  CAPACITY: 

opinions  of  subscribing  witnesses,  194. 

MENTAL  CONDITION: 

declarations  showing,  66-68,  329,  325. 

MENTAL  FEELINGS : 

oral  expressions  of,  68-71. 

MENTAL  INCAPACITY: 

evidence  of  declarations  to  show,  67,  322,  325. 
when  disqualifies  witness,  452,  453. 
(see  Insanity.) 

MENTION  TO  THIRD  PARTIES  (see  Self-serving  Statements). 

MERCANTILE  AGENCIES: 

judicial  notice  of  customs  of,  373. 

MERCANTILE  AGENCY  RATING: 

best  evidence  of,  51. 
MERCHANDISE : 

evidence  of  value,  291. 
"  MERCHANTABLE  HAY:" 

evidence  to  explain  term,  319. 
MERCHANTS : 

judicial  notice  of  their  customs,  373. 
MERGER : 

of  oral  stipulations  in  writing,  301. 
MERITS : 

judgment  on,  is  final,  232. 
MESSAGE  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE: 

judicial  notice  of,  370. 
MICROSCOPIST: 

evidence  of,  as  to  character  of  blood-stains,  281. 


INDEX.  C41 

References  are  to  pages. 
MIDWIFE : 

physical  examination  by,  in  action  to  annul  marriage,  297,  298. 

MILEAGE  OF  WITNESSES: 

when  paid  in  two  or  more  suits,  409. 

payable  to  witness  though  he  was  not  summoned,  409. 

not  payable  to  attorney,  409. 

of  federal  officials,  409. 

in  criminal  cases,  410. 

may  be  recovered  from  a  party,  when,  411. 

vested  right  to,  411. 

detained  in  custody,  415. 

in  federal  courts,  408. 

of  a  party  when  a  witness,  408. 

when  taxable  as  costs,  409. 

how  estimated,  410. 
MILITARY  SERVICE: 

attendance  of  witness  in,  how  procured,  423. 

MILK : 

evidence  to  show  its  quality,  284. 
MINER: 

as  expert  witness,  291. 

MINISTERS : 

confessions  to,  not  privileged,  130. 

MINORITY : 

determined  by  inspection  of  the  jury,  492-495. 
(see  Age.) 

MINUTLE: 

summary  or  effect  of,  as  observed  by  a  witness,  2G8-270. 

MISDESCRIPTION : 

in  wills,  evidence  in  case  of,  326. 

MISNOMER : 

in  wills,  evidence  to  explain,  326-329. 

MISREPRESENTATION : 

as  an  element  of  estoppel,  119. 
MISSING  WITNESSES  (see  Absent  Witnesses). 

MISTAKE : 

as  ground  for  avoiding  an  estoppel,  105. 

that  a  will  was  executed  by,  may  be  shown,  328. 

in  a  deed,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  329. 

MODE  OF  PROVING  ADMISSIONS,  114 

MODIFICATION : 

of  contract  in  writing,  may  be  shown,  312-314, 
MONTH  AND  WEEK,  DAYS  OF: 

judicial  notice  of,  305. 
41 


642  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
MONUMENTS: 

primary  evidence  of.  55. 
evidence  of  survej'or  to  identify,  291. 
maps  admissible  to  show,  1309. 
parol  evidence  to  identify,  321. 

MOON  RISING: 

judicial  notice  of,  371. 
MORAL  INSANITY,  353. 

"MORE  OR  LESS:" 

evidence  to  explain  the  term,  318. 

MORTALITY  TABLES: 
judicial  notice  of,  366. 

MORTGAGE: 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  300. 

absolute  deed  may  be  shown  to  be,  329. 

MORTGAGEE : 

bound  by  judgment  against  mortgagor,  231. 

MORTGAGOR : 

oral  agreement  that  mortgagor  may  remain  in  possession,  311. 

MOTIONS  : 

affidavits  to  sustain,  526. 
to  suppress  depositions,  533. 
(see  also  Striking  Out.) 

MOTIONS  OR  GESTURES : 

their  meaning  (see  Deaf  Mutes). 

MOTIVE :       * 

relevancy  of  evidence  of,  20-24. 

declarations  to  show,  67. 

presumptions  as  to  maliciousness  of,  361-363. 

of  witness,  explanation  of,  on  redirect  examination,  487. 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  483. 

MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS: 

their  records  as  evidence,  216. 

admissions  by  inhabitants  of,  99. 

competency  of  their  members  as  witnesses,  427. 
MUNICIPAL  COURTS: 

proving  their  records,  221. 
(see  Justices'  Courts.) 

MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES : 

primary  evidence  of  is  required,  51. 

statutory  mode  of  proving,  213. 

proof  by  certified  copy,  213,  214. 

power  to  enact,  214. 

parol  evidence  to  show  a  compliance  with  statute,  214 


INDEX.  643 


References  are  to  pages. 


MUNICIPAL  ORDINANCES  (continued): 
publication  of,  how  proved,  214,  215. 
in  newspaper,  215. 
in  foreign  language,  215. 
judicial  notice  of,  375,  376. 

MUTES,  AS  WITNESSES  (see  Deaf  Mutes). 

MUTILATION : 

of  evidence,  presumptions  from,  343. 

"  MY  CHILDREN : " 

devise  to,  evidence  to  explain,  326. 

N. 

NAKED  CONFESSION: 
defined,  133. 

NAME: 

abbreviation  of.  319. 

when  forgotten,  475. 

of  articles  ih  trade,  317,  318. 

witness  may  be  asked  to  write  his  name,  200. 

NARCOTIC: 

dying  declaration  by  party  under  influence  of,  145. 

NARRATIVE  DECLARATIONS : 

when  inadmissible  as  admissions,  95,  96. 

NATIONAL  BANKS: 

judicial  notice  of  their  existence,  366. 

NATURAL  CONSEQUENCES: 

presumed  to  be  intended,  361,  362. 
NATURAL  PHENOMENA: 

judicial  notice  taken  of,  366. 

NATURAL  SHOW  OF  FEELINGS,  6a 

NATURALIZATION: 
best  evidence  of,  50. 

NATURE  OF  BUSINESS: 

judicial  notice  of,  373. 
NAUTICAL  EXPERT: 

evidence  of,  289. 
NAVAL  SERVICE: 

attendance  of  witness  in,  how  procured,  423. 
NAVIGABLE  WATERS: 

judicial  notice  of,  369. 
NECESSARY  EXPENSES: 

of  federal  officials,  as  witnesses,  410. 


644  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
NECESSITY: 

opinion  evidence  of  non-experts,  when  admissible  from,  268. 

NEGATIVE : 

burden  of  proof  on  party  alleging,  380-389. 

NEGATIVE  TESTIMONY : 

its  admissibility,  565,  566. 

NEGLIGENCE : 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  18. 

is  a  question  for  the  jury,  29,  291. 

proper  instructions  as  to,  33,  34. 

opinion  evidence  of,  266,  267,  282. 

of  plaintiff,  burden  of  proof,  388,  390. 

of  bailee,  when  admitting  evidence  of  bailor,  429. 

in  management  of  railroad,  288,  289. 

in  management  of  ship,  289. 

freedom  from,  burden  of  proof,  388,  390. 

inspection  by  jury  of  injured  person  to  show.  494. 

NEGOTIABLE  INSTRUMENTS: 

incompetency  of  parties  to,  as  witnesses.  445,  446. 
value  of,  293,  294. 
filling  blanks  in,  181. 
parol  evidence  to  vary,  3G1. 
presumptions  in  favor  of,  346,  347. 

NEW  CONTRACTS: 

may  be  shown  by  parol,  306-308. 

NEW  ENGLAND  TOWNSHIP: 
admissions  of  inhabitants  of,  99. 

NEWLY-DISCOVERED  EVIDENCE: 

materiality  of,  554. 

discretion  of  court,  554. 

sufficiency  must  appear,  555. 

diligence  of  party  who  offers,  555,  556. 

affidavits  necessary  in  offering,  556. 

must  not  be  cumulative.  556. 

must  not  be  impeaching  merely,  557. 
NEWSPAPER  CORRESPONDENT: 

may  state  testimony  of  absent  witness,  173. 
NEWSPAPERS: 

as  evidence,  208. 

as  evidence  of  public  acts,  218. 
NICKNAMES : 

their  use  in  indictments,  43. 
NOD : 

significance  of,  269. 


INDEX.  645 

Heferences  are  to  pages. 


NOISE: 

opinions  as  to  effect  of,  269. 

NOMINAL  CONSIDERATION  (see  Consideration 

NOMINAL  PARTY: 

admissions  of,  when  binding,  100. 
his  incompetency  as  a  witness,  426. 

(see  also  Parties  and  Interested  Witnesse&) 

NON-ACCESS : 

when  creating  a  presumption  of  illegitimacy,  360. 
wife  may  testify  to  fact  of.  249. 

NON-ATTENDANCE  OF  WITNESSES: 
as  ground  for  a  continuance,  1 16-419. 
procured  by  intimidation,  415. 
commitment  to  prevent,  414. 
poverty  as  an  excuse  for,  410,  411. 
on  whom  subpoena  is  served,  407,  408. 
attachment  in  case  of,  410,  411. 
may  be  shown  by  parol,  414. 
when  contempt,  419. 
attachment  in  case  of,  419. 
clear  proof  must  be  made,  420. 
affidavits  to  show,  420. 
caused  by  delay,  420. 
summoned  to  give  deposition,  420. 

NON-CONCLUSIVENESS : 
of  presumptions,  355. 
of  admissions,  114. 

NON-EXISTENCE : 

of  fact,  burden  of  proof,  387-389. 

NON-EXPERT  WITNESSES : 

opinions  of,  when  admissible,  265. 

evidence  of,  on  insanity,  285,  286. 
NON-OCCURRENCE : 

of  event,  evidence  to  show,  565,  566. 

NON-PAYMENT  (see  Consideration). 

NON-PRODUCTION  OF  WITNESSES: 
presumption  from,  16. 

NON-REPAIR: 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  17-20. 

NON-RESIDENT  WITNESSES : 

their  former  testimony,  when  admissible,  168. 
taking  depositions  of,  169. 
commission  to  procure  deposition  of,  530-534. 
privilege  of,  from  arrest,  420-422. 


G4G  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pagea. 
NONSUIT: 

for  failure  of  proof,  29. 

motion  for,  affidavit  to  sustain,  52G. 
NOTARY  PUBLIC: 

his  entries  as  evidence,  79. 

may  take  acknowledgments,  188. 

acknowledgment  before,  after  expiration  of  term,  189. 

seal  of,  may  amend  his  return,  189,  190. 

judicial  notice  of  seal  of;  373. 

his  power  to  administer  oaths,  527. 

NOTES : 

filling  blanks  in,  181. 

presumption  as  to  date  of  alteration  in,  182. 

presumptions  of  payment,  344. 

NOTICE : 

certificate  of  acknowledgment  as  notice,  192. 

to  produce  writings,  176. 

in  legal  proceedings,  406. 

to  adverse  party  to  take  depositions,  531. 

NOTICE  TO  QUIT: 

silence,  when  admission,  113. 

NOTORIOUS   FACTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  364  et  seq. 

NUMBER : 

of  witnesses  required  in  equity,  430,  431. 

NUMBER  OF  WITNESSES: 

court  may  limit,  when.  561,  562. 

of  expert  witnesses,  562. 

in  trials  for  perjury,  562,  563. 

in  trials  for  treason,  563,  564. 

whose  calling  may  be  compelled,  565. 

as  affecting  the  weight  of  evidence,  565,  566. 
NURSE: 

evidence  to  show  value  of  services  of,  292. 

o. 

OATH : 

of  witness,  its  utility,  64. 

should  not  be  administered  to  prisoner  on  his  preliminary  examination, 

131. 
of  party,  to  show  loss  of  writing,  183. 
defined,  448. 
classified,  448. 
form  of,  in  courts,  448,  449. 
assent  of  witness,  449. 
affirmation,  449. 


INDEX.  047 

References  are  to  pages. 
OATH  (continued): 

binding  character  of,  450. 
objections  to,  450. 
administered  by  arbitrators.  451. 
waiver  of,  in  arbitration,  451. 
mentioning  aliases,  450. 
religious  character  of,  451. 
irreligion  as  a  disqualification,  451. 
constitutional  guaranties,  452. 
administration  of,  to  deponent,  531. 
of  interpreter,  469. 

OBJECTION: 

to  variance,  necessity  for,  46. 
to  evidence,  necessity  for,  35. 

OBJECTIONS  TO  DEPOSITIONS: 
should  be  promptly  made,  533. 
waiver  of,  533. 

because  of  interest  of  deponent,  533. 
parol  evidence  to  remove,  533. 
in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  533. 

OBJECTIONS  TO  EVIDENCE: 
must  be  specific,  538. 
must  be  promptly  made,  539. 
must  be  followed  by  an  exception,  539. 
may  be  waived,  540. 
need  not  be  repeated,  541. 

mode  of  waiver.  542. 

snoulcl  be  followed  by  motion  to  strike  out,  5421 

OB  LITER ATIONS  (see  Alterations). 

OBSERVATION : 

of  detailed  fact,  with  judgment,  268-270. 
of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  483. 

OBSTRUCTING  THE  ATTENDANCE  OF  WITNESSES: 

a  misdemeanor,  414. 

when  witness  was  not  subpoenaed.  414. 

unsuccessful  attempt  at,  415. 

by  scurrilous  language,  415. 

arrest  of  obstructor,  415. 

beating  a  witness  after  he  testifies,  415, 

by  district  attorney,  415. 

language  of  indictment  for,  415. 
OCCUPATION  OF  REAL  PROPERTY: 

presumption  of,  from  paying  rent,  347. 
OFFER  OF  COMPROMISE : 

as  an  admission.  106,  107. 

when  presumed  confidential,  106. 


G48  INDEX. 

Beferencos  are  to  pages. 

OFFER  OF  EVIDENCE: 
must  be  explicit,  10. 
should  show  purpose,  537. 
stating  substance  of,  in,  537. 
purpose  may  appear  from  answer,  537. 

OFFICE  COPY: 
defined,  219. 

OFFICER : 

de  facto,  acknowledgment  before.  188,  189. 
seals  of,  judicially  noticed,  370,  373,  378,  379. 
arresting  witness,  when  liable,  422. 
authority  of,  to  take  depositions,  532. 
authority  of,  to  administer  oaths,  527. 

OFFICERS  OF  COURTS: 

judicial  notice  of  their  character,  379. 

OFFICIAL  BOOK  ENTRIES,  78-80. 

OFFICIAL  CHARACTER : 
judicial  notice  of,  370. 

OFFICIAL  COMMUNICATIONS: 
when  confidential,  256. 

OFFICIAL  DUTY: 

presumption  of  performance  of,  349. 
OFFICIAL  RECORDS  (see  Public  Records). 

OLD  AGE: 

of  witness,  admits  his  former  evidence,  169. 
OLEOMARGARINE : 

judicial  notice  of,  372. 

OMISSIONS : 

parol  evidence  to  supply,  307,  308. 

in  wills,  cannot  be  filled  by  parol,  326. 

in  declaration  of  trust,  parol  evidence,  400. 
OPEN  AND  CLOSE: 

goes  with  burden  of  proof,  383. 
OPEN  COMMISSIONS: 

to  take  testimony,  529. 
OPENING  THE  DOOR: 

for  the  adverse  party,  436,  437. 

(see  also  Personal  Transaction.) 

OPERATION: 

of  machine  in  court,  296! 
OPERATION  OF  RAILROADS: 

evidence  of  experts  to  show,  288. 


INDEX.  64r'J 


Heferences  are  to  pages. 

OPERATOR  AT  TELEPHONE : 
when  agent  for  both  parties,  123. 

OPINIONS : 

form  of  question  calling  for,  267. 

(see  also  Hypothetical  Questions.) 
inadmissible  as  dying  declarations,  141,  143. 
to  show  bad  reputation  of  witness,  506. 

(see  also  Expert  Evidence.) 

OPPORTUNITY : 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  20. 

of  witness,  ascertainable  on  cross-examination,  480,  483. 

ORAL  EVIDENCE: 
denned,  299. 

(see  also  Parol  Evidence.) 

ORAL  WARRANTY : 
evidence  to  show,  311. 

ORDER : 

for  witnesses  to  withdraw,  466-468. 

ORDER  FOR  MONEY : 

presumption  from  possession  of,  345. 

ORDINANCES : 

judicial  notice  of,  375. 

(see  also  Municipal  Ordinances.) 

ORIGINAL  AND  HEARSAY  EVIDENCE: 
distinguished,  65,  66. 

ORIGINAL  ENTRY : 
books  of,  83,  84. 

ORIGINAL  EVIDENCE: 
when  required,  47-62. 

ORIGIN  OF  FIRE : 

evidence  to  show,  295. 

ORPHANS'  COURTS: 

proof  of  records  of,  226,  227. 
OUTCRY : 

evidence  to  show  meaning  of,  268. 
"OUT  OF  JURISDICTION:" 

denned,  168. 
OVERT  ACT: 

evidence  of,  in  treason,  564. 

OWNER  OF  PROPERTY: 

cannot  make  evidence  for  his  successor,  166. 


650  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
OWNERSHIP: 

primary  evidence  of,  52. 

ship's  registry  as  evidence,  216. 
opinion  evidence  on,  267. 
presumption  of,  341. 

OWN  WITNESS: 

party  may  not  impeach,  500-502. 
exceptions  to  the  general  rule,  502-504. 

OYER: 

of  sealed  instruments,  41. 

P. 

PAIN : 

declarations  of,  68. 

PARDON : 

restoring  competency  of  witness,  455. 

when  ineffectual,  456. 

conditional,  456. 

full  pardon,  456. 

judicial  notice  of,  456. 

proof  of,  456. 

irrevocable  character  of,  4.10. 

PARISH  REGISTER: 

as  evidence  of  birth,  210. 

not  primary  evidence  of  marriage,  54 

PAROL  OR  EXTRINSIC  EVIDENCE: 
when  inadmissible,  299-301. 

interpretation  and  construction  of  writings,  301-304 
rule  applies  between  parties  only,  304. 
to  vary  or  explain  or  show  real  consideration,  304-308. 
incomplete  and  collateral  writings.  307.  308. 
to  connect  and  explain  contemporaneous  writings,  308. 
to  explain  receipts,  309.  310. 

to  show  independent  parol  contracts  and  conditions  precedent,  310,  311. 
to  establish  implied,  resulting  or  constructive  trusts,  312. 
to  show  discharge,  modification  or  extension  of  contract,  312-314 
to  rebut  presumptions,  314,  315. 
to  show  usage,  316,  317. 
to  explain  technical  terms,  317,  318. 
to  explain  abbreviations,  319. 
to  show  the  relations  of  the  parties.  320. 
to  ascertain  or  explain  subject-matter.  320-322. 
ambiguities  defined  and  distinguished;  parol  evidence  to  explain,  323- 

326. 
as  applicable  to  wills,  326-329. 


INDEX.  05 1 

References  are  to  pages. 

PAROL  OR  EXTRINSIC  EVIDENCE  (continued): 

to  show  absolute  deed  a  mortgage  and  in  suits  for  specific  performance 

and  reformation  or  cancellation,  329-332. 
inadmissible  to  vary  a  written  award,  110. 
inadmissible  to  supply  omissions  in  an  acknowledgment,  191. 
erroneous  admission  of,  how  cured,  51. 
to  explain  returns  on  writs,  228. 
to  show  contents  of  missing  telegram,  263. 

PARTIAL  EVIDENCE: 
defined,  3. 

PARTIAL  PERFORMANCE: 

of  parol  contract  for  the  sale  of  land,  397. 
of  parol  partition,  399. 

PARTICULAR  CUSTOM : 

actual  knowledge  of  required,  316. 

PARTIES: 

to  writing,  their  relation  may  be  shown  by  parol,  320. 

bound  by  rule  excluding  parol  evidence,  304. 

as  witnesses,  when  entitled  to  fees,  408,  409. 

may  serve  subpoena,  413. 

competency  of,  as  witnesses,  433-437. 

competency  of,  as  witnesses  in  equity,  430-433. 

their  incompetency  to  testify  at  common  law,  426. 

reasons  for  excluding  them,  425. 

their  knowledge  of  the  facts  in  issue,  425. 

when  they  are  competent,  427-429. 

may  make  affidavits,  526. 

as  witnesses,  impeachment  of,  501,  503. 

PARTITION : 

by  parol,  when  valid,  398,  399. 

PARTNER : 

admissions  of,  92. 

when  a  trustee  for  his  associates,  403. 
PARTNERSHIP: 

must  be  shown  to  admit  declarations  of  partner.%  93. 

presumption  of  continuance  of,  350. 

contract  of,  when  it  must  be  in  writing,  402. 
PARTNERSHIP  SETTLEMENT: 

conveying  land,  397. 

PART  PAYMENT: 

evidence  of,  86,  87. 
of  firm  debt  after  dissolution,  93,  94. 
PART  PERFORMANCE: 

of  oral  contract  of  partnership,  403. 


052  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
PASS-BOOK: 

of  bauk,  as  evidence,  84. 

PATENT: 

burden  of  proof  to  show  want  of  invention.  390. 

PATENT  AMBIGUITIES: 

parol  evidence  inadmissible  to  explain,  323,  324,  325. 

PAYMENT : 

indorsements  as  evidence  of,  87. 
of  firm  debt  after  dissolution,  93,  94. 
presumption  as  to  time  and  purpose  of,  344,  345. 
of  money,  when  evidenced  by  writing,  406. 

PAYMENT  INTO  COURT: 

its  effect  as  an  admission,  117. 
PAYMENT  OF  CONSIDERATION: 
admission  of,  when  conclusive,  117. 

PEACEABLE  DISPOSITION : 
when  relevant,  27. 

PECUNIARY  INTEREST: 

declaration  against,  162-106. 

PECUNIARY  LIABILITY: 

of  witness,  questions  showing,  515,  516. 
PEDIGREE : 

defined,  68-71. 

PENALTY : 

burden  of  proof  in  action  to  recover,  387. 
PENCIL  SKETCHES: 

as  primary  evidence,  60. 
PERFORMANCE : 

time  of,  may  be  shown,  307. 

burden  of  proving,  389. 

of  contract  for  the  sale  of  laud,  397. 

of  parol  partition,  399. 

PERFORMANCE  OF  DUTY: 

by  officers,  when  presumed,  349. 
PERISHABLE  GOODS: 

evidence  to  show  the  condition  of,  284. 
PERJURY: 

variance  in  an  indictment  for,  44. 

presumptions  from.  343. 

conviction  of,  disqualifies  witness,  457. 

presumptions  from,  512-514. 

in  affidavit,  528. 

possibility  of  excluded  interested  witnesses,  425. 

number  of  witnesses  in  trials  for,  562.  563. 
(see  Falsus  in  Uno.) 


INDEX.  C53 


^References  are  to  pages. 

PERPETUATION  OF  TESTIMONY: 
by  a  bill  in  equity,  534,  535. 

PERSON: 

exhibition  of,  to  the  jury,  492-495. 

PERSONAL  CONDITION  (see  Condition,  Health,  etc.). 

PERSONAL  KNOWLEDGE: 
of  witness,  its  character,  64. 
admissions  based  on,  115,  116. 
juror  having,  should  testify,  489. 
of  juror,  verdict  based  on,  505. 

PERSONAL  PROPERTY: 

presumptions  from  the  possession  of,  343. 
trusts  created  in,  by  parol,  400. 

PERSONAL  REPRESENTATIVE : 

exclusion  of  interested  witnesses  against,  436-445. 
(see  also  Personal  Transactions.) 

PERSONAL  SERVICE: 
of  the  subpoena,  413. 
by  a  party,  413. 
when  it  must  be  shown  to  obtain  a  continuance,  417. 

PERSONAL  SERVICES : 

evidence  to  show  the  value  of,  291,  292. 

PERSONAL  STATUS: 
judgments  fixing,  239. 

PERSONAL  TRANSACTIONS  WITH  DECEASED: 

incompetency  of  witness  to,  435,  436. 
waiver  of  exclusion  of,  436-438. 
who  are  representatives,  438. 
object  of  the  statutes,  439. 

character  and  construction  of  the  statutes,  439. 
definition,  440. 

transactions  with  agent  of  the  deceased,  450. 
contract  in  issue,  441. 
a  writing  is  not,  441. 

whether  excluded  is  a  question  for  court,  442. 
incompetency  of  interested  witnesses,  443,  444. 
(see  also  Interested  Persons.) 

PERSONS : 

proof  of,  in  indictment,  43. 

PHENOMENA  OF  NATURE: 
judicial  notice  of,  366. 


C54  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
PHOTOGRAPHS: 

when  primary  evidence,  49,  59,  00. 

as  evidence,  relevancy  of,  60,  80. 

to  prove  handwriting,  59,  180. 

to  describe  buildings,  physical  injuries,  etc..  49,  59. 

for  identification,  59,  00. 

preliminary  question,  60. 

by  amateur,  60. 

weight  of,  60. 

changes  in  object  photographed,  60. 

PHRASES : 

meaning  of,  will  be  noticed,  365. 

PHYSICAL  CONDITION: 

photographs  to  show,  60. 
(see  also  Health.) 

evidence  to  show,  278-282. 
PHYSICAL  DISABILITY: 

of  witness,  admits  bis  former  evidence,  169. 
PHYSICAL  EXAMINATION: 

evidence  of  an  expert  medical  witness  founded  on,  278. 

of  party  by  medical  experts,  297,  298. 

by  the  jury,  492-495. 
PHYSICAL  FEELINGS: 

verbal  expressions  of,  68-71. 

PHYSICAL  INJURIES: 

photographs  as  evidence  of,  59. 

medical  testimony  as  to,  278-280. 
PHYSICIANS  : 

declarations  to,  70. 

information  acquired  by,  non-professionally,  260l 

credibility  of,  as  witnesses,  276. 

physical  examination  by,  297,  298. 

PHYSICIANS  AS  EXPERT  WITNESSES: 
may  testify  — 

to  effect  of  wounds  or  injuries,  278. 

to  manner  inflicted,  279. 

to  health,  278. 

to  possibility  of  recovery,  279. 

to  probable  cause  of  injury,  279. 

to  curability  of  injury,  279. 

to  cause  of  death,  280. 

to  time  of  death,  280. 

to  means  of  death,  280. 

to  character  of  a  disease,  280. 

to  simulation  of  disease,  280. 

to  manner  of  conducting  autopsies,  280. 


INDEX.  65* 


References  are  to  pages. 


PHYSICIANS  AS  EXPERT  WITNESSES  (continued): 

may  testify  (continued)  — 

to  cause  of  condition  of  body,  281. 

to  blood-stain,  281. 

in  actions  for  malpractice,  281,  282. 

to  insanity,  288. 

to  chemical  analysis,  283. 
may  examine  weapon,  279. 

PISTOL: 

used  to  explain  evidence,  60. 

PLACE: 

proof  of,  in  indictments,  43. 
allegations  of,  39. 
judicial  notice  of,  368. 

PLAINTIFF : 

his  right  to  open  and  close,  390,  391, 
PLANS  (see  Maps  and  Photographs). 
PLATS : 

incorporation  of,  in  deeds  by  reference,  309. 
PLEADING,  MODE  OF: 

customs,  316. 

former  judgment,  236. 

PLEADINGS : 

pedigree  in,  73. 

as  admissions,  107. 

presumptions  from,  107. 

when  sworn  to,  108. 

when  considered  as  formulas,  108. 

amendment  of,  when  presumed,  354. 

right  to  open  and  close  arising  on,  392. 

admissions  in  the  answer  in  equity,  430. 

may  be  read  by  the  jurors,  489. 

FLEAS  IN  BAR: 

proof  of  one  of  several,  sufficient,  40. 
POISONS : 

testimony  of  chemists,  283,  284. 
POLICEMEN : 

confessions  made  to,  127. 
POLICE  OFFICIALS : 

communications  to,  when  confidential,  255. 
POLICIES  OF  INSURANCE: 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  301. 

expert  evidence  in  actions  on.  294,  2C5. 

burden  of  proof  in  actions  on,  388. 


*)~)C)  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
POLITICAL  FACTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  369,  370. 

POLITICAL  SUBDIVISIONS: 
judicial  notice  of,  368. 

POPULAR  MEANING: 

of  language,  318. 
POPULATION : 

judicial  notice  of,  368. 
POSITION : 

of  objects,  photographs  to  show,  59,  60. 

POSITIVENESS : 

of  answers  by  witness,  267. 

POSITIVE  TESTIMONY: 

its  weight  and  credibility,  565,  566. 
instructions  on,  565. 

POSSESSION : 

evidence  of,  in  corroboration  of  ancient  documents,  152,  155. 

presumption  from  adverse,  338,  339. 

presumption  of  ownership,  342-344 

in  trespass,  burden  of  proving,  389. 

of  land  under  statute  of  frauds,  397,  399. 

of  writings,  presumptions  from,  343,  344,  345. 

of  negotiable  paper,  344. 

of  rent  receipts,  347. 

presumed  continuance,  350. 

POSSIBILITY  (see  Probable  Cause  and  Care). 

POSTAL  LAWS,  VIOLATIONS  OF: 

evidence  of,  obtained  by  decoy  letters,  177. 
POST-MARK :      ' 

presumption  from,  347. 

POST-MORTEM  EXAMINATION  (see  Autopsies). 

POVERTY : 

evidence  to  show,  269. 

of  witness,  as  excuse  for  his  non-attendance,  410,  411. 
does  not  extend  privilege  from  arrest,  422. 

PORTRAITS : 

inscriptions  on,  as  pedigree,  73. 
POWER  OF  ATTORNEY: 

blanks  in,  180. 

PRAYER : 

confession  contained  in,  131. 

PREGNANCY : 

expert  testimony  in  case  of,  284,  285. 


index.  daJT 

References  are  to  pages. 
PREJUDICE : 

when  rendering  evidence  of  reputation  inadmissible,  156. 
of  witness,  ascertainable  by  cross-examination,  480,  483,  485. 
(see  Bias  and  Prejudice.) 

PRELIMINARY  EXAMINATIONS : 
objects  of,  131. 
witnesses  at,  131. 
voluntary  appearance  at,  131. 
statements  of  accused  at,  132. 
when  taken  down  in  writing,  133. 
signature  by  accused,  133. 

PRELIMINARY  PROOF: 
of  partnership,  92. 
of  conspiracy,  95. 

PRELIMINARY  QUESTION: 
for  judge,  30,  35. 
of  voluntary  character  of  confession,  126,  127. 

may  be  submitted  to  jury,  35. 
of  competency  of  expert,  271. 
of  competency  of  dying  declarations,  143. 
of  loss  of  writing,  184. 
of  conspiracy,  135,  136. 

PREMEDITATION : 

declarations  to  show,  76. 

PREMISES : 

maps  or  photographs  of,  59,  60,  217,  218,  309. 

PREMIUM : 

increase  of,  for  insurance,  295. 

PREPAYMENT : 

of  witness  fees,  when  necessary,  409. 

PREPONDERANCE  OF  EVIDENCE: 

not  required  as  basis  for  hypothetical  question,  272. 

sufficient  in  civil  trials,  9. 

may  prevent  a  continuance,  418. 

in  equity,  431. 

PRESCRIPTION : 
defined,  335. 
presumptions  from,  339,  340. 

PRESENCE : 

of  testator,  what  constitutes,  405,  406. 

of  witness,  does  not  prevent  reading  his  deposition,  534. 

PRESENCE  OF  ADVERSE  PARTY: 

as  rendering  self-serving  declarations  competent,  112. 
42 


658  INDEX, 

"References  are  to  pages. 
PRESIDING  JUDGE: 

his  duty  to  certify  to  records,  224. 
his  incompetency  as  a  witness,  447. 

PRESS  COPY: 

of  letter,  as  evidence,  80. 
when  primary  evidence,  48,  49. 

PRESUMPTION : 

arising  from  false  testimony  of  alibi,  12. 

from  non-production  of  witness  or  deposition,  16. 

of  performance  of  official  duty,  133. 

of  continuance  of  improper  influence  producing  a  confession,  129. 

how  rebutted,  129. 

province  of  court  to  say  whether  it  is  rebutted,  129. 
in  favor  of  ancient  documents,  148,  150. 
as  to  alterations  in  a  will,  182. 
as  to  alterations  in  a  deed,  181. 
as  to  alterations  in  promissory  notes,  182. 
as  to  identity  of  persons,  183. 
when  two  of  same  name,  183. 
of  impotency,  298. 

that  ordinance  was  properly  enacted,  214. 
of  consideration  from  sealing,  305. 
as  to  corm  tness  of  date,  314. 
satisfaction  of  legacies,  314,  315. 
as  to  resulting  trust,  314. 
from  advancements,  315. 
as  to  delivery  of  deeds,  315. 
as  to  acceptance  of  deeds,  315. 
of  knowledge  of  law,  377. 

definition  and  classification  of  presumptions,  333,  334. 
of  law  and  fact  distinguished,  334-337. 
of  fact,  337,  338. 

from  adverse  possession  and  prescription,  338-340. 
from  lapse  of  time,  341. 
from  possession,  342-346. 
from  the  usual  course  of  trade,  346-349. 
of  lawfulness;  continuity;  sanity;  insanity,  349-353,  385. 
as  to  jurisdiction,  353-356. 
of  life,  death  and  survivorship,  356-359. 
of  legitimacy;  innocence;  malice,  359-363. 
none  to  be  drawn  from  interest  of  witness,  435. 
none  from  refusal  to  answer  incriminating  questions,  522. 
from  deliberate  perjury,  512-514. 

PREVIOUS  COURSE  OF  DEALING: 

effect  of,  in  construing  contracts,  303,  304. 

PRIESTS: 

communications  to,  258.  259. 


INDEX.  659 

References  are  to  pages. 

PRIMARY  AND  SECONDARY  EVIDENCE: 

distinguished,  47-49. 

instruments  required  to  be  in  writing,  49,  50. 

disputed  writings.  51,  52. 

contracts  and  transactions  actually  reduced  to  writing,  52-54. 

collateral  writings,  54,  55. 

exceptions  in  the  case  of  records  and  appointments,  55-57. 

exceptions  in  the  case  of  general  results,  57,  58. 

admissions  as  primary  evidence,  58. 

photographs  as  primary  evidence,  59r  60. 

production  of  articles  in  court,  60-62. 
(see  Statute  of  Frauds.) 
PRINCIPAL: 

when  bound  by  agent's  declarations,  101-103. 

PRINCIPAL  AND  AGENT  (see  Agency  and  Admissions). 

PRINCIPAL  AND  SURETY: 
admissions  of,  99,  100. 

PRINTED  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  208,  211-213,  215-218. 
PRINTED  CLAUSES  IN  CONTRACTS: 

their  meaning  controlled  by  written  clauses,  303. 
PRINTERS'  ABBREVIATIONS : 

judicial  notice  of,  366. 
PRISON : 

attendance  of  witness  in,  how  procured,  423. 
PRISON  RECORDS: 

as  evidence,  216. 

PRIVATE  ARBITRATIONS  (see  Arbitration). 

PRIVATE  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  79-86. 

PRIVATE  BOUNDARIES: 
proof  of  (see  Boundaries). 

PRIVATE  CORPORATIONS: 

when  bound  by  admissions  of  employees,  1021, 

judicial  notice  of  their  charters,  376. 

competency  of  members  of,  as  witnesses,  427. 
PRIVATE  CORPORATION  RECORDS: 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  300. 

PRIVATE  ENTRIES,  78. 

PRIVATE  MAPS: 

to  show  boundaries,  218. 
PRIVATE  RIGHTS: 

reputation  to  prove,  154,  157-159. 


660  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

PRIVATE  STATUTES; 

judicial  notice  of,  374-376. 

PRIVATE  VIEW: 
by  the  jury,  488. 

PRIVATE  WRITINGS: 

definition  and  classification,  174,  175. 

production  of ;  proof  of  contents  by  secondary  evidence,  175-177. 

obtained  by  fraud  or  deceit;  decoy  letters,  177,  178. 

spoliation  and  alteration  distinguished;  effect  of  material  alterations, 

178-181. 
alterations;  presumptions  and  burden  of  proof  to  explain,  181-183. 
when  lost  or  destroyed,  183-185. 
handwriting  defined,  185,  186. 
production  of  writings,  when  necessary,  186. 
proof  by  admissions  of  party,  186,  187. 
when  proof  of  handwriting  may  be  dispensed  with;  acknowledgments, 

187,  188. 
who  may  take  acknowledgments,  188,  189. 
the  certificate,  189-191. 
impeaching  the  certificate,  192. 
proof  by  subscribing  witnesses,  192-195. 
proof  by  witnesses  acquainted  with  handwriting,  195-198. 
mode  of  examining  witnesses  to  handwriting,  198-200. 
comparison  of  handwriting,  200-204. 
to  what  expert  may  give  evidence,  204,  205. 
proof  of  exhibits  in  equity,  205. 

PRIVILEGED  COMMUNICATIONS : 
foundation  of  the  doctrine,  243. 

husband  and  wife,  when  competent  witnesses,  244,  245. 
statutory  legislation;  confidential  communications,  245-247. 

between  husband  and  wife,  247-249. 
communications  to  attorneys,  249,  250. 

character  and  time  of  the  communications,  251. 

attorney  employed  by  both  parties,  252. 

permanent  character  of  the  privilege :  its  waiver,  252,  253. 

privileges  as  to  documents,  253,  254. 

what  communications  are  within  the  privilege,  254,  255. 
privilege  of  police,  judicial  and  executive  officials,  255,  256. 
privilege  as  relating  to  jurors,  257,  258. 
confidential  communications  to  clergymen,  258,  259. 
communications  to  physicians,  259,  260. 
telegrams  are  not,  262,  263. 

PRIVILEGE  OF  WITNESSES  FROM  ARREST: 
from  service  of  civil  process,  420. 
service  may  be  set  aside,  421. 
from  civil  arrest,  421. 


INDEX.  601 

References  are  to  pages. 

PRIVILEGE  OF  WITNESSES  FROM  ARREST  (continued): 
before  investigating  committee,  421. 
in  case  of  non-residence,  421. 
duration  of,  422. 

abrogated  by  delay  to  return,  422. 
officer  is  not  bound  to  know,  422. 
arrest  after  termination  of,  422. 

PRIVILEGES  OF  WITNESSES  IN  ANSWERING: 
questions  showing  pecuniary  liability,  515,  516. 
questions  tending  to  disgrace,  497,  498,  516-519. 
questions  tending  to  incriminate,  519-522. 

PRIVIES : 

judgment  binds,  230. 
PRIVITY : 

as  affecting  admissions,  89,  90. 

PROBABILITY : 

as  grounds  for  belief,  4. 
relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  21. 
opinion  evidence  to  show,  267,  268. 

PROBABLE  CAUSE: 
a  judicial  question,  33. 
evidence  of  declarations  to  show,  67. 
opinions  when  inadmissible,  268. 
of  death,  278,  280. 
of  injury,  279. 
of  symptoms,  279. 
in  malicious  prosecution,  387. 

PROBABLE  MEANS: 
of  death,  280,  281. 

PROBABLE  TIME: 
of  death,  280. 

PROBABLE  TRUTH: 

of  evidence  of  absent  witness,  417. 

PROBATE : 

proof  of  fact  of,  227. 
PROBATE  PROCEEDING: 

burden  of  proof  in,  383,  384. 

right  to  open  and  close  in,  393. 

PROCEEDINGS: 

special,  right  to  open  and  close  in,  393,  394 

PROCESS : 

privilege  of  witness  from  service  of,  420. 

to  procure  attendance  of  witness  (see  Compulsory  Process,  etc.  ;  Duces 
Tecum;  Subpcena.) 


GG2  .  INDEX. 

Beferences  are  to  pages. 
PROCLAMATION: 
as  evidence,  208. 
judicial  notice  of,  370. 

PRODUCTION  OF  WITNESS: 

dispensed  with  in  case  of  entries,  79. 

PRODUCTION  OF  WRITING: 

when  necessary  in  proving  a  writing,  183-186. 
how  obtained,  175,  176. 

PROFESSIONAL  ENTRIES: 
their  value  as  evidence,  78-80. 

PROLIXITY : 

as  an  objection  to  hypothetical  questions,  273. 

PROMISE : 

rendering  confessions  involuntary,  128. 
confessions  procured  by,  130. 
persons  making,  135,  136. 
to  hold  testamentary  gift  in  trust,  328. 

PROMISSORY  NOTE: 

right  to  open  and  close  in  an  action  on,  393. 

PROOF: 

dispensed  with  by  judicial  notice,  364. 

" PROPER  EVIDENCE : " 

defined,  14. 
PROPER  CUSTODY  FOR  ANCIENT  WRITINGS: 

defined,  149,  150. 

a  judicial  question.  149. 

lessor  or  grantor,  150. 

PROPER  MANAGEMENT: 

of  ship,  289. 
PROPRIETY : 

of  act,  opinion  of,  266. 

PROSTITUTES : 

association  with,  as  revelant  to  prove  adultery,  22. 

PROVINCE  OF  JUDGE : 

to  instruct  jury  as  to  circumstantial  evidence,  8. 
to  determine  if  dying  declaration  is  admissible,  140. 

as  to  proper  custody  of  ancient  documents,  149. 

voluntary  character  of  confessions,  127. 

genuineness  of  standard  for  comparison  of  writing,  203. 
to  construe  foreign  law,  211. 
on  issue  of  domestic  record,  220. 
to  construe  contract,  302. 
to  permit  disgracing  questions,  520. 
to  permit  incriminating  questions.  521. 
to  take  part  in  examination  of  witness,  472. 
to  exclude  incompetent  evidence,  472,  473. 


INDEX.  663 

References  are  to  pages. 

PROVINCE  OF  JURY : 

to  weigh  circumstantial  evidence,  8. 
over  opinion  evidence,  273,  276. 
over  negligence,  291. 
to  determine  damages,  292,  293. 
to  determine  completeness  of  contract,  307. 
to  construe  contact,  303. 
to  weigh  the  evidence,  472. 
(see  also  Facts.) 

PRUDENCE : 

evidence  to  show  presence  or  absence  of,  268. 
(see  also  Care.) 

PUBLIC  AND  PRIVATE  ENTRIES: 
distinguished,  78. 

PUBLICATION : 

service  by  proving,  229. 
of  ordinances,  how  proved,  214,  215. 
in  newspaper  as  evidence,  215. 
of  will  by  testator,  406. 

PUBLIC  BOUNDARIES: 
judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 

PUBLIC  HOLIDAYS: 
judicial  notice  of,  365. 

PUBLICITY,  156,  157. 

PUBLIC  LANDS: 

primary  evidence  of  their  boundaries,  57. 

PUBLIC  LAWS: 

judicial  notice  of,  374-376. 

PUBLIC  OFFICIALS: 

judicial  notice  of  customs  of,  373. 

PUBLIC  POLICY: 

communications  incompetent  by  (see  Privileged  COMMUNICATIONS). 

PUBLIC  RECORDS: 

primary  evidence  of,  54. 

PUBLIC  RECORDS,  PROOF  AND  EFFECT  OF: 
definition  of,  209. 
inspection  of,  206,  207. 

proof  of  executive  and  legislative  acts  and  writings,  208. 
proof  of  non-judicial  records,  209-211. 
proof  of  foreign  laws.  211-213. 
proof  of  municipal  ordinances,  213-215. 
effect  of  public  documents  as  evidence,  215-217. 

historical  and  scientific  publications;  almanacs  and  newspapers,  217, 
218. 


664  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

PUBLIC  RECORDS,  PROOF  AND  EFFECT  OF  (continued): 
proof  of  judicial  records  defined,  218-221. 
records  of  courts  of  equity  and  of  inferior  courts,  221,  222. 
records  of  courts  of  other  states,  222-225. 
foreign  judgments,  225,  226. 
records  of  surrogate  courts,  226,  227. 

returns  on  writs;  the  effect  of  judicial  records  as  evidence,  227-229. 
the  effect  of  judgments  on  those  in  privitj7  with  the  parties,  231,  232. 
judgment  records  as  evidence,  230,  231. 
judgment  must  have  been  final  and  on  the  merits,  232. 
judgments  conclusive  only  as  to  material  facts  in  issue,  233. 
identity  of  cause  of  action  required,  234-236. 
persons  affected  by  judgments  in  rem  and  actions  fixing  personal  status, 

236,  237. 
criminal  judgments,  237. 

proof  of  judgments  as  facts  and  their  use  as  proving  ulterior  facts  dis- 
tinguished, 237,  238. 
validity  and  effect  of  foreign  judgments,  238-240. 
judgments  of  sister  states,  241. 
judgments  in  bar  need  not  be  pleaded,  242. 

PUBLIC  RIGHT: 

reputation  to  show,  154. 

PUBLIC  STATUTES: 
judicial  notice  of,  373. 

•PUBLIC  WRITINGS:" 
defined,  174. 

PURPOSE  (see  Malice,  Intention  and  Motive). 

Q, 

QUALIFICATION  OF  WITNESS: 
to  testify  to  blood,  281. 
to  insanity,  287. 
to  value,  292. 
to  machinery,  etc.,  288. 
of  experts  in  general,  271-273. 
to  physical  condition  of  a  person,  283. 

QUALITY: 

allegation  and  proof  of,  39. 
proof  of,  by  comparison,  297. 

QUANTITY : 

allegation  and  proof  of,  39. 

QUARRELSOME  DISPOSITION: 
relevancy  of,  27. 


INDEX.  665 


References  are  to  pages 


QUASI-MUNICIPAL  CORPORATIONS : 
admissions  of  inhabitants  of,  99. 

QUEEN'S  CASE: 
rule  in,  508. 

QUESTIONS  PUT  TO  WITNESS: 
when  leading,  470,  471. 
when  assuming,  470. 
may  be  answered  by  narrative,  471. 
put  by  court  or  jury,  471-473. 
to  witness,  must  not  be  vague,  476. 
responsive  answers  required,  477. 
(see  Hypothetical  Questions.) 

QUESTIONS  FOR  COURT  OR  JURY,  28-35. 

QUESTION  OF  FACT: 

proof  of  foreign  law,  211. 
(see  also  Facts.) 

QUESTIONS  OF  LAW: 

competency  of  expert,  271. 

QUO  WARRANTO: 

judgment  of  ouster  iu,  effect  of,  231. 


R. 

RACE: 

inspection  by  jury  to  determine,  493,  494. 

RAILROAD  BUILDERS: 

as  expert  witnesses,  288,  289. 

RAILROAD  CORPORATIONS : 

when  bound  by  the  admissions  of  their  employees,  102. 

RAILROAD  OFFICIALS: 
as  expert  witnesses,  288. 

RAILROAD  TRAINS: 

evidence  to  show  speed  of,  269,  270. 
damage  caused  by  running,  271. 
proper  method  of  stopping,  288. 
derailment  of,  288. 

RAILROAD  TRAVEL: 

judicial  notice  of,  365. 

RAILROADS : 

judicial  notice  of  the  existence  of,  372. 
expert  evidence  to  show  operation  of,  288,  289. 


666  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
RAPE: 

relevancy  of  evidence  of  chastity  of  prosecuting  witness  in,  25. 
declarations  by  the  victim  of,  71. 
presumption  that  boy  cannot  commit,  334. 
medical  testimony  in  a  case  of,  284. 
questions  on  witness'  chastity  in,  517. 

RATE  OF  INTEREST: 
judicial  notice  of,  378. 

REAL  ESTATE  AGENT: 

as  a  witness  to  land  values,  292,  293. 

REAL  EVIDENCE: 
defined.  492. 

where  legitimacy  is  in  issue,  492. 
resemblance  shown  by,  493. 
to  show  a  person's  race  or  color,  493. 
to  determine  age,  494. 
to  show  identity,  494,  495.  « 

REAL  PARTIES  IN  INTEREST: 
admissions  of,  99. 

his  incompetency  as  a  witness,  426. 
guarantor,  his  interest,  429. 

REASONABLE  CARE: 

charging  the  jury  on,  33,  34. 
opinion  evidence  as  to.  266,  267. 

REASONABLE  CONSTRUCTION : 
defined,  302. 

REASONABLE  DOUBT: 

defined.  8-12. 

burden  of  proof,  384. 

prisoner  need  not  prove  insanity  beyond,  385. 
REBUTTAL : 

parol  evidence  in,  of  presumptions,  314,  315. 

of  experiments  by  others.  296. 

evidence  in,  may  be  offered  in  chief,  16. 

depositions  for  use  in,  532. 

defined,  551. 

discretion  of  court  to  reject  evidence  offered  in,  551,  553. 

corroborative  or  cumulative  evidence  in,  552. 

evidence  in,  to  overcome  a  presumption,  552. 

evidence  in,  to  show  whole  of  conversation,  552. 

order  of  proof,  553. 

RECALLING  WITNESS: 

discretion  of  court.  487. 

after  recross  examination,  488. 

refusal,  488. 


INDEX.  C67 

References  are  to  pages. 

RECALLING  WITNESS  (continued): 

if  witness  is  unable  to  answer  positively,  488. 

not  to  obtain  cumulative  evidence,  488. 

both  parties  may  examine  on,  488. 
RECAPITULATION  OF  EVIDENCE: 

by  court,  32. 

RECEIPTS : 

indorsement  as  evidence,  87. 

definition  of,  309. 

evidence  to  explain,  309. 

form  of,  310. 

considered  as  co7itracts,  310. 

as  a  declaration  against  interest,  162. 

of  agents,  100-103. 

RECEIVING  EVIDENCE  OUT  OF  COURT: 

when  it  is  improper,  488. 

by  experiments,  488. 

from  private  persons,  488. 

from  witnesses,  489. 

in  writing,  489. 

from  articles  in  jury  room,  489. 

by  taking  the  view,  489-491. 
(see  also  Taking  the  View.) 
RECEPTION  OF  EVIDENCE: 

offering  and  objecting  to  evidence,  536-540. 

waiver  of  objections  to ;  necessity  for  repeating  objections,  540-542. 

motions  to  strike  out,  542,  543. 

improper  admission  of  evidence,  when  immaterial,  544,  545. 

improper  exclusion  of  evidence,  when  immaterial,  545,  546. 

nature  and  use  of  stipulations,  547-549, 

demurrer  to  evidence,  549,  550. 

surprise,  550,  551. 

rebutting  evidence;  nature  and  use  of,  551-553. 

order  of  proof ;  evidence  offered  by  the  party  after  he  rests,  553,  554. 

materiality  and  sufficiency  of  newly-discovered  evidence,  554,  555. 

diligence  of  party  offering,  must  be  shown,  555,  556. 

newly-discovered  evidence  must  not  be  cumulative  or  impeaching.  556^ 
557. 

writ  of  error;  when  employed  at  common  law,  557,  558. 

Lhe  powers  of  appellate  tribunals  in  relation  to  the  evidence,  558-561. 

limitations  on  the  number  of  witnesses.  561,  562. 

number  of  witnesses  in  trials  for  perjury,  562,  563. 

number  of  witnesses  in  trials  for  treason,  563,  564. 

compelling  the  calling  of  the  witnesses.  564,  565. 

positive  and  negative  testimony ;  number  of  witnesses  affecting  the 
weight  of  evidence,  565,  566. 

the  discretionary  power  of  the  court,  566,  567. 


668  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
RECITALS: 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  304-308. 

RECOGNITION : 

of  speaker  tli rough  telephone,  122. 

RECOGNIZANCE: 
of  witness,  414. 
when  dispensed  with,  414. 

RECOLLECTION  OF  WITNESS  (see  Refreshing  the  Memory). 

RECONCILEMENT: 
of  discrepancies,  32. 

RECORDS: 

primary  evidence  of,  54. 
parol  evidence  to  vary,  300. 
presumptions  where  they  are  silent,  353-356. 
judicial  notice  of,  378. 
(see  Public  Records.) 

RECORDS  AND  APPOINTMENTS  TO  OFFICE: 
best  evidence  of,  55-57. 

REDELIVERY: 

of  conveyance,  effect  of,  401. 

REDIRECT  EXAMINATION : 

explaining  contradictory  statements  on,  486. 

explaining  motives  on,  486. 

new  matter  may  not  be  brought  in,  486. 

must  not  be  suggestive,  487. 

irrelevant  evidence  on  cross-examination,  its  effect  on,  487. 
REFEREES : 

incompetency  of,  as  witnesses,  447. 
REFERENCE : 

admissions  by,  109-111. 

confessions  by,  125. 
REFORMATION : 

evidence  required  in  a  suit  for,  330-332. 

of  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  191. 

REFRESHING  THE  MEMORY: 

as  to  genuineness  of  writing,  199. 

writing  used  for,  not  obtainable  by  subpoena  duces  tecum,  412. 

by  leading  questions,  475. 

by  consulting  memoranda,  477. 

memorandum  for,  is  not  evidence,  477. 

character  of  writing  used  for.  478,  479. 
REFUSAL  TO  ANSWER  QUESTIONS: 

when  it  is  an  admission.  112. 


INDEX.  GG9 

Heferences  are  to  pages. 

REFUSALvTO  TESTIFY: 
when  a  contempt,  468. 
who  may  punish  for,  468. 
before  commissioner,  468. 
before  grand  jury,  468. 
at  an  examination  before  trial,  469. 
in  case  of  impertinent  questions,  469. 
when  court  has  no  jurisdiction,  469. 

REGISTER : 

of  ship,  as  evidence,  216. 

REGISTERS,  PUBLIC: 
proof  of,  208-211. 

REGULARITY : 

of  judicial  records,  presumptions,  353-356. 
presumptions  of,  in  official  business,  341. 

REGULATIONS  OF  DEPARTMENTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  370. 
RELATION  OF  PARTIES: 

may  be  shown  by  parol,  320. 

RELATIONSHIP: 

declarations  of,  as  res  gestce,  76. 
family  reputation  as  evidence  of,  75. 

RELEASES : 

parol  evidence  to  vary,  301. 

RELEVANCY: 

a  judicial  question,  7,  14-16. 

collateral  facts,  how  far  admissible,  17-20. 

evidence  of  intention,  motive,  good  faith,  etc.,  when  relevant,  20-24, 

collateral  facts  bearing  on  character,  24-27. 

of  photographs,  maps  and  diagrams,  59. 

RELEVANT: 

defined,  14. 
RELIABILITY : 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  test,  483. 

RELIGIOUS  BELIEF: 

as  a  sanction  for  dying  declarations,  138,  139. 

of  witness,  451,  452. 
RELIGIOUS  DISCIPLINE: 

communication  in  the  course  of,  258. 
REMAINDERMAN : 

admissions  of,  91. 

judgment,  when  binding  on,  231. 
REMARKS  OF  COUNSEL: 

court  may  in  the  charge  call  attention  to,  31. 


(370  INDEX. 

Inferences  are  to  pages. 
REMOTENESS : 

when  an  objection  to  a  photograph  as  evidence,  60. 
as  bearing  on  relevancy,  17. 

RENT: 

presumptions  from  collection  of,  347. 

RENTAL  VALUE: 

primary  evidence  of,  52. 

REPAIRS: 

opinion  evidence  of,  270. 
REPAIRS  TO  HIGHWAY,  MACHINERY,  ETC.: 

relevancy  of  evidence  of,  19. 
REPLEVIN  TO  RECOVER  WRITING,  53. 

REPLIES : 

of  witness,  must  be  responsive,  476. 

REPRESENTATIVES : 
admissions  of,  100. 

REPUTATION : 

distinguished  from  specific  acts,  26. 
as  primary  evidence  of  marriage,  54. 
defined,  153. 

(see  also  Pedigree.) 

REPUTATION  FOR  TRUTH : 
impeachment  of  — 

by  evidence  of  bad  reputation,  504. 

bad  repute  must  be  recent,  504. 

synonymous  with  character,  505. 
belief  under  oath,  505. 

jury  may  not  rely  on  personal  knowledge  of,  505. 
mode  of  impeaching,  506. 

general  moral  character,  when  admissible,  506,  507. 
of  absent  witness,  may  be  attacked,  419. 
REPUTATION  OF  IMPEACHED  WITNESS: 
relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  514. 
in  case  of  contradictory  evidence,  514. 
when  testimony  of  witness  is  shaken,  514. 
when  contradictory  statements  are  shown,  515. 

RESCISSION : 

of  writing,  may  be  shown  by  parol,  312-314. 

RESEMBLANCE : 

proof  of,  value  by.  294. 

inspection  by  jury  to  determine,  492,  493. 

RES  GESTAE : 

requisites  of,  75.  76. 

must  be  illustrative,  75,  76. 

must  be  contemporaneous.  77,  78. 


INDEX.  f)71 

References  are  to  pages. 

RES  GESTAE  (continued): 
entries  as  res  gestcc,  78-80. 
distinguished  from  dying  declarations,  142. 
declarations  of  partners  as  a  part  of,  92-94. 
declarations  of  conspirators  as  a  part  of,  94-96. 
admissions  of  agents,  when  a  part  of,  103,  104. 

declarations  forming  a  part  of  and  declarations  against  interest  distin- 
guished, 163. 

RESIDENCE  (see  Domicile). 

RESISTANCE  TO  ARREST: 
as  a  confession,  124. 

RESOLUTIONS : 

of  corporations,  not  judicially  noticed,  375,  376. 
admissible  to  explain  corporative  intention,  76. 
primary  evidence  of,  55. 
of  municipal  corporations  (see  Municipal  Ordinances). 

RESPONDENT: 

in  equity,  his  answer  as  evidence,  430. 
RESPONSIVENESS : 

of  answers  on  the  direct  examination,  476. 
RESTRAINT : 

attendance  of  witness  under,  423. 
RESULT : 

of  experiments  out  of  court,  296. 
RESULTING  TRUST: 

parol  evidence  to  establish,  312. 

not  under  the  statute  of  frauds,  400. 
RETIREMENT  FROM  PRACTICE: 

does  not  disqualify  an  expert,  273. 
RETURN  OF  SEASONS : 

judicial  notice  of,  366. 
RETURNS  ON  WRITS: 

defined,  227. 

requisites  of,  227. 

irregularities  in,  228. 

signature  to,  228. 

parol  evidence  to  explain,  228. 

invalidity  of,  228. 

filing,  228. 

amendment  of,  228. 

conclusiveness  of,  229. 

evidence  of,  227-229. 
REVIEWING  THE  EVIDENCE: 

on  appeal,  557-561. 


672 


INDEX. 


References  are  to  pages. 

RIGHT  TO  OPEN  AND  CLOSE: 

when  plaintiff  may  open  and  close,  390,  391. 

when  defendant  may  open  and  close,  392,  393. 

light  to  open  and  close  in  special  proceedings,  393,  394 

right,  when  discretionary,  394,  393. 

RISK,  INCREASE  OF: 

evidence  to  show,  2ZL 
RIVERS: 

judicial  notice  of,  369. 

ROBBING  THE  MAILS: 

evidence  of,  obtained  by  decoy  letters,  177. 

ROLLING  STOCK : 

evidence  to  show  condition  of,  288. 

ROUTINE : 

evidence  of,  to  refresh  memory,  475. 

RULINGS : 

of  court,  when  presumed  corrected,  354 
on  evidence,  form  and  character  of,  472. 

s. 

SAFETY  OF  DECK  LOAD,  289. 

SAILORS : 

as  expert  witnesses,  289. 

SALES  OF  LAND: 

as  evidence  of  value,  17. 
SANITY : 

relevancy  of  declarations  to  show,  67. 

presumptions  of,  350-353. 

essential  to  crime,  385. 
(see  Insanity.) 
SATISFACTION: 

of  legacies,  parol  evidence  to  rebut,  315. 
SCANDALOUS  LANGUAGE: 

in  affidavit,  effect  of,  529. 

SCIENTIFIC  BOOKS: 

use  of  in  cross-examining  experts,  275. 

as  evidence,  217,  218. 
SCIENTIFIC  FACTS: 

judicial  notice  of,  371,  372. 

SCREAMS  AND  GROANS: 
evidence  of,  70, 


INDEX.  C73 

References  are  to  pages. 


SEAL: 

of  corporation,  when  its  signature,  185. 

to  acknowledgment,  190. 

use  of,  at  common  law,  300. 

presumption  of  consideration  from  use  of,  305. 

judicial  notice  of,  370,  373,  378,  379. 

necessity  for,  on  surrender  of  lease,  401. 

necessity  for,  in  creating  an  agency,  403. 

when  required  on  jurat,  528. 

returning  depositions  under,  032. 

SEALED  INSTRUMENTS: 

must  be  proved  as  alleged,  41. 
power  of  partner  to  sign,  93. 
agent's  admission  in,  103. 

SEAMEN: 

as  expert  witnesses,  289. 

SEARCH : 

for  subscribing  witnesses,  194. 

for  witness,  when  a  continuance  is  asked,  410. 

SEASONS : 

judicial  notice  of,  3G6. 

SEAWORTHINESS: 
evidence  of,  289. 

SECONDARY  EVIDENCE,  47-62. 

to  prove  contents  of  writiug,  175-177. 

SECONDARY  AND  HEARSAY  EVIDENCE: 
distinguished,  65. 

SECOND-HAND  FURNITURE : 

evidence  to  show  value,  293. 
SECRECY : 

confessions  made  under  promises  of,  130. 
SECRET  CRIMES: 

circumstantial  evidence  in  cases  of,  6,  9. 
SECRET  PROCESS: 

protected  by  court,  412. 

SECURITIES: 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  293,  294. 
SEDUCTION : 

proof  of  chastity  of  the  plaintiff  in,  361. 

SELF-SERVING  DECLARATIONS  : 
when  hearsay,  111. 

made  in  presence  of  adverse  party,  112. 
understanding  of,  by  adverse  party,  112. 


674:  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

SELF-SERVING  DECLARATIONS  (continued): 
silence  of  adversary,  112. 
consisting  of  scurrilous  remarks.  113. 
when  competent  as  admissions,  113. 
as  hearsay,  63. 

SEPARATE  ESTATE  OF  WIFE: 

when  bound  by  husband's  admissions,  97. 

SEPARATE  ORAL  AGREEMENTS: 

may  be  shown  by  parol,  310. 

SEPARATE  TRIAL: 

when  rendering  accomplice  competent.  434. 

SEPARATING  WITNESSES  AT  THE  TRIAL: 
when  ordered,  466. 
disobedience  to  order,  467. 
exclusion  of  evidence,  467. 
exceptions  to  order,  468. 

SERVICE  BY  PUBLICATION,  229. 

SERVICE  OF  PARTY: 
when  presumed,  354. 

SERVICE  OF  SUBPCENA  (see  Subpceka  :  also  Duces  Tecum). 

SERVICES : 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  291.  292. 

SETTING  ASIDE  THE  VERDICT: 
on  appeal,  31,  557-561. 

SETTLEMENT: 

offers  of,  as  admissions,  106,  107. 

collateral  facts  involved  in  offers  of,  106. 
SEX: 

as  an  element  in  survivorship,  357,  358. 

medical  testimon)'  to  show,  281. 

SEXUAL  CRIMES: 

evidence  of  physicians  in  prosecution  for,  284. 

SEWERS : 

evidence  to  show  defect  in,  291. 

SHAM  PLEA  : 

does  not  give  right  to  open  and  close,  392, 
SHERIFF : 

judicial  notice  of,  379. 
SHIP: 

evidence  to  show  management  of,  289. 
SHIPS  REGISTER: 

as  evidence,  216. 


INDEX.  G75 

References  are  to  pages. 
SHIPWRECK: 

of  ship,  as  bearing  on  presumption  of  death.  357. 

SHOE  TRACKS  (see  Footprints). 

SHOP  BOOKS: 

as  evidence,  81-86. 

SHORTNESS  OF  MANNER: 
evidence  of,  269. 

SICKNESS  (see  Health;  Disease;  Insanity,  etc.). 

SICK  PERSONS: 

admissibility  of  their  declarations  of  present  pain,  69. 

SIGNAL  OR  GESTURE: 

evidence  to  show  meaning  of,  268. 

SIGNATURE : 

of  accused  to  written  statements  on  preliminary  examination,  131. 

by  mark,  185,  186. 

testimony  of  expert,  204. 

identity  of,  205. 

to  acknowledgment,  190. 

testimony  to  genuineness  of,  195,  196. 

proof  of,  by  comparison.  200-204. 

to  returns  on  writs,  228. 

judicial  notice  of,  373. 

of  testator  to  will,  what  constitutes,  405. 

not  indispensable  in  an  affidavit,  528. 

to  jurat  in  an  affidavit,  528. 

SIGNATURE  OF  PARTNERSHIP: 

proof  of,  by  admissions,  92. 
SIGNS: 

deaf  mute  testimony  by,  453. 

dying  declarations  by,  145,  146. 
SILENCE : 

of  writing  as  to  consideration,  306. 
SILENCE  OF  ACCUSED: 

as  a  confession,  124,  125. 

of  a  conspirator  not  a  confession,  136. 

(see  Failure  of  Accused  to  Testify.) 
SILENCE  OF  PARTY : 

as  creating  an  estoppel,  112,  113,  119,  120. 
SILENCE  OF  WITNESS: 

when  suspicious,  512. 

may  be  explained,  512. 

SIMILAR  CRIMES  OR  ACTS: 
relevancy  of,  21,  22. 


G70  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

SIMULATION  OF  DISEASE: 
evidence  to  show,  280. 
physical  examination  to  expose,  297. 

SIMULATION  OF  INSANITY: 
may  be  shown,  498. 

SIMULATION  OF  WRITING  (see  Handwriting). 

SINGLE  WITNESS: 

may  prove  usage,  317. 
or  perjury,  562,  563. 

SISTER  STATES : 

judgments  of,  222-225,  241. 

SITUATION  (see  Maps;  Photographs;  Condition,  etc.). 

SIZE: 

opinion  evidence  to  show,  267. 

SKELETON : 

opinion  as  to  sex  founded  on  examination  of,  280. 

SKETCHES : 

in  pencil,  their  use  as  evidence,  60. 

SKILL: 

of  expert,  evidence  of  by  other  witness,  274. 

SLANDER: 

evidence  of  character  in  action  for,  25. 
right  to  open  and  close  in  action  of,  391. 

SLATE: 

memoranda  on,  85. 

SMOKE : 

damage  by,  271, 

SOBRIETY : 

evidence  to  show,  269. 

SON  ASSAULT  DEMESNE: 

right  to  open  and  close  on  plea  of,  391. 

SPARK  ARRESTER: 

use  of,  295. 
SPECIAL  PROCEEDING: 

burden  of  proof,  383,  384. 

right  to  open  and  close  in,  393,  394 
SPECIFIC  PERFORMANCE : 

parol  evidence  in  suits  for,  331. 
SPECULATIVE  VALUE: 

of  securities,  293. 


INDEX.  67T 

References  are  to  pages. 


SPEED : 

non-expert  evidence  to  show,  267. 
shown  by  combination  of  witnesses,  270. 
expert  evidence  to  show,  288. 

SPLITTING  CAUSES  OF  ACTION,  234. 

SPOLIATION  OF  INSTRUMENTS; 
defined,  178. 

(see  Alterations.) 

SPONTANEOUS  CHARACTER: 
of  res  gestce,  77,  78. 
of  confessions,  129-131.  ■ 

STAINS: 

of  blood,  evidence  of  their  character,  61,  281. 
STAMP: 

on  deed,  presumption  of,  348. 

STANDARDS  OF  COMPARISON: 

of  handwriting,  202. 

irrelevant  writings  as,  201-204. 
STANDING  TIMBER  (see  Growing  Timber). 

STATE  COMMONWEALTH : 

statute  of  limitation  does  not  run  against,  339. 

STATE  COURTS: 

proof  of  judgments  of,  222-225,  241. 

STATE  LAWS: 

judicial  notice  of,  377. 
STATEMENTS  TO  BE  PROVED  AS  FACTS,  66-68. 

STATISTICS : 

registry  of,  as  evidence,  210. 
STATUTE : 

usage  admissible  to  explain,  317. 

STATUTE  OF  AMENDMENTS: 

in  cases  of  variance,  45,  46. 
STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS: 

writings  required  by,  49,  50. 

omission  in  writings  required  by,  307. 

oral  extension  of  contract  may  be  shown,  313. 

does  not  exclude  parol  evidence  to  reform  deed,  330. 

origin  and  nature  of,  396. 

agreements  relating  to  interests  in  land,  397,  398. 

partition  of  real  property,  398,  399. 

trusts  in  real  and  personal  estate,  399,  400. 

surrender  or  assignment  of  leases,  401. 

contracts  required  to  be  in  writing,  402. 

articles  of  partnership,  402,  403. 


678  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

STATUTE  OF  FRAUDS  (continued): 

form  and  character  of  the  writing,  403,  404. 
wills  required  to  be  evidenced  in  writing.  404-406. 

agreements  not  within  the  statute  of  frauds  which  must  be  evidenced 
by  writings.  406. 

STATUTE  OF  LIMITATION,  338-340. 

evidence  to  remove  the  bar  of.  87,  93,  94. 
as  a  defense,  right  to  open  and  close,  393. 

STATUTORY  FEES: 

of  witness  (see  MILEAGE). 

STATUTORY  LAW: 

judicial  notice  of  the,  372-374 
proof  of.  208. 
foreign,  proof  of,  211-213. 
presumptions  of,  348. 

STENOGRAPHER'S  NOTES: 

admissibility  to  show  testimony  of  an  absent  witness,  171,  172. 

use  of,  to  refresh  memory,  479. 

employment  of,  to  ascertain  knowledge  of  witness,  479. 

STERILITY : 

physical  examination,  when  alleged,  297. 

STIPULATIONS  ON  THE  EVIDENCE : 

of  attorney,  when  biuding  on  a  client,  104. 
as  to  admission  of  notes  of  evidence,  173. 
to  evidence,  change  of  venue  avoided  by,  416. 
continuance  may  be  avoided  by,  416. 
defined,  547. 

when  a  part  of  the  record,  547. 
when  in  estoppel,  547. 
liberal  and  strict  construction  of,  548. 
parol  to  explain,  548. 

does  not  waive  rights  to  call  witness,  548. 
substantial  compliance  required,  548. 
when  it  may  be  disregarded,  549. 
fraud  in  procurement  of,  549. 
STOCKHOLDER :  ' 

right  of,  to  inspection  of  corporation's  books,  207. 
admissions  of,  91,  92. 

STOLEN   GOODS: 

presumption  from  the  possession  of,  342. 

STORM : 

effects  of  on  ship,  289. 
STRANDING : 

of  vessel,  289. 


INDEX.  .  679 

References  are  to  pages. 

STRANGERS'  DECLARATIONS  AGAINST  INTEREST: 

declarations  of  third  persons  and  other  declarations  distinguished,  102, 

163. 
must  be  against  interest,  16:5.  164 
interest  of  the  declarant,  164,  165. 
death  of  the  declarant,  165. 
knowledge  of  the  declarant,  165. 

statements  of  predecessor  against  interest,  when  evidence  in  behalf  of 
successor,  166. 

STRANGERS  TO  RECORD: 

confessions  by,  135. 
admissions  by,  99,  100. 
spoliation  of  writings  by,  178. 
not  bound  by  the  judgment.  230. 

not  bound  by  rule  excluding  parol  evidence  to  vary  writing,  304. 
delivery  of  deed  to,  345. 
may  have  deed  declared  a  mortgage,  331. 
STREET: 

oral  agreement  to  grade,  311. 

STRICT  CONSTRUCTION  OF  WRITINGS: 
defined,  302. 

STRIKING  OUT  EVIDENCE: 

irresponsive  answers,  476. 
effect  of,  476. 
motions  for,  542. 
failure  to  move  for,  542. 
motion,  waiver  of,  543. 
because  of  insufficiency,  543. 
irresponsiveness,  543. 
irrelevancy,  543. 
STUDY : 

expert  qualified  by,  264,  265. 

SUBDIVISIONS  OF  TIME: 
judicial  notice  of,  365. 

SUBJECT-MATTER: 

of  writing,  evidence  to  explain,  320-322,  325,  326. 

SUBMISSION  TO  ARBITRATION: 
facts  under,  testimony  to  show,  447. 

SUBMISSION  OF  EVIDENCE: 
to  the  jury,  30-32. 

SUBMITTING  TO  JURY: 

prima  facie  case  in  criminal  trials.  384. 
SUMMONS : 

witness  privileged  from  service  of  a,  420. 


680  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

SUBPCENA  (see  Duces  Tecum;  Subpoena): 
defined,  407. 
fees,  408. 

traveling  expenses,  408. 
duces  tecum,  411,  412. 
in  criminal  cases,  410. 
when  unnecessary,  411. 
time  of  service,  413. 
mode  of  service,  413. 
allowance  of  time  to  witness,  413. 
notice  to  witness,  413. 
penalty  for  disobeying,  413. 
primary  evidence  of  service,  414. 
parol  to  show  non-attendance,  414. 
disobedience  to  attachment  in  case  of,  419,  420. 
power  of  the  legislature  to  issue,  423. 

SUBPCENA  DUCES  TECUM: 

to  obtain  production  of  telegrams,  2G3. 

SUBSCRIBING  WITNESS: 
death  of,  194. 

may  testify  to  testator's  mental  state,  288. 
defined,  193. 
proof  by,  192-194. 
signature  of,  by  mark,  185. 
impeachment  of,  by  party  calling.  502. 
not  by  showing  bad  characteV,  503. 

SUBSTANCE  OF  THE  ISSUE: 

matter  of  essential  description,  36,  37. 

value,  quantity,  time,  place,  etc.,  39. 

formal  allegations,  38,  39. 

proof  of  contracts,  40,  41. 

variance,  41,  45,  46. 

in  criminal  trials,  43,  46. 
SUFFICIENCY  OF  EVIDENCE: 

required  to  convert  an  absolute  deed  into  a  mortgage,  330. 

to  go  to  the  jury,  27. 

when  presumed,  355. 

SUFFERINGS: 

declarations  of,  69. 

SUICIDE : 

presumption  of  death  by,  from  absence,  357. 

SUMMARY  OF  FACTS  OBSERVED: 

given  by  witness  who  is  not  an  expert,  268. 

SUN-RISE : 

judicial  notice  of,  371. 


INDEX.  681 

References  are  to  pages. 


SUPERSCRIPTION: 
of  deposition,  532. 

SUPPLEMENTAL  AFFIDAVITS: 

defined,  their  utility.  526. 

SUPPLEMENTARY  OATH : 
of  defendant,  430. 

SUPPLEMENTARY  PROCEEDINGS: 
best  evidence  of,  51. 

SUPPLYING  OMISSIONS: 
in  writings,  307,  308. 

SUPPRESSION : 

of  material  facts,  burden  of  proof,  388. 
SUPPRESSING  DEPOSITIONS,  533,  534. 

SUPPRESSION  OF  EVIDENCE: 
by  police  officials,  125. 
presumptions  from,  343,  344. 

SURETY : 

not  bound  by  rule  excluding  parol  evidence,  304. 

when  bound  by  admission  of  principal.  99,  100. 

to  secure  the  attendance  of  a  witness,  414. 
SURGEONS  DIARY: 

entry  in,  as  evidence,  80,  82. 
SURPLUSAGE : 

in  indictments  defined,  37,  44,  45. 
SURPRISE : 

defined,  550. 

remedy  of  party  in  case  of,  550. 

negligence  will  not  justify  the  claim  of,  551. 

SURRENDER: 

of  lease,  must  be  in  writing,  401. 
parol,  at  common  law,  401. 

SURROGATES'  COURTS: 

proof  of  records  of,  226,  227. 
right  to  open  and  close  in,  393. 

SURROUNDING  CIRCUMSTANCES: 

as  res  gestae,  74  et  seq. 

parol  evidence  of  (see  Parol  Evidence). 

SURVEYOR: 

evidence  of  to  show  monuments,  57. 
declarations  of,  when  admissible,  160. 
as  expert  witnesses,  291. 

SURVEYS: 

as  evidence,  80. 


<!S2  INDEX. 

Heference3  are  to  pages. 

SURVIVING  PARTY: 

wlien  incompetent  as  a  witness,  43'$.  437. 
(see  also  Personal  Transaction.) 

SURVIVORSHIP: 

presumption  of,  358,  359. 

SUSPICION  OF  GUILT: 

diverted  by  false  confession,  125. 

SWEARING  THE  WITNESS  (see  Oath)l 

SYMBOLS: 

parol  evidence  to  explain,  324. 

SYMPTOMS : 

evidence  of  non-expert  showing,  283. 

T. 

TABLES: 

showing  expectation  of  life,  218. 

TAKING  THE  VIEW: 
discretionary,  400,  491. 
consent  of  parties  to.  490. 
in  jury  trial  in  equity,  491. 
when  ordered  suasponte,  491. 
necessity  must  be  shown,  491. 
presence  of  judge,  491. 

knowledge  thus  acquired  is  not  evidence,  491. 
presence  of  accused  at,  491. 
oral  evidence  inadmissible  while  taking,  492. 
in  proceeding  to  condemn  land,  492. 
after  summing  up,  492. 
privately  by  jury,  not  allowed,  488. 

TALKATIVE  WITNESS: 

may  be  checked  by  court,  472. 

TAMPERING  WITH  WITNESS: 
attempt  at  may  be  shown,  498. 
bias  caused  by,  525. 

TAX  SALES: 

presumption  of  regularity,  341. 
TEACHERS  OF  WRITING: 

as  witnesses  to  handwriting,  203. 
TECHNICAL  DEFECTS: 

in  affidavits,  may  be  amended.  528. 
TECHNICAL  TERMS: 

parol  lauguage  to  explain,  318. 


INDEX.  0^5 

References  are  to  pages. 
TELEGRAMS: 

primary  evidence  of,  52,  53. 
contents  of,  may  be  proved  orally,  53. 
not  privileged,  263,  263. 
presumption  of  delivery,  348. 

TELEPHONE : 

admissions  by,  89,  122,  12a 
judicial  notice  of,  365. 
agency  of  operator,  123. 
recognition  of  speaker,  122. 

TENANT: 

admissions  of,  89. 
TENANTS  IN  COMMON: 

admissions  of,  91. 

parol  partition  among,  398,  399. 
TENDER: 

primary  evidence  of,  54. 
TERMS : 

of  science,  evidence  to  explain,  318. 

TERMS  OF  COURT: 

judicial  notice  of,  378,  379. 

"  TERMS,  TWO  MONTHS :  " 

evidence  to  explain,  318. 
TEST : 

to  determine  burden  of  proof,  383. 

TESTAMENTARY  CAPACITY : 
burden  of  proof,  384. 

TESTAMENTARY  DISPOSITION  (see  WiLLS)t 

TESTATOR : 

judgment  against,  binds  devisee,  231. 

admissions  by,  bind  devisee,  89,  190. 

mental  capacity  of,  285-288. 

declarations  sbowing  capacity.  322. 

when  declarations  are  admissible,  325. 

what  constitutes  his  signature,  405. 

statutory  incompetency  of  interested  persons  as  witnesses  against,  432. 

TESTING  HANDWRITING  (see  Handwriting). 

TEXT-BOOKS : 

as  evidence  of  foreign  law,  212. 

THIRD  PARTIES: 

declarations  of,  against  interest.  162-166. 

(see  also  Strangers'  Declarations.) 
entries  made  by,  78. 
confessions  of  guilt  by.  135. 


0S4  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
THREATS: 

when  relevant  in  a  trial  for  homicide,  27. 

evidence  to  show,  G9. 

when  rendering  silence  inadmissible  as  a  confession,  125  123. 

persons  who  make,  135,  136. 
TICKET : 

when  a  writing,  174. 

TIMBER  (see  Growing  Timber). 

TIME  (see  also  Date)  : 

allegation  and  proof  of,  39. 

proof  of  in  indictments,  43. 

of  alterations,  181,  182. 

required  to  stop  train,  288. 

as  affecting  relevancy,  17-20. 

of  res  gestae,  77,  78. 

required  to  repair  house,  290. 

opinion  evidence  to  show  time  of  an  event,  267. 

as  an  element  in  experiments  in  court,  296. 

presumption  from  lapse  of,  336-341. 

in  proving  alibi,  385. 

of  making  contradictory  statements,  503. 
TIME  ROOKS: 

their  use  as  evidence,  85,  86. 

TOMBSTONES : 

inscriptions  on,  as  pedigree,  73. 
TORTURE : 

as  a  means  of  procuring  evidence,  2. 
TOWNS : 

admissions  of  inhabitants  of,  99. 

judicial  notice  of,  368,  369. 
TRACES  OF  AN  ABORTION: 

physician's  evidence  to  show,  285. 
TRADE : 

opinion  evidence  to,  288-291. 

TRADE  TERMS  (see  Technical  Terms). 

TRADITIONARY  EVIDENCE: 
■defined,  71-74. 

(see  also  Pedigree  :  General  Reputation.) 
TRAINS : 

their  management,  speed,  etc.,  288. 

TRANSPORTATION : 

opinion  evidence,  288-291. 
TRAVERSE  JURORS: 

confidential  communications,  258. 


INDEX.  685 

References  are  to  pages. 
TREASON: 

confessions  of,  136. 

number  of  witnesses  in  trials  for,  563,  564. 

TREATIES : 

judicial  notice  of,  377,  373. 
TREATISES : 

use  of,  in  examining  expert,  275. 

TREES,  MARKS  BLAZED  ON : 
primary  evidence  of,  57. 

TRESPASS: 

evidence  to  show  manner,  270. 

TRIALS  (see  Burden  of  Proof;  Right  to  Open  and  Close).1] 

TROVER : 

formal  allegations  in,  38. 

TRUSTS : 

under  the  statute  of  frauds,  399.  400. 

parol  evidence  to  establish,  312. 
TRUSTEE : 

admissions  of,  binding  on  beneficiary.  91,  100,  102. 

judgment  against,  when  binding  on  beneficiary,  232. 
TRUTH : 

of  libel,  burden  of  proof,  390. 

TRUTHFULNESS : 

of  witness,  cross-examination  to  ascertain,  484 
presumption  of,  6. 

TRUTH  OF  WRITING  : 
opinion  evidence  of,  267. 

u. 

ULTRA  VIRES: 

burden  of  proving,  389. 

UNCHASTITY : 

proof  of,  to  impeach,  507. 

UNDERSTANDING : 

witness  may  be  asked  his,  473. 

UNDERWRITERS : 

as  expert  witnesses,  294,  295. 

admissions  of,  91. 
UNDUE  INFLUENCE: 

in  procuring  execution  of  will,  parol  evidence  to  show,  328. 

admissibility  of  declarations  to  show,  68. 
UNIFORMITY : 

necessity  for,  in  usage,  316,  317. 


680  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 

UNIMPORTANT  FACTS: 
questioping  on,  475. 

UNINTENTIONAL  OMISSIONS: 
may  be  shown,  30S. 

UNLIQUIDATED  DAMAGES: 

right  to  open  and  close  in  cases  of,  890-392. 

UNRECORDED  DEED: 
when  valid,  188. 
effect  of  redelivery  of,  401. 

UNSWORN  ANSWER: 

in  equity,  its  effect,  431. 
UNVEILING : 

of  party  or  witness  in  court,  298. 

UN  WHOLESOMENESS : 
of  food,  evidence  of,  284. 

UNWILLINGNESS: 

to  believe  witness  under  oath,  505,  506. 
USAGE : 

definition  of,  316. 

presumed  to  be  known  to  parties,  316. 

evidence  to  show,  316,  317. 

usage  must  be  general,  317. 

evidence  of,  inadmissible.  317. 

of  insurance  compan}*,  evidence  of,  295. 

when  judicially  noticed,  373. 

of  foreign  country,  must  be  proved,  212. 

USE  OF  SCIENTIFIC  BOOKS: 

to  test  expert,  275. 
USURY: 

burden  of  proof  of,  389. 

right  to  open  and  close  where  defense  is,  392. 

V. 

VALIDITY: 

of  will,  right  to  open  and  close  in  issue  of,  393. 

burden  of  proof,  384. 
VALUE: 

allegation  of  and  proof,  39. 

of  expert  testimony.  276. 

judicial  notice  of,  366. 

of  machinery,  290. 

of  house,  290. 

refusal  to  produce,  creates  presumption  of,  344 


INDEX.  087 


References  are  to  pages. 


VALUE,  EVIDENCE  OF: 
of  services,  291. 
of  animals,  292. 
of  merchandise,  291. 
of  land,  292. 

qualification  of  witness  to,  292. 
future  value,  293. 
value  of  securities,  294. 

VALUE  OF  LAND: 

relevancy  of  evidence  to  show,  17. 

VARIANCE: 

defined,  41,  45,  46. 

VELOCITY  (see  Speed). 

VENUE: 

change  of,  for  convenience  of  witnesses,  415,  416. 
of  certificate  of  acknowledgment,  189. 

VENUE  IN  AFFIDAVITS: 

should  appear,  527. 

absence  may  invalidate,  528. 

VERACITY : 

of  witnesses  (see  Impeachment). 

VERBAL  ADMISSIONS: 
when  inadmissible,  116. 
when  estoppels,  120. 

VERBAL  AND  WRITTEN  DECLARATIONS: 

distinguished,  78. 

VERDICT : 

setting  aside,  31. 

proof  by  copy,  220. 

when  one  may  be  directed,  28. 
VERIFICATION: 

of  answer  in  equity,  its  effect.  431. 

of  dying  declaration  under  oath,  146. 

VERIFICATION  OF  PLEADINGS: 

effect  of,  107,  108. 
VERTEBRA : 

exhibition  of,  to  jury  to  explain  evidence,  6L 
VESSEL: 

register  of,  as  evidence,  216. 

proof  of  seaworthiness  of,  289. 

proof  of  management  of,  289. 
VESTED  RIGHT: 

to  witness  fees,  411. 


G8S  INDEX. 

References  are  to  pages. 
VICAR : 

his  books  as  evidence  for  his  successor,  1G6. 

VIEW  (see  Taking  the  View). 

VITAL  STATISTICS: 

registers  of,  as  evidence,  210. 
VIDELICET : 

defined,  38,  39. 

VOICE : 

as  showing  identity  of  speaker  at  telephone,  122. 

VOLUMINOUS  WRITINGS: 
primary  evidence  of,  57. 

VOLUNTARY  CHARACTER: 

confessions  must  possess,  126,  127. 

VOLUNTARY  EXHIBITION  (see  Exhibition). 

VOTING : 

as  evidence  of  naturalization.  50. 

w. 

WAIVER: 

of  privilege  of  communications  — 

to  attorney,  252,  253. 

to  husband  or  wife,  247-249. 

to  physician.  259,  260. 
of  fees  by  the  witness,  408. 
of  privilege  from  arrest  by  witness.  421. 
by  personal  representative,  to  exclude  interested  witness,  436,  437. 

(see  also  Personal  Transactions.) 
of  privilege  from  incriminating  questions,  521.  522. 
of  constitutional  privileges  by  the  accused,  497. 
of  objections  to  depositions,  533. 

of  objections  to  the  reception  or  rejection  of  evidence,  539. 
of  exceptions,  541,  542. 

WALLS : 

dryness  of,  290. 

WANT  OF  CONSIDERATION: 

as  a  defense,  right  to  open  and  close,  392. 
burden  of  proof,  383. 

WAR : 

judicial  notice  of,  367. 

WARNING  WITNESSES: 
by  the  court,  472. 

WAVES : 

size  of,  289. 


INDEX.  689 

References  are  to  pages. 
WEAPON : 

allegation  of,  in  homicide.  38,  44. 
use  of,  to  explain  the  evidence,  60. 
causing  injuries,  279. 
presumption  from  use  of,  301,  362. 
in  the  jury-room,  490. 

WEARING  APPAREL: 

evidence  to  show  value  of,  292. 
blood-stains  on,  61. 

WEATHER: 

opinion  evidence  of,  270. 

WEIGHT: 

of  extra-judicial  confessions,  134,  135. 
of  expert  evidence,  276. 
of  admissions,  114,  116. 

WEIGHT  OF  EVIDENCE: 

distinguished  from  burden  of  proof,  382-384 

WEIGHTS  AND  MEASURES: 

judicial  notice  of  character  of,  366. 

WHOLESOMENESS: 

of  food  and  drink,  284 

WIDOW: 

when  an  interested  witness,  443. 

WIFE : 

when  bound  by  her  husband's  admissions,  97,  98. 

confidential  communications  to,  247-253. 

as  a  witness  to  non-access  or  intoxication  of  her  husband,  249. 

WILFUL  PERJURY : 

presumptions  from,  513. 

WILLS: 

when  ancient,  need  not  be  proved,  148. 
presumptions  as  to  alterations  in,  182. 
when  admissible  as  evidence,  226,  227. 
declarations  inadmissible  to  vary,  68, 
writings  incorporated  in,  by  reference,  309. 
parol  evidence  to  explain,  322,  325-329. 
required  to  be  in  writing,  404. 
attestation  of,  404. 
of  personal  property,  404. 
place  of  signature  of,  405. 

"WITHOUT  RECOURSE:" 

indoisers,  their  competency  as  witnesses,  445,  446. 
44 


C90  INDEX. 

Heferences  are  to  pages. 
WITNESSES: 
who  are,  411. 

distinguished  from  affiant  and  deponent,  411. 
examination  of,  at  preliminary  examination,  131. 

admissibility  of  their  testimony  when  subsequently  absent  or  disquali- 
fied, 167-173. 
husband  and  wife  as,  244-249. 
attorneys  as,  249-255. 
police  officials  as,  255. 
officials  as,  256. 
jurors  as,  257,  258. 
clergymen  as,  258,  259. 
physicians  as,  259,  260. 

WITHDRAWAL  OF  WITNESSES  (see  Separating  Witnesses). 

WORDS : 

meaning  of,  will  be  noticed,  365. 

WORK  AND  SERVICES: 
value  of,  291. 

WOUNDS : 

opinions  as  to  nature,  cause  and  effect,  278. 

WRITING: 

hypothetical  questions  may  be  put  in,  274. 
defined,  174,  185. 

(see  also  Handwriting.) 

WRITINGS: 

variance  in  proof  of,  40,  41. 

when  ancient,  148-152. 

as  evidence  of  general  reputation,  160,  161. 

use  of,  to  refresh  memory,  199. 

testing  with  chemicals  in  court,  296. 

person  signing,  is  presumed  to  have  read  them,  361. 

obtained  by  subpoena  duces  tecum,  411,  412. 

when  not  evidence,  are  excluded  from  jury,  489,  490. 

(see  Parol  Evidence  as  Related  to  ;  Memoranda  to  Refresh 
Memory.) 
WRITINGS  OUT  OF  JURISDICTION: 

best  evidence  of,  51. 
WRITING  TEACHERS: 

as  witnesses  to  handwriting,  203. 

WRIT  OF  ERROR: 

defined  and  distinguished  from  appeal,  557. 
purpose  of,  557. 
does  not  review  facts,  557. 
may  be  brought  for  a  notorious  mistake,  557. 
as  employed  in  America,  558. 
(see  also  Appeals.) 


INDEX.  691 

References  are  to  pages. 

WRITS  (see  Returns  on.) 

WRITTEN  CONFESSIONS : 

on  the  preliminary  examination,  131-134 

should  be  signed  by  the  accused,  132. 

parol  evidence  inadmissible,  133. 

presumption  of  regularity,  133. 

do  not  render  distinct  parol  confessions  inadmissible,  133. 

WRITTEN  EVIDENCE  (see  Public  Records  and  Statute  of  Frauds). 

WRITTEN  INSTRUMENTS: 
best  evidence  of,  49-57. 


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